An aspirant, having become a fit candidate for attaining the highest knowledge, searches for the correct means to achieve one's cherished and aspired goal.

'Darsana' or the system of Indian Philosophy has evolved mainly out of an examination of our means of knowledge. "The structure of all systems of philosophy is based upon independent human reasoning. Hence in some darsanas, Sruti has been accepted as an infallible authority, but some others are entirely free from the influence of Sruti - as they do not rely on any thing, which lies beyond human reasoning. The Gārvāka darsana disregards the authority of Sruti altogether.\(^1\) The Lokayatas accept pratyakṣa alone as a valid source of knowledge. They admit inference only when in so far as it is in full conformity with our sense-experience, but they show scant regard for the formal form of the same.\(^2\) The Baudhāyas

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1. C.S.P. 12 ff.
2. Purandarastvah, Lokapravidhānagocārāvairāpyayata eva. yatta kāscit lOUkikam mārgaepisodevyā nāmānustvāryate tannidhyata iti'- Gāck, 2or XXX. (Val L.) P. 433. Tate Sam-

contd.........
and some Vaiśeṣikas admit two sources, perception and inference. To these the Sāṃkhyaś add a third, authority or testimony (Sabda). The Naiyayikas admit a fourth way of knowing (Upamāna) in addition to these three. The Prabhākaras again add to these three. The Prabhākaras again add to these four methods a fifth postulation or assumption (arthāpatti). The Bhāttas and the Monistic Vedāntins recognise however, six methods of knowledge, adding non-cognition (anupalabdhi) to the five already mentioned.5

Thus we find that all the six means or modes of acquiring the knowledge of ultimate Truth are recognised by Vedānta. The goal to be reached being one (i.e. the real apprehension of pure unitary consciousness), the different ways leading to it, command more or less the same importance in the eyes of Vedānta. Of these Sruti is accepted and declared to be the highest means for acquiring the knowledge of Brahman.

5. (a) S.W.K.P. 19
   (b) 'Pratyakesam kāryakāh, kanādasugataś punah ammaneṣe
       taccapi sāmkhyā Sabdana te-ubhe')
Hence we propose to begin with reference to the different pramanas as discussed in the Vedanta-Kaumudi and finally find the place of Sabda in the scheme of pramanas.

The different pramanas in the Vedanta-Kaumudi.

Ramanavaya does not overlook the other prominent pramanas. He explains and discusses them all in detail, but refutes them in favour of Sruti as the only conveyer of the knowledge of the ultimate Reality. Even then, the other pramanas have their own undeniable position and importance in the world of experience. He has discussed pramanas as the means to attain the knowledge of Reality.

Any verdict passed on the correct exposition of pramana, naturally implies and presupposes the awareness of the exact meaning of the term 'pramā' - the object of pramāna. No definition of pramāna is justifiable, when 'pramā' itself is a point of dispute.

Ramanavacarya has differed from the Vaidikas about the definition of the Right knowledge and its object. It is not merely the information of an unknown fact, as held by the Contd........
Vaidikas. This information may satiate the practical inquiry, but it does not necessarily disclose the Reality. An information about the unknown can not exhaust the object of knowledge. The Vedanta Kaumudi discusses the popular views later popularised by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra on the object of right knowledge and stresses not only on the knowledge of unknown (anadhitartana), but explains the importance of non-contradiction too, when an object is made known to an ignorant and at the same time there is no scope for any contradiction or negation of that knowledge. Then alone, a knowledge is called perfect or true.

Ramanavaya stands strongly for a correct interpretation of an 'artha'. A representation and non-contradiction seem to be more subjective to Kaumudii-Kastra, whereas a right interpretation is more objective. There may be an objective correspondence between an object and its representation without any contradiction, yet it may not be the right experience. The objective knowledge depends entirely on the correctness of the experience, otherwise the condition becomes relative and

4. V.K.P. 10 ff - Ajñātārthajñaptih pramanam iti tāvat vaidikah.
5. Tatra smṛtyuvayṛttam pramāṇam anadhitabādhi- tārthaviśayaka jñānatvam' -V.Pari(Pratyakṣa Parischeda-2).

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tends to satisfy the practical need alone. The absolute knowledge searches for a right experience.

From the standpoint of super-imposition of modification of antahkarana (vritti) on a particular object of knowledge, a monistic definition of pramāna will be objective rather than subjective. It will be absolute and final. The whole theory of Vedānta Philosophy rests on the basis that the whole structure is super imposed on the pure and all-pervasive consciousness. The subjects, objects and all possible cognitional relations between them are, as such, based on falsehood. The Vedānta Kaumudi explains carefully that the right knowledge or vatharthanubhaya is a complete definition of a pramāna, because it reveals the real nature of the object. The definition does not clash with the dualistic theories in empirical use, in the least. Information about an unknown object alone is good enough for practical purposes, declares Ista Siddhi as referred to by Rāmādvaya.7

6. Ajñātajñāpanam iti tadāśāram = V.K.P. 7 Ibid. P.8
7. Ibid = pp 10 ff

Contd.........
It is not that the first perception counts for right knowledge always. We often perceive things which had been experienced previously. This fact brings a process of recognition in. We cannot disown the weight of recognition either, in the pursuit of right knowledge.

The sense-organs do not stop operating just after one perception. Every time our perceptions get some new and more detailed qualities to make the knowledge derived, more precise. Knowledge is not perfect till it has touched every detail of the object, no matter how many repeated perceptions are required to gain a complete knowledge. Anadhyatatva, thus, has practically no position in Ramadvaya's definition of a 'Right knowledge'.

Pratyaksa: The visual perception or pratyaksa is the leading pramana unanimously acclaimed by all. It deals with the contact of our senses with the existing material objects.

The different schools of Indian Philosophy have put forward variant definitions of this pramana according to their own theories about the same. The Buddhists confine
pratyakṣa to the knowledge of a particular object with which our sense comes in contact. This definition of the Buddhists confine pratyakṣa to the knowledge of a particular object with which our sense comes in contact. This definition of the Buddhists, which paves the way to their theory of Keśabhaṅgavāda, is criticised mainly by the Mīmāṃsakas, who do not accept the knowledge of a momentary-particular to be any knowledge at all.

Gautama defines pratyakṣa as knowledge derived from the contact of sense and an object. Kanāda and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa have supported this definition and view. Tattvacintāmāṇi has defined pratyakṣa as immediate knowledge. Frabhākara also accepts perception as immediate knowledge. Dr. D.M. Dutta has quoted Āśubodhini (p.27) and clarified the definition of pratyakṣa by saying - "The word pratyakṣa etymologically consists of the two elements "Pratī" (to, before, near) and "akṣa".

* Pramāṇa Vārtika - p 245 ff.
8. Prakārama Pāṇcikā - (chaukhamba) - p. 49
9. Indriyārtha Sanni-karga jñānām jñānam - N.S. 1.1.4
12. "Sakṣatpratītiḥ pratyakṣam" - Pr. F.P. 51
13. S. W. K. P 34–35 (Āśubodhī Tīkā on Nyāya Pañcānana - p 27)

Contd..............
(sense organ), or 'prati and' akṣi' (eyes). So in common parlance in has come to mean present to 'or before the eyes or any other sense-organ; and hence 'direct' 'immediate' etc. It is contrasted with the word parokṣa, which means away from the eye or any other sense, 'mediate', 'indirect' etc. It is primarily used, as an adjective. In philosophy it is used, broadly speaking, to indicate immediacy. It is used here both as a noun and also as an adjective. As a noun it stands for immediate knowledge. As an adjective it is applied to (1) knowledge, (jñāṇa), (2) object of knowledge, (viṣaya), and also to (3) the way of knowing, (pramāṇa). From the first adjectival angle of pratyakṣa + that is, from jñāṇa point of view, we have examples like 'Pratyakṣam jñānam, or idam jñānam Pratyakṣam and from the second and third angles, that is, from the points of view of viṣaya and pramāṇa, we have the examples of ayam ghaṭaḥ pratyakṣaḥ and idam pratyakṣam pramāṇāḥ. Hence, this much becomes clear now that pratyakṣa is definable from both the points, i.e. as direct knowledge and direct means of knowledge or direct evidence, both of these lead to the one and the same meaning.

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Advaita Vedānta defines pratyakṣa as an immediate knowledge but does not take it merely as an activity of sense at the root. Dr. Dutta has explained the view of Vedānta paribhāṣā thus: 14 "There is no necessary connection between perception and activity of sense. God has no senses, yet it is admitted by all who believe in the existence of God, that he has immediate knowledge of things". Dr. Dutta emphasises this point by referring to some other Advaitins who do not regard mind as a sense and they say that we have in internal perception an instance of immediate knowledge which is independent of any activity of the sense. 15

The author of Vedānta Kaumudi 16 has nothing new to add to the definition of pratyakṣa and he adheres to the original line of the Vivaraṇa school of the Advaita-vāda.

Thus it becomes clear that, our sense receives impressions of the objects outside and therefrom knowledge of an object is gained. The Vivaraṇa school of Advaita Vedanta

15. Ibid.
16. V.K.P. 13

Contd........
elaborates this process of attaining objective knowledge by saying that it is necessary for every one of the senses to reach the object and have contact with it, in order to perceive the object. This theory strongly proves the indriyas to be "Prāpyakāri" (capable of working on reaching the object) as against the Buddhistic theory of "aprāpyakāri". 17 The senses are invisible or "atindriya" themselves but they reach the objects of their perception through the antahkarana-vṛtti. This is explained in the Prakārana Pāṇḍita. 18 It says that when we see a distant star the visual sense shoots forward in long rays and reaches the object. Vivarana Prameya Samgraha justifies this by saying that owing to the high speed of the Vṛtti we seem to perceive the distant and near objects simultaneously; 19 though actually the timing of doing so is different. According to the view of the Naiyāyikas, sound-waves travel to the ear to cast their impression therein. 20 But the Vedāntic theory of perception does not accept this, as Vedānta Kaumudi also makes it clear 21 that even in hearing the

17. V.P.S. pp 186ff
19. V.P.S. p187.
20. Ka. p556
21. V.K. p175
imperceptible sense goes out to reach the object.

It becomes clear now that, it is the vr̥tti which takes up the form of the external object and enables one to have the perception. The two manifestations of subject and object take place in the vr̥tti itself and thus the object attains a new status in being recognised as an object, describes Vedānta Kaumudi. Because, these two manifestations of subject and object take place in the same (vr̥tti) process of antahkarana and are joined together in one cognition which enables us to know an object (i.e. this object is known by me), this conjunction is termed as "Sanāleṣa pratyaya" by Vedānta Kaumudi.

In support of his theory, Ramadāvayā has referred to the "Daharādhikarana" of Śāṅkara bhāṣya and has explained the ultimate Reality (or pure consciousness) which manifests itself in various forms so as to give variant appearance of the subject,

23. "Karmakārakābhivyaktāmōca prameyaṇa Tatprakāśatmanā phala-vyāpayatā bhāk." Ibid.
25. S.B. l.3.19.

Contd........
object and the vṛtti. It is one and the same and there is no consciousness other than this which can establish its independent position in the field of pratyakṣa.

Vedānta Paribhāṣa has described this theory elaborately and has accounted for three manifestations or phases of the consciousness termed as caitanya. The first phase is the pramaṇa-caitanya, i.e., consciousness as conditioned by the antahkarana, which is the knower of all knowledge. The second phase is the pramāṇa caitanya, i.e., consciousness as conditioned by the vṛtti and lastly the vigaya caitanya, i.e., consciousness as conditioned by the external object. This conception establishes the theory of One Reality of Advaita Vedānta very firmly. Dr. D. D. Dutta has referred to and explains this view of Vedānta Paribhāṣa editties to give a complete interpretation of the facts of immediacy (Pratyaṇkṣatva) from his own standpoint. He convinces that

26. V. Fariś (Pratyaṇkṣa Pariccheda).
the word pratyakṣa or immediate can be judged from two
standpoints i.e. firstly from that of object or Viśaya.
As for instance, we can say that the book is immediately
known: so here the book is the pratyakṣa. This position of
perception is termed as "Viśayagata pratyakṣa". Secondly when
we say that the knowledge of the book becomes the pratyakṣa,
the position is termed as "Jñānagata pratyakṣa".28 Both of
these are "regarded as two distinct phases, cognitional and
objective of the same perceptual revelation", explains
S.N. Das Gupta29 Vedānta Paribhāṣā defining Jñānagata as
non distiction of pramāṇa caitya from the viśayacaitanya.30
It is possible through the super-imposition of vr̥tti on the
object. The viśayagata pratyakṣatinva is defined as non-
distinction of the object from the perciver (Pramatr̥caitanya).31
This latter view is open to objection that the object or viśaya
comes in direct contact with the vr̥tti-caitanya (pramāṇa caitya)

26. V. Pariś Pratyakṣa Parischoda.
29. S.N.D. (Vol.II) - p200f
30. Aṣṭa pramāṇa caityaṁ nityaṁ Viśayavacchana caityamabheda iti
brūmāh - V. Pariś (Jñānagata Pratyakṣatvam).
31. Ghaṭādor viśayya Pratayamantra Pramatvabhimaa-
viśayagata pratyakṣatvam. Ibid.

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and not with the praśāta-caitanya. This vṛtti intervenes in-between the perceiver and the object. Dharmarāja Adhvarindra, in his commentary on Vedānta Paribhāṣa has also brought out this point.²² In justification of Vedānta Paribhāṣa, Śikharāṇi refers to Prakāśatmanā's Vivarāṇa and argues that the author of Paribhāṣa was forced to define the non-distinction of the subject and the object here, as it was the traditional line of the Vivarāṇa school.²³ But the referred passage of Vivarāṇa brings in the via media of "Samvid".²⁴ "Samvid" actually comes in contact directly and it is the sense-knowledge and not the knower or perceiver. Tattraṇāṇa also explains the same point. Rāmādvaravācaryā, as has already been mentioned, worked on the traditional Advaita line of the contact of vṛtti and viśaya or the object.²⁵ The author of Vedānta Paribhāṣa, himself takes up an objection about the said theory of the non-distinction of the praśāta and viśaya, and says that in that case, the perceptive judgement would be "I am the object" instead of "I perceive the object".

²² Śikharāṇi Com. on V.Pari. p 73 ff
²³ Ibid.
²⁴ P.P.V. p50.6 - T.B. - p194.
²⁵ V.K.P. 10 ff
But he has replied himself saying that the consciousness underlying the object is non-different from the consciousness underlying the subject, as there is no separate consciousness or existence other than the subjective consciousness.36 But this argument of Vedanta Paribhasa does not explain the Advaitist view in the Vivarana line, as Advaita Vedanta does not reject like the Buddhists the entire existence of the outside world. On the contrary, it accepts the multifarious objects of the world on the empirical level. Pancha Padika Vivarana37 also makes this standpoint of Advaita Vedanta very clear.

Dr. S.N. Das Gupta explains the Vivarana theory elaborately and observes: "There is thus a distinction between visual percept and the object, but there is also a direct and immediate connection between them, and it is this immediate relationship of the object and its awareness that constitutes the perceptivity of the object."38 He has also referred to the Pancha Padika Vivarana.39

37. P.P.V. p50
39. P.P.V. p50

Contd.....
The Vedanta Kaumudi has followed the Vivarana line honestly without any deviation as Paribhaga has done. The whole theory of perception as described by Vedanta Kaumudi can be traced back to the Pancha Kudala Vivarana, where it says that the objects of the empirical outside world are covered by ignorance (avidya) and that antah-karana is transformed into different states by its superimposition on objects. It is enlightened by the underlying consciousness and when there is the contact with the object, the avidya veil vanishes from the object. Vedanta Kaumudi, by accepting vyrtti as the agent of antahkarana, has automatically solved the problem of identity and has elaborated its theory by stating that there are as many cognitive illuminations as there are ajñana-veils and each cognition removes one veil of ignorance. Vedanta has elaborately explained the theory.

40. V.K.Pp 10ff
41. jñanam mātmaguna nāpi kriyā, apiyu manuvrttih-Ibid. p.15.
42. Yavanti jñanani tavanti evantvani Paratantrāṇi va ajñanāhi, tato na dosah - Ibid. p.15.
saying that as soon as the vṛtti comes in contact with the object, the mind becomes illuminated, but the next aṭṭāna veil covers it again, which has to be removed by another contact of the vṛtti and the object. This process continues in quick succession. This contact and removal of aṭṭāna is not noticed owing to the rapidity of the process. 43 This view of Vedānta Pramāṇa is different from that of Vedānta Prabhās where the latter clearly says that there are no different aṭṭānas to remove different aṭṭāna-veils. 44 Now it becomes quite obvious that the contact of the self operation with the object is not direct but it is through the cognitive/ Vedānta Pramāṇa concludes that the cognitive operation is an active transformation of the antahkarana in the form of the object, 45 and has quoted Iṣṭa Siddhi in support of its view.

— Rāmānuja, does not accept time as a separate element or object of perception as he regards time as a mode of perception. 47

43. Ibid. P. 14.
44. V. Pari (Puruṣa lakṣaṇaṃ).
45. *Atah śārayava Sattvātmakaranataḥ karanam eva-anudbhūta rūpa Sparśamadāryamagamyavān on Vigayākaropa Parināmata iti romanāyami V.K. P. 13
46. Iṣṭa Siddhi, 1-9
47. V.K. Fp 143ff.
In our Indian Philosophy, two stages of perception have generally been distinguished, namely, nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka pratyaksa. Nirvikalpaka pratyaksa is explained by the Nyāya school as the first or the primary stage of pratyaksa, when the object remains indeterminate and is not characterized by any predicate. The pratyaksa in its second stage, when the non-related indeterminate elements are related in a definite form of a judgment like (this is a pot or ayam ghataḥ), it is termed as savikalpaka-pratyaksa.

The Mīmāṃsakas assert the theory of nirvikalpaka pratyaksa as we got from the ślokavartika. But they do not accept the extreme view of the Buddhists, who rule out the savikalpaka altogether as coloured by our imagination. Prakārana Pāñcika replies that at the first stage, any object can not be known as some thing unique (or svalaksana in the terms of the Buddhists).

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48. Sūtra of knowing. P.92ff
49. Tattva Cintāmani-Nirvikalpaka-vādah.
Siddhānta muktavali-(Nyāyasāgar) on Kar.58.
50. 3.V. (Pratyakṣa Sū. Kar. 112)
51. V.Pari. (Pratyakṣabhedāḥ)

Contd........
In the eyes of the Vedántins these two kinds of perception cover different fields. The immediate knowledge is a related perception. The perception, without this substantive-relative relation, is nirvikalpa. **Vedánta Paribhāṣā** deals with this point elaborately. It explains along the lines of Vedánta that, nirvikalpapratyakṣa is not merely a preliminary or prejudgment stage of nirvikalpapratyakṣa, but is a complete judgment in itself. We find this clearly, when on perceiving a man for a second time, we say "This is that Devadatta", here we have a nirvikalpa type of perceptual knowledge. Here we arrive at an identity between the first-seen "Devadatta" and the present "Devadatta". In such judgments as mentioned, we assert identity rather than adjectival relation. **Vedánta Paribhāṣā** meets the proposed objection that here, the knowledge is "Sabdajanya" and not "indriyajanya", by saying that, perception is not created by senses, but senses are instruments in gaining perception.

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52. V.Pari. (Pratyakṣabheda)
There are other factors also which work as auxiliaries in attaining such knowledge. The part played by the faculty of memory is also auxiliary and nothing more.

This kind of perception holds in the case of the tenets of our Upanishads, explains Vedanta Puribhasa. Because all of them are identity judgments indicating the realization of self and the ultimate realization of truth and the identity of self and Brahman.

Vedanta Karmadi has dealt with this point from the exact standpoint of the Advaita Vedanta, and states that the perception of identity with the Nirvikalpaka-Brahman includes all universals and individuals, because nothing is outside it.

This nirvikalpaka-pratyaksa leads on to the Nirvikalpaka samadhi, the stage where the ultimate realization takes place. It is naturally the final and fully-matured stage of mind according to the Advaita Vedanta, hence, nirvikalpaka-pratyaksa could not be taken

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53. V.Pari - (Nirvikalpaka Pratyaksa) (="Namabobdidad Jnanam..."
54. Ibid.
55. V.K.P. 89ff
56. Ibid.

Contd........
as the premature of preliminary stage of the pratyakṣa.
So we find in such identity-judgments that the savikalpaka
Pratyakṣa is rather preceding and not succeeding. Because,
when we saw Devadatta for the first time, we had a
definite and related perception, which was savikalpaka;
in the second perception, where has was identified, it was
nirvikalpaka.

Apart from the points mentioned, Rāmacārya has
also dealt with certain categories and types of pratyakṣa\(^\text{57}\)
of which yogika pratyakṣa occupies a prominent place in the
field of perception.

The deep insight of the Rāja and Siddhas can perceive
even the non-existent past and future.\(^\text{58}\) They can even see
the objects which are not seen by the ordinary beings.
Manusmṛtī also says that one, desirous of Dharma Siddha,
should be well-informed about the knowledge of perception,
inference and various Brūtis or Āramāṇa.\(^\text{59}\) This (above)
declaration of Manusmṛtī also shows the subtlety of sight.

\(^{57}\) V.K.P. 173ff
\(^{58}\) Samādhipa, Sa-7 (Pāṇini-jaya
\(^{59}\) Manus-12/103)
by which the learned can see what the ordinary sight fails to see. The final view of our author is that however subtle may the object be, yet it will be an object of perception. 60 He quotes *lokavârtika* in its support and explains the absence of hearing in vision. 61 An object of sight will always be perceptible by sight and never by hearing, no matter however subtle it be. 62

Realisation of subtle objects depends on *sruti*, inference etc. All the pramanas actively help in the realisation of the learned souls. When they see the past, memory comes to their aid wonderfully. It is a clear and strong memory, that enables them to see the past. When they predict about the future, it is their clear mind and flawless anticipation or rather perfect foresight than perception alone, that works. It is the versatility, deep knowledge and crystal intellect, that show their coordinated and masterly action. Even in yogik perception, the object of sight must be present. Nothing can be perceived in absentia.

60. V.K.P,173ff
61. S.V. 2-114

Contd..........
The sixth perception, that of absent object, tends to prove that, perception of objects which are not seen right in their places, give us the knowledge of 'Abhāva'. But the perception of the objects absent, can not be a means or source of knowledge. It would be a contradiction in terms in that case. Similarly, the illusory perception fails to bring the light of knowledge to one's eyes.

Buddhism insists on the 'golakas' or the bodily centres or aperture balls, being the actual sense organs. Sāmkhyā-yoga, one of the leading Schools of Philosophy, adds the supremacy of Abhināma over the sense-organs.

But, none of the schools succeeds in proving, as to how we see the objects which are much bigger in size than our tiny organs. It only the outer organs be the conveyers of knowledge, they should themselves be efficient enough to discriminate small from sight and sight from hearing and so on, but it is obviously experienced that this is accomplished.
by some other power. The organs are merely the conveyers of their different departments. The other functions are performed by some other authority. This authority is Ahamkara. Thus the Vedanta Kaumudi discusses the various theories about the senses used in perception. 65 In Bhagavad Gita also there is the well-known instance of bestowing the Divine sight or Divya Chakras to Arjuna to enable him to see Vishwarupa of the Lord. 66 Manusmriti accepts perception as a pramana and also takes up the subject-object contact. 68

This discussion on perception by Vedanta Kaumudi starts with a presumption of ignorance or Avidya that veils the pure consciousness. According to Dr. S.N. Das Gupta, here is an influence of Prakartha and both Vedanta Kaumudi and Prakartha borrowed it from Pancha Padikai Vivaranam. 69

It is the avidya veil that produces diversity. This contradicting factor is the quality of manas (mind). Mind, along with the instrument of buddhi, makes all perceptions and the reactions respectively, states Vedanta Kaumudi. 70

65. V.K.P-175-75ff - pratyaksha lakshana vicara
66. Gita-11.8
67. Gita-11-6
68. Manus-12-103
69. S.N.Das (Vol.II) P-108f. P.P.V. (Var I) - ajnana
bhavartatvocopapatti Pratyaksa pramana pradarsanam.
70. V.K.P. 13ff
As a crystal, confronted with a red object, reflects the redness, in the same way consciousness reflects all the shades and forms of Buddhi. This is the root or the primary contact for all perceptions.\(^1\) These concrete forms are originated by the Antahkarana.\(^2\) This contact, being at the root, there is no contradiction in the 'Dhāraṇa-Vahika Jñāna', explains Śrī Rāmānuja.\(^3\) Every cognition is ultimately based on this contact singly, where mana, propelled by the destiny (adṛśa), transforms itself into a ray touching the object. This ray is known as 'Vṛtti'.

The knowledge, in Vedānta Kaukūmi, is not a latent quality or attribute of Atman, as Nyaya proves, but it is an active process of 'Vṛtti'. Vṛtti moves definitely to the object and takes its reflection back to buddhi or 'antahkarana'. Vṛtti is the common place for the manifestations of both the subject and the object. In the cognition of an object, there is a blending of subjective and objective existences in the cittavṛtti. This co-existence is termed as 'Saméla-pratyaya'.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) V.s.\# 13
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Ibid. ff
\(^4\) Saméla-pratyaya.

Contd...........
Consciousness, as limited by the antahkarana and transformed into the process of Vrtti or cognition, appears as the cognizer or the experiencer. This Vrtti itself is the first samâleca and Vrtti, as the form of knowledge, is another samâleca. Thus, the complete pratyaya is samâleca Pratyaya.

It is the combined and blended appearance that rallies round one pure and all-pervading consciousness. As the fire can manifest itself with the help of fuel, similarly, pure consciousness shows itself through the concrete mediator, the antahkarana. The pure consciousness, underlying the antahkarana lies dormant and veiled, as it seems. But, as soon as, the Vrtti functions the luminous consciousness shows itself through the concrete functioning of the antahkarana. Thus it is clear that, knowledge cannot be merely a qualification of Atman.

Ultimately, the position stands that, even the most subtle object is not beyond the field of perception. There may be many sorts of perception, but one can never be an object of another perception, experienced by a different

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senses-organ, that is, an object of vision can not be seen.
Hence pratyakṣa is also a function and a play of avidyā
and nothing else.

Inference or Anumāṇa:

Inference is another means of gaining knowledge
about a certain class of objects. When we can experience
any thing by one or more of our senses-organs, or when
we can see, hear or feel, then only, we come to know
about the seen, heard or felt objects. But when the existence
of a particular object is not perceived, then we infer its
presence by reasoning.

In order to get the correct inference, we have to
follow certain laws and rules, basing on which, we draw
logical conclusions. This is known as anumāṇa. This is
also a widely accepted pramāṇa in the Indian Philosophy.
The popular example quoted for anumāṇa by the School of
Nyāya, is :- 

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bahi-yathā-rāhānasā, etc. This shows that, with the help of everyday experience or a general fact, we infer the existence of particular things. When one sees smoke, fire is sure to be. This mutual co-existence between fire and smoke is obvious even in a domestic kitchen fire. This co-existence is the primary source of inference here, and it is termed as "Vyāpti" in Indian logic. The Vedanta-Kaumudi having dealt with perception, comes down to discuss amāna or inference. 75

The Vedanta-Kaumudi 76 says that, in experiencing this Vyāpti, the main characteristic of firing that it emits smoke as soon as it is lit, is known to all. That is why, the very sight of smoke anywhere, gives the indication of the presence of fire there and is proved by the inevitable co-existence of fire and smoke. Vedanta Kaumudi 77 then proceeds to reject the inferential argumentation in proving the existence of Brahman.

75. Anuvātām punar jñata Sambandha vyānīk-āsādarnānāt ekadāntaraacksonikṣaṁtrothe buddhi. V.K.P. 175.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid. Pp 133-84

Contd........
Śaṅkara has also refuted the ability of reason, especially of human reason, in being able to prove the existence of the Ultimate Reality. In the aspiration for truth, it fails utterly. There is always a limitation to all such human reasonings and argumentations. 78

Inference becomes inoperative when it tries to prove the Reality which is beyond the reach of human capacity and yet is all-pervasive. The *Vedānta Kaumudi* also explains, how inference proves the creation and its cause and that, the inanimate world is regulated by the animate power. But then, all these argumentations only help in bringing a logical conclusion about the cause and effect relationship. How can these arguments ever deny a subjective Reality? We can argue about an objective fact, but we cannot do the same about the 'self' or the very 'subject' itself. We cannot attain the knowledge of Brahman through inference because Brahman has no *ānāma* or sign of cause through which it can be inferred. 79(b)

78. Ibid.
79. (a) Ibid. P. 190
79. (b) *Stad anumāṇa ma ca anānāpi brahma guṇyate lingabhāvāt* — Ibid — P. 185

contd.......

Brahman is that all-pervasive and subtle power, which cannot be argued out. It has no concrete shape perceptible to our external senses. Hence, there can be no place for inference as a means to attain the knowledge of the reality of Brahman, unaided by Sruti.

"Upamāna"

Any knowledge acquired with the help of similarising or comparing is known as Upamāna or Analogy. According to the Nyāya system, Upamāna is one of the prominent means of attaining knowledge. When a person sees a blue bull for the first time in his life, he compares it with a cow he had seen and gains the knowledge of blue bull. When a teacher desires to explain any unknown object to a pupil, who has no idea about that object, the teacher does it by comparing it with a known and almost similar object. This means of gaining knowledge is called Upamāna or Analogy. Upamāna is mainly based on perception and memory. It helps to similarities.

80. Ato na svatantram amūmam brahmani pramānam - Ibid 190.
and discriminate, but how can this be efficient enough as a means to attain the knowledge of Brahman? Here no question of comparison can arise mainly because a continuous vivartana or change is going on. The manifest form of Reality in the form of creation is ever changing. Moreover, there is no scope for comparing the reality itself with another reality. This is not possible, as there is only one reality without a second. The ultimate reality cannot be more than one to give us a chance to compare them. Hence, upamāṇa gets no place as a means to attaining the knowledge of Reality.

Moreover, 'Vyāpti' (i.e., co-existence of fire and smoke) is an essential factor in anumāṇa or inference, which is not found in upamāṇa. The latter moves on directly from the recollection of a known object to recognize the unknown one, whereas, in anumāṇa a number of experiences will have to be faced to form a clear idea about the mutual co-existence (i.e., as between the fire and smoke). In upamāṇa this experience of the co-existence is not possible. Hence, it is a separate pramāṇa altogether. Upamāṇa also stands futile in being a means to acquire the supreme knowledge.
It needs two objects of the same nature. Memory of the first helps to know the second one. No sooner than this duality prop up, the knowledge of Brahman becomes hidden behind the thick curtain of avidyā. Dualism can never bring about the knowledge of Brahman. Objective dualism fails to be the conveyor of the ultimate knowledge. Upamāna also being based on this dualism fails to become the means to attain the unitive knowledge. Hence, none of the pramāṇas excepting Śrutī can convey the knowledge of Brahman, because of their subject-object duality.

Śabda or Śrutī

But, Brahman being the ultimate Truth to be realised, it becomes essential to take up the right path of knowledge. Śrutī opens that path to lead an adhikārin to the goal. The term Śrutī, has the root 'Śru' as its base. This itself shows that the teachings of Śrutī were first heard from the preceptor and then followed. Guru actually showed the way to the highest knowledge, by telling and explaining the subtle

81. Āropitam ca na pramāṇagocaraḥ āto nādām upamāṇagocaraḥ
   -- V.K.P. 191.

Contd. .......
truth over and over again. Hence, the true definition of Sruti will be that it is the utterance of rśis, who visualised the truth which they realised.

The scope of Sruti is another important point to discuss. The Vedas i.e. Saṁhitās are the first pronouncement of the rśis and the Vedic tenets are meant to be followed. They are like commandos. The rśis declared their realisation of truth without any comments. Gradually a stage came when the hymns or Sūktas had to be explained, their inner meaning had to be brought out. This stage gave rise to the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas. Lastly came up the Upaniṣads, which are actually the consolidation of the teachings of the Saṁhitās. These Upaniṣads form the sole background of the whole Vedānta system. Thus, Sruti really covers right from the first Sūkta of the Saṁhitās to the last tenet of the Upaniṣads. This wide range of Sruti had made it a complete means to attain the highest knowledge.

Sruti is the chief means (pramāṇa) to achieve the knowledge of Brahman. Injunction and validity are the two main points in Sruti, on which Rāmādvaya has concentrated.
In contrast to Bhāmatī, the Vedanta Kaumudi has followed the Vivaraṇa view about accepting injunction in the term Srotavayaḥ. In place of direct Sākṣātkāra through nididhyāsana (meditation) as emphasised by Bhāmatī, Vivaraṇa establishes Śruti to be sufficient in itself as a means because of the unique potentiality in the Upaniṣadic sentences, which impart the knowledge of reality. Such sentences of the Upaniṣads show an individual the right path, without any other assistance. Even the blind can gain knowledge by listening to those sentences, says Vedanta Kaumudi.

Śruti conveys the first-hand knowledge of the reality. The Rais have announced what they experienced. Śruti is the statement of Reality itself. The other factors of manana and nididhyāsana are two auxiliaries and thus they are secondary. The knowledge, which Śruti imparts, cannot be acquired by any human endeavour. It conveys the final knowledge of the ultimate Fact and Truth, which can not be generated or

82. Ayaravaghatādi Vat-draśtartho niyamvidhi. V.K.P. 31
83. Sahultane tamasi oaksurhingasyapi "drasma-tvamasi" ityupadeśa oaksat-kāraśarṣanat-aścaddaraśanena va vinigamyate - ibid - p29.
produced by any human activity. It lies beyond the scope of human achievement. Sruti is the sole conveyer of it.

The qualified Brahman (saguna) is not the entire reality because, it is only a conditioned phase of Reality i.e. Brahman. This one-sided knowledge fails to bring about Liberation. Mokṣa or Liberation is not possible by attaining the knowledge about worldly objects or about the qualified Brahman alone. On the contrary, it is possible only by a total banishment of ignorance from its very root altogether.

The knowledge of the unqualified (Suddha) Brahman alone can dispel the total ignorance of the Jīva. Sruti is the main conveyer of the aforesaid knowledge which, the individual (Jīva) aspires to achieve. The Reality is not an objective existence of perception; it is much beyond the scope of such perceptions, in the view of the Vedanta Kaumudi.

84. (a) V.K.P. 233
    (b) Ibid. p33.

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Its Validity (Prāmāṇya):

This unique position attributed to Śruti brings in the question of validity of Śruti, i.e., its worth as the highest pramāṇa in the eyes of the Vivarāṇa Prasthāna and Vedānta Kaumudi. Every Pramāṇa stands on the strength of its validity. A short discussion about the validity or Pramāṇyan becomes inevitable to create the proper background to prove the real worth of any pramāṇa.

Rāmādvaṇya believes that the validity of pramāṇa does not follow of itself from the absence of defects in that pramāṇa. The distortions, inflicted on the objects of cognition, are due to the inefficiency of our senses, through which we perceive the external objects. This defect can not affect the object or the knowledge of it, in the least. The knowledge of an objective existence is valid in itself. The Vedānta School of thought supports and advocates this self-validity fervently. And there been any scope for a second pramāṇa to assist in proving the

85, V.K.P. 17

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validity of a particular pramāṇa, there would be no meaning at all in the term 'validity' or rather, it would leave enough scope for the fallacy of "regrasana-ad-infinitum", because a second pramāṇa would every time be necessary to prove the validity without any finalisation.

Nyāya, having its full faith in the perception (pratyakṣa) never accepts the validity of knowledge if it is not based on perception. Not a single means of knowledge is self-sufficient in itself; it has got to be supported by pratyakṣa to prove its validity. Nyāya quotes the example of a thirsty man having heard about water within a proximity, but it does not validate the reality, until it instigated the thirsty person to go and see it, so that he may quench his thirst. This power of fruitful impelling in a pramāṇa, is termed in Nyāya as "Samartha Pravṛtti". Udayanacārya has discussed the value of this 'paratah-pramāṇyāni' in his 'Nyāya Rucmañjali'. His view is that,

86. S.V. 1.2.49-51.
87. T.B: Pramāṇya nirūpanam
88. Tatra yā phalavatipravṛtticāsaṃarthā.
89. N.A. 2

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He......
had there been no necessity of a second means of ratification of a perception, there would not have been any doubt or enquiry about the 'validity'.\textsuperscript{90} It is because, a solitary pramāṇa is not convincing enough singly, i.e. merely the information about water (in the example quoted about), to a thirsty person is not enough, it should be able to move the person upto the said water and quench his thirst. This second condition validates the first statement. Rāmādvaṇīcārya, in his \textit{Vedānta - Pravṛtti}, quotes \textit{'Sīkṣa-Vartikā'} of Bhāṭṭapāda; while criticizing the theory of \textit{'Samartha Pravṛtti'} of Nyāya.\textsuperscript{91} Impelling is equally possible in illusions\textsuperscript{92} when a jewel is reflected in the light of lamp, the lustre of both the objects seem to be the real light and dazzle the eyes of persons and attract them, according to the theory of Samartha-Pravṛtti or instigation alright, but the reflection of jewel is a thorough illusion says Rāmādvaṇi. If an information fails

\textsuperscript{90} N.Ku P228
\textsuperscript{91} V.K.P. 16
\textsuperscript{92} \textit{manipradīpa prabhayor māni buddhyā-bhidhāvataḥ}
imtyā jñānavidgūdāpi vīśevortheśāryaṃpratī - \textit{Ibid} P.20

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to convey the fact, it is a mal-information, and no amount of argument can prove it to be a correct information. A true information is strong enough in itself singly. The whole structure of knowledge depends on the texture of the information itself. It is the strength of Sakti of a pramāṇa, that puts weight to its validity. This sakti is that ingrained nature or capacity, which can not be created by any external aid of any other pramāṇa. A 'Pramāṇa' has the capacity to make the unknown known. This particular capacity is termed as Prācānyam. Sabda is self-valid. The validity of Sabda cannot be established or proved by argumentation and action. It is beyond the scope of intellect of a human being. Validity lies inherent eternally in the Sabda itself.

Sruti is thus the highest Pramāṇa. The Mahāvākyas of the Upaniṣads are the direct background of the Vedānta Philosophy. These mahāvākyas are the declarations of the Rgis, who reached the pinnacles of the self-fulgent ultimate Truth. Thus the

93. Ajñāta Śūṇāram Sakti prāmāṇya - V.K.P. 18
94. P. 121. Ibid.

Contd............
Upaniṣads are self-sufficient in announcing the true wisdom. They are self-valid (swatḥ pramāṇa), without the need of any second pramāṇa to prove their validity. A teaching, an information or declaration, if true to the fact, is sufficient in itself, argues Vedānta Kaumudi. Rāmādwaya has supported and established this position strongly. Finally, we can say that all the pramāṇas are self-valid, for otherwise they fail to be a 'means' of gaining knowledge, says Rāmādwayācārya.

Brahman being all-pervasive and all-powerful Reality, super-human and beyond this creation, knowledge of it cannot be imparted by any other pramāṇa. Śrī Bādarāyana, having examined all the pramāṇas, concludingly framed the third Sūtra of Sāstra-yonitvāt. This Sūtra clearly explains that, it is the Sāstras alone which can impart the knowledge of the ultimate Reality. Now the position stands that, Śruti or the verbal testimony is the only possible source to

95. P. 21. Ibid. ff
96. V.K.P. 16 - ff
97. Ibid. P.p. 19,21 ff
98. Br. Sū-1.1.3.
Impart the knowledge of the supreme Reality, in the view of the Vedānta Kaumudi. 99 The knowledge, obtained from the Śruti, is called 'Śabda = jñāna'. Āmnāya is another term for the śāstras. Brahman is 'Āmnāya = Pramanaka' – declares Vedānta Kaumudi. 100 It is Śabda or the verbal testimony alone, that conveys the knowledge of that Truth, which is beyond the reach of any sense-organ. This knowledge is termed as Śabdam. 101 The testimony of the Śrutis is not the same as that of any argument of an ordinary man; on the contrary, Śruti is exclusively self-valid. Śruti passes the authoritative verdicts. It is a source by itself. 102

Śabda and Artha

Śruti is thus accepted by all and especially by the Sāmkara Vedānta, as a self-valid means of the knowledge of Reality, because it produces by itself the fruit of realisation or attainment of the self. 103 The mutual relationship between a word and its meaning is inherent

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100. Ibid
101. Sabdaśravijñānādāmānikrotoartho buddhi Śabda, Ibid, P.192
102. Ibid, Pp.184-85 ff
103. Ātmaviṣṇunāyam phalaparyantatvān na tadvisayocyāñjātrasya pramanam Sakyam pratyakhyātum.
and eternal. It is self-existent, i.e., when one says "bring the cow and tie it there", every word presupposes a meaning and concept, which we learn from our elders. Our elders had in turn learnt the same meanings from their elders, and thus, this chain goes back to time immemorial. Any diversion in use and variety, in tone etc., is due to the person using a particular word. His voice and his intonation bring about the variations in the spoken form of the words.

A particular individual may be mortal but the word used to name it is eternal. It indicates the mortal individual not as a particular individual but as a class. When one says 'cow', one means any cow—rather one means the very 'class of cow'—not any particular mortal being of a specific colour, size or shape. The mortality is connected with the physical body of the 'cow', but the word hints at every cow at all times. 'Cow' as a class (the common noun) is immortal. It is not affected by the mortality of a single cow in the least. At the death of a single cow, the entire race of 'the cow' does not become extinct. This fact proves the immortality of a word. Similarly the immortality of Sruti is self-evident. Any limitation

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put by the speaker on the object named does not hamper
the actual nature of the word and its meaning; both remain
equally eternal. The efficiency of the defect of the
speaker simply has no influence over the "words". It is
this eternality and changelessness that makes verbal
testimony, the authority and the harbinger of the real
knowledge of the supreme Divinity, which is all-pervasive,
eternal and changeless. Sādhanācārya propounded this theory
in his commentary and established it well. Kusumānjali
shows, with the help of inference, that, Sabda is non-
eternal and perishable. The school of Nyāya accepts Sabda
as "eternal" and establishes dharma as founded on the word
of the Vedas, which is the highest word.

Recognition of any object shows clearly that it had
existed at the time of the first and original perception
and its existence continued till the second perception and
so on. On the basis of this psychological argument about
the factors of mind and memory, the Tautātita School proves

105. S.B. On B.S. 1.1.3.
107. Dharmaya mulatvat = naś abadamanāpekoṣam-Syāt Jai. 1.III.
in its first adhyāya, the recognition of the letters in the alphabet and establishes the eternity of Sabda as a nityadravya. 108(a) Certain schools of the Hīmaśakas also, as states Vedānta Kaumudi, believe in the eternity of Sabda (as the attribute of ākāśa) 108(b) Ākāśa being nitya, its essential quality is also always so.

Dhvani & Sahota:

It is dhvani or sound, which makes Sabda audible.

Any change, that we find, is usually in the modulation and intonation in the dhvani (or sound). A person, reading or reciting in a particular tone, voice or accent, brings about the variation in sound, but, that change does not affect Sabda, because, it is just aupāchika and external. Thus it creates a secondary change in Sabda and not a real one. It is Sabda, that gives rise to memory and recognition. The means of expressing and conveying words or propositions is the sound that is produced by the various contacts and movements of the vocal chords and muscles. This audibility.

108(a) Tattātitarorata Tilaka - Part-I
108(b) Nityoyam nabhaso Viśesa gunatvāt iti - Recit
Hīmaśakah.-V.K.P. 198

Contd.......

of words or propositions is similar to the characteristic of light which makes the objects visible with the assistance of the visual organ or the eyes. Sound also works in a similar process through the instrumentality of the auditory organs or the ears, explains Ślokā-Śāntika. 109 Mārācakau hold this position strongly in showing the relation between the sound and the word or logos. Sound is produced and it dies out, but it being only an agent of audible expression of logos, mortality of sound (dhvani) does not hamper the eternality of logos (aphota). Mahābhāṣya also emphasises the same point where it says that the variation is always created in sound, which is one aspect of Śabda. The other aspect is the aphota, which remains undisturbed in the variation of sound expressions. 110 Whenever a word is pronounced, the tone and pitch of the voice makes a varied impression of the same. To explain this we have to imagine the infinite syllables and from them deduce a class (gotvādijāti). But dhvani is an intrinsic quality of Ākāśa, it is based on

109. S.V. 1.6.42
110. Mahābhāṣya - 1-1-70.
neither words nor syllables. Hence Rāmādvayācārya concludes that it is more convenient to accept that the differences and variations are created by the modulation of dhvani in the varṇas or syllables.  

Rāmādvayācārya has followed the path of Advaita Vedānta paved by Śaṅkarācārya in his bhāṣya. The inherent capacity of expression in the letters (Varṇas) brings up the much discussed question of sphota Vyāda of our philosophy.

**The theory of sphota-vaṇḍa.**

In the grammatical school, the theory of sphota has been well developed. It has started from the old works of Brāhmaṇḍ, Patañjali etc and has come down to the most modern writers like Nāgasa. Not only in the grammatical works but also in the old Vedic tradition the doctrine of sphota has been expressed in some form or other. It is however evident that the grammarians also have a very old tradition of sphota.

111. V.K.F. 199  
112. S.B. 1:3:26

Contd.............
which goes as far back as Yāska. In the Nīrūkta manifestation of Śabda by external means of its physical expression has been recognised, for it is a kind of Vyāpti, which is the result of the application of the different means of expression of words and is commonly taken to be words expressed through Kānta etc. In the above example of Nīrūkta, the antara sphota is the cause of external manifestation of words through Kānta etc. In the Mahābhāṣya it has been said "Athavā pratīta-padārthako lokes dhvani Śabdah". The meanings coherently explained by the grammarians is that in a word like gauḥ, it is a kind of dhvani expressed by the particular letters like 'ga', 'au' and 'a' — which is a sum total of all the sounds and thereby becomes the cause of knowing the meaning of the word "gauḥ". Therefore in the view of Patañjali, the Bhāṣṭa theory as given in works like Śloka-vārtika, Śastrādipika etc. that, there is no justification for accepting sphota, has been refuted. This view of the

113. Vyāptisatvat tu Sabdasya-Nīrūkta 1/1/2
114. Paśupātā Abhīka
115. Sphoṭavādaṇa p.2 Sabara bhāṣya. 1.1.1. & S.V. 135
(***contd. 'nadi', dina' ff)
Mahābhāṣya is to be taken to include the expression of the akhanda sphota of the grammarians being expressed through the different modes like 'ga’kāra etc.

According to grammarians sphota may be of two varieties - (I) Vyakti sphota, that is, sphota pertaining to a single entity and (II) Jāti sphota that is sphota pertaining to a generic entity. There are sub-divisions of both these varieties. Five of these varieties belong to the Vyakti, such as, (a) akhanda varna sphota, (b) akhanda pada sphota, (c) akhanda Vākya sphota, (d) Adhanda pada sphota, (e) Adhanda Vākya sphota. Three other belong to the Jāti, such as: (f) Varna jāti sphota, (g) pada jāti sphota, (h) Vākya jāti sphota. Therefore these eight varieties are found in the old Schools of the Grammarians. Of these again akhanda Vākya Sphota is regarded as the principal variety. 116 Some, however regard this as not the akhanda vākya sphota but as the vākya jāti sphota. 117

117. Tatra Vākya Sphota ityavadḥayam-Sabda Kaustubha (Chow. Ed.-p.1)

Contd.............
The view of Patanjali, as referred to above, leads towards the pada sphota and the vākya sphota. It seems to us that of these two varieties, it is more inclined to akhaṇḍa sphota Vāda. In the Pañcasa-Āhūka, Patanjali has indicated Saṣṭa as "yena uʊçāritaṃ Saṣṭa lāṅgula kāpuḍa khur vīśālīnaśa aciṣpratya yo bhavati ca Saṣṭa", and under this Kaiyata, in his pradīpa, explains as "Vaiyākaraṇāh Varnāṭiriktasya padacaya Vākyacaya vā va vācaktvam ischanti". Therefore according to Patanjali's analysis it is evident that when we utter the word 'gauḥ' and have a knowledge of the particular word, we have a knowledge of padasphota apart from the particular letters which constitute the word. Similarly, we have also knowledge of a whole sentence which is the vākyā sphota apart from all the words which constitute the sentence.

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There has been however, a controversy between the old and the new schools of Grammarians regarding the existence of jati-sphota, in either a particular pada or in a whole vākya. The controversy regarding jati-sphota arises from the contention of the Bhatta School of Mīcāśa regarding the absence of jati in the particular letters. It is contended that firstly the sphota is not constituted for the individual letters and therefore there is no jati of the letters and secondly that the letters (varnas) are all very much short-lived, therefore the succession of letters from the first letters to the second and from the second to the third and so on, is not what we mean by a particular word (pada) constituted by that succession of letters. Moreover there can not be any jati in a particular sphota as the sphota is one and resides in that one substratum, for the knowledge of a comprehensive idea is a sufficient reason for refuting the jati. In reply to this we may say that it is possible to admit a sphota even though the varnas are short-lived.


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The old Grammarians have admitted that the trace of the sound in every preceding letter continues up to the last. This last sound is seen in the last letter, as associated with all the previous traces of the other letters. Or we may also support the sphyota according to these Grammarians from the standpoint of Halārāja, who says "Anubhavapūrvakatvam hi svarapagya niyatam, na tu kramopalabdham yugapanam Ścaryato Satādi pratyayābhāva pracaṅgat".¹¹⁹ This means that it is only by our remembrance of the previous sound that the sphyota in a particular pada constituted by these letters is possible. The other contention that in an individual, there is no knowledge of jāti is also replied to by these old Grammarians by saying that, firstly, a particular word like 'gauḥ' may be uttered by a hundred organs of speech and therefore the abhivyāñjaka (manifesting) coat of Kantha, tālu etc. being different in every person, the word as gauḥ, may have a generic knowledge; but secondly and more philosophically, they contend that the jāti is nothing but Brahman which is inseparable from Highest existence (Mahācattā).

¹¹⁹. Under Vākyapādiya Verse 39

Contd........
All other ideas expressed by particular words like 'gotva',
eaśvatva' etc are all due to maccionce (avidya) and
therefore, there is no real or ultimate knowledge of jāti
in any of these particular words. This view is upheld by
Bhartṛhari himself and supported by Pahābhāṣya-kāra and
Kaiyata in his Prādīpatikā.

But, some of the later Grammarians themselves have
not subscribed to the jāti-sphota. Their main reason is
that it is only by a kind of 'upādhi' (the external
conjunct) that the jāti is only-palaksita (i.e. referred
to from outside) in the particular words. But they contend
that jāti should not be accepted here as a completely
separate category. But this controversy can be only replied
to by what the old grammarians have accepted in regard
to the highest existence which is nothing apart from Brahman,
upon which, like the prapanca, the Śabda manifested by
different words and sentences, plays as a super-imposed
knowledge, subservient to the highest jāti.

Contd...
'Sphota' as the ultimate Reality, or sphota-vāda as an independent theory, has been set aside by Saśkarācārya, because of the necessity of the particular order of syllables and words. He clearly established that, the word-order is the means of conveying meaning in our world of experience that we face in our day to day life whereas imagination of sphota is unnecessary and superfluous. Because, when we look at a piece of gem over and over again we get repeated impressions which make the conception clearer, similarly, any word when pronounced over and over again, the after-impression of every syllable sets in, in the form of a definite and clear conception of the same. There is no need of "sphota" to give the knowledge of term. Syllables set together in a particular order, convey a particular meaning and that expresses the meaning of the term as a whole. Saśkarācārya has discussed this theory in his bhāgya and has ultimately refuted the theory of sphota.121

120. S.B. 1.3.28
121. Ibid.
Ramadvaayacharya aptly takes the Advaitic stand and criticises the theory in the same line. In his arguments, sphota, either expressed (abhivyakta) or un-expressed (arabhivyakta) does convey the meaning of the whole term independently. If the syllables pronounced one after another generate only one impression, there is no necessity of imagining a third entity as sphota, because these syllables form a pattern, being taken together. \footnote{122} Sphota is not required here to convey the meaning, as the smoke indicates the existence of fire, argues Ramadvaayacharya. \footnote{123} It is the order of the syllables and particularly the last syllable, right after which the meaning becomes clear, is capable enough to express the inherent meaning of the whole term. Any other agent (sphota) introduced here would have to rest upon the impressions (saancharae) left by the preceding syllables. Saancharae or the after-impressions can give rise to memory but not to knowledge. In that case, we can never gain knowledge of the new and unknown. Ramadvaayacharya puts this point emphatically in his repudiation of sphota. \footnote{124}

\footnote{122}{'Te gu ca sangatigrahena cyânt" - V.K.P. 202}
\footnote{123}{Ibid.}
\footnote{124}{Ibid.}
A collection of syllables form a term which stands for a single meaning. A term fixed in a case signifies a padam, which not only gives out its own meaning but at the same time shows the position of the complete proposition. This grammatical setup strengthens the status of the syllables and conveys the significance of the term. Rammāvaya has denied the acceptance of sphota when a term can do the main function of expressing the meaning completely. Finally, we can find that Advaita Vedanta does not see any such necessity of taking the help of a logo as different from words and sentences to convey the meaning, which it argues can be done by the setting of syllables into terms and terms into propositions that possesses the efficiency of expressing the inner ideas and inherent meanings.

An abstract idea gets a definite and clear form through Sabda. But, whether Sabda is a substance (dravya) or an attribute (guna), is a point of dispute. The first

125. (a) Karakabhedībhīdhadhī hi padam. Padyate amsa iti vyutpattī tu tacechabdā-sa kāryasambandhnabodho-pnihādmano nācāti taṃmin pravartitum ite'-Ibid. (b) 'tascēt arthadhī ra sphotaśādhyā'. Ibid. P. 205.

Contd. . . . . . .
view argues Sabda to be an attribute of ākāśa just as
rūpa is an attribute of any object. Śloka varīka describes
Sabda to be an outward expression of an idea, just as a
rūpa is of any other object. We can see an object because
it has rūpa (shape, colour etc.). Similarly, we can know the
idea of persons, when they speak out and thus the ideas
become receivable by the sense-organs in the form of Sabda.
Here Sabda does the work of rūpa and carries the abstract
ideas from one mind to another. Vedānta Kaumudi establishes
its theory that Sabda is made of varāsa and is an eternal
substance. It puts that just as we experience the objects
of sight, touch, taste through the particular sense-organs,
similarly, we hear Sabda through ear. Hence, Sabda, being
a substance responsive to an outer sense-organ as any of the
mentioned objects, it is also a dravya (substance) and not a
gupa (attribute). While dealing with the inherent relation

126. S.v. 1.642
127. Vargātānākam Sabda dravyam nityādta
   iti vyavasthitam. V.K.F. 201.
128. Ibid.

Contd........
between words and their meaning, our author touches upon another pair of theories i.e. the Anvitābhidhānavāda and Abhihitānyayavāda of the Mīmāṃsā School. These are about words and meanings and sentences. A sentence is defined to be the collection of individual words which lead to a judgement consisting of concepts brought into a relation with one another, according to Nyāya. So a sentence consists of different words put in a certain pattern, which are competent to express meanings, by virtue of their harmony with one another, cohering into a judgment. We need not go into details here as these two theories have been dealt with and discussed in full detail by many eminent scholars.

Anvitābhidhānavāda:

Prabhākara, the propounder of this theory says that the meaning of a sentence is a consistent individual judgment and though it is ultimately traceable to the individual word

129. V. K. P. 205 ff
130. "Nyāyādī mālaivalīṣṭārtha pratipāda-parāṇi-padānv- eva" - N. K. P. 89
131. cf. Phil. of word and meaning - chapter VIII by Sri Gaurināth Sastri.
and their meanings, the words are always understood as related concepts. A word therefore denotes a concept as related, and an unrelated concept is an abstraction.\(^{132}\) Ramadwya takes up the theory and objects to the first point saying that the meaning of a sentence depends on the meaning of the component words and not the words alone. So, the point that the meaning of the sentence comes out from the setting of the words, faces the fallacy of anyathāsiddha.\(^{133}\) Secondly, he also puts that the meaning of the last word, with the help of the memory of the meanings of the previous words, gives out the full import of a proposition.\(^{134}\) Thirdly, our author elucidates his point with the help of the popular example of "gām ānaya". Here the meaning of the whole sentence depends on the relation between the meanings of the components and especially the grammatical inter-relation of verb and case between them. A replacement of these two particular words will change the meaning of the sentence but

\(^{132}\) Tattvādiśā - P. 145.
\(^{133}\) V.K.P. 205
\(^{134}\) V.K.P. 205, āvāopāva - V.K.P.-205

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the grammatical formation will not be effected by that replacement of the words. Any two words brought into a grammatical formation will give the meaning accordingly.\(^{135}\)

\textit{Abhivātāraya Vāda:}

The propounder of this theory was Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. His followers who assert that the verbal judgement is effected by the meanings as opposed to words have advanced serious objections against the theory of Anvītābhīdhanāvāda. It is urged that the plea of direct denotation of related meaning as a single act is a hoax. Relatedness is intelligible only if relation is understood before or synchronously.\(^{136}\)

\textit{Nyāyaśāstra}\, stresses that in that case Prabhākara must admit a two-fold capacity of words for the denotation of the relation as well as of the fact that is related.\(^{137}\)

Rāmacayācārya also argues from a similar standpoint and accuses the opponent’s theory of the same fallacy.\(^{138}\) It has been rightly observed: “The concept of relatedness implies relation as well as the fact meant to be related.”\(^{139}\)

\(^{135}\) Ibid.

\(^{136}\) Phil. of. word & meaning - P. 185-86

\(^{137}\) N. P. 102

\(^{138}\) “Tenāvītābhidhūnet padārthavākyārthabhīdhanāvāpatrāvāya praṇaṅgah” - V.K.P. 206

\(^{139}\) vide Phil. of. words & meaning P. 186
Rāmadvaya always rejects the view which asserts the capacity of a word as the conveyer of knowledge of the meaning (Padārtha) or the relatedness (anvītapadārtha). Because it is the recognition of the padārtha that helps us to get the meaning of the whole sentence every time. The knowledge is gained only at the first chance when the object had to be seen and understood. After that, every time when the word 'cow' be used, it will remind of the 'cow' as experienced previously. Hence Rāmadvayaśārya argues that only by words the knowledge of the facts and meanings or relatedness is not possible. Relation between the words can only be clear when the meaning of the word is known. Repetition of the word will always bring the memory of the previous knowledge. This state can neither be called "pramāṇa" nor illusion nor hallucination, it will always be memory.

Rāmadvaya has also charged the all-pervasive nature of Śabda as described by the Mīmāṃsakas. No action would be possible in Śabda. Even vibration is an action and if the

140. V.K.P. 206
141. Ibid.
syllables be eternal, all-pervasive object, how would any action be possible in Sabda? 142 So, knowledge of a word brings in the memory of the padārtham produced by the denotation or 'abhidhāna' of that particular word. When such words are joined together in a sentence, they become capable of giving out the clear meaning of a complete sentence; otherwise, any word or sentence will give any meaning, 143 and all the theories will become meaningless in that case.

The inherent and eternal relationship between a word and its meaning has a great bearing upon Śruti. Śruti is super-human (apaurāṇa) in nature. The meaning it conveys, is eternal, showing the solitary path to Mokṣa. Even the Lord did not attach specific meaning to the words but, He only recollected the words along with their meaning imbedded in them inherently, argues Vedānta Kaumudi.

142. Ibid.
143. 'gāmānaya ityukte turangini bandhamabodhah syat' - V.K.P. 206
144. 'Tataḥ pūrvapūrvakalpaprayogārājaśaranena bhagavān api prayogau kalpayati iti na tenāpyādheyā-Sākṣa Saktih' - Ibid - P. 121.
According to Nyāya, the verbal testimony is a composition, hence, it is paaurāṇeya. This view is contradicted by Mīśānta when it says that, the actual root or source of Dharma is Sruti. All the other sources stand in support. Inference, perception etc. are helpful for the doer (karta) and experiencer (Bhokta) the acting personality. But, any knowledge about the Nitya. Suddha, Mukta, Buddha svabhava Brahman or Ātman, which is much wider that this tangible creation and beyond the scope of all arguments and debates, is not possible except through Sruti. Sruti is the sole conveyer of the highest knowledge. So, it can not be a human composition or rather it is eternal. It is self-established knowledge and needs no other argument or pramāṇa to prove its validity.

Sruti is "Svataḥ Pramāṇa".

VICHY:

Concludingly, we refer back to the point of vidhi in Sruti, which has already been mentioned previously and which brought us to an incidental brief reference to the theories about Sabda. Our author, Śrī Rāmādwayācārya has dealt with

146. Jaimini. I/III

Contd. . . . .
this topic precisely. Śruti is the statement of Reality, the study and listening of which are marked with injunctions as supported by samana and nididhyāsana. Injunction regarding the word śravavya is valid because it brings in the knowledge of the ultimate Reality.

Vidhi is a typical topic of Purva Mīmāṃsā, where the sacrifices are of the highest merit. But, in the Uttara Mīmāṃsā, vidhi or injunction plays only a secondary part, because, 'knowledge' is the final goal here. It also gets only limited validity at places even in the Purva-Mīmāṃsā, states Vādanta Kaumudī. Thus, injunctions have only limited position in the arguments of impetus as the other regulations get in one's life. All the injunctions for a day or a life hold good till the scheduled time is over. Similarly, vidhi in śruti also implies that it has validity till the supreme knowledge is gained and has no point to linger on for ever.

148. Pradhānavidyāprakaraṇa tadaṅgavidhvat vidyā-prakaraṇa tadaṅgavidhiḥ = V.Kp. 52
149. Aṣṭāṣṭu vidhiḥ, tathāpi sākṣātkārād arvāgava-
Sravanamabhyaśyataḥ prayañcet; tādā jāmsāntara-
diva-abhāyāvata vidhi vyapāro na sāyat.- Ibid = P 53

Contd.……
True, self-valid śruti, supported by the injunctions is the only means to gain the knowledge of Brahman, concludes the Vedānta Kaumudi. It is due to the revealing power of śruti alone, that the teachings of the Vedānta are stored in and conveyed through the mahāvākyas. It is the sole torch-bearer of the true and divine knowledge of the supreme and non-dual Reality.

150. Ibid - P 35