CHAPTER V

SARTRE'S CONTRIBUTION TO PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Sartre also starts with intentionality or directedness towards the object as the essential characteristic of consciousness. In this, Sartre follows Husserl in holding that consciousness is intentional i.e. always refers to something beyond it. It is this notion which enables Sartre to conceive of the existence of Being-in-itself which is other than consciousness. Though consciousness is of something, yet it is always conscious of itself, though not always explicitly. When I perceive a tree I am aware not only of the tree which is the explicit object of my consciousness but also of my awareness. This awareness of being aware is called by Sartre 'pre-reflective cogito'. Like the Kantian 'I think', it accompanies all our perceptions, thoughts, feelings. But it is not an 'I think'. The cartesian cogito is reflective. The 'I' is a subsequent product of reflection. The pre-reflective cogito is transparent, aware of itself, but not an 'I think'.

Therefore, in order to understand the true nature of our mental states and processes like thoughts, feelings

etc., Sartre looks not outside consciousness but within consciousness, where the psychical states have their real beings. What he asks to do is to get back to the pure consciousness and to describe it as it is given to itself.

The empirical psychologists regard consciousness as an object of the natural world. Just as an object is composed of parts, so also consciousness is taken as consisting of discrete elements. It is supposed that just as a physical substance can be defined by its qualities so the complex personality of a person can be known by his desires. The empirical psychologists hold that a man is nothing but the summation of desires and tendencies which empirical observation could establish. Thus the complex personality of a person is sought to be reduced to a few basic desires and dispositions. Just as the chemist analyses a complex chemical mixture to a few simple elements, so the literary disposition of a young man like Flaubert is explained as the combination of a few basic desires - his high ambition, the need of violent action and intense feeling, which when combined produce an

exaltation and that exaltation symbolically satisfies itself in the writing of novels. But such an explanation fails to reveal the true nature of the project under consideration. The question may be asked: why did ambition and the need of violent action produce in the person concerned an exaltation? It could have easily produced in him a tranquil waiting. Again why did the need of violent action satisfy itself symbolically in the writing of fiction instead of satisfying itself violently in adventures? Again the person concerned could have tried to be a great musician or a painter instead of a writer.

From all these it follows that the above explanation fails to give knowledge of the true nature of our desires. Empirical psychologist's analysis holds that an individual fact is nothing but the result of the intersection of abstract, universal laws. Thus instead of the abstract produced by the combination of the concrete, the concrete is sought to be produced with the help of abstract elements. But it is logically absurd to hold that the abstract is prior to the concrete and that  

5. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 559.
kind of psychological explanation, though it is sometimes able to discover a general connection between two concomitant desires, yet fails to explain a concrete case. Now it is clear that empirical psychology, in so far as psychology is a Science, can provide us only with disconnected facts, most of which have no necessary connection amongst them.

The complex personality of a person is reduced to a few basic states which are regarded by the psychologists as irreducible in so far as it is impossible for us to analyse them any further. But our incapacity for further analysis is not a legitimate proof of their irreducibility. The empirical psychologist tries to consider psychic states and processes from an aspect which compels him to consider the psychic states as deprived of all significance. For him a psychic state is accidental and non-significant. He simply refers the complexity of certain behavior pattern back to some simple elements comparable to those of chemical bodies beyond which it is meaningless to proceed. Therefore, the irreducible fact which the psychologists present before us is only
apparently irreducible. What is necessary is a veritable psychic irreducible. "Every desire if presented as an irreducible is an absurd contingency and involves in absurdity human reality taken as a whole". Just as according to Spinoza we cannot reconstruct a substance with the summation of its attributes, similarly we must remember that man is a whole and not an aggregate of inclinations. If we want to understand the real nature of man in the way the psychologists suggest, then "either in looking for the person, we encounter a useless, contradictory metaphysical substance - or else the being whom we seek vanishes in a dust of phenomena bound together by external connections".

Therefore, instead of trying to understand the essence of man with the help of a bundle of drives we must try to discover the nature of individual person in the initial project which constitutes him. A man is what he wants to be. It is absurd to think that each of our desires is irreducible. I establish

7. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 561.
8. Ibid p. 561.
a contingent fact when I say that my friend likes to go rowing. For my friend's fondness for rowing is not his original project. It is something which is derived from a more general and abstract inclination i.e. his fondness for play in general. Thus this explanatory classification fails to explain the concrete enrichment which at each stage is undergone by the abstract inclination. Again it is not easy to understand that our desire can be reduced so simply to what it is, for it has meaning which transcends it.

Thus our problem takes the form that if we hold that the person is a totality, then we cannot reconstruct him by the addition of empirically observable tendencies which we have discovered in him. On the other hand, the person expresses himself completely in each of his tendencies though from a different point of view. But this view enables us to discover in each inclination a meaning which transcends it (which forms the fact that every conscious state is intentional).

We can encounter the self-evident irreducible principle when we discover the project of being. The

project of being does not originate in physiological differentiation or in an empirical contingency. It is then the result of an *a priori* description of the being of the for-itself. "Each empirical tendency exists with the original project of being in a relation of expression and symbolic satisfaction just as conscious drives, with Freud, exist in relation to the complex and to the original libido. .........., but the desire to be exists and manifests itself only in and through jealousy, greed, love of art, cowardice, courage and a thousand contingent empirical expressions which always cause human reality to appear to us only as manifested by a particular man, by a specific person! In fact, Sartre means to say that every human conduct, however, insignificant it may be, is revealing. It reveals the original project of man. It is through all our empirical behaviours, our artistic senses, our fondness for literature, our superior moral qualities, as well as through the meanness of our character we are manifesting our fundamental project. Similar view is accepted by Freud when he says that every human act is symbolic. Our unconscious wishes satisfy themselves symbolically through our conscious drives. Both Freud and

Sartre think that every empirical conduct is not an end in itself but it refers to something more. This something, according to Sartre, is the fundamental choice or the original project of being, while according to Freud, it is the complex. Of course, Sartre thinks that this complex is not so original as the fundamental choice.

A man is what he wants to be. In every human being there is a gap between what he is and what he wants to be. Human reality desires to be being-in-itself, it wants to have the impermeability and infinite density of the in-itself. The best way to describe the fundamental project of man is to say that man wants to be God.

But the question may be asked: if man's ultimate project is to become God, then what is the meaning for a human reality to be free? For, freedom is the freedom of choice. In answer, we may say that though the meaning of desire is to become God, desire itself is not constituted by this meaning. "The abstract ontological 'desire to be' is unable to represent the fundamental human structure of the individual, it cannot be an obstacle to his freedom. .......... Freedom is precisely the being which

makes itself a lack of being. But since desire, ......
is identical with lack of being, freedom can arise only
as being which makes itself a desire of being; that is,
as the project-for-itself of being in-itself-for-itself. 12
According to Sartre, man 'desires to be' the being of the
inanimate world. It is his metaphysical desire. Through
this desire he wants to escape from his human condition.
Of course, this ontological desire to be being-in-itself
is not inconsistent with the concept of freedom. For,
freedom implies a lack. Freedom is the nothingness in
man's heart that motivates him to complete himself. Man
has the freedom to be what he is not. Similarly man's
'desire to be' implies that man lacks something which
he wants to have. Therefore, the for-itself can have
freedom only when it has the nothingness of being-in-itself,
and only when it desires to be being-in-itself-for-itself.

Thus we find that the method of induction and
observation can enable us only to make a list of desires.
But these methods are not appropriate to determine the
fundamental desire: of human beings. Empirical description

can give us something which is not irreducible but only pseudo-irreducible. But our aim is not only to make a catalogue of 'behavior patterns', of inclinations and drives, but to decipher them, that is, it is necessary to know how to question them. But this purpose can be fulfilled only by the method of existential psychoanalysis.

II

The name of Freud is closely related with the method of psycho-analysis. It was he who first introduced the method of psycho-analysis in order to cure mental disorders. For this reason we must try to indicate the point of similarity and dissimilarity between psychoanalysis proper and existential psychoanalysis.

Existentialist psychology is "the attempt to discover and describe the structures of the radical decisions or choices, 'the project of being' which give unity to a particular life and enable us to understand it in the concrete". While empirical psychoanalysis aims at determining the complex, existentialist psychoanalysis wants to determine the original choice.

These words clearly express the basic difference between Freud's empirical and Sartre's existential psychoanalysis. But from the above statement it never follows that Sartre entirely rejects the concept of complex. For, Sartre not only uses the concept of complex but he himself has introduced two new concepts of complex - the acteon complex and the jonath complex - over and above Freud's oedipus complex and Adler's inferiority complex. He only rejects the view that these complexes are the ultimate terms of our analysis and are irreducible. For, these complexes can be reduced to something more original which is man's original choice. Inferiority complex and oedipus complex are not the general character traits which are common to all men. "Existential psychoanalysis does not attempt to reduce the complex psychic phenomena to their molecular or atomic physiological or physical sources but attempts to study the fundamental unity of the concrete experiencing subject as he is in his own subjective and conscious experience. It considers man-and-his-world as a unitary, structural whole". Thus the aim of Sartre's existential psychoanalysis is to

decipher the empirical behavior of man and to discover the ultimate significance of every human behavior by revealing the apparently differing significance implied in each human act.

"For Freud as for ourselves, an act is not limited to itself, it refers immediately to deeper structures".

Both of them consider every human act as symbolic, i.e. as translating a desire - desire of man to be what he wants to be. It is this desire which is determined by the fundamental project, the original choice. Both the empirical and the existential psychoanalysts are searching for the fundamental choice within an existing situation, for the choice is the choice of a person in relation to his position in the world.

Both the empirical and the existential psychoanalysts are concerned with man as he lives in the world. Both the schools accept the view that the being of a man cannot be realised without analysing all the situations of the person concerned. In order to rebuild the life

of the person both of them take into consideration all objectively observable documents from the beginning of his life to the moment of his cure. Each historical fact in the life of the individual concerned is important in the sense that it is the symbol of psychic evolution. The human being is considered by both as a 'perpetual, searching historization'. So they try to uncover the significance of this history. Heredity, dispositions and characters, which are generally regarded by us as the primary giveness, are not so regarded by both the empirical and the existential psychoanalysts. Sartre is a philosopher of freedom and action. So the concept of substance in any form, be it a character, temperament or human nature, is strongly rejected by Sartre as inhuman. Human being is free. He is not determined by anything causal. Mechanistic determination of human action is rejected by 16 Sartre.

Both empirical and existential psychoanalysis accept the view that the subject is not in a privileged position in order to make enquiries concerning himself. A subject can carry on psychoanalytic investigation of himself.

16. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Introduction, p.XXXVI
17. Ibid p. 570.
But in that case he should always question himself in such a way as if he were undertaking psychoanalytic investigation with regard to other persons.

Empirical psychoanalysts accept the concept of unconscious mental state while Sartre rejects the unconscious mental state. Mind is co-extensive with consciousness. That it is the unconscious which is the root cause of all our psychical disturbances is not accepted by Sartre. Instead of the concept of unconscious, he accepts the concept of bad faith. Bad faith is a specific type of lie - a lie to oneself. A man is in bad faith when though he knows the truth yet he conceals it from himself.

In Freud's theory the notion of the unconscious plays an important part. Thus, in his theory, according to Sartre, Freud has substituted for the notion of bad faith, the idea of a lie without a liar, for there is no conscious ego who lies to himself but only the concept of the unconscious, id, censorship which are not the ego. According to Freud, there is some unconscious force that

causally determines our activities. Sartre himself accepts the view that human behaviours have symbolic meanings. "What he rejects is the notion of a conscious ego as a weak and derived play thing for drives that manipulate it from beneath. There may be such desires in the sense of purely psycho-physiological mechanisms, but these are then 'objects' of consciousness, a part of the 'facticity' of a given human situation, not the projects or choices of consciousness itself." Thus the original choice of the individual concerned is not unconscious. There is no causal force that determines our consciousness. The meaning and significance of my life is not predetermined but it is the result of my free choices in the present. A man is a totality but it is not a static totality. It is a whole which is striving towards future goal. Our past experiences do not lie in the unconscious. They are the object of our consciousness. Our consciousness is conscious of them as something past. In fact "I can accept it, reject it, interpret it, like any object in the world". Freud is of opinion that

our censor makes a selection among our impulses. But Sartre asks: is it possible for an unconscious censor to act as a selective principle and make repression of those desires and impulses which are banned by the society and satisfaction of those desires which are socially approved? Thus it is clear that, according to Sartre at any rate the principle of unconscious cannot be accepted.

Here we may ask a question: if all our psychic states are conscious, and we are always conscious of our original projects then what is the need of analysing an individual by adopting a specific kind of method? Here Sartre makes a distinction between consciousness and cognition. A person may be conscious of his project but from this it never follows that he knows it, rather the contrary is true. Therefore, there is no contradiction in saying that mind is co-extensive with consciousness.

Sartre wants to determine the original project of man. But he rejects Freud's libido theory, for according to him, sex can never be the fundamental relation. A fundamental relation is the project of being which is more basic than sex. But though Sartre rejects Freud's Pan-sexualism, yet he holds that sex instinct does play an

important role in the life of the individual concerned. For Sartre, "sexual desire is not merely or primarily the desire of physical 'satisfaction'. It is rather the deep-seated impulse of the for-itself to capture the other's subjectivity".

It is through desire that our sexuality and that of the other is revealed to us. The main characteristic of desire is that it is defined with reference to its transcendent object. It is love which is the basis of desire. The aim of love is to get possession of the beloved as a self, as a subject and not as an object. It is through his gaze that the beloved turns his lover into an object and reveals his characteristic as a subject endowed with freedom. Now the aim of sexual desire is not only to possess the physical body of the beloved but also to possess the beloved as a subject, a living freedom. But this project of desire turns into failure. In the climax of sexual pleasure desire loses its transcendent character being directed towards the pleasure of the lover and forgetting his beloved's freedom.

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23. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Introduction, p. XII
But what about love? According to Sartre, so long as we are not loved by anybody our existence is not justified. And the joy of love, according to Sartre, is nothing but this feeling that our existence is justified. Again sadism and masochism may be counted among the basic projects of our being for-others. Thus we find that though Sartre wants to reject Freud's libido theory, yet sexuality is a central theme in his theory.

Sartre admits the Freudian view that no children are innocent. The sexual significance of certain objects surrounding the child is accepted by Freud as well as by Sartre. But Sartre rejects the view that every child is endowed with a sexual instinct which enables him to bestow sexual significance upon those objects. Freudian psychoanalysts are of opinion that most of the children are interested by any kind of hole in their body. According to the existentialist psychoanalyst, the hole is a symbol of nothingness which must be filled up. So the child intends to fill it up by pushing his finger within it. The child has no previous experience of sexual act.

Therefore Sartre accuses Freud of presupposing an

experience in the child which he cannot have. But a similar charge may also be brought against Sartre. For, it is equally impossible for a child to understand his emptiness and thus to push his finger in his mouth in order to achieve "the whole of being".

Sartre says that "We will gladly recognise along with the Freudeans the innumerable relations existing between sexuality and certain matter and forms in the child's environment. But we do not understand by this that a sexual instinct already constituted has charged them with a sexual significance. On the contrary, it seems to us that this matter and these forms are apprehended in themselves, and they reveal to the child the for-itsel' s modes of being and relations to being which will illuminate and shape his sexuality." 25

Existentialist psychoanalysis has shown that every all concrete desire, such as eating, sleeping and the creation of the work of art, all express the personal progress of a particular man for the realisation of his fundamental project, that is an en-soi-pour-soi. And the particular way the person concerned undertakes to realise this supreme goal

determines the nature of his personality. Man desires to realise the in-itself-for-itself, but our desire can be defined with reference to the object which is desired. The aim of existentialist psychoanalysis is to investigate the three categories of existence - to have, to make and to be which are deduced from the nature of the object desired. Thus if a man desires a book, it means that he wants to have the book, if he desires to write a book, this means that he wants to make it, thirdly, if he desires to wear a nice suit, this means that he wants to be beautiful. It can be seen that the desire to make is not irreducible, for, it can easily be reduced to the desire to have. Thus when one makes a beautiful work of art it means that one wants to have it. It is my right of ownership which is expressed. Love, knowledge as well as art, sport, charity etc. are moods of the category of having.

Human freedom is the choice of becoming God and this choice expresses itself in an infinity of being and having. Now it is Sartre's existentialist psychoanalysis which judges from the ethical point of view the goodness and badness of different human projects. This is why
existential psychoanalysis is considered as a 'moral description', whereas Freud's psychoanalysis is merely a psychological investigation free from any ethical concept of rightness and wrongness of our conduct. 26

Again it is existential psychoanalysis which reveals to us the nature of our ultimate goal which is the unification of the in-itself-for-itself, and which also reveals that values are subjective. But if values are subjective and written into things by us, then it is we who are responsible for the choice of a particular kind of value. "This explains man's ethical anxiety". But Sartre holds that this anxiety is necessary for us because through it we can understand the true nature of our life. Thus we find that while Freudian psychoanalysis aims at relieving the anxiety of the person concerned, existential psychoanalysis gives us the anxiety of a authentic life. Therefore, it cannot be considered as a therapy. But from the ethical point view it saves man from his blind passions and develops in him the power of reasoning so that he can easily understand the true significance of his existence. But Dr. Mme. Duss draws the conclusion that rigorous existentialism causes

26. Stern, Sartre: His Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, p. 175
27. Ibid, p. 199
or may cause insanity. For, existentialism holds that there is no universal norm. But if a man is not guided by any general norm, but only depends on his free choice then it is impossible for a man to bear the responsibility which is imposed upon him. That is why the individual escapes from his anxiety and responsibility, and takes shelter in a peaceful world created by his own psychotic construction. Thus he becomes an abnormal person. So Stern in his Chapter on "Existentialism and Psychiatry" says that Sartre's psychoanalysis cannot serve the purpose of a mental therapy for it gives 'freedom with anxiety' while a mental therapy in the true sense of the term gives 'freedom from anxiety'. Even if it serves as moral therapy, it can do so in the sense of a moral function. In respect of therapy both the empirical and the existential psychoanalysts differ. While according to Freud it is the health of the mind which is the proper object of our study, Sartre holds that it is the moral health which is to be studied. Like Spinoza, Freud holds that man can be free from all his sufferings by acquiring knowledge about the nature of his repressed tendencies. Sartre's psychoanalysis on the contrary not

29. Ibid p. 203.
only liberates us from our suffering but increases it by making us solely responsible for our own virtue and vice.

Existentialist psychoanalysis has proved the irreducibility of certain mental data. It has some scientific merits but Sartre himself says that the existential psychoanalysis has not yet found its Freud. 30

The method, which is applied by Sartre, is the method of phenomenological intuition. F. J. J. Buytendijk in his 'Phenomenological approach to the problem of Feeling and Emotions' states that "the only interest of the phenomenologist is directed towards the essential structure, the intrinsic connections, and the self-revelation of the significance in the full context of the phenomenal field." 31 Sartre's phenomenological method is confined not only to describe immediate phenomena of consciousness but also to decipher them. It analytically tries to reveal the significance of the invariant and more fundamental structure which is the basis of all our motivations. It is intuitive insight which enables him to discover the 'fundamental choice' of man. No other proofs except the intuitive verification is accepted. In this sense the method of 'Phenomenological description'

30. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 575.
31. Ruitenbeek, Psychoanalysis and Existential Philosophy, p. 175.
is accepted by Sartre. "Thus the ideal of Sartre's phenomenological method would seem to be the reflective elucidation of the pre-reflective consciousness according to its structures and meanings with the intent to intuit and to describe the fundamental phenomena based on a deciphering of their more immediately accessible manifestations." Thus we find that the Husserlean criterion of intuitive evidence has an important place in Sartre's theory. This, in fact, is nothing but the extension of Husserlean philosophy.

It may be concluded that intuitive experience is a purely subjective experience. Therefore, if existential psychoanalysis is to be a science in the true sense of the term it must be independent of the phenomenological method, for it takes no help of proof except intuitive insight in order to place its discoveries on a sound basis. For a science without proof is not a science at all. But in reply to such a criticism we may say with Scheler: "The phenomenological approach offers the advantage of a continuous progress of insight after every return to the 'thing-itself in its thisness'."

And this must surely be taken as the aim of science.

Another good example of Sartre's phenomenological psychology is to be found in his psychology of imagination. Sartre has described the intentional structure of imagination. Thus "the imagination in its essential detachment from the world of causal reality is used as a proof of freedom against determinism ....... the imagination cannot be reduced to the world of positive causal forces." The method which Sartre applies to reveal the essential nature of imagination is the method of phenomenology. The nature of imagination is such that there is a distinction between imagination and perception. Imagination cannot be reduced to perception. Therefore, the method of causal psychology cannot be applied to it. It is the creative freedom of the self which is emphasised by Sartre. In imaginative thinking this power of the self is fully realised. Though imagination is dependent on perception for the sensitive element of its object, it is not a passive reproduction of the object. It is a conscious activity which retains the sensible quality of its object with the help of its creative will. But this sort of

freedom is not found in the field of mathematical and natural sciences. There we are not free to think; but the nature of our thought is determined by some fixed laws and principles. According to Sartre, imagination is a particular mode of consciousness. It is a free and spontaneous intentional act. It is intentional in the sense that to imagine is to imagine something, of some object; the object of imagination may be either existent or non-existent.

It is the intentional structure of imagination which enables Sartre to make a sharp distinction between immanent imagining act and a transcendent imagined object which is overlooked by the traditional theorists. In order to establish his own view of imagination Sartre in the first place attempts to criticise the previous theories of imagination and draws a distinction between imagination and perception. According to empirical theory, which is sometimes called the 'copy theory', "an image is inherently like the material object which it represents". The psychologists like Hume are the victims of two kinds of error together known as immanent illusion. According to

the empirical psychologists, the object of image is immanent in the image and the image itself is immanent in consciousness. This error is due to the fact that we are habituated to think of objects which are in space and time. We try to impose spatial and temporal qualities to our consciousness. But our consciousness is not spatial. Hume distinguishes impression and idea on the ground that "those perceptions, which enter with most force and vividness we may name impressions ......... By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning." Thus our ideas are the true copies of the external things and whenever we have an idea of a thing say, a table, the object must enter into my consciousness, and consciousness, as a result, must have qualities which are equal to the object. Physical objects always have determinate qualities and parts. So the idea must have determinate qualities; there must not be any ideterminateness in consciousness. Thus it becomes clear that our ideas are the copies of the objects which are external to consciousness and which are known by us in an indirect way.

But in criticism we may say that to accept the illusion of immanence is to distort the unique nature of consciousness. According to Sartre, "consciousness would cease being transparent to itself; its unity would be broken in every direction by unassimilable, opaque screen." For this reason, some logical mind thinks that in order to save the integrity of mental life, we must reject the existence of mental image. We can easily think of the image of objects like table, trees etc. but our very acceptance of the illusion of immanence enables us to construct a mental world in conformity with the objects of the external physical world. But this is wrong, for the world of mind obeys different laws from that of the world of nature.

Thus according to Sartre, what reflection teaches us is that there is not much difference between perception and imagination on the basis of the object perceived or imagined. In the case of perception we accept the existence of extramental object such as tree, man etc. and think it absurd that the tree or the man which is

the object of perception should be in the perception itself. Similarly, when we imagine a tree, the tree remains in the external world and not in my imaginative consciousness of the tree. Thus Sartre holds, "the object of my perception and that of my image are identical". They are not different in character or in location. The only difference between the two is that our consciousness is related to the external corporeal object in two different ways. Now the image is intentional, it is an image of something. It is a relation between consciousness and its object, "it means a certain manner in which the object makes its appearance to consciousness; or, if one prefers, a certain way in which consciousness presents an object to itself." Thus the difference between imagination and perception is not a difference of object or its location. The real difference lies on the side of the imagined act.

The way in which we look at the object is responsible for the distinction between imagination and perception. In perception we observe the object while in imagination we depend on quasi-observation. In perception we observe the object. But the object never presents itself in its

full significance at a time. I can perceive only one aspect of the object at a time. Thus when I perceive a house I cannot perceive the whole house in a single act of perception. Only the front part is visible at a glance. Again when I move towards the back and apprehend it, there is a chance that the idea of the front part has already disappeared from my mind. The main characteristic of perception is that the object presents itself successively. The object can be perceived from different points. The object itself is the synthesis of all these appearances. The perception of an object is truly a phenomenon of an infinity of aspects. Thus in perception the object gradually reveals itself to consciousness while in the case of imagination we have an immediate grasp of the essence of the object. As in perception, so in imagination, the object presents itself in a series of profiles. The real difference is that in imagination we feel no need to travel round the whole object. The whole structure of the object is immediately revealed to us. When I perceive an object, there is always a scope of doubt as to whether the object I perceive is exactly so as it is perceived by me. For, the object may be perceived from different angles and each new attention
may present new aspects of the object. But the case is different with respect to imagination. My judgment is true, when I say that I have an image of a house, because the image is complete as soon as it appears before me. In imagination there is no progress of knowledge. I find nothing new in the image except that which I put in it. Thus we find that while in the case of perception continued observation can bring constantly new items, no such enrichment can result from the corresponding observation of the imagined object. It remains as rich or poor as our original imagination was. This attitude towards the image may be called quasi-observation. It is an attitude which is similar to observation, but which never reveals anything new. If the image of a printed page is produced, it is assumed that I am looking at the page of the book and reading it. But in reality I am not even looking at it, for the page of the book has already been read by me.

What reflection teaches us is that the image is intentional. "In the image a certain consciousness does
Indeed present itself with a certain object. It is this intention which makes the object what it is. The nature of the object is determined by imaginative consciousness. When we try to construct the image of an object, say a book, we must at the same time construct the object, the book as the object of imaginative consciousness. Thus the object as what it is is determined by the imaginative consciousness.

The third characteristic of the image is that "the image envelops a certain nothingness. Consciousness, therefore, becomes a peculiar mixture of being and non-being". As imagination is intentional every image is always the image of something, of some object. When we construct the image of a tree we are conscious of the tree as the object of imaginative consciousness. The tree which is the object of my consciousness is external to consciousness. Our consciousness transcends it. The nature of the transcendental consciousness is revealed to us by reflection. It is this reflection which warns us of the grave mistake that though the imaginative consciousness searches for its object,

like perception, among the objects of the natural world, the not two are/identical. Perception, we know, is the perception of external things, but the main characteristic of perception which differentiates it from the sphere of imagination is that perception asserts the existence of its object, while the image can assert its object as (1) non-existent or (2) as absent or (3) as existing elsewhere or (4) it can neutralise itself. From this it follows that the imaginative consciousness presents its object as nothingness.

"The characteristic of the intentional object of the imaginative consciousness is that the object is not present and is posited as such, or that it does not exist and is posited as not existing, or that it is not posited at all." 42

Thus it follows that in perception we can touch, hear or see the object of perception while in imagination we cannot actually touch or see the object. We can grasp the form of the image intuitively. In fact, we can say that in imaginative consciousness belief posits the intuition, but not the object. Therefore, we find that the existence of the object is asserted by perception, while its non-existence is posited by imagination.

Sartre has stated that every image is the image of something. But he has no clear cut idea about the nature of the object of imaginative consciousness. We can form different images of the same thing at different times due to its position at different times and places. Thus the image of Peter when he lives in Paris is different from that which we construct when he lives in Berlin. Now the question is: how can we construct the image of Peter? Shall we construct the image of Peter as living in Paris or in Berlin?

Another characteristic of imagination is its spontaneity. Perception is non-creative and passive. We perceive the object as it is. We never actively construct the object of perception. But in contrast to passive perception our imagination is active and creative.

It searches for its object in the perceptual field, but as it is spontaneous and creative "it maintains and sustains the sensible qualities of its object by a continuous creation". It is a continuous flow which is united with its preceding consciousness synthetically.

But though, imaginative consciousness is creative, it is not conscious that it has created the object.

(C) SARTRE'S THEORY OF EMOTION

Sartre's theory of emotion is another good example of his phenomenological psychology. He is mainly concerned with the question, what is the function of emotions. Sartre thinks that positivistic psychology is based on the data of experience which are supposed to be given to us in the form of isolated, accidental facts. But the mere assimilation of such facts cannot provide us with the true character of emotion as consciousness.

Sartre starts with criticisms of the theories offered by the other psychologists. William James' theory of emotion is known as the peripheric theory. According to James, emotion is the result of the physiological disturbances. We generally hold that our tears are caused by our sadness, but James reverses the order and holds that our tears are causes of our sadness.
James' theory is severely criticised by Sartre and others for its failure to explain the plain facts. It fails to explain the subtler emotions. To give an account of distinct psychic states on the basis of ordinary organic reactions is to some extent a difficult task. Sometimes we shed tears in anger as well as in joy. So the question is: how can we on James' theory distinguish between the two on the basis of this simple physiological disturbances? Anger is not only a greater intensity of joy but it is something else. "Of all the critics of James who have successively examined the state of consciousness, 'emotion' and the accompanying physiological manifestations, not one recognises the former as being the projection of, or the shadow cast by, the latter. They find more in it." 44 Thus in his theory, James has neglected the role of the psyche in emotion and has regarded emotion as wholly determined by an antecedent cause of physical disturbance.

Janet understands the defects of James' theory. His own theory of emotion gives due weight to both physical and mental elements. According to him, emotion is a behaviour of defeat. When the situation is difficult and

44. Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, p. 33.
45. Ibid p. 35.
we find that it is impossible for us to adapt ourselves appropriately to it, we adopt a behaviour that requires lesser psychic energy. The weeping and the nervous crisis are good examples of such emotions.

But against Janet, Sartre holds that Janet has wrongly introduced the concept of purposiveness into his theory. But the mental element in his theory is not cognitive. If Janet has to introduce the concept of purposiveness, then he must show that consciousness plays an important part in his theory. Otherwise, the introduction of this concept of purposiveness would not be justified.

Again Sartre cannot accept the psychoanalytic theory of emotion. The notion of the unconscious plays an important part in the psychoanalysts' theory. According to them, our emotional experiences, like anger and fear, are nothing but the means by which the unconscious urges satisfy themselves symbolically. In one of the cases it is found by the psychoanalysts that a woman cannot stand the sight of laural bushes. Whenever she sees them she faints away in fear. Upon investigation it is found that the woman in her childhood had a painful sexual experience

46. Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, p. 2.
in the laural bushes. This sad experience, connected with the laural bushes, subjects the woman even in her adult life to the emotion of fear. To the psychoanalysts, the "significance of our conscious behaviour lies wholly outside that behaviour itself."

But Sartre has criticised this theory of the psychoanalysts. He holds that there can be no state of consciousness which is unconscious. Consciousness is translucent, it is always aware of itself though not explicitly. Further, how can the unconscious act upon the conscious states and processes? Sartre's most serious objection urged against the Freudsens concerns their causal explanation of psychical states and processes. But the explanation of conscious states such as emotion, dream etc. must be found within consciousness, not outside it. Consciousness is not like a physical object. It has a peculiar character which distinguishes it from other objects. This is its intentionality. The meaning of intentionality is that our consciousness is always directed towards something. Therefore, our emotion which is nothing but a part of our consciousness is directed to something and it can be

47. Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, p. 51.
explained only in terms of this something. It cannot be explained causally by something else. The main defect of the Freudeans lies in the fact that they ignore that consciousness has intentionality, and try to explain every psychical phenomenon in terms of cause and effect. But causal explanation distorts the true nature of consciousness. For "whatever is going on in consciousness can receive its explanation nowhere but from consciousness itself..............: a theory of consciousness which attributes meaningful character to the emotive facts must look for that meaning in the consciousness itself".

Thus by rejecting the psychoanalytic theory of emotion Sartre proceeds to explain his own theory. Emotion, according to Sartre, is intentional. We must try to understand the nature of emotion only in terms of what it signifies. Our emotions like all other conscious states are always directed towards some object. In every emotion there is a subject who experiences the emotion, and there is an object towards which the emotion is directed. "In a word, the emotional subject and the object of the emotion

are united in an indissoluble synthesis". The emotions have meaning in the sense that they constitute purposive behaviour. "In particular, they are not simply passive states but 'spontaneous degradations of consciousness'; as such they are basically insincere and 'in bad faith'. By way of emotions consciousness tries to reach its objective 'magically' in running away from reality". Thus emotion fulfils a teleological purpose. It is a means towards some goal. In this respect, Sartre's view is similar to that of the Gestaltists who also interpret emotion as a means of escaping difficult situations or solving problems.

This phenomenological study of emotion is not wholly new. This method had already been applied by Husserl and Scheler to the study of emotion. Phenomenology, we know, is the descriptive science of essences. It is the study of phenomena. As phenomenology is the study of phenomena, and not of facts, it never regards any psychical state as a fact devoid of significance. Therefore, the primary task of phenomenology is to study the significance of emotion. As emotion is a part of consciousness, the study of emotion

49. Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, p. 57.
should enable us to know the essential structure of consciousness; or again, the essential structure of consciousness will be found to be examplified in emotions.

Though Sartre's approach is not new, yet his originality lies in the fact that in his view emotion is no doubt a behaviour; it is not a mechanical, but a purposive behaviour. Emotion is a conduct in relation to our existence in the world as a whole. We, the human beings, live in the world. The world makes some demand upon us. Here we have to work and to reach some goals. There are some means that lead to the goal. But there are also some obstacles that we cannot overcome and that stand in the way of our achievement. Therefore, we feel frustrated in our dealings with the world. Nevertheless, we must try to reach the goal. We try to change the world, that is, to live it as though the relations between the things and their potentialities were not governed by deterministic process but by magic. Thus emotion is nothing but the transformation of the world. The existing order of the world seems to us too difficult to satisfy our needs, so we change it or modify it indirectly, i.e. magically. Now we apprehend the world in a new way.
We impose qualities upon the world which are not found in it normally. These are the qualities of a magic world.

Now this magical world demands magical behaviour from us. Sometimes it is impossible to change the world. So we change ourselves. According to Sartre, consciousness transforms itself in the hope of transforming the objects. The magical transformation of the world is due to some changes in our body in relation to the world. Flight, fainting etc. are means which serve this end. Thus whenever we are in front of a critical and dangerous situation, we cannot face it boldly, and we become senseless. In this way we magically annihilate the world of danger. Similarly flight in active fear is also a means of annihilating the danger. When we fail to become unconscious, we try to flee away from the object of danger. Thus the true significance of the emotion of fear is that it is a consciousness which by means of magical behaviour transforms the world of danger, it goes so far as to annihilate the object also.

Thus, we find that our emotion is purposive. It has some end in view. Similar is the case with anger and sadness. In the case of passive sadness, the person
concerned is in a melancholy mood. He sits in a lonely place, and there is least contact between him and the world. Whenever we lose our normal manner of dealings with the world, we, instead of searching for some other means of activity, sit motionless regarding the world as a system of affectively neutral reality, demanding nothing from us. Thus our melancholy aims at the transformation of the world, regards it of a totally indifferent structure and thereby relieves us of our obligation to find out new means to carry out our projects.

Again, objective sadness is also a means of escaping from our responsibility. Whenever Janet asks the patient to make a confession before him, the patient sheds tears. Here according to Sartre, "the sick girl who cannot confess sobs in order not to confess, not because she cannot confess". "The emotional crisis here is an abandonment of responsibility, by means of a magical exaggeration of the difficulty of the world." Thus we find that Sartre is trying to show the application of his general theory of

52. Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, p. 70.
emotion in many particular cases of emotional consciousness. But it can be seen that his theory more easily fits in the case of anger and despair than in those of joyful emotions. In the case of joy, Sartre holds that there is some difference between joy as sentiment and joy as an emotion. Emotional joy is characterised by impatience. If I heard from a person that I shall get a lot of money by lottery, or I shall meet within a week with my dearest friend, I feel excessive joy, though there is sometime gap between my present condition and the actual possession of the desired object. Here the function of delight or joy is to change the situation magically and to enable us to realise the possession of the desired object as a whole at once in such a way that it is before us. "Joy is magical behaviour which tries, by incantation, to realise the possession of the desired object as an instantaneous totality."

Thus, we find that the conception of magic has a two-fold function in Sartre's theory. Firstly, our consciousness becomes asleep and we lose our power of rational judgment of the objects of the world. So we

regard the world as magical. Secondly, we try to react upon them by transforming our body magically, that is, by fainting or fleeing away. "What is involved is apparently a kind of makebelieve, supported by a pre-reflective bad faith which allows us to change if not the world itself at least its meanings for us by some kind of incantation, verbal or non-verbal."

Therefore, it is clear that emotion is a primitive or inferior means of handling the problems of the world. It is a degraded or inferior mode of consciousness which is nothing but the result of frustration.

Emotion, Sartre holds, is not an accident. But it is a characteristic of human being. It is not the effect of human reality, but it is that reality in itself. Therefore, it is wrong to regard emotion as a psychophysical disorder.

Lastly, we can say that though emotion is generally supposed to be a lawless disorder, Sartre has shown its significance. Instead of this, a question may be asked: how far can Sartre's theory be accepted as an adequate description of the significance of emotion? Can we accept

it as an exhaustive account of all our emotions? Sartre himself states that his theory is applicable more skilfully to the field of disagreeable emotions than in those of agreeable ones. His theory, that all emotions are escape into futility, does not fit in with the emotions of joy, love, the feelings of scorn or contempt, which are emotions that lead man not to futility but to activity or efficiency.

Again, Sartre has laid too much importance upon the magical power of emotion. But there is a contradiction between the magical role of emotion and the assumption that the emotional consciousness is the consciousness of reality. The reality of the world cannot be apprehended if emotion is nothing but an abrupt drop of consciousness into the magical.

The magical role played by emotion is akin to the concept of regression in abnormal psychology. Regression is an abnormal manner of behaving and thinking on a primitive level. Therefore, Sartre's conception of emotive behaviour more fits in with the abnormal case than with the normal one.
But we may also raise the question: to what extent Sartre's theory is descriptive? Sartre himself states that his theory is not genuinely descriptive. It is partly descriptive and partly metaphysical. He aims at describing the significance of the emotions. But when he says that emotion is nothing but a magical transformation of the world, he is not simply describing the fact of emotion. "That is to say he is not concerned only to describe or even to define emotion, but to show that human beings are of such a kind that they must adopt the characteristic behaviour which he ascribes to them." It seems to Lauer that "to adequately describe an act (as opposed to an activity) of consciousness, it is not sufficient to say either that it is oriented towards an object or that it is lived in reflection; it must be a reflexive living of one's own consciousness precisely as intentional or objectively oriented." 

Therefore, Sartre's theory is not purely descriptive. It would be genuinely descriptive if all consciousness.

56. Ibid p. 12.
were explicitly aware of itself. There are, according to Sartre, unreflective conducts. Of course, these are not unconscious conducts. The only thing to be remembered is that in pre-reflective cogito our consciousness is not explicitly aware of itself. Sartre thinks that consciousness is not a ego. Therefore, it is non-substantial and non-positional. In pre-reflective cogito I should not say that I am attempting to transform the world magically, but should say that there is a consciousness of transforming the world magically. In emotional acts we are simply apprehending the world in a certain way, but we are not conscious of ourselves as acting. Sartre says, "our effort is not conscious of what it is, for then it would be the object of reflection". Sartre like Husserl thinks that all consciousness refers to transcendental object other than itself.

But still in Sartre's theory we are faced with the intentional character of our emotion. It is a phenomenon which has no biological significance but is a characteristic of our consciousness. This intentional analysis is immediately directed towards the act of emotion and reveals the essential structure and significance of our emotive states.

59. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Introduction, P.X.