An important part of Crane's belief is that the history of ideas is 'a good thing' for both the literary artists and the literary critics and scholars. Literary artists, whether consciously or not, exploit ideas which appear in various forms in their works. Most of the 18th century writers for example, as Crane shows in one of his essays¹, were more or less influenced by the 'man of feeling' cult, and in consequence the mid-eighteenth century literature was full of sentimental heroes and heroines. Literary critics and scholars are also required to have a definite knowledge of the history of ideas. Otherwise it will be difficult for them to properly understand, illustrate and evaluate ideas expressed in literature. Crane's belief, I think, is shared by others also.

In his The Idea of the Humanities and Other Essays, Critical and Historical, Vol. I Crane has grouped five essays, written in different times and on different occasions, under the generalized heading of "The History of Ideas". The essays included under this title are (i) "Philosophy, Literature, and the History of Ideas" (1954), (ii) "Suggestions

Toward a Genealogy of the 'Man of Feeling'" (1934), (iii) "Anglican Apologetics and the Idea of Progress, 1699-1745" (1934), (iv) "Notes on the Organization of Locke's 'Essay'" (1965), and (v) "Montesquieu and British Thought: Gibbon, Adam Smith, Burke" (1941). Crane's aim in these essays is not to construct a history of the ideas. In each of the essays he has considered some different, or we may say independent, problems or objects of interest. In one essay, for example, he tries to identify the distinctive nature of literary ideas, whereas in another he concerns himself with the origin and development of a particular idea - its historical background and the ways of its coming into vogue. Thus each essay of this group deals with different problems. Of course, they are related to one another in the sense that the problems Crane tries to solve in these essays are all related to the history of ideas. Still each one is independent and complete in itself. That is why Crane does not follow chronology in arranging them in his book.

Another important thing to note in this context is that these five essays are not all that Crane says about ideas. We must include at least one more essay, namely, his "Interpretation of Texts and the History of Ideas", in which Crane considers the necessity of a successful cultivation of the history of ideas and the difficulties in such a cultivation. One may also mention Crane's "The Houyhnhnms, the Yahoos, and the History of Ideas" as another writing in the related
subject. And surely this essay also has its contribution to any illustration of Crane's view on the history of ideas. But I shall keep this particular essay out of the purview of my discussion at present for two reasons. One is that this essay is primarily an example of practical criticism. It exhibits Crane as a practising critic and contains only a little amount of theory. The other reason is that I am going to consider this essay on the fourth voyage of *Gulliver's Travels* separately in my next chapter along with other examples of Crane's practical criticism. So, for the time being, I shall try to illustrate the remaining six essays on the history of ideas showing how they mark Crane's originality of critical insights as well as what they exhibit about his impression on the subject.

I

In the literature and philosophical writings of the mid-eighteenth century the abundance of sentimentalism is quite discernible. The distinguishing notes of the philosophical expressions of that period were, to quote R.S. Crane, "the identification of virtue with acts of benevolence and still more with the feelings of universal goodwill which inspire and accompany these acts; the assumption that such 'good Affections' are the natural and spontaneous growth of the heart of man uncorrupted by habits of vice". Besides,

2 Ibid., p.189.
the literary artists of the 18th century modelled their heroes and heroines of countless English novels, poems and plays after the philosophical concepts of sentimental feelings, benevolence, moral weeping and good affections. All these exhibit unmistakably that the mid-eighteenth century generated and popularized the cult of the 'man of feeling'. Sentimentalism became one of the chief aspects of literature of that time.

The debatable issue, however, is not the cult itself, but its origin. How did it come to triumph during the 18th century when "neither in antiquity, nor in the Middle Ages, nor in the sixteenth century, nor in the England of the Puritans and Cavaliers had the 'man of feeling' ever been a popular type"? Crane in his essay "Suggestions Towards a Genealogy of the 'Man of Feeling'" tries to answer this question.

A solution to the problem of origin of the 'man of feeling' cult has been accepted by many scholars. They take it for granted that the writings of the third Earl of Shaftesbury and his followers were there as inspirations behind the moulding up of sentimentalism. For, truly speaking, the distinctive traits of the 'man of feeling' cult are found to exist in the writings of Shaftesbury and his followers, which were published in the early part of the 18th century.

3 Ibid., p.190.
Crane, however, refuses to give full credit to Shaftesbury and his followers on the ground that their writings appeared too late. He tries to trace it out in some philosophical and religious writings of the previous century. He believes that it is not in the influence of any single moralist like Shaftesbury but in "the combined influence of numerous Anglican divines of the Latitudinarian tradition who from the Restoration onward into the eighteenth century had preached" the same ethics of benevolence, that the real source of the 18th century cult of sensibility can be found. In support of his belief Crane has mentioned four major aspects of the ethical and psychological preaching of these divines.

The first remarkable aspect of their preaching was to equate virtue with universal benevolence. They had actually before them the hope of freeing religion from the darker aspects of the Puritan creed. That was why they insisted on the humane qualities like love, benevolence and good-feeling. This type of humanitarian homiletic of the Latitudinarian school was delivered to the public since about 1680s and it became stronger than ever in the early 18th century. Long before Shaftesbury people came to know from Samuel Clarke that "the true End and Design of Religion, is manifestly this; to make Men wiser and better; to improve, exalt and perfect their Nature; to teach them to obey, and love, and imitate God; to cause them to extend their love and Goodness and charity to all their Fellow creatures, each in their several

4 Ibid., p.190.
stations, and according to the measure of their several Abilities; in like manner as the universal Goodness of God, extends itself over all his Works through the whole Creation"⁵.

The second aspect of their preaching was that they attached 'benevolence' to 'tender human feelings'. True benevolence, according to them, is that which springs from tender feelings of pity and compassion, and therefore one should try to develop those feelings within oneself instead of suppressing them. Their repeated emphasis on the elements of 'tenderness' and quick response to the misery of man gradually leads to the conception of the 18th century 'man of feeling'. Crane has cited passages from the writings of Robert South, Gregory Hascard, William Sherlock and other anti-stoic preachers of the later 1600s to show the growing urge for sentimentalism. The most distinguishing mark of the benevolent man, as these writers emphasized, is that he must feel for others. And this quality of human mind (ability to feel) is there in the background of the terms like 'moral weeping' and 'sensibility' which were used by the sentimentalists of the 18th century to eulogize the quality of mind.

Another important thing the anti-stoical divines preached was that benevolent feelings are quite natural to man. They pictured human heart as naturally good, and disseminated the view that it tends invariably to tender humane feelings.

⁵ Clarke, Samuel, "The Great Duty of Universal Love" (1705) p.2.
The last important thing that contributed to the formation of the popular 18th century conception of the 'man of feeling' was the preaching of the divines that the benevolent emotions afford joy to those who feel them. This idea of receiving joy in exchange of exercising benevolent emotions was perhaps received from Aristotle and moulded by the divines to suit their purpose. It was also prevalent in the Elizabethan period. In Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*, for example, it has been said that the reward of being merciful is an experience of joy. Crane has quoted Tillotson and Parker to show that they have estimated the pleasure in doing good to be greater than any sensual pleasure in the world. All these writings created a sense of the greatness of tender feelings and emotional expressions in the minds of the public, which ultimately formed and popularized the 'man of feeling' cult of the mid-18th century.

Thus Crane studies the tradition of the Latitudinarian divines to ascertain the cause of the 18th century sentimentalism. Crane, however, does not deny the influence of Shaftesbury and his followers. He rather considers it to be an effective influence toward the formation of this cult especially after 1725. His only claim is that his study of the writings of the Latitudinarian clergymen will help to make the whole movement of the man of feeling more intelligible. This attitude of Crane is quite in tune with his anti-monistic critical temperament. And, truly speaking, Crane's
explanations widen the range of information, which will certainly enable the scholars to approach the problem from different standpoints.

II

In "Anglican Apologetics and the Idea of Progress, 1699-1745" Crane studies the contribution of the Anglican divines to the formation of the progressivist myth. The progressivist myth - a belief in the theory that the history of civilization is an account of constant progress and that man, as he gathers experiences, passes from worse to better - chiefly gathered its force from the Enlightenment. The scientists, philosophers, and literary artists who looked forward for a hopeful future had the greatest contribution in diffusing the theory of progress. But Crane considers it to be only a part of the picture. He believes that a group of other writers had also a great contribution toward formulation and dissemination of the theory of progress, especially in England. They were the orthodox Anglican divines who were quite active in the first half of the 18th century and who exploited the theory of progress in their own way to protect revealed religion from the attacks of its enemies. They found that the theory of progress might help them to answer some of the embarrassing questions of the deists and others who suspected the greatness and appropriateness of christianity. Crane here considers the writings of John Edwards, William Worthington
and Edmund Law, the three great contributors to the progres­

sicist doctrine, in some details to show how these divines
explained and popularized the idea in the 18th century Eng­
land.

Edwards was the pioneer to the movement. He draws a very
consistent and elaborate picture of the constant progress of
religious state toward perfection in future. With the help
of his imagination he depicts the happiest age of mankind.
Crane admits that Edwards' approach was modernist because he
attached religious progressivism to that of science and phi­
losophy.

Edwards' explanations, however, have two major lapses.
Firstly, Crane has rightly suggested that the modernism of
Edwards was more assumed than real, because he failed to
free himself from the illusion of the Golden Age; the tradi­
tional belief in the existence of that age was retained in
his writing. Secondly, Edwards failed to make credible his
picture of the future perfect world. He only played upon
imagination and could hardly convince us why and how the
future world must be as he had imagined.

However, after Edwards William Worthington came forward
to carry on the type of apologetic Edwards had started.
Worthington had before him two purposes to fulfil. One was
of course to vindicate christianity against the attack of
the deists, and the other was to solve the problem of the
natural and moral evils introduced into the world as a result of the Fall. As a follower of Edwards Worthington also depicted "the main steps in man's gradual redemption from the antidiluvian age to the end of the world". But his notion of the perfect state of mankind at the end of progress is different from Edwards'. He speculates the future moral and religious state to be the same as it was for a short time at the beginning. Worthington here commits a gross mistake which Crane has only hinted but not elaborated. His identification of the future state of perfection with the earliest is quite incongruous with the theory of progress. If we are to believe as the previous theologists made us believe that God blesses us with gradual prosperity, then the conception of the perfect state of the world at the beginning loses its credibility. And if we are to believe in the existence of the perfect state at the beginning, which was comparable with the future state of perfection, then the theory of progress leads us to no forward journey but only to a backward movement. However, it must be admitted that Worthington deserves a remarkable position among the anti-deistic writers. His Essay acted as a "fresh emphasis to the growing belief that later times are bound to be superior on the whole to earlier, not only in knowledge of nature and mechanical skill, but

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also in spiritual insight and moral excellence" 7.

The next important name in the tradition of antideistic writing is Edmund Law, whose book 8 was some sort of a reply to the agitation caused by the publication of Matthew Tindal's *Christianity as old as the Creation*. Tindal's attack on religion was on the ground that whatever is true or valuable must be characterized by universality of diffusion and appeal. Christianity lacks these qualities. It appeared late and is still now confined to only a part of the world, and therefore it can hardly claim to be the true religion. In his reply to this attack Law based his arguments on psychological grounds and maintained that God's desire was not to offer complete perfection and absolute happiness to man at a time. Human beings must prepare themselves through experiences before receiving the blessings of God. Drawing examples from nature he justifies that everything on earth grows to perfection gradually. In case of religion also it cannot be otherwise. Law actually did a lot in his earnest desire to answer Tindal, and formulated what Crane calls "a theory of the progressive religious and moral education of the human race" 9. His greatest contribution is that he was the first to introduce the psychological theories to justify progressivism in religious history.

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7 Ibid., p.250.
Crane has also considered a few minor writers who appeared after 1745 to exhibit that the idea of progress was a dominant theme in their articles and books. And from his consideration of all these writers he sums up the nature of the movement in England in a few points. First, the Anglican writers throughout the first half of the 18th century developed their distinctive theory of general progress and popularized it in England. The influences coming from France were felt only after 1750 and that was also greatly exaggerated. His second observation is that "in the formulation of this theory before 1750 the determining factors were mainly of a religious nature." And those who gave a particular shape to this new philosophy were, unlike those in France, the friends to the church. These divines were, again, motivated not by any philosophical insight but by the urgent need of protecting revealed religion against the deists. But gradually the optimistic people gave it the shape of an independent philosophical doctrine of the 18th century. Another point Crane draws in this connection is that in England Edmund Law was the most prominent figure of the movement. It was he who popularized the theory among the educated public by means of his attractive and inventing manner of arguing.

However, this essay thus explores one yet unexplored realm of the progressivist movement. The writings of the Anglican divines were surely there, but none attempted the type of historical investigation Crane has completed here to

10 Ibid., p.286.
point out the contribution of the Anglican divines toward formulation of the theory of constant progress.

III

In another essay, "Interpretation of Texts and the History of Ideas", however, Crane fails to fulfil our expectation. His professed aim in this essay is to indicate the main difficulties in the way of constructing a history of ideas as well as to 'look for solutions of them'. But even after analysing the difficulties and their possible solutions he admits before he ends the essay: "We are back then where we started, with our original difficulties unsolved, or solved only in incomplete and somewhat less than satisfactory ways".

Crane observes that the primary task of the historian of ideas, like any historian, is two-fold. First, he must be able to adequately interpret the texts of different varieties - essays, poems, speeches, histories, dialogues, philosophical and scientific treatises, and others - all of which contain ideas and serve as the primary materials of the history of ideas. Second, he must form and execute his own principles of historical construction in order to give integrity to his narrative, without which his book is destined to be a mere 'collection of detached analyses' but not a history proper.

11 Crane, R.S., "Interpretation of Texts and the History of Ideas", College English, II (1941), p.764.
Crane draws our attention to some practical difficulties in connection with the interpretation of texts. Ideas are prevalent in various forms in almost all the branches of knowledge - philosophy, theology, natural science, morality, politics, economics, psychology etc. So the historian of ideas is required to interpret and realize the ideas occurring in those subjects. Here it must be remembered that the same idea may and does occur differently in different subjects. In other words, the writers of different subjects exploit ideas in different ways in keeping with the different principles of construction of their individual subjects. The historian of form must be able to understand which one is a basic idea and which one is only a variety of some other idea. But no historian of ideas, not even a specialist in literary texts, can really attain technical skill in all these varied subject matters. And even if he succeeds in interpreting them in some way, it is very difficult for him to fit them together in a significant frame of historical reference. The historian of ideas thus faces difficulties both on the part of textual interpretation and on the part of inventing appropriate historical principle.

Crane has suggested two possible ways to avoid the difficulties - one is to follow the method of philological investigation and the other is to adopt dialectical method. He illustrates how these methods may help the historian, but at the same time he admits their limitations. The philological
method enables the historian to give special care to the elements of words, but the elements of ideas are not so carefully judged by this method. The dialectical method, on the contrary, can do justice to the ideas prevalent in the varieties of subjects, but its power seems lacking on the part of words. Thus it is not enough to achieve scholarly perfection in these methods to be a good historian of ideas. Crane also admits it when he says that "it is not enough to collect materials exhaustively or even to interpret them in a scholarly way; many can do this, and the results, as we all know, are too often dull and unilluminating in the extreme—collections of quotations from many sources, forced into a semblance of unity by means of borrowed formulae ill understood: to be a Stephen (Leslie Stephen) or a Lovejoy (A.O. Lovejoy) something more is required, namely, inventiveness in securing principles and insight in applying them." 12

At the concluding part of the essay Crane has suggested the possibility of inventing another new method in which the subject matter of investigation will neither be words (as the philologists treat them) nor ideas (as dialectical historians conceive them), but a combination of the two. But Crane does not go into the detail of what this third method is and how the historian of ideas is expected to avoid the difficulties in this new method. Therefore, I must recall what I have said at the beginning of this section, namely,

12 Ibid., p. 762.
Crane in this essay fails to fulfil our expectation.

IV

In "Montesquieu and British Thought: Gibbon, Adam Smith, Burke" we find R.S. Crane as a book-reviewer. Crane reviews Fletcher's book *Montesquieu and English Politics (1750-1800)* - the book in which Fletcher has attempted to show how a large number of great and small historians, economists, political orators and even constitutionalist theorists of the 2nd half of the 18th century exploited Montesquieu's *Esprit des lois* for material assistance or support of their own arguments. Fletcher shows the likeness of thoughts between Montesquieu on the one hand and a group of English writers on the other. The method he follows for this purpose is a comparative one. And Crane observes that Fletcher is most successful when he argues on the philological level and exhibits the influence of Montesquieu on the British writers through a simple comparison of texts and doctrines. But whenever his observation moves beyond that field and Crane has pointed out that Fletcher moves time and again, and whenever "his judgments take the form of generalizations about the fundamental procedures of his authors or the implications of their statements"\(^\text{14}\), he can fairly be accused


of over simplifying the problems occurring in the authors he
deals with due to his failure to understand properly the
principles underlying their works.

In his article Crane first points to the limitations of
Fletcher's understanding of Montesquieu and then to his lack
of understanding of the relation of other writers to Montes­
quieu. Regarding Fletcher's understanding of Esprit des lois
Crane observes that Fletcher's interpretation of the book is
done in Platonic terms. It is, however, not wrong to inter­
pret Esprit des lois in Platonic terms. Crane rather admits
the validity of that interpretation. But he, at the same
time, does not hesitate to mention that it is not the pro­
per way since to understand the book in the way Fletcher
does is to "neglect the distinction Montesquieu establishes
in Book I between laws 'in their most general signification',
which are necessary relations arising from the 'nature' or
the raison primitive of things, and laws in the sense of
rules established by legislators using their 'human reason'
or faculty adjusting means to ends in a world of finite
beings and varying physical and social conditions. It is with
'law' and 'reason' in the second of these senses that Montes­
quieu is primarily concerned". What Crane thus suggests is
that Fletcher's tendency to generalizing keeps him away from
a more careful analytical study of Montesquieu.

15 Ibid., pp.303-4.
The same charge can be brought against Fletcher in his attempt to study the influence of Montesquieu on English writers. Crane mentions only three of the English writers - Gibbon, Adam Smith and Burke - to give us an example of Fletcher's dealing with them. Fletcher for example, Crane observes, fails to have a clear understanding of Gibbon and the nature of the influence of Montesquieu on him. Fletcher insists on Gibbon's neglect of general for particular causes in his account of the greatness of Rome. Crane has analysed the point to show how Fletcher has achieved a wrong judgment. Crane observes: "the point is not that he (Gibbon) is neglecting general causes but that, given the essential nature of a despotism, however disguised, the happiness or misery of the Commonwealth must necessarily be dependent, as he recognizes at the end of Chapter 3, on the character of a single man"\textsuperscript{16}. Crane also exhibits that the way Gibbon did his analysis in Chapter 3 of his book was largely due to the influence of Book XI of \textit{Esprit des lois} in which Montesquieu expounded the theory of balance and separation of powers in his account of the British constitution. Fletcher misses the point and thus fails to do justice to the influence of Montesquieu on Gibbon.

Similarly, in his treatment of Adam Smith also, Crane has exhibited, Fletcher exaggerates the intellectual relation between Montesquieu and Smith. Of course, Crane admits

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 307.
Fletcher's success in pointing out Montesquieu's influence on Burke. Fletcher, Crane observes, is right in his attempts to show that many of the arguments in different books and articles of Burke are linked to *Esprit des lois*. But at the same time Crane criticizes Fletcher for making some generalized statements in order to differentiate Burke's political approach from that of Montesquieu.

However, Crane in this review article has remained confined to these three writers only. He says nothing about how Fletcher exhibits the influence of Montesquieu on other writers of England. It may be due to the fact that Crane thinks it enough to make us understand the basic approach of Fletcher in his book, and to do so three writers of three major fields of study are sufficient. Besides, the duty of a reviewer is not to summarize the whole book but to point out the major traits and to evaluate the achievement of the writer. Crane's article seems to support this view. And there can hardly be any doubt that Crane has successfully performed this task of a reviewer.

A very interesting as well as important essay of Crane is "Philosophy Literature, and the History of Ideas", where he examines the nature and function of literary ideas "in the context both of ideas in philosophy and of ideas in the
history of ideas"17. The essay can be divided into two parts for the sake of understanding - the first dealing with the nature of ideas occurring in the history of ideas, philosophy and literature along with a few suggestions on the construction of the history of ideas, and the second showing the applications and roles of the ideas in literary works, on the basis of which an idea becomes literary.

The history of ideas, Crane observes, works on a large canvas. For the purpose of its working materials the history of ideas is not restricted to any particular branch of knowledge, but can easily exploit philosophy, literature, theology, history, scientific treatise and, what not, because ideas in different forms may be traced in all the established branches of knowledge. But the history of ideas does not entertain the ideas as they appear in various fields because the same idea may and does assume different outward forms and implications as it occurs in different fields. The scholar's job, therefore, is of "separating out from particular systems of thought, viewed as more or less unstable 'compounds', the basic conceptual and methodological elements of which they are composed, and the results of this analysis - the 'unit ideas' it fixes our attention on - become the essential data of the history of 'ideas"18. The term 'unit

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18 Ibid., p.175.
ideas' has been borrowed from A.O. Lovejoy, and 'unit ideas' are the basic ideas which frequently occur in speeches and writings of scholars of different fields. They are thus universal notions, which work in the minds of writers as well as scholars. And this universality of thought actually makes us often surprisingly discover the affinity of ideas between the writers of two different countries or between two writings of widely different natures. Crane uses the term 'commonplaces' to mean what Lovejoy calls 'unit ideas' because he considers it more comprehensive.

However, these ideas are of immense value for the interpretation of philosophical and literary works as well as others. So the historical study of ideas, Crane rightly observes, should be done with care and interest. And he has scholastically showed that this can be done in three different ways. The first one can be called a Text-oriented study of the ideas. The historian may take as his working material any literary or philosophical text and then he shows how the author of the text has exploited the 'commonplaces' or 'unit ideas' available to him in earlier writings. The other way of studying ideas may be seen as a diachronic study of an idea. In this process a historian may take up some idea in isolation and then show the gradual development and implications of the idea through examples from different fields and different periods as long as the idea remains current. And the third method may be called a synchronic or period-
oriented study of ideas. Here one is required to concentrate one's attention on a particular period and then to closely examine and show what ideas predominate in that period, occurring in different provinces of thought.

The task, however, is by no means an easy one. Some problems are there in each of the methods. The first problem is to identify the ideas because the task must be done from artistic or scholastic writings in which the ideas appear in a wide variety of forms. The same idea may and does take different names after the names of the fields in which they are employed. Thus the ideas appearing in philosophy are called philosophical ideas, in literature, literary ideas. The historian must have to recognize the basic ideas free from all the outer formative decorations they receive in a particular branch of knowledge - say for example, literature or philosophy. Another equally serious task is to study how and why one idea or a group of ideas predominates in a particular period and how it gives place to another.

Crane next turns to the other object of his interest in this article, namely, the identification of the distinctive nature of literary ideas. He rightly observes that most of the serious literary works possess within themselves some philosophical truths. The thoughts expressed in those works often become similar to some remarkable ideas occurring in
some philosophical writings. This incident never suggests that literary ideas are identical with philosophical ideas. Actually philosophical ideas often recur in literature, but their forms and implications very often change as they undergo or sometimes help literary synthesis. So in order to recognize the peculiarly literary ideas "we must consider them in the light of the literary synthesis they help to make possible and of their various functions relative to these"\(^{19}\). But the problem here is that literary synthesis takes place in no fixed, or one or two ways. Naturally, one engaged in examining the parts played by ideas in literary synthesis must explore all the possible varieties.

However, Crane has also observed that the role of ideas varies as widely as the literary structures vary. In the structure, for example, where metaphor and analogy play an important part, ideas are often used as bases of the metaphors and analogies. In the dramatic structures "the dramatic personae are frequently made to state universal propositions or to develop generalized arguments in order that their estimates of the situation, their motives in the action, their plans and deliberations may be clear"\(^{20}\). In some other structures again, ideas are used as "external signs or manifestations of inner moral habits and states of mind"\(^{21}\). The

soliloquies of Hamlet may be cited as examples. Thus, in various structures ideas play various roles. The role of the ideas, however, is more artistic than philosophical, and they play mainly some functional parts in all such structures. Another important thing Crane suggests here is that in most of the representational works we often search and generally find certain 'universally intelligible postulates', wherefrom we constitute an idea of the 'vision of life' or 'world view' of the author. These postulates are generally implied in the structure but not clearly stated, and they may be traced to be the reflection of some philosophical or theological systems.

What finally emerges from Crane's investigation of the nature of literary ideas is that they are used in literary works in two principal ways: (i) as moral and intellectual bases of their forms and (ii) as parts or devices necessitated or made appropriate by their forms. And naturally there can be no single way of judging the significance of ideas used in literature. The criterion must be changed as we take up either of the functions of the ideas. It may passingly be noted here that this idea of changing the criterion or method as and when necessary is fundamental in Crane's critical theory.

A very important point that Crane makes at the end of the article is that the material of ideas in a literary work
does not determine the greatness of that work. The peculiarly literary value of literature depends on the pleasure it affords as a 'beautiful individual whole', constituted of so many materials. Therefore, a merely philosophical consideration (in the traditional way) of the ideas involved in literature is never sufficient because the ideas here achieve something more than merely philosophical significance.

VI

I may turn now to the remaining essay of this group, entitled "Notes on the Organization of Locke's Essay". Crane's concern here is to point out the main design of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. His professed aim is twofold - one is to study the character of the basic analogy which, Crane thinks, is there at the centre of Locke's Essay, and the other is to examine how far this unifying analogy controls the movement of Locke's arguments throughout the Essay.

Locke in his Essay records the "history of the first beginnings of human knowledge". The function of the human mind is extremely vital in the production of knowledge and therefore, Locke first determines the nature and function of the mind. He does it by means of an analogy which, Crane

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thinks, is basic to Locke's analysis in his Essay. In the first chapter of the second Book of the Essay Locke informs us that thinking or perception of ideas is related to the soul in the same way as motion is related to the body. Here Locke differs from the Cartesians in his concept of the soul. Unlike the Cartesians, who consider thinking or perception of ideas to be the essence of the soul, Locke takes it to be just one of the activities of the soul. And this activity of the soul, Locke thinks, can fully be analyzed by means of the same terms used to consider physical activity. Thus Locke comes to the conclusion that both motion and thought (a) are things which have their existence in succession, (b) are diverse in nature, and (c) can both be considered in terms of the cause-effect relationship.

With the help of this analogy as a basis Locke composes "a systematic 'history' of human knowledge as something that comes to be, in a temporal and causal succession, as a result of the powers with which God has endowed the human mind". New things may come into being in at least three ways. But human mind in the process of converting ideas into knowledge follow mainly one of these three, and this one is the process of 'making'. Locke observes: "when the cause is extrinsical, and the effect produced by a sensible separation, or juxtaposition of discernible parts, we call it making, and

such are all artificial things"\textsuperscript{24}. Human knowledge is the product of an activity of making, and the extrinsical cause here is the mind, which in Locke's concept functions like a workman or artist. Therefore, in order to explain the powers and limitations of the mind Locke draws a parallel between the activity of the mind with simple ideas and the activity of a workman with material objects. Thus Crane shows that this fundamental analogy of Locke's book is the organizing force in the light of which, when we explain or try to understand the book, everything becomes more evident.

Since the \textit{Essay} is a history of human knowledge, it must have its own principles of organization and interpretation. Its principles are derived from the universal traits of the mind - its powers and its situation. And these traits of the mind are determined by means of the analogy of the activity of the mind in thinking and the activity of the artist in dealing with his materials. The workman receives his materials from the world and fashions them in his own way. In this act of fashioning, certain things are active and certain others passive, some things are internal and some others external. One who attempts a study of the origin of knowledge must carefully determine the proportions of passive and active, internal and external. Crane has rightly observed that "to consider the origin of knowledge in terms

\textsuperscript{24} Locke, John, \textit{Essay Concerning Human Understanding}, Book II, Quoted by Crane, R.S., \textit{op. cit.}, p.291.
of this parallel is inevitably to be led to discover in each phase of the mind's operations proportions between what is external in the process and what is internal, between what is passive and what is active; and it is precisely these proportions, applied in context after context throughout the Essay, that provide Locke with the general analogical framework within which his literal treatment of ideas and knowledge is developed. Crane, by referring to the different Books of the Essay has exhibited that Locke had to depend at every stage of his analysis on the determination of the ratios.

In Book I, for example, Locke has exhibited that the materials with which the mind operates have their origin, like that of the materials of the artist or the workman, in everything other than the mind. "They are", in the language of Crane, "ideas to which the understanding is related as an 'extrinsical' cause. What is internal here is only man's reason considered at once as a set of powers and as a tabula rasa with respect to whatever is knowable in the world."26

The analysis in Book II also is guided by the ratio of the external materials coming within the mind and the internal operations by which these materials, the simple ideas, are made complex and made available for knowledge. Thus the

26 Ibid., p.293.
proportions of active and passive, voluntary and involuntary, simple and complex, external and internal, materials of thought and the process are all involved as devices in the treatment of Locke's subject matter in the *Essay*. And the important point, to repeat it once again, is that the fundamental analogy is there as the source of all such devices.

However, in the concluding part of his essay Crane has pointed out a probable fault in the theory of Locke. He suggests that the way in which the general ideas of things are formed may ultimately obscure the original materials out of which the construction of the ideas has been made possible. And if it actually happens the extent of knowledge becomes narrow and limited because then "we can have only those notions which can be resolved ultimately into the simple ideas given us by experience; no other conceptions of sensible qualities than what come from without by the senses, no ideas of the operations of any thinking substance except those the mind finds in itself through reflection". But it must be mentioned that Locke has emphasized not the limits but the extent of human knowledge. Here Crane virtually harks back to what he said in the beginning of the essay, that Locke's view of the mind as "a passive recipient of impressions from without or at most a mechanical manipulator of the simple ideas it has derived from these", is extremely narrow.

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approach of Crane does not do justice to Locke, because Locke's view of the mind and theory of knowledge when seen in proper perspective shows a distinct possibility of inclusiveness. Locke is often regarded as the founder of empiricism which is the doctrine that all our knowledge is derived from experience. The first book of the Essay is concerned in arguing as against Plato, Descartes and the scholastics that there are no innate ideas or principles. But in the second book he tries to show in detail how experience can give birth to various kinds of ideas. He rejects the notion of 'innate ideas' and contends: "Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has pointed on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience: in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself". Locke also makes provision for intuitive knowledge of which the mind is capable. While it is true as Crane argues that intuitive knowledge cannot be put forward in the form of logical proposition, it is also true that the intuitive knowledge is a valid form of knowledge. In fact, our knowledge of our own existence is intuitive, as Locke clearly demonstrates in book IV, while our knowledge of God's existence is

demonstrative and our knowledge of things present to sense is through sensation. Obviously Crane here underestimates Locke and does injustice to him by not studying him in depth.

The mind actually has a great power of multiplying the objects of its thought and by virtue of that it can carry human knowledge much further to ensure satisfaction and happiness in this world. In fact when Locke says that the mind "in making its complex ideas of substances, only follows nature"\textsuperscript{30}, he talks about the human limitations of the mind as an instrument. It is the human quality to join dissimilar objects in imagination but as Locke suggests, both the objects are available in experience. If we think of a golden apple which does not exist, we can think of it because we have experience of the apple and gold. All that the mind does is to connect them arbitrarily. Locke therefore makes a very significant point and strikingly original suggestion that even the concept of utopia or dystopia must take its origin in our experience of external phenomena. The mind cannot really create anything out of nothing. The mind can only re-create new objects through different permutations and combinations, but cannot really create anything \textit{ex nihilo}. But the mind has an infinite capacity of thus creating innumerable objects which donot exist in the world. Coleridge, in fact, partly draws on this quality of the mind when he talks

about the esemplastic power of the mind in describing the nature of the secondary imagination.

A close study of Locke's essay really reveals that Crane has not done justice to him. He attributes to Locke ideas of which Locke cannot be held responsible. But the importance of Crane's essay lies in the fact that it revives Locke, renews our interest in him, and offers a fresh look to Locke's essay. Even the historical interpretation which Crane offers only reinforces Locke's philosophy of the mind: the finite mind has an infinite capacity for thought.

To conclude now I must repeat what I have said at the beginning of this chapter that Crane's aim in these essays is not to construct a history of ideas. Each of the essays is complete in itself, solving the particular problem it takes into account. And it is needless to say that each one is important either to remove some of our misconceptions or to enrich our concept of the history of ideas. Some faults are surely there in Crane's understanding and illustration, as I have mentioned from time to time. But it is an excusable error in view of the difficult subject he grapples with.