CHAPTER - III

Chief Arguments in favour of Samavāya

The preceding chapter, however, has offered an account of the blows which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of inherence has received from the different systems of Indian philosophy time to time. Now this chapter undertakes to consider certain leading arguments which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas have presented as proofs of inherence. Here from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school three champion authors of the different ages are selected for this purpose. They are:

(1) Vallabha,
(2) Gangesa,
(3) Mahādeva Bhatta.

Their arguments will be discussed here from the Nyāya-Līlāvatī, the Tattvacintāmani and the Dinakarī commentary on the Siddhāntamuktāvalī of Viśvanātha in three separate sections.
The Nyāya-Lilāvatī of Vallabha is a highly reputed manual representing mainly the Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy. It is a few centuries older than the Tattvacintāmaṇi, the monumental work of Gaṅgesā. In the Nyāya-Lilāvatī Vallabha offers some arguments in favour of the view that inherence exists. In this connection he raises the question in a clear and straightforward way: what is the evidence of inherence, perception or inference¹? Here it is necessary to note the point: the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika differ from one another regarding the pramāṇa by which inherence is cognised. Inherence, according to the Vaiśeṣika, is imperceptible and is known by inference², while the Naiyāyika holds the view that the perceptual knowledge of inherence is possible. This point is, however, the subject of the fifth chapter. In the present context the point of interest is whether perception or inference can at all stand as a proof for the actual existence of inherence.

1. "kim punah samavāyasiddhau mānam, pratyakṣamanumānam vā?"
   - Vallabha (73), p.704.

2. "ata evātindriyah .... tasmādiḥ buddhyanumeyah samavāya iti."
   - Praśastapāda (57), pp.784-85.

3. "nyāyanaye tu pratyakṣa eva samavāyah......"
   - Vallabha (73), p.718.
It may be supposed that the perceptual cognition like 'this cloth is in these threads', provides the evidence of the existence of inherence. But a clear examination shows that this supposition cannot stand the test of reason. If it is held that inherence is perceived, in that case inherence will have to be treated either (i) as the basis of the awareness of the substratum, or (ii) as the basis of the awareness of the superstratum, or (iii) as the basis of the awareness of both the substratum and the superstratum.

But Vallabha shows that none of these alternatives is possible.

(i) The first alternative is not possible, because in that case inherence may be held responsible for the cognition of the substratum in both of its relata.

(ii) The second alternative also is not possible, because in that case inherence may be held responsible for the cognition of the superstratum in both of its relata.

5. "samavāyo ṣyāḥdharuddham vā kuryāt, ādheyuddhim vā, udhayabuddhim vā ?" - Ibid.
Neither the third alternative is possible, because in that case inherence may be held responsible for both the cognition of the substratum and the cognition of the superstratum in both of its relata.

It may next be supposed that the perception of inherence occurs when we cognise the tie between a universal and the individual having that universal. But this supposition also cannot ultimately stand. If it is held that inherence is perceived on such occasion, in that case inherence may be cognised in either of the following three ways:

(i) as related with a universal and the individual having that universal;

(ii) as related with the quality and the substance having the quality, etc.

(iii) as a mere relation.

The first alternative is not possible, because it ultimately leads to infinite regress. If inherence is supposed to relate a universal and the individual having that universal, in that case
another relation is to be supposed by which inherence itself may be related with them. In this way the requirement of another relation stands recurring.

(ii) The second alternative also is not possible, because in that case the problem of the first alternative persists, and at the same time it involves a further problem. The problem is that then inherence may be cognised to be the relation holding only between a quality and the substance having that quality, etc., and not between a universal and the individual having that universal.

(iii) Nor is the third alternative possible, because in that case no relation is, in fact, perceived. It is, of course, a much debated philosophical issue whether a relation is ever known as a mere relation. It is, however, held by Vallabha that the knowledge of a relation as a mere relation without any reference to its relata is an absurd position. If such knowledge is admitted at all, the relation, so known, ceases to be a relation, because then it is known as something on a par with its relata which are not known to be relations. On this consideration it may be said that while a relation is known, it is invariably and necessarily known with reference to

15 "netaraḥ. anyatraivasambandhabodhaprasaṅgāt." - Ibid., pp.704-05.

16 "na tṛṭīyaḥ. kkacidapi sambandhapratyāyānupapateḥ." - Ibid., p.705.
its relata, because it is by virtue of this reference that a relation as a relation can be the object of knowledge. So in the East, as in the West, most of the systems of philosophy are in favour of the view that the knowledge of a relation as a mere relation is not possible. They hold it perhaps on the ground that 'a mere relation' cannot be a faithful interpretation of one's own empirical experience. If one claims to have such experience at all, in that case, perhaps, 'a mere entity' is more reasonable and appropriate interpretation of that experience.

Vallabha, thus, ultimately holds the Vaiśeṣika position, and shows that perception cannot provide any proof of inherence. Next he proceeds to see whether inference can provide it, and in this connection he critically examines a number of traditional inferences. Some major points of his examinations are taken up here for discussion.

One of the grounds on which the inferential arguments in favour of the existence of inherence are generally framed is the cognition 'it is here'. Historically it is, perhaps, the oldest of all the grounds so far furnished for admitting inherence. Inherence is said to be inferred from the cognition 'it is here', because the

17 "ihețibuddhihṛīṅgamiti cet." - Ibid., p.706.
cognition like 'the cloth is in these threads' cannot be accounted for until and unless a relation is supposed to exist in between the cloth and the threads. As for example, the cognitions, like 'the fruit is on the pot', are explained on the basis of the relation of conjunction. Similarly, the cognitions, like the cloth is in these threads', are to be explained on the basis of some relation. Here, of course, it cannot be the relation of conjunction, for the relation of conjunction is subject to destruction; but the relation between the cloth and its threads is not subject to destruction.

Vallabha says that as a ground of the inference of inherence the cognition 'it is here' is not sound. He says so on the ground that inherence is not perceived on the occasion of the cognition 'it is here'. He has already shown that it cannot be reasonably said that inherence is perceived. As inherence is not perceived on the said occasion, inherence cannot be said to be the object of the cognition 'it is here'. If the cognition 'it is here' does not have inherence as its object, then this cognition cannot be held to be the probans through which inherence may be inferred.

One may argue here that if inherence is not perceived

18 "na. samavāyaḥpratyakṣatve ihetibuddhirnirviṣayāyā anupapatteḥ." - Ibid.
as the object of the cognition 'it is here', then a relation other than
inherence, namely, the substratum-superstratum relation may be
perceived; and this relation may be said to be an object of that
cognition. But this argument also is not acceptable mainly for two
reasons:

In the first place, another relation will be required in
order to relate this substratum-superstratum relation with the
substratum and the superstratum. This requirement of another relation
will go ad infinitum. Hence, the argument that the
substratum-superstratum relation is the object of the cognition 'it is
here', involves infinite regress.

Secondly, in this case the cognition 'it is here' of which
the substratum-superstratum relation is an object may be held to be
the probans through which the substratum-superstratum relation can
be inferred, not inherence. Here the argument involves the defect of
admitting something else.

Thus, by no means the cognition 'it is here' serves as

19 "ādhārādheyabhāvākhyāṁ sambandhāntarameva todgocara iti
cet." - Ibid.
20 "duṣitaḥvāt,..." - Ibid.
21 "padārthāntarasvākāraprasāngācca." - Ibid.
the ground for the inference of inherence.

It may next be argued that inherence may be inferred on the basis of the cognition of something as determined by universal, etc. When substance is cognised as determined by quality or by action or by universal, or substance or quality or action is cognised as determined by universal, a relation between the determinans and the determinandum is inferred. As far example, inherence may be inferred from the cognition of the cow as determined by cowness. Here inherence is inferred as the relation between the cow and cowness. But this argument does not appear to be a sound one for two reasons.

First, the supposition that inherence can be inferred from any cognition of the determined appears to claim too much, because some relation from it. The above argument may be countered with the instance of the cognition of absence. When the absence of fruit on the pot is cognised, the absence of fruit is cognised to be the determinans and the pot to be the determinandum. The cognition of the absence of fruit on the pot is, therefore, a cognition of the determined. The

22 "ata eva heti pratyayopapattau samavaya numanaprasangacca."
   - Ibid.

23 "jatyadivisista pratyayo lingamiti cenna." - Ibid., pp.706-07
relation which is inferred from this cognition of the determined is not inherence. It is the self-relation. It is thus, seen that the cognition of the determined ultimately stands as the proof of a relation which is other than inherence.

Secondly, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas emphasize on the point that the relation between the determinans and the determinandum is the cause of the cognition of the determined. Here this determinans — determinandum relation or the self-relation alone can be held responsible for the cognition of the determined. There is no need of saying that inherence is inferred through certain cognitions of the determined. The point of inherence appears absolutely redundant here.

Vallabha, thus, ultimately shows that neither the cognition 'it is here' (ihetibuddhi), nor the cognition of something as determined by universal, etc. (jātyādiviśiṣṭapratyaya) can serve as a strong ground for the inference of inherence. Next he suggests a third probans, namely, being an uncontradicted usage of 'the determined' which has only the positive entities as its objects (bhāvamātraviśayābādhitaviśiṣṭavyavahārah). Here he says that the usage as determined by universal, etc. invariably follows from some relation, because it

24 "vīsesanaviśeṣyabhāvasya sambandhāntarasya sīkāraprasaṅgat".
   - Ibid., p.707.
25 "tata eva viśiṣṭa bodhotpatvau samavāyānanumānaprasaṅgācca".
   - Ibid.
is an uncontradicted usage of 'the determined' which has only the positive entities as its objects, as it is in case of the usage 'the jar is on the ground'. Now some light may be thrown upon the structure of this inference for the sake of the proper clarification of the content therein.

In the above inference 'following invariably from some relation' (sambandhanyatatva) is the probandum. The subject is 'the usage as determined by universal, etc', (jätayādigocaro visiṣṭavyavahāra.)

The probans of the inference is 'being an uncontradicted usage of 'the determined' which has only the positive entities as its objects (bhāvamātraviśaya abādhitaviṣṭavyavahāraiva.) Here the word 'vyavahāra' means usage or expression. The word 'visiṣṭa', i.e. 'determined', is used as a safeguard against the cases of non-determined, such as two qualities, or two actions. The word 'abādhita', i.e. 'uncontradicted', is used in order to exclude the cases of contradiction, such as, air determined by colour. The word 'bhāvamātra', i.e. only the positive entities, is given in the probans in order to prevent its deviation to the cases of absence. As for example, the usage 'the ground is determined by the jar' follows from

26 "jätayādigocaro visiṣṭavyavahāraḥ sambandhanyataḥ bhāvamā- traviśayābādhitaviṣṭavyavahāravatāt saghaṭaṁ bhūta lamīti vyavahāraravat". - Ibid., pp.709-10.
a relation, since it is an uncontradicted usage of 'the determined' which has only the positive entities as its objects. For the same reason the usage as determined by universal, etc., - e.g. the cow is determined by cowness - may be claimed to follow from a relation. In the former case the usage follows from the relation of conjunction the locus of which can be substance alone, while in the latter case the usage follows from the relation of inherence which holds between all the positive categories excepting itself.

One of the points on which this inference distinguishes itself from the other inference which is widely given as a proof of inherence is that the word 'vīśīstapratyaya' or the cognition of the determined is replaced here by the word 'vīśīstavyavahāra' or the usage of 'the determined'. A possible reason of this replacement may be to shift the ground from the private pratyaya to the public expression of the pratyaya. The word 'pratyaya' means only cognition, whereas the word 'vyavahāra' means cognition as it is expressed in language. Expression, perhaps, is the more appropriate mark of the structure of the cognition. Cognition is subjective state and we can known its exact form from its expression only. However, the expression, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, always presupposes cognition.

The pivotal point of the above inference, however, is that without the knowledge of any relation the usage of
'the determined' is not possible. Here the opponent may say that the knowledge of some relation is not much needed for the usage of 'the determined'. Such usage may be possible on the basis of the knowledge which has certain objects like quality and substance, or absence and substance, etc. As for example, in case of the cognition 'the ground is without a jar', the absence of the jar and the ground are the objects. Having them as objects a knowledge may occur and this knowledge may be supposed to be the cause of the usage of 'the determined'. Hence, there is no need of bringing the question of relation in order to account for the usage of 'the determined'.

To the opponent if appears that no relation is inferred to be the cause of the usage of 'the determined'. How, then, is the relation inferred? The problem still remains unsolved. Vallabha answers here that the relation is inferred from the usage of 'the determined' not on the ground of its causing the usage, but on the ground of its pervasiveness over the usage. What follows from this

27 "asati sambandhāvabhāse viśīstavyavahārah kuta iti cet. gunadravyavisayāt buddhivīśeṣāditi brūmāḥ. aghatāṁ bhūtalam-tyatra ghatābhāvabhūtalavisayādbuddhivīśeṣādīva". - Ibid., pp.710-11.
28 "kutastarhi sambandhānunānam, buddhivīśeṣādeva viśīstavyavahāropapatteḥ". - Ibid., p.711.
29 "na hi tathāsatī viśīstavyavahārajana- sambandhānunānam, api tu tadvyāpakatvena". - Ibid.
argument is that all cases of the relation may not necessarily be followed by the usage of 'the determined', but all cases of the usage of 'the determined' necessarily follow from the relation. Thus, in this argument the one-sided relation of pervasion (vyāpti) between the probans, the usage of 'the determined', and the probandum, the relation, is claimed on the basis of the fact that some sort of relation regularly precedes the usage of 'the determined' without exception. To be precise, the pervasiveness of the relation covers those instances in which the relation is known to be present on the occasion of the said usage.

The usages like 'the ground is determined by the jar' may plead in favour of the above claim. Here the perceptual cognition of the relation of conjunction between the jar and the ground occurs first, and then it is followed by the usage 'the ground is determined by the jar'. Vallabha, thus, first cares to prove that there is the relation of pervasion between the usage of 'the determined' and the relation, and then on the basis of it he proceeds to show that there is the role of some relation in those cases also where such usage occurs without the perception of any relation. As for example, in case of the usage 'a cow is determined by cowness' Vallabha admits that no relation between cowness and the cow is perceived. In addition to this he admits more that some relation is there between cowness

30 "vyāpakatvam ca tasya drśtāntapratītameva, ...." - Ibid.
and the cow because it is a case of the usage of 'the determined'. He, of course, does not keep this relation within the depth of unknowability. He concludes that this relation is inherence and it is known through inference. This contention proves that Vallabha is against the admission of the perception of inherence.

One more point is there which is yet to be discussed. If it is the case that in case of the usage 'the cow is determined by cowness' the relation between cowness and the cow is inherence, then in case of the usage 'the ground is determined by the absence of the jar' the relation between the absence of the jar and the ground may also be taken to be inherence. Anticipating this point of objection Vallabha offers the rejoinder that in case of the usage 'the ground is without a jar' the relation between the absence of the jar and the ground cannot be held to be inherence, because it involves certain problems.

31 "tadabhāveḥpi tadvalena sambandhānumānam."
- Ibid.
First, if it is supposed that this relation is inherence, then the ground will be the inherent cause of the absence of the jar. From this it follows that the destruction of the absence of the jar is an effect of the destruction of the ground. But, in fact, the absence of the jar is never destroyed as a result of the destruction of the ground on which it is.

Secondly, it involves another more serious problem. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology only a positive entity can have its inherent cause. As for example, a jar is a positive entity and its parts are its inherent cause. Accordingly, if the ground is held to be the inherent cause of the absence of the jar, then the absence of the jar remains an absence no more. It becomes a positive entity. The supposition that the relation between the absence of the jar and the ground is inherence sets itself on this conceptual absurdity that absence is a positive entity. In order to avoid this absurdity this relation cannot be said to be inherence.

Vallabha, thus, being a representative mainly of the Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy holds that though perception cannot provide any proof of inherence, its existence can be inferentially proved.

32 dhvamsasya samavāyikāraṇavattve (na) bhāvatvāpatteḥ. - Ibid., pp. 711-12.
Section - 2

Gaṅgēśa

This section profiles Gaṅgēśa's discourse upon inherence with a view to see how far the cognition of the determined (viśistapratīti) is useful as a ground for admitting inherence in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology. In this chapter on inherence, samavāyavādaḥ, of the Tattvacintāmaṇi Gaṅgēśa begins with a doubt; and this doubt has been the spring of a major portion of his critical examinations of the theory of inherence. Before getting into his examinations a little clarification of this doubt is necessary. His point of doubt is: whether the relation holding between the determinans (viśesana) and the determinandum (viśeṣya) is the object of the cognitions like 'the white cloth', or not.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology the cognition like 'the white cloth' is considered to be a cognition of the determined. The cognition of the determined is also called savikalpaka-jñāna and is understood in contrast with nirvikalpaka-jñāna. The former type of cognition is translated in English in many ways. Such as: (a) the cognition with modes; (b) the constructive cognition; (c) the determinate cognition; (d) the judgemental cognition; (e) the

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33 "vipratipattiśca śuklaḥ paṭa iti pratitiḥ viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyasyasam- bandhaviṣayā na veti" - Gaṅgēśa (24), p.640.
qualificatory cognition, etc. Here the translation lastly mentioned is adopted. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view regarding the construction of this kind of cognition is as follows: Such a cognition must have three objects. They are:

(i) the determinans (vīśesana),
(ii) the determinandum (vīśeṣya),
(iii) the relation between the above two (samsarga).

There is a causal order behind the organisation of these three objects in a qualificatory cognition. First, the cognition of the determinans occurs in the form of the non-qualificatory cognition (nirvikalpaka-jñāna), then this cognition of the determinans stands for the cause of the qualificatory cognition. It is only after the origination of the cognition of the determinans that the determinans can possibly be cognised to be related with the determinandum in a qualificatory cognition.

In case of the cognition 'the white cloth', the white colour is the determinans, and it is known to be related with the cloth which is the determinandum. Gaṅgeśa raises no question against the point that the white colour or the cloth is the object of the qualificatory cognition 'the white cloth'. He rather throws doubt on the point of their relation. Here he prepares to justify the contention that the relation between the white colour and the cloth is an object of the qualificatory cognition 'the white cloth'. His doubt is, thus, initial and highly programmatic.
In a qualificatory cognition something is generally cognised to be determined by quality, or by action, etc. Here it may be argued that the relation between the determinans and the determinandum must be an object of the qualificatory cognition, because without any relation the pairs of reals, such as, substance and quality, cannot appear in the cognition as the determinandum and the determinans. If there were no relation between them, then two mutually unrelated entities like two qualities, or two actions, etc. might very well be known to be the determinans and the determinandum. But two qualities, or two actions, or any two reals like a quality and an action are never cognised to be so. There can be no cognition like 'a red sound', because the red colour and sound are in no way related with each other on the basis of which one of them may be known to be determined by the other. Thus, what follows from the fact that we do never have the cognitions like 'a red sound', is that a qualificatory cognition must have a relation as its object in addition to the determinans and the determinandum; otherwise the system through which something is known to be determined by something else cannot be explained.

Now Gaṅgeśā intends to remove the doubt with which he started with the help of the following inference: the cognition like 'a black jar', etc. has the relation between the determinans and the determinandum as its object, because it is a qualificatory
cognition, as it is in case of the cognition of a person holding a stick. In this inference the subject (pakṣa) is the cognition like 'a black jar', etc. : the probandum (sādhya) is 'having the determinans-determinandum relation as the object'; and the probans (hetu) is 'being a qualificatory cognition'. The cognition of a person holding a stick is an example (udāharana) in support of the inference.

The above inference serves as the ground of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that the determinans-determinandum relation is the object of every qualificatory cognition. In the cognition like 'a black jar', the relation between the black colour and the jar is objectified along with the black colour and the jar. If it were not so, the difference between the cognition of the black colour and the jar (samuhālambana-jñāna) and the cognition of the black jar (visiṣṭa-jñāna) is left unexplained. The two cognitions are different in the sense the former is a non-qualificatory cognition; while the latter is a qualificatory cognition. This difference between the two cognition is quite obvious and it lies in the fact that the relation between the black colour (the determinans) and the jar (the determinandum) is an object of the cognition of the black jar which is a qualificatory cognition; but this relation is not an object of the

34 "niloghaḥ ityādyanubhavo visēsaṇa - visēṣyasambandhaviṣayah visiṣṭapratītvāt dandijñānavaḍiti ...". - Ibid., p.640-41.
cognition of the black colour and the jar. The cognition is not a qua
lificatory cognition; it is the cognition of only two things not 
related with each other as the determinans and the determinandum. 
Their difference cannot otherwise be accounted for.

Although it is proved here that a relation is involved 
in a qualificatory cognition as its object, there is no reason to think 
that the opponent will accept this relation to be inherence. Rather 
objection may be raised from the opponent's court that the probans 
of the given inference is fallacious since it overcovers the cognitions 
like 'the ground is without a jar', 'this is known', 'that is desired', 
etc. These cognitions are also the qualificatory cognitions, because 
in the cases mentioned above the ground is cognised to be determined 
by the absence of the jar, this by knowledge, and that by desire.
Here the probans of the inference, 'being a qualificatory cognition', 
is present in all the cases. But in addition to the ground, the absence 
of jar, etc. no relation has been the object of these cognitions. These 
are all, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the cases of self-relation 
(svarūpasambandha) which is not anything over and above its relata.
Now Gaṇgeśa offers the above inference as a proof of inherence, but 
it allegedly coincides with certain other cases i.e. the cases of self-
relation. It is, therefore, to be rejected as vyabhicāri or imperfect 
due to deviation.

35 "aghaṭaṁ bhūtalaṁ ṣāntamiṣṭaṁ kṛtancetyatra vyabhicārāt". 
- Ibid., p.641.
The inference may survive the above blow. In its defence it may be said that there is some bar in the cases cited above. It is due to this bar that the cognitions like 'the ground is without a jar' cannot have inherence as their object. To state clearly, a qualificatory cognition involves inherence as its object provided that there is no bar against this involvement. So one may suggest here that the adjective 'bādhakābhāva', i.e. the absence of bar, is to be used as an appendage on the part of the probans of the inference. This adjective may safeguard the inference against the above objection.

This suggestion invites the opponent to argue that as a result of this insertion of the adjective, namely, the absence of bar, the probans of the inference loses all its importance, because if in any case of cognition there is no bar against having inherence as its object, the cognition will have it. For this the cognition need not be a qualificatory cognition. Besides this, the absence of bar is a too general proof, if it is a proof at all, and it emancipates inference from all rules and principles of logic. The point of danger that it involves is that it allows one to infer everything from everything else, and from nothing also, if one can.

Following this line of thinking the opponent may construct a counter-argument that the cognition like 'a black jar', etc. does not have inherence as its object, since there is no proof in support
of this. This counter-argument stands on this simple logic: as the absence of bar is a proof, so the absence of proof is a bar. If the absence of bar is considered as a proof of inherence, then, since inherence is yet to be proved, the absence of its proof may stand as a bar against having inherence as the object. An inference which is in this way charged by a counter-inference of equal strength is technically called satpratipakṣa. Each of such two inferences is hit hard by the other and as a result of it neither of them can stand valid. Here the opponent is successful at least to cry down the view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas that inherence is an object of the qualificatory cognition.

If it is said on behalf of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas that inherence is the object of the qualificatory cognition in those cases where the determinans is a quality, or an action, etc. because there inherence is known to be the object of that cognition. This argument also is not tenable for two reasons.

First, inherence cannot be said to be known as the object of the qualificatory cognition, because, though there is no bar against knowing so, still there is no proof on the basis of which one can hold it evident. If there is neither any bar against nor any proof

36 "bādhakābhāvasya śādhakatvavat śādhakābhāvasya bādhakatvāt." - Ibid.
for the knowledge of something, it is left with doubt. So in this situation if inherence is said to be known at all, it is sure to be objected to by the opponent.

Secondly, it is a circular argument, because once a cognition is said to be a qualificatory cognition for its having inherence as an object, and again a cognition is said to have inherence as its object, on account of its being a qualificatory cognition. Such an argument is said to involve the defect of anyonyāśraya i.e. being reciprocally based. In this type of argument something is asserted on the basis of something else, and again the latter is asserted on the basis of the former. That is to say, an argument, in which two things are set to prove each other by turn, cannot be considered a sound argument.

Although the opponent agrees to the point that the relation between the determinans and the determinandum is an object of the qualificatory cognition, the dispute still remains as regards whether this relation is inherence, or it is something else. Gaṅgeśa clearly states his apprehension of the opponent's view that some relation is there in the cognition of the determined as the object of that cognition; but (i) it is neither conjunction, (ii) nor it is inherence, (iii) nor it is a mere relation, (iv) nor is it the determinant relation of that qualificatory cognition which is
distinguished from that which is not the qualificatory cognition. Now these points may be discussed in the following four paragraphs.

The relation between the determinans and the determinandum, which is an object of the qualificatory cognition, cannot be conjunction, because the field of conjunction is restricted to the realm of substance only. Conjunction holds exclusively between two substances, because it is produced in substances and nowhere else. But a qualificatory cognition may be such in which neither the determinans nor the determinandum is substances. For example, in the cognition of the red colour and determined by redness the determinans, redness, is a universal, and the determinandum, the red colour, is a quality. Their relation cannot be conjunction.

The said relation cannot be claimed to be inherence, because inherence is yet to be established. In the eye of the opponent the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are in an awkward position with the case of the cognition like 'the ground is without a jar'. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas

37 "sambandhasca na saṁyogah saṁavāyo vānyataro vā bādhādasi-ddhervā. na pī sambandhātmātraṁ, jñāpakaṭvādinī siddhasādhanaṁ. na pī avīśśavāvṛttavīśśajñāṇāṇāni yāmakāḥ, abhāvaṣhānādāviva svarūpasambandherārthāntaravāt".

- Ibid., p.642.
can neither deny that it is a qualificatory cognition, nor can say that here the relation between the determinans, the absence of the jar, and the determinandum, the ground, is inherence.

If this relation is asserted to be a mere relation, then Gaṅgeśa's inference involves the defect, namely, siddhasādhana. It means 'assertion of the asserted'. Here the opponent shares the view that there must be some relation which is an object of the qualificatory cognition otherwise the difference between the cognition of the determinans and that of the determined is left unaccounted. The given inference asserts this much and nothing more. It ultimately provides a proof of that which is already proved.

This also cannot be said that the relation which is an object of a qualificatory cognition is responsible for that cognition. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that in case of the cognition like 'the ground is without a jar', etc. the determinant (niyāmaka) relation is self-relation. Now on the basis of this example the opponent may conclude that self-relation is generally responsible for any qualificatory cognition whatsoever. Thus, the above inference which is employed with the purpose of asserting inherence, the opponent may think, is ultimately asserting self-relation. On this consideration
the opponent may say that the inference in question is defective, because it is asserting something other then that which it aims to assert. This defect is technically called arthāntara. It means 'assertion of something else'.

Gaṅgeśa, thus, anticipates the opponent's view that the inference furnished as a proof of inherence ultimately stands nowhere. He suggests that an attempt of defence may be made by qualifying the probandum of the inference with the adjective, sambandhibhimmatva, i.e. being different from the relata. With this qualification the inference runs thus: the cognition like 'a black jar', etc. has the determinans-determinandum relation which is different from its relata as its object, because it is a qualificatory cognition.

The opponent may not accept this modified inference also as a sound one, because the probans of it does not cover the cognitions of absence and the cognitions of the special qualities of the self, e.g. knowledge, desire, etc. These are all the qualificatory cognitions. Although the above cognition are the qualificatory cognitions, the inference with the supplement, 'being different from the relata', on the part of its probandum, excludes them. The ground of this exclusion is that in cases of such cognitions the relation between the determinans and the determinandum is not different from its relata.
Apart from this, the inference appears to be defective from some other point of view. It is obvious that if the probans of an inference is validly known to be present in the locus of the absence of the probandum of that inference, the probans is said to be deviant (vyabhicāri). In case of the inference under consideration the cognition like 'the ground is without a jar', etc. is the locus of the absence of the probandum, because the relation which is objectified in the cognition is not other than its relata. Since the cognition like 'the ground is without a jar', etc., stands to be the locus of the absence of the probandum and at the same time is granted to be the qualificatory cognition, the inference in question, even in its revised figure, cannot be treated as valid.

Gaṅgesa serves another brilliant argument formulated by the Nāyika Naiyāyikas in favour of inherence. It runs as follows: the qualificatory cognition is which something is known to be determined by quality, or by action, or by universal, has the relation of the determinans, which is different from its relata, as its object, because it is a qualificatory cognition in which the determinans is objectless (nirviṣayaka) and positive (bhāva). In this inference the

38 "nayastu guṇa-kriyā-jātivisistabuddhiḥ sambandhibhinnaviṣeṣa-
śānasambandhaviṣayā nirviṣayakabhāvavisēsanakaviṣistabuddhi-
 tvāt itaranirupanānirūpyavisēsanakaviṣistabuddhitvādvā..."

-Ibid., p.651.
subject is 'the qualificatory cognition in which something is known to be determined either by quality, or by action, or by universal' (गुणाकृयाज्ञातिविश्वासबुद्धि). The probandum is 'having the relation, which is different from its retala, of the determinans as its object' (संबन्धहिभिन्नविशेषानसंबंधविश्वत्व). The probans of the inference is 'being a qualificatory cognition in which the determinans is objectless and positive' (निरविशेषानकविश्वासविश्वासबुद्धि-त्वा).

Now it is necessary to construe the probans, because in this inference it has obtained a rich figure. The probans of the previous inference, 'being a qualificatory cognition' appears here as qualified by निरविशेषानकविश्वास, i.e. of which the determinans is objectless and positive. It is, thus, taken to speak of that qualificatory cognition of which the determinans is objectless and positive. Without this new part the probans, Gangesā apprehends, unduly extends its purview to the cognitions like 'this is known', and also like 'the ground is without a jar'. The two adjectives, 'objectless' and 'positive', are given in the probans in order to put a check against its deviation to the cognitions of the special qualities of the self and the cognitions of absence respectively.

As a proof of inheritance this inference distinguishes certain qualificatory cognitions from some others on the basis that in some cases of such cognitions the determinans is objectless and
positive, while in some other cases it is not so. Among the qualificatory cognitions of which the determinans is not objectless and positive, some are the cognitions like 'this is known', 'that is desired', etc. In these cognitions the determinans is either of the special qualities of the self. In order to exclude these cognitions from the purview of the inference the adjective 'objectless' as given. The special qualities of the self are six in number. They are: cognition (jñāna), pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), desire (incchā), aversion (dveṣa), and effort (prayatna). They are generally spoken of and understood with reference to some object. Such as, cognition of, pleasure in, pain from, desire for, aversion to, and effort for something. When these qualities appear as the determinans in cognitions like 'this is known' or 'that is desired', etc., they are not objectless. These cases, therefore, cannot be considered as the cases of inherence.

The adjective 'positive' is a check against the overcoverage of the cognitions like 'the ground is without a jar'. It prevents those cognitions of which the determinans is the absence of something, from being counted and classed with the cases of inherence. It, thus, exclude all such cognitions from the purview of the inference on the basis that the determinans in such a cognition is never a positive one.
The newly proposed inference, thus, seems more satisfactory the previous one and stands valid. It successfully reckons up the cognitions of the determined of which inherence is an object by excluding, with a strong measure, those qualificatory cognitions of which inherence is not an object. But a most fastidious opponent may set the inference at defiance by saying that the probans in it is too weighty with a number of adjectives. Perhaps with a view to answer him back Gaṅgesā suggests an alternative probans: itarani-rūpanānirūpyaväśanakavistiṭabuddhitva, i.e. being such a qualificatory cognition in which the determinans is not known without reference to something else. For example, in the cognition 'the ground is without a jar' the absence of jar is the determinans. Here the absence is spoken of, and, therefore, is to be known, with reference to the jar. So to speak of the special qualities of the self. In the cognition 'this is known' knowledge is the determinans which has got to be cognised with reference to 'this'. In this way, absence and the special qualities of the self are generally known with reference to something else which they refer to. Thus the alternative probans, to be previous speaks of only that determinans which does not have any reference. It is, therefore, on account of having this reference that the cognitions of absence and certain other cognitions of the special qualities of the self are not to be taken together with the instance of inherence. This probans is quite expertly employed with much more brilliance. It works with accuracy and precision and renders the inference a very good service brushing away all possibilities of its deviation and other anomalies.
The above discussion amounts to the conclusion that each of 'nirviṣayakabhbavīśesānanakavīśistabuddhitva' and 'ītaraṇirūpa-nānirūpyavīśesānanakavīśistabuddhitva' by its own capacity uniquely and satisfactorily asserts that it is the relation of inherence which stands responsible for certain specific qualificatory cognition where the qualifier or the determinants is a quality, or an action, etc.

But an important objection against the above inference of Gaṅgeśa has come from Vyāṣṭīrtha. He shows in his Tarkatandava that Gaṅgeśa's inference is not consistent with the case of the cognition 'the colour of the jar is in time'. The cognition of the colour of the jar in time is a qualificatory one, because here time is cognised to be determined by the colour of the jar. Now this instance provides the ground for the supposition that the said cognition has such a relation as its object which is admittedly different from its relata. But, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the relation between the colour of the jar and time is self-relation (svarūpasambandha) which is rather non-different from its relata. Gaṅgeśa's inference does not allow one to hold the opinion that the relation between the colour of the jar and time is self-relation, because it is a case of qualificatory cognition, and here the determinants, namely, the colour of the jar, is objectless and positive as per the first probans and is not known without reference to something else as per the second probans. That is to say, if fulfils
all the stipulated conditions of being treated as a case of inherence. Now since the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do not think that the relation between the colour of the jar and time is inherence, Vyāṣṭīrtha notes the defect of *vyabhicāra* here.

In reply to the above objection of Vyāṣṭīrtha the following two points may be put forward.

(1) First, it is one of the ontological assumptions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas that whatever is produced is related with time by itself i.e. by self-relation (*svarūpasambandha*). So the colour of the jar cannot be said to be related with time by inherence.

(2) Secondly, when it is said that inherence holds between substance and quality, it means a particular quality resides by inherence only in that substance which possesses that particular quality. The colour of the jar is related by inherence with the jar, because the colour is the quality possessed by the jar and not by time. Since the colour of the jar is not the quality of time, the relation between the colour of the jar and time cannot be said to be inherence.

Here Gaṅgesā's inference has got to be understood in the spirit of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. But Vyāṣṭīrtha takes it in isolation and concentrates only upon the propositional import of Gaṅgesā's inference without regard to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

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39 "kāle ghaṭarūpamityādiṣpratītav vyabhicārāt".
- Vyāṣṭīrtha (78), p.449.
A strong proof of inherence is available in Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa's *Dinakari (Prakāśa)*, a commentary on the *Siddhāntamuktāvali* of Viśvanātha. There it is said that inherence is admitted as that relation which is the specifier of effecthood (kāryatāvacchedakasambandha). To say that a piece of cloth is produced in certain threads is to agree that the threads stand for the cause of the piece of cloth by the relation of inherence. Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa generalises this fact and discovers the proof of inherence therein. He says that in regard to all pieces of cloth in general, threads stand for the general cause by the relation of inherence, and it is for this reason that inherence has got to be admitted to be that relation which is the specifier of effecthood. This proof is somewhat different from those which are already discussed in the previous sections.

Although the proof given by Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa is somewhat different from those which are already discussed in the previous

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40 "atra samvāyasambandhena paṭatvāvacchinnam prati tādātmyasambandhena tantutvena hetutvāt kāryatāvacchedakasambandhāvidhayā samavāyasiddhiḥ,....."

- Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa (77), p.66.
sections, still we can discover a clue to this proof in Gaṅgeśa. On the occasion of arguing in favour of the oneness of inherence Gaṅgeśa says that the fact of the determination of the like effect by the like cause provides a ground to hold that inherence is one. The argument of Mahādeva Bhāṭṭa seems to be a development of the said point of Gaṅgeśa.

In this connection it is necessary to mention the opinion of Rāmarudra also. He is of the opinion that the argument of Mahādeva Bhāṭṭa is an additional proof of inherence and it is offered especially for those Navya Naiyāyikas who uphold the plurality of inherence. The argument of Mahādeva Bhāṭṭa serves a double purpose. It proves that (i) first, inherence exists, and (ii) secondly, inherence is one. For the obvious reason the present occasion confines the discussion to the first point only.

41 "anugatakāryasyaṇugatakāraṇāniyamyatyavacca."

42 "nanu samavāyanāntvavādināṁ navyānāṁ mate uktanumānena na samavāyasiddhīḥ sambhavati, ..... tanmatehpi samavāyasiddhyartham svayaṁ pramāṇāntaramāha. atreti."
- Rāmarudra (77), p.66.
The concept of kārya or effect is analysed as that which is the counter-positive of the anterior absence. In consonance with this definition the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas think that only the non-eternal qualities and all actions are effects. It is due to their being effects that in order to come into existence they all need to be produced in, and thereby related with, some cause. Substance alone, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, can be such cause of the above effects.

The above argument insists on a unique relation which quite reasonably explains the facts of cause-effect correspondence among the positive reals. This cloth is a product of these threads only, and not of other threads, - this type of sharp causal assignment

".... prāgabhāvavatihkṣaṇāyaṇupakāryatvasya...."

Dhvaṁsābhāva or absence by destruction, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, is also an effect, but it is a negative effect which is utterly different from the positive effects. The positive effects are produced in certain specific positive entities the destruction of which results in the destruction of the effect; whereas absence by destruction is not produced in any such specific cause the destruction of which may result in the destruction of the absence. So here it appears reasonable to take the word 'kārya' or effect in the sense of bhāvakārya or the positive effect.
is possible only on the basis of a certain relation between the cause and its corresponding effect. The relation holds between this cloth and these threads; so only these threads, and not any other threads, are to be held to be the cause of this cloth. This relation is supposed to hold in every such causal situation commonly and uniformly. The argument in question in this way offers a quite plausible account of the causal affairs.

The argument further proposes that this causal relation which is unique and uniform, is inherence. Objection may be raised here: why should this relation be identified with inherence? Can't it be identified with self-relation? In reply to this objection it is said that if self-relation is taken to cover the causal situation, then it does not agree with the concept of inherent cause. An inherent cause of an effect is said to be that in which the effect inheres on the occasion of its production. As for example, the threads of a cloth are the inherent cause of the cloth.

The opponent may say here that there is no need of

45 "na ca samavāyasthāne svarūpasambandham nivesya kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ kalpanīya iti vācyam. tathā sati ...... samavā-yikāraṇavyavasthā na syāt." - Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa (77), p.66.
46 "yatsamavetām kāryamutpadyte tat samavāyikāraṇamiti" - Ibid.
defining the concept of inherent cause in that way. It may be taken to be that with which being related an effect is produced. This notion of inherent cause is compatible with the view that the causal relation is identical with self-relation. But this position also cannot ultimately stand. If inherent cause is taken to be that with which the effect is simply related, then the component parts of a jar might be the inherent cause of the destruction of the jar; because while the destruction of the jar is produced it gets related with the component parts of the jar. Here one may ask: what is the harm in the supposition that the component parts of the jar is the inherent cause of the destruction of the jar? In reply it is said that then the absence of the jar being the effect of the component parts of the jar itself should be destroyed as a result of the destruction of those parts. But this never occurs. This supposition rather fails to agree with the verdict of our common sense.

In the above argument Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa, however, has made a classic approach throwing sufficient light upon the part 'yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoh' of Kanāda's aphorism, 7-2-26. On the one hand it strongly appeals to our sense of logic, and on the other hand it holds a unique defense of the common sense notion of causality.

47 "na ca yatsambaddhāṁ kāryamutpadyate tat samavāyikāraṇami-
tyevāḥstviti vācyam." - Ibid.

48 "kapālasambaddhaghatadhvaṁśaṁ prati kapālasya samavāyikāraṇ-
avaprasangādityapi drastavyam." - Ibid.