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CHAPTER VI

MORAL AND OTHER VALUES

ETHICS

Ethics, derived from Greek Ethicos means having to do with conduct. Ethics also means moral philosophy. According to Richard B. Brandt, ethics proper is concerned with what is justifiably believed or valued. Thus ethics is concerned with the systematic study of the value concepts, viz., good, bad, ought etc. Hence ethics is concerned with asserting the supreme importance of moral factor in all the relation of life. It aims at the good life which will comprise the religion, and the justice, love, loyalty, peace, brotherhood etc. to a society. Ethics is not a theology nor a ceremony. A.E.HN argues that, “Devotion to the ethical ideal is central and quite apart from any theological, metaphysical or ceremonial considerations.”

In Indian Philosophy ethics is not discussed separately. As a result there is no separate branch called ethics. The division which is found in Indian Philosophy is of dharma-śāstra and mokṣa-śāstra. Dharma-śāstra is concerned with actions. Action, according to Advaita Vedānta, cannot lead man to the ultimate goal. On the basis of the merit of the action one can at least reach to the heavenly bliss. But so long as there is action there remains embodiment. And embodied existence cannot be devoid of ignorance. Knowledge only can help us to know the Intelligent Self. Knowledge destroys the body which is caused by ignorance. But in order to attain that knowledge some form of religious actions are required. And here comes the question of morality.
Action may be good or bad. The distinction between red and blue, good and bad is a common faculty of knowledge. The problem is that these two kinds of distinctions are not of the same type. Normally the distinction between red and blue is objective while the distinction between good and bad is subjective. According to some the distinction between good and bad must be objective like red and blue. They maintain that so far as morality is concerned, what is good is good for all and what is bad is bad for all. They are of the opinion that the distinction between rightness and wrongness are absolute. Hence the distinction between right and wrong is objective. And the perception of this distinction is attained by an individual by proper education and intelligence. There are certain forms of moral actions which are common to all man called the mānaṇa-dharma; for example, everybody knows that the speaking truth is right while talking a lie is wrong; keeping promise is right while failing to do so is wrong.

According to others, the moral distinction is not natural or innate. They are of the opinion that it is the society which is the possessor of this non-natural ideal and society imposes this moral law upon individual. Hence it appears that moral sense of an individual depends on the nature of education given to him by the society. It is also true that moral sense is already in man but until and unless he gets properly educated, this sense does not act. And the kind of education given to him determines the nature of moral activity. From this it follows that moral action may differ with the difference of educational surroundings. Question may arise thus: how society which is prior to individual develops its moral sense. It is thought that society develops its moral sense by trial and error method. In this sense it is empirical. It is also natural because those actions help to make greater social harmony.
and well being. According to these thinkers moral distinctions are relative. There is no such moral distinction which is absolute. Such distinctions change from society to society, from person to person.

In contrast to this view there are philosophers who believe that moral sense is given to us from the above. They maintain that morality is absolute. According to them, every society while deciding their moral code look at their history to find out which code is most expected. It means that they decide that code which prescribes certain standard for all time. And such standard is dependent on the authority of some person whose personality is beyond question. Hence here the code of conduct is supernatural. According to this view God has implanted the distinction of right and wrong in us. Man is educated to learn the code but that education is fully sacred education. And the code attained by such education is absolute, not relative.

Yet there is another group of thinkers, for whom morality does not depend on the society or on religion. This group maintains that morality has wider scope than religion. It is expected that one man may not belong to any religious group but he must be moral. In their view morality is possible without religion but religion is not possible without morality. So moral distinctions are sui generis. They have their own fields. So the distinction between rightness and wrongness does not come from outside. As a result moral values are ultimate and irreducible.

Malkani maintains that morality is not possible without some religious background. Morality is based on religion. He maintains that, “If we exclude all religion, we as a matter of fact exclude every interest. Which morality can serve.” As the question of moral obligation comes in, the next question that follows
is why should one follow what is conventionally taken as right and wrong. If the morality is objectively determined i.e., if it is prescribed by some outside agency then one may not conform to that prescription. Malkani is of the opinion that the prescription can be followed by a person if and only if it is imposed by scripture, which is a non-human and divine authority. And why man will submit himself to this prescription is guided by the belief that such authority can only safeguard our highest interest, here and hereafter. As a result man gives to it his unconditional allegiance. It follows that, that is ultimately valuable which gives man highest pleasure or satisfaction. Pleasure or satisfaction may be of two kinds. There are certain forms of pleasure which gives us satisfaction in this embodied life and is called preya. It is also called kāma. There is another and higher level of satisfaction promised by religion which can be attained only here after and is called śroya. And this śroya is related to dharma. There is still higher satisfaction which is Freedom or Eternal joy and is called mokṣa. Malkani regards kāma and artha as naturalistic value and dharma and artha as non-naturalistic value. He says, “To save the unique character of the value-concept of goodness, we illegitimately upgrade pleasure and down-grade virtue”.³

Malkani maintains that as ethical ideals have no meaning without their connection to religion, it is better to say Hindu morality, Christian morality, Instead of saying ethical obligation par excellence. Virtues of life may be the same but the emphasis on them depends in accordance with the scheme as found in different scriptures. Thus without accepting any religious scheme ethical ideals can only satisfy our self-interests and nothing else. But there is always a conflict between the objects of desire (preya) and the religious duty ( śroya). Our religious duty
always try to regulate our natural desires. So religious duty is the law of the spirit and helps to safeguard our ultimate happiness. If the authority of the scripture is not accepted then our conduct will be guided by self-interest.

Now, some thinkers, may content that as man is essentially a rational being, reason must guide his conduct. Generally man lives a life of instincts, passions etc. But reason is such that upgrades man's living and helps to lead a rational life. So all our legitimate desire will be satisfied within the limit under the supervision of reason. But the fact is that though some people think that man is essentially rational and will be guided by reason only, yet we cannot ignore the other important element in man i.e., his animality. Malkani regards that man actually is not driven by reason but by the animal nature in him. It is the animality in man which is actually the driving, instinct in man. Reason, in that case, has a negative function only. Reason only warns us not to do something. So Malkani maintains that reason is concerned with the 'do's and don'ts' of our life. So far as pure rationality is concerned the question of morality does not arise at all. Morality has its relation to some person who is more or less guided by his animal nature.

Again it may be said that all man may have some personal and some impersonal desires. Impersonal desires are like 'all man must get peace' etc. And as man is rational, so he must acquire these impersonal desires inspite of personal desire. Malkani opines that, all desires are actually subjective desires. And so far as subjective desire is concerned it will vary from person to person. If someone desires peace, other will strive for war. For some person war is the impersonal desire. And as a result there will be more chaos so far as impersonal desire is
concerned. So it must be admitted that value must be in accordance with scriptural value.

In the Advaita Vedānta, it is also found that supreme knowledge of truth is not possible without performance of religious duties. Action is indispensable for the attainment of truth. And action is the action prescribed in the scripture. The performance of such actions must be free from all kinds of desires except the desire for the knowledge of Brahman. All actions must be done to acquire Brahma knowledge. So absolute freedom can be attained only with the rise of Brahmajñāñaysā. And at this stage all actions will come to an end. But Brahmajñāñaysa can be satisfied only by the listening to a true guru. This stage, is called śravana. The stage of śravana is followed by the next stage of manāpa. Since in the stage of śravana the formal doubts about the meaning of the words are only removed. But even in this stage all doubts are not removed. It is stage of mere belief in the scriptural truth. So at the third stage attempts towards the real knowledge about the truth takes place. According to Malkani, the stage of manāpa is the philosophy proper. Since in this stage all the doubts are removed as a result the truth is seen. Though the spiritual aspirant attains the truth here by resolving all doubts by a speculative mind yet he is not totally free to live in truth. Man’s past habits and believes are in constant disturbing element to realize the truth. And these are required to be abolished which is only possible in a stabilized mind. Only a stabilized mind can overcome the false ideas, wrong habits etc. To attain a stabilized mind, on the other hand, constant meditation is required. This is called nididhetsyasana. Here the person lives in truth. He unites himself to the truth through a
process of intensive meditation. Here knowledge becomes perfect. "Nothing is left
to be done. Life and action respond to the higher wisdom. We are perfectly free".\textsuperscript{4}

Thus it follows that, "Morality in Advaita Vedānta prepares the ground for
knowledge, and gives the necessary qualification for it. There its function is over. The
Highest can only be reached through knowledge. But knowledge, being a human
affair, is capable of refinement and perfectibility. The goal is Perfect Freedom in life
or \textit{jīvan-mukti}.\textsuperscript{5} The fact is that, the person who is \textit{jīvan-mukta} still have a body;
so he is not beyond humanity. Malkani opines that though the \textit{jīvan-mukta} has a
body as a result he is somehow related to humanity yet he is so detached from the
world that he is just a stranger to his performances. He acts just like an actor in
the drama, who knows that the part he is playing is not real. A freed soul or \textit{jīvan-
mukta} acts in the human society just like the actor in the drama.

A question may be raised here thus whether the freed person has any kind
of morality to the society. Morality prepares the ground to attain freedom. Morality
is the first step to make somebody fit for the desire for Brahma knowledge. It is
found that according to Malkani, a freed person is not moral by no means. He
argues that, "It cannot be doubted that morality after knowledge is the highest kind
of morality, for it alone is truly and absolutely disinterested. It is service at the
purely spiritual level and true universal love. Conventional morality, which is
morality at the level of ignorance, is completely transcended here. The freed soul acts
not with his ego, but as the Divine Life or the Universal Life within him, which
actually directs him to do. He is just like a human tool to do for the humanity.\textsuperscript{6}

Some may argue that the freed person is not above human obligation. He is
obliged to the society because society has helped him in various ways to attain
freedom. So he cannot get away from the duties to the society. They argue that even the freed person has greater duty towards the society as he is the most efficient person to help the society to overcome all kinds of evils. So he is in a sense bound to serve the miserable society.

Malkani first of all likes to contend that it is true that the freed person is a human being. But the specialty in him is that he combines in himself the best of humanity with divinity. So he acts in the best interest of humanity i.e., to say at the highest level of moral excellence. The fact is that such a person cannot do any sin. There is no possibility of doing the wrong by him. He is above this. Hence the distinction between right and wrong, the actual fact of morality, makes no sense to him. It makes no difference to him. So the question of morality with the freed person does not arise at all. In the opinion of Malkani, the question of obligation with the freed person is a distorted view only. Obligation has meaning only to a person who may not perform his duties and obligations. So some kind of impositions like obligations etc. is required for that person to make him bound to that man. As the freed person is always in service to the betterment of humanity so the external imposition is quite unnecessary for him. To him all kinds of worldly values are only illusions. The External Value i.e., the knowledge of oneness with the Absolute is the only real value to him. And as he realizes himself as one with the Absolute so morality in the empirical sense is out of question.

VALUE

There is at least one philosophical problem in which all thinking men are interested - it is the problem of man's existence in the world, the final goal of his
life and the values he should pursue in order to realize that goal. It is said that the
uniqueness of the Indian way of life and its spiritualistic outlook as a part of a
philosophical heritage cannot be brought to light clearly unless the entire system of
values in Indian thought is considered primarily. Besides the spiritual and religious
values Indian Philosophical systems are also conscious about the economic,
political, hedonistic and moralvalues of life. Four-fold (caturvarga) value concept
is found in Indian system of philosophy viz., dharma, artha, kama and moksa.
Artha consists of politico-economic value, kama, the hedonistic value and dharma,
the moral value. The religious and spiritual goal of life is called moksa. These are
called purusarthas. Purusartha literally means the “objective of human life”. These
four values are laid down by the ancient Indian thinkers for governing the moral
life of human being. In India the origin of philosophy is not in, ‘the thinking
consideration of things’ but in the attempt at reaching the sumnum bonum of life;
not in the desire to know (jijnasa) but in the desire for emancipation (mumuksa).
The scheme of caturvarga satisfies the entire man. In the Upanisadic tradition man
is considered not as a mere being but as a self-directed becoming. And this self-
directed aspect of becoming consists in man’s search for values.

Contemporary European thinkers are chiefly concerned with the three traditional
values viz., Truth, Beauty and Goodness. A large number of scientific minded Humanist
philosophers of the west are mainly associated with the objective and intrinsic
nature of values. Not only in the west but in contemporary Indian thought also this
very concept of value occupies a place of prominence. “One thing will however,
have to be acknowledged that the very concept of value owes its origin to its
recent times and it is possible to study ancient systems of thought in its light”.7 In
the view of M. Hiriyanna, “the realization of value is preceded by a definite awareness of it. This constitutes a very important difference between man and the lower animals which also, as we know pursue ends like him. They too strive to satisfy their desires but they differ from him in that they do so without any idea of the satisfaction they are seeking." G.R. Malkani has also made an elaborate discussion on this concept of value. His books viz., *A Study of Reality*, ‘*Metaphysics of Advaita Vedanta*’ etc. throw sufficient light on this conception of ‘value’.

Moral life is necessary for a man because by leading a moral life man can live a happy and comfortable life. It is said that moral consciousness is found in all men. Man can naturally distinguish between the rightness and wrongness of action. The distinction between right and wrong is like the distinction between red and blue. It is also said that the distinction between right and wrong is objective i.e., something is right in itself and some other thing is wrong in itself. This distinction is like the sensible distinction as found in red and blue. But yet some sort of education and intelligence is required to perceive the distinction of the moral qualities, since the distinction between the rightness and wrongness is not crude. It is said that there are some *mānabadharmā* which are found in all men. Generally all men agree that speaking the truth, keeping promise etc., are virtues and consequently speaking a lie, disobeying promise etc. are vices. Hence it follows that man has a moral sense present in them. And by proper education this moral sense becomes developed as all men are not conscious about them.

Malkani does not conform to the above view. According to him, there lies a difference between the distinction of right and wrong and red and blue. The distinction between right and wrong differ from person to person. What is right to
some one may be wrong to other. Again, according to him moral sense and consequently moral values are not objective; they are not the result of education. Moral values are subjective. The concept of value has a reference to the subject and it is purposive. Hence the concept of value implies dualism i.e., there is quality and a subject who appreciates that quality. It means that values always implies value to some person.

Now, those philosophers who regard value as objective, say that value embodies ideal. These ideals are not dependent on individual’s realization and they are beyond individual. It is argued that, “things that have value are not valuable because they are those things simply, but because they embody some ideal.” A particular thing has value only because of some ideal beyond the thing. Here, the question arises whether, this ideal is objective like the thing itself or not. According to the supporter of the objectivity of value, an ideal may not be objective like the thing. But even then the ideal is not made by the individual, hence it is independent of the individual. They also point out that the objectivity of value is clear from the fact that there is a general unanimity among individuals regarding the acceptance of something as valuable. The individual realizes that value is not something which is imposed by him. Value is already there, he is only to recognize that value. Thus, “A thing is valuable not because it is appreciated, it is appreciated because it is valuable.”

According to Malkani, on the other hand, the value always implies the value to some person or individual. If value is not realized or appreciated by some individual then it will imply that there is unrecognized and independent value. But this is absurd. There is nothing which is valuable but is not recognized as
valuable, be it aesthetic value or moral value. For example, aesthetic value is recognized in the case of a beautiful picture. But even though it is appreciated or enjoyed due to its beauty there is difference among individuals regarding the degree of aesthetic effect it produces. And if beauty is not enjoyed or appreciated by some subject it cannot be regarded as beauty at all. Similarly in the case of moral values also this subjectivity of value has to be accepted. Moral value also cannot exist independently. Moral value is meaningful only to a person who freely tries to realize an ideal. Law of causality cannot produce morality. Morality guides an individual in his aspiration towards a higher and more harmonized life. However, we cannot define this moral ideal by which man is guided, this is beyond definition. An ideal is such that it regulates the conduct of the ideating subject. As soon as the individual approaches towards the ideal it expresses itself in essence. Hence the moral ideal cannot be regarded as an object which can be defined as good or bad etc. value is not in things, it is in the subject that appreciates things. Hence, Malkani says, “value is value because it is appreciated value and not because it is value”. In this way Malkani establishes the subjectivity of value by rejecting its objectiveness.

Now, according to Malkani, there are two levels of good or value viz., preya and śreya. Those things which give us pleasure or satisfaction in this embodied life and which is naturally desired by all men are regarded as preya. Again there are certain kinds of enjoyment prescribed by religion which cannot be enjoyed in this life. Such kind of enjoyments can satisfy our life in the hereafter. These kinds of enjoyments or good are regarded as śreya. The former is regarded as kāma and the latter is dharma. The objects of desire and religious duty are constantly
conflicting to each other. Religious duty or \textit{sreya} tries to control the objects of desire. \textit{Sreya} can thus be regarded as the law of the spirit. The ultimate good or happiness is protected by this law. And the source of this law is the scripture. And if the authority of the scripture is rejected then the result would be that the law of enlightened self-interest will control our conduct. Hence pleasure or ultimate reality is the basis of morality. Morality is not independent of religion, "In Indian Philosophy, there is no independent science of ethics. Ethics is part and parcel of religion."\textsuperscript{12} Scripture can only safeguard man's highest interest both in this world and hereafter. And that is ultimately valuable or good which can give us complete satisfaction or pleasure. This Malkani refers to as \textit{sreya}.\textsuperscript{13}

The four traditional values of Indian philosophy are classified by Malkani as naturalistic and non-naturalistic values, \textit{kama} i.e., the pleasure in this life and \textit{artha} i.e., good things of life are brought under the distinction of naturalistic value. And the religious duty or \textit{dharma} and the Absolute Freedom or eternal joy or \textit{moksha} are regarded as non-naturalistic value. Pleasure is good as also speaking the truth is good. But there is a difference between these two types of goodness. "Pleasure is not good in the same sense in which speaking the truth is good, and it would be quite wrong to suppose that both have the same non-naturalistic quality of goodness".\textsuperscript{14}

Goodness is the ultimate value which is ultimate bliss. And the attainment of this ultimate pleasure is \textit{moksha}. Human being is guided by this ultimate value or \textit{moksha}. And this \textit{moksha} Malkani points out can be attained in this life itself. As soon as a person attains \textit{moksha} he is regarded as \textit{jivan-mukta}, since his body still persists. This is the view upheld by the Advaitins. This \textit{jivan-mukta} possesses two natures i.e., divine and human. With his divine nature and temperament he can teach
the people for their spiritual upliftment. Whoever comes nearer him is influenced by his power of truth. Hence, nothing can be regarded as more valuable service to the society than his. But this Jivan-mukta is not interested about any worldly values created by man. He enjoys the eternal joy of freedom. Hence only the eternal value is valuable to him. Worldly values are created by the ignorant man who still lives in illusion. Jivan-mukta is beyond all such values. Whether society will degrade him for not doing anything, he does not care. This Jivan-mukta or freed person does the greatest service to the society. But he does not do anything under any obligation. Actually he is the law unto himself. He is really free. No sin accrues to him. But in reality the Jivan-mukta is ‘incapable of committing a sin or something that is repugnant to the moral sense of mankind. He is the true moral instructor of the society.’ Hence Malkani says, “It cannot be doubted that morality after knowledge is the highest kind of morality; for it alone is truly and absolutely disinterested.” Thus according to Malkani this is the highest value of life.

**IS REALITY IDENTICAL WITH VALUE?**

It is often found that a thing has value to some one and it has no value to others. Hence a thing is not valuable in itself. Again it is found that there is something which is valuable to everybody and which is appreciated by all. It implies that there are certain things which are intrinsically valuable And the thing which is intrinsically valuable cannot be known by any other means except by intuition.

A question may arise as to how existence is related to value. Because it is possible that a thing exists and it has value yet fact and value are different. It is
generally thought that a thing can exist without its entailment of value. And existence
does not entail value. Malkani does not conform to this view. According to
Malkani the notion of value entails the notion of being or existence. Because
without some being or existence value cannot exist in the air. But this relationship
of value as a dependent concept can be put in two ways. (1) The conception of
intrinsic value cannot be validated. Value is not in the thing. It is therefore not an
adjective of the existent in any sense. (2) Value is what is felt. And on the ground
of feeling, value can be shown to be itself a substantive which has existence for its
predicate.  

Prof. G.E. Moore regards value as intrinsic because he holds that value is
the intrinsic nature of the thing. And as long as the thing exists value also exists
as its nature. Hence value is objective. “If however, we are thus to say that
predicates of value, though dependent solely on intrinsic properties, are not themselves
intrinsic properties, there must be some characteristics belonging to intrinsic properties
which predicates of value never possess. And it seems to me quite obvious that
there is, only I can’t see what it is”.  

Malkani, while criticizing this view, maintains that value is produced to the
thing by a feeling subject. It does not exist in the internal sense organ i.e., in the
feeling nor does it exists in external sense object. Thus, though value is produced in
the thing by the feeling subject, yet it is not in the feeling. Again, while appreciating
a thing as beautiful, the person does not only give value to the thing, it actually
manifests the subject’s artistic sense. If the person concerned here does not have the
artistic sense, the beauty of the thing will not be appreciated. Like J. S.
Makenzie, Malkani opines that it implies that beauty is not a passively recognized
property. While regarding something as beautiful one is also actively participating in this recognition. Because to regard something as beautiful and so to have value the person must have a creative eye. So it cannot be said that value is beyond all appreciation. Hence, it is intrinsic.

Now, the question arises that if a thing has no value like beauty etc., is it possible to regard it as beautiful. In that case value will be superimposed on the thing. Malkani opines that, “The only conclusion to which we are inevitably driven is that value is not intrinsic to the thing; it is not falsely superimposed upon it, and lastly, it is not really produced in it through any kind of subjective action.”\(^{18}\) He maintains that the value is not arbitrarily superimposed on the thing. The intrinsic nature of the thing is equally responsible for determining it as valuable. Here there is some sort of objectivity of value character of a thing. It is not superimposed and it is not produced by the feeling subject. On the other hand value can be felt only. And it is not expressible by thought. It is not a matter of thought.

Malkani, while discussing about the second contention that value is itself a substantive, concludes that, “The thesis which I want to maintain as against this is that value has no locus standi except being, and that in the end the truest being must coincide with highest value”.\(^{19}\) It may appear that while regarding something as having value, it is thought that value is related to something which pleases us. Without such relation a thing will exist only without any value. Question may arise that what is that thing which pleases us. Because beauty, for example, is not produced by the perceived character. Beauty, is something which produces the value beauty, not by mere perception. But that ‘something’ which cannot be defined
produces pleasure. A person may get pleasure by perceiving the body only. But Malkani opines that the soul which is an ideal content actually pleases us not the body. And that ideal content is real and alive. Question arises that where this ideal content exists. If it is not existent in the thing it is either in an ideal realm or in an appreciating mind. Because if it does not exist then value will be unreal. Again if the ideal content exists then it will lead to infinite regress. Because in that case one thing will have value for some ideal content and another thing will have value for some other ideal content and so on ad infinitum. Hence value is not a different substantive having being as its adjective. It is not free from being. Malkani points out that value does not exist yet it is real. It may be argued that value is not real if it is non-existent. Value must exist in the simple sense of existence i.e., it exists or it does not exist.

It is said that existence in the simplest sense of the term implies that it is an ultimate and unanalysable concept. But in that case anything may exist. Because according to the simplest sense of existence the existence of a thing is not a matter of analysis. As a result it cannot be decided which of the things exist and which does not exist according to the definition. Thus this definition of simple existence as unanalysable is not sufficient to decide whether something exists or not. Consequently if a man makes an error regarding the existence of something, which in fact is non-existent, he cannot be detected. So it is required to specify the concept of simple existence. It may mean non-contradiction, for example, the existence of a son of a barren woman is contradictory. Existence, again is not a matter of fancy. The imagined golden mountain does not exist. Existence must be a fact of knowledge. Again knowledge often deceives us in cases of illusory perception.
Hence, illusory object also does not exist. It appears that existence of a thing must be known without doubt. Because if there is doubt then the existence or being is indeterminate. And if an existence is latter cancelled then it is an illusory existence. Hence Malkani defines the simple sense of existence as that which depends on knowledge, “I shall go even further and say that the conception of being is really meaningless unless it involves this relation to knowledge.\(^{20}\)

It may be argued that in all cases this knowing attitude is not possible. It is a matter of fact that the concept of absolute is beyond knowledge. Absolute is not within our knowing attitude. Malkani maintains that it is true that the absolute is beyond knowing attitude. But, although it is not known yet its existence cannot be doubted. And it is only about the absolute that we can say that its existence cannot be denied though it is not known. Value is also such a concept which is not known by the knowing faculty but it can be felt. Hence we cannot deny value and it must be regarded as real. Malkani maintains that as both the absolute and value are matter of feeling only not a matter of knowledge and both cannot be denied of their reality, hence ultimately the truest being must coincide with the highest value.

Now it may be asked whether the content of cognition is totally different from the content of feeling. It means that whether the mind is a complex state - mixed up of content of feeling and content of cognition, or the mind is a pure state only. It is generally believed that the content of feeling is different from the content of knowledge. Malkani opines that so far as the subjective state is concerned, no content is a pure content. Because in our experience, for example, ‘x has value’, two types of contents are mixed up i.e., the known content and the felt content. x is known and the value is what is felt. Mere feeling as such cannot be asserted and it
cannot be denied. Feeling when it is a matter of reflection can supply us with data. Now the fact is that the introspection of feeling is itself a feeling. Because at the time of remembering, a joy for example, the person has some kind of joyful feeling. Hence the introspection of feeling is itself a feeling. Again, introspection is a knowing aspect because it is a kind of internal perception. And perception is a source of knowledge not of feeling. A feeling when it is more felt in the latter case may appear a case of introspection. Here the person concerned may feel greatly about an old feeling. Malkani opines that it is not a case of introspection. It is found in introspection not produced by introspection hence it is a byproduct of introspection. Actually introspection gives us knowledge, it is indifferent about the mental state concerned.

According to Malkani, feeling and knowing cannot be absolutely separated. In case of feeling there is the knowing element also. Because if the felt content is not known then that cannot be regarded as felt. Value can be felt. It can be felt that something has value. But feeling by itself is not capable of self-criticism and so of directing itself. There are certain satisfactions which are illusory and certain are real. When one gets satisfaction from the perceived things such satisfactions are not real because things have no reality; they are appearances only. Hence, the satisfaction that arises from the illusory things have illusory values. Now the fact is that feeling cannot determine which gives us real satisfaction and as a result has real value. Again which gives us illusory satisfaction and hence has illusory values. Such things can be determined by thought alone. Here in lies the necessity of thought and hence of cognition. It may be said that to distinguish illusory satisfaction from real satisfaction thought cannot guide us. It is the difference of feeling that helps us to
understand the differences of satisfaction. Malkani opines that uncritised feeling cannot guide us in this respect. But feeling can be criticized only when it is related to thought. Thought can only analyse a feeling critically. "Feeling is too subjective. It may be very entrancing, and yet it may have no more reality than the passing colours on an unstable and moving background. It lacks that stability which thought alone can give to it."21

Man gives value to that which is truest value in itself. When the highest ideal of feeling coincides with the highest ideal of thought then only real and eternal value can be realized. In mysticism feeling is only stressed. But Malkani maintains that to realize the highest value both the ideals of feeling and thought should be indistinguishable. Hence we find that the feeling which has real value refers to the being. Hence feeling has some sort of objectivity which cannot be wholly analysed. Because value is the content of feeling. As a result feeling cannot be merely subjective. That feeling can be regarded as real which has reference to value which is the being itself. So value is that which is realized. If it is not realized or felt then that cannot be regarded as value. And it is the being which is realized, which is felt hence it is the being which is value, "It is, however, only when we reach the highest value that the unity of being and value is fully realized for then the feeling disappears in the purest feeling which is at the same time true being; being is bliss.22 Malkani again maintains that "We cannot possibly explain away the dualism involved in feeling, by trying to eliminate all cognition and keep feeling pure."23 Hence it must be accepted that though feeling is what is felt, yet it does not exclude cognition.
Now the question arises that whether value is related to pleasure. It implies that whether value is that which gives pleasure. In other words whether we give value to something which gives us pleasure. Some may say that value is irrespective of pleasure and pain. It is not that which is valuable must be pleasant also. Because in some cases, value may be painful when the valuable thing is in conflict with our expectation. When a thing is regarded as having value but cannot satisfy our desire, that case is regarded as a case of painful state. Hence it cannot be said that value is in conformity with pleasure. Again it is found that a moral deep which is unrelated to pleasure and pain is valuable. In other words, value is not dependent on pleasure or pain. As for example, when one perceives a beautiful thing he gets pleasure, but this does not mean that the thing is beautiful because it produces pleasure. On the other hand beauty as a value is there, which is irrespective of pleasure and pain. But it has already been established by Malkani that value of a thing does not exist independently of the feeling. And if value is independent of pleasure and pain then we must have to accept that value can exist independently. So Malkani maintains that value is that which is felt and as a result is intrinsically connected with pleasure or pain.

Question may be raised that whether the pleasure and pain are related to feeling or with willing. It is argued by some that pleasure and pain are directly related to willing and not with feeling. For example, a pain occurs due to the fact that we want to get rid of a certain mode of being. In case of pleasure also we will have to get freedom from certain oppression and when that is attained we get pleasure. Thus it follows that both pleasure and pain are related to will i.e., the complex of willing and feeling.
Malkani admits that it is true that no mental state is pure. And will is an element in all our feelings of pleasure and pain. Because it is found that pleasure and pain occur subsequently where there is the fulfillment of desire and where there is not fulfillment of desire. But value is beyond this pleasure and pain. It is not that which gives us pleasure. Pleasure in the ordinary sense of the term i.e., which satisfies some kind of our will is not identical with value. Value, according to Malkani is suigeneris. But so far as the value of pleasure is concerned it is the absolute. Apparently it may be the case that value is independent of pleasure. But it is a matter of common experience that value, whether positive or negative, is related to pleasure and pain. The value which gives us pain has negative value to us. It means that we value that thing which can please us. “To be pleased with anything then is to value it. And conversely, to value anything is to be pleased with it.... The value of pleasures in this sense, may be said to be absolute. Pleasure does not have value. It is value.\(^{24}\)

Question may be raised here that whether all objects of value give us pleasure. Malkani’s reply to this is that all objects of value give us pleasure. For example we get joy by perceiving beauty, which is an aesthetic value. If this element of joy is extracted from beauty then the object of beauty will be nothing different from other objects which are not beautiful. Hence ‘beauty’ as an object of value gives us pleasure. It follows that both the value and pleasure have the same basis in feeling. The two concepts really coalesce in feeling. Pleasure is value means that what we accept as value gives us pleasure. Malkani maintains that, “the value-concept indicates the ultimate happiness of being”.\(^{25}\)
Malkani has accepted the grades of value from lower to higher. The pleasure which comes from the sense-objects has less value. It increases in aesthetic value where the beauty of an object gives us pleasure. Moral value is higher than it. According to Malkani, the religious value is the highest of all these different values. Religious value only can give man complete pleasure where as the pleasure attained from all other values are only partial.

It has already been stated that according to Malkani, the pleasure that is attained from the sense-objects is regarded as the lowest value. Malkani maintains that all forms of value must be related to some sort of satisfaction. But the pleasure attained from the sense-object, may not give us satisfaction always. Since the satisfaction attained from the sense-enjoyment is of the nature of animal satisfaction. Civilized man does not get satisfaction from the sense-object only his satisfaction gradually changes with the education and training. His satisfaction is related to some sort of sophisticated satisfaction. And there is no such prescribed rule by which one can determine the sophisticated satisfaction. Man’s tastes change from time to time. Hence his satisfaction is a matter of feeling. Saints, for example, does not get satisfaction in the sense object. With the help of religious belief and education man runs from the crude satisfaction towards the highest spiritual satisfaction. True happiness on the other hand, has freedom. In case of sense-object no such freedom is found because here the satisfaction is dependent on sense object. So far as aesthetic satisfaction is concerned no such dependence on sense-object is found. Here the object of satisfaction is not found in space and time. Such satisfaction is found in an idea of a creative work of the spirit. Here man can overcome the body and the animal needs attached to it. According to Malkani,
artistic mentality is a detached and so a spiritualized mentality. It gets the enjoyment of beauty in everything which is lacking in case of an ordinary or not artistic mentality.

Malkani opines that moral value is higher than this aesthetic value. In case of moral value the will behind the act is important not the act. Actually here the freedom of the will is valued. "But what gives value to the act is not the doing of it or the deed as such but the amount of freedom behind it or the success of the will to overcome desire and attachment." Hence here the seat of value is the free and autonomous will. And it is expected that the free man cannot do sin.

But the fact is that even in case of moral value the ideal of value is attached to temporal being or the act done. The moral decision is more or less dependent on the desire of man. Because the desire cannot be wholly conquered. Here the decision is done by the temporal being, it does not come from heaven. It implies that here also lies the limitation of value. Moral value also cannot be regarded as supreme since it means acts and acts means bondage. Hence there is the need to go beyond morality to religion. In case of religion feeling becomes active love. It does not remain as mere feeling. Feelings of religious value means love towards the religious ideal. Here a person realizes that he is everything and thereby shares the freedom of the spiritual being. The person realizes that he is the absolute freedom himself. But it is also true that the highest being or the absolute freedom is beyond our knowing attitude. In this world we get some idols or symbols and not the real being. Different symbols are the mark of differentiation among the followers of different religions. Truly divine reality cannot be symbolized and as a result there is no differences. And when God is within the control of our knowledge he is a
finite God. This finite God satisfies our finite desires. Actually God’s reality is a matter of feeling, not of knowledge. “This is the highest freedom of feeling, because the feeling has no other object except the pure spirit, and spirit is freedom”.27 The highest love completely forgets both itself and its object. It remains a pure radiance or a pure feeling. It is the mystic union. All distinctions disappear in it. Love become the life, the Absolute or God.”28

Now, the fact is that all kinds of feelings cannot be regarded as an ideal feeling or ideal value. The ideal feeling is that which will lead us towards the values of values i.e., the ideal value. Malkani maintains that some kind of unconscious feeling of an ideal value indicates that all kinds of finite feelings are partially satisfying. And among the feelings, the value feeling is the highest because it approximates more nearly to the feeling of the ideal value.

According to some the ideal of value is not one but many because there are different types of values viz., sense-object value, aesthetic value, moral value, religious value etc. Each type of value is supreme in itself which is not comparable with other qualities or values. Each type of value has its own ideal value hence not reducible to one single value. Malkani’s reply to this is that these different ideals of values are comparative in nature. Because there the question always remains as to what is more than it. Malkani is not interested about the comparative values. He in fact tries to find out the superlative value which is beyond all these comparative values of different grades of values. And superlative value is a class by itself. Because what we call the highest beauty or highest morality are not some beautiful objects of the same kind or the highest kind of moral action. For example, the highest morality is perfection. Thus, it is found that the highest value of a
class is not comparable with that class. According to Malkani both the quality and quantity must be ruled out from the ideal of value. Hence the ideal value is one only not many regarding different qualities and quantities. He maintains that, "The ideal can never constitute a manifold, or in other words, there can be only one ideal value". 29

Some may argue that introspectively, we do not find any ideal value feeling. So there is no need to postulate any Ideal value. All values are finite. It is because of some kind of our feeling that certain values are higher and others are lower. Malkani’s reply to this objection is that such ideal is not a matter of introspection because it is transcendental to feeling. So he maintains that, “The infinite and the unlimited should only be sought in the feeling - consciousness which is necessarily transcendental and towards which no feeling is possible. This then is the ideal of feeling”. 30

According to some the happiness which cannot be felt, the joy that cannot be enjoyed are no happiness or joy. Hence one does not feel impelled to go after such kind of happiness. Malkani’s reply to this is that such happiness is always with us and there is no need of searching for that joy. Because we are Brahman, the reality who is the joy itself. As we are joy ourselves so joy or happiness is not required to be searched for. And in this sense the above contention is true. The happiness which is complete cannot be felt at all. Because in that complete happiness man is one with the happiness or Brahman. Here there is no distinction between the happiness and the person to be happy. Man is here placed with what may be called the Absolute of feeling. This Absolute of feeling is always with us; it is not required to be attained in the future. We are not aware about this Absolute feeling of satisfaction only because of our ignorance. It is man’s ignorance which makes
him bound to search for happiness everywhere except within himself which is the happiness itself. "It would therefore be true to say that the transcendental happiness alone is felt in all that is ever felt. There is no other happiness that is not a partial and inadequate expression of it, and paradoxical although it may seem, we are happy in our sorrow. We may try to feel this happiness of completion in its completedness and infinitude. But then the more our feeling approximates to it, the more will it ceases to be a feeling. It will loose itself in the joy of being."\(^{31}\)

Malkani thus maintains that the ideal of value is not a matter of feeling. The ideal must be realized. And feeling and realization are not the same thing. Again, an ideal can be realized only if it is within us. If an ideal is far away from us, it cannot be realized. Feeling as such is finite and if an ideal is felt then that ideal too is finite. Hence it is required to accept some consciousness which is beyond feeling where the infinite ideal can be realized. Here the question of satisfactoriness comes in. A real satisfaction is that which satisfies completely. If it cannot satisfy completely, it is a contradiction in terms. It is no satisfaction at all. It does not help us to know pure joy. Here we know the joy mixed up with regrets. The infinite satisfaction or ideal satisfaction, according to Malkani "must not be mine in any sense, but inherent in being and wholly transcendental to introspective knowledge".\(^{32}\) According to Some there is no self-contradiction in a finite satisfaction. Because all feeling is finite. Malkani does not oppose the view that feeling is finite. As a result if the ideal is felt then that ideal too is finite. The fact is that there is something more than the feeling where the infinite ideal can be realized. Malkani opines that satisfaction where the ideal can be realized cannot be arranged in the series of higher and lower. That means it does not form a continuous
series starting from the lowest and ending in the highest satisfaction. As our feeling there is always the dissatisfaction so it implies that there is such an ideal. Hence feeling itself is the evidence of such an ideal. On the other hand the infinite feeling or the ideal satisfaction always impelled man to regard all finite feeling as dissatisfying. And as there is always the need to feel it so it cannot be felt. Because feeling implies incompleteness. And on the other hand the need of such an ideal implies its feeling i.e., we feel that there is such an ideal. This ideal is thus connected with our subjective feeling. It is our immediate self not something distant reality. Hence it can be realized.

REALITY AND VALUE

It is found that the Idealistic philosophers are of the view that reality and value are identical. Non-idealistic philosophers, on the other hand, do not accept this view. They do not accept that value is intrinsic to matter. Malkani maintains that, “The view which we suggest is that everywhere being and value constitute a real unity, and it is this unity which we break up under different concepts which we then seek to re-unite externally. Reality is not being alone, or value alone, or both these in some kind of external relation.” It indicates that originally there is no distinction between being and value. Now, let us find whether the view that being is predominant over ‘value’ is acceptable or not. According to the first view the being of the thing is primary and its value character is subordinate to its being. Malkani argues that this view cannot be acceptable because value is indistinguishable from the being. Value is intimately connected with the being. When we say that a thing satisfies us it implies that it is the being of the thing which satisfies us. And at the
same time it is the combination of qualities of the thing that actually satisfies us. In other words it is the value of the thing which satisfies us. Thus we find that it is not the being nor the value alone but both the being and the value which actually satisfies us. It is our experience which breaks up the two. So far as the reality of the thing is concerned it is the unity of both the being and the value in an indistinguishable form.

Malkani again tries to analyse the opposite view viz. value is predominant to being. The case of beauty, for example, is such that where the beauty is more important than the being of beautiful thing. Malkani, asks here what, for example, would be the value of something that had no being? According to him such a value without being is an imaginary concept. Value can have reality only in its association with being. Hence so far as the value as beauty is concerned it is the unity of value with being. So Malkani maintains that being is the highest value or supreme bliss.

Question may arise that whether the being and the bliss are the same or not. It may be said that bliss is of the being i.e., being has bliss. Because happiness is an accidental quality and is not necessary to being. Happiness is a state of the being. It means that being can be happy only in certain state. Happiness cannot be induced to the reality from the outside because there is nothing outside of Brahman. Again, it cannot be said that happiness is not induced because if it is not at all induced then the question of state does not arise. State means a temporal sequence where something is newly introduced to something to whom it is the state. Thus it appears that both the views of outside introduction or no introduction of happiness are not acceptable at all. Thus Malkani is of the opinion that happiness is, co-
extensive with the eternal being. Being cannot be regarded as conscious of its happiness. Because in that case happiness will be something other than being, which is not acceptable as has already been shown. It is the satisfaction of pure being which is called the highest happiness. Because, as Malkani says "It can only be said to be really happy. When I am not conscious of it, when in truth happiness does not fall apart but is coincident with me or is myself. All real happiness consists in this identity or this indistinguishableness of happiness from being. I am most happy when I least know it." Because if the happiness is regarded as a state then it implies that this state is achieved from the earlier state of painfulness to the later state of pleasure. According to Malkani the succeeding state is not at all pleasurable, it is only the freeing of the previous painful state. It implies that the latter state is also painful though less than the former. Because any felt state cannot be regarded as pleasurable state. In feeling there is a distinction between the feeling and the felt content. The real pleasurable state is the completed process. Here man is free from all dead weight of pain as well as pleasure. Because worldly pleasure also makes man tired. As a result all happiness which can be regarded as a state of being, or a positive experience of being are transitory. Happiness is the being itself not its any state. It is the inmost nature of our being. The happiness which is found in certain stages comes from the supreme happiness. But they do not add anything to the supreme happiness. The question may arise: Why we love our self. Malkani opines that it is because the self is the supreme happiness. And as much it is loved by us. It is loved for the sake of happiness i.e., for the sake of itself. The love about which we are conscious is nothing but selfish love. The love which is not given to consciousness, which is the love for the self is the highest
love. "It is taken away whole and entire whether we will or not. If god is love and our self is one with god, we can understand the possibility of the infinite love we bear to our true self."35

Malkani further maintains that the Ultimate Reality is the person who is beyond the limitation of personality. He is the super-person. Actually He is the culmination of personality. A self is finite or is a person because of its attachment to a body. Some philosophers opine that the self has no existence apart from the body. They maintain that a bodyless self is a myth. Malkani, on the other hand, argues that if a soulless body can exist then why not the bodyless soul. In his view intelligence cannot be regarded as dependent on the body Because intelligence is not the function of the body. Body is external to the soul. And as it is external to the soul hence it can be dropped from the soul. As the conception of body leads to the view that it can be destroyed hence the state of disembodiment can be realized.

From the above analysis it appears that Reality is the person who is the happiness itself. It implies that the being or reality which is existence, consciousness, infinite and bliss is not without the emotive aspect. He is bliss himself for which He is loved by us. Actually the love towards the reality is the love for the self. Because the self is identical with reality. He is the supreme happiness. Who is the supreme happiness cannot be devoid of value. He is valuable for His unlimited bliss or pleasure. But the fact is that the Ultimate Reality is non-qualified, non-dual. Nothing can remain outside of Brahman or Reality. Hence it is concluded by Malkani that Reality Itself is the pleasure or value.
LAW OF KARMA

The doctrine of karma forms one of the fundamental features of Indian way of thinking. The doctrine of karma and its fallout concept ‘rebirth’ has been accepted by all the Indian philosophical systems except the Āryavakas. Though Buddhism and Jainism are nāstika drāśana, yet they also believe in the law of karma and the concept of rebirth. Karma is regarded as the cause of man’s birth and rebirth in this world. With the help of this doctrine Hinduism, tries to explain the sufferings of and the inequalities among men in this world.

There are critiques like Warren Steinkraus who tries to argue that the doctrine of Karma leads to fatalism and inaction. Steinkraus further argues that a fundamental bifurcation will be drawn between God and the moral law if we accept the law of karma. He points out that the law of karma implies that an impersonal law is responsible for moral results. The law of karma is also a cruel one since sometimes man gets such severe punishment which a human lawyer cannot give to a prisoner. Moreover, it is argued that if the law of karma is accepted man will lose his freedom.

G.R. Malkani is a strong supporter of the law of karma. He has tried to defend the law of karma from the attacks made by Steinkraus. There is a lively debate and counter-arguments between Steinkraus and Malkani in this issue.36

The word karma literally means any action - good or bad, moral or immoral. And the law of karma means that all actions good or bad produce their fruits in the life of an individual. Every action has its reactions Indian philosophers maintain that the law of karma governs the life and destiny of all beings. This law points out that as a man sows so he reaps. It is maintained that as all actions produce proper fruits
in the present life so it is reasonable that all actions past, present and future will produce their respective fruits in future life also. Thus the theory of rebirth is actually a corollary of the law of karma. With the help of this doctrine Hindu philosophers try to explain the inequalities among men in this world.

So far as creation of the world is concerned, the question of its creator and the purpose of its creations arise. Whether God is related with the creation of the world and how? The Hindus believe that God is the creator of this world but he does not create this world out of nothing as Christianity and Judaism believe. Hinduism defines God as ‘blameless’. He is never partial, never despotic, never arbitrary. He is always benign, always helpful. But God being good and impartial it is impossible to explain reasonably the sufferings and inequalities found in this world. All these questions often puzzle us and we require their satisfactory answers.

Christianity and Judaism maintain that God creates this world to fulfill his purpose. God expects that man must be ‘united God in love’. And with this purpose in view He creates this world. Man is the highest creation of God. Human beings are endowed with intelligence and freedom. With his intelligence and free choice man must select his destiny. He must decide whether heaven or hell is desirable for him. Man has certain prescribed duties towards God and also to his fellow beings. And by performing his prescribed duties man can satisfy God and thereby get united with God. Again according to these religions although man has great destiny in front of him together with immense freedom and intelligence yet the time span to attain that destiny is very limited. It is limited only to this life. There is neither a past life nor a future life to give man an opportunity for reforming him. The present life is all. Man has no part to play in regard to his coming to this
he is to fulfill God's purpose. Hence creation is nothing but the fulfillment of God's purpose. And with the fulfillment of the purpose creation ends.

Malkani has strongly criticized this view of the creation of the world as the fulfillment of God's purpose and strongly recommends the Hindu view of the law of karma. According to him, in Hindu philosophy, "God, being perfect, has no ulterior motive in creation." He argues that God cannot create such an imperfect world. This world is surrounded by inequalities, sufferings etc. some are enjoying a splendid life whereas others are suffering miserably. There are so many honest, kind hearted, good man in the society, who are leading a complete unhappy life. On the other hand, there are many happy rich men enjoying their life in so many ways who are actually the most dishonest, cruel and bad men. We require its correct explanation. Malkani maintains that if God is regarded as the creator of this world who creates only to fulfill his purpose then the whole moral responsibility will be of God. Malkani opines that God cannot create such an unbalanced world. If God creates this world then the very definition of God as good, impartial, blameless, never despotic, never arbitrary etc. will lose all its significance. The source of such an unjust world cannot be a just God. Malkani argues that if creation is nothing but the fulfillment of God's purpose then it appears that the purpose of God is to give punishment to men. Because whoever is born in this world suffers from many kinds of sufferings.

The Hindu view is totally different in the sense that it upholds that man himself is responsible for his birth in this world. Man does not come to this world with a blank moral state. He comes to this world with a load of Samskāras (tendencies), a load of karmas of previous birth. Man's previous Karmas are
therefore responsible for his birth in this world. Karmas differ from man to man
because man does different karmas in his past life. And the inequalities of man are
nothing but the results of his karmas accumulated from beginningless time. Malkani
puts it very rightly by arguing, “everyone gets what he deceives, nothing more and
nothing less.” Malkani also points out that God is the creator but He creates this
world with the aid of man’s karmas. He passively creates the world, karmas only
take the active part in creation.

It also follows that this life is not the only life as upheld by Christianity and
Judaism. There are innumerable past and innumerable future lives. Man is born in
this world to get moral perfection and thereby mोṣṭha. He gets innumerable changes
to purify him and ultimately to get release from the cycle of birth and death and
to attain liberation. Though Hinduism believes in transmigration, but the aim of
Hinduism is to get release from the cycle of birth and death and to attain liberation.
Though Hinduism believes in transmigration, but the aim of Hinduism is to get
release from this transmigration.

Now, there are critiques who try to reject the doctrine of karma by pointing
out some defects in this conception which cannot be undermined. Firstly, the
objection raised by the critiques against the law of karma is that karma leads to
fatalism and inaction. It is nothing but a tendency to take suffering and poverty for
granted. People has nothing to do to remove the causes of sufferings because
everything is blamed on the law. Man is to bear the sufferings because everything is
blamed on the law. Man is to bear the sufferings and cry on the fate. Secondly, it is
alleged that a fundamental bifurcation will be placed between God and the moral law
by accepting the law of karma and consequent rebirth. What is od if he is not interested in morality and justice and the moral development of the race?

Malkani strongly defends the law of karma against the charges of fatalism and inactivity. Malkani opines that inaction, fatalism etc. are features of lazyman and not of the law. There are many people who try to lead an inactive life. And they regard all happenings of their life as his fate. Malkani has given utmost stress on the will power of man. Man can improve his condition by action and will-power. The law of karma teaches man that his present condition is due to his past deed. Hence it clearly appears that the present action of man will build his future life. And if man understands the mystery of his life he can overcome all the undesirable happenings of his life by will and effort. Past is not completely in his control but he can control his future. Even the past karmas and their evil effects which are not in control of man cannot lead him to frustration. Because the law of karma teaches him that in God's world there is no injustice. God is just and what happens in man's life is the result of his own action. Hence the law of karma instead of increasing despair increases courage and power to face the challenges of life.

Here we must take note of the criticisms leveled against Malkani by Steinkraus and point out the defense meted out by Malkani in this respect. The first objection of Steinkraus refers to the question of fatalism and inaction which is already answered in the foregoing lines. Secondly, Steinkraus contends that though many cases of sufferings of man can be traced to his past karma, yet it is not always the sole cause. There are other social, parental causes also. He opines that the suffering of a new born child may be due to his or her parents negligence. As for example, a mother who has used the drug Thalidomide some years ago, may give birth to
defective baby. In such cases the defects of the child is not due to his fault but it is due to his or her mother's irresponsibility. Hence it is often found that children's failure or going astray are due to their parent's negligence. Hence to explain such kinds of sufferings metaphysical explanation such as the law of karma etc. is not required. These types of problems can be solved empirically also.

Malkani replies that such type of criticism by Steinkraus is due to his misunderstanding of the scope of the law of karma. In the above example of the suffering of the child due to his or her mother's irresponsibility and indisciplined life is not free from inadequacy. Malkani maintains that over and above the scientific explanation of the cause of the suffering of the child there remains the metaphysical point. Metaphysically speaking all the responsibility is the responsibility of the person suffered. Here the question necessarily arises is: why that particular child has taken birth to that indisciplined mother and not to any other better informed and better disciplined parents? According to Malkani, it is the karma of that particular child which is responsible for its unfortunate birth.

Thirdly, Steinkraus maintains that it is often observed that in all cases of natural catastrophes people suffer badly. And such kinds of sufferings cannot be traced to their past karmas. He argues that in all cases of the conversion of 'A' proposition cannot give an 'A' proposition. For example, the proposition, "All cases of immorality will result in suffering," cannot give the proposition, "All cases of sufferings are cases of immorality." In a catastrophes all the moral and immoral men suffer. It is not possible to assume that the sufferings of all these people are due to their past karmas.
Malkani objects to this. According to him, all kinds of sufferings of human beings are due to their karmas. Whenever there is suffering, there must be some karma behind it. The suffering is man's past whether it is natural or personal.

Fourthly, Steinkraus regards the law of karma as cruel. According to him there are certain cases of very intolerable inhuman sufferings in this world. These are so cruel, that even human judges will flinch from uttering these in case of a dangerous criminal. And if such kinds of cruel sufferings are the necessary consequences of the law of karma then it can be easily concluded that the law of karma itself is a cruel one. Hence, "The law of karma itself is unjust and needs to be rejected".40

Malkani's reply to this is that, it is true that people suffer from many cases of severe punishment to an offender. But he maintains that for this the law of karma is not responsible rather the sufferer is solely responsible. Human beings pass away so many past lives. And it is not possible for us to keep into the whole past of a man. In the present life also we find that people are torturing other very inhumanly. And this is more or less common feature even in the modern educated society. Hence it follows that such karmas must get their return here or here after. Malkani repeatedly confirms that man reaps what he sows. Hence facts of sufferings however unpleasant need to be changed.

Fifthly, according to Steinkraus, the Law of Karma cannot operate independently. A law by itself cannot accomplish justice. The ontological status of the law of karma is denied by Steinkraus. In Western philosophy it is believed that a law is not differentiated from the law giver. Matters which are the ultimate stuff of the world
are distinct from the law of karma. Hence Steinkraus opines that these two independent factors cannot be identified by itself without any supreme being.

Malkani criticizes this view. He points out that the moral law is not formulated by God. It is maintained that God cannot design moral law. God may spend prophets to communicate these laws but he never creates those laws. Human laws can be changed but this is not the case with moral law. Hence moral laws are not created by anyone not even by God as in the case of human laws. Moral laws are moral in its own right. God only recognizes its rightness. Hence the moral laws are impersonal. Malkani stresses that the karmic law does not differ in this respect from the moral law.

Malkani further points out that the Hindu ethics is not dogmatic but scientific. In this context he shows that the ethics of Bhagawat Gita and Buddhism are purely scientific ethics.

Malkani maintains that Bhagawat Gita can be regarded as a scientific ethics as it teaches niskama-karma. Gita's famous teaching of duty for duty's sake is completely free from dogmatism. Malkani opines that all acts of mankind are associated with some kind of kama or desire. Hence man's action is not free. No duty can be regarded as absolutely for duty's sake. Every kind of action is associated with some kind of higher or lower desires. And man is born in this world again and again only for the fulfillment of that desire. But in Gita, Lord Krishna teaches Arjuna to do his duty without expecting its fruit i.e., niskama-karma. Because if the karma is niskama i.e., desireless then that karma does not require the fulfillment of desire as it has no desire. And if there is no desire there is no rebirth to fulfill that desire by way of reward or punishment. Consequently, if war and violence are done as a service
to humanity and not for the fulfillment of hatred or self interest then these are also free from sins. Because man must perform his ‘action and duty’ and this is not against morality. In doing anything man must be free from all kinds of temptation. *Gītā* does not teach us to ‘do this or do not do that’, which is clearly dogmatic. Malkani says that *Gītā* only gives us the universal law - desire for fruit binds, renunciation of desire emancipates. *Gītā* only teaches the universal law which is the characteristics of scientific ethics. Like the other unscientific scriptures it does not impose any injunctions and prohibitions.

According to Malkani, Buddhistic ethics is also scientific because it is based on reason and personal experience. It is not a revelation as such Gautama Buddha personally experienced the miseries of man’s life. And such experiences lead him to find out the path to remove the miseries of life. And with this aim in view he comes to realize that if the cause of suffering can be removed suffering will disappear at once. And he realizes that the cause of suffering is unfulfilled desire. Malkani maintains that the aim of Buddhism is to find out the stage where human beings are completely free from all kinds of desire. And this is the stage of *nibbāna*. Once *nibbāna* is attained all pains and sufferings will be removed. Hence once man understands the significance of *nibbāna* he logically follows this path. Thus Buddha does not teach us to do this and not to do that. He simply shows the path of cessation of suffering systematically. And it is up to the individual being whether he aspires after *nibbāna* or prefers a miserable life. Hence, Malkani maintains that Buddhistic ethics, “scientifically formulated, is a means to emancipation for all life from the lowest creature to the highest”. It is taught as a means for the removal of pain and sufferings which is the main curse of man’s life.
Malkani like the Hindu theists does not deny the efficiency of God. But he argues that though each happening is related with the will of God yet God does not create the happenings of the world out of nothing. He takes the help of the karmas of the individual while creating the world. The destiny of each is not wrongly determined. Everyone is in his right place. Nobody in this world is suffering for which he does not deserve. And he though suffers for his karmas yet there is scope to him to get rid off from the clutches of karmas and be free.

In the foregoing lines we have discussed in detail the view of Malkani on the law of karma. Malkani has explained the rationale of the law of karma and has succeeded in safeguarding this law from the adverse attack of the western philosophers. He has very ably shown that the sole cause of human sufferings and inequalities is the human being himself, not an unjust God nor a finite God nor anything else. This view places a great responsibility on the shoulder of individual beings. But nevertheless, this does not deprive him of his freedom. "Man becomes truly the master of his destiny. He cannot shift his responsibility to anything else and he cannot blame anyone for what happens to him in the ups and downs of life except himself." However, we think that the acceptance of the law of karma as an independent and impersonal law is not free from defects. Malkani admits it as impersonal and is not authorized by God. But the question is in what way it is related with God? Whether it is different from God or identical with him? If different, then the question of fundamental bifurcation between the law and God cannot be avoided. The philosophers like the Buddhas, the Jainas and the Purva-mimamsakas who do not accept any God are justified in accepting the karmic law as independent and impersonal. But those for whom God is the idol and the ideal
of perfection, this poses a serious problem and an unsolved mystery. Malkani’s interpretation also cannot satisfactorily explain this question. Hence he has admitted that the working of the law of karma is mysterious. It is mâyâ inexplicable. This, in our view, is the best possible answer of this unsolved mystery. So we agree with Malkani that, “the law of karma gives an ultimate and metaphysical explanation of all those things which cannot be explained merely scientifically.”

S. RADHAKRISHNAN’S VIEW OF THE LAW OF KARMA

Dr. S Radhakrishnan also believes in the doctrine of karma. But he does not conform to the view that the law of karma is in conflict with the concept of human freedom. According to him, “A philosophy of despair is by no means the necessary outcome of the doctrine of karman.”

Now, freedom ordinarily means freedom of decision or freedom of choice. But Radhakrishnan has conceived the meaning of the word freedom in a wider sense. For him freedom means that the soul of man is metaphysically free. Freedom also means that man is free to choose his own course of life and action. Radhakrishnan maintains that freedom is the essence of man’s spirituality. It also means that the future of man depends to a great extent on the law of karma, on the other hand, means that the karma performed in this life determines the course of future life. That means the law of karma is the determining factor of life. Hence this, law of karma is contradictory to the concept of freedom. But Radhakrishnan endeavours to explain this apparent problem by means of his conception of the spirituality in man. In fact, man is not only a physical being. He is a spirit, i.e., he has the spark of reality in him. He is a bridge which connects the visible or physical world
and invisible spirit or reality. Moreover, man is conscious that there is the Supreme Spirit or God and that the individual spirit is only a partial manifestation of God. “In the moment of its highest insight the self becomes aware not only of its own existence but of the existence of an omnipotent Spirit of which, it is, as it were, a focussing.”45 Thus, Radhakrishnan has admitted the spirituality of the soul.

Like the ancient Indian philosophers Radhakrishnan also believes that the law of karma determines the various embodied stages which the individual self has to overcome. The law of karma tells us that millions of lives are consumed before one perfect life is produced. Radhakrishnan opines that the principle of karma takes into account the material or the content in which each individual is born. Though it regards the past as determined, it regards the future as only conditioned. “The spiritual element in man allows him freedom within the limits of his nature. Man is not a mere mechanism of instincts. The spirit in him can triumph over the automatic forces that try to enslave him.”46 He also says that the concept of freedom is not in contradiction with the concept of karma. For in freedom also there are determining conditions. Freedom of one is determined by one’s self. And being determined by one’s own karma is nothing but self determination which is the basic condition of freedom.

Moreover, Radhakrishnan maintains that karma has two aspects, one is connected with the past and is called a retrospective aspect, the other is future aspect. Though man has no control over the retrospective aspect he can choose the progressive aspect of his life.

In the philosophy of Radhakrishnan it is clearly stated that the freedom of human being is not in conflict with the law of karma. Radhakrishnan makes it clear
that the freedom does not imply lawlessness and immorality. As the life of man is guided by the law of karma, which also implies that good karma will entail good result, so man is inspired to do good. The law of karma also guards him from doing harm to others and to abstain from selfishness. Morality is the code of conduct for man. This idea of Radhakrishnan may be compared to the democratic state. In a democratic state people have freedom of action, speech etc. This does not indicate that this is a lawless state. It also does not mean that man can use his freedom in a selfish way overlooking the well being of the other people. To be a good democratic citizen one must abide by the law of the country and try to be helpful to his fellow beings. Similar is the case with the concept of the law of karma and the freedom of mankind.

**SUICIDE**

The dictionary meaning of suicide is, “the intentional taking of one’s life.” It means that one who commits suicide i.e., one who dies by his own hand. Thus it appears that suicide is different from mercy killing. As a result suicide is not Euthanasia where the murder is thought to be done by other with the consent of the person who is being murdered. To illustrate this case we can take the example of a doctor who himself kills his patient on humanitarian reasons, perhaps with the patient’s consent. “in law this is murder on the part of the doctor, not suicide on the part of the patient, but from the ethical point of view there is little difference. Both are forms of what is commonly called euthanasia.”

Prof. G.R. Malkani contends that suicide, though requires courage, is often condemned by the human society. He maintains that a person who commits suicide is actually doing an offence towards himself. Life is the means to acquire values of
life. If the life is no longer there attainment of values in life by an individual is out of question. There are some philosophers like Aristotle who regards, that suicide is an offence against the state. Against this view Malkani argues that if the individual has some obligation towards the state than the state must also comply with some responsibility towards the individual. It is true that the individual is born not in the freedom of nature. He is born in a particular society and a particular family. So his personality is moulded by the social, educational and political atmosphere of the society. So the individual is not free to think or to do anything without the consent of the society. It implies that the society requires some sort of duties towards it by the individual. Malkani’s view in this regard is that not only the individual but also the society is indebted to the individual. Society must bestow such situation to the individual that the individual feel obliged to continue. Life must not be unbearable for the individual in that society. As the individual is not a machine, so nothing can be imposed on him from outside without sufficient sympathy towards him. Hence the society has nothing to expect from the individual committing suicide if it fails to give a healthy situation to continue his life. So Malkani opines that it is not always true that suicide is a crime towards the state. Rather he maintains that by doing such an unreasonable work the man is actually depriving himself from the worthy life. Life is worthy because within the span of life man can try for the attainment of the highest values in life. If the life itself is destroyed the values of life have no meaning to realize them.

Sometimes it is argued that before condemning suicide it is required to judge the situation under which the person is committing suicide. The person must be judged sympathetically rather than condemning him. But Malkani strongly opposes
this. He maintains that over and above all situations that compelled a man to commit suicide, it must be remembered that in all circumstances life is the higher ideal. So it must not be ended. There may be some cases where it may appear that it is better to end the life than to continue it. As for example, a woman who has lost her chastity or a general who has committed some blunder in the war field because of which the country lost in the war, are the cases in which it appear that the persons should quit the situation by ending their life. Malkani condemns the mentality of quitting the situation. According to him the persons must face the situation like a brave man. Because in that case his or her spirit of facing the situation will be honoured. In the above case of women losing the chastity, the woman is not responsible, but the situation is responsible here. So why should she surrender before the wrong doer. Again the general, for whose blunder the country has faced the unexpected situation, must share the situation with his fellowmen rather than flying away from the situation. And that will be his correct remedy for the blunder. In this case we can mention the name of Josephus, the commander of a defeated army, who refused to kill himself to avoid surrender. His arguments are put forward by Glanville Williams thus: “suicide is a crime remote from the common nature of all animals and the soul is a deposition received from God, so that a man acts wickedly in casting it from the body.”

Schopenhauer, a philosopher of nineteenth century also condemned suicide in some of his writings, viz., ‘The world as will and Ideas’ and in the article ‘on suicide’ etc. He regards suicide as an error. He maintains that suicide can give a person only an apparent release. It fails to give real release because it cannot kill the will which is not in time and space. According to him will is the thing-in-itself. In
suicide the body is killed. He opines that, “the first and simplest assertion of the will to live is only the assertion of one’s own being i.e., the exhibition of the will through acts in time, so far as the body, in its form and design, exhibits the same will in space, and no further. The assertion shows itself as maintenance of the body, by means of the application of its own powers”. Though Schopenhauer regards suicide as an error, he never thinks it to be a sin or crime. “I have said, suicide is even accounted a crime and connected with this, especially in vulgar bigoted England, are an ignominious burial and the confiscation of legacies; for which reason a jury almost invariably brings in a verdict of insanity.” He maintains that one may have done experiment by committing suicide in order to get a better life. But he opines that if a man does not live in this world then how can he knows the consequences of his action. So, it appears that killing oneself is not the proper remedy of one’s pains and sufferings in this world. As body is the phenomenon of the will-to-live, so man must not kill his body and thereby attaining death.

Malkani opines that one can destroy only one’s body not the mind by committing suicide. Malkani points out that if the crisis is physical then it can be overcome by destroying the body. But the fact is that the crisis is often found to be mental, so it cannot be destroyed by killing the body. Our sufferings are the result of desires, passions, hopes and fears. These are strictly mental. Again, a person who commits suicide does it with the expectation of a new and peaceful life. But, Malkani like Schopenhauer opines that if the person does not continue his existence, how can he will enjoy the fruits of his such horrible steps. So Malkani says that man must try to negotiate with his sorrows. He must not try to stop the life violently. Since that will give him a pseudo relief from the crisis of life not any real mental relief.
Malkani does not accept the view that the persons committing suicide are insane. According to some they are insane because they welcome death. In their views the same persons are those who love their person. And as the persons who commit suicide appear as the lovers of death, so they must be insane. Malkani on the other hand maintains that, "The mentality of the person on the verge of committing suicide is more akin to that of the gambler than it is to that of the insane person".  

Though Malkani condemns suicide, yet he does not go to the extent of Christianity in regarding suicide as an inexcusable sin. So far as Christianity is concerned, the person committing suicide will fall to eternal damnation. He will never attain salvation. Malkani does not conform to this view. He does not find any significant difference between a person leading an inactive life and a person committing suicide. According to him to attain moksha karmas are necessary, "freedom is not a gift. Everyone has to work for it himself....." If a person who does not endeavour for salvation and live a purposeless life so to say, then how can he attain salvation. In this respect there is actually no difference between a person who commits suicide and a person who lives but without any higher aspiration. According to Malkani that living is worthwhile which is lived in the true spirit. Simple continuation of life has no meaning.

Further, Malkani makes a difference between the destruction of body by an ordinary man and ignoring the body by a spiritually elevated person. He says that sometimes a person of great spiritual elevation takes recourse to death like the death in suicide. But there are some basic differences between the person who commits suicide in the actual sense of the term and the spiritual man who gives up his
body. Generally a person commits suicide in order to get rid of the miseries of life. But the person of great spiritual elevation is completely indifferent to all kinds of name, fame or wealth. And thereby he is above the sorrows or despairs of life. Again they cannot be regarded as insane, since they retain sufficient self awareness. What happens to them is that they are so much involved in their meditation that they forget about their body. As a result they fail to distinguish between the life and death. So they can easily forget their body which leads to death. Here death is unavoidable because the person who dies forgets the existence of the body.

Another kind of death is found among the persons who know that soul is immortal. As the soul is immortal so soul will not be destroyed with the destruction of the body. With this view in mind they prepare for death like a great celebration of their life. They do that to win death. We know that death comes unaware. But these people try to make death to be unaware. In this respect we can mention the cases of Indian saints who kill themselves when their body becomes incapable of performing penance because of old age or illness. Here we can mention as an example the case of Kumārilā Bhaṭṭa who as is said in the Saṅkara Dīgvidaya by Madhabacārya, was preparing for his death by burning himself when Saṅkarācārya approached him for debate. Perhaps Malkani has such instances in his mind when he speaks about the self killing by the spiritually elevated persons.

Here in this context we can refer the Jaina view of Samlekhana also. Samlekhana is a practice of fasting unto death. "Samlekhana is not to be regarded as a form of suicide. The Jainas distinguish Samlekhana from other self-mortification, such as, taking of poison, falling down from a high place and so on."
These methods are designated by them as bāla-marāṇa or akāma-marāṇa i.e., suicide, while saṃlekhanā is described by them as samādhamarāṇa or death leading to the realization of the self, the highest end to be achieved in the course of spiritual endeavour.\textsuperscript{57} It is practiced under the circumstances of emergencies and also at the end of religious practices. In Jainism it is advised that at the time when a person fails to lead a pious life due to extreme famine, spiritual calamity etc., saṃlekhanā is to be practiced. A monk who is incapable to perform his prescribed duties due to illness is also advised to fast unto death.

These are the different kinds of self-killing in our religious and spiritual life. Such type of killing can be regarded as conventional type of suicide. Another type of suicide is called personal type suicide. Malkani is not concerned with these spiritual or religious type of suicide when he speaks about suicide. But it is true that Malkani is in opposition to suicide in the proper sense of the term. He concludes by saying that nobody can achieve anything by death. If something is to be achieved it is to be achieved only within life. So to destroy life with the expectation of achieving peace by destroying miseries is only a false notion found among the persons committing suicide.

The discussion on moral and other values reveals the fact that Malkani is very much concerned with the concept of morality and value. He believes that morality is not possible without some religious background. He does not accept that morality is the work of the society. The moral rules prescribed by some outside agency or human being may not be acceptable to all. He says that the prescription will be acceptable to all if and only if it is prescribed by the scripture, which is a non-human and divine
authority. He says that without accepting any religious schemes ethical ideals can only satisfy our self-interest and noting else.

So far as value is concerned Malkani opines that value is value since it is appreciated. According to him the concept of value has a reference to the subject and it is purposive. So it appears that value always implies value to some person.

Malkani is an ardent supporter of the Law of *karma*. According to him God cannot create such an imperfect world. He is of the opinion that one’s *karma* governs his life and destiny.

He is against the decision of committing suicide. He says that if the life itself is destroyed then he cannot perform his prescribed duties for which he comes to the world.

**NOTES AND REFERENCES**

3. Malkani, G.R., *Metaphysics of Advaita Vedanta*, (At the fundamental experienced level religion and morality are separate and autonomous. Malkani does not subscribe to this view), p. 281
4. Ibid., p. 285
5. Ibid., p. 286
6. Cf. Ibid., p. 292
7. Gupta Shantinath, *The Indian Concept of Values*, p. 31

11. Ibid., p. 138


13. Cf. Ibid., p. 281

14. Ibid., p. 281

15. Ibid., p. 292


19. Ibid., p. 155

20. Ibid., p. 154

21. Ibid., p. 159

22. Ibid., p. 161

23. Ibid., p. 163

24. Ibid., p. 168

25. Ibid., p. 172

26. Ibid, p. 174

27. Ibid., p. 175

28. Ibid., p. 177

29. Ibid., p. 179

30. Ibid., p. 180

31. Ibid., p. 181

32. Ibid., p. 184

33. Ibid., p. 193
34. Ibid., p. 195
35. Ibid., p. 197
37. Ibid., p. 15
38. Ibid., p. 13
39. Ibid., p. 15
40. Ibid., p. 37
41. Ibid., p. 7
42. Ibid., p. 70
43. Ibid., p. 50
44. Radhakrishnan, Dr. S., *The Hindu View of Life*, p. 55
45. Radhakrishnan, Dr. S., *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 103
46. Radhakrishnan, Dr. S., *The Hindu View of Life*, p. 54
47. “Our demand for freedom must recon with a universe that is marked by order and regularity. Life is like a game of bridge. The cards in the game are given to us. We do not select them. They are traced to past *karma* but we are free to make any call as we think fit and lead any suit. Only we are limited by the rules of the game. We are more free when we start the game than later on when the game has developed and our choices become restricted. But till the very end there is always a choice. A good player will see ‘possibilities which a bad one does not.’ The more skilled a player the more alternatives does he perceive. A good hand may be cut two pieces by unskillful play and the bad play need not be attributed to the frowns of fortune” in Radhakrishnan’s S. *An Idealist View of Life*, pp. 221, 222.

49. *The Encyclopedia Philosophy*, Vol. 8, p. 43

50. Cf. Ibid., p. 43


52. *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer*, Irwin Edman (ed.), p. 278


