CHAPTER - V

Cognition of Samavāya:
the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika Views

One of the major points on which the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas are said to differ from each other is how inherence is known. The Naiyāyikas think that inherence is perceptually known; but the Vaiśeṣikas are of opinion that inherence is not perceived and it is known through inference. Śaṅkara Miśra clearly and precisely states this antagonism in his Upaskāra. There he says that the perception of a relation, according to the Naiyāyikas, occurs on the occasion of the perception of its relata. That is to say, if the relata of a relation are perceptible, then that relation also is taken to be subject to perception. As for example, when one perceives a table and its colour both, he perceives also their relation. The Vaiśeṣikas are not at all at variance with the

1 "nyāyanaye tu pratyakṣa eva samavāyah...."
   - Vallabha (73), .718.
2 "vaiśeṣikamate tu samavāyo na pratyakṣaḥ."
   - Viśvanātha (77), pp.192-93.
3 "tasmādiḥa buddhyanumeyah samavāya iti."
   - Praśastapāda (57), p.785.
Naiyāyikas on the point that the perception of a relation is conditioned by the perception of the relata of that relation. Rather in conformity with this point the Vaiśeṣikas say that since inherence is one and eternal and the perception of all of its relata is impossible, the perception of inherence also is impossible.

In this connection it should be noted here that the Vaiśeṣikas do not admit only the normal (laukika) perception of inherence. Besides normal perception, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas admit three kinds of super-normal (alaukika) perception.

(1) Sāmānyalakṣaṇā,  
(2) Jñānalakṣaṇā,  
(3) Yogaja.

The third type of supernormal perception is the prerogative of the yogi-s only. Those who are accomplished in practising meditation are called the yukta yogi-s. They can perceive many things which ordinary people cannot perceive. In this sense this super-normal perception is possible to the yukta yogi-s, and this variety of super-normal perception, as it is due to yogajasannikarsa, is technically called yogajapratyakṣa. The yukta yogi-s, as it appears from the Praśastapādabhāṣya, can perceive inherence.

5  "alaukikaḥ sannikarṣastrīvidhaḥ parikṛttitah. sāmānyalakṣaṇo jñānalakṣaṇo yogajastathā." - Kārikā 63, Viśvanātha (76), p.63.

   "sambaddhaviśesānabhāvena samavāyābhāvayorjñānaṁ janayati." - Śrīdhara (57), p.467.
The Naiyāyikas, however, admit the normal perception of inherence and according to them it is *indriyasambaddhaviśeṣaṁatā* which stands for the operative sense-object relation in case of the perception of inherence.

The argument that the Vaiśeṣikas may put forward for the non-perception of inherence, as stated by Śaṅkara Miśra, is that, inherence is imperceptible, because it is a positive entity other than the self and does not inhere in anything.

The probans of the above inference is a compound one composed of three parts: (i) being other than the self (*ātmānyatve sati*); (ii) not inhering in anything (*asamaveta*) and (iii) being a positive real (*bhāvatva*). Each of these three parts is indispensable for the fulfilment of the required service to be rendered by the probans of the inherence. The necessity of the employment of each part in the probans may be considered here one by one. If the first part is forsaken, then the inference stands to prove that, self is imperceptible since self does not inhere in anything and is a positive real. But this conclusion does not conform to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas'
commitment that self is subject to mental perception. Here the insertion of the part 'being other than the self' in the probans enables the probans to strike out self from the list of the imperceptible reals. Omission of the second part of the probans leads to the abandonment of external perception altogether. Without this part the inference stands to assert that no positive real which is other than the self is perceptible. But, as a matter of fact, whatever reals are perceived with external senses are all other than the self and they are all, in a somewhat relaxed sense, positive reals. Even the perception of absence also is necessarily conditioned by the perceptibility of the pratiyogī or the counter-positive of the absence. In this situation the second part of the probans limits the field of imperceptibility to those reals only, which do not inhere in anything. Since inherence does not inhere in anything, its perception is impossible. The third part of the probans answers to the objection of non-perception of absence, because absence is other than the self and does not inhere in anything. Thus the Vaiśeṣikas try to justify their claim that inherence lies beyond the reach of the senses.

Another inference in favour of the Vaiśeṣikas is available in the Sūktidīpikā of Kalipada Tarkācārya, a commentary on the Sūkti of Jagadīśā. It runs thus: inherence is imperceptible, because it is an eternal and positive entity, and is other than that which is qualified by consciousness, and does not inhere in anything,
as it is in case of ākāsā, etc. This inference is virtually the same as the previous inference. In comparison with the former inference the speciality of this one is that it has got an additional constituent part, 'nityatve sati', of the probans. By virtue of this part in the probans it has been made explicit in this inference that inherence is eternal. However, this inference differs from the previous inference on certain points. First, in the previous inference it was implicit in the notion of 'asamavetabhāvatva' in the probans. The word 'asamaveta' means not inhering or being without inherent cause; and 'bhāvatva' means positive. A positive entity without inherent cause is invariably something eternal, because no positive real which is without inherent cause can be said to be subject to destruction due to the destruction of its inherent cause or of its non-inherent cause; nor can it be said to be subject to origination due to the emergence of its inherent cause or of its non-inherence cause. Secondly, the word 'ātmā' in the former inference has been replaced hereby the word 'cetana' which means conscious, or qualified by consciousness. By the word 'cetana' what is intended to mean is undoubtedly ātmā; but the intention of the author behind this replacement of the word 'ātmā' by the word 'cetana' is not clear. The third point of difference between the two inferences is that the former inference speaks of mind (manas) and time (kāla) as examples

in support of the inference, while this inference cites the example of ākāśa. Needless to say, these three are non-inherent positive reals and other than the self; and except the atoms no other reals can be classed with them in this sense.

But the above inference fails to draw the favour of the Naiyāyikas, because they refuse to take note of this pervasion of the probans, 'being a non-inherent entity which is positive and other than the self', with the probandum, 'imperceptibility'. And for this they do not face any problem in their epistemology or ontology. So, for the Naiyāyikas, there is no justification for admitting of this pervasion and making it a ground for sweeping away inherence beyond the range of the senses.

The Naiyāyikas conclude that inherence is subject to perception. According to them, even the ordinary people i.e. who are not the yukta yogi-s, can perceive inherence. They think so on the ground that any relation of which the pratiyogī and the anuyogī are exposed to senses, is subject to perception. As for example, the relation of conjunction between two atoms are not perceived, because the atoms are imperceptible. But the relation between two threads are perceived, because the threads are perceptible. Similarly, as the cloth and its threads both are

10 - Kalipada Tarkācārya (59), Bengali elucidation, p.40.
perceived, perceived as the superstratum and the substratum respectively, on the occasion of their perception their relation, inherence, is also perceived.

The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas commonly hold that a relation is perceived always along with its relata. They stand united in case of the cognition of conjunction, because conjunctions are non-eternal and many in number; and they are at one with each other as regards which ones of conjunctions are perceptible and which ones are not. But on the point of the cognition of inherence they sit to deny each other, because inherence is eternal and one in number. The Vaiśeṣikas hold the view that inherence is not subject to perception, because inherence being one and eternal simultaneous perception of all its relata of past, present and future, is impossible. But, on the contrary, the Naiyāyikas admit of the perception of inherence in those cases where its relata are perceptible. Here the Vaiśeṣikas appear to be more rigid than the Naiyāyikas on the point of the cognition of one inherence, because the Naiyāyikas allow perception of inherence in certain cases with reference to the specifier (avacchedaka) but the Vaiśeṣikas dismiss it altogether.

The Naiyāyikas' position that inherence is perceptually known, is sometimes misconceived as inherence is perceived to be
determined by inherencehood (samavāyatva) which is, to the Vaiśeṣikas, nothing but eternal relationhood (nitya sambandhatva). The perceptual cognition of inherence as determined by inherencehood or eternal relationhood is impossible, because on the occasion of the perception of something it is not possible to perceive that it is eternal. The Naiyāyikas admit of the perceptual cognition of inherence to be determined by inseparability or relationhood only, but they deny that the cognition of inherence as determined by eternal relationhood is perception, because on the occasion of the perception of a piece of cloth it is perceived to be just inseparably related with its threads. The perception of something to be inseparably related with something else is, according to the Naiyāyikas, the perception of their relation as determined by inseparability. The cognition of inherence as determined by inherencehood, the Naiyāyikas think, is inferential.

It may appear striking to note the point that though the Vaiśeṣikas do not think that inherence is subject to perception, still they admit that the cognition of the superstratum-substratum order in a case of inherence where the relata are perceptible, is perceptual. The cognition originates as a result of the determining

11 - Gaurinath Sāstrī (71), Bengali elucidation, Vol.1 p.259.
12 - Ibid., pp.259-60.
13 - Ibid., p.260.
function of a relation which sticks the labels of the superstratum and the substratum on the objects of the cognition. The relation which does this function remaining beyond the area of sensibility is known inferentially on the basis of the perceptual cognition of the superstratum-substratum order in a complex set of inseparable reals, as it is in case of the cognition like 'this cloth is in these threads'. But in a compound set of separable reals the relation (\textit{samyoga}) is perceptually known along with the superstratum-substratum order in them, as it is in case of the cognition of a person holding a stick.

In addition to the superstratum-substratum order of association of reals the Vaiśeṣikas speak of another order. That is the order of inseparability; and the Vaiśeṣikas from Prāśastapāda are seen to have been comparatively no less emphatic with it. In the word \textit{'ayutasiddhānām'} Prāśastapāda connects inseparability with the relata of inherence. But inseparability is never known to reside in a single locus. Whenever it is known, it is known to hold between reals like the cloth and its threads. From this standpoint inseparability appears to be more akin to a relation than to a non-relation; and this view is quite compatible to the position that the relation to which inseparability pertains is perceptually grasped.

Prof. Gaurinath Śāstrī expresses the view that according to
the Naiyāyikas' inherence may be perceived as determined by inseparability. Inseparability is perceived here as the absence of separability (yutasiddhatya). An epistemological analysis of this perception of inherence as determined by inseparability shows that it is a qualificatory cognition (visiṣṭa-jnāna). In this cognition inherence is the determinandum, and inseparability is the determinans by which inherence is perceived to be determined. The Naiyāyikas are, perhaps, inclined to say that inseparability is perceived to be a property pertaining to the relation of inherence; and thereby they secure an advantageous position to claim that inherence is a perceptible real.

The Vaiśeṣikas introduce inseparability as a natural order of association which is present only within certain fixed pairs of reals. It is no intrinsic property of them, but simply an external law of their necessary association. They assert inseparability between the reals like a cloth and its threads. In such cases a distinguished relation has got to be admitted in order to simply mark them out and distinguish them from the cases of occasional association of the separable reals. So as the ground of the cognition of the very natural coupling of

14 - Ibid., pp.259-60.
15 - Ibid., p.260.
16 The word 'ayutasiddhānāṁ' in Prāśastapāda's definition of inherence refers to the relata of inherence. Here the instances of inherence are meant by 'certain fixed pairs of reals'.
reals the Vaiśeṣikas posit a new relation and call it 'samavāya', because it is of such a distinguished nature that it is reducible to none of the relations already admitted by them. One of the peculiarities in its nature which may quite relevantly be mentioned here is that it puts its relata, which are altogether different from it, into an inseparable tie.

Now, it follows from the above discussion that virtually the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas go together up to the point that inherence is never perceived as determined by inherencehood or eternal relationhood. But the Vaiśeṣikas take departure from the Naiyāyikas' camp on the point where the Naiyāyikas make claim that inherence is perceived as determined by relationhood or inseparability. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that inherence cannot be perceived as a bare relation, because it is one and eternal; nor do they think that inherence is perceived to be determined by inseparability, since according to them, the relata of inherence are perceived as inseparables. Having thus, a short course of disagreement the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas again meet on the point that the cognition of inherence as determined by inherencehood is inferential.

It appears from the Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy that for the occurrence of the perception of a positive real either it
will be related with a perceptible thing by some relation which is other than its relata, or it will come in relation with the perceiving sense-organ by some relation which is other than its relata. The relation which is other than its relata is either conjunction or inherence. Now, since inherence stands outside of these two alternatives, it remains imperceptible. On this consideration the following two arguments may be offered.

(1) On the occasions of the perception of universals they are perceived to exist in some perceived objects by some relation other than the relata. But inherence cannot be perceived in that way, because it never exists in any perceived object by some relation which is not other than its relata. It rather exists by some relation which is not other than its relata. So the perception of inherence is impossible.

(2) A positive real is perceived only when the object of perception comes in relation with the perceiving sense-organ by conjunction or by inherence. Inherence as an object of perception never comes in relation with the perceiving sense-organ by conjunction or by inherence, because by conjunction or by inherence gets related with nothing. Since inherence never gets related with the sense-organ by conjunction or by inherence, it remains unperceived.
CHAPTER - VI

Conclusion

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika pluralism has its foundation in the differentiation of the characterized (dharmin) and its character (dharma); and, needless to say, it is their relation which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas have recourse to for explaining the organisation of their assumed realities. In the Western metaphysics a good amount of penetrating thoughts regarding the nature and status of substance and quality is available. But there the problem of the relation between substance and quality is not found to be discussed with much care and profundity. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas realists, however, are as much occupied with the problem of relation as with its terms. In their doctrine of inherence they advocate that inherence is the relation which exists together with as well as independently of its relata. It is conceived to be as much independent as a reality can be within a pluralistic system. And it is the point where the present work is mainly concentrated.
Inherence exists and exists by itself

The problem of the existence of a relation, which has thus far propelled the work, now lights up the following contents of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of inherence:

(a) inherence is a relation;
(b) it exists as a distinct reality;
(c) it is not parasitical in nature.

The first one of the three is simply an assumption of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika category system. So this point may be left here without further discussion. But queries may be raised in regard to the second and the third points. These two points may be considered here separately in the light of the above problem: how does inherence exist by itself?

(b) The verb 'to exist' seems to correspond to 'to be sat' in Sanskrit. Its noun form 'existence' has a number of corresponding Sanskrit words like 'sattā', 'bhāvatva', 'astitva', etc. Now what

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1 "sannitipratītivisayo bhāvatvameva"
- Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa (77), p. 60.

2 Śrīdharma prefers to coin the term 'bhāva' to denote the six positive categories only. It is commonly used to mean 'positive', which comes much close to the notion of existent.
is meant by 'existence' in English is conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in different senses. Some of these senses may be just mentioned here.

(i) In a sense to exist is to be that with which sattā is related by inherence. In this sense substances, qualities and actions are said to exist, since sattā is related with them. Sattā resides in them by inherence.

(ii) In another sense to exist means to be that with which sattā is related by co-inherence (ekārthasamavāya). In this sense universals, ultimate-individuators and inherence are said to exist, since sattā is related with them by co-inherence.

(iii) There is a third sense in which Śrīdhara conceives all the six categories indiscriminately to exist. He advocates that the very nature of a thing is its existence. According to him, an

3 "saditi yato dravyagunakarmas u sā sattā."
- Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 1-2-7, Kaṇāda (40), p.27

4 "dravyadīnāṁ trayāśrāmapi sattāsambandhaḥ."
- Praśastapāda (57), p.43.

5 "jātyāśrāmapyekārthasamavāyasambandhena sāmānyavattvāt."
- Mahādeva Bhatta (77), p.78.

6 "astitvāṁ svarūpavattvam." - Śrīdhara (57), p.41.
individual, whatever kind and category it may be of, has a nature of its own; and that is its existence. This nature is, perhaps, nothing but its very individuality, or, in other word, uniqueness. Those which are many differ in their nature. Udayana agrees on this point that the difference of nature manifests in plurality.

(iv) According to Udayana, existence (astitva) consists in becoming the object of the knowledge of affirmation. He says again that a thing which is grasped independently of the counter-positive (pratiyogī) is to be considered to have existence. This further explanation is intended most probably to deny astitva to the category of absence (abhāva) which, although becomes the object of the knowledge of affirmation, is never grasped without any reference to its counter-positive.

Among the above views of existence the first one seems to involve the defect of under-coverage (avyāpti), because it fails to favour the universals, ultimate-individuators and inherence as existent entities. The second view is a bit flexible of the first view.

7 "yasya vastuno yat svarūpaṁ tadeva tasyāstītvam." - Ibid.
8 "anekatvāṁ svarūpabhedeḥ." - Udayana (71), Vol.2, p.34.
10 "pratiyogyanapekṣanirūpanatvamiti yāvat." - Ibid.
and it is made to serve as almost complementary to the first, since it makes up the under-coverage therein. Udayana's definition of existence presupposes the notion of existence which is ingrained in the word 'vidhi'. In comparison with his, Śrīdhara's view is clear-cut and appears to be much more convincing. Inherence as an individual entity has a nature of its own, and its very nature as a one individual entity is its existence. Jagadīśa also sides with Śrīdhara.

Prof. Gaurinath Śāstri offers a definition of bhāvatva, which is just the combination of the first and the second views. It, however, overcomes the above shortcomings and imparts to the notion of bhāva the necessary coverage in the Vaiśeṣika ontology. Prof. Śāstri says that bhāvatva consists in being that with which sattā is related either by the relation of inherence or by the relation of co-inherence. Now, sattā is related with substances, qualities and actions by inherence; so they are considered as bhāva padārtha or positive reals. Sattā is related with the universals, ultimate-individuators and inherence by co-inherence; on this ground they also are considered as positive reals.

11 "astitvaṁ svarūpasattvaṁ taccobhayāvṛttidharmavattvam."
   - Jagadīśa (59), p.42.
12 "bhāvatvaṁca samavāyaikārthasamavāyānyatarasambandhena sattāvattvam." - Śāstri, Gaurinath (A14),
   "Abhāvatattvavivecanam", p.5.
The term 'bhāva' may preferably be translated as 'positive' which comes very close to the notion of 'existent'. The difficulty with the term 'existent' is that the category of absence (abhāva) is existent, but it is not positive. The absence of jar exists, but it is not a positive entity like a jar. If existence is taken in the sense of positive reality, this existence, of course, cannot be attributed to absence. But in this sense inherence exists. Inherence exists positively as its relata do.

(c) Inherence is not parasitical in the sense that it exists by itself. When it is said that inherence exists by itself, it does not mean that inherence exists without its terms. It means, inherence exists as an independent reality. The view that a relation can exist without its relata faces the hardest blow from the following comment of Bradley:

13 "a relation without terms seems mere verbiage."

14 To him such a relation is "a thing which loudly contradicts itself."

In conformity with Bradley it may be said that although a relation without being a relation between terms is logically impossible, a relation independent of its terms is not only logically but also ontologically possible. Of course, it cannot be said with regard to all relations.

13 Bradley, F.H. (14), p.27.
14 Ibid.
We can conceive of at least two types of relation which cannot be said to exist independently of its terms:

(i) first, a relation which is caused, or brought into existence, by its terms; and

(ii) Secondly, a relation which is psychologically forced on us together with its terms.

Of these two, only the first type of relation is of much importance to the present problem: in what sense can inherence be said to exist by itself? This problem is in no way concerned with the second type of relation. The second type of relation appears only in the phenomenalists' philosophy; and as opposed to them the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are admittedly realists.

In a realistic system a relation which is not caused by its terms may possibly be conceived of as self-existent. It may be said to be self-existent in the sense it is independent of everything that false outside it. A relation (like a non-relation) may be considered independent in two ways.

(i) First, it may be causally independent i.e. not caused by its terms, or anything else.

(ii) Secondly, it may be relationally independent i.e. not brought into a relation by any other relation.
Inherence is independent in both ways. It is not a produced entity; so it is causally independent. Its relation with its terms is not the consequence of the intervention of any other relation; so it is relationally independent. Such a relation, perhaps, may be regarded as self-existent. And on this consideration inherence may be claimed to exist by itself.

Gains of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems from the category of inherence:

From the category of inherence the gain of the Vaiśeṣika system is, perhaps, more than that of the Nyāya system. The Vaiśeṣikas have admitted of a limited number of relations, and they are practically helpless without inherence. But the Naiyāyikas, especially the Navya Naiyāyikas, have devised plenty of relations and, if necessary, they can substitute some other relation, or relations, for inherence. Nevertheless, both the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas are profited from their category of inherence mainly in the following matters:

(a) The category of inherence provides them with a strong substructure to build their realistic ontology thereon.

(b) It enables them to account for the relation between two entities which are known to occupy the same point of space.

(c) Inherence being a self-related relation overcomes the hopeless infinite regress of relations. The Navya Nyāya view on this
point is precisely represented by Prof. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya who may be relevantly quoted here:

"The postulation of one relation in the ontology is often used to solve the problem of infinite regress of relations. For eventually the regress is stopped when this relation is reached. This relation is usually regarded as not requiring any further relation to relate it to its terms, for it is ontologically of the nature of relation and hence is radically different from other elements in the ontology. But Navya-Nyāya does not use inherence in this way to stop the infinite regress of relations. The method of Navya-Nyāya is very different because, for one thing, when inherence itself is denoted by the word 'inherence', it becomes an object like all other objects in the ontology. According to Navya-Nyāya whatever is denoted by a word is the qualificandum in the cognition which the hearer has on hearing the word. Thus inherence as denoted by the word 'inherence' is the qualificandum of a cognition of inherence 

Prof. Bhattacharyya has translated samavāya as inherence instead of inherence.
(d) Epistemologically inherence makes normal qualified perception possible. Magnitude (mahattva) being a quality is held to inhere in substance. Now, until magnitude inheres in a substance, that substance is not capable of being perceived. If substance is not perceived, the perception of quality, action and universal also is not possible because they are not perceived without their substratum.

(e) The category of inherence has immensely helped them to account for the causal affairs of the universe.

Some modern relections

Dharmendra Nath Shastri:

Prof. Shastri in his critique observes,

"The samavāya being eternal and one, the question arises whether it is omnipresent also."

He says more,

"This important question has not been tackled in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises in respect of samavāya."

Here Prof. Shastri tables a motion which crops up from the equation

16 "dravyapratyakṣe mahattvam samavāyasambandhena kāṛanam."
- Viśvanātha (77), p.187.
18 - Ibid.
of vyāpakatā with parama-mahat-parimāṇa.

According to him,

"A universal (sāmānya) or inherent relation (samavāya) is held to be omnipresent (sarva-vyāpak). Wherever, in any part of the universe, a cow is born, the universal cowness becomes associated with it by inherent relation (samayāya). As they both, the universal (cowness) and the inherent relation are only one is number, they must be regarded as omnipresent. But if omnipresence is a measure, i.e. a quality, that it cannot reside in the sāmānya and in the samavāya, because, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, all categories except substance are held to be devoid of qualities."

The differentiation between vyāpakatā and parama-mahat-parimāṇa is, he thinks, "a knotty problem for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to solve."

Although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas have not been vocal directly on the point of the difference between sarvavyāpakatā and parama-mahat-parimāṇa, still their system of thought suggests that they are different, Vyāpakatā is not omnipresence. It is, perhaps, the capability of being instantiated on suitable occasions irrespective of spatio-temporal determination. It may rather be viewed as a

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19 - Ibid., p.297.

20 - Ibid.
characteristic which may possibly be attributed to any category of reals. But parama-mahat-parimāṇa means omnipresence i.e. occupying every point of space. It is a quality (guna) inhering only in a limited number of substances, namely, ākāśa, dik, kāla, and ātmā.

So when it is said that inherence is sarvavyāpaka it does not mean that inherence is omnipresent. It means that the instantiation of inherence is possible everywhere. Wherever two inseparable entities occur in the substratum-superstratum position inherence is known to hold between them.

Bimal Krisna Matilal:

Prof. Matilal has thrown light upon the fact that the pair of entities which are said to be related by inherence occupy the same space. In his Epistemology, Logic, And Grammar In Indian Philosophical Analysis he describes the fact of occupying the same space by two entities at the same time, as 'nesting'. He says,

"the notion of NESTING allows two or more different entities, objective realities, to occupy the same spatial spread without violating the impenetrability principle."

In this connection he contrasts the Nyāya position with the Buddhist position.

"The Nyāya tries to get around this difficulty by its doctrine

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21 Matilal, B.K. (44), p.75.
of inherence, the 'inseparable relation. If \( a \) inheres in \( b \) in the sense that \( a \) cannot exist without occurring or residing in \( b \) then \( b \) may be allowed to occupy the same space. In other words, Nyāya accepts the IMPENETRABILITY principle of the Buddhist but adds a further principle, which we may call the principle of NESTING. 'Nesting' is said to counteract the impenetrability principle. We may roughly distinguish the two positions as follows:

The Buddhist position is: If \( a \) and \( b \) are two different entities then \( b \) cannot occupy the space occupied by \( a \). This is just a generalization of the empirically verifiable principle: two material bodies cannot occupy the same space together.

The Nyāya position is: If \( a \) and \( b \) are two different entities then \( a \) cannot occupy, at a given time, the same space occupied by \( b \), provided one is not nested in, or, does not nest, the other."

Here it is necessary to point out that by 'impenetrability' he means sapratighatva of matter. He says,

"Impenetrability is a necessary attribute of matter. This implies that the space occupied by one material object cannot be occupied by another."

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22 - Ibid., p.57
23 - Ibid., p.56.
In his *Perception* Prof. Matilal calls inherence a 'relational universal'. There he says,

"I have called it a 'relational universal' in other contexts to convey the idea that it is claimed by Nyaya to be one (eka) and non-distinct, although it has manifold manifestation and it connects different types of entities."

As the universals are connected with their particular instances that manifest them, so inherence also is connected with its particular instances that manifest it; and, perhaps, on this ground he calls inherence a 'relational universal'.

M. Hiriyanna:

Whether inherence is an internal relation, or not, - this issue has, perhaps, developed under the influence of the western thoughts over relation. Prof. Radhakrishnan, however, describes inherence to be an internal relation, and thus distinguishes inherence from conjunction which he describes as external relation. Prof. Hiriyanna also in his article, "What is *samavāya*?", puts the problem with

25 "Sañyoga takes place between two things of the same nature which exist disconnectedly and are for a time brought into conjunction. It is external relation, while samavāya is internal relation." - Radhakrishnan, S.(60), p.217.
a view to distinguish inherence from conjunction. He raises the question: "If samavāya also is an external relation, 'wherein', it may be asked, 'does it differ from samyoga'?" At the end of his article, he sums up his observation in this regard as: "The relations of samyoga and samavāya are both external - the former in the sense that it relates co-ordinate factors; the latter in the sense that one of the terms is relative and subordinate to the other. Speaking generally, the Vaiśeṣika seems to repudiate internal relations altogether. Its uncompromising realism and pluralism render this conclusion necessary. It recognises only external relations but they are not all of the same kind and there are at least two varieties of it as illustrated by samyoga and samavāya."

The notable point in the above observation is that the notion of internal relation is incompatible to the uncompromising realism and pluralism of the Vaiśeṣikas. "The theory of internal relations is generally advocated by the idealistic thinkers as against the realists who uphold the doctrine of external relations."

The Western thinkers like Bradley are the advocates of the theory of internal relations. The internal relation, according to Bradley,


27 - Ibid., p.222.

"must at both ends affect, and pass into, the being of its terms."

He says more: "But every relation, as we have learnt, essentially penetrates the being of its terms, and, in this sense, is intrinsical."

Now in this Bradlean sense inherence cannot be said to be an internal relation, because inherence does not affect the being of its terms at both ends. Anyway, the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika thinkers are not found to throw light upon the notion of internal relation anywhere in their system of philosophy.

Kalidas Bhattacharya:

Prof. Bhattacharya's observation regarding the positivistic approach of the Naiyāyikas to the problem of relation appears to be a noteworthy point. He says,

"They do not believe in different orders of reality. The First Cause, with them, is coordinate with the natural causes and substances just entities beside attributes, and they try to understand the relation between any two items of reality in the language of other accepted relation, as far as possible. It is only when they fail, as for example, in the case of substance and attributes, that they say they are compelled to postulate a novel relation - in other words, a novel entity as intermediate. This positivistic attitude is commendable."

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30 - Ibid., p.347.
31 Bhattacharya, Kalidas (9), p.6.
In this connection it may be noted here that the Vaiśeṣikas also deserves the above commendation, since they do not differ from the Naiyāyikas in their approach to the problem of relation.

Prof. Bhattacharya offers an analysis of the case of inherence intending to contrast the view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with that of the Advaita Vedānta. He demonstrates:

"While for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the proposition 'The flower is red' means (1) there is a substance, viz. this flower, (2) there is an attribute, viz. this red, (3) this red inheres in this flower, (4) the inherence of this red is also related in some way to this flower and (5) yet this relation of the inherence of this red to this flower is not entitatively other than this flower, for Advaita Vedānta the proposition means (1), (2) and (3) only and also that the inherence of this red is not entitatively different from this flower. For the Advaitin the inherence-of-red belongs to the very essence of this flower."

Sibajiban Bhattacharya:

Prof. Bhattacharya has made a number of thought-provoking statements in regard to the Navya Nyāya theory of inherence in his Gadādhara's Theory Of Objectivity.

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32 Ibid., p.7.
(Visayatāvāda). Here a few of them may be taken for discussion.

(1) "it is obvious that 'samavāya' cannot be translated by 'inherence' if we translate 'anuyogin' and 'pratiyogin' as 'predecessor' and 'successor' respectively. .... we shall always use 'inherence-converse' ('inherence') as the translation of samavāya."

Prof. Bhattacharyya explains 'anuyogin' as the first term of a relation and 'pratiyogin' as the second term of that relation; and accordingly translates them as 'the predecessor' and 'the successor' respectively. Here Prof. Bhattacharyya has not made it clear in what order he considers the anuyogin and the pratiyogin to be the first position and the second position of a relation respectively. It is, perhaps, on consideration of the logical priority of the substratum (ādhāra) that he crowns the anuyogin with the first position of a relation. Otherwise there is no good reason to consider it ontologically prior to the pratiyogin. Anyway, he is quite justified in using the term inference converse in the above context.

(2) "a relation relating two terms forms only a qualified or compound object, but not a fact."

It is another striking comment of Prof. Bhattacharyya.


The spellings 'anuyogin' and 'pratiyogin' in the book are, perhaps, wrongly printed. The use of the words 'anuyogin' instead of 'anuyogi' and 'pratiyogin' instead of 'pratiyogini' in the above statement is of mine.

34 - Ibid., p.19.
According to him a relation from the Navya Nyāya perspective relates its two terms in the form of an object, not of a fact. Now, if this be true, then in opposition to Wittgenstein it suggests the Navya Nyāya view that the world is the totality of things, not of facts. And perhaps this observation does justice to the realistic position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.

(3) "when inherence itself is denoted by the word 'inherence', it becomes an object like all other objects in the ontology."

Prof. Bhattacharya rightly observes that a relation functioning as a relation has to be indicated by word order in the sentence but never to be denoted by any word. It is simply an object what is meant by a word and he observes,

"One consequence of this theory of word-meaning is that a relation cannot function as a relation if it is denoted by a word."

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35 "The world is the totality of facts, not of things." (1.1) - Wittgenstein Ludwig (79), p.7.
37 - Ibid.,
38 - Ibid.
Concluding remarks

The present work is now, coming to acknowledge that the doctrine of samavāya is a sterling contribution of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in the field of realism. It is on this doctrine that they have been able to build the superstructure of their pluralistic realism. This doctrine is one of their unique speculations still now standing unparalleled in the history of philosophy. The Western metaphysicians have hitherto offered relations a relatively poor entrenchment. In comparison with them the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are much more serious in respect of handling relations. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology samavāya is outlined as a relation-entity and is awarded ontological sovereignty. It is conceived to be the sole organising principle which remaining within the system of categories takes hold over the existent reals and shapes the reality in diversity.

By introducing the doctrine of samavāya the Vaiśeṣikas have not only secured an advantageous position in building a compact ontological system, but also opened a new phase of study of relation in metaphysics. They have added a new dimension to our thinking over the nature and status of relations. A relation is generally

39 Samavāya shapes the reality in the sense that creation cannot start until action (karma) is produced in the atom (paramāṇu) by the relation of samavāya.
spoken of as something made by its relata. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas also hold the same view in respect of sāṁyoga. But in their doctrine of sāmavāya they hold the reverse position. Against the traditional view that relation conforms to the objects related they advocate in their doctrine of sāmavāya that the objects to be related conform to the relation. The relata of this relation have nothing to contribute in the matter of its being a real, or being of such nature. It is on the part of the relata of sāmavāya that they must exist inseparably in the substratum-superstratum order in order to be an instance of sāmavāya; but nothing is to be done on the part of sāmavāya here. So it is absolutely independent of its relata. But any two reals which are its relata, so long as both of them exist, under no circumstances get released from this relation, and, hence, from each other also. Sāmavāya, thus, exists independently with full command over its relata which are in a bond with it. This is a very strong position for a relation. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology this status is allowed to no other relation. From this point of view sāmavāya may be treated as the relation per excellence in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology.

From the point of its independent existence sāmavāya comes closer to the eternal substances and the universals than to the other reals of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, since like them it is causally independent and exists in its own
right. But the eternal substances and the universals are not relationally independent. They require some relation in order to get related with other reals. In this respect samavāya does not require even that minimum. As a self-linking relation it reigns the world of plurals. All other positive reals are bound fast with it; but it is bound with nothing. The ontological status of self-relatedness distinguishes samavāya from the other five positive categories. Here I will allow myself to repeat that creation begins and samavāya, the eternal inexhaustible reality, renders it possible, since the causality of the very first created state of affair is rooted in samavāya.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas have, thus, enshrined samavāya in their metaphysics as a paragon of relation, and thereon built perhaps the most delightful system of realism. In the conclusion it deserves to be mentioned that samavāya as the relation-real has toned up the realistic spirit of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, and considering its role therein the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism may be declared as the kingdom of samavāya.