CHAPTER - IV

Some Features of Samavāya

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold some general views regarding the features of inherence. Some of these views are not unanimously accepted by all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. For example, Raghunātha is, perhaps, the solitary exception among the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in repudiating the view that inherence is one. Now the following points accepted by the majority of the thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school will be dealt with hereunder in four sections.

(1) Samavāya is one.
(2) Samavāya is eternal.
(3) Samavāya is self-related.
(4) Samavāya is a kind of sense-object relation (sannikarṣa).
Section - 1

Samavāya is One

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system inherence is held to be a one unique relation. Here one may ask: why is inherence not held to be many like conjunction? In support of the view that inherence is not many we find two reasons in the Prasāstagabhaṣya. First, the probans (the cognition 'it is here') through which inherence is inferred presents inherence as one and the same everywhere, as it is in case of sattā; and secondly, there is no such probans which may stand as a ground for the inference of inherence as many. Thus Prasāstagāda concludes that as sattā is one and the same in all of its instances, so inherence is. Sattā is conceived to be one for two reasons. They are:

(i) It is known to be the cause of the like cognitions in the form 'the substance exists', 'the quality exists', 'the action exists'.

(ii) There is no proof in favour of the view that these cognitions are varying from each other in form.

1 "bhāvavallīṅgāvīśeṣād" - Prasāstagāda (57), p. 777.
2 "Viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāccha" - Ibid.
3 "tasmād bhāvavat sarvatraikāḥ samavāya iti". - Ibid.
Similarly, inherence also is conceived to be one for two reasons. They are:

(i) It is known to be the cause of the uniform cognition 'it is here' in cases of the cognition like 'the cloth is in these threads'.

(ii) There is no proof in favour of the view that these cognitions do not always conform to the form 'it is here'.

Now, it may be objected that the view that inherence is one is not defensible. It may lead one to conclude that substancehood exists in substance and quality, or qualityhood exists in quality and action, etc. If it is granted that substances, quality etc. are related with substancehood, qualityhood, etc. by one and the same relation, then substancehood may be conceived to exist in quality and action also, as it is conceived to exist in substance, because quality and action are related with substance by the same

4 "yathā satsaditijñānasya lakṣaṇasya sarvatrāvisēśādvaylla-
ksanyād viśese bhede lakṣaṇasya pramāṇasyābhāvāccha
sarvatraiko bhāvaḥ, tadvadhetipratyayasya lakṣaṇasya
sarvatrāvailaksanyād bhede pramāṇābhāvāccha sarvatraikah
samavāya iti". - Śrīdhara (57), pp. 778-79.
relation which relates substancehood with substance. Prasastapada is aware of this problem. His reply to this problem is that there is a fixed substratum-superstratum system among the reals. For example, qualities always reside in substances, but the reverse of it occurs never.

Here Prasastapada sheds light on the point that the substratum-superstratum system which is uniformly present in the instances of inherence provides a ground for asserting that inherence is one. He says that the agreement in presence (anvaya) and the agreement in absence (vyatireka) are the evidence for this substratum-superstratum system among reals. It is observed that all cognitions like 'substancehood resides in the substance alone' are the cognition 'it is here' which springs from inherence; and this is a ground for conceiving inherence to be one. Inherence stands for the common cause of a type of cognitions, and there is nothing through which the cause may be treated as different in different cases.

The ontological issue that the oneness of inherence is compatible to the uniform substratum-superstratum system of reals,

5 "dravyagunakarmanam dravyatvagunatvakarmatvadivisesanaih saha sambandhaikatvat padarthasaankaraprasaanga iti". - Prasastapada (57), Ibid.

6 "na, adharadheyaniyamat". - Ibid., p.779

7 "anvayavyatirekadarsanat". - Ibid. p.780

8 "iheti samavayanimittasya jnanasyanvayadarsanat sarvatraikaat samavaya iti gamyate". - Ibid.
receives a logical support from Gangesā. He apprehends the objection: inheritance being one, how can it be maintained that colour resides in certain substances, but in certain other substances it never resides? It may be said in reply that the relation of colour with the jar is inheritance, so colour inheres in the jar. Since the relation of colour with the air is not inheritance, colour does not inhere in the air. But another problem crops up from this reply. If inheritance is held to be identical with the relation of colour (rūpasambandha), then it must not be identical with the relation of taste (rasasambandha).

Inherence being one, the inherence of touch (sparśāsamavāya) and the inherence of colour (rūpasamavāya) may be taken to be one. Now, as the inherence of touch exists in air, so the inherence of colour also may be said to exist in the air. If it is so, then on the ground of the existence of the inherence of colour in the air let colour be known to inhere in the air, as it is known to inhere in a jar or a piece of cloth. How can there be the absence of colour in the air in spite of the presence of the


10 "ghatena saha rūpasambandharūpapataṁ samavāyasya na vāyuneti cet". - Ibid.

11 "na. rūpasambandharūpapataṁ hi samavāyasya svarūpameva yadi tadā rasasambandharūpapataṁ na syāt tayorvirodhēḥ anyacca durvacamiti cet". - Ibid.
inherence of colour there?

We find a solution of the above problem in the Prasastapada. Praśastapāda's point is that notwithstanding inherence is one the substratum-superstratum system among reals may be retained by the difference of capacity in the manifested and the manifester (vyaṅgyaṇjakasaktibhedā). Śrīdhara clarifies the point as that although the inherence of substancehood (dravyatvasamāvāya), the inherence of qualityhood (guṇatvasamāvāya), etc. are one, still the inherence of substancehood inheres in the substance alone, because the substance alone is capable of manifesting substancehood.

On the point of the cognition of colour in the air Viśvanātha is very much clear. According to him, it is not the case that if inherence is held to be one, then the air would be known to have colour. Here the question of the cognition of colour in the

12 "vāyau rūpasamāvāyasattveḥpi rūpātyantābhāvohsti na ghate".
- Ibid., pp.654-55.

13 "tathā dravyatvadīnāmaipi samavāyaikatvahpi vyaṅgyaṇja-kaśaktibhedādāhārdheṇyāniyama iti." - Praśastapāda (57),p.781.

14 "dravyatvābhivyāṇjikā satīdṛavyāṇāmeva, tena dravyesveva dravyatvam samavaiti, nānyatreti". - Śrīdhara (67), p.782.
air does not arise, because colour is absent in the air. The inherence which is in the air cannot be called the inherence of colour (though it is one and the same with the inherence of colour), since colour is absent in the air. Colour is absent in the air, because the air is not capable of manifesting colour. There is the manifested manifester (*vyaṅga-vyanjaka*) system among the reals; and it is that system which determines the name of the inherence between two particular reals. For example, the inherence between the fire and its colour is called the inherence of colour, the inherence between the air and its touch is called the inherence of touch, etc. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, therefore, are not at all in contradiction in holding the following two views together.

(i) Inherence is one.

(ii) The air is colourless.

In this connection Raghunātha, one of the most celebrated champions of the Navya-Nyāya school, is a big opponent. He sticks to the above point of objection and revolts against the view that inherence is one. He argues that inherence cannot be one, because the supposition that inherence is one goes against the substratum-superstratum system advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.

15 "na ca samāvāyaśyai katve vāyau rūpavattābudhiprasaṅgah, tatra rūpasamavāyasattvepi rūpabhāvāt."
- Viśvanātha (77), p.67.
If inherence is taken to be one, he thinks, then the inherence of taste (rasasamavāya) and the inherence of odour (gandhasamavāya) cannot be viewed to be different. On the basis of this logic he argues that as in the water the inherence of taste is present, so the inherence of odour also is present there. But the case is not so. In this way in a particular substratum many things which are eternally absent have got to be admitted to be present. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, thus, falls into self-contradiction as a result of admitting inherence to be one. Inherence, therefore, is many; and inherencehood is an indivisible characteristic commonly present in all inherences.

Perhaps, if it is of course allowed to say, the objection of Raghunātha is anticipated and fore-answered by Gaṅgeśa. Gaṅgeśa's position, in brief, is that since colour is absent in the air, the inherence of colour also is absent there. He infers the absence of the inherence of colour in the air from the absence of colour there. Here the interesting point to note is that Raghunātha pleads for the existence of the inherence of odour in the water on the ground of the oneness of inherence, while Gaṅgeśa asserts the non-existence of the inherence of colour in the air on the ground of the non-existence of colour in the air.

16 "samavāyopi ca naiko jalādergandhādīmattvaprasaṅgāt paraṁtu nānaiva, samavāyatvam tu punaranugatamakhandopādhiriti". - Raghunātha (61), p.71.
Visvanātha argues that inherence is one, because there is parsimony in this assumption. Here it is necessary to explain how the view that inherence is favoured by the principle of parsimony. In the Rāmarudrī annotation there is an argument from analogy which throws sufficient light on this point. The argument is as follows:

The first cosmic product (ksītyaṅkura) being a product (kārya) must be due to some effort (kṛti), since all products are due to some effort. The ground of his supposition is that effort in general is a condition for a product. Now, the effort which is behind the first cosmic product is conceived to be one, because the principle of parsimony favours this supposition. Similarly, on the ground that the cognition of something as determined by a quality, or an action, etc. always has the one relation between the determinans and the determinandum as its object, it is supposed that inherence as the relation-object (samabandhavisāya) of all such cognitions is a one unique relation, since there is parsimony in this supposition also.

17 "lāghavādekasamavāyasiddhiḥ." - Visvanātha (77), p.67
18 "kṛtijanyatvavyāpyakāryatvavānītiparāmarśādapi krterekatve lāghavamitiilāghavajñānasahakṛtāt ksītyaṅkurādikamekakṛtiya- nyamityanumitivat sambandhayaikye lāghavamitiilāghavajñānasahakṛtāt viśeṣaṇavisēṣyasamabandhavisāyakatvavyāpyavīśiṣṭabuddhityavāti guṇakriyādivisiṣṭabuddhiriti-parāmarśādapi viśeṣaṇavi- sēṣayorekasambandhavisāyinumitiriti samudāyārthaḥ." - Rāmarudra (77), Ibid.
In connection with the oneness of inherence one point may be added here that since inherence is conceived to be one, the jāṭi, inherencehood (samavayatva), cannot be accepted. If inherencehood is admitted to be a jāṭi, then another inherence has got to be admitted in order to explain the relation between the jāṭi, inherencehood, and inherence. But this supposition leads to infinite regress. So the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do not accept inherencehood to be a jāṭi.

Before closing the discussion the advantages that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are getting from the view that inherence is one, may be summed up. Needless to say, oneness always goes with parsimony; and this is the greatest advantage that they have got. In this regard what more analytically can be said is that the view that inherence is one,

1) relieves the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas of the load of explaining the occasional occurrences of the innumerable inherences;

2) favours them with only two additional reals - (i) inherence and (ii) inherencehood (as a upādhi, not as a jāṭi) - instead of infinite number of relation-reals;

3) enables them to bring together all the possible cases of two positive reals which are inseparably related, under the purview of a single relation.

19 "samavāyasyaikatvāc ca samavāyāntaraṁapekṣayāmanavasthānāc c.ca."
Section - 2

Samavāya is Eternal

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas perhaps unanimously hold that inherence is eternal. As a prelude to the discussion regarding the reasons for holding inherence to be eternal a brief account of the notion of eternality (nityatva) may be given here after Udayana. Udayana explains eternality as endlessness (anantatva). His argument on this point is that whatever is a non-effect (akārya) is endless. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold inherence to be eternal; and their main ground of this consideration is that inherence is not an effect. If inherence is held to be an effect, then it cannot be taken to be eternal, because no positive effect whatsoever is treated as eternal in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the supposition that inherence is non-eternal leads to certain serious difficulties particularly in connection with the explanation of the origination of inherence and finding out its cause.

Had inherence been supposed to be a non-eternal relation it cannot but be a produced entity, since to be non-eternal is to be produced. In case inherence is supposed to be a produced entity, the first problem is that it cannot be one. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas

20 “nityatvam-anantatvam.” - Ibid., p.120
21 “taccākāryatvāt.” - Ibid.
accept it to be one. The reasons for accepting inherence as one have been discussed at length in the previous section of this chapter. Here for avoidance of repetition the point may be dropped. This much can, however, be said that the reasons in favour of regarding inherence as one paves the way for regarding inherence as eternal. It is claimed that the eternality of inherence follows from its oneness; and the ground of this claim is that without being eternal, one and the same inherence cannot hold between innumerable entities irrespective of temporal consideration.

In case inherence is supposed to be a produced entity, the second problem would be the inexplicability of its origination. If inherence originates at all, it must be originated in either of the following ways:

(a) before the origination of its relata;
(b) at the time of the origination of its relata;
and (c) after the origination of its relata. 22
But none of these three possibilities is acceptable.

(a) First, the origination of inherence cannot be said to be an event prior to the origination of its relata, because in that case that relation cannot be said to be the relation of those relata

22 "samavāyasyāpyakāryyatvam pūrvāparasahabhāvānakārlpteh,"
- Śrīdhara (57), p.51.
which are, in fact, yet to be produced. If it is said that inherence originates before the origination of its relata, then it is not possible to answer between which relata the specified inherence will be known to hold at the moment of its origination. In this situation inherence can hardly be conceived to be a relation between two specific particulars, since a specified relation before the production of its relata is inconceivable. Sridhara clearly states the problem with an example. He says that if the inherence of cloth is said to originate before the production of a cloth, then it is left unanswered, in the absence of a cloth between which relata that relation will be known to hold.

Moreover, if inherence is said to be produced before the production of its relata, then nothing can be assigned to be the cause of inherence. But any product being an event in time must be due to some cause; and inherence cannot be an exception to it. To the question of the cause of inherence three possible answers may be given. They are as follows:

(i) the relata of inherence are the cause of inherence;
(ii) inherence itself is its cause;
and(iii) some other unrelated entities are its cause.

"yadi hi pātasya samavāyāḥ paṭāt pūrvam sambhavati, asati sambandhini kasyāsau sambandhaḥ syād."
- Ibid., pp.51-52.
(i) The relata of inherence cannot be said to be the cause of the originated inherence, because at the time of the production of inherence its relata were absent there. Then they were not yet produced. Now, in no circumstances a cause can have its time-position later than its effect.

(ii) Again, inherence cannot be said to be self-caused, because the concept of self-caused itself is to be explained by the concept of eternality; and as a result it stands that inherence is eternal.

(iii) Lastly, some other unrelated entities also cannot be said to stand for the cause of inherence, because that which is not in any way related with an effect cannot be treated as the cause of that effect. If anything not related with inherence is admitted to be the cause of inherence, then nothing can be definitely said to be its cause. Apart from this, the supposition that the cause is not related with its effect, is in contradiction with the notion of causal relation.

(b) Secondly, the origination of inherence cannot be held to be an event concurrent with the production of its relata, because in that case also there is the problem of ascertaining the cause of inherence. That which is produced simultaneously with the production of an effect cannot be said to be the cause of that effect. A cause
must precede its effect. If inherence and its relata both are said to be produced at the same time, then neither of them can be accepted to be the cause of the other; they should rather be treated as co-effects.

Besides this, if the inherence of cloth, for example, is said to be produced simultaneously with its relata, then the cloth cannot be treated as the instance of the inherence of cloth, because the cloth at the very moment of its origination cannot be known to be the locus of inherence. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, in order to be known to be the locus of something non-eternal; a thing must originate at least one moment before that of which it is known to be the locus. One of the two things which are known to be

24 The concept of cause is rather a very complicated concept. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists are, however, firm in holding that a non-eternal cause cannot produce any effect at the moment of its production. It is only after the production of itself that a non-eternal cause may produce some effect. An effect, thus, in temporal consideration, is always held to be produced at some posterior moment of the production of its cause.

25 Another instance in favour of this view is that a non-eternal substance does not possess any quality at the moment of its origination.

"na gunagurinoh samānakālinaṁ janma. kintu dravyaṁ
produced at the same time, cannot be known to be located in the other. Under the circumstances the cloth also cannot be known to be the cause of inherence. But it is a fact that the relation between the threads and the cloth is known to be an instance of inherence. For this reason also inherence cannot be said to be produced simultaneously with the production of its relata.

(c) Thirdly, nor can the emergence of inherence be held to be an event posterior to the production of its relata, because in that case the production of the cloth itself remains unexplained. If it is supposed that at the time of the production of the cloth the inherence of the cloth remains absent, then it is left unexplained by what relation the cloth is to be produced in its threads. The production of something without being related with its cause is inconceivable.

nirgunameva prathamamutpadyate, pasćāt tatsamavetā guṇā utpadyante." - Kesava Miśra (42), p.45

"guṇān prati tu pūrvabhāvitvādbhavati guṇānaṁ samavāyi-kāraṇam." - Ibid. p.46

"atha paṭena sahotpadyate, tadā paṭasyānādhāratvāṁ prāpnoti." - Śrīdhara (57), p.52.

"na ca kāryyatvamanādhāram yuktam," - Ibid.

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27
Again, if the inherence of cloth is said to be produced after the production of its relata, then as because inherence is absent, on the occasion of the production of the cloth, the relation between the threads and the cloth cannot stand as an instance of inherence at all. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas accept it to be an instance of inherence.

Apart from the above points, the relata of inherence can never be said to be in a would-be-related or may-be-related state. They are always and permanently in the actually-related state, since they are inseparable. Hence, the supposition that the origination of the inherence of cloth is an event posterior to the origination of the cloth is not compatible to the fact of the origination of the cloth, because the threads are the inherent cause of the cloth. Whenever and wherever the cloth originates, it originates as related with its threads by the relation of inherence.

28 "atha paścādbhavati, tathāpi paṭasyānādhāratvameva, ..." - Ibid.

29 The non-eternal relata of inherence being positive entities must have some inherent cause in which they may be conceived to be produced. Now, before inherence is produced the inherent cause of its relata cannot be conceived. So the production of its relata before the production of inherence becomes inexplicable.

There is another point of difficulty in holding the view
Thus, one of the reasons for which inherence is held to be eternal is that the hypothesis that it is non-eternal fails to provide any satisfactory explanation of the origination of inherence as well as of the origination of its non-eternal relatum like a cloth.

In case inherence is taken to be a produced entity, the third problem would be that its nature cannot be retained. A non-eternal relation is simply a coupling tie; a mere occasional association which is terminable. Such a contingent relation cannot hold between two positive entities that cannot stay as mutually dissociated from each other. A relation cannot render two such entities inseparable for ever until and unless it is everpresent.

Again, there are, however, many eternal entities like ākāśa and its magnitude that are inseparably related. A non-eternal relation cannot be held to be the cause of their inseparability. It is only an eternal relation which is capable of ensuring inseparability between two such entities. This particular eternal relation, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, is inherence.

that inherence is produced after the production of its relata. Where one of the relata of inherence is a quality or an action, the effect-inherence must have that quality or action as its inherent cause. But in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology a quality or an action is never held to be the inherent cause.
The above discussion shows that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas' conclusion that inherence is eternal follows mainly from their following assertions:

(i) inherence is a relation between inseparables;
(ii) inherence is one;
(iii) inherence holds between innumerable entities at the same time;
(iv) inherence is a positive entity;
(v) inherence is without any cause;
(vi) inherence is not perishable;
(vii) inherence plays some causal role in the matter of the origination of each and every positive product.

Under these considerations inherence must be held to be eternal; otherwise the said inconsistencies are left unanswered.

Inherence, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, holds between many eternal entities as well as many non-eternal entities. In respect of being eternal and non-eternal of the relata of inherence there are three types of pairs:

(i) of which both the relata are eternal, as it is in case of ākāśa and its magnitude;
(ii) of which both the relata are non-eternal, as it is in case of a jar and its colour;
and (iii) of which one of the relata is non-eternal and the other eternal, as it is in case of a cow and cowness.
In this connection it may be pointed out well in advance that inheritance is eternal not because of that some of its relata are eternal.

Now, one may be tempted to make the first of the three a sufficient ground for arguing that inheritance is eternal. From this point of view an argument may be constructed in the form of pañcāṅga-nyāya or five-membered syllogism. The argument is shown below:

1. Inherence is eternal (pratijñā)
2. Because it is a relation holding between two eternal entities (hetu),
3. All cases of relations holding between two eternal entities are cases of eternal relations, as is in case of the relation between the absence of colour and air (udāharanā),
4. Inherence is such a relation (upanaya),
5. Therefore, inherence is eternal (nigamana).

In this inference 'being the relation holding between two eternal entities' is the probans, and the probandum is

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Such an argument can be formulated only being guided by some misconception about the relation of inherence. In order to remove such misconception the examination of the above argument is needed.
'eternalitv'. This argument is defective, because the vyāpti or the pervasion of the probans in the probandum is vyabhicāra or deviating. If the probans of an inference is known to be present in the locus of the absence of the probandum, the probans is said to be savyabhicāra. Now, the conjunction between two atoms may be taken to be the locus of the absence of the probandum of the inference. There the probans is present, because both the atoms are eternal; and the probandum is absent, because the conjunction between two atoms is a non-eternal relation. In this situation it is meaningless to say that wherever there is the case of a relation holding between two eternal entities, there is the case of an eternal relation, because the vyāpti is not between the two cases. So the above inference may be turned down by the opponent on the basis of the counter-instance of the conjunction between two atoms. It is, therefore, not worth proving the eternality of inherence on the ground that it is a relation between two eternal entities.

Apart from this logical fallacy there is an ontological mistake in the above argument. The mistake is done by assuming that the nature of the relation is determined here by the nature of the relata. Inherence, according to the Nyāya-Vaisēśikas, is eternal not because of that it holds between some eternal entities, but because it is not produced. No pair of its relata, eternal or non-eternal, can exist without having the relation of inherence between them. They bear this relation so long as both of them exist, and in the state
of dissolution when all non-eternal entities are destroyed, inherence continues to exist between its eternal relata as an independent real.

Illuminating the above point Praśastapāda says that although some of its relata are non-eternal, inherence is not non-eternal like conjunction, because inherence is, like sāttā, without any cause. This argument reflects that no uncaused entity can be non-eternal. Since inherence is uncaused, it cannot be non-eternal. As regards its being eternal it is no point whether its relata are eternal or not. Thus, inherence is eternal because it is uncaused, but not because its relata are uncaused.

Now, another argument may be given in favour of the view that inherence is eternal. Any positive entity which is known to be uncaused, may be claimed to be eternal. That which is uncaused is beginningless; it cannot have the moment of its origination. A positive entity which is without beginning cannot have its destruction; and, hence, it is eternal. This type of argument is available in Vātsyāyana's commentary on the Nyāya Sūtra, "vītarāgajanmādarsānāt." There in the context of self he argues that since self, being a positive entity, is beginningless, it must be held to be eternal. This

31 "sambandhyanityatvehi na saṁyogavadanityatvāṁ bhavavadā-kāraṇātvaḥ." - Praśastapāda (57), p.782.
32 - Nyāya Sūtra 3-1-25, Gotama (26), p.162.
33 "anādiśca rāgānubandhaḥ, iti siddham nityatvamiti." - Vātsyāyana (26), p.163.
argument holds good in case of inherence too. Like self, inherence is a positive entity and it is beginningless also, because it is uncaused. Thus, being a positive entity and beginningless inherence may be asserted to be eternal.

The point of Prasātapāda is further clarified in the elucidation of Śrīdhara. Following Prasātapāda he focuses on the point that the eternality of inherence cannot be proved by argument from analogy. He is sure of certain points, which, though can very well be thought about conjunction, cannot be thought about inherence. About conjunction it can be said that if the relata of a conjunction are non-eternal, then the conjunction also is non-eternal. But it cannot be said in connection with inherence. Inherence cannot be said to be non-eternal even if its relata are non-eternal. Conjunction is not without any cause. The relata of conjunction are held to be its inherent cause. The destruction of any of the relata of a particular conjunction causes termination of that conjunction. Since inherence is uncaused, the question of the destruction of its cause does not arise. Hence, inherence is held to be eternal.

Śrīdhara is, perhaps, afraid lest the opponent should construct a counter-inference that inherence must be a non-eternal

34 "yathā sambandhinoranityatve saṃyogasyānityatvam, na tathā samavāyinoranityatve samavāyasyānityatvam bhāvavadakāraṇaṭ-vāditi." - Śrīdhara (57), p.782.
relation, since an eternal relation cannot hold between two non-eternal entities. The opponent's inference may be shown in the following figure of five-membered syllogism:

(1) Inherence is non-eternal (pratijñā)
(2) because it is a relation holding between two non-eternal entities (hetu),
(3) all cases of relations holding between two non-eternal entities, are cases of non-eternal relations, as it is in case of the relation between the jar and the ground (udāharana),
(4) inherence is such a relation (upanaya),
(5) therefore, inherence is non-eternal (nigamana).

As a safeguard against such possible attack inherence is ontologically contradistinguished from conjunction. It cautions the opponent against the misconception that the two cases are analogous. Sridhara puts the caution that the two relata of inherence are not the cause of inherence, because they are merely the relata. The relata of inherence are not the cause of inherence as the relata of a conjunction are. They are not the cause of inherence, because in consequence of the destruction of any of its non-eternal relata inherence is not destroyed. Inherence continues to exist even when

35 "samavāyasya tu sambandhināv na kāraṇam, sambandhimātratvāt." - Ibid., p.783.
all its non-eternal relata cease to exist. Inherence is not, therefore, causally related with its relata as the conjunction is. The relata of inherence are its relata only. But the relata of a conjunction are not only its relata, but also its cause. So the argument which holds good to the case of conjunction should not be blindly transferred to the case of inherence.

Now the opponent may argue that if inherence is held to be eternal because of its resting elsewhere on the occasion of the destruction of some of its particular relata, then the conjunction also may be held to be eternal since conjunction also rests elsewhere on the occasion of its termination in a particular situation. This argument also is grounded on another misconception that inherence is said to be eternal because it exists always holding between some relata or other.

In this connection another point may be discussed in order to explain why inherence does independently exist, and why conjunction cannot. A conjunction exists as a product of its relata, and so it is destroyed at the destruction of its relata. The conjunctions which are destroyed and the conjunctions which are existing are not one and the same conjunction. They are different and distinct entities. They are distinguishable in terms of their cause and circumstances of origination. Conjunctions are, thus, many and
non-eternal; one terminates and another originates. But the inherence of which the relata are destroyed and the inherence which is known to exist somewhere are not different. They are one and the same, because inherence is neither produced nor destroyed. If one and the same relation is supposed to hold between infinite number of relata resting in different points of space and time, it cannot be non-eternal.
Section - 3

Samavāya is Self-related

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, inherence is admitted as a positive real which can directly relate itself with some other positive reals. It does not require the mediation of any other relation for this purpose. So it is held to be svatantra. Here svatantra means existing as related, but not related by any other relation as it is in case of conjunction. In favour of this view Prasātapāda says that inherence holds between its relata not by any other relation, so it is self-related. That is to say, inherence gets related with its relata by itself (svarupena).

36 "ekah samavāyah sarvatra svatantrah."
- Prasātapāda (57), p.779.

37 "svatantrah samyogavat sambandhāntareṇa na vartata ityarthah."
- Śrīdhara (57), p.780.

38 "samavāyasya nānyā vr̥ttirasti, tasmāt svātmavr̥ttih."
- Prasātapāda (57), p.784.

39 "samavāyasya vr̥ttyantaram nāsti tasmādasya 'svātmana' svarūpenaiva vr̥ttirna vr̥ttyantarenētyarthah."
- Śrīdhara (57), p.785.
When it is said that inherence gets related with its relata by itself, it means that inherence gets related with its relata by svarūpasambandha. Svarūpasambandha is one of the most interesting concepts of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. Gaṅgēśā defines it as that which is capable of generating the qualificatory cognition (visiṣṭapratyaya) without any other relation. Svarūpasambandha, in fact, is an entity playing a double role at the same time; the role of a relation and the role of a relatum of that relation. When a relatum itself functions as its relation, it is said to be a case of svarūpasambandha. It is virtually a term of a relation and is supposed to be that relation also. Since in case of a svarūpasambandha one of the relata, or terms, itself is held to be the relation, it is translated here as 'self-relation'. It means a relation embodied by one of its terms itself. It is at least an approximate, if not appropriate, translation of svarūpasambandha, and is favoured by parsimony.

Self-relatedness is a unique feature of inherence so far as inherence is a relation entitatively different from its relata. This peculiarity distinguishes inherence from the other five positive categories, namely, (i) substance (dravya), (ii) quality (guṇa), (iii) action (karma), (iv) universal (sāmānyya), and (v) ultimate-individuator (viśeṣa). None of these categories is held to be self-related.

One of the reasons why the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas have felt the necessity of self-relation (svarūpasambandha) in case of this relation of inherence, perhaps, is that no other relation in their ontology is found suitable for relating inherence with its relata. Here the opponent may wonder that so many relations like conjunction, etc. are admitted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology; but all of them are said to be unfit to act as the relation between inherence and its relata! The wonder is actually based on this wrong supposition that as conjunction is related with its relata by inherence, so inherence also must be related with its relata by some other relation. Here the opponent is supposed to raise the question - why should the relation between inherence and its relata be taken as the self-relation?

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas were not unaware of the query; rather they have taken the problem seriously. That is why they repeatedly put the caution that inherence is not to be taken at per with conjunction. The point on which conjunction and inherence may be said to stand on a par is that both conjunction and inherence are relation-entities and are different from their relata. But on the basis of this point of similarity their relations with their relata cannot be explained in the same way. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣiaks, conjunction is conceived to be related with its relata by inherence, because the relata of conjunction are the inherent
cause of the conjunction. But the case of inherence is absolutely different. Inherence is not a product of its relata as conjunction is. So, the argument which is applicable to the relation between conjunction and its relata, cannot be transferred to the case of the relation between inherence and its relata.

The supposition that inherence is not self-related has got to be complemented with any one of the following views:

(i) Inherence leaves itself unrelated with its relata.
(ii) The relation between inherence and its relata is conjunction.
(iii) The above relation is another inherence.
(iv) The above relation is identity.
(v) The above relation is something other than conjunction, inherence and identity.

But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are prepared to accept none of the above views, because each of these views involves certain serious problems. Now, a considerable length of discussion may be devoted to these problems.

(i) It cannot be said that inherence relates its relata leaving itself unrelated, because in that case no specific field can
be fixed for the knowledge of inherence. To say that inherence is unrelated is to assert that inherence is related with nothing, neither its relata nor non-relata. In this situation inherence may be conceived to relate indiscriminately any two entities like a table and cowness. Inherence being unrelated with everything can never be in a position to be selective of its relata, if at all it can be said to have some relata.

Besides this, the concept of an absolutely unrelated relation is a sheer absurdity. It is not intelligible how a relation relates two things and at the same time keeps itself unrelated, because this view is in contradiction with this axiomatic truth that a relation can never coexist with its relata being unrelated with them. A thing can have no bearing on that thing with which it is not related in any way. One is, thus, logically forced to admit that inherence is related with its relata in some way or other.

(ii) If conjunction is conceived to be the mediating relation between inherence and its relata, then the following difficulties arise.

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41 "na tāvadasambaddhasya sambandhakatvām yuktam, atiprasaṅgāt." - Śrīdhara (57), p.784.
First, conjunction is admitted by the Nyaya-Vaisesikas to be a kind of quality which as a relation holds between two substances only. Since conjunction is deemed to be operative exclusively between two substances, it cannot be thought that conjunction can relate inherence with its relata. Inherence can never be a relatum of the relation of conjunction, because inherence is not a substance.

Secondly, conjunction cannot hold between inherence and its relata, because conjunction holds between only two separable entities. But inherence is inseparably related with its relata. So far as its relata exist it can never exist without being related with them.

Thirdly, conjunction as a non-eternal relation holds between two such entities which can be its inherent cause. As inherence can never be the inherent cause of conjunction, conjunction cannot be conceived to hold between inherence and its relata. Conjunction only by virtue of its being a product of its relata can relate them. In this situation conjunction cannot be said to relate inherence with its relata, because conjunction can never be a product of inherence and its relata.

42 "sambhandhaścasya na sāmyogarūpaḥ sambhavati, tasya dravyā-śritatvāt." - Ibid.
(iii) The relation between inherence and its relata cannot be held to be another inherence, because once inherence is admitted to be one, the question of another inherence does not arise. Besides this, another serious difficulty which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are much afraid of is that if another inherence is supposed to relate inherence and its relata, then again another inherence may be supposed to relate the second inherence with the first, and then still another inherence to relate the third with the second. In this way an infinite number of inheritances the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas will have to admit instead of one in order to be consistent with the view that inherence is related with its relata by another inherence. So this view is given up.

(iv) The relation of identity cannot be held to be the relation between inherence and its relata, because identity is a relation between two such entities which are virtually non-different, but inherence is categorially different from its relata. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology inherence is admitted to be a distinct category. As the inter-categorial relation between positive reals it is distinct from those entities which it relates. So on no account it can be said that identity is the relation between inherence and its relata.

43 "nāpi samavāyaḥ, ekatvāt." - Ibid.
(v) It may be supposed that inherence is related with its relata by some other relation. But this supposition also is not of much value because it involves infinite regress. In order to be consistent with this supposition one has got to admit an infinite number of relations, because if inherence is said to require another relation in order to get related with its relata, then this new relation also may require another new relation in order to get related with its relata, and it will go ad infinitum. In order to avoid this infinite regress of relations the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold the view that inherence is self-related.

Here the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas may confront the opposition that if inherence as a relation is taken to be self-related, then conjunction also should be regarded as self-related since conjunction also is a relation. This charge, of course, is not logically proper, because it is a separate issue. It is not the point to be discussed here. Anyway, although inherence and conjunction both are relations, they differ from each other on a serious point. Conjunction is a product and it is produced as a result of the relation of inherence. So conjunction requires another relation in order to get related with its relata. Inherence does not require another relation for this purpose, because inherence is not a product. It is an eternal

44 "kṛtako hi samyogastasya vṛttyātmakasyāpi vṛttyantaramasti, kāraṇasamavāyasya kāryalakṣanatvāt." - Śrīdha (57), p.785.
relation. So unlike conjunction it can directly relate itself with its relata. The pith of this argument is that conjunction for its existence depends on another relation; so it cannot be said to be a self-related relation. But in contrast with conjunction inherence is held to exist in its own right. Inherence, to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, is an absolutely independent entity which for its existence depends on nothing whatsoever. Hence, neither the question of self-relation does arise in connection with conjunction, nor does the question of another relation arise in connection with inherence.

The most serious point on which the relation between a conjunction and its relata and the relation between inherence and its relata differ from each other is that the former as an entity is something in addition to its relata, while the latter as an entity is not something over above its relata. In order to make the point clear the complete situation may be demonstrated below in three phases.

Let us suppose, A and B are related by conjunction. The conjunction is related with A and B both as a third entity i.e. as something different from its relata which are A and B. This is the relational situation of the first phase. In the second phase the conjunction-of-A and B are related by inherence. Similarly the conjunction-of-B and A also are related by inherence. Inherence is related with the conjunction-of-A and B both as a third entity i.e.
as something different from its relata which are the conjunction-of-A and B, or the conjunction-of-B and A, as the case may be. In the third phase the conjunction and inherence are related by some relation. This relation, however, is not a third entity i.e. not something different from its relata which are the conjunction and inherence. It is rather embodied by its relatum itself; so this relation is called self-relation. Inherence always relates itself by this self-relation. So inherence is held to be self-related. The above relational situations may be shown in the following way:

\[
\begin{align*}
A \rightarrow Rc & \rightarrow B; \\
\text{and } A & \rightarrow Rc \rightarrow B, \\
Rc-\text{of-}A & \rightarrow Ri \rightarrow B, \\
\text{but not Rc-}\text{-of-}A & \rightarrow Ri \rightarrow B, \\
Rc-\text{of-}B & \rightarrow Ri \rightarrow A, \\
\text{but not Rc-}\text{-of-}B & \rightarrow Ri \rightarrow A, \\
Ri & \rightarrow Rc, \\
\text{but not Ri} & \rightarrow Rc, \\
Rc & = \text{Relation of conjunction.} \\
Ri & = \text{Relation of inherence.} \\
Rs & = \text{Self-relation.}
\end{align*}
\]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, thus, allow no separate relation to occur in between inherence and its relata, and come to conclude that the relation between inherence and its relata is self-relation.
It means, inherence gets related with its relata through itself. This self-relatedness is a unique characteristic which has offered inherence a distinguished status among the positive reals. By virtue of its being a self-related relation inherence has obtained an important place in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism where the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are able to resolve the infinite regress of relations which the opponents like Śāṅkara have reasonably complained of. But here a point is to be noted that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas did not devise inherence in order to meet the problem of the infinite regress of relations.

"vṛttyātmakatvāt svata evāyaṃ vṛttiriti."

- Ibid., pp. 784-85.

In this connection Padmanābha Miśra also may be quoted from his Kīrāṇavali-Bhāskara:

"svarūpasambandhasya samavāyaghaṭitatayā samavāyenaiva samavāyasya vṛttirityarthah. na hi svātiriktasamavāyena vṛttirlaksanam api tu samavāyeneti bhāvah."

- Padmanābha Miśra (51), p. 48.
Samavāya is a kind of Sense-Object Relation (sannikarṣa)

A non-eternal perception being a product must be dependent on some causal factor. The most important causal factor of a non-eternal perception, according to the Nyāya-Vaisēśikas, is a relation, technically known as 'sannikarṣa', between the perceiving sense-organ and the perceive object. From one point of view perception, in the Nyāya-Vaisēśika system, is divided into two kinds: (i) normal (laukika) perception and (ii) super-normal (alaukika) perception.

Accordingly the sense-object relation, the instrumental factor of perception, is divided broadly into two kinds: (i) normal and (ii) super-normal. The normal perception originates from the normal sense-object relation; and the super-normal perception originates from the super-normal sense-object relation.

46 "indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam ......
47 "evaṁ pratyakṣaṁ laukikālaukikabhedena dvividhāṁ,"
The normal sense-object relation (laukika sannikarsa) is of six kinds. They are:

1. conjunction (samyoga),
2. inherence-in-'the conjoined' (samyukatasamavāya),
3. inherence-in-'the inherent-in-the conjoined' (samyuktasamavetasamavāya),
4. inherence (samavāya),
5. inherence-in-the inherent' (samavetasamavāya),
6. the determinans-determinandum relation or the relation of 'characteriser-characterised' (viśesyaviśesānabhāva).

Though in the list inherence is separately admitted to be one kind of sense-object relation, still except the sixth all other types of sense-object relations are connected with inherence in some way or other. So as a sense-object relation inherence has got an important role in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology.

Gangesā holds this feature of sense-object relationship to be a proof of inherence. He argues: the perception of a quality,

48 "viśayendriyasambandho vyāpāraḥ sohpi sadviddihah."
- Kārīka 59, Viśvanātha (77), p.189.

49 The English translations are taken from Bhattacharya, Gopinath (1), p.176.

50 "yadvendriyapratiśattitvena samavāyasiddhiḥ."
or an action, or a universal occurs as a result of some relation with the sense-organ, because it is an originated perception, as it is in case of the perceptual cognition of a person holding a stick. Since in case of the perception of a quality, etc. the direct relation between the object of perception and the perceiving sense-organ is impossible, certain chain relations like inherence-in-'the conjoined', etc. are postulated and inherence is conceived as one common constituent relation of those chain relations.

In case of the perception of a quality like the colour of a jar the perceiving sense-organ, the eye, gets related with the jar, the substratum of the colour, by conjunction; and the colour of the jar is related with the jar by inherence. Thus, the relation between the perceiving eye and the perceived colour of the jar, is inherence-in-'the conjoined', and this relation is held to be the cause of the perception of the colour of the jar. In this way the other cases of perception are to be understood. Thus, in the chapter of sannikāraṇa of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises ontology and epistemology are found to be wonderfully interlinked. The ontic reals are made to play here serious epistemic roles, and by virtue of their epistemic service they are endowed with special ontic status. This is one of the striking features of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism.

Directly inherence is held to be operative in case of the
perception of sound. Sound, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, is
the special quality of the ākāśa. It is non-eternal, and is produced
in the ākāśa limited by the cavity of the ear. The ākāśa limited
by the cavity of the ear is the auditory sense-organ, and it is the
inherent cause of the sound. A sound is heard only when it is
produced in the hearing organ which is nothing but the ākāśa. On
the occasion of sound-perception the sound inheres in the ākāśa.
So accordingly inherence is held to be the operative sense-object
relation in case of the perception of sound.

The case of the perception of soundness the operative
sense-object relation is inherence-in-'the inherent', because the
object of perception, soundness, being a universal inheres in the
sound, and the sound again inherence in the ākāśa, the organ of
audition.

51 "sabdohmbaragunah" - Prasāstāpāda (57), p.692.
"ākāsasya vīśesagunah sābdah" - Visvānātha (77), p.692.
52 "ksanikah" - Prasāstāpāda (57), p.692.
53 "samavāyācchabdagrahaṇam" - Sūdhara (57), p.463.
54 "samavetasamavāyācchabadvagrahaṇam" - Ibid.
In this connection another point may be added that, in case of a perception, certainly non-eternal, the perceiving sense-organ is said to be the karana, and its relation with the object perceived is said to be the vyāpāra. Here the words 'karana' and 'vyāpāra' need a bit clarification.

The concept 'vyāpāra' is to be understood in the context of karana; and the concept 'karana' is to be understood in the context of kārana. The karana, according to Viśvanātha, is the uncommon cause (asadharana karana); and being uncommon consists in having the vyāpāra. Vyāpāra, the intermediary, is defined in the Rāmarudri annotation, and in the Tarkasamgraha-Dīpikā also, as that which originates from the uncommon cause and produces the effect of that uncommon cause.

An objection may be raised here that inherence, in spite of being one of the sense-object relations, cannot be treated as the intermediary of perception, because the intermediary is said to originate from the uncommon cause. The question of the origination of inherence does not arise since inherence is eternal. This problem is, however, raised and resolved in the Rāmarudri annotation. There

55 "asadharana karana asadharanatva vyaparatvam.
- Viśvanātha (77), p.189.

it is said that in the definition of vyāpāra, tajjanyatve sati
tajjanyajanako vyāpāraḥ, the word 'tajjanyatva' is to be taken in
the sense of 'tadadhīnasattākatva' which means 'having the existence
dependent on that'. The perception of sound, according to the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣikas, occurs only when the existence of the inherence specified
by sābdapratiyogikatva rests on the hearing organ which is nothing
but the ākāśa itself. On this consideration inherence may be accepted
to be a sense-object relation which is necessary for the perception
of sound.

As regards the relation of inherence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas
stand in a sharp opposition against the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, because
the Bhāṭṭas do not admit inherence. As they do not admit inherence
as a relation in their metaphysics, so they need not admit it as
a sense-object relation in their epistemology. In their system the
relation of inherence is replaced by the relation of identity
(tādātmya); and the sense-object relation admitted by them is named
accordingly.

While the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas admit six kinds of sense-object

57 Ibid.
58 Rāmarudra (77), p.189.
59 The word 'sābdapratiyogikatva' refers to the fact of having
sound as the pratiyogī.
relation, the Bhāttaas recognise only two kinds. They are: (i) conjunction (\textit{saṁyoga}) and (ii) identity-with-'the conjoined' (\textit{saṁyuktatādātmya}). The Bhāttaas reject inherence on the ground that sound, according to them, is not a non-eternal quality, but as eternal substance. So the sense-object relation through which sound is perceived is not inherence; but it is conjunction. On the occasion of the perception of sound sound comes in conjunction with the auditory sense-organ like other substances. Now, since in their system sound is held to be a substance, the Bhāttaas do not require inherence as a form of sense-object relation. In the same vein they dispense with the inherence-in-'the inherent' also. In this connection it appears needless to enter into the dispute whether the Bhāttaas are justified in making the replacement of inherence by identity. The dispute actually hangs on to another ontological issue: whether sound is a quality, or it is a substance.

But the reduction of six types of sense-object relation into two draws our attention a little further. Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa who appears to be a spokesman of the Bhāṭṭa school of the Mīmāṁsakas rejects the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas' six-fold division of the sense-object relation as superfluous. He points out that, (i) conjunction, (ii) inherence-in-'the conjoined', and (iii) inherence-in-'the inherent-

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{saṁnikarṣastu dvividhaḥ. saṁyogah saṁyuktatādātmyaṁ ceti.}
\end{enumerate}


\begin{enumerate}
\item Bhatt, P.G. (8), p.186.
\end{enumerate}
in-'the conjoined' — these are virtually the same. They are
differentiated by names only. He says so because, according to the
Bhātīyas, the relata of conjunction are admittedly different from each
other, whereas the relata of inherence are basically identical with
each other. Thus, among the three conjunction alone stands as a
relation, and the other two only nominally differ from it. There
is no factual evidence for admitting the two as distinguished
relations.

But Nārāyaṇa himself ultimately could not deny the
difference between the three. He accepts identity in place of
inherence, and accordingly he admits identity-with-'the conjoined'
to be a kind of sense-object relation in addition to conjunction.
From this it follows that he is aware of that the situations of
identity-with-'the conjoined' are different from the situations of
conjunction; otherwise he would not admit identity-with-'the
conjoined' as a different kind of sense-object relation. Again, it
is not the point where he is sure to stop. He clearly expresses his
view that as for the perception of colourness, etc. the opponents,
i.e. the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, have admitted a different kind of sense-
object relation, namely, inherence-in-'the inherent-in-the conjoined'
(samyuktasamavetasaṃavāya), so for the perception of them the
Bhātīyas may very well accept a third kind of sense-object relation
which may be called as identity with-'the identified-with-the

62 "tatrādyām trividham tāvannamātrena bhidyate."
- Nārāyaṇa (49), p.16.
conjoined' (सांयुक्तादात्मादात्मया) correspondingly. He finds no problem in this way of thinking. Sense-object relations, then, may be of three kinds instead of two kinds. He is, thus, not much assertive here as regards the number of divisions of the sense-object relation. But the न्याय-वैसेषिकास are very particular and firm of this number; in their system it is six, neither more nor less.

The most striking point in this part of the discussion is that Nārāyana recognises the problem which has forced the न्याय-वैसेषिकास to admit the above three kinds of the sense-object relation. Here the problem referred to is to determine whether in cases of the perception of a substance like a jar, a quality like colour, and a universal like colourlessness the sense-object relations are of the same kind or of the different kinds. Although he denies the necessity of admitting three separate relations on the part of the न्याय-वैसेषिकास, he himself is ready to accept each of them as different just labelling a different name. Here he is more occupied with the opponent than with the problem, because the nature of his discussion reveals that he is at the base much

63 "यद्वा यथा परे रूपत्वादिग्रहानोऽसा सांयुक्तसामावेतसामवायमार्ग्यं तथाभिन्नकमामपि सांयुक्तादात्मादात्ममायाः नाम त्रित्याः सांविकारसहस्तुः काहेनाथ।" - Ibid., p.15.

64 "तस्माद वदेह त्रेहाः वा सांविकारसः।" - Ibid.
impressed by the Nyāya-Vaśēśika theory of the sense-object relation. So the chief note of his criticism is tuned with the fundamental divisions of the sense-object relation of the Nyāya-Vaśēśikas; and it is concentrated upon the number and not upon the matters of fact.

In regard to the other three kinds of the sense-object relation of the Nyāya-Vaśēśikas Nārāyaṇa's attitude is somewhat different. He comments that they are baseless. He argues for his non-acceptance of inherence and inherence-in-'the inherent' from the ontological point of view that they are not necessary for the perception of sound and soundness since sound is not a quality of the auditory sense-organ. As it is not a quality, it cannot be said to inhere in the ākāśa of the aural cavity. So the question of admitting inherence as the sense-object relation in case of the perception of sound does not arise at all. If the question of inherence does not arise, the question of inherence-in-'the inherent' automatically subsides. But on the point of the ontological status of sound the position of the Nyāya-Vaśēśikas is opposed to that of the Bhāṭṭas, and the Vedāntins. So although inherence as a sense-object relation is needed in the Nyāya-Vaśēśika system for the perception of sound, the Bhāṭṭas and the Vedāntins reject it. As regards the relation of characteriser-characterised the Nyāya-Vaśēśikas think that though this kind of sense-object relation

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65 "smavāyādayastvanye sāṁniharṣā nirāśrayāh." - Ibid., p.16.
absence is grasped. According to the Naiyāyikas the apprehension of inherence also is effectuated from this relation. But Nārāyaṇa says that this kind of sense-object relation is to be discarded, because absence is not subject to perception at all and inherence is as unreal as a hare's horn.

Inherence as a sense-object relation is an epistemological need felt within an ontological system. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas have the following commitments regarding the origination, nature and ontological status of sound.

1. Sound is a non-eternal quality.
2. Sound is produced in the substance, ākāśa.
3. Ākāśa is the inherent cause of sound; and sound inheres in the ākāśa.
4. This ākāśa is limited by the aural cavity, and it is identical with the auditory sense-organ.
5. Sound is heard only when it is produced in the hearing organ.
6. Sound and its locus, the organ of audition, are inseparable, because sound cannot exist without its substratum, the ākāśa limited by the cavity of the ear.

Now, all these points taken together amounts to that the
operative relation which effectuates the perception of sound cannot be anything other than inherence, because sound and the organ of hearing are two inseparable entities of which one is the substance and the other is its quality. That their relation is inherence is an ontological demand which the Nyāya-Vaiśeśikas are committed to accept. On this point the position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeśikas is stated clearly by Viśvanātha in his Muktāvalī. He says that the sense-object relation which stands for the cause of the perception of sound is inherence specified by the organ of hearing; and the sense-object relation from which the perception of sound originates is inherence in the inherent specified by the organ of hearing. The author of the Tarkasaṅgраha also represents the Nyāya-Vaiśeśikas' view likewise. He says that in case of the perception of sound with the ear the sense-object relation is inherence, because of that the ākāśa in the ear-cavity is the organ of audition, that sound is a quality of the ākāśa, and that the relation which holds between a quality and that which possesses that quality, i.e. substance, is inherence; whereas in case of the perception of soundness the sense-object relation is inherence in the inherent, because of that soundness belongs to sound by the relation of inherence and again sound belongs

66 "śabdapratyakṣe śrotravacchinna-samavāyaḥ, śabdasamaveta-śrāvanapratyakṣe śrotravacchinna-samaveta-samavāyaḥ kāraṇam."
- Viśvanātha (77), p.192.
to the auditory sense-organ by the relation of inherence.

On the basis of the above discussion it may be concluded that as a sense-object relation inherence is quite justifiably recognised by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, and it acquires an epistemological dimension in their theory of perception. So not only as an ontic real, but from the epistemological standpoint also the notion of inherence is indispensable for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

67 "śrotreṇa śabdāśākṣātkāre samavaśyaḥ sannikarṣaḥ. karṇavivara-vartyākāśasya śrotatvāt, śabdasyāḥkkāśasaguṇatvāt, gunaṇauniṣoṣa samavaśyaḥ. śabdasyaśākṣātkāre samavetasamavaśyaḥ sannikarṣaḥ. śrotrosamavete śabde śabdavasya samavaṣṭaḥ." - Annaṁbhatta (4), p.84.