CHAPTER - II

Chief Critics of Samavāya

Before raising objections against a particular view, a critic generally offers a representation of that view. Now, sometimes it is complained of that most of the ancient Indian critics, including many celebrated thinkers, failed to be authentic in representing and analysing the views of the opponent. This is, perhaps, mainly because they fail to meet the opponent in the opponent's ground. In most cases of their critical estimate they intentionally rearrange the opponent's commitments and take the advantage of rebutting his view easily. Thus very often a gap is found between what originally the opponent's view is and what appears in the critic's representation. Here I did not feel the necessity of entering into the original sources of the Nyāya-Vaisēṣika views in connection with their critic's arguments. In most of these cases I feel that their criticisms have lost their force since they are wrongly directed against the expositions of the original sources. Anyway, references from the original sources are given in support of my expositions of the Nyāya-Vaisēṣika views in the other chapters. So in this chapter I have simply discussed in profile how the critics represent the Nyāya-Vaisēṣika doctrine of inherence and argue against it. In certain cases I have also tried to answer their objections on behalf of the Nyāya-Vaisēṣikas. Now, we are going to discuss the main points of opposition raised against the Nyāya-Vaisēṣika doctrine of inherence by the following six critics:
Their views will be discussed in six separate sections.

Section - I
Śaṅkara

Among the chief critics of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of inherence Śaṅkara is a ruthless one. He tries to show that self-relatedness of inherence is not logically justified. While refuting the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of atomism Śaṅkara, the uncompromising absolutist of the Vedānta School, incidentally drives a blow against the doctrine of inherence. In his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, "samavāyābhhyupagamāccā sāmyādanavasthitēḥ." - 2-2-13, he stands against the opinion of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas that the relation between certain entities, for example, the atom ²(paramānu) and the dyad ³(dvyanuka), is inherence. The ground of his opposition is that two

1 Vādarāyaṇa (Vyās) (39), p.511.
2 The atom is the smallest partless unary particle of a composite substance. It is imperceptible and further unanalysable.
3 The dyad is the binary molecule composed of two atoms. It is the first atomic product.
entities like a dyad and its atom being two different entities cannot related by a third entity which is also different from the two. Here it may be mentioned that the Nyāya-Vaiśeśikas hold that the two relata of inherence are two different entities. They are different in the sense they do have independent ontic status in the Nyāya-Vaiśeśika ontology. Their relation, inherence, also is entitatively different from its two relata because of its having an independent ontic status. Now, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeśikas, the two relata of inherence are related with each other by inherence, but inherence is related with them not by any other relation, but directly by itself.

Śaṅkara argues that as the dyad being different from its two component atoms is related with them by inherence, so inherence also being different from its two relata should require some relation other than inherence in order to get related with its relata, since there is parity in the difference between the dyad and its atoms, and between inherence and its relata. As the dyad is entitatively different from its atoms, so inherence also is entitatively different from its relata. On the basis of this parity he demands that in order to establish that there is a relation between inherence and its relata another relation

4 "yathaiva hanyubhyāmatyantabhinnaṁ sad dvyanukaṁ samavayalaksanena sambandhena tābhyaṁ saṁbadhyata evam samavāyohpi samavāyibhohtyantabhinnaḥ sansamavāyalaksanenānyenaiva sambandhena saṁvāyibhiḥ saṁbadhyeta; atyantabhedāsāmyāt".
- Śaṅkara (39), p.511.
is to be supposed to hold between them, and this relation must be other than its own relata i.e. inherence and the relata of inherence; otherwise it cannot go consistently with the case of the relation between the dyad and its atoms. But this one new relation is not sufficient to solve the problem, because here the due of a new relation is a recurring one. So the doctrine of inherence of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas involves the defect of infinite regress.

Śaṅkara represents the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position that inherence is known through the cognition 'it is here'. So it is never cognised as leaving itself unrelated, or as requiring another relation in order to relate itself with its relata. It is rather always cognised as being eternally related with its relata. In this connection Vācaspati Miśra, an annotator of Śaṅkara, highlights the mode of operation of inherence in the constitution of the complex reals. The sole and distinguished function of inherence, he thinks, is to relate itself with its relata. In his annotation, the Bhāmatī, he furnishes an inference which is intended to state clearly the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view on this point. The inference runs thus: inherence does not require another relation in order to get related with its relata, because it is its very

5 "tataśca tasya tasyānyonyaḥ saṁbandhaḥ kalpayitavya ityanavas-thaiva prasajyeta". - Ibid.

6 "nanu iha prayayagrāhyah samavāyo nityasaṁbaddha eva sama-vāyibhirgrhyate nāsaṁbandhaḥ saṁbandhāntara-pēkṣo vā". - Ibid.
nature to relate itself with its relata. He anticipates that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas may use the probans (hetu), namely, the nature of relating itself with its relata (sambandhisambandhanaparamārthatva), as an escape door, and thus they may guard their doctrine of inherence against the alleged defect of infinite regress.

Now, as possible ways of justifying the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis that inherence is a self-related relation Śaṅkara, Vācaspati Miśra, Amalānanda and Appaya Dīksita have suggested three arguments and ultimately shown that they are all incapable of giving any support to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position. These three arguments are:

1. Inherence is self-related, because it is responsible for (niyāmaka) the existence of its relata.
2. Inherence is self-related, because it is a relation, but not a quality (agunatve sati sambandha).
3. Inherence is self-related, because it is not an effect (akārya).

These three arguments are going to be discussed in detail in the following three parts.

While Śaṅkara proceeds to show that there is inconsistency

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7 "asau sambandhibhyāṁ sāmbandhe na sambandhāntaramapekṣate sambandhisambandhanaparamārthatvāt". - Vācaspati Miśra, Ibid.
8 "tasmāt svabhāvadeva samavāyah samavāyinorna sambandhāntar- eneti nānavastheti". - Ibid.
in holding that inherence does not require another relation in order to get related with its relata and at the same time regarding it to be entitatively different from its relata, Vācaspati Miśra suggests a possible defence in favour of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas that though inherence is different from its relata, it does not require any other relation in order to get related with its relata, because it is the very nature of inherence to get related with its relata by itself. Now Amalānanda, the annotator of the Bhāmatī, formulates an inference which can possibly be put to defend the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position. The inference runs thus: Inherence is related with the threads and the cloth by virtue of its determinanthood (niyāmakatva), as it is in case of a cause. In this inference inherence is the subject (pakṣa), relatedness with the threads and the cloth is the probandum (sādhyā), and determinanthood is probans (hetu). The import of this inference appears to be that as the cause of the cloth, e.g. its manufacturer, is related with the cloth and its threads in connection with his contribution to their textile, so inherence also is related with them by virtue of its contribution of their objective relational synthesis. Here it is the relation of inherence which is held to be responsible for the synthetic unity of the threads and the cloth; and hence, it is the niyāmaka just as its cause, e.g. its manufacturer, is held to be.

9 "samavāyastantupābhyyāṁ saṁbaddhaḥ tanniyaṁmakatvāt kāraṇavat".
   - Amalānanda, Ibid.

10 "tantupatobhayasaṁśīṣṭatāprayojaka".
   - Appaya Dīkṣita, Ibid.
Amalānanda observes that the above inference which is apparently suggested in favour of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas involves some upādhi. He apprehends that the upādhi, namely, asambandhatva, is there. Here the word 'asambandha' appears to refer to those cases where the relation between two entities are said to be not different from its relata. In such cases the relation is rather claimed to be identical with any one of the relata. Most probably he thinks that in these cases there is virtually no relation other than the relata.

In the Nyāya logic upādhi is a kind of bar which hinders an inference from being valid. According to the Naiyāyikas, in case of an inference if anything is discovered to be more pervasive than the probandum and less pervasive than the probans of that inference, it is treated as upādhi. In the Vedānta system upādhi is defined in a

11 "atrasaṁbandhatvamupādhimāsāṅkate." - Amalānanda, Ibid.
12 In the context of the Nyāya theory of inference upādhi is defined in more or less similar way. The following definitions will reveal it.

(i) "sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpakatvam."
- Udayana (70), p.403.

(ii) "tatropādhistu, sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpakah."
- Udayana (72), P.352.

(iii) "upādhīśca sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakah, ..."
- Gaṅgeśa (34), p.3.
somewhat different way. There upādhi is defined as that which is less pervasive than the probans and co-pervasive with the probandum.

Amalānanda apprehends that asambandhatva or non-relationhood is a upādhi. Now it is the time to see how non-relationhood stands as a upādhi in the context of Amalānanda's inference. Since Amalānanda has suggested the inference to go, though apparently, in favour of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the upādhi in this inference is expected to be shown in accordance with its definition accepted in the Nyāya system.

Non-relationhood may be shown to be less pervasive than

(iv) "tathā hi 'sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpaka upādhiḥ ityupādhlakṣanaṁ, ..." -Keśava Miśra (42), p. 119.
(v) "sādhyasya vyāpako yastu hetoravyāpakastathā, sa upādhirbhavet ..." - Kārikā 138, Viśvanātha (77), p. 492.
(vi) "sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāhvyāpakatvamupādhiḥ".
- Annambhatta (4), p.120.

"sādhanāvyapakatve sati sādhyasamavyāpta upādhiḥ..."
- Nārāyana (43), p.28.

In the Saptapadārthī of Śivāditya upadhi is defined likewise.

"upādhīścā sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyasamavyāptīḥ".
- 227, Śivāditya (69), p.70.
the probans, determinanthood, on the ground that determinanthood is obviously more pervasive than non-relationhood. A determinant is not necessarily a relation. Apart from relation, a cause, or a property, etc. may be a determinant. When a cause or a universal is the determinant, it is a non-relation; but when a relation is the determinant, it is not a non-relation, and so non-relationhood cannot be there. Thus the field of non-relationhood is restricted to non-relations only, whereas the field of determinanthood is open to relations as well as non-relation. Non-relationhood, therefore, has got a field narrower than that of determinanthood; and hence, it is less pervasive than the latter.

Non-relationhood may also be shown to be more pervasive than the probandum, relatedness with the threads and the cloth. Since, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, there is no relation between inherence on the one hand and the cloth and its thread on the other over and above the inherence and the cloth and its thread, it is quite reasonable to consider the case of relatedness with the threads and the cloth to be a case of non-relation. Again, non-relationhood may be shown to be present beyond the probandum also. Fox example, the case of the relation between the absence of colour and air. Here also Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do not admit any relation over and over the absence of colour and air. Thus, non-relationhood may be conceived to have a broad field which includes in it the case of the probandum. Hence, it is more pervasive than the probandum.
In this way Amalananda may have thought that being less pervasive than the probans and more pervasive than the probandum non-relationhood has become a *upādhi* in the context of the inference under consideration. By showing that the *upādhi*, non-relationhood, is present in the probans, determinanthood, he intends to prove that the inference is imperfect. The imperfection which vitiates the inference is vyāpyatvāsiddhi. The defect of vyāpyatvāsiddhi may appear in an

14 "sādhyāprasiddhyādayastu vyāpyatvāsiddhimadhyehntarbhūtah.
sādhye sādhyatāvacchedakasyāhbbhāvah sādhyāprasiddhiḥ,
...evaṁ hetau hetutāvacchedakābhāvah sādhanāprasiddhiḥ,..."
-Viśvanātha (77), p. 249.

Following Viśvanātha it may be said that if the limiting property of the probandum (*sādhyatāvacchedaka*) remains absent in the probandum, or the limiting property of the probans (*hetutāvacchedaka*) remains absent in the probans, of an inference, the inference suffers from the defect of vyāpyatvāsiddhi. In Amalananda's inference determinanthood is the probans, and the limiting property of the probans is the property possessed by determinanthood (*niyāmakatvata*). Determinanthood (*niyāmakatva*) specified or limited (*avacchinna*) by determinanthood- hood (*niyāmakatvatva*) is a too general concept. It may be a cause, or a universal, or a relation, etc., but not any of them in particular. In the present inference the probans, determinanthood,
inference if some upādhi is discovered to be present in the probans of that inference. The upādhi acts as a hindrance against the knowledge of the pervasion (vyāpti) of the probans by the probandum.

While Amalānanda in his Vedāntakalpataru, shortly known as Kalpataru, points out some logical problems involved in the inference in question, Appaya Dīkṣita in his Kalpataruparimala, shortly known as Parimala, raises an ontological problem that the absence of the cloth prior to its production (pataprāgabhāva) is the cause of the cloth, but it is not related with the cloth and its threads by the relation of inherence or by any such relation. If inherence is said to be related with the cloth and its threads because of its being their determinant (niyāmaka), then the said absence of the cloth also may be said to be related with the cloth and its threads because it is also their

is known particularly in the relational reference only. This is not the knowledge of the probans as specified by the limiting property of the probans. This stands as a hindrance against the knowledge of the pervasion of the probans specified by the limiting property of the probans. Without this knowledge an inference cannot stand valid. Such an inference is said to involve the defect of vyāpyatvāsiddhi.

15 "vyāpyatvāsiddhastu dvividhaḥ. eko vyāptigrāhakapramāṇābhāvāt, aparastūpādhisadbhāvāt". - Keśava Mīśra (42), p.117.

16 Here 'any such relation' means that relation which is not identical with, but different from, its relata.
determinant by virtue of its being the cause of the cloth. Appaya Dīkṣita highlights here the parity between the role of inherence and that of the prior absence of the cloth in the matter of the production of the cloth. His point against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas is that if inherence is admitted to be related by itself with the cloth and its threads just for its being their determinant, then the prior absence also has got to be admitted to be related with the cloth and its threads for the same reason, because the said absence also is their determinant being a cause of the production of the cloth. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do not think that the absence prior to the production of the cloth is anyhow related with either the cloth or its threads. If that absence is not related with them, then why should inherence be said to be related or self-related with them?

Thus, from the above discussion it stands that the probans, niyamakatva, is on no consideration profitable to plead in favour of the self-relatedness of inherence.

2

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas think that the relation of conjunction is a quality and so it depends on another relation in order to get related with its relata; and since the relation of inherence is not a quality, it does not require any other relation in order to get related

with its relata. Inherence gets related with its relata by itself. Now Śaṅkara apprehends that the fact of being a relation but not a quality (agnatve sati sambandhatva) may be used as the probans in the argument in favour of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that inherence is self-related. He is, however, not satisfied with this probans for two reasons. First, the need for another relation is same in both the cases of conjunction and inherence; and secondly, the difference of nature of the reals cannot be established by mere terminology.

If conjunction needs another relation for its relation with its relata, then inherence cannot be justifiably said to be out of this need, because conjunction and inherence both are in the same position as regards their dependence on another relation. As inherence is always apprehended along with its relata, so conjunction also. If inherence is said to be eternally related with its relata, then the conjunction between ubiquitous substances also may be said to be

18 "na ca gunatvātsamyoṣah sāmbandhāntaramapekṣate na samavāyohgunatvāditi yujyate vaktum; ...."
- Śaṅkara (39), p.512.

19 "apeksākāraṇasya tulyatvāt, gunaparibhāṣāyāścatātantratvāt".
- Ibid.

20 "samavaṇyena tulyanyāyatvātsamyoṣaṁohpyasaṁbandhaḥ prasajyeta".
- Amalānanda (39), pp.511-12.
eternally related with its conjunct. Even it cannot be said that conjunction is a product and so it needs another relation, because the conjunction between ubiquitous substances is not a product. Similarly, on the other hand this also cannot be said that inherence is not a product and so it is not in need of another relation, because inherence also is a product. It is destroyed as a result of the destruction of one or both of its relata on which it depends for its existence. The need for another relation, therefore, cannot be the need of conjunction only, because as relations conjunction and inherence both are enjoying the same status.

Here on behalf of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas it may be argued that conjunction and inherence are not at all of the same status, because conjunction is a quality while inherence is not a quality. As because conjunction is a quality, it exists in the substance by the relation of inherence. But the Vedāntins are not bound to admit that conjunction

21 "saṁyogahpye vam sati saṁyogibhirnityasambaddha eveti saṁavāya- vannānyaṁ saṁbandhamapekṣeta".
- Śaṅkara (39), pp.511-12.

22 "na ca - kāryatvātsamavāyyasamavāyikāraṇāpekṣitayā saṁyogah samavāyīti - yuktam; ajasaṁyogasyātathātvaprasaṅgāt".
- Vācaspati Miśra (39), p.512.

23. "api ca samavayasyāpi saṁbandhyadhīnasadbhāvasya saṁband- hinaścaikasya dvayorvā vināsitvena vināsitvātkāryatvam".
is a quality. If they argue that inheritance is not a quality because of its non-dependence on another relation, then a counter-argument may be constructed contending that conjunction also is not a quality, because it does not depend on inherence in order to exist in the substance. Here the point to be noted is that simply qualityhood cannot be a ground for the fact that conjunction requires inherence in order to exist in the substance.

Amalānanda represents the anticipated inference at full length: inherence is independent of any other relation, because it is a relation and not a quality. He levels a rather technical charge against it that no example (udāharana) can be set in support of this inference.

Example is an integral part of the inference technically known as 'Nyāya'. It substantiates an inference with the help of a suitable instance. But here the problem is that not a single instance is available which can help one to make out the present inferential situation, because there is no such relation other than inherence which is not a quality and so is independent of any other relation.

24 "yadyasamavāyehsyāgūnatvam bhavati kamaṁ bhavatu, na naḥ kācitksatiḥ." - Ibid., p. 512.
25 "samavāyaḥ sambandhānaapekśaḥ agūnatve sati saṁbandhatvāt." - Amalānanda, Ibid.
26 "atra tāvad drstāntābhāvādanadhyavasitavam." - Ibid.
Moreover, the inference may be opposed by a counter-argument that inherence gets related with its relata by inherence because it is a relation, as it is in case of conjunction. As conjunction being a relation gets related with its relata by inherence, so inherence also being a relation may analogously be inferred to be related with its relata by the relation, inherence. The given inference fails to stand unshaken in the face of this counter-inference. It is vitiated by the defect of facing a counter-inference of equal strength (satpratipaksa).

It is, therefore, seen that the second probans, agunatva sati sambandhatva, shares the same fate with the first, niyamakatva. Both of them fail to prove that inherence does not require another relation in order to be related with its relata.

27 "samavāyah samavetah sambandhatvat saṁyogavat". - Ibid.

28 A counter-inference of equal strength means another inference where a counter-probans is employed to establish the absence of the probandum in the subject of the inference opposed to. Such a counter-inference cannot win the match; but it is strong enough to arrest an inference in a tight corner. However strong and sharp its opposition may be, from the point of validity it is as good as its counter-inference. Both are equally unsound. A counter-inference is, however, successful so far as it ventures to disprove an inference.
Vācaspati Miśra throws some light upon the possibility of a third probans. He thinks that the Nyāya-Vaśesikas may move afresh with the probans, namely, akāryatva i.e. not being an effect. With this new probans the inference runs thus: inherence is not dependent on any other relation because it is not an effect. Here conjunction cannot come to be a counter-instance because it is an effect. It depends on its inherent cause and non-inherent cause for its production. It is produced and exists in its inherent cause by the relation of inherence. In contrast with conjunction inherence is an eternal entity, not an effect; so the question of its inherent cause and its relation with that cause does not arise.

Since inherence is not an effect of its relata and its relata are not its cause, its relation with its relata is not a causal one. For this reason inherence cannot be said to depend on another

29 This point has been slightly touched in the second part, and now it has become the pivotal point of the discussion of this third part.

30 The relation between conjunction and its inherent cause is a direct relation, and it is inherence. But the relation between conjunction and its non-inherent cause is a chain-relation of which inherence is a constituent relation.
inherence in order to get related with its relata. Again, inherence cannot be conceived to be related by conjunction also, because it is not a substance. Conjunction holds between substances alone. Thus, it may be argued that as because inherence is a non-effect (akārya), it does not depend on any relation whatsoever. This defence prima facie appears to be competent enough to prove the non-dependence of inherence on any relation.

The above argument stands on the ontological assumption that conjunction is an effect. Vācaspati says that this assumption is not justified. He tries to refute it by citing the cases of the conjunction between the ubiquitous substances. The conjunction between the ubiquitous substances are not, and can never be, effects, because they are eternal. The ubiquitous substances are all eternal, and they exist in a state of eternal conjunction with each other. Thus, conjunction is not always an effect; and it is not the case that it must have some cause. So it cannot be claimed that conjunction always gets related with its relata by inherence. The relational status of conjunction is, therefore, not different from that of inherence. Now, if in case of inherence the probans, non-effecthood, is claimed to

31 Vide Foot Note 22 of this chapter.
prove the probandum, non-dependence on any relation, then in case of conjunction also the same probans may be taken to stand as the proof of the same probandum. But this goes against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika stand that conjunction depends on some relation in order to get related with its relata.

Even if conjunction is supposed to be an effect on the ground that it is destroyed when its relata are destroyed, then inherence also may be claimed to be an effect since inherence also, like conjunction, may be taken to be destroyed when its relata are no more. As the conjunction between the parts of a table is said to be destroyed when the parts of the table are destroyed, so the inherence between the table and its parts may be taken to be destroyed when its parts cease to exist. On this ground if conjunction is said to be an effect, inherence also may be accepted to be an effect.

According to the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas, inherence is an effect and it is without the inherent and the non-inherent cause. It has only the efficient cause. Inherence does not have the above two kinds of cause, because the supposition that inherence is produced by its inherent and non-inherent cause involves infinite regress. Now, the objection may be raised here that conjunction also should not be said to have those two types of cause, because then the doctrine
of conjunction also may involve infinite regress. If conjunction is said
to originate from its inherent cause, it must have to stand in relation
with its inherent cause, and will require a second relation for it. Then
this second relation again will require a third relation in order to
get related with the first i.e., conjunction; and this process will
32 go ad infinitum. The main force of this objection, however, leads to the
question: if it is thought about inherence that it does not require
another relation for getting related with its relata, then why can't the
same be thought about conjunction?

32 "tathā ca yathaisa nimitakāraṇamātrādhirudhinaotpāda evāṁ saṁyogahpi.
atha samavāyohpi saṅavāyyasamavāyikaraṇe apeksate,
tathāpi saivānavasthā."
-Vācaspati Miśra (39), p. 513.

33 Though this point specifically concerns the Prābhākaras,
still it has some relevance for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas
also, because the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas think like the Prābhākaras
that inherence has neither inherent cause nor non-inherent cause.
But on the point of the efficient cause of inherence they are
at variance with the Prābhākaras.

"ye tu samavāyasya kāryatvam svākrtyaiva
samavāyikaraṇanapeksatvena samavāyantarāpeksāṁ na manyante
prābhākarastāṃpratī pratibandhā samavāyantarāpeksāṃmupapādādayati
-tathā ceti." - Amalānanda, Ibid.
Thus, on the whole the probans, 'akāryatva,' is no better in position than the previous two, 'agunatve sati sambandhatva' and 'niyāmakatva.' The above discussion, therefore, amounts to the conclusion that none of the three probans is fit to construct a strong defence in favour of the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika position that inherence is a self-related relation.

In the conclusion Śaṅkara comes to the point that in so far as inherence is entitatively different from the entities between which it holds, its self-relatedness is not justified, because it appears inconsistent with the Vaiśeṣika view that the dyad which is also entitatively different from its atoms, is not related with them by itself. Even if it is said that inherence is known to be always related with its relata, then the same reason is applicable to the case of the dyad also, because a dyad also is known to be always related with atoms. Śaṅkara, thus, tries to show that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that inherence is self-related is not a well-reasoned conclusion.

Now it follows from the above discussion that Śaṅkara puts the issue of self-relatedness of inherence between the horns. He shows that if inherence is held to be self-related, then it leads to some metaphysical inconsistencies; again if it is held to be related
by some other relation, then it leads to the fallacy of infinite regress.

34 The above inconsistencies and the fallacy are, however, apprehended by Śaṅkara; and the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣikas have the reply of their own. The contention of the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣikas regarding the self-relatedness of inherence will be discussed in the third section of the fourth chapter.
Citsukha, another eminent Vedāntist, raises a number of objections against the doctrine of inherence in his *Tattvapradīpikā* which is renowned as *Citsukhi* after the name of the author. His points of criticism may be discussed here in two phases. In the first phase he criticises certain definitions of inherence, and for this he chooses mainly the definitions given by Prāśatapāda and Udayana. In the second phase he examines the proofs of inherence, and this part of his discussion centres round mainly the *Nyāya-Līlāvatī*.

His main objection against Prāśatapāda’s definition of inherence is that the self-relation of the determinans-determinandum (visēsana-visēsyā) type between the entities like the absence of jar and the ground is overcovered by this definition. He has been much analytic to show separately how the different parts of the definition are in keeping with the self-relation of the determinans-determinandum type. His observations are as follows:

(a) First, he tries to show the self-relation is an inseparable relation like inherence. Here the question arises: is the relation

\[ \text{"na syādayutasi dhīyādi samavāyasā laksanam. visēsana visēsyasaṁbandhe vyabhicāratah."} \]

- Citsukha (16), P.199.
between the absence of jar and the ground an inseparable relation? Inseparability between two entities, Pratyagrupa elucidates in his annotation, the Nayanaprasādini, consists in the fact that neither of them resides in a separate locus. Now following this elucidation it can be said that the locus of the absence of jar is not anything other than the ground and the locus of the ground is nothing but its parts which are not different from the ground. Under the circumstances the absence of the jar and the ground may be considered to be located in the same locus which, according to Pratyagrupa, and most probably to Citsukha also, is a mark of inseparability.

(b) Secondly, he observes that any two relata of the self-relation like the ground and the absence of jar may be said to exist as the substratum and the superstratum. Since the absence of jar is known to exist on the ground, the ground and the absence of jar are viewed to exist as the substratum and the superstratum respectively. Now, if their relation is held to be the self-relation, there is no difficulty in holding that it is the relation of which the relata exists in the substratum-superstratum order. And on this ground it may be treated to be a case

36 "anyatarasya prthagāravyārayītvābhāve bhavatyevāyutasiddhiriti bhāvah". - Pratyagrupa, Ibid.
37 "asti hi tatāyutasiddhirbhūtalaghatābhāvayorbhūtalasya svāvavāśritatvepyabhāvasya bhūtalātiriktāsrayābhāvāt". - Citsukha, Ibid.
of the cognition 'it is here'.

(c) Thirdly, he shows that as inherence is held to be responsible for the cognition 'it is here', so the self-relation also may be said to stand for the cause of the cognition 'it is here'. When the absence of jar on the ground is cognised, the cognition is certainly a cognition of 'it is here'. The cognition 'it is here' always springs from some relation. Here in this case it is the relation between the ground and the absence of jar which may be considered to be the source of the cognition 'it is here', just as from the relation of Inherence such cognition is said to emerge in case of the cognition of a piece of cloth in a set of threads.

Thus Citsukha observes that the self-relation possesses all the characteristics of inherence, such as, inseparability, etc., and on this basis he concludes that the self-relation is overcovered by Prasastapada's definition of inherence.

Here as a possible defence against the above blow it may be said that inherence is a relation which holds between two positive entities only. But this defence is too weak to guard the position of Prasastapada, because here the objection may be raised that the relation between the cloth and the colour-inherence (rupasamavāya) is

38 "asticādhāryādārabhāva ..." - Ibid.
39 "ihapratyayāścā." - Ibid.
a relation between two positive entities, but this relation, according
to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, is not inherence. This relation is regarded
as the self-relation. Thus Prasastapada's definition of inherence, even
if it includes the suggested reply as a clause within it, has no way
of escape from the alleged defect of overcoverage.

Here it is necessary to mention that the relation between
the colour-inherence and the cloth, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas,
a relation between the determinans and the determinandum respectively.
Now this opinion involves a difficulty that if the relation between
inherence and its relata is held to be the determinans and the
determinandum, then on this ground all the cases of inherence may
indiscriminately be claimed to be the cases of the self-relation of the
determinans-determinandum type. Hence, on no account Praśastapāda's
definition of inherence can be held to be a sound one.

On consideration of Citsukha's grounds of refutation of
Praśastapāda's definition of inherence it may be said that Citsukha
is not fully justified in his criticism since certain assumptions of the

40 "atha bhāvayorśrṣaḥ sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ tathāpiḥa pate
rūpasamavāyo rūpasamavāyavānpaṭa iti viśesanavisēsyaśabhāve
laksanasyātivāptīḥ. uktalaksanasya tatrapi sambhavāt." - Ibid.

41 "atha gunaguninoḥ kriyākārakayoravayavāvayavinarjātijātimator-
viśesatadvatosća yah sambandha uktaśrpaḥ samavāya iti cenna.
tesāmevānjoyavīsesanavisēsyaśabhāvetivyāptēḥ." - Ibid.
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas have fallen out of his consideration. For example, he overlooks the following points in connection with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of inseparability:

(i) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of inseparability does not consist in residing of two entities in one and the same locus, but in their incapability of leaving one another.

(ii) Two inseparable entities related by inherence are always located in different loci; but two separable entities sometimes may reside in the same locus, and sometimes may not.

(iii) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of inseparability pertains to positive entities only and not to absence.

If these points are taken into consideration, the above objections of Citsukha, like Praśastapāda's definition of inherence is too wide, does not arise.

But Citsukha raises the same objection against Udayana's definition also. Udayana defines inherence as an eternal relation. Citsukha thinks that this definition is too wide since it overcovers the self-relation

42 "bhavatu tarhyavācūnāmatanunāsāraṇā nityō gandhaḥ samavaya iti laksanam iti cenna." -Ibid., p. 200.

43 "tathāca nityaprāptih samavaya iti laksanām sūcitam." - Udayana (71), Vol. 1, p. 249.
of the determinans-determinandum type. Here the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas may say that the self-relation is non-eternal because of the non-eternity of its relata in certain cases like the absence of black colour in a jar. But, according to Citsukha, it cannot be said for two reasons:

(i) First, it cannot prevent the overcoverage of the self-relation. In the cognition of the absence of colour in air, the absence of colour is known to be the determinans and air to be the determinandum; and the relation between the absence of colour and an atom of air is, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the self-relation of the determinans-determinandum type. Now, if the relation between the absence of colour and a jar is held to be non-eternal because of the non-eternity of the relata of that relation, then the relation between the absence of colour and an air-atom must be held to be eternal because of the eternality of the relata of this relation. Here the self-relation is, therefore, held to be eternal; and this relation being eternal is allegedly overcovered by Udayana’s definition of inherence.

(ii) Secondly, if the self-relation is said to be non-eternal on account of the non-eternity of its relata, then inherence also should

44 "vīśēsanaviśēṣyabhāva eva vyabhicārātsohnityah pratiyoginorānityatvādītī cettathāpi nityapratiyogikaviśēsanaviśēṣyabhāve vyabhicārasya tulyatāt......"
be said to be non-eternal for the same reason, because there are innumerable instances of inherence in which both the relata are non-eternal, e.g. a jar and its parts.

Thus, according to Citsukha, the definition of inherence, given by Udayana and accepted by the Navya-Naïyāyikas, is not a satisfactory definition at all.

Citsukha apprehends that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas may defend their position by adding a clause to the definition in question. This supplementary clause is that the relation of inherence holds between positive entities only. Now the instance of absence cannot be brought as a counter-instance against this modified definition. But this defence is not free from defect, because the conjunction between the ubiquitous substances is overcovered by the revised definition of inherence. The conjunction between two ubiquitous substances is an eternal relation holding between two positive entities. This definition because of being too wide fails to distinguish inherence from this eternal conjunction.

In reply to this objection the following rejoinder may be given on behalf of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The reply is that there

45 "pratiyoginoranityatvena sambandhānityatvāpādanasya samavāyepi samānātva cca". - Ibid.

46 "bhāvarūpatve satīti viśeṣanādayamadoṣa iti cenna". - Ibid., pp.200-201

47 "ajasāmyoge vyabhicārāt". - Ibid., p.201.
is no proof in favour of eternal conjunction. If such conjunction is admitted at all, then eternal disjunction also is to be admitted. But what follows from the definitions of conjunction and disjunction is that they are produced entities; they cannot be eternal. Besides this, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas reject the eternal conjunction between ubiquitous substances on the ground that they never exist in separation from one another. Since they never get separated from one another the question of their coming in contact does not arise.

In this second phase of his criticism Citsukha tries to prove that there is no proof in favour of the existence of inherence. The Naiyāyikas say that perception is the proof of inherence, while the Vaiśeṣikas reject the Nyāya view and hold that inference is the proof of inherence. Citsukha rules out both the views. In order to refute the Nyāya view he has given arguments from the Nyāya-Līlāvatī. These arguments will be discussed in the third chapter in connection with Vallabha. Here we may direct our attention to his consideration on the Vaiśeṣika view.

48 "nāstyajah saṁyogo...." - Praśastapāda (57), p.358.
49 "aprāptayah prāptih saṁyogah". - Ibid. p.347.
50 "prātipūrvikāhprāptirvibhāgaḥ". - Ibid., p.364.
51 "vibhūnām tu parasparataḥ saṁyogo nāsti, yutasiddhyabhāvāt!". - Ibid., p.360.
52 "pratyaksah samavāya iti naiyāyikastadapyanupapannam samavayo-hūntindriyah...." - Saṅkara Miśra (40), p.161.
53 Citsukha (16), pp.201-2.
Regarding the Vaisesikas view Citsukha's opinion is that inference also is not a proof of inherence, because there is no such probans on the basis of which an inference may be constructed as a proof of inherence. Here the Vaisesikas may possibly offer an inference that the cognition of 'it is here', which is under dispute, is preceded by some relation, because it is an uncontradicted cognition of 'it is here', as it is in case of the cognition 'the plums are in the pot'. In this inference the subject (pakṣa) is the cognition of 'it is here', which is under dispute. The part 'under dispute' is given here in order to exclude the cases of self-relation like the relation between the colour-inherence and the cloth, and to take only the genuine instances of inherence into consideration. The probandum (sādhyā) of this inference is the precedence of some relation. Here the relation is taken to be some relation other than the self-relation. The probans (hetu) of the inference is being the uncontradicted cognition 'it is here'.

Citsukha thinks that the relation of which the above inference is anticipated to be a proof, is not inherence, but some other admitted relation like the relation between the determinans and

55 "vivādādhyāṣita ihapratyayaḥ saṃbandhapuraḥsarohbādhite-
ahapratyayatvādihakunda badarāṇīti pratyayavadityanumāna-
mastīti cenna". - Ibid.
the determinandum, or the relation between the substratum and the
superstratum, etc. So the inference may be said to suffer from the
defect of asserting the asserted.

The Vaiśeṣikas may of course argue here that inherence
is inferred as the basic relation (mūlasaṃbandha) and on the basis
of it the cognition of the other relations emerge. Thus the said defect
may be avoided. Now this argument, according to Citsukha, is not
good enough to defend the Vaiśeṣika position. It does not hold good
in cases like the cognitions 'the absence of jar is on this ground',
'the colour-inherence is in this cloth', etc. In these cases also the
cognition of the relation between the determinans and the determinandum
emerges, but inherence has nothing to do with the emergence of such
cognition. So it is not justified to say that it is the relation of
inherence on the basis of which the cognition of the other relations
always occurs.

The anticipated argument involves the fallacy of

\[ \text{anaikāntika. To be particular, it is a case of the sādharana type of} \]

\[ \text{56} \]
\[ \text{"viśeṣaṇavisesyabhāvādharādheyabhāvasaṃbandhādīnā} \]
\[ \text{siddhasādhanatvāt." - Ibid.} \]
\[ \text{57} \]
\[ \text{"viśeṣaṇavisesyādhereva mūlasaṃbandhapurāḥsaratvām} \]
\[ \text{sīśādhyāsitamīti na siddhasādhanamīti cet." - Ibid., pp.202-3.} \]
\[ \text{58} \]
\[ \text{"iḥabhūtale ghaṭābhāva ityasminneva viśeṣaṇavisvesyabhāvāp-} \]
\[ \text{ratyayehnaikāntyāt." - Ibid., p. 203.} \]
anaikāntika. If the probans of an inference is known to reside in both, that which is the locus of the probandum as well as that which is not the locus of the probandum, the inference is said to involve the fallacy of anaikāntika of the sādhāraṇa type. In the inference in question the cognitions like 'the cloth is in these threads' as well as the cognitions like 'the absence of jar is on the ground' - both are the cognitions of 'it is here'. Hence, the probans is present in both types of instances, sapakṣa and vipakṣa. On this ground Citsukha concludes that the inference is invalid. Such an inference cannot stand as a proof of inherence.
Section - 3

Vyāstīrtha

Vyāstīrtha is an eminent exponent of the Mādhva school of Vedanta. While discussing about the notion of Varna in his Tarka-tāndava he has found some difficulties in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of inherence. He has arranged those difficulties in two sets. In the first set he argues against the proofs of inherence, and in the second set he reckons certain drawbacks of the theory of inherence.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, varṇa-s are the syllabic sounds. They are the non-eternal qualities of the organ of audition which is nothing but ākāśa; and ākāśa is their inherent cause. The varṇa-s, therefore, exist in the ākāśa by the relation of inherence. But Vyāstīrtha does not admit this Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of varṇa. He raises objections against it from the Vedānta point of view. He thinks that varṇa-s cannot be said to be related with the ākāśa by inherence for two reasons: first, varṇa-s are eternal and

59 "sabdohmbaragunaḥ śrotragṛāhyah, ksanikah, ...... sa dvividho varnalaksanoro dhvanilaksanaśca, tatra akārādir

varnalaksanah". - Prasāstapāda(57), pp.692-93.

60 "ākāsātmakaśrotragunā varṇāḥ samavāyena sambandhena grhyanta iti tanna." - Vyāstīrtha (78), p.444.
ubiquitous substances; and secondly there is no proof in favour of inherence.

In order to prove that there is no proof in favour of inherence Vyāṣṭīrtha first stands against the Nyāya view that perception is a proof of inherence. Following him his annotator, Rāghavendraīrtha, says in his annotation, the Nyāyadīpa, that if inherence is perceived at all, then it must be perceived either as (i) the determinans (viṣesāṇa), or as (ii) the determinandum (viṣeṣya), or as (iii) something determined by inherencehood (samavāyatvarūpasvarūpa), or as (iv) the relation (saṁsarga). But ultimately he shows that in no way inherence is perceived.

(i) If inherence is perceived as the determinans, then the mode of expression of such cognition would be 'these are inherents'. But since the perception of inherence is never expressed in that way,
inherence cannot be said to be perceived as the determinans.

(ii) If inherence is perceived as the determinandum, then the mode of expression of such cognition would be 'inherence of these'. But since the perception of inherence is never expressed in that way, inherence cannot be said to be perceived as the determinandum.

(iii) If inherence is perceived as something determined by inherencehood, then the mode of expression of such cognition would be 'I know inherence'. But since the perception of inherence is never expressed in that way, inherence cannot be said to be perceived as something determined by inherencehood.

(iv) Lastly, it cannot be said that inherence is perceived as a relation between a jar and its colour. The relation between the jar and its colour and the relation between the ground and the absence of something on it are, according to Vyāstīrtha, not two different kinds of relations. If any relation other than inherence is perceived on the occasion of the perception of the ground as determined by absence of something, then instead of inherence that very relation may be held to be perceived on the occasion of the perception of

68 "imau saṃyuktāvityādīvadimau samavetāviti...... ananubhavāt."- Vyāstīrtha (78), p.444.
69 "anayoḥ samavāya iti vā". - Ibid.
70 "samavāyaṁ jānāmītyananuvyasāyācca". - Ibid.
the jar as determined by colour too. Hence, inherence cannot be said to be perceived as a relation.

In this way Vyāstīrtha rejects all of these possibilities and conclude that perception is not a proof of inherence.

Vyāstīrtha apprehends a possible argument which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas may put forward in favour of the visual perception of inherence. The inference runs thus: the cognition of the relation between the threads and the cloth is a visual perception, because its occurrence is due to the presence and non-occurrence is due to the absence of the eye, as it is in case of the cognition of the jar.

Vyāstīrtha thinks that the above inference suffers from the defect of āśrayāsiddhi. The defect of āśrayāsiddhi occurs when the subject (pakṣa) of an inference is known to be unreal. In the above inference the cognition of the relation between the thread and the cloth is the subject. Here the thread is the material of production

71 "ṛūpi ghaṭa ityādesābhāvavabdhūtalamityādivadupapatteḥ". - Ibid.

(upādana) and the cloth is the product (upādeya). According to Vyāstīrtha, there is no essential difference between the two. In this situation the question of their relation does not arise at all. Now, since the cognition of a relation between two things which are non-different is the subject of this inference, the inference is treated to be fallacious.

Here a possible reply that may be given from the court of the Nyāya-Vaiśeśikas is that they are not going to accept the view that the thread and the cloth are identical. They think that they are different entities. But, according to Vyāstīrtha, this reply also is not free from difficulty. If the thread and the cloth are taken to be different, then the claim of the visual perception of the self-relation (svarūpasambandha), instead of inherence, may stand as well. And in fact the Nyāya-Vaiśeśikas do admit the visual perception of self-relation in case of two different entities like the absence of jar and the ground. And if the relation between the threads and the cloth is admitted to be the self-relation, then the inference in question will involve the defect of establishing something other than


Vyāstīrtha assumes the basic and essential identity between the cloth and its threads. He thinks that their difference is only pragmatic, and so apparent.
Vyāstīrtha has examined a number of inferences given by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas as the proofs of inherence and raised some general points of objection which have been previously discussed in connection with Śaṅkara. Vyāstīrtha thinks that most of these inferences involve the fallacy of the assertion of something other than the intended. They are offered as the proofs of inherence, but ultimately almost all of them appear to be the proofs of self-relation instead of inherence. He argues more that if conjunction being a relation between separables is taken to be many, then inherence also being the relation between inseparables should be taken to be many, since both of them are relations. These points are, however, dropped here for the avoidance of repetition. Vyāstīrtha, of course, brings another serious charge against Gaṅgeśa's inference, and this point will be discussed in the next chapter in connection with Gaṅgeśa.

Now we may skip over to his second round of criticism where Vyāstīrtha mentions four points of ontological inconsistency which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of inherence involves. Vyāstīrtha calls these

74 "tadbhedavadepi ghaṭabhavabhūtalayorivehāpi svarūpasambandhasya cākṣuṣaṭvenārthantarāt". — Ibid., p.446.
75 "svarūpasambandhenārthantarāt". — Ibid., p.447.
76 "yutasiddhesu samyogasyevāyutasiddhesu samavāyasyāpi nyāyasāmyyena nānātvāpātācca". — Ibid., p.469.
inconsistencies 'vādhaka' and considers them unavoidable. They are:

1. non-apprehension of inherence between time and its number etc. qualities:

2. apprehension of self-relation between entities like quality and substance, as it is apprehended between quality, etc. on the one hand and their absence, etc. on the other.

3. non-apprehension of the distinction of the qualificatory (vīśīṣṭa) cognition from the collective (samūḥālambana) cognition;

4. infinite regress.

First, Vyāstīrtha aruges that if the relation between time and its number, or magnitude, etc. is admitted to be self-relation, then the admittance of inherence is useless. In that case all the cases of inherence may be explained with the help of self-relation. On the other hand if it is said that the said relation cannot

77 "vādhakacatuṣṭayām duṣpariharam". - Ibid., p.474.
78 "kālasya svagatasāṅkhyaādinā samavāyānupattih".
- Ibid., pp.473-74.
79 "gunaśeṣvābhāvādineva guruṇādīnāpi svārūpasambhandhenai-vopapattih", - Ibid., p.474.
80 "samūḥālambādvailaksanyānupattih", - Ibid.
81 "anavasthā ceti". - Ibid.
82 "kālasya svagatena saṅkhyaāparimānādīnā tvayāpi svārūpasamb-bandhaḥ svākrta iti kim tatra samavāyena". - Ibid., p.471.
but the inherence, then the admittance of self-relation becomes useless, because the cases of self-relation like the relation between the jar and time may be treated as conjunction, etc.

(2) Secondly, he Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas think that the relation between quality, etc. on the one hand and its absence, or its knowledge, or time, on the other, is self-relation. Vyāstīrtha argues here that their relation is held to be self-relation not because of that the counter-positive (pratiyogī) of the absence, or the object (viṣaya) of the knowledge, is the relation, but because of that the determinans (viṣēsana) is the relation. This view is favoured with the principle of parsimony. As a unifying principle determinanshood is more general; and hence, is stronger than counter-positivehood or

83 "yadi ca kālasya tena saha samavāyasya sattvānna svarūpasambandhaḥ tarhi kālasya ghaṭena saha saṁyogasya sattvāt svarūpasambandho na siddhet. sāmyāt".
- Ibid., p.471-72.

84 "api ca ānurāderapi tvanmate svābhāvasvajñānasvakāliḥ saha svarūpasambandhatvaṁ tāvadasti. tatra ānurāderabhāvasvajñāna-dīnprati svarūpasambandhatvaṁ na pratiyogīsvayatvādīnaṁ ananugamīt. gauravācca. kintu viṣesatvenānugamīllāghavācca".
- Ibid., p.472.
objecthood. Determinanshood has got a much broader field which includes in it the cases of inherence also. Now, Vyāstīrtha is inclined to see the cases of inherence like the quality and the substance, etc. to be similar with the cases of self-relation. On this ground he thinks that the relation between the entities like the quality and the substance may very well be held to be the self-relation, because here like the other cases one of the relata is known to be determined by the other, as it is in case of the cognition of a jar determined by its colour. He thinks that there is no justification of introducing inherence in those cases which can be explained by an already admitted relation, namely, self-relation.

(3) Thirdly, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, inherence is admitted to be a relation which distinguishes a qualificatory cognition (visīṣṭa-jñāna) like 'the jar is coloured' from a collective cognition (samūhālambana-jñāna) like 'the jar and the colour and inherence'. Vyāstīrtha admits the distinction between the two kinds of cognition, but he observes that in order to explain the distinction between the two kinds of cognition self-relation is sufficient, and there is no need of introducing inherence for this purpose. It can very well be conceived that in case of the cognition 'the jar is coloured' the

85 "visēṣaṇatvam ca guṇāderguṇyādāvapi samamiti guṇyādāvapi
guṇādeḥ svarūpasambandhatvam klīptameveti kka samavāya- syāvakāsāh". - Ibid.
the relation between the jar and its colour is self-relation, since in this cognition the colour is known to be the determinans and the jar to be determined by it. Here the relation of inherence is superfluous.

(4) Lastly, inherence can neither be conceived to be related by some other relation, nor can it be said to be self-related. If a further relation is supposed to hold between inherence and its relata, then this supposition involves infinite regress. Again if inherence is said to be self-related with its relata, then there is no need of admitting inherence as a relation-entity distinct from its relata and then regarding it as a self-related relation. Its relata themselves may be considered to be self-related. Here the notable point is that if self-relatedness is held to be possible in case of inherence, then it remains a mystery why it is not held to be possible in case of the relata of inherence. It self-relatedness is to be admitted at all, it should be admitted one step before for the sake of parsimony.

86 "api ca ghaṭarūpasānavāyaḥ iti samuḥālambanaṭānāt rūpī ghaṭa ityādibuddhe vairākṣanāya āvasyamaṅgīkāryenā rūpasya ghaṭena saha viśeṣānti viśeṣenaiva viśistabuddhymapattau kiṃ samavāyena'. - Ibid., pp.472-73.

87 "samavāyasyāpi svasambandhinā saha sambandhāṅgīkāre anavasthā". - Ibid., p.473.

88 "tatra svarūpasambandhāṅgīkāre ca guṇādēva guṇyādīna svarūpasambandhostu. sāmyāt. kiṃ dūragamanena". - Ibid.
Section - 4

Nārāyana Bhatta

This section intends to take account of the Bhāṭṭas' reaction against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of inherence from the Mānameyodaya, a valuable manual of the Bhāṭṭa school. The book, Mānameyodaya, consists of two parts and these two parts are known to have been produced by two different authors at different times. It is, however, irrelevant here to enter into the controversy whether both the parts are written by the same author or not. What is relevant here is the text, and let us concentrate upon the text. In this connection it is of course necessary to mention that though in the present discussion most of the references are given from the second i.e. meya part of the book, the title of this section is after the name of the author of the first i.e. māna part.

89 "The whole work Mānameyodaya, consisting of the two sections 'Māna' and 'Meya', was projected by Nārāyana Bhatta himself as is clear from the introductory verse; but he wrote only the first part; probably he passed away before completing it. Nārāyana Pandita who completed it, adding the 'Meya' portion, ... For details regarding this see my book, The Contribution of Kerala to Sanskrit Literature, University of Madras, 1958." - K. Kunjunni Raja, (49), Preface To The Second Edition, pp. XVII-XVIII.

The introductory verse runs thus:

Among the Mīmāṃsakas the Bhāttas do not admit inherence. Nārāyaṇa Bhāṭṭa, a spokesman of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, thinks that inherence is as real as a hare's horn. In the meya part Nārāyaṇa rejects inherence on the ground that there is no proof of its reality. He says that if there be any proof of inherence, it is either perception or inference. But neither of them, he thinks, is admissible.

In opposition to the opinion of the Naiyāyikas he says that inherence does not appear as the object of perception. According to him, when we perceive a qualified object like a white cloth, we perceive the cloth and whiteness, but we do not perceive anything as inherence between them. So the claim of the Naiyāyikas that we perceive inherence in a qualified object is a disputed one. As it is a disputed case, perception cannot be said to be a proof of inherence.

90 ".... samavāyasya ca śāsaśāyamānātatvād...." - Ibid., p.17.
91 "viśesasamavāyau tu śāvāsānasabrahmacārīnau, tatasiddhau pramāṇābhāvāt". - Ibid., p.293.
92 "samavāyehpi pratyaksamanumānaṁ vā pramāṇam". - Ibid.
93 "tatra na tāvat tārkikābhimataṁ pratyaksam apratibhāsāt". - Ibid., pp.293-94.
94 "samavāyarpasyaiva vipratipannatvādetesāṁ pratyayānāṁ samavāya-viṣayatvāsiddheḥ". - Ibid., p.294.
Nārāyaṇa rules out the possibility of the inferential proof of inherence. For this round of criticism he selects the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsaka as his opponent. This point of his criticism is, however, not applicable to the Vaiśeṣika theory of inherence. It is a matter of wonder that the Vaiśeṣika view on this point is left out of his consideration.

Another objection Nārāyaṇa raises from a logical point of view which, of course, is not irrelevant to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of inherence. He puts the problems as whether inherence is identical with its relata or not. He ultimately shows that it can neither be identical with nor be different from its relata.

Inherence cannot be said to be identical with its relata, because in that case inherence could not be imagined to exist without its relata. Again, if it is said to exist without its relata, then it cannot be said to be identical with its relata. Two things cannot be conceived to be both identical and at the same time capable of existing separately.

95 "nāpi prābhākarānumatamanumanaṁ pramāṇam". - Ibid.
96 "apica samavāyaḥ samavāyibhyāṁmatābhinno vā na vā". - Ibid., p.296.
97 "na tāvadabhinnaḥ samavāyīvyatirekena samavāyasyābhāvāprasaṅgat". - Ibid.
The supposition that inherence is different from its relata, suggests two alternatives:

(i) there is some relation between inherence and its relata,

(ii) there is no relation between inherence and its relata.

(i) The first alternative cannot be supported, because it involves infinite regress. If it is said that there is some relation between inherence and its relata and if this relation is held to be another inherence, then still another inherence is to be imagined as the relation between the first and the second inherence; and it will go ad infinitum. This is, however, not a new argument. It is rather the commonest charge labelled against the doctrine of inherence. This point has been discussed in connection with Śaṅkara and Vyāśṭīrtha. So there is no need of discussion on this point here.

(ii) Nor can the second alternative be accepted, because it fails to explain the origination of the qualificatory cognition. If an individual, its universal and inherence are supposed to be mutually

98 'bhinnatve tu samavāyasya samavāyibhyāṁ saṁbandhohsti vā na vā". - Ibid.

99 "na tāvadastīti vācyam tasyāpi saṁbandhasya samavāyatvāt samavāyāntarakalpane tasyāpyevamiti anavasthāprasāṅgāt". - Ibid.
unrelated, then they can give rise only to a collective cognition (sāmūḥālambana-jiṇāṇa) i.e. the cognition as 'a cow and cowness and inherence', instead of the qualificatory cognition (visiṣṭa-jiṇāṇa) i.e. the cognition as 'it is a cow'. But it is a fact that the cow, cowness and inherence being related with one another are able to give rise to the cognition 'it is a cow'. Thus, the qualification cognition like 'it is a cow' hold it evident that inherence and its relata are not as a matter of fact unrelated.

On the basis of the above argument Nārāyaṇa tries to show that inherence can neither be identical with its relata, nor can it be different from them. Again it cannot be taken to be out of these alternatives also, because in that case it involves logical contradiction. Inherence, therefore, cannot be admitted by any means. In the conclusion he suggests that the relation of inherence is to be replaced by the relation of identity (tādātmya).

100 "नपि नस्तिति वाचयां पिन्दासामंयसामवायानां परस्पराम 
सांबंधाभवे सति यां गाउँ इति व्यावहारांमारसाय यां पिन्दागो 
त्वसामावयाः इति व्यावहारस्विकारप्रसांगति". - Ibid.

101 "तस्मादवायवायवायिन्युगुनुल्लहरोष्टितित्तमतोऽक्रियाक्रियाव 
तोऽस्य परस्पराम्तादात्म्यामेव सांबंधाह!". - Ibid.
In the Tattvasaṅgraha Śāntarakṣita, the neo-Buddhist critic, has made a thorough examination of the different concepts and doctrines of the different systems of Indian philosophy. In course of his examination of the Vaiśeṣika categories, when he comes to deal with the doctrine of inherence, he begins with one of its grounds offered by the Vaiśeṣikas. He says that the apprehension of inherence is involved in the cognition 'it is here' in cases like 'the cloth is in these threads', etc.

Here Śāntarakṣita observes a disparity between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas' mode of cognising the tree-branch relation, etc. and the naive mode of cognising them. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas cognise the tree-branch relation as that the tree is in the branches; while the ordinary people experience it as that the branches are in the tree. Now Śāntarakṣita clearly expresses his reaction regarding this disparity that this kind of cognition of 'it is here' is, in fact, admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas only, because they are rather infatuated with their own doctrine. They have formulated the theory of inherence in

102 "tattusveva patoṁisu vīraneṣu kataḥ punah. ityādihamater-bhāvaṁtasmāvāyohvagamyate".
- Verse 823, Śāntarakṣita (63).

103 "vrkṣe sākhāḥ śilāscāga ityesā laukikī matih".
- Verse 831, ibid.
opposition to the common sense view.

Kamalaśīla, in his Pañjikā, unfolds the logical aspect of the above objection. He says that the probans (hetu), the cognition 'it is here', which the Vaiśeṣikas generally offer as a ground of the inherence of inherence involves the defect of āsrayāsiddhi. Āsrayāsiddhi means paksāsiddhi i.e. the unreality of the subject. According to Śāntarakṣita, the inference offered by the Vaiśeṣikas as a proof of inherence is that the cognitions like 'this cloth is in these threads', etc. are the instances of inherence, because they are the cognitions of the type 'it is here'. In this inference the cognition 'this cloth is in these threads' is the subject (paksā); being the instance of inherence is the probandum (sādhyā); and being the cognition of 'it is here' is the probans (hetu). Now, the reality of the subject of the inherence is questioned by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, because common sense opinion is never seen to subscribe to the above view. The common sense experience is rather the reverse of this view. It is the cognition 'the threads are in this cloth' instead of the cognition 'the cloth is in these threads'. So the subject of the inference is sheer unreal from the common sense point of view.

104 "tadetadadhavijñānam pareśāmeva varttate. svasiddhāntānurāgena
na drṣṭam laukikām tu tat" - Verse 827, Ibid.

105 "tadanena ātoraśrayāsiddhatāmāha". - Kamalaśīla (63), p.266.

106 "iha tantuṣu pata ityādikā hi dhiyāḥ svasiddhāntānurāgopaka
kalpita eva. natu loke tathotpadyamānāḥ sāṃvedyanta ityataḥ
sādhyadharmā na siddhāḥ". - Ibid.
In reply here it may be said that the parts come into existence first, and then the whole emerges. The parts cannot belong to the whole, because prior to the existence of the whole the parts cannot reside in it. The whole never comes into being before its parts, because the whole is the effect of its parts. The parts being the cause of the whole always precede it, and so can never be said to reside in it. The ordinary people do not always express facts exactly as they are. As for example, they say that the sun rises and sets every day, but the sun, in fact, never rises and never sets. The common sense version of the above fact is rejected by modern science. The explanation of modern science is just the reverse of the common sense i.e. it is the earth that moves round the sun.

Śāntarakṣita's next point of attack is against the oneness of inherence. He represents the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that inherence is known to be one since it exists in all of its instances. Here he draws our attention to the point that if inherence is said to be one present in all of its instances, then the cognition of the cloth, etc. may occur in the parts of the jar, etc. Here his apprehension is that if inherence is taken as one, a particular object like a cloth may be known to be

107 "sarvasminbhāvavattvesa eka eva pratiyate".
- Verse 825, Śāntarakṣita (63),

108 "yadyekah samavāyāḥ syāt sarveśveveva ca vastuṣu.
kapālādiśvapi jñānam pṛtadīti prasajyate". - Verse 835, Ibid.
located in anything and everything else. Thus the conception that inherence is one is not at all compatible to the substratum-superstratum system of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. Kamalasīla explains the point as that if inherence is held to be one then the classification of the five positive categories will not be possible. The relation between substance, the quality and the action on the one hand and their determinans (visēṣaṇa) like substancehood, qualityhood, actionhood, etc. on the other, being one and the same everywhere, everything may be known to be determined by everything else. In that case substance may be known to be determined by qualityhood. As a result, it is not possible to divide the positive reals into substance, etc.

For a possible answer to the above objection Śāntarakṣita refers to Praśastamati. Praśastamati is one of the least known

109 "tantoryāḥ samavāyō hi paṭasyetyabhidhīyate. sa ghaṭasya kapālesu taddhīranavadhirbhavet." - Verse 839, Ibid.

110 "tataśca dravyagnakaramaṇāṁ dravyatvagunatvakarmatvadivisēṣaṇaiḥ sambandhasyaikatvāt pañcāpadārthavibhāgo na syāt." - Kamalasīla (63), p.268.

111 "Śāntarakṣita refers to the opinions held by another Naiyāyika scholar who is called Praśastamati. This author seems to be different from the Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda. Like his compeer Aviddhakaraṇa we have no information about him, his doctrines, opinions and his time. All that we can hazard to say is that he flourished before Śāntarakṣita, and the latest date that can be assigned to him is cir. 700 A.D."

- B. Bhattacharyya (36), P.LXXXIX.
philosophers of India. He is known to belong to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika group. He thinks that as a result of admitting inherence to be one the categorial identity of reals are not at stake. It is sustained by the substratum-superstratum system. For example, substancehood resides in substances alone, and qualityhood only in qualities. A particular substratum, or a particular set of substrata, is fixed for a particular superstratum; there is not a single instance of violation of this system.

Here a question arises: When inherence is one, how is the substratum-superstratum system among the categories maintained so strictly? This question may be answered by saying that there is the diversity in the capacity of being the manifester (vyañjaka) and the manifested (vyañgya) among the categories, and this diversity provides sufficient reason to remove the possibility of the loss of categorial identity of

112 ".... The theory of inherence as held by Praśastamati is rather interesting: he held that though the inherent connection between the substance and the quality is one and eternal, it will not be felt in the same way in all substances with other qualities, because substances have the power only to represent their own specific qualities". - Ibid., p.XC.

113 "ādhārādheṇiyamam nañvekavēhysya durghataḥ. dravyatvam dravya evēṣtam katham tatsamavāyataḥ."

- Verse 846, Sāntaraksita (63).
But Santarakṣita is not ready to accept that inherence is one and, at the same time, it stands responsible for the fact that substancehood resides in substances only, and not in qualities, because inherence being one, there is every possibility of cross-identification of reals. Again, if the inherence of substancehood and the inherence of qualityhood are taken to be different, then inherence cannot be said to be different from conjunction.

Santarakṣita raises a more interesting point in this connection. It is that as the notion of 'it is here' and the diversity in the capacity of being the manifester and the manifested are themselves based on the notion of inherence, they cannot be responsible for the fact that substancehood resides in substances alone, or qualityhood resides in qualities alone. Here he contends that where the notion of inherence fails to answer how it is possible that the locus of a particular entity is fixed and restricted to certain other entity or entities, it is hopeless to search the answer in any such notion or principle which is based on the notion of inherence.

114 "vyāgyavyaṅjakasāmarthyabhedādrravyādi jātiṣu. samavāyaikabhāvehipi naiva cetsaviruddhate". - Verse 845, Ibid.

115 "anyathā guṇajātyādbhinna eva bhavedayam. yogibhēdatpratīvyaktī yathā yogō vibhidyate". - Verse 848, Ibid.

116 "tadasritatvasthanadi tasmādevabhidyate. samavāyādītāsvaitannā yuktaṁ tanniyāmakam. vyāgyavyaṅjakasāmarthyabhedohpi samavāyataha." - Verses 850-851, Ibid.
Next Santaraksita questions the eternality of inherence. He represents the Nyāya-Vaiśešika position on this point as that inherence is eternal since in no ways its cause is apprehended. Here his point of objection is that if inherence is held to be eternal, then the entities like a jar, etc., which are its relata, are all should be considered to be eternal, because all these entities are ever present in their own substratum by the eternal relation of inherence. Again, if all these relata of inherence are taken to be perishable, then their relation inherence also has got to be admitted as destructible. In this connection he tries to reason away the Nyāya-Vaiśešika position that even when the two relata cease to exist, their relation may continue to exist. He tries to prove it to be absurd with the help of the example of the relation of conjunction. As with the destruction of the conjuncts their conjunction is destroyed, so with the destruction of the inherents their inherence also must be destroyed, since inherence also is a relation as conjunction is.

117 "kāraṇānupalabdheśca nityo bhāvavadeva saḥ. na hyasya kāraṇām kiṃcit pramanenopalakṣyate". - Verse 826, Ibid.
118 "nityatvenāsyā sarvehipi nityāḥ prāptāḥ (ghaṭādayah). ādhāreṣu sadā teṣām samavāyo na saṁsthiteh". - Verse 854, Ibid.
119 "svādhārāssamavāyo hi teṣāmapi sadā mataḥ. teṣām vināsābhāve tu niyatāḥsyāpi nāśīta". - Verse 856, Ibid.
120 "sambandhino nivṛttau hi sambandhoṣṭī ti durghaṭām". - Verse 857, Ibid.
121 "na hi saṁyuktanāsēhpi saṁyogo nopatiṣṭhate". - Ibid.
He further analyses the point as that if it is granted that even after the destruction of the relata like a jar, etc. their relation, inherence, continues to exist between some other relata, then one is to go with either of the following two alternatives:

(i) that inherence which existed between two relata which are now destroyed is the same as the inherence which is existing between some other relata;

(ii) that inherence which existed between two relata which are now destroyed is something different from the inherence which is existing between some other relata. Here inherence is taken to be on a par with conjunction, etc.

Now, the first alternative is not acceptable, because if the same inherence is said to continue to exist after the destruction of its relata, then none of its relata can ever be destroyed. Again, if any of its relata are ever known to be destroyed, then their inherence cannot be said to exist in reality. If it is said to exist at all, it will exist by name only.

122 "yadyevasam yena vinasyanti ghatādya samavāyinaḥ. teṣāṁ vṛttātmakā yosau samavāya prakalpitaḥ. sa eva vyavatisthe kīm sambandhyantarasthiteḥ". - Verses 860-861, Ibid.

123 "athānya eva samyoga ...... vahutādīvat". - Verse 861, Ibid.

124 "samavāyohvatistheta samājnanatrena va tatha". - Verse 863, Ibid.
The second alternative also cannot be supported, because if the inherence that continues to exist is held to be somewhat different cannot be said to be one. As in case of conjunction it is held to be many, so here also one is compelled to admit the plurality of inherence.

Thus, the main point which this objection centres round is that a relation between perishable entities is always perishable. It cannot be held to be eternal, because if it is held, then there would be many other inconsistencies like the above. Kamalaśīla points out some of them in his Pañjikā, such as:

(i) lack of productivity of cause;
(ii) contradiction in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika aphorisms;
(iii) cross-perception;
(iv) non-successive production of all objects;
(v) futility of making philosophy.

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125 "samyogādivadevaṁ hi nāṁvasya vahutā bhavet." -Verse 866, Ibid.
126 "kāranaaviphalyam" - Kamalaśīla (68), p. 274.
127 "anekasūtravirodhaḥ" - Ibid.
128 "pratyaksādivirodhaḥ" - Ibid.
129 "sarwapadārthānāmakramotpattirityādi..." - Ibid.
130 "vyarthāṁ śāstra-praṇayanaṁ..." - Ibid.
(i) First, if inherence is said to be eternal, then the cause has nothing to do with its effect. Inherence being an eternal relation between the cause and its effect never leaves the cause-entity and the effect-entity in isolation. Since the cause and the effect rest in a permanent association with each other by virtue of the eternal relation, inherence, between them, the question of the origination of the effect does not arise at all. The effect is ever-present in an eternal association with its cause. In this situation the so-called cause ipso facto produces no effect. This lack of productivity of cause stands as a point of inconsistency which is involved in the conception that inherence is eternal.

(ii) Secondly, the conception of inherence as an eternal relation contradicts certain aphorisms of the Nyāya system as well as the Vaiśeṣika system. As for example, it is said in the Vaiśeṣika aphorism that conjunction may originate from the action of one of the two conjuncts, or actions of both the conjuncts, or another conjunction. Here, if the conjunction-producing action, or the conjunction-producing conjunction, is said to be related with the substratum, substance, by the eternal inherence, then the product-conjunction may be conceived to be always in a produced state; and then it ceases to be a product. But in the above aphorism it is aphorism to be a product, and its

131 "anyatarakarma ubhayakarmajah samyogajascasamyogah".
- Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 7-2-9, Kanāda (40), p.147.
origination is accordingly explained. Again, the Nyāya aphorism defines perception to be a kind of originated knowledge born out of the sense-object relation (sannikāraṇa). This sense-object relation may be conjunction, or inherence, etc. In case it is conjunction, it will certainly be related with its conjuncts, i.e. the perceiving sense-organ and the object perceived, by the eternal inherence; and then the perception will be an ever-produced affair which prevents it from being an effect. But in this Nyāya aphorism perception is treated to be an effect. Thus, particularly those Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika aphorisms which accounts for the origination of some non-eternal state of affairs are allegedly contradicted by the view that inherence is eternal.

(iii) Thirdly, the view that inherence is eternal contradicts the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that the eye, etc. are the cause of perception, etc. Had the sense-organs like eye, etc. been related with their respective objects by the eternal relation, inherence, they should render each and every object ever-known to everybody. But, fortunately or unfortunately, this is not the actual state of affair.

(iv) Fourthly, the doctrine of eternal inherence is contradictory to the notion of successive production. If eternal inherence is taken to be the prime condition of production, then the

132 "indriyārthasannikārṣotpannam ānānam...."
- Nyāya Sūtra 1-1-4, Gotama (26), p.13
effects cannot be produced in succession. They must be produced simultaneously. But the notion of successive production of effects is accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas; and, for example, it is advocated in the Nyāya aphorism that the non-production of simultaneous cognitions is a proof of the mind.

(v) Fifthly, since inherence is eternal and, as it follows, the production of things is also eternal, the different objects, which the world consists of, have nothing to do with each other from the causal point of view. The notion of causality is totally crushed by the doctrine of eternal inherence. In this situation the so much deep and deliberate philosophical contemplation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas over the category system of the universe turns into a fuss.

133 "yugapajjñānānupattirmanaso liṅgam."
Prabhāchandra, a reputed Jain critic, presents some fresh points in his arguments against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of inherence. In his Prameyakamalamārtanda, a commentary on the Parīkṣā Mukha sūtra of Mānikiya Nandi, he says that the relation which is the object of the cognition of 'it is here', like 'this cloth is in these threads', is not inherence alone. The relation, vaiśīṣṭya, also is associated as an object in case of such cognition, since the cognition 'this cloth is in these threads' has as its objects the threads and the cloth which are qualified by inherence (samavāyaviśīṣṭa). Hence, vaiśīṣṭya also is there as the relation relating inherence with the threads and the cloth.

A reply to this objection may be given in the following way. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do not think that the thread and the cloth are known to be qualified by inherence. According to them, the cognition 'the cloth is in the thread' has the following three objects.

134 "na hi 'iha tantuṣu paṭaḥ' ityādihapratyayah kevalam samavāyamālambate;" - Prabhāchandra (56), p.606.
135 "vaiśīṣṭyaṁ cānayoḥ sambandha iti". - Ibid.
136 "samavāyaviśīṣṭatantupatālambanatvāt". - Ibid.
only: (i) the cloth,
(ii) the thread,
(iii) inherence, the relation between the two.

They think that when the cognition 'the cloth is in the thread' occurs, in this cognition the cloth is known to be related with the thread by inherence in a definite way. According to them, it is the inherence specified by the cloth (patasamavāya) which is known to be in the thread, and this inherence is related with the thread by self-relation (svarūpasambandha). Thus, no relation as vaiśīṣṭya appears here to be an object of the above cognition.

Next Prabhāchandra shows that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of inherence involves certain problems.

First, he says that it is a problem to decide whether inherence is the relation between two entities which are not yet produced, or it is the relation between two entities which are already produced. Inherence cannot be said to be the relation between two unproduced entities, because where there is no relata, there can be no relation. Such a relation of which the relata are not produced is inconceivable. Again, this also cannot be said that inherence is the

137 But the inherence specified by the thread is never known to be in the cloth.
138 "nanispannayoh samavāyah sambandhinoranutpāde sambandhābhāvāt". - Prabhāchandra (36), p.608.
relation between two produced entities, because conjunction alone is sufficient to explain the relation between two produced entities.

Secondly, neither it can be said that inherence remains unrelated, nor can inherence be said to be related with its relata. Inherence cannot be said to remain unrelated, because this view stands in contradiction with the usage, 'inherence of the inherents'. If it is said that inherence is related with its relata, in that case it may be held to be related either (i) by itself (svatah), or (ii) by some other relation (paratah).

(i) If inherence is said to be related with its relata by itself, then the relations like conjunction, etc. may be held to be self-related.

(ii) If inherence is said to be related with its relata by some other relation, then a further relation is to be imagined for relating inherence with this new relation, and then still another. In this way it will involve infinite regress.

139 "nispannyośca saṁyoga eva". - Ibid.
140 "asambandhe cāsya 'saṁavāyinoḥ saṁavāyaḥ' iti vyapadesānu-pappattiḥ". - Ibid.
141 "sambandhe vā na svatosau; saṁyogādāṁmapi tathā tatprasaṅgat". - Ibid.
142 "parataścedanavasthā". - Ibid.
Prabhāchandra levels a strong charge against the Valṣeśkās' inference that in cases like 'the cloth is in these threads' the cognition 'it is here' is a product of some relation, because it is the uncontradicted cognition of 'it is here', as it is in case of the cognition 'the curd is in this pot'. The inference suggests that all uncontradicted cognitions of 'it is here' are the effects of some relation. In this inference the cognition of 'it is here' like 'the cloth is in these threads' is the subject (pakṣa), being an effect of some relation is the probandum (sādhyā), being the uncontradicted cognition of 'it is here' is the probans (hetu), and the cognition 'the curd is in this pot' is an example. His assessment on this inference is that it is an imprudent assertion (asamīkṣitābhidhānam). He observes that this inference is suffering from a number of logical defects which are as follows:

First, he says that the above inference involves the defect of āśrayāsiddhi. If the subject of an inference is proved to be non-existent, or anything not in conformity with human experience, the inference is said to involve the said defect. In the given inference

143 "iha tantuṣu pataḥ ityādihapratyayāḥ sambandhakāryoḥbhādhyā-
māneḥapratyayatvādiha kuṃde dadhītyādipratyayavadityanumā-
nāccāsau pratīyate". - Ibid., p.611.

144 "tadapyasamīkṣitābhidhānam;" - Ibid.

145 "hetorāśrayāsīddhatvāt". - Ibid.
the cognition of 'it is here' in cases like 'the cloth is in these threads' is the subject. Here Prabhāchandra thinks that the cognition that conforms to the common-sense experience at large is 'the threads are in this cloth'. It is the opposite of the cognition 'the cloth is in these threads'.

A reply to this objection may be given on behalf of the Vaiśeṣikas that the threads cannot be said to be known to reside in the cloth, because in that case the cloth must exist before its threads come into being. But, as a matter of fact, the threads come first, and they stand as the inherent cause of the cloth. Then only the cloth can come into existence. This logical as well as temporal sequence of the events leading to the production of the cloth suggests that the threads are prior to the cloth. 'The threads are in this cloth' is, thus, merely an unreflected judgement of the ordinary people.

Secondly, he thinks that the inference involves the defect of svarūpāsiddhi. If in an inference the probans is known to be absent in the subject, the inference is said to involve the defect of

146 "'paṭe tantavo vṛkṣe sākhāḥ' ityādirūpatayā pratiyamānopratyayena 'iha tantusu patah' iti pratyayasya bādyamānatvāt".
- Ibid.

147 "svarūpāsiddhaścāyam;" - Ibid.
svarūpāsiddhi. In the subject of the inherence the probans, the
cognition 'it is here' is not available, because in the subject the
cognition is not 'it is here'. There it is something like 'the cloth
is in these threads'. The two are different.

In reply to this objection it may be said that the
cognition 'it is here' and the cognition 'the cloth is in these threads'
are not two different cognitions altogether. The cognition 'the cloth is
in these threads' is an instance of the cognition 'it is here'. So the
former cognition should not be treated as something other than the
latter cognition. It is not justified at all to think that where there
is the cognition 'the cloth is in these threads', the cognition 'it is
here' is absent. On this consideration the question of svarūpāsiddhi
does not arise in connection with the given inference.

Thirdly, he observes that the Inference involves the
defect of vyabhicāra also. Needless to say, vyabhicāra is a variety
of anaikāntika. The probans which is found to be present in the locus
of the absence of the probandum, is a vicious one. He says that the
cognitions like 'beginninglessness (anāditva) exists in the absence prior
to origination (prāgabhava)' and 'the absence of the absence posterior
to destruction (pradhvamsābhavābhava) exists in the absence posterior

148 "tantupatprayaye ihapratyayatvasyānubhavābhāvāt,..."
- Ibid., pp.611-12.

149 "anaikāntikaśca;" - Ibid., p.612.
to destruction (pradhvamsābhāva)' are the cases where the probans, the cognition 'it is here', is present; but here this cognition is not a product of any relation. No relation can be said to hold between the absence prior to origination and beginninglessness, or between the absence posterior to destruction and the absence of the absence posterior to destruction. Here this also cannot be said that in these cases the relation which stands responsible for the cognition 'it is here' is the relation between the determinans and the determinandum, because this relation without some other relation is inconceivable. Without any relation the matter of determinans-determinandum attribution cannot be explained. Among the substances, the qualities and the actions whenever an entity is cognised to be the determinans and another to be the determinandum, a relation is found to be operative there as the ground of that cognition.

The Vaiśeṣikas may reply here that it is not the fact that there is no relation between the said entities, because there is the self-relation (svarūpasambandha). The charge is, in fact, based on the misconception that the self-relation also must require another relation which may stand responsible for the cognition like 'it is the

150 "'iha prāgabhāvehnaṁditvam, iha pradhvamsābhāve pradhvamsābhāvābhāvaḥ' ityādhyamānehaprayasyasya sambandhapūr-vvakatvābhāvat". - Ibid.
151 "sambandhamantareṇa viśesāṇaviśesyabhāvasyāḥsambhavat,..." - Ibid.
determinans', or 'it is the determinandum'. But this is not the case at all. In case of self-relation one of the relata embodies the relation; so the question of some other relation does not arise here.

The most interesting point in Prabhāchandra's discussion is that he has offered a number of arguments as proofs of the plurality of inherence. I am not going to mention them because it is not my purpose here to establish, or to counter, the view that inherence is many. But in this regard one may be allowed to raise a question which, perhaps, stands unavoidable. It is: is it justified to refute something altogether first and then to argue in favour of its plurality?