CHAPTER I

PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY
(A) Husserl's refutation of Psychologism:

Psychologism is the view according to which "the theoretical foundation for the construction of logic .... is supplied by Psychology, and specially by the psychology of knowledge". Husserl means by psychologism the view that psychology must be taken as the necessary and sufficient condition for the foundation of logic. Among the logicians John Stuart Mill and Theodor Lipps are the supporters of this view. Logic is regarded by Mill as a part of psychology and he thinks that the theoretical basis of the art of logic is obtained from the science of psychology. A similar view is accepted by Lipps when he regards logic as a special branch of psychology. Lipps had said, "logic is either the physics of thought or it is nothing at all."

Antipsychologistic logicians especially Husserl have raised some objections against psychologism. According to Husserl, logic is a normative discipline, which is the science of 'ought' whereas psychology

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is a positive science, the science of 'is'. Now the problem is: how can the 'ought' be derived from the 'is'? But this problem is met by the psychologistic logicians with the reply "that thinking as it should be is a special case of thinking as it is . . . . . . . every 'ought' is based upon an 'is'.

The 'ought' is interpreted in terms of what must be done in order to attain a certain goal, and that is equivalent to the question as to how the goal is actually to be reached". Mill and Spencer try to support psychologism by interpreting the law or contradiction as a psychologica law. Just as belief and disbelief are two mental states that exclude each other so we cannot regard the same statement to be true and false at one and the same time. "Logical statements, according to this interpretation, are empirical generalisations about the ways in which people think". The logical statement -

1) if all men are mortal and Ram is a man, then Ram is mortal - can be converted into a psychological statement of the following form - (2) whoever believes that all men are mortal and Ram is a man, cannot but believe that Ram is mortal.

5. Chisholm, Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, p. 13.
According to Husserl, the statement \((z)\) is an empirical generalisation regarding all believers. The truth of this statement can be established by psychological investigation. But in order to support and justify the truth of the statement \((1)\) we must not take help from psychology. For the 'ought' cannot be dependent on the 'is'. Being an empirical generalisation the statement \((2)\) is probable and can easily be refuted by a single individual; while the statement \((1)\) is not probable and is not falsified and refuted by the invention of a single contrary evidence. It is as Husserl says "apodictically evident and necessarily true". Therefore, what is conveyed by the statement \((1)\) is not equal to that of the \((2)\). Lipps has tried to modify the statement \((2)\) by introducing the concept of the rules of thought. Thus the statement \((2)\) takes the form - \((3)\) whoever believes that all men are mortal and Ram is a man, if he follows the rules of thought, cannot but believe that Ram is mortal. Now Husserl thinks that the concept of the rules of thought is ambiguous. It if means descriptively the way in which we think, then the statement \((3)\) would be an empirical generalisation and as
such like (2) it can easily be refuted. On the other hand, if by 'rules of thought' Lipps means the way in which we ought to think then it cannot be justified by psychological investigation.

According to Lotze and Natorp, psychologism involves a vicious circle. For all sciences including psychology are dependent upon logic for the ultimate clarification of their concepts. A science is possible only when it conforms to the rules of thought advocated by logic. The validity of the laws of thought is presupposed by every science. Therefore, to base logic upon psychology would be to presuppose at least some principles of logic.

Again, psychology is a factual science. It is a science of experience. Hence if logic is based on psychology then what would be the consequences for logic? Psychology lacks in exact laws; the propositions established by psychology are vague generalisations from experience. They are probable. Now if the laws of psychology are vague, the same must be true of the logical percepts. Although it is true that some of the percepts of logic are vague, yet the basic laws of logic are exact.

and apodictically certain. "Because of its inability to yield more than empirical generalities, psychology cannot account for the apodictically evident, 'super-empirical' absolutely exact laws which make up the core of logic."^7

Husserl refutes psychologism on the ground that it results from our attempt to naturalise consciousness and by confusing the ideal with the real. From the fact that a human being is so constituted that he cannot assert two contradictory judgments in any unified train of thought it never follows that the law of contradiction is a natural law. "The psychologistic logicians misunderstand the fundamental and essential differences between ideal and real laws, between normative and causal regulation, between logical and real necessity, between logical grounds and real grounds. In opposition to them it is maintained that there can be no conceivable gradations mediating between the ideal and the real."^8

Logical propositions give us truth about essences. Logic is an eidetic science. The truth of logical propositions can only be understood by means of insight into essence. Logic as an eidetic and 'superempirical' science is not

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7. Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology, p. 112.
8. Ibid p. 113.
based on empirical generalisation but is presupposed by every empirical and natural science. If the laws of logic are based on psychological facts, then those laws would be the laws of psychical facts and they would also presuppose the existence of psychical facts. But a real insight into the meaning of the logical laws shows that those laws do not presuppose the existence of any cognitive being and they are not the laws of actual mental life.

"To be sure, the knowledge of logical laws, as a mental activity, presupposes actual experience and has its basis in concrete intuition. But psychological 'presuppositions' and 'bases' of the knowledge of a logical law should not be confused with the logical presuppositions, grounds, or premises of the law."

Husserl has raised some objections against the prejudices of logical psychologism and the consequences to which they lead. Mill thinks that the only object that can be described as 'true or false' is the act of belief. It is true that the opposing acts of belief cannot co-exist; they exclude each other. The logical law of contradiction follows from this psychological fact. The law of contradiction states that the same statement

cannot both be true and false at one and the same time. Husserl thinks that the feeling of impossibility cannot be used to prove that we shall never be able to accept contradictories. The very attempt to prove the source of the principle of contradiction inductively has turned it into a mere probability. For there is evidence that opposing judgments may be true and false at the same time.

Again psychologism leads to sceptical relativism. "Husserl argues that no charge could be more serious against a theory of logic than it violates the conditions of/possibility of a theory as such, and psychologism is charged with violating both the subjective and the objective conditions of the possibility of a theory." If the truth and falsity of the logical laws are dependent on the psychical states of the human beings, then the existence of the logical laws are relative to man's thinking ability. Thus man becomes the criterion of truth and falsify of logical laws. "And to Husserl relativism is a self-defeating position. It denies the possibility of all knowledge while asserting its own truth. In fact it even destroys the very meaning of truth and falsehood." 

Again, if man is the measure of every thing, then there can not be any universal standard for truth and falsehood; for whatever is true for a member of human species may be false for a human species differently constituted. Moreover, if it is accepted that the general nature of man is the source of all truth then it follows that if there were no human beings then there would also be no truths. But according to Husserl, truth is eternal. "It is an 'Idea' and as such is supertemporal. We do indeed say of truth it 'comes to consciousness' and that it is 'experienced' by us. But we do not 'grasp' truth like an empirical content". As ideal possibility the truth always remains even if it is not known by some human species. If truth is essentially related to the thinking being then it would come and go with the human species. "Truth and being are both 'categories' in the same sense, and they are correlative. Hence one cannot relativize truth while maintaining the objectivity of being. In presupposing an objective being as a point of reference, the relativist contradicts himself." 13

Although it is true that the logical concepts have a psychological origin, yet the principles of pure logic

13. Ibid

p. 124.
are not psychological. The concepts of logic have no empirical extension. Like the concepts of pure mathematics they are general concepts having ideal extension.

Thus Husserl has proved the untenability of psychologistic logic. According to him, logic has its foundation outside psychology. The psychologistic logicians had merely proved that psychology contributes to the foundation of logic. But they had failed to prove the fact that psychology alone is the foundation of logic. So there is the possibility that there is another science that is the science of pure logic which contributes to the foundation of logic in a more significant manner. Pure logic is free from everything empirical and hence it is independent of psychology.

Husserl's refutation of psychologism has been much misunderstood. He refutes psychologism, not psychology. What he refutes is the thesis that empirical psychology is the basis of logic. He wants to develop a pure, phenomenological psychology which is sharply distinguished from empirical psychology. And he did hold that all eidetic sciences are ultimately founded on such a pure, eidetic and phenomenological psychology.
(B) Phenomenology and Psychology (relation).

Phenomenology as developed by Husserl is a philosophical endeavour that tries to clarify the ultimate concepts of the sciences. It seeks to acquire eidetic insight into the essences of things. Psychology, on the other hand, is a science that deals with psychical states and processes of human beings as well as animals. The question naturally arises, what is the exact relation between the two? In order to give a systematic account of the relationship between phenomenology and psychology we must investigate the historical facts that may shed some light upon it.

According to Spiegelberg, both phenomenology and psychology depend upon each other. There are some respects in which psychology presupposes phenomenology. In his early years Husserl looked upon phenomenology as a descriptive psychology. Husserl's refutation of psychologism has been taken by many to mean that he is an enemy of psychology. But the truth is that Husserl never refutes psychology. He only holds that psychology can never be the foundation of logic. But at the same time he thinks that it is his task to help psychology
in the pursuit of its legitimate task. The main objection urged by him against psychologism is that logic cannot be a branch of psychology and that a psychological explanation of the laws of logic is futile. Here by 'psychology' Husserl means the experimental psychology of the Wundtian School which looks upon psychology as psychophysiology and psychophysics. According to Husserl, phenomenology as the study of the essential nature of consciousness in its intentional structure is closely related to psychology in so far as both are concerned with consciousness, though not in the same manner. The experimental psychologists, like Carl Stumpf and Theodor Lipps felt the need of the descriptive clarification of their concepts which can only be provided by phenomenology. The German Psychologist Messer holds that "Psychology need not assume unobserved physical states and properties but can restrict itself to what is given in consciousness.... phenomenology, far from being opposed to psychology, is itself psychology, the pure psychology of consciousness, or rather, the foundational part of it."  

Husserl thinks that the psychologies of his time cannot be regarded as rigorous sciences in the

true sense of the term. For these sciences are concerned mainly with making experimentations upon factual materials but not with the clarification of their basic concepts. Psychology is a positive empirical science not much different in principle from other positive sciences. It deals with the acts of consciousness as belonging to man who is a part of nature and regards the psychical states and processes as causally dependent on the physical and the physiological processes. Phenomenology, on the contrary, is not a positive empirical science; it is a philosophical discipline which claims to provide the foundation of all knowledge and experience. Thus whereas psychology is an empirical science, phenomenology is the science of transcendental subjectivity. It is the science of essences which is necessary and a priori. In his earlier work Husserl attempts to designate the distinction between Philosophy and Psychology by saying that the relation between the two is similar to that of content to form; e.g., when we study space, the essence of space comes to us from philosophy but the factual experience, i.e. perception of space comes
to us through our tactual and visual experiences that belong to the realm of psychology. Therefore psychology does nothing new. It works on the essential insight supplied by phenomenology and philosophy.

The most important distinction between phenomenology and psychology is that psychology presupposes some principles which are relevant for it whereas phenomenology is supposed to be presuppositionless. Husserl with his method of phenomenological reduction puts everything within brackets and describes only that which is given. Like phenomenology psychology also seeks to establish general laws such as the laws of after image. But as the laws of phenomenology are transcendental, there must be some difference between the phenomenological and the psychological laws. The phenomenological principle, that qualitative discontinuity is necessary for object discrimination, is wider in scope than the psychological principle connected with Stimulus -threshold, after image etc.

We may also try to draw the distinction between Phenomenology and Psychology in still another way. We
may say that phenomenology is presuppositionless, whereas psychology presupposes phenomenology, i.e. some of its evidences fall within the field of phenomenology. The phenomenological principle of qualitative discrimination is activated in the field of psychology. The animal can be conditioned to a box containing food only when it has a shape, size different from those placed by the side of it. But even when we find that the psychological principle - the ground of a figure has no shape - has the same scope as that of the phenomenological principle - qualitative discontinuity is necessary for object discrimination; the phenomenological principle is presupposed by the psychological one; e.g. we can perceive something as figure on a ground only when there is some qualitative distinction between them. This phenomenological principle is a priori and intuitively established. It is not established by experiment but it is itself the condition of experiment. The essential nature of the facts of psychology can be furnished by Phenomenology. "Hence Husserl argued that only a full-fledged phenomenology that had investigated the essential structure of phenomena in their variety could make sense of experimental findings.
Empirical psychology, a psychology that presupposes phenomenological psychology, a psychology that works out the fundamental distinctions of psychological phenomena on the basis of the celebrated, if not notorious, essential insights (Wesenseinsichten).

Thus phenomenology will guide psychology. But we have to see whether phenomenology is really presuppositionless. It is found that a phenomenological principle, which is intuitively established, and self-evident, can easily be questioned from a psychological point of view. Psychological experiments can increase or decrease its certainty. Thus the phenomenological principle that qualitative discontinuity is necessary for object discrimination can be more meaningful with the results of experiment on dark adaption and stimulus threshold under controlled conditions. In fact, psychology helps to eliminate phenomenological illusion and tries to define the scope and meaning of phenomenological principles.

According to Husserl, the sensuous content of a perceptual object may change through a certain range but the meaning of a perception remains the same. But this principle of Husserl has been confirmed by experiments that determine

what its range is. The insight that the same object can be determined in different illuminations, however obvious it may be to philosophical reflection, can be tested and refined by phenomenal constancy experiment that determines the constancy for subjects of different ages and habituations. It is learning and association which enable us to accept the phenomenological principle that the predicate applied to S in the past tends to be reactivated when a new predicate is applied to S. Thus we come to the conclusion that just as psychology presupposes phenomenology for the clarification of its basic concepts, so also phenomenology is dependent upon psychology for the verification of its principles.

According to Husserl, psychology deals with facts. But knowledge of fact presupposes knowledge of essence. In his article on 'Phenomenology' Husserl wrote a section on pure phenomenology i.e. on psychology which is free from reference to everything physical and physiological. This pure psychology is developed along the line of Brentano's descriptive psychology and deals with intentionality as the distinguishing characteristic of psychic life.

16. Lauer, Phenomenology: Its Genesis and Prospect, p. 34.
It is based both on the method of phenomenological reduction that leads to inner experience and also on the eidetic reduction which reveals the nature of essences. Next it is shown by him how such a phenomenological psychology would serve as the basis of transcendental phenomenology.

The problem which Husserl faces is: In what sense is the world to be taken as real? For the experience of the world as it appears to us in our consciousness is ambiguous. This ambiguity can be removed only if we look within our transcendental subjectivity. Even phenomenological psychology, due to its belief on the existence of the natural world would suffer from the difficulties of naturalistic psychology. But in so far as it uses the method of reduction and searches for the ultimate foundation of the world within inner experience it is akin to transcendental phenomenology.

According to Spiegelberg, an empirical psychology must presuppose a pure or transcendental psychology which is concerned with the intentional structure of consciousness. This latter essential structure cannot
be revealed to us through the traditional psychology. Phenomenological psychology is to give us description of the essential structure of consciousness. And like all phenomenology such an intentional description also presupposes a method of reduction.

Empirical psychology presupposes some concepts such as function, conation, perception which are not clearly defined but are vague and based on ordinary experience. The aim of phenomenology is to clarify these concepts. "It wants to derive psychological definitions from what is called, perhaps a little pretentiously, an essential insight (Wesensschat.), or a little more concretely, from grasping the essential types that can be intuited on the basis of a systematic variation of the observed phenomena." Husserl holds that "these steps ........... description of pure subjective experience, identification of essential types, and constitutive phenomenology - are indispensable for making psychology a science. In this case phenomenology would of course be relevant in the strong sense. It would certainly be a serious challenge to all existing psychology that is still innocent of such a phenomenology."

17. Lee & Mandelbaum, Phenomenology and Existentialism, p.231
18. Ibid
The influence of Husserl's phenomenology can be traced in the work of different psychologists of his time. In recent times, we find that the intuitive method of phenomenology is accepted even by some behaviourists. By using the method of intuition they want to determine whether the psychologists' procedures or results are in accordance with their postulates. In this sense intuition is one aspect of scientific method. Phenomenology is the study of that aspect of scientific method and its importance has been emphasized recently by the Psychologists, even in the field of animal psychology. Köhler has emphasized the importance of phenomenological method. "Phenomenology", he says, "is the field in which all concepts find their final justification".

Psychologists like Muller and David Katz in Gottingen were influenced by Husserlean method. The notion of the intentional structure of consciousness has a considerable effect upon the distinction between surface colour and film colour made by psychologists

like Katz. The Existentialists like Sartre and Psychiatrists like Jaspers are also influenced by Husserl's phenomenological method.

According to Husserl, there is no fundamental difference between the standpoints of phenomenology and psychology. The subject matter of both is the same. In a broad sense, it is man who is the subject of both. When we try to form the image of man, we take him as an empirical self situated in the world of causality. But this empirical psychology, if it attempts to find out the nature of that which it is describing, it must regard man as the focus of reflection and not merely as a part of nature. That psychology is based on the essential insight supplied by the phenomenologists is true; but from this it does not follow that phenomenology can replace psychology. In conclusion we may say according to McGill that "since psychology presupposes phenomenology, the subjective data and principles, even present in the mind of the objective psychologist, should be explicitly recognised and further explored. Since phenomenology is not presuppositionless, but presupposes psychology and other science, efforts should be made to delimit and corroborate phenomenological intuitions in the light of empirical research."
Husserl wants to develop a pure psychology, which is 'pure' in the sense that it should be free from everything psycho-physical. This pure phenomenological psychology is to be distinguished from naturalistic psychology. Naturalistic psychology follows the path of the exact natural sciences like physics and chemistry. That Psychology is influenced by the growth and development of the natural and the mathematical sciences is found in the British School, in the works of Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, Hartley, the two Mills, Herbert Spencer, Fechner and Helmholtz. The naturalistic Psychologists consider the mental as a part of the natural world and try to introduce causal explanation in psychology. They take over the idea of causality from Physics and apply it in their own fields; associationism and sensationism are the results. Just as in Physics it is held that a material body is composed of simple units, say atoms, so a complex psychical state is supposed to be composed of simple units such as sensations, images etc. Thus they consider consciousness like a physical object.
Like the Physicists they try to explain psychical states by sitting in a laboratory and using the method of hypothetical construction and verification. Thus the naturalistic psychologist naturalises consciousness. Naturalism "is afraid of introspection, it refuses any direct grasp of the data of consciousness, thus blocking any access to the essence of the very concepts with which it must work". According to Husserl, the idea of modern Galilean Physics plays an important part not only in the formulation of Psychological concepts but also in the formulation of Psychological problems, especially, the problem of perception. "To account for perception, the Psychologist accepts, and starts from, the universe as conceived in Physical Science and considers the human organism as a physical system acted upon by physical events." Even the Gestaltists are not free from naturalistic tendency. Kohler frankly states that the natural world, the world which is presented before us, is the starting point for every

23. Ibid p. 313.
science, Physics as well as Psychology. In fact, the naturalistic psychologists are naive in their procedure.

The mental experiences are, of course, real aspects of a natural whole; they are together with concrete bodily experiences. This accounts for the predominantly naturalistic tendency in psychology, and for the fact that the identity of the psychological and the naturalistic methods has been taken to be self-evident. There has been a Universal blindness for intentionality. Even by speaking of 'gestalt qualities' and forms or wholeness, one may have to some extent overcome psychological atomism, but not naturalism. The principle of psychological naturalism is only then made intelligible and so loses much of its power when the mental life is revealed in its own pure character through phenomenological reflection. Thus, according to Husserl, the tendency to study the mental phenomena in relation to the physical processes and the prejudices derived from the other sciences, has prevented modern psychology from arriving at a true understanding of the concept of intentionality.
In contrast to naturalistic psychology, Husserl develops a purely intentional psychology. It is a psychology that denies the mental to be a part of the natural world. At the same time, it is free from the prejudices derived from the sciences and from the other sphere of experiences which might blind us to what is given in phenomenological reflection.

In order to arrive at a pure phenomenological psychology it is necessary to put within brackets my entire natural existence with all its claim to theoretical validity. But at the same time the problem arises: since every perception is perception of something, how would it be possible to describe perception without taking into consideration its object which is out there? In reply, Husserl would say that every perception is perception of something no doubt, but this is quite independent of the further question whether this something exists or not (as for example the case of illusion). Consequently, as phenomenologists we must put ourselves in the position of disinterested perceiver or witness of conscious life, and not interested in the world. It is only through this phenomenological reduction
that we can catch hold of the appearance as appearance; the perceived as perceived. The intentional object and also the intentional experience, both in their true character, are revealed to us first only through phenomenological reduction. It also makes clear the fundamental character of the nature of being or consciousness, namely the identity of the manner in which the noema (perceived as perceived) is apprehended. The noematic correlation is contained in the corresponding consciousness. The same perceived or intended house, that is to say, the same noema can be apprehended as the same house in a whole series of other perceptions. The something, towards which consciousness is directed, is a noematic pole which indicates an endless multiplicity of other conscious experiences for which it remains identically the same. Therefore this real, identical noema is not really contained in the conscious act but only ideally contained.

Intentional analysis is completely different from real analysis. The explanation of the intentional meaning of conscious experience leads amongst others to the
explication of its horizon, that is to say, what is anticipated in it.

Conscious life is always constituting meanings, constituting new meanings on the basis of the already constituted ones. And the task of the intentional analysis of consciousness would be to show the different ways, modes and levels in which meanings are constituted by consciousness.

Husserl claims that phenomenological psychology would be the basis for any scientific empirical psychology. A science of facts based on experience presupposes an a priori science of essences. The empirical science of nature presupposes an a priori science of space namely, Geometry. What Geometry is for natural sciences, a phenomenological psychology claims to be for empirical psychology.
(ii) Dilthey's conception of Psychology.

Dilthey sought to develop the idea of a descriptive psychology through a criticism of experimental psychology. He was interested not in mathematics and natural sciences, but in aesthetics and the historical studies. He thinks that in knowledge situation there is nothing which may be called a priori. Our knowledge is wholly based on experience which gives order and structure to our thought. But it is not mere sense experience. It is the inner life of the mind which imposes this order to our thought. Therefore, we are in need of a good psychology which provides us with the knowledge of mental life upon which epistemology should be based. Dilthey holds that "in every department of historical and social knowledge, psychological influence is to be paramount. Psychology is to be the basis of all work in the human studies, as mathematics is the basis of all work in natural science." All natural sciences, especially Physics and Chemistry, depend on mathematics or the certainty of their conclusions. Thus just as on the basis of mathematical reasoning natural

24. Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey, p. 27.
sciences come to indubitable conclusions, similarly it is on the basis of Psychology that all human studies can obtain the certitude of their results. But if psychology is to perform the function which we ascribe to it, it must not rely on the method of hypothesis and verification. Dilthey thinks that psychology can serve the basis of human studies only if it "remains within the limits of a descriptive science."

Dilthey makes a distinction between descriptive and explanatory sciences. In a descriptive science there is no place of hypothetical construction. It limits itself within the field of experience and observation. It studies and observes facts as they appear. On the other hand, an explanatory science follows the path of the exact sciences like Physics and proceeds in the manner of Physics through hypothetical construction which transcends direct intuition. In fact, an explanatory science tries to explain the wealth of observable events by making

hypotheses which are based either on some elements of observed data or on something unobservable. Thus in so far as the procedure of the natural sciences are hypothetical, there is some possibility of uncertainty here. Therefore, Dilthey comes to the conclusion that if psychology is to be the basis of the human studies, it must not follow the procedure of a natural science. "Psychology can solve the problems of such a fundamental science only if it remains within the limits of a descriptive science, which records facts and likeness between facts, whereas explanatory psychology, which endeavours to make the whole system of mental life deducible by means of certain assumptions, is clearly distinguished from it. ......... only so can the special sciences of mind be placed on a foundation which is itself secure, whereas at present even the best expositions of psychology build hypotheses on hypotheses."

Thus Dilthey thinks that instead of being a natural science, psychology should be an independent descriptive science. In their attempt to explain psychic states and processes, the psychologists need not be guided by the ideal of causal explanation. Physiological causes fail to explain the true nature of psychical events. The aim of the experimental psychologists is to analyse the mind into many small units like sensations, feelings, images which like the physicist's atoms can be observed by introspection. But Dilthey thinks that it is wrong to hold the view that not the atoms can be observed. The supposed atomic sensations can be observed by introspection. Therefore, the method of natural science does not at all suit the nature of mental life. In the natural sciences, this procedure may have some meanings and may even be necessary; for it traces on outer experiences in which nature is given as mere spatial outside dimension. The objects of the natural world are not presented to us as something coherent and ordered. Therefore, order is to be imposed on them by the method of hypothetical construction. On the other hand,
psychology is concerned with mental life. It deals with inner experiences. Inner experiences fail to know the distinction of independent elements. Mind, on the contrary, has unity of its own. It knows of states which are intimately bound up together in the unity of a whole which is itself intuited in inner experience. It is absurd to explain the structural system or the unity of mind by the law of causality, for it is itself the source of the idea of causality.

Now we are in a position to understand the nature of the method of psychology which Dilthey wants to develop. The subject matter of psychology is quite different from that of Physics. As a result, its method also should be different. The peculiar task of Psychology is to go back to the inner experiences which have a unity of their own. The unity of our inner experiences are reflected in the systematic unity of our experiences. The structural unity of our consciousness distinguishes it from the external world. "...... consciousness cannot go behind itself." The law of causation with

which the elements of external world are ordered, is the product of the structural unity of our inner experiences. Therefore, like explanatory science we must not go beyond consciousness to a system of abstract elements to explain inner experience with the help of the concept of causation, for we have to acquire knowledge/such a structural system within us. The descriptive method or the reflection upon the self is the valid foundation for the knowledge of the structural system. Descriptive method contains what is good in experimental method. After we have gained knowledge of the structural system by the method of description, we must take the help of the method of hypothetical construction and verification. It is only then that the sphere of knowledge can be extended.

Descriptive psychology would try to explain the unity of experience or Erlebnis. It would deal with the cognitive, affective and volitional elements of consciousness and show how these three elements are interconnected. The natural sciences explain (Erklären); but the mental states try to understand (Verstehen).
A separate element in mental life is an abstraction. Every conscious state is a combination of these elements. A feeling, a will or a thought is never explained in isolation. It is what is through its entire context --- its motivations and indications, and these are inseparably co-experienced moments. A state of consciousness is called cognitive, affective or volitional according to the predominance of one factor upon the others. All these three mental states can be represented in the order of growing complexity. But the significant problem for Dilthey's psychology is to discover the connection between thought and will. Dilthey finds this connection in feeling but holds that feeling itself is based on instincts. Thus the centre of our mental structure is a bundle of feelings and instincts. The whole system represents the teleological unity of life. Like Husserl, Dilthey holds that our consciousness is intentional. It is directed towards something. That of which we are conscious is called the content (Vorstellung) and our being conscious of it is called the act or attitude (Erlebnis). The task of descriptive psychology is to classify the different types of unity and structure of mental life, and to describe them.
Dilthey's programme is concerned with the understanding of an individual's mental life, but cannot arrive at universally valid laws. The problem for introspective psychology is: how is it possible to arrive at universal laws on the basis of one's inner experience? Psychology must seek to establish the universal law of necessity. Nevertheless, the contribution of Dilthey regarding the method and nature of Psychology has immense value. His originality lies in what he says about the unity of mental life and in the idea that Psychology should be descriptive.
Phenomenology and Existential Psychology -

Phenomenology as advocated by Husserl claims to be a presuppositionless philosophy dealing with the essences of objects. It is also a descriptive science. The essence of a thing is what it means and the meaning or the significance of the thing can be found only in consciousness. "A meaning is an intention of mind. To mean is to intend. Intentionality then is the keyword with the phenomenologists". Phenomenological psychology is intentional and the method which it applies is the descriptive method. Instead of studying the psychical states and processes causally, the phenomenologist thinks that as the mind has a unique nature of its own it cannot be causally determined but can only be described by the method of intuition. Thus in spite of its epistemological orientation, phenomenology has played an important part in the field of psychology. Consciousness has an important place in phenomenology. It is regarded as the ground of all meaning. The essence of mind is intentionality. The phenomenologist's conception of intentional psychology is accepted by the existential thinkers, especially by Sartre. Like

Husserl, Sartre thinks that we must have some insight into the inner working of the mind in order that a descriptive or phenomenological psychology can be developed. "It is, however, noteworthy that in his theoretical discussion Sartre charges Phenomenology with the additional task of finding "synthetic unity" within the phenomena analysed by empirical science, and with determining their significance as goal-directed ways of behaviour (conduites); the chief instance of such a hermeneutic interpretation is that of the emotions". The existentialists think that empirical psychology can provide us with knowledge about the nature and significance of psychical states and processes which is only probable; for the ultimate clarification of any psychical concept we require the help of phenomenological method because only eidetic insight gives us the essence of consciousness. Like the phenomenologists, the existentialists also start with the cogito and hold that consciousness is always directed to some object. Thinking is impossible without some object to think. This directedness towards the object

is termed by the phenomenologist as the intentionality of consciousness. However, the existentialists think that the problem of mind is closely linked up with the problem of life and existence. Therefore, they think that every psychologist must try to understand the philosophical question: What is meant by man? What is the significance of human life? What is man's attitude to life and world? What is the true nature of his psychical states? The true nature and significance of all these questions, which the psychologists need, can only be provided by the phenomenologists and the existentialists. The concepts of intentionality, meaning, freedom and choice have same part to play in the field of psychology. In fact, the psychologists must know the significance of the concepts from the philosophers i.e. from the phenomenologists and the existentialists.

Both the phenomenologists and the existentialists hold that our mind is not quantitative, but it is intentional. All our psychical states are directed to some objects. According to the existentialists, all
emotions and imaginations exhibit the intentional structure of consciousness. An image is the image of an object. Similarly, emotions are intentional. Emotions have meanings. Through emotions man tries to escape from the present situation by transforming the real world magically. The purifying reflection which enables man to escape from emotion is like the method of phenomenological reduction. "An orderly way of relating to the object and the world is replaced by an irrational way in which everything happens as if the unconditional will of the subject were able to reach its result by merely projecting itself into the object without any employment of means. This is an example of what Husserl calls an eidetic analysis."

The empirical psychologists are full of prejudices. They deal with psychical concepts—thought, feeling, willing, emotion, imagination—without finding out the significance of those concepts through reflecting upon their own experiences. Psychology deals with the facts and relations among them. But both Husserl and the

existential psychologists think that the true significance of these facts can only be furnished by an eidetic or phenomenological investigation. Thus it is the view of the phenomenologists and the existentialists that the psychologists must be free from any preconception. They should study the psychical states as they appear to them and must not presuppose any theoretical framework. According to both of them, true psychology must be eidetic and must depend upon the method of phenomenological reduction.

In order to understand the bearing of the phenomenologists and the existentialists upon psychology we must remember that they are not professional psychologists, they are philosophers. Therefore, their notion of mind is to some extent coloured by their philosophical standpoints. They have not gone to the laboratories like the scientific psychologists to make experimentation upon human beings or animals. Their conception of mind is more subjective than that of the scientific psychologists. Nevertheless, their contribution to the field of psychology cannot be ignored today.
Husserl's crisis and its relevance for psychology as a natural science:

Husserl's aim is to make philosophy a science. The attempt had already been made by different thinkers to raise philosophy to the status of a strict science. But the ideal of scientific rigor demanded by Husserl is to some extent different from those of the positivistic scientists. The scientific rigor, according to Husserl, must not be of the nature of an inductive natural science but must be of the nature of a deductive science. "Here science stands for a system of knowledge connected by reasons in such a manner that each step is built upon its predecessor in a necessary sequence. Such a rigorous connection requires ultimate clarity in basic insights and a systematic order in building further propositions upon them. This is the rigor which Philosophy would have to achieve to become truly scientific". The root of the crisis of modern science lies in the fact that modern science is confined to positive facts. As a result, it is incapable of

handling the problems of value and meaning skilfully.

Naturalistic sciences claim that they can fulfil the purpose of a scientific philosophy. But Husserl is of opinion that the methods and principles of naturalism itself demand clarification. Naturalism is not to be identified with scientific approach. Naturalism is a doctrine, according to which the physical is the only reality. It is a factual science that naturalises consciousness and holds that psychical states and processes have physical accompaniments. Husserl wants to show that "a strict science of philosophy was possible only if consciousness and ideas were not 'naturalized' in the way which the 'psychologists' were accustomed to do."32 The psychologists think that if philosophy is to be science it must be modelled after the empirical sciences like empirical psychology. But Husserl's intention is not to show that psychology is not a science. He simply shows that the ideal of psychology as a science cannot be equated with that of philosophy. Empirical psychology is a factual science. If philosophy is to be a science at all i.e.

32. Lauer, Phenomenology: Its Genesis and Prospect, p. 28.
if it is philosophy in the true sense of the term, it must be a science of essences. Philosophy is not concerned with facts. It provides us with the ideal that transcends facts. Psychology deals with the experience of the existing individuals. Therefore, it is empirical and contingent. The objects with which Philosophy deals are not measurable and quantitative. In fact, they are ideal. They are ideal because they are not factual and as such they are not measurable. They spring from a consciousness that cannot be explained causally by empirical terms. Therefore, no science of fact, not even science of psychology can provide us with the ideal of Philosophy. "Experience alone cannot answer the most important questions about experience but must seek the answers in a theory of cognition from which every positing of experience has been rigorously eliminated."

Husserl thinks that empirical or naturalistic Psychology can neither be philosophy nor can it be a psychology in the true sense of the term. This is due

33. Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 10.
to the fact that it ignores introspection. Consequently it fails to grasp the essence of consciousness which is the source of the concepts of psychology. Psychology wants to explain experience. But in order to explain experience it must depend not only on the concepts that are derived from experience alone but also on some concepts that can only be had from the analysis of the acts of consciousness. The fault of psychology is that it wants to know things themselves without even attempting to know what things are. In fact, in order to form concepts we must require experiences, but the experiences themselves cannot justify concepts. "The question, then, of a scientific knowledge of what experience presents cannot be answered by experience; it is a question of 'sense' which is a trans-empirical element in all knowledge. By 'naturalising' consciousness psychology is bound to miss this essential character."  

Naturalism holds that the method of empirical science must be uniformly applicable to all sciences including psychology. But there is a great difference between the subject matter of psychology as well as that

34. Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 11.
of the other natural sciences. The concept of nature is applicable only to the spatio-temporal world, the nature of which can be studied causally; whereas the psychical world has a peculiarity of its own and cannot be submitted to empirical investigation. The psychical world is divided into several windowless monads which can only be communicated through empathy. The psychical sphere is always in a continuous flux and here there is no distinction between being and its appearance. Here the nature of a being is its appearance. And the nature of this Phenomenal appearance can be understood only in an essential intuition. In the physical world the being and the appearance of a thing are causally determined.

Modern psychology is a science of psychical phenomena. The knowledge which it derives from experience is the foundation of its empirical conclusion. In its attempt to describe and determine the nature of psychical phenomena it must use some concepts whose scientific value has to be determined by phenomenological analysis. For, there is no provision in experimental psychology for
the analysis of its own concepts. Psychology fails to see that it applies to experience concepts which are not taken from what is given in experience. It fails to see that it cannot justify its own presuppositions. Its procedure is radically distinct from that of Physics because the latter excludes phenomena whereas psychology wants to be the science of the phenomena themselves. Empirical psychology, because of its naturalistic tendency, has neglected to consider to what extent the psychical has an essence proper. The source of this error lies in the fact that empirical psychology has always accepted the physico-chemical method as the model. It has supposed that the method of all empirical sciences was the same, and has accordingly prescribed for itself the very same method. In fact, the true method of a science must be modelled after the nature of the region to be investigated and not by our prejudice and preconception about what is means to be a science. Husserl wants to confine himself within the world of the psychical. Everything that is psychical is precisely phenomenon and not nature. A phenomenon has no substantial unity, no real properties and parts, no real change and no causality. It is impossible
to investigate the real component parts of psychical experience. It is absurd to try to naturalise something whose essence excludes the being of nature. A thing remains in its identity for ever. It can be determined with objective validity. But something psychical comes and goes. It retains no identical being that would be objectively determinable as such in the sense of the natural sciences.

What psychical being is experience cannot say in the same sense as that it can with regard to the physical. Its essence can only be revealed to us through the method of phenomenological intuition. It is the naturalistic point of view that makes us incapable of making the psychical an object of intuitive investigation. It inhibits the growth of a science which is both the condition for a scientific psychology and the field for a genuine critic of reason. The entire sphere of a psychical phenomenon is dominated by pure intuition. When we bring to givenness what perception is, then we have intuitively grasped the essence of perception. Thus it is clear that the phenomenological analysis of essence in no way can be similar to that of the empirical analysis.
From the above discussion it is clear that "a really adequate empirical science of the psychical in its relations to nature can be realised only when psychology is constructed on the base of a systematic phenomenology". Pure Phenomenology is an investigation into essences. Psychology wants to have some knowledge of the essence of the psychical states and processes. And this can be provided by phenomenological reflection. In fact, for the ultimate clarification of its concepts psychology stands in a close relationship to phenomenology.

Thus Husserl thinks that his criticism has made it clear that "to recognise naturalism as a fundamentally erroneous Philosophy still does not mean giving up the idea of a rigorously scientific philosophy, a "philosophy from the ground up." The critical separation of the psychological and phenomenological methods shows that the latter is the true way to a scientific theory of reason and, by the same token, to an adequate psychology."

35. Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, p. 119.
36. Ibid, p. 122