As opposed to the Absolute Monism of the Vedānta more than one type of realistic pluralism flourished in India as alternative approaches to the Reality. Among them the Jainas and the Sarvāstivādins stood not only against the idealistic monism of the Vedānta, but also against the entire Vedic tradition. Jainism and Buddhism are hostile to Vedas in spirit. The Mīmāṃsā system has been realistic in nature, but it is a system which is built up as a gate-way to Vedānta. Under the circumstances, the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy have taken a firm realistic step accepting the truth of the Vedas in good spirit. They have engaged themselves in making a realistic study of the empirical world and launched their venture with a two-fold purpose. First, they purport to reason away all anti-Vedic doctrines and isms and aim at re-affirming the veracity of the Vedas refreshingly; and secondly, they attempt to build a bold realistic and pluralistic system which can in no way be treated as a gate-way to monism.

With a view to frame a realistic system of philosophy the Vaiśeṣika school and the Nyāya school have developed themselves as if they are complementary to each other. The Nyāya school is mainly devoted to the epistemological problems, while the Vaiśeṣika school is mainly occupied with the ontological issues. The two schools stand side by side to construct the details of their systems. They have developed independently having a common pattern and spirit in thought, though
in certain cases they are of different opinions. In consequence of this now we are getting in them a common approach to reality. This common approach to reality among them is the common-sense-realism and it is the basis of our usage 'the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika', though as system the Nyāya is not the Vaiśeṣika, nor the Vaiśeṣika is the Nyāya. They are rather two allied (samānatantra) systems. In spite of their having separate origins they have been subsequently tagged up particularly in the hands of the Navya-Naiyāyikas who proceeded farther to offer Indian philosophy a strong realistic garb. Hence, the part 'the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realism' in the title of this work is not to be confusingly taken to be a product of a programmatic joint effort of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas.

The foundation of realism on a relation-entity is one of the challenging features of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy and it is the point where the present work has fixed its end to go. In this connection this much I can say that this work is intended to highlight the ontological grandure of samavāya as a relation-entity and its bearing upon the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. As a result a thorough discussion of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism is not taken up here.

I have not been encouraged to make a comparative study of the philosophy of relation, oriental and occidental, in this work for the obvious reason that the most of the thinkers of the West have not
been able to accept relations with as firm ontological status as they confer to the objects related. Most of them believe and express unhesitatingly that a substance exists. But the term 'exists' is hardly found to be used in connection with a relation. Relations are generally treated by them to be the content of thought, and consequently are settled as a matter of discussion in logic rather than in metaphysics. And a few thinkers like Russell, etc. who have brought them in the chapters of metaphysics, have brought as if compassionately. They have accommodated them under universals, or something like that, to which existence has been pitiably denied. The following comments of the Western thinkers may reveal the ontological poverty of relations in the West.

(1) "The conclusion to which I am brought is that a relational way of thought ----- any one that moves by the machinery of terms and relations ----- must give appearance, and not truth".

----- Bradley, F. H. (14), p. 28.

(2) "We can prove that there must be relations, i.e. the sort of universals generally represented by verbs and prepositions".


"Thus thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects exist. But universals do not exist in this sense; we shall say that they subsist or have being, where 'being' is
opposed to 'existence' as being timeless".
----- Ibid., p. 57.

(3) "Relations are treated as a specific kind of adjective, and are called transitive adjectives in distinction from ordinary adjectives which are intransitive".

(4) "I have called attention to two different kinds of 'universals' or 'general ideas', which I called respectively 'relations' and 'properties'.
"For the present I want to go on to consider the other class of things, with regard to which it may, I think, be plausibly urged, that, though they undoubted! y are, they don't exist. This second class of things, I said, was the class of things that may be called 'general ideas' or 'abstract ideas', or 'universals';......"
----- Ibid., p. 312.

The present work is altogether an effort to comprehend the nature and importance of samavāya in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology which is intensely realistic. It is an endeavour to show that the ontological status of this relation-entity vitalizes and enriches the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism.
This work is composed of six chapters with an introduction. The introduction starts with a brief survey of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, and then includes the discussion about the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of relation in general. The first chapter is intended to make the reader acquainted with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of samavaṇḍa; and for this purpose this chapter undertakes to elucidate the available definitions of samavāṇḍa and to consider the field or the area of its function. Mainly the definitions given by Kaṇḍa, Praśastapāda and Udayana are taken into consideration here. The second chapter aims to consider the incisive criticisms of six critics in six separate sections. The critics who are discussed here are Śaṅkara, Citsukha, Vyāstīrtha, Nārāyaṇa Bhatta, Sāntarakṣita and Prabhāchandra. The third chapter represents some arguments formulated as proofs of samavaṇḍa by Vallabha, Gaṇeśa and Mehādeva Bhatta. Some particular aspects of their thoughts are discussed here in three sections. The object of this chapter is to make defence in favour of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. In the fourth chapter I have found occasion to throw some light upon the different features of samavāṇḍa. Its oneness, eternality, self-relatedness and its role as one kind of sense-object relation (sannikāraṇa) are discussed here in four separate sections. As soon as it is proved that samavāṇḍa exists and it is shown that it has certain describable features, the question of its cognition arises. So the subject of the fifth chapter is how samavāṇḍa is known. On this point the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems differ in opinion. While in the Vaiśeṣika system samavāṇḍa is held to be imperceptible (to the ordinary people), in the Nyāya system the possibility of its perception is admitted.
The sixth is the concluding chapter which aims to focus on the independent existence of samavāya and estimate the gains achieved by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas by incorporating samavāya in their system of categories. In this respect the reflections and observations of some recent thinkers who are well-acquainted with the philosophies of both the East and the West and are in favour of dealing with philosophical problems in a wider perspective overcoming the geographical barriers, are felt worth discussing. In this regard this chapter includes the opinions of D. N. Shastri, B. K. Motilal, M. Hiriyanna, Kalidas Bhattacharya and Sibajiban Bhattacharya. This chapter ends with the concluding remark that the elevation of the dignity of a relation to the level of an absolutely independent real stimulates the realistic position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.

Now I do solemnly admit that this work is a humble attempt to expose the profound importance of a relation which the Indian realists felt at an age when the Lord Christ was yet to descend on earth. Here I have made attempt to make the study explanatory as well as critical, and I have tried my best to do justice to the programme promised. Here I am not going to say anything more in defense of my arrangement of the chapters herein, because I do admit that they could very well be arranged otherwise. For the preparation of them I have depended mainly upon the Vaiśeṣika treatises, and upon the Nyāya and the other treatises only when I felt the necessity.
In this work the words in bold letters are to be taken to be italicized. The books which I have used and found relevant to this work are enlisted in the bibliography furnished at the end of this work. The bracketed numbers given in the foot-notes of the pages refer to the serial numbers used in the bibliography which contains the necessary particulars of the books consulted and referred to in the work. References are given from those editions of publications which are mentioned in the bibliography. In the bibliography the diacritical marks are used in the names of the books only, and not in the names of the authors.