CHAPTER - I

Definition and Field of Samavāya

Section - 1

Definition of Samavāya

The category of samavāya or inherence is mentioned in Kanāda's aphorism in the last place; and the other five positive categories are found to precede it there. Praśastapāda also maintains the order of Kanāda to place the categories in his commentary. Here one may ask: why is inherence given the last position in naming the categories? Śrīdhara throws some light on this point. He thinks that since inherence is related with the five categories, its relata are told first, and then it is placed in the sixth position which is the last. Inherence, as a matter of fact, sustains the unity of the five categories which precede it in the aphorism and the commentary.

In Kanāda's aphoristic presentation inherence is described as that wherefrom the cause-effect awareness springs as

1 "...dravyagunakarmmasāmānyavīśeṣasamavāyānām padārthānāṁ...."
   Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 1-1-4, Kanāda (40), pp.4-5.
2 Praśastapāda (57), P.15.
3 "paṇca padārthavṛttteḥ samavāyasya sarvasāsenabhidhāne prāpte...."
   Śrīdhara (57), P.17.
'it is here'. When it is said that this cloth is produced here in these threads, it means that this cloth exists in these threads by the relation, inherence. In other words the fact is described as this cloth inheres in these threads. Here a question arises: how is it known that this cloth is a product of these threads, or these threads are the cause of this cloth? Kanāda discovers the relation of inherence as the source of this knowledge. He shows that it is on the basis of inherence that the knowledge like 'the cloth inheres (is produced here) in these threads' is obtained.

Kanāda's definition, if it be regarded as a definition at all, is the earliest available definition of inherence. Here Kanāda takes the matter of cause-effect as the basis of his approach to inherence. His literal presentation of the aphoristic note on inherence apparently limits the field of inherence within the causal periphery. But there is no reason to think that it was really the intention of Kanāda to exhaust all importance of inherence exclusively in the causal situations, or to identify inherence with the cause-effect relation. The notions of inherence and cause-effect are rather two intersecting notions in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of thought. The intersection is clearly exposed in their classification of cause and reckoning of the instances of inherence. The following two points will reveal it.

4 "ihedamiti yataḥ kāryyakāraṇayoh sa samavāyāḥ."

- Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 7-2-26, Kanāda (40), p.158.
1) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas make the following three-fold division of cause (kāraṇa):

(i) samavāyikāraṇa or the inherent cause,
(ii) asamavāyikāraṇa or the non-inherent cause,
(iii) nīmittakāraṇa or the efficient cause.

Among the three types of cause inherence is required to relate the first two types of causes with their effects, but it is not necessary to relate the third type of cause with its effect.

2) Inherence, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, holds also between two entities (for example, cowness and a cow) which are not cause and effect to one another at all.

On the basis of the above discussion, perhaps, the following comments may be made as regards the significance of the word 'kāryakāranayoh' in the context of inherence:

(i) Kanāda brings the notion of cause-effect in the context of inherence not in the spirit of laksana i.e. definition, but as

5 "trayānām samavāyyasamavāyinimittakāranānāṁ ...."
- Praśastapāda (57), p.409 (& 410 also).

6 "ihedamiti yatah sa samavāyah ityāvataiva laksanāsiddheḥ
cāryakāranayoityasya tadgṛhaṇaḥvāyogat."
upalakṣaṇa i.e. a feature or a proprium. So after him it is no more retained by his followers in their definitions of inherence.

(ii) By drawing the point of cause-effect Kanāda might have wanted to bring up the notion of inseparability. Praśastapāda is found first to be explicit on this point of inseparability; and much importance has been attached to it by most of the subsequent thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

(iii) It is true that the notion of cause-effect alone is not able to bring out the nature of inherence comprehensively. So, in the context of inherence one must connect the point of cause-effect with the cognition 'it is here', because a case of cause-effect known in the sentence-form 'it is here' is invariably a case of inherence. As for example, the case of the cognition 'the cloth is in these threads' is a case of inherence. It is a case of inherence, since here the cloth is causally related with the threads and it is known as 'it is here'. Thus, it seems, it is not justified to treat Kanāda's aphorism on inherence as a definition; it may rather be treated as a proof of inherence.

(iv) By introducing inherence in terms of cause-effect Kanāda abstains from being pedantic, and comes much closer to common sense.

7 "kāryyakāraṇayorityupalakṣanam, ....."
- Śaṅkara Miśra (40), p.159.
- Jaya-Nārāyana (28), p.244.
While Kanāda introduces inherence as the underlying relation of a causal bond, his commentator Praśastapāda who first developed the Vaiśeṣika aphorisms into a comprehensive system, has conceived it as the bond between two entities on more general perspectives. Praśastapāda defines inherence as that relation which holds between two inseparable entities standing as the substratum and the superstratum, and gives rise to the awareness 'it is here'. Here Praśastapāda has used the term 'ayutasiddhānām' in place of 'kāryakārānayoḥ' of Kanāda. In Praśastapāda's definition of inherence the point of cause-effect is absent; but on this ground it cannot be said that it is rejected here altogether. He has rather revealed its full significance that the cause-effect relation virtually refers to the relation between inseparables.

Though the concept of ayutasiddhi, or inseparability, is not present in Kanāda's definition of inherence, there is no reason for thinking that it was quite absent in Kanāda's thought. Kanāda has used the term 'yutasiddhi' in a previous aphorism. So it is not unjustified to suppose that the concept might have been adopted by Praśastapāda from Kanāda. Praśastapāda, however, has proved his ingenuity by incorporating the concept of inseparability in his definition of inherence.

8 "ayutasiddhānāmādhāryādārhārabhūtānām yah sambandha ihapratya-yahetuḥ sa samavāyah". - Praśastapāda (57), p.37.

9 "yutasidhyabhāvāt kāryakārānayoḥ saṁyogavibhāgau na vidyete".
He has made it a point that the field of inherence covers certain non-causal situations also in addition to certain causal situations.

Praśastapāda's definition of inherence may be analysed into the following parts:

(i) inherence is a relation between inseparables;
(ii) inherence holds between two entities standing as the substratum and the superstratum;
(iii) inherence is the cause of the cognition 'it is here'.

Now for a detailed study of this definition it is necessary to discuss each of these parts one by one.

(i) To the concept of inseparability, which is, however, impinged in the notion of inherence, the authors of the Nyāyabhūsana, the Tarkabhaṣa, etc. have attached as much importance as of a defining property of inherence. Inseparability means not-existing-in-separation. The two entities which can exist independently of each other are called 'yutasiddha' or separable; and the two which cannot, and can never, exist independently of each other are called 'ayutasiddha' or

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10 "... akāryyakāraṇayorityapi drāstavyam....."  
- Śaṅkara Miśra (40), p.159.
11 "ayutasiddhayoh saṁślesah samavāya iti".  
12 "ayutasiddhayoh sambandhah samavāyah ...."  
- Keśava Miśra (42), p.36.
inseparable. A monkey and a tree are two separable entities because they can exist separately; but a cloth and its threads are inseparable entities because the cloth cannot hang on the hook of a wall while its threads are scattered below on the floor. The relation existing between two such inseparable entities in inherence.

In the Upaskāra Śaṅkara Miśra explains the concept of inseparability as not-existing-as-unrelated. In the Setu Padmanābha Miśra says likewise. Jagadīśa says in his Sūkти, an annotation on Praśastapāda's commentary, that inseparables are those which never get separated and always exist together being bound by some relation. Śivāditya Miśra, however, brings the substratum - superstratum relation also in his clarification of inseparability in the Saptapadarthī.

13 "... asambaddhayoravidyamānatvamayutasiddhiḥ...."  
- Śaṅkara Miśra (40), p.159.

14 "ayutasiddhiscasubhayorasaambaddhayoravidyamanata".  
- Setu, quoted in the Sūktidīpikā of Kalipada Tarkācārya (59), p.36.

15 "ayutasiddhānāṁ aprthagbhutanam sarvada mithah sambaddhānāmīti yāvat". - Jagadīśa (59), p.35.

16 "avidyamanayoradharadheyayah sambandhobyutasiddhiḥ".  

The entities which exist, and hence, are known, only as related are, according to Udayana, inseparables.

"ayuṭāḥ prāptāśca siddhā iti ayutasiddhāḥ".  
- Udayana (71) Vol.1, p.249.
Śrīdhara says in the *Nyāyakandaī*, one of the most celebrated annotations on Praśastapāda’s commentary, that separability means possibility of separate existence. Two mutually related entities which are capable of existing in isolation leaving one another are separable; and those pairs of entities which lack this capability of existing independently leaving one another are inseparable. Here existing in isolation means existing apart from being the substratum and the superstratum. As for example, a piece of cloth and any of its component threads are two entities related with each other. They are not separable because the cloth cannot exist leaving its component threads apart. That the cloth cannot part with its threads means they cannot exist outside the substratum-superstratum set up. They get separated only when one of them is destroyed. So naturally their isolated existence is inconceivable.

(ii) If inherence is defined simply as that relation which as a causal bond holds between two inseparable entities, then the relation

17 "yutasiddhiḥ prthaksiddhiḥ prthagavasthitirubhayaṇa prthagāsrayāśrayitvam, sā yoyornāsti tāvayutasiddhau, toyoḥ sambandhaḥ samavāyah, yathā tantupatayah". - Śrīdhara (57), p.37.

The relata of inherence are said to be inseparable in the sense that they are conceived to exist in the substratum-superstratum position occupying the same point of space.
between dharma, or virtue, and sukha, or pleasure, is overcovered by this definition, because virtue and pleasure are causally related to each other. Virtue is the cause of which pleasure is the effect. But the relation between virtue and pleasure is not regarded as inherence because virtue and pleasure both are qualities, and inherence does not relate two qualities. Inherence has a decisive relational scheme into which the relation between two qualities does not come. So the definition is too wide. In order to eliminate the cases as above Prasāstapāda says that the relation of inherence holds between two inseparable entities remaining as the substratum and the superstratum. Virtue and pleasure may be inseparably related as the cause and the effect, but they never exist or appear as the substratum and the superstratum or vice versa. Their relation, therefore, cannot be said to be inherence.

For the relation of inherence the importance of the substratum-superstratum position of its relata, is therefore, in no sense less than that of their inseparability. In those cases where two things are related as one residing in the other, that in which the one resides is the substratum, and that which resides is the superstratum. In case of conjunction, of course, the relata are not always of this type. Vyomasiva throws some light upon the nature of the substratum-superstratum position of entities in his Vyomavati which is another annotation on Prasāstapāda's

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18 "ayutasiddhayoh sambandha ityucyamāne dharmasya sukhasya ca yah kāryakāranabhāvalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhah, sohipi samavāyaḥ prāpnoti". - Śrīdhara (57), p.38.
commentary. There he says that if between two conjuncts, which cannot but be substances, one is on the other, they are treated to be in the substratum-superstratum position. For example, when an orange is placed on a table, the table is the substratum, and the orange is the superstratum. In case of inherence its relata always and everywhere appears as one residing in the other. But the relata of conjunction are not so. The entities related by conjunction may have their existence outside this relation, but the entities related by inherence can never exist independently of this relation.

Vyomaśiva argues that inherence cannot be defined merely as a relation between Inseparables. In addition to inseparability the substratum-superstratum position also is necessary for the relata of inherence. If inherence is defined just as a relation between inseparables, then the relation between the vācyā, or the object referred to, and the vācaka, or the word referring, is overcovered by this definition. The thing ākāśamahatva and the word 'ākāśamahatva' are vācyā and vācaka respectively. The ākāśamahatva or the magnitude of ākāsa, according


Udayana also has touched the point:

" ..... vācyavācakādibhāvalakṣaṇasambandho na prasajyate. etadeva spaṣṭayati—ādhāryādhaṁhbhūtānāmīti."

to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, belongs to ākāśa by the relation of inherence, because it is a quality of the ākāśa. Again the sābda, or the word, 'ākāśamahatva' also, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, belongs to ākāśa by the relation of inherence, because it is also a quality of the ākāśa. Here the point should be noted that according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas sābda is of two kinds: (i) literal, and (ii) sonic. Both kinds of sābda are the qualities of the same ākāśa. Now, ākāśamahatva as the vācyā and 'ākāśamahatva' as the vācaka are inseparable because of their inhering in ākāśa. On account of their inseparability, the opponent may conclude, their relation is inherence. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do not think that the relation between two qualities may be inherence. In spite of the fact that the thing ākāśamahatva and the sābda (word) 'ākāśamahatva' are inseparable, inherence cannot be their relation, because both of them being qualities they do not exist in the substratum-superstratum position. Thus, the relation between any two entities which are inseparable cannot be said to be inherence, because the substratum-superstratum position of its relata is its another essential condition.

The substratum-superstratum position of the relata of inherence,

21 "śabdohmbaragunaḥ... sa dvividho varṇalakṣaṇo dhvanilakṣaṇasāca".
   - Śrīdhara (57), pp.692-93.

22 "tathā hyākāśamahatvamākāśe samavetāṁ tadvācakaśca śabdastatra-
   vetyutāsiddhatvam".
   - Vyomaśiva (58), p.108.
according to Udayana, is given in their very nature, and it is not at all an adventitious affair to them. This position in case of the relata of conjunction is just a circumstantial occurrence, because the relata of conjunction are not sure to appear always in a fixed position. As for example, a red book may appear to be kept on a white book, again the white book also may appear to be kept on the red book. There is no hard and fast order of their appearance. But the relata of inherence always appear in a fixed order, because this order follows from their nature, and they can never get out of it. As for example, the colour of a piece of cloth is always known to reside in the cloth, and this situation is never known to be otherwise.

(iii) The third part of the definition of inherence is that inherence is the cause of the cognition 'it is here'. The Vaiśeṣika thinkers have shown that this part also plays some important role in Praśastapāda's definition of inherence.

According to Śrīdhara, this part is given in the definition because without this part the definition of inherence overcovers the vācyā-vācaka relation between the substance, ākāśa, and the word, 'ākāśa'. This part eliminates the vācyā-vācaka relation from the purview of the definition on the ground that the vācyā-vācaka relation never gives rise to the cognition of 'it is here'.

23 "svabhāvādādhāryādāhāraṇāṁ na tvāgantukena dharmenētyarthāh". - Udayana (71), Vol.1, p.251.

24 "evamapyākāśasyākāśāpadasya ca vācyavācakabhāvāḥ samavāyāḥ syāt, tannivrūtyarthamihapratyayaheturiti". - Śrīdhara (57), p.38.
It is already seen that this argument of Śrīdhara is offered by Vyomasīva also with an apparently minor change. Vyomasīva offers it to show the indispensability of the second part of Praśastapāda's definition of inherence, while Śrīdhara offers it to explain the necessity of the third part. Vyomasīva takes the relation between the thing, ākāśamahatva, and the word, 'ākāśamahatva' as the instance of the vācyatv-vācaka relation, while Śrīdhara takes the instance of the relation between the thing, ākāśa, and the word, 'ākāśa'. The two instances are quite different from each other. Ākāśamahatva and 'ākāśamahatva' are two qualities; so the question of their substratum-superstratum position does not arise. But, the thing, ākāśa, and the word, 'ākāśa', are a substance and its quality respectively, and the latter is always known to reside in the former in the substratum-superstratum order. This is why Vyomasīva offers his argument in connection with the second part and Śrīdhara offers his argument in connection with the third part of Praśastapāda's definition of inherence.

Udayana and Jagadīśa hold different views as regards the necessity of the third part. They hold that the third part of the definition of inherence is given as a proof of inherence. According to Udayana, a satisfactory account of the genesis of the cognitions like 'the cloth is in these threads', 'the white colour is in this

25 "adhāryyādhārabhūtānām" - Praśastapāda (57), p.37.
26 'ihapratyayahetu' - Ibid.
cloth', 'cowness is in this cow', etc. is not possible until and unless a relation between the cloth and the threads, the white colour and the cloth, cowness and the cow, etc. is postulated. This relation which stands as the ground of such cognitions is something other than the relations already admitted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology. It is supposed to be inherence, a relation of a distinguished nature. Its relata are always known to be inseparably fixed in the substratum-superstratum position. The cognition of its relata, thus, stands as a proof of inherence. This is the pith of Udayana's contention.

Jagadīśa thinks that if inherence is defined only as a relation between two inseparable entities having the substratum-superstratum position, then self-relation is overcovered by this definition. For the purpose of putting a check to this overcoverage the third part is essential to the definition of inherence. According to Jagadīśa, that which is responsible for the cognition like 'substancehood is in this substance' is known to be a relation. He says so, surely on the basis of this logic that it is


28 "tanmatraṁca kālikaparamparāsambandhe atiprasaktamata uktamiheti". - Jagadīśa (59), p.35.

29 'iha dravye dravyatvamityākārakapratyaye hetuḥ sambandhamar-yyādayā bhāsamana ityarthah". - Ibid.
invariably some relation which is known to be responsible for any cognition of 'it is here'. In case of the cognition like 'substancehood is in this substance' this relation is inherence, because no other relation is conceivable here to hold between substancehood and substance. They are a typical pair of entities related by a typical relation. This relation is inherence and the cognition of 'it is here' is a proof in support of its existence.

Praśastapāda’s definition of inherence is undoubtedly a reformed version of Kaṇāda’s definition. In comparison with Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda appears to be much more analytic and unfolding. In his definition Praśastapāda gives emphasis on the nature of the relata of inherence. But Kaṇāda in his definition emphasises on the cognition of 'it is here' which is, however, an effect of inherence. Whatever may be their point of emphasis in their definitions of inherence, this much can be said about them that neither Kaṇāda nor Praśastapāda has been vocal on the point of the nature of the relation. Their point of interest has been the nature of the relata between which the relation is known to hold, instead of the nature of the relation itself.

Now, few more definitions of inherence will be discussed here which have thrown light directly upon the nature of the relation of inherence.

Udayana is found to be one of them in whose definitions the nature of inherence is highlighted. He thinks that Praśastapāda’s note on inherence suggests a definition. He draws it out as nityaprāpti
which means, (at least) one of the two relata of inherence exists always in association with the other. The word 'nitya' speaks of an important feature of inherence that it is eternal. The word 'präpti' means relation. According to Padmanābha Miśra, the term 'präpti' is not applicable to any relation other than conjunction and inherence. Thus Udayana represents inherence as an eternal relation the relata of which cannot exist maintaining a spatial or temporal distance between themselves.

The opponent may argue here that the conjunction between the ubiquitous substances is overcovered by the above definition of inherence. Such substances are eternally related because they never get detached from one another. But this objection cannot be levelled against Udayana because he does not admit of eternal conjunction between ubiquitous substances. Like Udayana the other reputed Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas also are not in favour of the doctrine of eternal conjunction. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas rather discard it on the ground that the relation between ubiquitous substances does not conform to their conception of conjunction. Conjunction, according to them, is coming-in-contact of those which were not-in-contact before. Ubiquitous substances cannot be

30 "präpta eva santi nā präpta iti yāvat. teṣām sambandhaḥ präptilakṣaṇah samavāyaḥ. tena samyogo vyavachinnastasyāpräptipūrvavakvāt. tathāca nityapräptih samavāya iti lakṣaṇam sūcitam".
- Udayana (71), Vol.1, p.249.

31 "saṁyogasaṁavāyaṁatiriktaśca sambandho na präptirityarthah."
- Padmanābha Miśra (51), p.48.
conceived to be ever in a state of not-in-contact. Only those things which are not-in-contact can come-in-contact afterwards. So the question of coming-in-contact does not arise in case of the ubiquitous substances. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas never say that the ubiquitous substances are in eternal conjunction.

Udayana, an important spokesman of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, is followed by most of the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers on the point of the definition of inherence. He says that inherence is an eternal relation. Eternality alone cannot be the complete definition of inherence, because apart from inherence many substances, many qualities, universals, etc. are eternal. Inherence cannot also be defined as only a relation, since along with inherence conjunction, self-relation, identity, etc. many other relations are accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. Even 'an eternal relation' also is not a satisfactory definition of inherence, because it overcovers the self-relation between the air and the absence of colour. This relation also is an eternal relation, but it is not inherence.

32 "aprāptayoh prāptih saṁyogah".
- Praśastapāda (57), p.347,
"vibhūnāṁ tu parasparataḥ saṁyogo nāsti, yutasiddhyabhāvāt".
- Ibid., p.360.
"yatra yutasiddhastatraiva saṁyogo drṣṭah. yutasiddhiścākāsādīṣu nāsti, ato vyāpakābhāvāt saṁyogohpi tesu na bhavati".
- Śrīdhara (57), p.361.
The Navya-Naiyāyikas amend, better to say clarify, Udayana's definition of inherence by appending the clause, *sambandhi bhinnatve sati* i.e. which is different from the relata. The relation between a table and its colour is inherence, because the relation between the table and its colour is utterly different as from the table so from its colour also. But in case of the relation between the air and the absence of colour, it is not inherence, because here the relation is not anything over and above its relata.

In this connection Mahādeva Bhatta says that the relation of inherence is to be considered here as different from either of its relata, and thus, the definition may get rid of the overcoverage of the self-relation in cases of the eternal absence, etc. Rāmarudra clarifies the meaning of *sambandhi* as *sambandhapratiyogyanuyogi*. By *pratiyogi* generally a content is understood, and by *anuyogi* its locus. A relation is always known to hold between two entities of which one is called *pratiyogi* and the other *anuyogi*. The relation which is identical either with its *pratiyogi* or with its *anuyogi* is called self-relation (*svarūpasambandha*). Accordingly the relation between the air

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33 "sambandhasāhtra sambandhibhinno grāhyah, tena nityābhāvādisvarūpasambandhe nāhtivyāptih".
- Mahādeva Bhatta (77), p.66.

34 "pratiyogyanuyogyātmakasvarūpasambandhe..."
- Rāmarudra (77), p.66.
and the absence of colour is the self-relation. The self-relation as a
relation-entity is not different from its relata. But inherence as a
relation-entity is utterly different from its relata. It is the third
independent entity and is as real as its two relata. Thus, the clarified
version of Udayana's definition of inherence as an eternal relation which
is utterly different from its relata, appears to be a more or less
satisfactory definition of inherence.

Kalipada Tarkācārya clearly points out in his Sūktidīpikā,
an elucidation of the Sūktī, that inherence is virtually an eternal
relation, and the inseparability of its relata, etc. are its certain
features. This comment conforms to Jagadīśa's definition of inherence
available in the Tarkāmṛta. There it is said that inherence is an
eternal relation which is different from its relata. Here, the relation
is one of the objects of the qualificatory cognition; and the relata are

35 "tathā ca sambandhapratiyogyanuyogibhinnatve sati nityatve sati
sambandhatvam samavāyalaksanaṁ......" - Ibid.
36 "vastutastu nityasambandhatvam samavāyatvam, ayutasiddhānamityā-
dikantu svarūpa paricāyakamātram".
37 "svasambandhibhinno nityaḥ sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ".
- Jagadīśa (33), p.16.
38 "sambandhatvaṁca viśiṣṭadhīviṣayatvarūpaṁ grāhyam".
the pratiyogī and the anuyogī of the relation. Accordingly, Jagadīśa's
definition may be clarified as: inherence is that relation which is
eternal and is entitatively different from its pratiyogī and anuyogī.40
Sivāditya Miśra also defines inherence likewise.

Mādhavācārya represents inherence as a relation which
is not related with its relata by inherence. To be clear, inherence
is that relation which can never be the pratiyogī or the anuyogī of
inherence. Now, conjunction cannot be taken to be such a relation because
it is related with its inherent cause and its substratum, namely,
substance, by the relation of inherence. Here conjunction is the
pratiyogī of inherence. But inherence is not related with anything by
the relation of inherence, because it gets related with its relata by
itself. Mādhavācārya's note on inherence cannot be taken as a definition
of inherence, because he introduces inherence with the help of the
notion of inherence itself. To define something with
the help of itself is to commit the fallacy of
ātmāśraya or being self-based. So his representation may be treated

39 "tathāca sambandhāpratiyogyanuyogibhinnatve sati nityatve ca
sati sambandhatvam samavāyatvamitiparyyavasitam". - Ibid.

40 "nityah sambandhaḥ samavāyah".
- Śivāditya (69), p.49.

41 "samavāyastu samavāyarahitāḥ sambandhāḥ ......."
- Sāyana Mādhava (64), p.217.
as a description rather than a definition of inherence. In the Kiranavali we find a similar description of inherence as being without inherence.

The above definitions suggest certain features of inherence which may be stated as follows:

1. Inherence is a relation between two inseparable entities.
2. It is a relation between two entities which always exist in a fixed substratum-superstratum position.
3. It is the cause of the cognition of 'it is here'.
4. It is eternal.
5. It is entitatively different from its relata.
6. It is a positive real.
7. It is one.
8. It is not related with its relata by inherence.
9. It is an inter-categorial relation.
10. It is partly a relation of causal bearing.

"samavāyohpi niḥsamavāyah....."
- Udayana (71), Vol.2, p.103.
The word 'field' perhaps, cannot be compatibly used in the sense of locus in connection with the doctrine of inherence advocated by the Nyāya-Vaśisṭkāsa. Inherence is a self-existent entity like a universal. It does not require any locus for its existence. Although inherence exists independently of any locus, it is never cognised without any reference to its locus. Whenever it is known, it is known to hold between two entities of certain specified pairs. These typical pairs taken together is what is meant by the word 'field'. Here it is used in the sense of the possible situation where inherence is known to exist.

Inherence is a one and eternal relation which holds between two definite positive categories. A detailed demonstration of the field of inherence is available in the Praśastapādbhāṣya. Viśvanātha more generally and conclusively enumerates the possible pairs of the relata of inherence. According to him inherence holds between the entities of the following five pairs:

1. a whole-substance and its parts,
2. a universal and its individual,
3. a substance and its quality,
4. a substance and its action,

43 "sāmānyādīnāṃ trayānām svātmasattvāṃ....."
- Praśastapāda (57), p.49.
44 Ibid., pp. 774-75.
(5) an eternal substance and its ultimate-individuator.

The above pairs of entities are of a distinguished type in the sense that the two entities of any of the above pairs are always known to be inseparable appearing in a fixed substratum-superstratum order; and that is why it is held that none but the relation of inherence holds between them, these pairs of entities may be taken for discussion one after another following the order of the above representation.

(1) A whole-substance and its parts: The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas think that the concepts of part (avayava) and whole (avayavi) pertain to the category of substance alone. They are not applicable to the other categories, because none of the other categories are produced as a result of the combination of parts. Only the non-eternal substances are produced in their parts; so only the non-eternal substances are treated as the whole-substances (avayavidravya), and their parts as the part-substances (avayavadravya). A whole-substance is always non-eternal; and except atoms (paramāṇu) all possible part-substances also are non-eternal. Atoms are the indivisible primary units of all non-eternal substances. Dyads (dvyanuka) are the immediate effects of atoms.

45 "avayavāvayavinoh, jātivyaktyoh, gunaguninoh, kriyākriyāvatoh, nityadravyaviśesayoeca yah sambandhah, sa samavāyah".
- Viśvanātha (77), p.65.

46 "paramāṇulaksanā nityā, karyalakṣanā tvanityā".
- Praśastapāda (57), p.78.

47 ".... dvyanukādirprakramena kriyate kāryalakṣanā...."
- Śrīdhara (57), p.80.
The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, thus, conceive the whole-substance to be something composed of part-substances, and at the same time to be something different from them. The part-substances in which a whole-substance inheres on the occasion of its origination, are considered to be the inherent cause (samavāyikārana) of the whole-substance. After the origination of the whole-substance its inherent cause, i.e. the part-substances, are not immediately destroyed. They continue to exist being related with their product, i.e. the whole-substance, by the relation of inherence. But at the destruction of any of the component part-substances the whole-substance perishes. The whole-substance cannot exist without its part-substances, though the part-substances do not require the whole-substance for their existence. Thus, the whole-substance is inseparable from its part-substances, and resides in them as long as it exists. The relation between such two entities, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, is inherence.


A comprehensive discussion as regards why the whole is different from its parts, is available in the Nyāya Sūtra-s of the fourth chapter, second part, and Vātsyāyana's commentary on them. The discussion on this point is avoided because here the point of relevance is rather how the whole as an entity different from its parts is related with them.

49 "yatsamavetam kāryam bhavati jñeyam tu samavāyijanakaṁ tat".
- Kārikā 18, Viśvanātha (77), p.81.
(2) A universal and its individual: According to the Nyaya-Vaisesikas, the universal is an eternal entity. It resides in substance, quality and action. Substances, qualities and actions are the individuals (vyakti) in which the universal is known to exist. They are treated as individuals only in relation to some universal. So long as an individual exists, the universal is not separable from it. For this reason the relation between an individual and its universal is held to be inherence.

(3) A substance and its quality: A substance is the substratum of its qualities. It is causally related with its emergent qualities, and is held to be the inherent cause of them. As long as a quality exists, it exists as inseparably related with its substratum. The relation between a substance and its quality is inherence, since a quality can never exist independently of its substratum i.e. the substance.

(4) A substance and its action: An action also like a quality can never exist independent of a substance. Actions reside in the substance alone. A substance is the substratum of its action. It is causally related with its actions and is held to be the inherent cause of them, as it is in case of the relation between a substance and a quality. The relation between a substance and its action is inherence, because as long as an action exists, it exists as inseparably related with its substratum i.e. the substance.

(5) An eternal substance and its ultimate-individuator: According
to the Nyāya-Vaisēśikas, there are infinite number of eternal substances in the universe. They are the atoms of the four kinds of substance (earth, water, fire and air), ākāśa, space, time, innumerable souls and innumerable minds. Each of these substances has a separate eternal ultimate-individuator. A particular individuator abides in a particular substance and entitatively differentiates the substance from the other substances and at the same time itself from the other individuators. An individuator is inseparable from the substance in which it abides and, hence, the relation between an ultimate-individuator and an eternal substance is inherence.

The above five sets of reals are the instances where inherence can possibly be cognised. In all of these sets inherence stands as a relation between inseparable reals. Now, if both the entities between which inherence holds are eternal, then the question of the existence of one of them without the other does not arise. Such two entities exist together through eternity. But where one of them is non-eternal, or both are non-eternal, in that case a particular one of them may be destroyed leaving the other existing.

The eternal reals between which inherence holds are of the following pairs:

(1) An eternal substance and its eternal quality, such as, ākāśa and its magnitude.
(2) An eternal substance and the universal in it, such as, self and selfhood.

(3) An eternal quality and the universal in it, such as, the eternal knowledge of God and knowledgehood.

(4) An eternal substance and its ultimate-individuator, such as, space and the ultimate-individuator in it.

The other instances of inherence where both the reals are not eternal are the following:

(1) A non-eternal substance and its parts, such as, a cloth and its threads: The threads of a cloth exist without the cloth before the origination and after the destruction of the cloth. But the cloth can never exist without its threads. The cloth needs them for its origination and existence, because the threads are the inherent cause of the cloth. But the threads do not require the cloth in order to exist, because the cloth is in no way the cause of the threads.

(2) A substance and its non-eternal quality, such as, a jar and its red colour, or ākāśa and sound: According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, a non-eternal substance being the substratum of qualities remains quality-less at the moment of its origination. In the next moment qualities reside in it. Thus, a non-eternal substance exists without quality, though for a moment only, but a non-eternal quality can never be produced, and
therefore, cannot exist, without a substance. Again, in case of ākāśa and sound, ākāśa can exist without sound, but sound can never exist without ākāśa. Sound is the non-eternal quality of ākāśa, and ākāśa is the inherent cause of sound. So sound needs ākāśa for its origination and existence, but ākāśa exists independently of sound.

(3) A substance and its action, such as, a running car and its motion: According to the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣikas, only a substance of limited magnitude can have an action or motion. It can have only one action at a time, and not more. Actions are all non-eternal. An action is always produced in a substance, because a substance is the inherent cause of its action. Thus, an action can never be produced, and exist, without a substance though a substance can easily exist without action.

(4) A non-eternal substance and its universal, such as, a jar and jarness: The universal, jarness, exists, and for this it does not matter whether a jar is there or not. But the substance, jar, can never exist without bearing the universal, jarness, in it.

(5) A non-eternal quality and its universal, such as, sound and soundness: A non-eternal quality like sound cannot exist without having the universal like soundness; but the universal, soundness, exists independently of the quality, sound.

(6) An action and its universal, actionhood: An action can never exist without actionhood. Wherever there is an action, there is
actionhood. But actionhood exists eternally, and for its existence it does not require any action to be there in the universe.

The above analysis clears the point that inherence holds between all positive categories except the cases where one of the relata is inherence itself. The categories which constitute the field of Inherence are all many in number. The entire field of inherence is jointly covered by the above four and six sets of reals. Certain other notable points about these sets of reals are:

(i) Among these ten sets in two groups only the first three sets of reals of the second group are causal situations, whereas the other seven sets of reals are non-casual situations.

(ii) Only in case of the first set of reals of the second group Inherence holds between two entities which belong to the same category, namely, substance; but in case of the other nine sets it is an intercategorial relation.