CHAPTER - III
CHAPTER III

METAPHYSICS - I

It is often held that it is not possible to construct a whole metaphysical system. The philosophical endeavour is endless, as philosophical truth is infinite. And thereby it cannot be realized fully. They hold that the truth can be aimed at, but it cannot be reached. Malkani strongly opposes this view. He is of the opinion that though philosophic truth is unlike other truths, yet it is attainable. It has a direct bearing upon man's spiritual well-being and it is the ultimate destiny of life. Hence to know this truth human endeavour is significant. Metaphysics aims at realizing the Ultimate Reality. This reality is the ground of all things. The Ultimate ground cannot be known by the sense-experience which is the source of knowledge of all empirical sciences.

The concept of reality in Malkani's view is different from those of the western philosophers. The western philosophers maintain that reality implies those things which are thinkable. Hence in this sense universals, relations, propositions etc. are regarded as reals. There are some European thinkers who try to give some criterion to designate reality. And the criterion of reality differs among the philosophers themselves. Because these criterion are subjective. Hence there is no common criterion of the reality. But the term reality must signify a common something. Reality must be a thing-in-itself. Hence it must be infected by the subjectivity of knowledge.

Some thinkers again maintain that the 'real' must be in time i.e., that which is real must be temporal. Only that which is in time can exist. And in that sense events
which occur in time are real. Malkani points out that an event is infinitely divisible and indicates that there must be some substance behind these events. As the events are always changing hence there must be something unchanging and static. "The limit can only be reached in what is called an instantaneous event or a point event which cannot be further subdivided.............. There is no change or movement within it. It is what we understand by substance. We thus find that if we know anything, we know substance only. Reality is in this sense essentially substantial." Thus it appears that reality is not in time. It is not related to time. Because what is in time is born and hence it has to be brought into being. Reality or substance is never born or does never die. Hence it is not brought into being. What is in time is only an appearance. An appearance does not exist at any time past, present and future. It comes out of nothing. An appearance is born whereas reality is never born. "All things born are mere appearance in the words of scripture, being born is a sign of illusoriness .......Reality, on the other hand, must be out of time or existent in all the three times (trīkālābādhita)" In other words "truth of philosophy has a timeless character". So, according to Malkani the notion of reality cannot be defined because it is simple and unanalysable. And it has no parts. Reality is beyond thought.

BRAHMAN: THE ULTIMATE REALITY

According to the Advaita Vedāntins the significance of all the Upaniṣads lie in the acceptance of non-dual Brahman as the only reality. Śaṅkara maintains that Brahman the Ultimate Reality is without any quality (Nirguṇa) and without any difference, whose essence is sat (existence), cit (knowledge) and ānanda (bliss). This Ultimate Reality is identical with spirit or self (atman). The material world has
no reality; it is false. Malkani does not differ from this central theory of Advaita Vedānta. Rather he has tried to show how the Absolute truth offered by Advaita Vedānta can provide us with the highest form of spiritual satisfaction so far as Truth is concerned.

Malkani, literally accepts Śaṅkara’s ideas when he says that Brahman is the only reality who is sat, cit, ananta and ānanda. The explanations given by Malkani of these terms i.e., sat etc., also proceeds in the line of Śaṅkara. Thus he says that Brahman is sat, i.e., the Pure Being which underlies the reality of all things; everything has sattā or being. Being is thus the universal locus and nothing can be greater than it. Hence, Malkani maintains that, “Brahman is fundamentally indicated by sat.” But this does not mean that things of the world are Brahman; rather it implies that Brahman alone ‘is, not the things, “There is no plurality in Brahman”.

Malkani maintains that the Ultimate Reality is different from all other realities. A thing which is real in itself is the Ultimate Reality. Ultimate Reality is not relative to anything and. It does not exist in another for Its existence. The world, which is the collection of all things is not Ultimately Real. Because it depends on another for its existence. World is dependent on time, space and causality. All things of the world are found in some time, some space and above all is causally connected with others. Hence Malkani argues that though the world is perceived by us, it appears as real, yet it is not real in the ultimate sense of the term. Hence there is the need of a Metaphysical reality, which is beyond time, space and causality.

It may be argued that how can we know this reality. According to Malkani, this metaphysical reality cannot be known by reason. Knowledge of the Ultimate Reality can be attained in a direct way which is not possible by reason. Because
reason can know something with the help of ideas. Hence reason is always mediate. It can reveal the reality only in a negative way. Hence some positive means to know the reality is required. And that method must be non-sensible and non-rational. In this connection it is worth mentioning that Malkani distinguished among the three levels of experience. In the primitive level experience is related with the bodily activities, it is not done intelligently. This is the instinctive level. In the next stage when intellect starts to function it is called intellectual action but here also intellect and action are not separated. The separation starts in the next stage which is called the reflective level. In this level there is found the freedom of activity. And in this stage or level dualism starts. Because reflection makes a distinction between the real and the experience of the real. And philosophical problems starts with the conception of dualism. But experience which gives us a dualistic view of reality cannot help us to know the non-dual Ultimate Reality or Brahman. Hence Malkani maintains that this reality can be known only by the revealed words or Śruti. Śabda is the only proof of Brahman. The Advaita Vedāntins unanimously hold that the only Pramāṇa in the case of Brahman is ‘Śabda or āgama. i.e., the Vedas which are regarded as the revealed texts. The Śruti itself declares, “None who has not understood the Vedas can know the great one”. Śaṅkara also holds that Śabda or āgama is the exclusive means of Brahma realization (śāstrādeva pramāṇāy jagato janmādi kāraṇāṁ brahmādhaṁgāyate. BSS, 1.1.3).

This Ultimate Reality is known as the ultimate cause of the world. Brahman is the uncaused cause. It is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world. According to Malkani, this causeness of Brahman cannot be taken in the ultimate sense. A gold ornament is made out of gold. And after destruction it becomes the
same material gold. It means that the ornament comes out of gold, stays in gold and returns to gold. Similarly the world which is created cannot be absolutely true. Because that which has a beginning and an end cannot be absolutely true, it is only apparently true. Just like the gold ornaments the metaphysical creation is not absolute and does not come out of nothing. The world is created out of Brahman, stays in Brahman and goes back to Brahman. Being is not created i.e. no permanent thing is created. Brahman is the substance of the world. Thus we find that though Brahman is regarded as the ultimate cause of the world yet in reality Brahman does not create anything real. Thus He is not the cause of anything.

It may be asked here, is it not possible to create a permanent effect. Malkani maintains that it is not possible to create a permanent effect. According to him “The effect implies an act of putting forth or a process; and an act is by its very essential nature impermanent.” As the effect is something to bring into existence hence it is nothing in the beginning and nothing in the end. It appears in the middle hence impermanent- Again it cannot be said also that the effect is real only at the time when it exists. Malkani opines that the effect is a part of a process which is changing in every minutest of moments. It is said that a person cannot take bath in the same ocean twice. Malkani goes to the farthest of the view and says that the person cannot bath in the same ocean even once. For a stream cannot stay the same for a very short time also. Continuity in time means that it is not broken for a very limited time also. There is no self-identical thing in the process. “Thus creation must at the same time be destruction or there is no creation at all.”

It may be argued that the effect produced by an act of will is different from the effect which is a part of the physical process because the former has some sort
reality. When an intelligent agent creates some effect then behind the act of his will lies some unchanging something which is the reality. And the effect as the product of that will is related to the act of the will and is real in some sense. But the effects in the physical process do not have this reality. Malkani opines that the effect created by the will of the intelligent agent cannot be regarded as real. Because it is a part of the process and hence changing. Again the putting forth or willing act cannot be regarded as an act. Putting forth must be done by something behind which again must be put forth by something behind it and so on ad infinitum. Hence the original willing does not involve any change because it is not in time. That original willing is not in time. That original willing is free. And time is also created by that freedom. Thus it follows that the original willing is outside the time. Because actual time requires something unchanging and unmoving as cause which is outside time. It may be argued that from the agent to the act there is no time gap. Hence, there is nothing like willing from the agent to the act. It means that the act is put forth immediately and without any lapse of time. Here a question may arise as to what is the meaning of putting forth or the willing? There may be two alternatives: either it is an act of the agent or it is not. If it is the act of the agent then the infinite regress cannot be avoided. If it is not the act then this putting forth is either identical with the agent or it is not identical with the agent. If it is identical with the agent then it follows that there is nothing which is an effect. The agent is only true. In the case of the second alternative it becomes unrelated to the agent. Thus, Malkani shows that nothing is created. Effect is only an appearance. Hence it follows that the effect has no reality apart from the cause. Either it is the cause itself or uncaused and illusory.
Malkani like Śaṅkara regards the causality of Brahman as His \textit{tatastha-laksāṇa}. It is evident from the previous discussion that causality is not real; it is only accidental. According to Śaṅkara, \textit{tatastha} means that quality which does not reside in the substance all the time and is purely temporary. Though it is temporary, yet this quality helps to distinguish the substance from all other things for the time-being. Similarly, the definition of Brahman as the cause helps to distinguish Brahman from all other things of the world which are causally connected. Here we proceed from the apparent world to Brahman. But one cannot think the world from the standpoint of Brahman. As we are confronted with the world in the apparent life so there is the need to find out the cause of this world and not vice-versa. "The world demands an ultimate metaphysical cause, but it says nothing definitely about the nature of this cause."\footnote{11}

Malkani points out that Brahman is the unchanging ground of the world and is the \textit{Vivarta-Upādāna}. Because so far as the world is concerned it appears that Brahman changes into the world. But in reality Brahman is the substance of the world, it does not change at all. Like the gold ornaments the world changes; but Brahman remains unchanging just like gold, the substance.

\textbf{Svarūpa laksāṇa of Brahman}

It is clear from our previous discussion that the definition of Brahman as the cause of the world is only accidental and not permanent. It does not exist in Brahman for all the time—past, present and future. Hence some essential definition of Brahman is required for showing the essential characteristics of Brahman. An essential definition of a thing consists of the essential nature of that thing. Malkani
like Śaṅkara shows that the essence of Brahman is *sat*, *cit*, *ānanda* and *ananta* which constitute the essential definition of Brahman.

According to Malkani, the most essential nature of Brahman is that, It is *sat*. *Sattā* or Being is found in all the particle of matter right from the minutest particle. Being is the essential nature of everything. Thus, being is all-pervasive. Everything positive entities as well as the absence of positive entities - appears in being. Being is the universal locus and hence, it is the great. Nothing is greater than being. Brahman is the greatest and as such everything appears in the Being of Brahman. Here, Brahman is indicated by *sat*. The relation between the being and the `thing` is one-sided. Things cannot exist without being as its ground. But this dependence is applicable to the case of being. Being does not require to depend on the thing. Thus being is the reality of all things. Hence, says Malkani, Upaniṣadic declaration - “verilly, all this is Brahman (sarvāṁ khalvidāṁ – Brahma), becomes meaningful. It means that Brahman alone is real. It, however, does not indicate that the things are Brahman and hence things are real like Brahman. In this way Malkani proves that Brahman and the things do not have equal status. Things are negated in Brahman.

The conception of substance or being as found in Malkani is different from Spinoza’s conception of substance. According to Spinza substance has innumerable qualities and the mind can grasp only two among them viz., thought and extension. And these attributes have modes. The modes are found in the finite things. This implies that the finite things are the real expressions of the Absolute substance. Hence the world of things are real as expression of the Absolute. But so far as Malkani’s view is concerned, which is in conformity with the Advaita Vedāntins, the
ultimate substance or Brahman has no qualities. And as a result world is not the real expression of Brahman. So the world is not literally contained in Brahman. In reality the world and Brahman are opposed in character. Brahman is the locus of the world. World is grounded in Brahman. It has no real existence, it is illusory. The relation between Brahman and the world is like the relation between the real and the illusory. It follows that to know Brahman we have to negate the world. Brahman is described as not this, not that. Malkani opines that the negative definition of Brahman is important. But in order to know Brahman some positive approach is also necessary. Positively Brahman is defined as the being. Being is the common ground of everything.

This notion of being is also not like the notion of being as found in Hegel’s philosophy. According to Hegel Being is rational. Because according to him what is rational is real. The highest development of reason is the Absolute Idea and it is all-inclusive. Finite Self and the world are the expressions of this Absolute Idea. As it is an Idea hence the concept of mind comes into which it is the Idea. But for Malkani, Brahman is the reality in Itself. It is not the reality in a mind. Brahman is the Being which is the limit of all ideal things. Things are ideal not the being. "Being is the only thing that is real and non-ideal. It is no exaggeration to say that all things are made out of being, live in being and go back to being". Thus he maintains that Brahman is not ideal, It is real of all reals.

The most important significance of the concept of being is that it is not used to indicate something objective. The word ‘dog’ has some objective reference but being does not have such objective reference. When everything is destroyed, being is not destroyed. There is nothing in the apparent world that can be regarded as
being. Being is different from both the unreal or the tuccha and the illusory. Both being and the unreal thing like the hare’s horn are never perceived. The illusory is sometimes perceived and is not perceived after sometime. Being is not perceived but it is not like the illusory. The word being implies the eternal reality which is never cancelled like the illusory. Now, it is said that Brahman is indicated by the attributes of being or sat. But it should be noted here, says Malkani, that this attribute of Brahman has no external relation with it. Being does not belong to Brahman. They are actually identical. Both the words being and Brahman ultimately indicate the same reality, hence, have the same significance.

**Brahman is “cit” or Intelligence**

Brahman as a being must have depth or inwardness though it is unqualified and pure being. And this inwardness of being, according to Malkani, is intelligence or ‘cit’. ‘Cit’ or Intelligence is the core of being. Malkani maintains that no kind of being have any meaning unless it is either related to intelligence or it is itself this intelligence. When it is said that the intelligence is the core of being it necessarily follows that there is a distinction between the core and the outer cover of being. This distinction of being is signified by the distinction between intelligent being and the non-intelligent being. Knowledge of a thing leads to the conception of its independence. We do not proceed from the independence to knowledge. Because independence is the outcome of true knowledge or intelligence. If the knowledge is erroneous then the question of independence does not arise at all.

Brahman is Intelligence Itself. Brahman is not known by intelligence hence it is not related to intelligence. Malkani maintains that when a thing is known by
intelligence it cannot be regarded as the thing-in-itself. In that case it will have nothing in itself until and unless it is related to intelligence. A relative thing cannot be a thing-in-itself. Brahman, on the other hand is not related to anything not even to the intelligence. Brahman comprehends all things. Noting is outside or beyond Brahman. Brahman is the highest being. Hence so far as intelligence is concerned and is necessary for being, it implies that Brahman itself is the Intelligence. Hence Malkani opines that Being that is Brahman is Intelligent Being. "The only reality is experience, and the only difference between finite experience and absolute experience is the all-inclusiveness and the logical stability of the latter". It may be argued that the content and the consciousness together constitute the real i.e., the experience. But so far as reflective consciousness is concerned it is not possible to understand the difference and unity at a time -because the unity and the difference are not compatible terms. Hence difference is here more significant and unity is less significant. If we have to make unity more significant then we have to understand the nature of unity so that the difference can be compatible with the unity. Unity may be understood in different ways. Firstly, there may be a de facto unto where both unity and difference are equally necessary. In this case there is no hidden identity between the content and consciousness. Secondly, in case of asymmetrical reality the two terms are not equally real. One term is primary or may be the cause of the other, the other is not unreal, but it has only a dependent reality. According to the other conception or we may say third conception, unity is fundamental, other two are superfluous, unity may be neutral. And there is another sense of unity where one term is real and the other term is illusory or unreal. Here the real is the self subsisting being but it will be unreal, if it is thought to be related.
Malkani argues against the de facto unity. In his view de facto unity implies that the distinction of object and subject must itself be objective and the whole which they together constitute cannot be a real or an ultimate whole. Because the true subject does not enter into a relation. And the ultimate unity cannot be a differentiated unity.

The distinction between the subject and the object must be cancelled. Because otherwise they will constitute a bigger whole out of the subject and the object. And in this whole the object will be somehow related to the subject. But according to Malkani consciousness is not a kind of content and hence it cannot be related to other content. As a result the object is not related to consciousness. Differentiation is found into the very nature of the object. And the object is supposed to be related to consciousness. In the view of Malkani, such object about which we speak of cannot be known at all. Knowing is here equivalent to speaking. When we speak of a thing it implies that it is not knowledge proper. Because, when one thing is merely spoken of it can be directly intuited to know it. “When I distinguish knowing from speaking, I mean this direct relation of the object to consciousness." The knowledge of the object is found in our speech it cannot be known properly. Hence there is no object. Thus the question of its relation to knowledge and consciousness does not arise at all.

Again, there is incompatibility between the reality of the subject and that of the object. Subject and object both cannot be regarded as given. And as they are not both given so there is no distinction between them. Because distinction is possible only in case of the two given entities. Consciousness will be degraded to the status of a relative term in case of much distinction. Because in distinction two terms must be relative and as such none of them is independent. In such case if
distinction is to be accepted then it will lead to the dualism which is fundamental. Malkani here opines that dualism is a fact which must be accepted. And this dualism is the dualism of the real and illusory. Real and illusory are incompatible terms and if one is real then the other must be unreal. Thus it follows that real consciousness can never make a unity with the object.

Again object cannot be regarded as real and the subject unreal. Because object can be proved only by a knowing subject. Object neither knows other nor itself. Hence consciousness or the subject alone is true. Malkani maintains that the subject is not a mere abstraction without the content. Because the consciousness or the subject can be proved only by itself. Otherwise nothing could be proved. Because consciousness or intelligence can prove others. Which is required to prove all others cannot be proved by others. Because to prove that other another consciousness will be required and so on ad infinitum. Hence consciousness must be proved by itself. “We conclude that consciousness alone is real. It is wrong to say that it has a necessary relation to the content, and is itself nothing without the relation. The real consciousness or the pure subject is not known content of any kind, and its reality is incompatible with the reality of any content.”

So far as the asymmetrical unity is conceived it may be argued that the content is not altogether unnecessary though the consciousness is the ultimate necessity. Content or the object may have relative or dependent reality. And this dependent reality is the creation of the subject. It means that this consciousness is the cause and the object is the effect.

Malkani does not disagree to this view. He has shown how Brahman is the ultimate cause of the world or the effect. In his discussion of tatastha laksana.
Malkani like Śaṅkara ultimately rejects this relation as an ultimate relation. He shows that Brahman never creates a world. World is ultimately unreal or illusory. In the view of Malkani, "the effect has no reality apart from the cause. It is either the cause itself or it is uncaused and illusory. If then there is a sense in which the subject causes, creates or makes the object, the object can have no distinct reality of its own. Its reality is the reality of the subject, and its apparent independence is only illusory."^{16}

In the third kind of unity it is found that in the primitive unity the distinction is absent. But the distinction between the object and the subject is found latent in the unity, this distinction becomes clear. Such view is found among the idealists like Bradley, Kant and Hegel. According to all of them Reality is the Absolute unity which is neutral to the distinction of subject and object. But the subject and object are latent in the Unity. Subject knows the unity and the object also knows that through the subject. Though the Ultimate Reality is the Spirit yet it carries with it the distinction of subject and object. And their distinction is found in our thought. For Bradley appearance consists in the duality of the subject and object and is conceived by thought. Reality is above this distinction. Kant upholds this view by his distinction of phenomena and noumena. Hegel shows that Reality is the Absolute Idea. And the finite spirit and the matter are the expression of this Idea. Though the finite soul and the matter are latent in the Absolute Idea, the Absolute Idea is the unity of the subject and object. However, His unity is neutral to this distinction. Hence according to all these thinkers unity is already there and is neutral to the distinction but the distinction which comes latter is latent in the unity.
Thus, it is found that according to all forms of Idealism, Ultimate Reality is the spirit and the object is denied by all of them. They denied the object either by saying that the object is not related to the subject. Or by saying that the object has no independent existence apart from the subject. Others maintain that the being of the object cannot be explained without the being of the spirit. That means objects have no independent being without the subject. It is said that the object is not related to the subject or spirit just like a self-existing thing is related to another self-existing thing. It implies that the object is not self-existent. Maikani opines that all these characters of the object are the character of the illusory appearance. The spirit is real and not the object. He says that in none of the above mentioned sense the object can be regarded as real, the object cannot exist independently of the subject. Now the content of thought is the object. And if the object is nothing at all then it implies that thought has no content in reality. Hence thought is a mere principle of the subjectivity. Because the subject only thinks about the object which is ultimately inexplicable. As thought is concerned with the unreality hence this thought cannot be the Ultimate principle of the spirit.

According to Malkani consciousness which is unrelated to the content determines the nature of the Ultimate Reality. But the materialists do not accept the existence of independent consciousness. According to them consciousness is an epiphenomenon. They do not deny the mental phenomena. Mental phenomena are, according to them, dependent upon the physiological or neurological processes. And just like the liver secretes bile, brain secretes consciousness. Consciousness is a by-product of certain processes in the brain. But Malkani like the Advaita Vedāntins rejects this view and
maintains that the consciousness is the sole reality. All other physical and mental phenomena are the appearance of this reality. "The fact of consciousness as something quite distinct from a purely physical or physiological process may be recognized. Consciousness is something sui generis, requiring a spiritual substance for its basis." But it is argued that there is nothing like pure consciousness. Because consciousness is something dynamic. It is not something static, Consciousness is like a stream. And there is no permanent substance behind the stream. In this stream one dies and the other is born. It is a kind of becoming.

According to some other philosophers again, both consciousness as such and the object are real entities. In knowledge, there is found the object in the external world and the awareness of the object. Objects have independent existence and we are aware of them. Awareness does not make any difference in the object hence there relation is external. And if we try to know we can know the awareness of the object but this we know through the awareness because it is diaphanous. "Malkani does not conform to this dualistic view. He maintains that awareness as such cannot be known by any amount of attention. It cannot be known by introspection. Introspection can give us knowledge about a definite entity. It gives us the knowledge of the feeling of pain etc. Such fact which is distinct, separate, successive actually constitute the mind or the stuff of consciousness. Introspection can give us knowledge about this stuff not of the consciousness itself which is not the mere out come of this stuff. Hence Malkani concludes that "Consciousness as known would not be consciousness, even as God who is finite would not be acceptable to us as a real God. If consciousness is real, it is real only as the Absolute subject, never as object."
It is sometimes argued that there is no kind of pure intelligence as such. Intelligence must be related to the act of intelligence. Intelligence means intellectual act. Mind performs this act. Hence, the individual mind is only intelligent. Pure intelligence is a myth. Pure intelligence is merely an abstraction without any reality. Intellectual act is the only reality.

To this Malkani argues that if pure intelligence is denied then everything must be objective. In that case, when something is known as objective by an intelligent agent, that intelligent agent will have to be known as an object by some other intellectual act and so on ad infinitum. Thus it follows that, “the distinction of subject and object is functional only, not substantial. The subject at one moment can become object at another.”

Malkani maintains that in knowledge function the knower is known. But in reality the knower is not known. When the knower is thought to be known actually, some functions of the mind is known not the knower. The knower as such is not known. Real knower is never known from the outside. And in knowledge-function when we try to know the knower from outside, the knower just escapes of our knowledge. Hence it follows that the distinction between the knower and the known is not absolute. The real knower is the pure intelligence, it is the pure subject.

It may appear that there are two kinds of being viz., intelligent—being and non-intelligent being. Both are independent. A being that can be objective is called the non-intelligent being. It is not true that if it is a being it must be intelligent being. It is not true that if it is a being it must be intelligent being. Brahman is of the nature of pure intelligence. And from our previous discussion it is proved that Brahman is never an object, He is the true subject. The finite selves which are
sometimes subject and sometimes object can be regarded as non-intelligent being. Hence it is found that there are two kinds of beings, intelligent and non-intelligent being. Malkani maintains here that these two kinds of beings are not independent of each other. The non-intelligent being, if it is not related to the intelligent being then it is nothing at all. The non-intelligent being is fundamentally dependent on the subject. It is the object to the subject. It is never found as self-being. On the other hand the intelligent being is the subject to the object i.e., to the non-intelligent. It is true that the subject without its relation to the object has no meaning at all. Though the intelligent being is the subject to the object yet it is more than the subject. Because while revealing the subject–object relation the intelligent being also reveals itself, it is self-revealing. The non-intelligent being is only a superficial subject as it cannot remain as the subject all the time. The real subject is always the subject and does never become the object. The Intelligent being is the real subject. It is the ground of all appearances. And the relation between these two types of being is one of false identity. "Intelligent being is thus beyond all those relations which subsist between objects of some kind. It is really unrelated."^{20}

It may be argued that if the pure-intelligence is to be known it must be first objectified. In order to know It, It must be isolated. As pure awareness is a diaphanous stuff, so to know it as it is, is quite impossible. And any attempt to know it will lead just to miss it. So some kind of isolation and objectification is required to know it. Malkani does not conform to this view. He maintains that pure awareness is not an object of any kind. He maintains that just like Hume's view of self i.e., there is no permanent self that can be known, pure awareness also cannot be known as an object. If we try to know it by analyzing it, our attempt
will be turned out into failure. Because it is the all-inclusive whole. Hence it cannot be isolated. Self must be known in another way and not by objectification. Pure awareness can be known by negative approach only because it is not an entity, so it cannot be known directly like other entities. Firstly, It must be known as the negation of \textit{jada}, i.e., inert; it is not the \textit{jada}. Again there is the mixture of intelligence and non-intelligence. There is the form of thought and the subject of thought. The former is the non-intelligent while the latter is the intelligent. And if we go on negating all forms of thought which are objective we shall reach to a position of formless awareness that sustains all forms. And pure awareness can be known in this negative way. According to Malkani, Brahman is Pure Intelligence. However, it doesn't indicate that Intelligence is an external character of Brahman. Just like the Being of Brahman Intelligence too is its essential nature. Malkani maintains that 'Brahman rejects what is finite, 'being' rejects what is illusory, and 'intelligence' rejects what is unintelligent or \textit{jada}. Thus, these different terms are coined to the same person in order to dispel different kinds of doubts. Fundamentally all signify the same Ultimate Reality or Brahman. He is the pure formless intelligence (i.e., \textit{nirvikara-citi-reva-kevala}). If Brahman is distinguished from intelligence and intelligence is regarded as a function of Brahman, then Brahman will become a \textit{jada}. And if Brahman is unintelligent being, then He cannot function as an intelligent being. Hence function is not primary, intelligent being who have the function is primary. So, there is no distinction between Brahman and the Intelligence. Brahman is the intelligent \textit{Itself}. 
Brahman as ānanda

Now, this intelligent being may be pleasurable being or painful being; it cannot be neutral like the unconscious matter. But Brahman, the intelligent being cannot be painful since it is infinitely great. Finitude is the cause of all pain. Hence the Advaita Vedāntins accept Brahman as of the nature of joy or happiness (ānanda). Malkani maintains that joy is the absolute value. This value is inseparable from the Intelligent Being. Malkani argues that the value of things depend on the condition that how much satisfaction it gives, i.e., things are evaluated on the basis of their capacity to satisfy people. According to him, if the feeling of satisfaction of beauty are not there, then there cannot be any aesthetic value. This is true in case of moral value also. Moral values are enjoined either by the scriptures, or by the sacred tradition or by social custom. But the acceptance of these acts as our duty depends on our will and that will is again guided by one’s happiness. Hence, in case of moral act also, the capacity to produce happiness only can determine its value.

Malkani maintains that Brahman is infinite joy (ānanda). He quotes the Upaniṣadic saying while accepting Brahman as joy or ānanda, the statements like, “That which is great is full of joy, the small is painful (yo vai bhumā tat sukham, nālpe sukham asti).”

According to Malkani, just like there is a neutral transition from being to intelligence in case of Brahman, there is a transition to value from intelligence. Object has no value, It is the Self or Brahman who is joy Itself and has value. Real value lies in the subject, not in the object.

It may be argued that being is neutral to value. Something has value if it is pleasurable or painful. And being is neutral to pleasure and pain. Malkani maintains
that by intelligent being as neutral to pleasure or pain it does not mean that the Intelligent being is neutral like a matter. Matter itself cannot be regarded as pleasurable or painful. But the joy of being is an intrinsically valuable state. A thing is derived because it produces joy to the being. But the joy of being is not a means to other end. Being itself is joy.

According to some thinkers, moral act is itself valuable, Beautiful things have their intrinsic value. It is not required that a beautiful thing or a moral act is to be said that it is beautiful and is good. The feeling of satisfaction or granting something as good comes later. Hence, value does not depend on pleasure or joy which is a feeling of some being. Malkani, objects to this. He maintains that value is not independent of feeling or emotion. A thing in order to be valuable is required to be evaluated. Evaluation depends on needs, desires and aspirations. Man requires to be satisfied. He is satisfied by doing moral action. “Behind the icy appearance of the call of duty is the satisfaction that it conduces to greater freedom from fear; to inner peace and to a higher destiny of the soul. There are all kinds of needs for a fuller, more harmonious and more-Universal life”.22

Brahman can only be known negatively. He is not changing, moving and illusory. He is not like the material things, which is never the knower of others or of themselves. Again Brahman is defined as infinite joy to indicate that He is not something like the finite thing which always gives us satisfaction mixed with dissatisfaction. But Brahman who is infinite is the joy itself. Finite being who is not free is the cause of sufferings. The freedom of the finite is restricted which causes pain to it. Hence, man has to shake off his finitude. All kinds of human existence viz., birth, old age, death are bondage. Man must try to over come this bondage
which is the result of his finitude. *Brahman* is free from all kinds of bondage (*nityamukta*). Hence Brahman is defined as immortality itself or *amrtam*. This immortality can be attained by the individual if he knows Brahman as joy. But the joy of Brahman cannot be conceived like the ordinary joy. According to Malkani, the joy of Brahman is different from all other worldly joy. Because the joy of the world is always related to some desire. If some desire is satisfied it gives joy. But such type of joy always leads to a negative aspect. As soon as a desire is fulfilled human being gets pleasure or joy, but at the same time he feels the despair that it will not remain all the time. Such type of joy is externally temporal hence limited. It creates a new type of restlessness due to the thought of loosing the joy. The whole life of the human being is surrounded by the incipient desires. Hence human existence is painful. Malkani opines that when a desire is fulfilled human being feels joyous but this joy is the inner joy of the individual. If the object caused the joy then it will create joy all the time. But as the objects of the world is purely temporal hence it cannot continue to be joyous. Thus which is sometimes pleasurable and sometimes painful cannot be regarded as joy in itself. And as the joy of Brahman is not related to any object i.e., any fulfillment of desire so the joy of Brahman is qualitatively different from all other joys. The joy of Brahman, points out by Malkani, is positive, it has no negative side.

It is argued that all our joys are not followed by the fulfillment of desires. For example, if a person is given a sugar candy in his mouth and at the same time he is not in the desire of that at that time, even then it will give him joy of the sweet taste. Again a person when suddenly perceives a beautiful thing will enjoy
the beauty of the thing. Hence from these examples it follows that the object is the joy, which is capable of producing joy without prior desire of the object.

Criticizing this argument Malkani says that the value does not lie in the object but to the subject because joy is purely a subjective affair. He argues that the appreciation of values depend on the subject. Hence value is subjective.

According to Malkani, desire-based joy depends on the mind and desireless joy depends on the spirit, “The joy of the spirit is as permanent as the spirit, It is always there, only it is hidden or veiled by pain or by desire. When the pain or the desire is removed, the fundamental and ever present joy of being manifests itself. It is never lost. It only appears to be lost and regained”.23

Malkani maintains that the true joy is attained only by the knowledge of non-duality. So long the individual does not have this knowledge he is infected by pain. His joy is partial. All joys are the expressions of various degrees of joy of Brahman. And these degrees of joys are enjoyed by the individual only because he forgets his real nature i.e., he is Brahman. And the infinite joy lies deep in the being or Brahman. When man understands his real nature i.e., the non-duality of Brahman and the individual he also realizes this infinite joy, since Brahman is the joy itself.

**Brahman is Infinite**

According to Malkani, the fourth attribute of Brahman i.e., ananta follows from the above mentioned three attributes. The fact that being is the ground of all things known and knowable implies that it is infinite. There is no limitation to being - spatial, temporal or substantive (deśa-kāla-vastu-pariccheda).
As Brahman is all inclusive hence He is greater than the greatest. Again as It
has no dimension hence it is smaller than the smallest. The infinitude of Brahman is
not like the infinitude which we generally find in the world. As for example, when
we extend the space it will be extended infinitely. Again time can also be extended
infinitely. That means they can be extended in their magnitude. But this infinitude is
not genuine; it is a kind of spurious infinitude. This is not the case with Brahman.
According to Malkani, the infinitude of Brahman is accomplished i.e., completed
infinitude. He maintains that, "the pure intelligence that is Brahman is inclusive of
all levels and all orders of particular intelligences." Hence Malkani opines that the
infinitude of Brahman cannot be measured as it is not quantitatively infinite. He is
infinite in quality. And quality cannot be measured in terms of extension or
additions of parts.

Malkani also describes Brahman as pure, ever free and formless. By pure he
means that Brahman is not mixed up of two ontological substances like spirit and
matter. The body and the mind of man consist of two different substances and function
intelligently. They are not the spirit which is pure. By their intelligence they try to
thrive the intelligent self and cannot affect the Self. Because the Self is ever free
and never comes into bondage like mind and matter and consequently does not seek
to get freedom like mind from the bondage of the body or matter. Thus we find
that the body is the cause of bondage and as the Self is pure and is not affected by
matter or impurity hence is ever free. "The Self is by nature free, - free from every
limitations of the body and the wider world with which the body is related". Again
a thing which is finite must be in some dimension of space and time. As it is
limited and composite. Hence it has birth and decay. As its various parts are
combined so it has the possibility to be destroyed. But the thing which has no parts is not liable to any combination or destruction i.e., to be born and to decay. Brahman is only simple in this sense. It may be said that the ultimate elements of electrons and protons are also simple. But Malkani does not accept it. He argues that the elements of electrons and protons have a spatio-temporal location. Hence they cannot be regarded as simple like Brahman. Again they are active. Action and reaction are found in them which is not the case with Brahman. Brahman does not act or react.

Malkani maintains that the *Upanisad* is right in maintaining that the object-language can properly help to signify Brahman. Brahman is defined negatively because the object language has the limitation of the objects. Hence the positive attributes of Brahman must be interpreted negatively. Again there are certain attributes of Brahman which are essentially negative. Brahman is described as infinite, indivisible, unqualified, unrelated, unchanging, immutable, actless, not long, not short, without hunger or thirst and formless etc. Thus it follows that though Brahman cannot be defined by our ordinary speech yet it can be defined by those words only by negating them. Brahman can be directly known by the Intellectual Intuition. As intellectual intuition cannot be defined so Brahman is defined by giving it different names. All these names signify the only one reality i.e., Brahman.

**SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTES**

According to Malkani attributes depend on the thing and not the vice-versa. Hence there is no mutual dependence between the substance and the attributes. Thus there is something which is called the thing-in-itself apart from the attributes. The
thing-in-itself does not require the attributes in order to exist. And this thing-in-itself is the object of knowledge. Attributes only belong to it. It is somehow related to the substance. And this relation of the attributes to the substance is a problem for the philosopher.

The relation of belonging can be explained in three ways and ultimately it will appear that all these are erroneous. That we think that attributes belong to the thing. A thing is belonging to something and the something is the owner. The ultimate owner only owns something but it is not owned by anything else. Again in the case of the ultimate ownership what it owns does not affect its proper nature. Attributes may belong to the substance or may not belong to the substance, but that will not affect the pure nature of the substance. It remains as it is. A thing possesses some external attributes which the thing wills to have. For example, a man may possess a house because he may will to have that house. If he does not will, he will not possess. Hence the conception of will is necessary for possessing something. But this is not found in the case of the Ultimate substance i.e., Brahman. Brahman does not will to have something. Hence the thought of possessing some attributes by Brahman is found elsewhere. We finite beings ascribe attributes to Brahman. And as the ultimate owner does not accept anything hence what is expected by the finite beings is only erroneous, i.e., the finite beings erroneously think that Brahman possesses attributes.

It may be argued that when it is said that a house belongs to a person and the mind belongs to the self these do not indicate the same kind of belonging. In the former case a house can exist without the possessor of the house. But in the latter case mind cannot exist without being belonging to the self. Self gives it
integrity and intelligence. The Self acts behind the mind. Hence it appears that the attributes of the mind cannot exist independently like the house. Malkani maintains that this is the case of attributes and substance. The attributes cannot exist, it only subsists in the substance.

"The most important case in which something cannot subsist except through the relation of belonging is that of the illusory. The illusory belongs to the real." From this it follows that the attributes have only a dependent or an illusory sort of existence.

Ultimate substance is attributeless and hence is one. Possessions of attributes give rise to different substances. Different substances have different kinds of attributes. And if these substances have no attribute then they cannot exist or be separated. But we find that attributes are not essential for the substance. And the substance which essentially own the attributes are not real substance.

Now, how to know this attributeless substance or Brahman? Man can know the truth mixed up with error i.e., man's physical beings. But this is not the case of the knowledge of 'I'. I is never known through the body. Body is just an outside cover of 'I'. The 'I' or the spirit is found inside the body hence it can be known only by intuition. There cannot be two original intuitions of 'I' and the other of 'you'. Original intuition can be one only. Hence in man's original intuition there is no place of second person 'you' and still no place of the third person 'he' or 'she'. 'You' and 'he' have objectivity as they are perceived through there physical appearance. But this is not the case with 'I'. Our knowledge of 'I' is never objectified. It is direct and immediate.
"The 'I' stands for the pure subject, and it is diametrically opposed to the pure object or 'this'. The 'I' and the 'this' cannot be unified in any whole. They cannot stay together in any common ground."

Brahman or the Absolute is not the unity of the subject and object. Because the unity of subject and object only gives rise to an object. And this object requires another subject to know. The real subject is never included in this whole of subject-object which leads to a complex object. Object is presentable to the subject. And hence it cannot include the subject to which it is presentable. The real subject exists outside this whole which is presentable to it. Self is an independent category by itself. The non-determinate and non-objective whole is what is called the Self, objects are something to It, but It takes nothing from the object i.e., the Self is not the whole composed of subject and object. It is essentially unrelated and in itself.

Malkani thus maintains that Brahman, though can be known in various ways, yet to know Him as the Self is the true way. When we consider His tatsthalaaksana i.e., as the cause of the world, He is known as in the third person. Because He is regarded as a power or greatness and this is an impersonal concept of Brahman. Again we may try to know Brahman by considering His svarupa laksana or the essential qualities like existence, intelligence and bliss etc. In this sense He appears to us as an over-soul. The spiritual qualities are found in man's self. And Brahman is considered as a Greater Self or Transcendental Self. It follows that here Brahman is known from the outside. Malkani maintains that this knowledge of Brahman is still incomplete. Because here man can have some feeling towards Brahman. He can know Brahman through that feeling. But this is not the knowledge of Brahman.
in the literal sense because there will be found some duality between the feeling of the finite self and Brahman. And the knowledge of Brahman in the literal sense can be attained only by identifying the self with Brahman. Brahman is our very Self and hence identical with the self. This is meant by the scriptural text i.e., *aham brahmāsmi*. 

As soon as the self is recognized as identical with Brahman, the Self gets some new qualities like greatness, powerfulness, infinitude, all-pervading, blissful etc. Because there are the qualities of Brahman. And being identical with Brahman the Self becomes identical in qualities also. Brahman is also known as immediate as the Self. This is also new to the knowledge of Brahman. And this gives the completeness in the knowledge of Brahman. And the new knowledge of the self as identical with Brahman makes it more significant.

But the fact that the Self is identical with Brahman is not a new thing. It is not a new identity. The identity between Brahman and the Self is eternal. Because two things must be always identical or always different. If they are once different, they cannot be identical at any time. The Self is identical with Brahman but due to ignorance this fact is hidden from us. When our ignorance about this identity is removed we come to know this fact which exists from time eternity. Hence Malkani opines that, "Jīva and Brahman have literal identity. Only we must reject those characters of each which are incompatible with the essential reality of the other. Brahman must lose its outsidedness and distantness, and jīva must lose its embodied character and the finitude that comes from it".28
SELF

Being a true Advaita-Vedāntin Malkani also contends that the individual self is nothing but the ultimate reality and the philosophy of the self is the only pure philosophy because ultimate reality is nothing but the self. As soon as man comes to know the self all philosophical problems will come to an end. "Every-one is aware of his own self and is never in doubt that he himself exists."²⁹

The self is in Malkani’s view, pure knowledge or pure intelligence. Malkani maintains that Brahman can be known only by identifying It with the self. In the scripture the description of the nature of Brahman is found. But so long It is known as Brahman. It remains as an Idea of reason. But as soon as It is known as the self then only the knowledge of Brahman will be completed. Because the reality of the self is directly known by us. He says that the I-ness is the ultimate ground of the intuition of self and is the same for all individuals. The knowledge of the physical object is changing. The object is not known, its different aspects are only known. Different physical objects represent different aspects of the self. Hence no knowledge about two different physical objects are alike. So the knowledge about the objects is different. This implies that as there is no permanent knowledge about the object hence there is no permanent object. Similarly the knowledge of the mental events is not possible. A mental state is related to motives, tendencies and predispositions which are not always at the surface of mental life. So the mental event is a complex state. This indicates that the experience of the mental state is not the same thing as the knowledge of the mental state and metaphysics deals with knowledge and not experience. And though the experience of the mental state is a direct event, its knowledge is not direct but mediated. For the knowledge of the
mental state must be attained through different elements functioning in creating that mental state. But the knowledge of the self is not mediated. I-ness or pratyaktva is the only character of the self. This I-ness is the presupposition of all mental states. "All actions are significant in me; and there is nothing outside me which can act upon me. Nothing can exclude me, nothing can be outside me; for nothing can think away that respect for me in virtue of which alone it is what it is. I am the real whole; for everything is real only in my experience of it."\(^{30}\)

The sceptics strongly deny the existence of a permanent self. As stated by George B. Burch in his article, 'Neo-Hinduism of G.R. Malkani', "there is n't any world really there is no creation, no illusion, no world, no individual, no bondage, no release and no freedom, but only self."\(^{31}\) Though the reality of the self cannot be denied yet its knowledge is often deceiving. Because as soon as we try to know the self we know some object. And the idea of the object as already found is not the idea of a permanent entity. The sceptic thus denies the existence of the permanent self. Malkani rejects this view of the sceptics on the ground that their own contention calls for the acceptance of the self itself. Malkani's view in this regard is that if the sceptic do not have the deeper intuition of the permanent self then they would not have denied the objects as the permanent self. For in that case they would have identified the not-self or the objective - self with the real self. But as they have the contention that the objective self is not the real self so it implies that they have the deeper intuition of something called the self. But as they cannot experience this self in their common experience, hence they deny the permanent self. They know that man's natural instinct or their intuition will not accept the self as an object or part of the changing world. According to Malkani the self is
outside all objects. It is a unique entity and as such is not presentable to any experience whatsoever. In the beginning it may appear that both 'I' and 'this' are real. Malkani maintains that these two realities are opposed to each other. Here one is the self and the other is the not-self. And man often confuses the self with the not-self. It is not a true expression that, 'this is I' i.e., 'the body is I', 'thought or mind is I' etc. Rather it is true to say, "This is to me". Here 'this' is something outside me but 'me' is never the outside entity. 'This' always stands for the not-self or the object as it is given to someone. On the other hand, 'I' is never given to any body. It is not the object. It is the subject. Malkani opines that all our knowledge is grounded on this fundamental confusion between these two diametrically opposed entities. Due to our confusion we use our mind and body and try to get knowledge with this. Hence he argues like Saṅkara that all our knowledge is based on this error or adhyāsa.

According to some philosophers both the self and the not-self together constitute the ultimate reality. And both the self and the not-self are real. Thus, there is dualism. According to Malkani, in case of duality the objects can only be real. If the self and the not-self both are equally real then the self will lose its essence of non-objectivity. The self is real in another level. Objects may also be called real as they are given and are experienced by us. But, Malkani's contention is that both together cannot be real. Hence there remains a choice between the self and the not-self, which can be regarded as real. There are a few scholars who opine that the objects are only real; the self is not real as it is not perceived. According to them the objects are not actually real they are the appearances. Appearances are illusory. Actually the real lies behind the appearances they are the
mental states which is real and they are related in a certain way with each other and with the body. Malkani refuses this view considering it as crude and superficial. Here the view is that the self is that which can be known by introspection. But the fact is that, what is known by introspection is not different from what is known by external sense organs. Both can give us knowledge about an object only. On the other hand if the self is regarded as appearance and the world of objects as real, Malkani argues, in that case the object will turn to mere nothing. Because if the self is nothing but the appearances and not real then the objects have nothing to be related with. As a result they will have nothing to get their reality from, “Take away its relatedness to myself, and it collapses. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that the self lends reality to the world. It is the only ground behind the appearance of the world”.32

A form has no meaning without a knowing mind. As for example, a sound has meaning i.e., it can be regarded as sound only when it is heard by somebody. Similarly the form of the object is not intelligible to the objects; it is intelligible in the sensuous experience. The ground of the reality of the physical world is the experience itself. Hence the object is not real. The ground is not the appearance. The self is the matter for a higher form of intuition. And this intuition transcends thought. The self, the Ultimate ground cannot be a matter of thought. It is the negation of everything which is the object of thought. It is not an appearance. The self is the negation of everything. And the negation is of various kinds. There may be temporal negation, spatial negation, negation of quality or of all taken together. Temporal negation implies that a thing cannot be present in all time, past, present and future. Negation of space indicates that when a thing exists in a certain place,
it will not exist in another place. Again all things cannot have all the qualities at
the same time. When all these three elements are ‘negated i.e., the thing is not in
time, space and having no qualities it implies that the thing really does not exist It
is an illusory thing. So far as negation is concerned it means the negation of all
space, time and quality. Object means all these negations. Object does not exist in
any time, space and has no quality. Malkani maintains that all kinds of negation
do not have only negative sides. There is a kind of negation which has some kind
of positivity also. As for example, in case of deep sleep there is the negation of all
kinds of objects. Though there is the absence of all kinds of experiences, yet this
absence of experience, is ultimately known. A question arises here that who knows
that state. All experiences in that state can be negated by the experience which is
the ground of experiences. And this permanent ground is another object which has
a positive character. According to Malkani it is the negation par-excellence. This
negation par-excellence is the ground of all the appearances both positive and
negative. And this negation par-excellence not only negate the things but also negate
their negation. Because if the things do not exist the question of their negation
does not arise at all. That which negate all objects cannot be objective in nature As
it is not objective so it cannot be given in experience and thereby can conceive it
“It can only be intuited. And when it is intuited, it will not offer any further
problem.”33 “We may give any analysis of the intuition of self we choose; but we
can never get beyond or further analyse the character of ‘I-ness’. It is the
ultimate ground of the intuition of the self and is the same for all individual.”34
According to Malkani there is no varieties in this intuition. It is necessarily
unchanging and self identical.
IS THE FUNCTIONING SELF THE REAL SELF?

It is true that everyone is aware of his own self. The self about which any one is aware is a functioning self. This self acts as a subject which knows, feels etc. There is another self which does not function. According to some the functioning self is not the real self. This self can exist only in relation to the objects. It is also known like other objects. Like the objects it is also an empirical entity called the ego. This empirical entity i.e., the ego cannot be the real self. Because there is the need of some other self to know this ego. Hence this empirical ego which is known, is in reality, the object. Malkani here maintains that the true subject can never be the object of any knowledge. Hence there is no two kinds of ‘I-ness’ or, ego like the subject—self and the object—self. I-ness can belong to the subject only. The object—self i.e., the object do not have this I-ness. Hence Malkani opines that, “If anything is absolutely clear to us, it is the distinction of the object and the subject. The object cannot be the subject, and vice-versa. If then the real self is indicated by the subject, this self is never known. It must be distinguished from the empirical ego which is known.”

A question may arise here thus: if the subject—self is not known, how can it be accepted that there is the subject—self. The knower is always related to the known. The concept of the knower has no meaning without its relation to the known. And in that sense the self is known as related to the object or the known. If it is not known the question of self—consciousness does not arise at all. According to Malkani, self is known as the intelligent being where there is no distinction between the intuition and the intuitive being. And intuitiveness itself is
the basis of the self-awareness. Without the original intuition of the self, the self cannot be distinguished from the not-self. Some may argue that in self awareness the self is not known; an idea of the self is known. An object is known and the self is taken as an idea to distinguish it from the object. The idea is objective. Malkani here points out that without some prior intuition of the self such idea will not come. And in that intuition the subject and the object cannot be distinguished. “We have an original intuition of the self. But this intuition, by its very nature, cannot be the intuition of one thing by another thing, or of one part of the self by another part, or even of the self by the self taking the self to be in two different positions such as subject and object”

The self is the soul of every other intuition. It is the intuitiveness itself. The self is the being. It is the ground of every intuition, so it is the Intelligent being. The self is subjective because it cannot be the object. In self awareness the being and its intuitiveness is overcome. Being and the intuitiveness are identical.

Self is not a matter of imagination. Because the self cannot be thought of. Thought is related to the object. It is true that man starts with ordinary self awareness. But by starting with this ordinary awareness the ground of awareness must be distinguished from the appearance. Knowledge of the self is a matter of understanding. One must be aware about the error that may occur in realizing the self. One must guard against those error. But this does not imply that the self is thought in his imagination. Because imagination also presupposes the existence of the self.

Thus from the analysis of the true nature of the self it appears that the self is never the known. The self which is known is the ego. And this ego is our
problem. Because in our practical life we cannot deny the necessity of the ego. But the ego is not the real entity. And this problem gives rise to the plurality of selves.

PLURALITY OF SELF

There is some differences among the Advaita Vedātins about the number of the ātman. According to some, there is only one ātman, while others admit of many ātmanas. Accordingly two theories have come into existence - one is ekātmanavāda, the other, anekātmanavāda. In Siddhāntaleśasaingraḥa, these views of ekātman and aneka-ātman have been elaborately discussed.

Ekātmanavāda: According to this theory, there is only one ātman. Among these ekātmanavadins also there are differences of views viz., Eka-śarīra-ātmanavādā and Aneka-śarīra-ātmanavādā.

Anekātmanavāda: This view propagates that the ātmanas or the selves are many as against the Ekātmanavāda. These thinkers do not accept the Ekātmanavāda, since in their view it cannot explain the distinction between the bound and the liberated. Accordingly, they propound the theory of many ātmanas. In their view the internal organ is the adjunct of the ātman, and as there are many antahkaranas, the ātmanas are also many. Thus, the difference between the bound and the liberated can be maintained on the basis of the difference of the upādhis. (itare-tu-anekātmanavādam āśritya baddha muktavasthāṃ pratipadyante, Siddhānta-Śeśa-Saingraḥa, p. 166).

The view of the anekātmanavādin is put forward by Malkani thus: as there are different apprehensions so there must be different selves. The different selves
perform different apprehensions. Hence in case of different apprehensions different selves perform the work and as a matter we call them ours. And consciousness in general includes all these different ‘I’ together. Our consciousness of different things is attained by the combined consciousness of different selves. So there are many selves. Malkani does not conform to this view. According to him, “many selves is fictitious; for it is after all the standpoint of the individual, who is a law unto himself”37 In his view, ‘I’ can be logically used for only one entity. But ‘you’ can be used for many different entities. And all these different entities are objective and their spirituality is in the secondary sense. They are like ‘you’ but in reality they are not actual ‘I’.

It may be argued that the other ‘I’ are also actual ‘I’. Because to say that there is only one genuine ‘I’ does not indicate that other selves are not genuine. The other selves are ‘you’ to the ‘I’. Hence they are objects to the ‘I’. Again ‘I’ is ‘you’ to other ‘I’, so there is a direct intuition of other ‘I’. ‘I’ intuits itself, similarly other ‘I’ intuits them in the same way. In their view the self must be represented by the term ‘you’ like ‘I’ in this sense, which indicates that the ‘self’ has some amount of objectivity in it. And it must be admitted that there is a community of selves. In this community each self is equal to every other self. Malkani objects to this view. According to him the intuition of ‘I’ is primary. “It will be noted that our intuition of ‘you’ is not primary. If ‘I’, then ‘you’. Unless I first Intuit myself, I cannot intuit other selves.”38 Because ‘you’ is the person spoken to. But without ‘I’ who speaks about ‘you’, the existence of ‘you’ cannot occur. Hence ‘I’ must be there before ‘you’ appears. We can directly intuit ‘I’ not ‘you’. ‘You’ is never a reality in itself. Some may argue that the lack of direct intuition does not indicate lack of
existence. The other selves also use the term ‘I’ for them and ‘you’ are the original ‘I’. So one’s selfhood can be protected only by admitting the selfhood of others.

To this Malkani argues that the concept of many selves is not acceptable. It is true that in the objective world many selves appear. But the real self is one and only one. It is not in relation to others. Because the self in relation is not self-luminous or self-revealing. Many selves appear in the dream of the ego. And the ego is not permanent. Hence it can exclude other selves at any time with its personal exclusion. And the self which is thus limited as it has existence with reference to other selves, cannot be self-luminous. It appears that the conception of many selves is fictitious.

In different acts of apprehension also there is only one and the same self. Malkani maintains that so far as apprehension is concerned it has some objective content. Because if an entity is knowable, it is an object. Thus in apprehension there is not self. The self is not a matter of apprehension. Self is known by intuition not by knowledge. In apprehension self is not found because in a mere apprehension there is no possibility of the consciousness of ‘I’. And as there is no consciousness of ‘I’ so the problem of many ‘I’ does not appear. Hence Malkani propagates the *Eka-jīva-vāda* as against *anekajīva-vāda*. According to Malkani, as there is not two entities both of which are self revealing so there cannot be many selves “The many selves must be known as many. But the moment a self is known it becomes the not-self or *jaḍa.*” 39 Because when one is known by the other then both the knower and the known become *jaḍa* or not self. Malkani maintains that though there are not many selves, it does not imply that the knowledge of the self is
absent. A thing is absent when it is previously known i.e., if the presence of a thing is known then only its absence can be known. But the self is not the object of knowledge hence its absence cannot be known. By looking merely within oneself, one may not get the knowledge of the self, but this does not mean that the self does not exist. That means the absence of the knowledge of the self does not imply the absence of the self. Because self is the knower, He is the Ancient one (purātana). Self has no beginning no end. Nobody can know the birth of the self. “It reveals all things as they come to birth and reveals all things as they go out of existence. It is the alpha and the omega.”\(^{40}\) It is also stated in the Gītā, “The unreal can never be, the real never ceases to be.” If a thing comes into being then it implies that that thing does not exist before that. So it is unreal before that time. Again, if a thing ceases to exist then it will imply that that thing will not exist after that time. Hence it is unreal after that time. Thus the self is that which does not cease to be and the matter is that which does not arise at all. Its coming into being is only an appearance. According to Malkani, “All things change. But if there is one thing that does not change, it is the Self. Without an unchanging self, change itself cannot be apprehended.”\(^{41}\) Behind the changing world something must be permanent. Because not a single object is found to be changeless. Self is the only permanent entity. It can be proved with the help of memory. The memory of a person may be corrected yet there is the continuation of the memory. Both the erring memory and the corrected memory remains as there is a continuous self. The self identity of the self is beyond any reasonable doubt.

According to some, the self is permanent in change. The permanent has no meaning without the impermanent. Self is changeless among the changeable body
and the mind. Hence, if the changeless self is real then the changeable body and
mind are also real. One requires the other and the both together constitute the
ultimate reality. Malkani argues that this view has an one-sided strength. It is true
that the change requires the unchanging. But the unchanging is not dependent on
the change. Because absolute permanence is always independent. If the changeless
has to depend on the change then it will be relatively permanent not absolutely.

"We must recognize that the self belongs to the order of eternity. It is the one
witness of the whole moving panorama of things. Nothing can touch it, nothing
affect it."42 Man passes through different states of life, i.e., wakefulness dream and
deep sleep. In the wakeful state he knows with the help of his different sense
organs, here there is no problem of memory and knowledge. In the dream state his
mind works. But in deep-sleep nothing remains. Neither the external nor the
internal organs work, yet we find a continuity in memory in all these states.
Malkani maintains that it is possible for the presence of the unitary and pure
objectless consciousness which is the witness or साक्षि of all these three states.

Some may say that life of a man and his personality is changing throughout the
life. There is no unchanging entity which will perceive this change. Because in
order to perceive the change something has to function or act. And the moment it
functions it itself has changed. Malkani argues that change must be known and in
order to know that change there must be some unchanging consciousness. This
unchanging consciousness does not act or function. By remaining actless and pure
it lends its light to reveal things which cannot be known otherwise. Hence to avoid
infinite regress some changeless entity is required. Otherwise it will happen that
one man will apprehend something and the memory of that apprehension will found
in another man. All the awareness of change and the consequent memory must be found in something which is called the self or 'sākṣī. Malkani says that Vedānta also develops the idea of the pure subject, "It alone exists in itself, if anything does. At the same time, it is not inert and immobile being; for all free activity, found in the phenomenon of willing, is ultimately to be referred to it as its sole cause. It is the only actor".43

Self is Freedom

Object is related. It is dependent on the subject. Subject has no need of the object, hence, it is free. Freedom is the very nature of the self. An object can exist even though it is not the object of a person. But the quality freedom cannot hang by itself. If the freedom does not inhere in the self then it is nothing at all. And the relation between the self and the freedom is fundamental.

Malkani argues that the will is not free; it is mixed up with desire. Will is always backed by desire. If there is no desire, there is no will. Hence the will is not free. The self that wills is free; he may will or he may not will. The freedom of the self is beyond all its external behaviour. Whether it will behave in a particular way or not depends on him. Hence freedom is the nature of the being itself.

Some may argue that being and the freedom are not the same. Because being is the substance it is static, while freedom is active; it is the action and as such dynamic. Hence, either the being is higher than the freedom or the freedom is higher than the being. (a) Freedom is higher because it is the power by which creation takes place. Being is created hence it is static and in the nature of
being. The power of creation is the principle of creativity. But the principle of creativity has meaning only to a being where it can subsist and which is uncreated being. If the being is also created out of the principle of creativity then there will not be the end of this series. Hence there must be some static uncreated being from which all creation become possible. Thus Malkani maintains that power issues from being and is dependent upon it. It is the being who is responsible or we can say that he has the freedom to decide whether to use the power or not. If freedom is beyond being, then it will control being. Malkani opines that, "The freedom of the self is beyond all its supposed expression in action. It is of the nature of being itself. We can truly say that being itself is freedom". Creator being is called the freedom because creation does not depend on the will but on the freedom of the being. Hence creation is identical with freedom.

Malkani again argues that if the self is said to be free then it must be accepted that the self is not spiritual. It will be like the created things of the world. Here the argument offered by Malkani is that when, it is said that, "I am free" it will be interpreted to mean that freedom belongs to the self. Now in case of false identification only the relation of belonging to can be understood. One thing cannot really belong to another. It can only belong to itself. Hence, "It is a false preposition to say that the self is free." A thing can belong to the self only when it has an independent existence. But freedom cannot be said to exist by itself or without any relation to the self. Hence freedom must be grounded in some real being. Real being is the ground of false appearance. This real being is nothing but the self. So he concludes that freedom is not beyond being nor is being beyond freedom. Freedom is the very nature of being.
Self is Joy

The notion that the self is freedom itself, immediately implies that the self is also joy itself. Because where there is freedom there is joy. Where there is no freedom there is limitation and bondage. And bondage is always painful.

Bondage is due to embodiment. Embodied existence is subject to hunger and thirst, heat and cold etc. And these different states of life naturally give us different kinds of pains. Because these states cannot be completely satisfied at any time. These various kinds of dissatisfactions cause pain. Hence in the embodied existence real joy cannot be attained. Real joy is found only in the fundamental disembodiment.

It must also be remembered that the physical body is not the only source of bondage. Man’s past karmas are primarily responsible for man’s bondage in this world. If body is the only cause of bondage then man can get rid of this bondage by destructing his body somehow. Body can be somehow destroyed but to destroy the past karmas and thereby to be dissociated with the past is not an easy matter. Hence, this is the potent form of bondage. It is associated with our moral life. And the moral life is the perfect expression of freedom. Because in moral life the agent is solely responsible for all his decision. Moral law has no compulsion. Man is free to do or not to do the moral act or good act so to say. Thus it follows that man is free but this freedom must be under some limitation. Freedom must not be equated here with eccentricity. What man does eccentrically is not permissible and it is not called freedom. "Thus both absolute freedom without reference to any determining factors and absolute bondage without reference to any element of freedom can be ruled out." Malkani opines that if we can break up the causal
chain then only we can get perfect freedom. This perfect freedom is the joy itself. This joy can be attained by knowledge and not by reflection. Reflection always hangs between ideals and actualities. Joy attained by reflection is mixed up with pain. Knowledge can only give us ultimate joy. This knowledge is the knowledge of the ultimate reality i.e., the self. The joy of the self is pure joy. This joy is the internal joy, it is not produced by external agency. Everybody loves his self. He loves his self not for the shake of other things but for the sake of the self only. This love for the self is unconditional. We love the self because it is the joy itself.

If it may be argued here that the being of the self and the joy of the self are not identical. If the being is the joy itself then it must be felt by each and everyone. And in that case the case of suicide will not occur. Joyful activity only can give joy to the being. In other cases the being is indifferent of joy so many persons become disappointed by the being of his existence and commit suicide.

Malkani maintains that the joy of activity is a secondary form of joy. Because joy associated with activity is attained due to the end of tension. In that case there will not be any pure joyful activity because all joyful activity will be related to some kind of tension. Hence joy attained from activity is always relative, sometimes mechanical. So, Malkani argues that pure joy must be unrelated to activity. It can be attained in the enjoyment of being who is the joy itself. He opines that the commitment of suicide also does not go against this view. The person, who commits suicide tries to get relief from the painful existence, not from the being of his existence. He tries a better condition of his existence because due to ignorance he does not know the real nature of his being as joy itself. If the
person does not find his desired state of being he tries to enter into the eternal forgetfulness or sleep called death. But death also, which he thinks is the ultimate peace, is not without being or self. Self is eternal as such it is neither born nor does it die. The person who commits suicide wants to get rid of his finite miserable existence. Actually he does not tell to destroy his self he tries to destroy his finite existence which is always painful.

REALITY IS THE SUBJECT

Knowledge is certain only when it is immediate. When knowledge is unmediated by sense etc. then only it can be certain knowledge. Knowledge which we generally conceive of is of the nature of subject – object relation. Hence knowledge is always about some object. This object may be external or internal. If it is external it will be mediate hence there is the charge of uncertainty of knowledge. If it is internal then it will be a form of imagination which is again not beyond criticism. Hence true knowledge must not be of the idealistic character. Knowledge is certain only when it is immediate to the self which is called the pratyagātman. Hence reality is subjective.

According to some western philosophers there is another sense in which subject is significant in case of reality. It implies that reality must be subjective because the subject can only be a self-subsistent whole. Object is always limited, subject can only be comprehensive. Hence the whole of reality is a self-contradiction. The subject, like the object is not included within anything. It is itself all-included within anything. It is itself all-inclusive.
Some maintain that the whole must be of the whole of subject and object. So far as the whole is concerned it must be subjective as well as objective. Subject or object in isolation has no meaning. Hence, in their view the concrete reality consists of ultimate subject and the ultimate object.

Malkani is against this view. He regards it as an erroneous idea. Subject never comes in relation to the object. The subject which is related to the object is itself the object. The real subject is not related to the object and thereby constructing the subject-object whole. “This ever uninclosed subject has a position which is quite unique with respect to every conceivable whole...... Thus the real subject includes every possible whole, but is not itself included”\(^{47}\). Malkani thus concluded that the ultimate reality is the pure subject not the object.

“The one substance in all reality is the self. Whatever else appears beside it is illusory in character. It has no real being.”\(^{48}\) Malkani maintains that illusory appearance is the result of our ignorance. Though it may appear as a mystery why the unreal appear, but in real fact it is not a mystery. It cannot be clearly stressed to our ignorance. There is no reason for the appearance of ignorance. This unreal appearance is regarded as māyā in Vedānta. Malkani maintains that māyā does not imply the mystery of creation. On the other hand mystery is solved by the term māyā.

**ABSOLUTE IN PROF. K.C. BHATTACHARYYA AND SRI AUROBINDO**

Now, we shall discuss about the concept of Absolute as interpreted by some of the contemporary Indian Philosophers, viz. Prof. K.C. Bhattacharyya and Sri Aurobindo. And in our discussion it will appear that the interpretation of the concept
of Brahman as given by Malkani is quite different from Prof. K.C. Bhattacharya and Sri Aurobindo, though all of them have accepted that Brahman is the only one Reality.

K.C. Bhattacharyya

Metaphysics

According to K.C Bhattacharyya, there is actually no metaphysics about the subject. Metaphysics is the theoretic consciousness about the object. It is the elaboration of the concept of the object as interpreted by the subject. Man is first conscious about the object. But the fact is that object is meaningless without the symbolization of the subject. It is the mind or the subject which actually understand the object. Hence though one is aware of the object first, yet it is the interpretation as given by the subject. Thus he maintains that metaphysical concepts have meaning only with reference to the subject or spirit, that goes beyond metaphysics. "What applies to the self applies with necessary alternations to other metaphysical entities. Metaphysics, or more generally, philosophy including logic and epistemology, is not only not actual knowledge, but is not even literal thought, and yet its contents are contemplated as true in the faith that it is only by such contemplation that absolute truth can be known".49

Absolute in K.C. Bhattacharyya’s Views

Generally a distinction is found between the content and consciousness. Content means the object about which we are conscious. This distinction is called the implicational dualism. We find three kinds of consciousness: thinking, feeling and willing. Corresponding to the consciousness of thinking we have the concept of
truth. Truth here is neither subjective nor objective. It is neither a fact nor a belief nor a form. It is the real substance. Feeling and felt together constitute the value of the object. Willing leads to freedom. The relation between the willing and willed content is the relation between two willed contents. Because so far as the will is concerned, the willing must be the will about something. Here one content is willed as a means to attain another willed content. This relation may be regarded as the contrast between ‘I will this act’ and ‘I will this act that I ought to will’. In the former case it is the being of willing which is super shaded by the latter willing. Thus it follows that an act is willed to overcome the being of the act which leads to freedom.

In the view of K.C. Bhattacharyya, Absolute is that which is beyond the implicational dualism. The dualism between the content and consciousness is not found in the Absolute. Again the Absolute is not the consciousness.

Absolute in K.C. Bhattacharyya’s views is an ununifiable triplicity. It is not some unitary concept. It is truth, freedom and value in their alternative forms. And the Absolute is not the unitary of truth, freedom and value. According to K.C. Bhattacharyya, three subjective functions of knowing, willing and feeling formulates the absolute of truth, freedom and value. “It is each of them, these being only spoken separately but not meant either as separate or as one.”

It cannot be said that the Absolute related to these three grades of consciousness truth, freedom and value are three in number K.C. Bhattacharyya opines that the Absolute is not a known content. Hence, the question of one or many does not arise at all. Because the question of one or many has significance only with reference to a known content.
K.C. Bhattacharyya makes a distinction between truth and reality. In the opinion of K.C. Bhattacharyya reality can be enjoyed but truth cannot be enjoyed. Truth is extra-religious or transcendental consciousness. According to him transcendental consciousness will not remain as consciousness if it is not spoken of or if it is not the consciousness of the subject. It is informative or descriptive so to say. But in knowing the absolute the transcendental consciousness cannot do anything because transcendental consciousness ends with the believe that truth can be symbolized only. It does not help us to know the truth.

The truth or Absolute can be known negatively only where the subjective consciousness or the transcendental consciousness is also dispensed with. Truth is believed but literally unspeakable. Hence, it is self-revealing. But K.C. Bhattacharyya does not think that the reality is self-revealing because reality is not beyond speech.

It has already been said that Absolute is the alternative forms of truth, freedom and value. K.C. Bhattacharyya opines that truth is not related to value. But this does not mean that value is untrue. Again value is not reality which again does not imply that value is unreal. Reality is not true and it does not mean that truth is unreal. That is why Absolute is defined as the alternation of truth, value and reality.

It appears that as in the opinion of K.C. Bhattacharyya the Absolute cannot be identified with reality, truth and value hence He can only be known negatively. Truth, reality, value are not informative about the Absolute. They can be spoken about the Absolute but not spoken of the Absolute. Truth, freedom and value are not descriptions of the Absolute. "The Absolute, it has been said, has to be formulated in a triple way as truth, freedom and value. Each is absolute, but what are here
understood as three are only their verbal symbols; they themselves are understood

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together but not as together. They can be negatively understood as truth is not

value, value is not real and reality is not true. In one direction their identity and
difference are alike meaningless and in another direction their identity is intelligible
though not assertable.

According to Prof. K.C. Bhattacharyya, the Absolute is that, what I am not. K.C.

Bhattacharyya only likes to symbolic representation of the Absolute, “the

absolute self is not only no judgment but is not even literally spoken. Still, it is

not meaningless, and symbolizes what is positively believed, viz., truth. What is

believed and is not literally speakable (and is as such undeniable) is truth.”

Thus K.C. Bhattacharyya maintains that the Absolute is a matter of believe but not a

matter of knowledge. He cannot be known in the judgmental form which is

informative in its character.

In Sāṅkara Vedānta we find that God is not identified with the absolute. God

is the qualified Brahman. And satisfies the religious cravings of the individual. But

with the rise of Brahma knowledge, when the individual understands that he is

identical with Brahman, the reality of God will be no more there. Hence the reality

of god like the reality of the individual is only an appearance.

In K.C. Bhattacharyya’s philosophy there is distinction between Brahman and

the over personality of religion. In religion there is a distinction between the person

and over personality. Person may be the individual being who is the devotee. Over

personality is the God who is worshipped. He is the enjoyed being. So in worship

the subject I abnegates itself, yet it remains as an enjoyed being. Absolute is not the

overpersonal reality because the Absolute cannot be enjoyed but the overpersonality
can be enjoyed. He is worshipped as a god in religion. In religion there is identity-in-difference but the Absolute is indeterminate. It cannot be called self-identity. Because its triple characters are never identical. They remain as alternate symbols of the absolute.

From the above discussion it follows that though both Malkani and K.C. Bhattacharyya has accepted Brahman as one Reality, yet the realization of this reality differs between them. According to Malkani, Brahman is realized as identical with the self. He is the identity of sat, cit, ananta and ananda. But in the view of K.C. Bhattacharyya absolute always remains as a symbol. He is not the identity. He is not the knowledge Itself nor is known except as a symbol of the three alternative metaphysical concepts of truth, freedom and value.

**Absolute in Sri Aurobindo’s View**

In comparison with Malikani’s view on the Absolute, Aurobindo’s view is somewhat different. Sri Aurobindo has never discarded the idea of Absolute Reality found in the ancient Vedānta, but only added something new which we do not find in any other system or view. In the view of Aurobindo, Being is the ultimate reality, he called it Saccidānanda. He maintains that Brahman, the supreme Reality, is one, ineffable, pure Existence, without quality, quantity and form. But pure Existence which is without quality, quantity and form, does not mean that It cancels them but it means that It exceeds them so that they can pass into It to get transmuted and again come out of it in the cosmic movement.

In order to understand Aurobindo’s concept of Saccidānanda, we have to understand his theory of evolution. In the words of Suraj Bhan Arora, “The Divine in Sri Aurobindo’s language stands for the creator who enters into his creation,
sustains it and is still above it." According to Aurobindo, evolution is the descent of the Divine consciousness. Absolute is dynamic. He expresses Himself in the world of spirit and matter. Aurobindo maintains that the Absolute manifests Itself in two ways, viz., in His static aspect and in His dynamic aspect. In the former sense He is the Being or reality, also called Saccidananda. In the latter sense He is Becoming or Supermind. He is the effectual reality. Supermind is not separate from saccidananda or Being. It is the Supermind which is the link between Being and Becoming. Aurobindo opines that Becoming is not separate from the Being but, "present in it, constituted by it, inherent in its every infinitesimal atom and in its boundless expansion and extension". And there is no fundamental difference between the two. All is fundamentally the essential Divine. The difference lies in their manifestation.

An important contention of Aurobindo is that he refuses to accept both Spiritualism and Materialism. According to him, both these are one-sided views. For him both spirit and matter are real. In his integral philosophy he has tried to reconcile matter and spirit. According to him there is a continuous series from the highest spirit to the lowest form of matter. In each step there is the presence of consciousness. The Supermind, which is truth consciousness, is the creator God. In the most insignificant form of matter there is consciousness as it is in the series of becoming or truth consciousness. It is a līlā of the divine because it conceals itself step by step towards the inconscient matter. Again It uncovers the veil step by step till to Its self revelation. Hence evolution is the gradual process of concealment and again its self-revelation. As the Divine consciousness is found in the matter also, matter has some sort of reality. While other Advaita Vedāntins regard the
world of matter as illusory or *māyā*. Aurobindo does not regard *māyā* in that sense. He is in the opinion that *māyā* is the supermind which is the creative principle of the Divine. According to him, “world is *Māyā*, world is not unreal in the sense that it has no sort of existence, for even if it were only a dream of the Self, still it would exist in It as a dream, real to it in the present even while ultimately unreal. No ought we to say that the world is unreal in the sense that it has no kind of eternal existence, for although particular worlds and particular forms may or do dissolve physically and return mentally from the consciousness of manifestation into the non-manifestation, yet form in itself, world in itself is eternal.”

According to Aurobindo supermind is the divine *māyā* by which He manifolds this world process. And this world process from the spirit to the matter is not unreal. Aurobindo calls it higher *māyā*. In this Divine *Māyā*, *Vidyā* and *Avidyā* both are comprehended. Unlike Malkani, Aurobindo maintains that this Divine *māyā* or Supermind is the only creative principle.

He maintains that mind is not the creative principle. When *māyā* is regarded as the creative principle than it is the false interpretation that mind is the creative principle in association with *māyā*. This is considered as lower *māyā*. By denying the mind as the creator either of the spirit or of the matter, Aurobindo denies mind as another incompatible original entity. Aurobindo’s monism is established when he has considered Supermind to be the sole creative principle. Supermind is identical with the Divine.

Thus we find that Aurobindo regards Brahman as the positive principle who is also the force and there by creates the manifold world. *Māyā* is not a negative principle over and above the *Saccidānanda* or Divine to create the world appearance.
Because the world is also not unreal. It is the expression of the Divine, here true—consciousness remains in an insignificant state without its complete negation. His monism is called, ‘integral monism’.

From the above discussions it becomes clear that Malkanis interpretation of Absolute is different in respects of Aurobindo’s interpretation of Absolute. The striking difference between Malkani and Aurobindo is that while Aurobindo regards matter as conscious and it is not totally devoid of reality. In the philosophy of Malkani, the reality of matter is totally denied. According to him spirit only is real. He maintains that appearance of matter is only an illusory appearance caused by mayā.

Aurobindo’s monism is ‘Integral monism’ it is unlike Malkani’s ‘Absolute monism’, Integral monism is “a monism that is which integrates the dual principles of Brahman and māyā into one single reality.”56

In conclusion it can be said that Malkani maintains that metaphysics aims at realizing the Ultimate Reality or Truth. This ultimate reality in philosophy is unlike other truths or reality. This reality is beyond creation and destruction and hence beyond our sense experience. Malkani, like Śaṅkara, accepts Brahman as the ultimate reality. Brahman is without any quality (nirguṇa) and without any difference (nirviśeṣa), whose essence is sat (existence), cit (knowledge) and ānanda (bliss). This Brahman though beyond quality and action and thereby beyond all kinds of definitions, can be known as something non-different from the self or ātman of man. The individual self is in essence identical with Brahman. So as soon as man comes to know the self, all philosophical problems will come to an end. But this eternal fact is unknown to man due to ignorance caused by māyā.
Malkani’s view of Brahman as identical with the self is different from that of K.C. Bhattacharyya who regards Brahman as a symbol not as an identical self. Malkani also differs from Aurobindo in his interpretation of the Absolute. Malkani’s monism is Absolute monism whereas Aurobindo’s monism is Integral monism.

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2. Ibid., p. 19.
6. “Causality relatedness etc., lead beyond the world to something that is no part of the world and that is essentially metaphysical in character”, *Metaphysics of Advaita Vedānta*, p. 34.
10. “The view that on unchanging agent really causes something is unintelligible and therefore untenable”. Ibid., p. 218.
12. Ibid., p. 40.
13. Ibid., p. 211.
15. Ibid., p. 215.


18. Ibid., p. 252.


20. Ibid., p. 49


23. Ibid. p. 57.

24. Ibid., pp. 59, 60

25. Ibid., p. 61.


27. Ibid., p. 70.

28. Ibid., p. 74.


31. *God in Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 245.


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45. Ibid., p. 106

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