Crane is a critical theorist and surely something more. We find him greatly interested in a "pursuit of a 'problematic' reconstruction of various modes of thought". His observation on the problem of defining the humanities as well as his long critical survey of the changing concepts of the humanities from Vives to the present may prove it. Actually, controversies over the actual nature and function of the humanities are quite common at present. A large group of scholars and commoners think that a nation should, at the present stage of civilization, indulge more and more in the developments of higher technologies and practical sciences like radio or tractor engineering. It will, they believe, enable a nation to flourish and to protect itself from various destructive forces like war. Another group, on the contrary, nurtures the view that a proper training and study of the humanistic subjects like history, literature, philosophy and languages may make us wise enough to avoid or fight out successfully any possible disaster. The problem attracts Crane and he turns his attention to the question of the meaning of the humanities as well as to the question of

their place in western culture. His observations, as I shall exhibit, help to remove some popular misconceptions about the humanities and enable us to determine what should be the most appropriate attitude to them. Crane's theory of critical pluralism, or we may say his pluralistic temperament, also finds its expression in what he says about the humanities.

I

The question of what exactly the humanities are is a very difficult question indeed because even when all of us have some idea about them it becomes really problematic if we ask for an all inclusive and comprehensive definition of the humanities. Attempts have been made to define the humanities in two ways—either in terms of some subject matters or fields of study, or in terms of the purposes or ends served by the humanities. Crane, however, finds faults with both the ways, and he suggests a third way which, he thinks, overcomes the limitations of the earlier definitions.

One of the traditional ways of defining the humanities is purely subject-oriented. In the universities and colleges we get the departments of humanities under which a number of subjects like languages and literature, fine arts, philosophy, history etc. are included. All these subjects are generally meant by the humanities, and those who remain engaged in teaching these subjects are taken to be humanists.
Such a definition is, according to Crane, too simple and limited. It fails to point out the peculiar nature of the humanities. We hardly know why certain subjects are called the humanities. It cannot, again, properly distinguish the humanists from the non-humanists.

In the other way some authors of various ages have tried to define the humanities in terms of some purposes or ends supposed to be served by them. The assumption which acts behind this method is that certain human values are served more adequately by the so called humanistic subjects than either by the natural or by the social sciences. So the primary task is to determine the human values served by the humanities, and in this task authors are found to divide in two groups. In some writers the values are determined in terms of the intrinsic good of the soul, while in some others it is in terms of some external utility. The Spanish humanist Juan Luis Vives, for example, thinks that the humanities restore man to humanity and raise him toward God. John Stuart Mill's concept, on the contrary, is based chiefly on some external utility. He believes, that the humanities "prepare and discipline men for active life by inducing them to recognize that they are men before they are lawyers or physicians or merchants". However, after thus determining the

\[\text{Crane, R.S., The Idea of the Humanities and Other Essays Critical and Historical, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 6.}\]
ends of the humanities one can pronounce in the form of a definition that the humanities are those subjects in the study of which these already established ends are fulfilled.

The most obvious limitation of this way of defining the humanities is that ends are actually liable to differ as and when the modes of investigations differ. They depend on how we like to get them. And as our outlooks and requirements may quite naturally be different in different ages, the ends also change. Thus we never get a complete set of purposes served by the humanities, which means that our task of defining the humanities remains for ever incomplete. Another remarkable defect is that the various attempts to define the humanities in terms of the ends can offer us no means to achieve the ends. Crane also emphasizes this point when he says that the greatest weakness of these attempts is "their persistent vagueness about the means by which these ends are to be accomplished in the everyday affairs of education". Crane's point here is sound enough. Lofty ends will be of no help to us if we don't master the means to achieve them.

Crane, therefore, suggests a third way in which he tries to define the humanities in terms neither of some specific subjects, nor of certain abstract purposes or ends of the humanities, but of some 'good arts' or principles.

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3 Ibid., p.6.
Crane identifies the humanities with the proper cultivation of certain arts or disciplines, which are actually means to some ends. The distinctive objects of the humanities are, Crane says, "what we commonly speak of as human achievements—whether in sciences, in institutions, or in the arts". What Crane suggests is that the purely humanistic aspects of human achievements are the objects of the humanities and an understanding and appreciation of the unusual excellences of man is their distinctive aim. And in order to identify and understand those aspects in every field of human achievements we need a particular appropriate method of approach which is of utmost importance.

Crane, obviously, gives the greatest emphasis on the mode of examination or method because he thinks that everything depends on the kinds of questions we ask. So a set of fixed techniques or arts must be there for the special purpose of exposing the humanistic aspects of human achievements. These arts or means however are not the humanities. They only lead us to understand the humanistic objects or we may say subjects, which are the ends. But in order to achieve the humanistic ends we must use no other method except the humanistic one. So Crane's impression, in short, is that the method or the technique, not the ends, is fixed, and the fixed humanistic method alone can ensure the ends. That's why

4 Ibid., p.8.
Crane gives emphasis on the means and identifies the humanities with it.

However, we may now turn our attention to what, according to Crane, are the humanistic arts or means. Crane observes that most of the writers like philosophers, logicians, critics and historians from antiquity to the modern times have formulated different techniques which help to appreciate the humanistic aspects of human achievements. These techniques may roughly be classified into four principal groups of humanistic methods or arts, namely, linguistics, the analysis of ideas, literary and artistic criticism, and historiography, all of which collectively form the constituent elements of the humanities. These arts are supplementary to one another; each one of them points out certain different aspects. So the study of a subject will be complete only when we apply all of the arts applicable to that subject. A teacher of literature is thus required not merely to do a linguistic analysis of his text but also to point out the critical, philosophical and historical problems involved in it. In the language of Crane "the best teachers of language are those who, while being skilled in modern linguistic science, have also been trained to deal sensitively with the artistic and philosophical uses of language and are more than amateurs in historical method; and the best teachers of history are those who know not merely how historical facts are derived but also how to deal competently with problems of ideas, of literary
and artistic techniques and structures, and of symbolic expression.\(^5\)

In Crane's way of explanation the difference between the sciences and the humanities is the difference more of techniques and means than of subject matters. Even in the achievements of science humanistic aspects can be detected. But what is peculiarly or exclusively humanistic is the techniques or arts, the direction of which is almost the opposite of the direction taken by the scientific methods. Crane rightly observes that "the sciences are most successful when they seek to move from the diversity and particularity of their observations toward as high a degree of unity, uniformity, simplicity and necessity as their materials permit. The humanities, on the other hand, are most alive when they reverse this process, and look for devices of explanation and appreciation that will enable them to preserve as much as possible of the variety, the uniqueness, the unexpectedness, the complexity, the originality, that distinguish what men are capable of doing at their best from what they must do, or tend generally to do, as biological organisms or members of a community."\(^6\)

Crane thus makes it clear that the sciences and the humanities employ two completely different types of techniques or means and consequently arrive at completely different

\(^5\) Ibid., p.10.
\(^6\) Ibid., p.12.
types of ends. Thus there remains no rivalry between these
two streams of knowledge. This explanation will surely help
to remove the popular misconception that the humanities nowa­
a-days have been threatened by the rapid development of the
natural and social sciences. Real threats, Crane has rightly
observed, come to the humanities from within, not from with­
out. They are the spirits of dogmatism and reductionism -
those twin monsters which oppose and often make impossible a
proper cultivation of the humanistic arts. Dogmatism gives
birth to various rival schools of critics, linguists, philo­
sophers and historians, each one of which is engaged to a
great extent in finding faults with others, neglecting what
they can contribute to the totality of thought. It spoils the
scope of employing all the available resources of analysis
and appreciation. Again, there remains a sense of jealousy
among the experts of the different humanistic arts, each one
of whom claims his own art to be of supreme importance, for­
getting the fact that all the arts are supplementary to one
another. Thus dogmatism hampers to a pernicious degree a
proper study and training in all the 'good arts'. The other
enemy to the humanities is reductionism which is not less
harmful than dogmatism. The spirit of reductionism keeps our
attention away from the diversity of human achievements and
thus denies the essential spirit of the humanities, which
lies in diversity.

In Crane's idea of the humanities, however, no
subversive spirit like dogmatism and reductionism is allowed. Crane claims that his idea of the humanities, if properly cultivated, will fight these spirits out. There is of course sense in what he says. For, his idea demands a proper cultivation of all the four arts and a good relation among them. Another point to note here is that the way in which Crane solves the problem of defining the humanities is quite compatible with the whole critical thought of Crane. His theory of critical pluralism is meant to remove the unhealthy and meaningless rivalry and jealousy among the various critical schools and also to cause a situation of mutual help. The desirable function of the humanistic arts as Crane has expressed is quite in tune with this spirit.

II

After defining the humanities in a different way Crane has engaged himself in some sort of a historical survey of how scholars of different ages have defined and evaluated the humanities in some distinctive ways. He starts his observation with Vives. However, Crane believes that it is Quintilian, not Vives, who long ago initiated a particular approach to the humanities which later scholars inherited.

As a teacher and practising advocate Quintilian was equally interested in rhetoric and perfection of man. In The
Training of an Auditor, a book which is divided into twelve parts, he considers rhetoric broadly under three heads: art, the artist, and the work. In the course of doing this he brings all these three aspects into a significant relationship of interdependence. Quintilian's modernity mainly lies in his reaction against the contemporary decadence in style and taste. A serious champion of education he enumerated the defects of the existing system in all its stages, and emphasized the need for common sense and an imitation of nature. He based his theory on nature, reason and experience. He definitely states that his intention is not to put forward rules that are universally and invariably applicable, but rather to inculcate general principles suggestive of the main truths. (Here Quintilian has a distinct affinity with the stand of Crane who also believes that no universal formula can describe literary qualities.) Quintilian held that Art, far from being in conflict with nature, is, in fact, based on observation of nature's ways. He, therefore, endorses the familiar doctrine of the need for natural capacity which should be activated by art and improved by practice. Nature, art and practice are the three requisites for perfection. Although Quintilian believed in the primacy of speech he held at the same time that everyday speech in itself is inadequate, that it is required to be raised to a higher power for artistic purposes, and he devotes a long time in suggesting how words can be combined in different
ways for effective communication. He divides the figures into figures of speech and figures of thought, a distinction which is often lost sight of by rhetoricians. In regard to style Quintilian's recommendation was that one must go for the choice of the best words and their most effective arrangement involving an exploitation of all the resources of language. In this respect Quintilian anticipates Coleridge's recommendation for "the best words in the best order" (Table Talk, William Hazlitt, VI, p.293). Briefly, as the last great exponent of classicism at Rome Quintilian put forward a creed that differed in some important aspects from those of his predecessors, though animated by the same principles of order, design and fitness, and making for the same goal of clarity of thought and expression.

In terms of the humanities Quintilian's stand is very clear. Clarity of thought and clarity of expression alone can make a man a good unit in the society. A training in rhetoric and a concern with the potentialities of the language would make one able to see things in broader perspective and would induce him to cultivate a broad, liberal or humanistic attitude towards life.

According to the Romans what made man different from animal was speech. Perfection of speech, therefore, leads to the perfection of man. This happens in a number of ways. At the personal level the effort to articulate one's thoughts
makes one conscious of his inabilities and the tyranny of the language. At the social level speech is the means of communication and makes man a social being. Although Quintilian flourished in the first century A.D. Christianity had not yet made a dent in the Roman civilization. So Quintilian's argument can be treated as pagan, or at least falling outside the purview of Christianity. Right from the Renaissance Christianity begins to pervade the texture of European Civilization so that gradually it became impossible to think of the total man or the fullest man without taking into consideration his religious aspect. The Humanism of Irving Babbitt was contested by Eliot on the ground of religion. Eliot held that "the humanistic point of view is auxiliary to and dependent upon the religious point of view".

Crane picks up Vives as "an early modern Quintilian", because of the affinity between Quintilian and Vives in regard to their definitions and evaluations of the humanities. But the important point that Crane tries to make us see is that Vives surpasses Quintilian on account of his emphasis on religion. Vives says: "what can we fix as the end of man, except God Himself?". For Vives the Christian God is the

9 Ibid., p.32.
God of love, and it is the cultivation of love in its Christian sense of selfless dedication and devotion that can improve the relation between individuals as well as the relation between the individual and the society.

At this point of his observation Crane shows an unexpected affinity with Eliot regarding the role of religion in the life of a man and the society. Without religious awareness man remains incomplete. Unless one is awakened by love which illuminates life man can never realize the full value of the humanities. The affinity becomes reinforced when Crane refers to the Divine Comedy "as an expression of man achieving selfhood through absorption into the Mind of God"\textsuperscript{10}. Eliot also writes: "the experience of a poem is the experience both of a moment and of a life time. It is very much like our intenser experiences of other human beings ... Dante's is one of those which one can only just hope to grow up to at the end of life"\textsuperscript{11}. He also says that the "enjoyment of the Divine Comedy is a continuous process"\textsuperscript{12}. Again, as Crane compares Dante with Shakespeare, similarly Eliot also compares Shakespeare and Dante in his essay on Dante.

Crane seems to agree with Vives, and later with Eliot, that

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p.39.


\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p.238.
the fullest realization of man is not possible without religious awareness. This new dimension of the humanities is, according to Crane, the most significant contribution of Vives, who otherwise has most things common with his great Roman predecessor Quintilian.

The five 16th century humanists - Erasmus, Montaigne, Elyot, Ascham and Sidney - are found to form, in a broad sense, a homogeneous group because of the fact that they all employ, in order to formulate their problems, the same distinction of words and things. And by virtue of the basic distinction employed by them they may be said to continue the tradition of Quintilian and Vives. However, solutions to the problems of education or culture are often seen to vary as either words or things are emphasized. In Quintilian the primacy of speech (words) is asserted, whereas in Vives it is 'reason' or 'practical wisdom' (things) that gets prominence. The 16th century humanists also give prominence to matter. But at the same time they believe in the interrelation of expression and content. They are conscious of the fact that the primary way to acquire a knowledge of the matter is through words, because the source to which one goes for matter is books, and books express their matters through words. The chief aim of education for all of them is effective guidance of human actions. And this aim can best be achieved by the study of those authors who have in their
writings dealt with human virtues and actions in eloquent languages. Thus almost all of these humanists prescribe the reading of classical texts.

However, this does not mean that the 16th century humanists were unanimous in all the issues. Crane has considered them individually, showing where they differ from one another as well as their individual contributions. In Erasmus, for example, Crane finds a unity of both literary and biblical criticism. Erasmus's ends are both moral and religious. It is, Crane observes, "a kind of humanism which seeks its values in the study of documents and writers rather than in the systematic consideration of doctrine."13 This tradition in humanism, Crane also observes, comes to the moderns through such eminent critics as Matthew Arnold and T. S. Eliot. Eliot's essay on Dante may be considered as an excellent example in hand. Crane thus links Erasmus to one of the greatest poet-critics of our century.

Ascham and Sidney also, like Erasmus, talk of human actions and virtues chiefly in terms of an interpretation and evaluation of words. Their ultimate aim is of course to expose the essential matter or impart wisdom which we require to achieve perfection in actions. But they like to do so through grammatical and critical investigation of words.

But the two other humanists of the 16th century, Sir Thomas Elyot and Montaigne, concentrate their attention primarily on things rather than on words. Crane observes that "they (Elyot and Montaigne) also treat of languages, authors, and arts, but their primary problem is the statement of principles or precepts relevant directly to the characters and behaviour of men in active life".  

Elyot is concerned chiefly with the education of those who take part in the important activities of the state, whereas Montaigne concerns himself not with the character of the civil servants or men engaged in important works of the state, but with that of "the private gentleman living a life of worldly but cultured ease on his estate, conversing with his friends, reading books, and above all ... seasoning his understanding with a philosophy which will teach him to know himself and how both well to die and well to live". Education, for Montaigne, should aim at giving general human wisdom, rather than technical specialization. It is, according to Montaigne, nothing but pedantry to spend much time in teaching grammar, rhetoric, or the art of forming syllogisms when, in practical life, we require to know natural and simple manner of speaking, which is the best of all. Students should be exposed to different languages at a very early age.

14 Ibid., p.50.
15 Ibid., p.52.
so that they may pick them up. Foreign travels and conversations with men are equally important.

Crane thus considers the 16th century humanists and points out the modifications which humanism underwent in the hands of its 16th century practitioners. Montaigne's emphasis on the natural way of speaking as well as on the generalized aim of education is one of them. And in this emphasis we may trace the origin of the concept of natural education - the concept which received some popularity in the 18th century in the great French philosopher Rousseau.

However, the 17th century is also not less significant in the history of the humanities. It is in the 17th century, Crane observes, that the long tradition of the humanities as the study of good ancient literature was opposed by the newer tradition of natural science. Crane has called it a conflict between letters and natural philosophy. Side by side another type of conflict also emerged in this century. This other conflict, Crane observes, was the conflict between ancient and modern literature and learning. Both the conflicts had long-term effects on the conceptions and discussions of the humanities in the later ages.

The chief exponents of the first type of conflict, however, were Bacon and Descartes. The Renaissance humanists, unlike Bacon and Descartes, evaluated the classics and the various other arts in the context of a 'philosophy', oriented
to the guidance of human actions. Natural sciences or the
discovery of truths about things were not so seriously con-
sidered in that philosophy. They were only viewed as means
to some non-scientific ends. In short, the 'philosophy' of
the Renaissance humanists had its basis on some other arts
like history, poetry, oratory and the precepts of the moral
philosophers. But in the philosophies of Bacon and Descartes,
Crane observes, the natural sciences do not remain insigni-
cificant, or merely as a means to some non-scientific ends. In
their philosophies inquiries into natural phenomena are raи-
sed to a "position in which they become, in one way or ano-
ther, basic to all the rest of learning". Both Bacon and
Descartes, Crane has observed through illustrations of their
works, have advocated the supremacy of the study of natural
philosophy over linguistic and literary studies. And they
exerted a tremendous influence on a large number of their
followers, who proposed various reformations of the system
of education as well as of the subjects to be studied. They
emphasized the discovery of the true nature of things in-
stead of the past tradition of linguistic and literary studi-
es. Sir William Petty in his short pamphlet "Advice ... to
Mr. Hartlib for the Advancement of Some Particular Parts of
Learning", John Hall in An Humble Motion, and Abraham Cowley
in his Proposition for the Advancement of Experimental Philo-
sophy have given different projects for the reformation of

16 Ibid., p. 56.
schools and universities because these educational institutions, according to their opinion, confine themselves to linguistic studies and to some unintelligible verbalisms of scholastic philosophy and thus neglect the studies which can give substantive knowledge. They, however, do not intend to banish logic and rhetoric altogether, but they clearly express it in their projects of reformation that primary emphasis must be given on the study of natural philosophy, mechanical experiments, chemistry, a scientific study of history and such other subjects that may give real knowledge of things. Thus, Crane observes, the 17th century initiates a new debate in the field of humanism - the debate that continues to exist in varying forms in all the later periods - and thus occupies an important place in any consideration of the evolution of the humanities.

The century is also remarkable in the history of the humanities for an initiation of the conflict between the ancient and modern literature and learning. Some of the 17th century humanists like George Hakewill, Joseph Glanvill and Charles Perrault make a distinction between the old and the modern and believe in the superiority of the latter. They compare the achievements of the moderns and the ancients in the different fields of knowledge and then assert the idea of progress from antiquity to the modern times. They explain this progress as a part of the necessary law of human development. The two basic assumptions upon which their arguments
rest are, firstly, that human powers (both intelligence and basic capacities) have remained more or less the same throughout ages, and, secondly, that the development of knowledge and the arts depends largely on experience as well as the inventions and application of the correct method of reasoning. And the matter of experience and invention of the correct method is subject to the passage of time. Naturally, the moderns are likely to offer us more than the ancients because they possess a comparatively matured form of experience.

Sir William Temple, however, is among those others who emerge as extreme defenders of the ancients. Temple tries to refute the assumptions upon which Perrault and others developed their idea of the relative progress of the moderns. His arguments are not very convincing. But the important point here is not so much how convincingly one refutes other's arguments as the fact that the quarrel is there among the 17th century writers over the issue. And in order to exhibit the influence of this quarrel Crane has mentioned two books — one of the 16th century and the other of the 18th — which point out the wide difference between the two writers with regard to their ideas. In Vives's *The Transmission of Disciplines* we don't come across any historical distinction of earlier and later, or ancient and modern. In other words, the tradition of the humanities for Vives was a single tradition in which there was no time bound division
of old and new. But Hugh Blair, the 18th century humanist considers in his book Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres the problem of time to be an important factor in the inclusion of authors in an educational programme. He thinks it proper to study the comparative merits of the ancients and the moderns.

It may passingly be noted here that long before Blair's book was published (1783), the comparative merits and demerits of the ancients and the moderns were already a matter of great debate in England. This debate, in fact, formed an important part of the 17th century critical climate. Dryden's book An Essay of Dramatic Poesy, published in 1668, succinctly sums up this important critical issue in the debate between Crites and Eugenius. In course of this debate Crites argues that poetry was held in greater esteem by the ancients, and the ancients were more faithful imitators of nature. Even earlier, Ben Jonson had admitted their (of the ancients) superiority, and he imitated and borrowed from them. But Eugenius replies that the moderns should not follow the ancients, but nature which was also imitated by the ancients. Furthermore, Eugenius argues - an argument that has persisted till our time - that we are taller than our ancestors because we stand on their shoulders. In other words, the moderns have the advantage of deriving the benefit of the wisdom of the ancients, while the ancients, for obvious historical reasons, are denied the wisdom of the
The discussion of Crites and Eugenius is of considerable interest in the history of literary criticism, as it was this issue that led to the division of the French Academy and became a matter of almost European controversy. The quarrel of the ancients and the moderns began in Italy where it arose out of a debate on the relative supremacy of Tasso and Aristo. It was introduced into France about 1635 by Boisrobert.

What is important to note is Crane's conspicuous omission of Dryden who has dealt with the relative merits by 1668 and, not in any spirit of partisanship though, he sympathizes with the moderns; and some of the arguments which he adduced, on one side or the other, wait to be used in the great quarrel between Perrault and Boileau. In this respect Dryden should be considered as the leader of the modern school in England through whose writings the debate was introduced to England and on account of whose fine critical insight to see the issue in broad perspective, the debate took a very definite shape, and influenced the subsequent course of literary criticism.

However, the quarrel of the moderns and the ancients, Crane observes, had a great impact on the humanities. The first important thing is that the quarrel broadens the scope of the humanities to include the modern poets,
historians, philosophers and others into the educational programmes. Another important effect of the quarrel is that the various discussions on the issue become important to the later history of the humanities in two different ways. In the first place, as Crane says, "it is largely to these numerous discussions of ages of learning in the 17th century that we must trace the increasing vogue, since then, of cultural history as a kind of general framework of more or less sharply differentiated periods each with its peculiar characteristics or conditions, within which human achievements in the arts and science must be placed if they are to be properly explained and evaluated". This observation of Crane is highly original in the sense that it marks the beginning of our general awareness of the cultural history, which is now closely related to any remarkable approach to poetry, history, or philosophy. In the second place "the particular schematism of ages of culture which emerged from the discussions of the seventeenth century is still, for the most part, the schematism employed, often with the same relative evaluations of ages, in popular histories of science or civilization and in most university courses on the humanities".

In the 18th century Crane marks a different approach to the humanities. The attention was shifted from the problems of the nature of things to the questions related to the

17 Ibid., pp. 86-87.
18 Ibid., p. 87.
human nature or the humanities themselves. Naturally, the opposition between scholastic philosophy and the humanities, which was in vogue in the Renaissance, or the 17th century opposition between the humanities and natural sciences takes a different direction in this century. It is of course true that a contrast between literature and philosophy still exists. But it is not actually in the form of an opposition between the principles of philosophy and those of the humanities. Philosophy is treated as complementary to the humanities in the sense that the humanists endeavour to deal philosophically with the humanistic subject matters of language, rhetoric, criticism and history. Thus the 18th century writers, making philosophy as the basis of all sorts of knowledge, attempted to achieve some sort of a harmony or balance among the various rival interests of the earlier periods. Crane has illustrated what Edward Gibbon says in his book *Essai sur l'etude de la litterature* as an example of the typical 18th century approach to the humanities -an "approach which emphasizes particulars and distrusts systems and yet seeks a philosophic basis for its operations"19.

The new philosophy which is there at the centre of all humanistic discussions of the 18th century may be called a philosophy of the human mind because it takes as its primary subject matter the mind of man, not the objects of nature. Some of the great writers of the period like John Locke, David

19 Ibid., p.93.
Hume, Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart, who are the proponents of this new philosophy, believed that there must be some natural order or system in all the functionings of the human mind, on the basis of which they aspired to construct the science of human nature. What they were required to do for a philosophy of the mind was to systematize the various operations of the mind under some generalized principles in the form of certain universal laws. Such a systematization of the multifarious operations of the mind, Hume suggests, will enable the philosophers to represent the various activities and progress of man as related ones.

Crane has mentioned George Campbell's *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* as an illustration of how the 18th century writers sought to give the new philosophical orientation to the humanistic subject of rhetoric. Campbell's purpose in this book, Crane observes, was "not to restate or rearrange the classical rules but rather to relate the particular effects of rhetorical composition to their causes in the faculties and operations of the mind - in short, to make rhetoric 'philosophical' by showing its connections with the science of human nature." Campbell achieves his aim by dividing the faculties of the mind under four heads and then connecting each of the humanistic arts of history, poetry (both narrative and dramatic) and rhetoric to each of the faculties.

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In a way Campbell anticipates some of the findings of I.A. Richards who in his Principles of Literary Criticism (first published in 1924) said that a theory of criticism must take into account the communication, and argued that "sensation, imagery, feeling, emotion, together with pleasure, unpleasure and pain are names for the conscious characteristics of impulses". In fact, through the analysis of a poem in Principles of Literary Criticism he shows with the help of a diagram how this happens.

However, regarding criticism or the art of poetry Crane observes that the 18th century idea of criticism was closely connected to rhetoric. Of course there were criticisms of poetry and poets which were not directly related to or dependent on rhetoric. Still "the ends of poetry are frequently given as identical with the rhetorical ends of pleasing, instructing, and moving; the treatment of style is usually the same in the two contexts". Besides, the 18th century humanistic writers tended to give a philosophical basis to criticism by using principles mostly derived from the natural faculties and operations of the mind.

In order to give us an idea of the 18th century discussions on the art of history Crane refers to Bolingbroke's

Letters On the Study and Use of History. For Bolingbroke, Crane observes, "the true use of history is to make us not more learned but better men and better citizens"23. In Bolingbroke's definition history is philosophy teaching by examples. The examples of history, Bolingbroke suggests, have some general and remote influence on our minds. They, thus, help us to form some sort of a philosophic sense, which may lead us to rise from the particular examples of history to general knowledge and guide our conducts in all the situations of private and public life.

One important thing Crane has missed here is that Bolingbroke was not the first to suggest that history was a kind of philosophy teaching by examples. About 150 years before the publication of Bolingbroke's Letters on the Study and Use of History, Sir Philip Sidney in his An Apologie For Poetrie, while comparing poetry with philosophy and history, remarked: "At length, the long lyne of theyr disputation maketh a poynt in thys, that the one giveth the precept and the other the example"24. Sidney was more acute and realistic than Bolingbroke when he pointed out, though in a different context, that the examples provided by history are not always ideal examples, simply because history is tied down to facts. He writes: "the historian ... is so tyed, not to

23 Ibid., p.100.
what should be, but to what is; to the particular truth of things, and not to the general reason of things; that his example draweth no necessary consequence, and therefore a lesse fruitful doctrine"\(^{25}\).

However, from the various discussions about the humanistic arts in the 18th century Crane endeavours to point out the nature of the humanistic studies during that period. He observes that the essential nature of the humanistic study in the 18th century is similar in many respects to that of the Renaissance. The emphasis is still there on grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history and philosophy. Crane, however, does not mean to suggest that the 18th century discussions on the humanities should be regarded as a simple continuation of the Renaissance humanism. The 16th century humanists were mainly concerned with how the different disciplines of the humanistic arts might be effectively utilized as guides to the actions of man as an individual as well as a member of the society. This problem still persists in the 18th century, but not as the most prominent one. The centre of interest, instead, in almost all the discussions of the century is "a problem of method in the humanities themselves - the problem, specifically, of how, in disciplines that have to do essentially with the judgment of writers, writings, and facts, the particularity of the material can be illuminated in its treatment or in its uses by the spirit of reason or

\(^{25}\) Ibid., p.17.
philosophic generality. A last point Crane mentions is that in the 18th century an attempt was there to achieve some kind of organic unification of the various particular humanistic arts.

If the 18th century in the history of the humanities can be considered as an age of harmony or balance among the various rival interests of the earlier periods, in the 19th century the history of the humanities once again becomes a history of rivalry and opposition. It was a period of attack and defense so far as the humanities were concerned.

The various attacks on the humanities in this century, Crane observes, came mainly from two different groups of intellectuals - one is the group of the Utilitarians or Philosophical Radicals, and the other is that of the propagandists for physical science. Jeremy Bentham and James Mill were the leaders of the first group, who undertook, as their main problem, the task of educating the rising generation. They formulated the general principles of education in utilitarian terms, and their utilitarian stand goes against literature or even the humanities in general. In Mill's formulation of educational principles, however, the hostility to the humanities is only suggested. But some of Mill's

followers like Thomas Southwood Smith were direct in their attack on the humanities. Smith, for instance, finds that the classical languages and literature are of no use for those who, in future, are destined to devote themselves to the ordinary business of life. Smith not merely condemns the linguistic and literary studies as useless, but considers them as "harmful survivals from medieval times". Modern world, he maintains, is a world chiefly of science and mechanical art. Naturally, the dominance of the humanistic subjects in the curricula of schools and colleges is inimical to progress.

The other group of intellectuals who may be regarded as the propagandists for physical science has also established the comparative greatness of science. Thomas Henry Huxley, for example, argues that the 19th century world is remarkably different from the Renaissance or the medieval world. There was then no remarkable development of physical science. Naturally the effort of the humanists for making the humanistic subjects the foundation of education was of great service to mankind. But now a man needs the knowledge of physical science more than that of the humanities. What Huxley, therefore, tries to do in a number of essays is to make science, rather than the humanities, the foundation of education.

27 Ibid., p.129.
However, the 19th century humanists, Crane observes, forcefully reacted against this attack, and met the challenge of the friends of science. He also observes that the humanists followed two different ways to defend themselves against their opponents. In the first place a group of specialists in some humanistic arts attempted to "model their disciplines on canons of inquiry in the natural sciences". They endeavoured to give a scientific orientation to the humanities by applying scientific methods to them, and thus make them conform to the scientific spirit of the age. In the second place another group of humanist educators concerned themselves with the principles as well as contents of education and thus shows that the humanistic subjects are as important to study, if not more, as the scientific subjects. They tried to reassert the universal and permanent value of letters and philosophy.

Crane has organized the opinions and discussions of different humanistic writers to expose the real nature of the defense of the humanities in the 19th century. He has effectively analysed how various eminent writers of the period have tried to give a scientific basis to the study of the humanistic subjects of language, literary analysis and history. Side by side Crane has analysed the observations of William Whewell, Cardinal Newman, John Stuart Mill, and Matthew Arnold, and has exhibited how these intellectuals

28 Ibid., p.138.
and educationists, in order to defend the humanities, have formulated some new principles of education which express the specific values of humanities, distinguished from the values of science. Thus, in the manner of an impartial observer and a faithful historian Crane records what actually happened in the field of the humanities during this century.

It is more or less clear from Crane's observation that the values or ends of the humanities were not supposed to be the same in all the ages. Even the very concept of the humanities is not uniform. Sometimes they are equated with certain subject-matters, and at some other times they are conceived as a set of arts or principles. The ends of the humanities are also modified or changed by writers of different ages according to the nature of their problems. Vives, for example, considers the humanities as a means to restore man to humanity and to raise him to God. For Sidney the humanistic arts give us a knowledge of ourselves, which does not end in well-knowing but leads us to well-doing. Sir Thomas Elyot thinks that the humanistic arts can prepare a man better than anything else to be a prudent, just and temperate magistrate. Milton also believes that the peculiar value of the humanities must be determined in terms of the important task they perform to make a man fit for all the occasions of his private and public life.

However, in spite of all such differences with regard to the particular ends the humanistic arts are believed to
serve, there is, Crane observes, a basic unity among all the humanistic writers. He also finds that this unity lies with the fact that they inherit the essential terms and manners of their discussions about the humanities from the Roman scholars Cicero and Quintilian. Even the 20th century humanists are not an exception to this, because, as Crane observes, "the humanities ... have been in the modern period, no less than for the Romans, means to the realization of some ideal or use over and above the understanding and appreciation of the peculiarly human achievements in art or philosophy or science which have been their subject matter." 29

In the twentieth century, Crane observes, we have inherited the 19th century quarrel between the humanities and natural science. The quarrel has rather taken a more acute form with the growing popularity of the social sciences in the present century. The humanities at present have thus faced a double enemy. Crane is surely right to conclude that a rapid and popular growth of the various vocational subjects and their inclusion in the school curricula have increased a general neglect of the classical languages at present. These vocational subjects are found to yield quicker result in establishing a man in his practical life. A study of the classical languages can hardly be found so useful to a man in his practical life as these professional subjects.

29 Ibid., p.158.
However, Crane divides the 20th century humanists into two groups. In the first group he includes those scholars who are known as philologists, textual critics, bibliographers, biographers, and literary historians. Their chief concern is with the factual arts or techniques of literary study. They deal primarily with the external aspects of literature and give us facts. The other group of humanists—the critics—on the contrary, are mainly concerned with the appreciation and understanding of the literary works. They (the critics) seek to "maintain the normative character of literary study and its concern with literary substance in opposition to the scientific preoccupations of the scholars". The critics, Crane finds, have done this in two major ways. In one way the problems of literary criticism have been taken primarily as problems of expression. And the critics who follow this way believe that the problems of criticism can best be solved in terms of the semantic analysis of literary texts. Critics like I.A. Richards, J.C. Ransom, and Kenneth Burke who may and do widely differ in all other respects are found to unite at this point. In another way the major problem of criticism is the problem of relating the poems or other literary works to experience or to the broader aspects of life. The critics belonging to the Marxist and psychological schools of criticism, for example, tend to do this very thing.

30 Ibid., p.165.
Crane thus observes that the literary scholars (including the textual critics, biographers, bibliographers and philologists) are there on the one hand, and the literary critics on the other forming two dominant schools of literary humanists in our century. And "the striking thing about them is that they represent, though with a more modern accent, the same twofold constitution of the arts of humanistic study - grammar and historical exegesis on the one hand and rhetoric on the other - which we saw first in Quintilian and then in the Renaissance and which, in the eighteenth century, appeared in the quarrels of Bentley and Pope". Crane thus connects the 20th century humanism to the long tradition of humanistic studies in the past. What is perhaps more important is that Crane finds the origins of modern scholarly and critical investigations in the grammatical - historical and rhetorical studies of the past centuries.

It may, however, be said that there is nothing very original about Crane so far as his essays on the humanities are concerned. He organizes and illustrates how the concept of the humanities have changed as well as how they have been treated from period to period. One may also feel that Crane should have included Sidney and give due importance to Dryden which, as I have exhibited, he so strongly deserves. But Crane may be defended on the ground that it is an excusable

31 Ibid., p.166.
omission in a work where the whole issue is seen in the light of the development of the humanities and their 'shifting definitions and evaluations'. And what is above everything else is that a historical study of the changing concepts of the humanities from the Renaissance, which Crane has so successfully done, will surely help us to understand the nature of the humanities at present as well as in the coming ages. Such a history, we must agree with Crane, enables us "first of all, to appreciate better the significance of what is being said and done with respect to the humanities in education at the present time and, more important still, to make possible a more adequate answer ... to the general questions on which our inquiry has turned, namely: what is the nature of the humanities? And what in view of their history and their present state, is the direction in which we should wish them to go in the future"32.

32 Ibid., p.155.