CHAPTER IV

INFERENCE (ANUMĀNA PRAMĀṆA)
The Rāmānuja school of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta recognises, like almost all schools of Indian Philosophy except the Cārvāka, inference (anumāna) as a valid instrument of knowledge. The word 'anumāna' stands for both inferential knowledge (anumiti-jñāna) and its instrument (anumāna pramāṇa). Very often, however, the word for inferential knowledge is anumiti. Though inference is considered to be a distinct source or instrument of knowledge, yet its ground is perceptual knowledge; for inference is initiated by perceptual knowledge. Inference is not possible, if there is no previous perceptual knowledge of the universal concomitance of what is employed as the inferential mark (liṅga or hetu) with the thing which is to be inferred (sādhya) by it; besides, inference starts with the perception of the mark (liṅga-dārsana) in some locus. Thus perception plays an important and basic role in the process of inference.

Rāmānuja, nowhere in his works, has discussed clearly, specifically or thoroughly the exact nature of inference as
a method of knowledge. So we have to learn his exact position in this matter mainly from what he says about it incidentally in his refutation of Śaṅkara's theory of knowledge and reality. Rāmānuja considers Śaṅkara as his most prominent opponent and in his writings he bestows a good deal of his energy to refute Śaṅkara's theory of Absolute monism (Advaitism) which asserts that reality is devoid of all kinds of difference, although Rāmānuja also propounds his own brand of monism in a special sense of this term which is called Viśiṣṭādvaita, and Rāmānuja's theory of knowledge is propounded in contrast with Śaṅkara's, in the course of his refuting the metaphysical position of Śaṅkara. Rāmānuja in his Śrībhāṣya (Sutra 1.1.1) has given a number of arguments against the contention of certain Śaṅkarites that all our pramāṇas or instruments of knowledge establish, truly speaking, only a differenceless reality which is pure or unqualified existence. Rāmānuja has, with great critical acumen, shown that there is no such differenceless reality or pure existence, as the Śaṅkarites say; for none of our instruments of knowledge can possibly establish such an entity.  

1. Na kenāpi pramāṇena nirviśeṣavastu siddhiḥ.

Śrībhāṣya, Catuḥsūtri, p 76
As we saw in the previous chapter, Rāmānuja tries to make out that perception even in its simplest or most rudimentary type, which may be called nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (or indeterminate perception) necessarily grasps an object as marked by some distinctive feature. He next proceeds to show that like perception, inference also necessarily apprehends its object as characterised by some special attribute; for inference is based on perceptual knowledge and the inferential mark (hetu), which is recognised first in perception, must itself possess some special feature on the basis of which alone the inferable thing is asserted. While, again, Rāmānuja refutes the possibility of avidyā or ignorance as a positive entity (as conceived by Śaṅkarites), he remarks that neither perception nor inference nor verbal testimony (sabda) can prove such an entity, namely avidyā. He shows the absurdity of such a notion as avidyā by various arguments. It is mainly from these and such other arguments employed by Rāmānuja that we have to extract Rāmānuja's view about inference as an instrument of knowledge. Of course, such data may not be considered to be quite adequate for forming a clear idea about his precise

2. Ataḥ pratyakṣasya Saviśeṣavāyatvėna pratyakṣeḥ- didṛśtasambandhaviśeṣṭaḥvāyaḥvāty anumānampi saviśeṣavāyameva. Šrībhāṣya, Catuṣūṭrī, p 76

By Rāmānuja.

Nirnaya Sagar Edition.
view of this particular cognitive instrument. But this is not a formidable difficulty. For, as is usually the case with a school of Indian Philosophy, there is a long line of writers, almost from the days of Rāmānuja, advocating the doctrine of the master, who copiously treat this particular topic as well as other similar ones and leave us in no doubt about the exact position of the master. In our present dissertation, we will mainly depend on these writers, and of course, on Rāmānuja's own words, as their source, wherever we have been able to trace them.

According to these interpreters of Rāmānuja's tenets, inferential knowledge is that special kind of knowledge of something y, which results from the memory that another thing x (which is to serve as the inferential mark) is universally concomitant with the something y; and its karapa or extraordinary cause is the instrument of inferential knowledge. In the definition of inference the Viśiṣṭād- vaita logicians have used the word 'anusaṅdhāna' which literally means the act of remembering some fact of which one has already had a primary experience. Here 'anusaṅdhāna' stands for the recollection (or better, the recognition) that the observed mark (vyāpya) has concomitance with the

3. (a) Vyāpyasya vyāpyatvāanusaṅdhānāt vyāpaka viśeṣa

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thing to be inferred (sādhyā). On the basis of the recognition that the observed mark (vyāpya) has concomitance with the thing to be inferred (sādhyā), one infers that the thing to be inferred is present in a new place where the mark is observed to be. For example, the presence of fire on a hill is inferred by observing the presence of smoke there and remembering the fact that smoke was experienced in the past to be universally concomitant with fire. The very language in which the definition of inferential knowledge is given by these thinkers indicates that 'anusañdhāna' or the recognition of the universal concomitance of the observed mark with the thing to be inferred plays the most vital role in the process of inference, so that we can say safely that this mnemonic recognition of the observed mark's concomitance with the thing-to-be-inferred is the


instrumental cause of inferential knowledge. For, according to the Rāmānujites, the instrumental cause of a piece of knowledge is that cause, in presence of which is immediately followed by the knowledge in question. The steps, then, for the knowledge of fire on the hill from the knowledge of smoke there, are as follows: i) By finding that smoke is never found in the absence of fire, one apprehends that smoke is universally concomitant with fire (vyāpti-grahāna). ii) After this, one sees smoke in a new place, such as a hill. iii) He then after remembering that smoke is universally concomitant with fire recognises (anusaṇḍhāna) that this observed smoke in the hill has also such universal concomitance. The third step is the karaṇa of anumiti of


Yatindramatadīpikā, Chap. I, p 3.

(b) This expressed by the statement that the instrumental cause of knowledge is that which plays the most important role (sādhakatama) in producing the knowledge in question. The following quotation explains what is meant by "playing the most important role". This most important role is constituted by the fact that the effect follows immediately after the karaṇa makes its appearance in the total cognitive situation.
fire in the hill. The inferential cognition that an object possesses a thing y takes place immediately after one knows that the object possesses another thing x which is remembered to have universal concomitance with the thing y.

This, on the whole would seem to be the same as the view which is maintained by the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā. Thus the Māṇeṣyodaya, a hand book of this school, defines inferential knowledge as the cognition of a thing which is not in contact with the senses - a cognition which comes from the perception of what is universally concomitant with the thing to be inferred.  

The phrase "the perception of what is concomitant ...." is then explained in the following manner. "The perception of smoke when its concomitance with fire is apprehended by

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a person is its first perception. The perception of smoke by him when he has gone near the hill is its second perception. When after remembering the fact of its concomitance with fire he recognises that there is that kind of smoke here, he has the third perception of smoke. This is what is considered to be "the perception of what is concomitant with the thing to be inferred". For after this, the (inferential) knowledge of fire comes into being. What is important to note, here, is that both for a Rāmānujite and for a Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā philosopher, inferential cognition occurs immediately after the anusāṅdhāna, i.e. recollection of mnemonic recognition that the inferential mark (vyāpya) is universally concomitant with the thing-to-be inferred. We will soon make some further remarks on this.


Ibid. pp 48-49.
The Advaita school of Vedānta should hold the same view, in consonance with its adage, "In empirical thought and behaviour, Bhatta logic applies." (Vyavahāre Bhātta nyāyah). But the author of Vedānta Paribhāṣā, a handbook of Advaita philosophy presents a somewhat different view about the instrument of inferential knowledge. He holds that the impression (sāṃskāra) of the previous knowledge of invariable co-existence is the intermediate operation (vyāpāra) and that the original knowledge of the universal concomitance is the instrumental cause (karaṇa) of an inferential judgment. He maintains that if a person already knows the vyāpti or invariable relation of concomitance that 'smoke is invariably accompanied by fire', then, when he afterwards sees smoke in a hill, the impression of the previously acquired knowledge of universal concomitance is revived, and in consequence he at once gets the knowledge, "The hill has fire"; so according to him, the function of the knowledge of vyāpti is the creation of such an impression or latent disposition (Sāṃskāra) through the revival of which inference takes place.

7. Anumitikaraṇām ca vyāptijñānam. Tat saṃskārovantaravyāpāraḥ. Na tu tṛtiyāṅga-parāmarṣa anumitau karaṇaṃ tasyānumitihetutvāsiddhyā tatkaraṇasya dūranirastvāt.

Vedāntaparibhāṣā Chap. II, P 52-53.
Edited by Suryanarayana Sastri.
We do not understand why Advaita Vedānta should support this particular view instead of the Bhāṭṭa view as presented by the author of the Mānameyodaya. At any rate, the view of the Rāmānujites is very different from this. Moreover, there are insuperable difficulties in the way of accepting it. In the first place, it asserts that the original apprehension of regular concomitance is the karāṇa of inferential cognition. But a karāṇa is also a kāraṇa. In other words, the instrument of knowledge is also a cause of it, though it is a specific kind of cause. Now a kāraṇa or cause must immediately precede its effect. If so, how can my past apprehension of universal concomitance be present immediate before my inferential knowledge which occurs how? This is possible only if I have memory knowledge of the said concomitance. But the Vedāntaparibhāṣā refuses to regard memory knowledge as a cause of inferential cognition, even if it happens to be there (by chance) 8.

Then again, what is this revival or awakening (udbodha) of a latent impression which does not amount to recollection? As far as I can see, the only justification of this view is that very often, if we already know that smoke is concomitant with fire, and now see smoke somewhere, we seem,

at once, to conclude that there is fire there, without explicitly recollecting the fact of concomitance. But for theoretical purposes, such a mute and quick mental process can hardly be accepted just as it appears on the face of it.

But Nyāya logicians differ from these Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta views (including those of Advaita and Viśiṣṭadvaita) about the instrument of inferential knowledge. According to them, the instrumental cause of inference is a complex judgment like "The subject of the inferential judgment (pakṣa) possesses the mark (hetu) which has universal concomitance with the thing to be inferred (sādhyā)". This complex judgment is technically called in Nyāya logic as līṅga-parāmārṣa or tṛtiya-līṅga parāmārṣa, meaning the third cognition of the mark. For instance, in the stock example of inferring fire in a hill by observing smoke there, the instrumental cause is, in their view, the complex judgment that there is, in the hill, smoke which has invariable concomitance with fire.

Some Nyāya thinkers, however, maintain that the instrument of inferential knowledge is the memory of the invariable co-existence of the mark and the inferable thing. They are
of opinion that the complex judgment (paramārśa) is the intermediate operation (vyāpāra) of the instrumental cause. Even so, the general Nyāya Vaiśeṣika position is accepted by these Nyāya thinkers also in that they recognize the complex judgment called paramārśa as essential for inference. Nyāya thinkers contend that the mental process which is involved in inference must include this complex judgment (liṅga-parāmarśa). Symbolically speaking "(s is m) and (m is p)" is quite necessary for the attainment


Muktāvalī, Kāriki - 66

Bengali Edition by Pańchānana Sastri.

10. Evidently those Nyāya thinkers who regard the memory knowledge of concomitance as the karaṇa of inferential knowledge accept the definition of karaṇa as vyāpāravat asādhārana karaṇa, i.e., "An instrument is that kind of uncommon cause of a thing which has a vyāpāra or intermediate operation". In the case of inferential knowledge, this vyāpāra is the complex judgment called parāmarśa. Those who consider parāmarśa to be the instrument of inferential knowledge accept the definition of karaṇa, as that cause which, as soon as it occurs, is immediately followed by the effect. It is clear that Rāmānujite thinkers accept this very definition of karaṇa when they define it as sādhakatama karaṇa i.e.,
of the conclusion "s is p". In other words, the mind cannot directly come to "s is p" from the separate judgments "s is m" and "m is p" without first combining them into the complex judgment \( \neg(s \text{ is } m) \land (m \text{ is } p) \).\(^{11}\)

Consideration would show that the difference between the Nyāya view about the instrument of inferential knowledge, on the one hand, and the Mīmāṃsā and the Rāmānujite (as well as the Advaita) views on the other hand, about this cognitive instrument is not as great as it is usually made out to be both by traditional writers on this topic and by modern Indian interpreters of these views, such as Suryanarayana Sastri who again, influenced by notions of Western logic, tend to support the Nyāya view. The point at issue boils down to this: When i) I see smoke coming out of a hill at some distance and ii) remember that smoke, the most effective cause. In Nyāya literature, the definition is: \textit{Phalāyoga vyavacchinnam kāraṇam} i.e. it is a cause which is distinguished from other causes by the fact that as long as it does not occur, the effect does not occur."

11. Western logicians like Bradley uphold a similar view. Bradley says, "... I see first A-B and then B-C, no mere analysis will give me A-C. I must first put them together as A-B-C and this is the construction of a synthetic judgment. I then perceive A-C and
in general, has universal concomitance with fire, so that the smoke that I see here has also this concomitance, then, is it a fact that I have further to have, in my mind, the complex judgment, "In the hill there is smoke which has universal concomitance with fire," before I infer that there is fire in the hill? The psychologically correct answer to this would seem to be an unambiguous 'No'. As Indian thinkers attempt to describe the psychological process that explicitly and consciously takes place in inference, this negative answer supports the Mīmāṃsā, the Rāmānujite and the Śaṅkarite view. But, then, the differences between this and the Nyāya view is very small indeed. For the former grants that all the components of the Nyāya paramārśa are present before the inference takes place, although the said paramārśa is absent. Nyāya thinkers have occasionally an implicit awareness of the formal aspect of inference, and it is true that the two judgments "The hill has 'smoke' is concomitant with fire" do not separately, but only in combination, formally imply the judgment "The hill has fire". This is what can be said in defence of the

(11. Contd...) this is the conclusion, which is inferred not because it is seen in fact, but seen in my head."

By F. H. Findley. Book II, Part I, Chap III
(Oxford University Press, 2nd Edition)

12. For a different answer, see the remarks of Suryanarayan Sastri in his notes in his edition of the Vedānta-paribhāṣā p. 189. note No. 29.
Nyāya view: But for my inference of fire by the mark smoke, psychologically and even for formal validity of the inference it is enough, if I recognise that the smoke in front of me is concomitant with fire. For this, the Nyāya parāmarśa would appear to be a superfluity. Of course, for the formal validity of the inference, I must know that there is smoke in the hill (pakṣa-dharmatā) and I must also know that smoke is concomitant with fire (vyāpti-jñāna). If I infer fire in the hill when these two conditions are fulfilled, will not my inference be formally valid? The only question that may be raised, here, is whether the process of inference can at all occur in my mind without my having, in addition, the Nyāya parāmarśa. The answer would seem to be affirmative.

It need hardly be mentioned that all Indian schools which accept inference as a valid instrument of knowledge at all, are unanimous in one point that the knowledge of universal concomitance or invariable co-existence (vyāpti-jñāna) of two things or phenomena is the basis of the inferential process. This is regarded as the logical ground of inference, since this it is which guarantees the truth of the conclusion.13

13. This is evidently recognised in Aristotelian logic, too, when it holds that a valid syllogism must have at least Contd....
Of these two relata, one is taken as the mark or hetu for proving the existence of the other called Sadhyā. The first is often called the vyāpya i.e., the locus of vyāpti or that which possesses the character vyapti and the second is called vyāpaka.

We may translate the term vyāpti by 'universal or regular or invariable concomitance'. But the word 'concomitant', by itself cannot definitely express either the vyāpya or the vyāpaka. For if there be the relation of concomitance or co-presence or co-existence between A and B, either would be the concomitant of the other. The word 'concomitant' applies both to what implies and what is implied. But the proposition,

(13. Contd...)

one universal proposition as a premise.

Bosanquet in his lectures on the topic of inference states the same thing when he says, "Inference cannot possibly take place except through the medium of an identity or universal which acts as a bridge from one case or relation to another".

Essentials of Logic, p. 139.
By B. Bosanquet.
Macmillan & Co. Publication.
"wherever there is smoke, there is fire", which expresses the vyāpti of smoke with fire is employed to prove the existence of fire from the existence of smoke; so it is equivalent to the implicative proposition, "If there is smoke, there is fire". That is to say, smoke, the vyāpya is the implying concomitant, while fire, the vyāpaka is the implied concomitant. We may, therefore, translate vyāpya by the phrase "implying concomitant" and vyāpaka by the phrase "implied concomitant". More briefly, vyāpya and vyāpaka may be translated by the words "implicans" and "implicate" respectively, remembering that these words of formal logic are then used to express the terms of what is not only a formal but also a factual relation 14. The vyāpya or the implicans is the referent of the character vyāpti or implicative concomitance.

14. Dr. Kunhan Raja and Prof. Suryanarayana Sastri have rendered vyāpti, vyāpya and vyāpaka by the words 'pervasion', 'pervader' and 'pervaded', respectively. Although the Sanskrit word vyāpti often expresses the idea of pervasion, it can hardly be said to do so in the present context.
here, if $A$ is uniformly concomitant with $B$, it does not imply that $B$ is also uniformly concomitant with $A$. To say that $A$ has the character of universal concomitance ($vyāpti$) with $B$, is equivalent to saying "If $A$, then $B"$, but it does not amount to saying also "If $B$, then $A"$, although in certain cases, this may be a fact. This is the reason why the two terms of the relation of vyapti are designated by two different names, $vyāpya$ and $vyāpaka$\textsuperscript{15}. Keeping in view the fact that in inferring fire by observing smoke, what we start with is the mark smoke, and what we reach is fire which is the thing to be inferred, the mark is sometimes called hetu or probans and the thing to be inferred is called sādhyā or probandum. Probans, therefore, connotes hetu, rather than vyāpya. Similarly, probandum connotes sādhyā, rather than

\textsuperscript{15} Thus smoke has $vyāpti$ or implying concomitance with fire, but fire does not possess such implying concomitance with smoke, since there may be fire in a place where there is no smoke, as for example, a red hot iron ball. That is to say, $vyāpti$ is not a relation which is necessarily symmetrical. However, occasionally, it is found to be symmetrical.

For instance, what smells is earth and what is earth smells. This is technically termed - "samavyāpti" or symmetrical concomitance, while the mere general type is called 'visamavyāpti' or asymmetrical concomitance.
vyāpaka. In other words, the term hetu and vyāpya (i.e. the mark or probans and the implying concomitant) in our instance of valid inference have the same denotation, although their connotations differ. The same remark is true of the terms sādhyā and vyāpaka (probandum or the inferable thing and the implied concomitant or the implicate).

Vyāpya or the implying concomitant is defined by the Rāmānujites as that which must not exist in any place or time where and when the implicate (sādhyā) does not exist. And the implicate is defined as that which cannot be absent in any of the places and times where and when the implicans is present. By these definitions, the Visistadvaita logicians try to explain the relation of vyāpti as a type of spatio-temporal relation of co-existence between the implying concomitant and the implied concomitant. But here it is

16. Anadhikadesakālaniyataṁ vyāpyaṁ. Anyūnadesakālavṛtti vyāpakanāṁ. Tadāhūḥ : "Desātāḥ kālataḥ vāpi samonyūnāpi vābhavet,

Svavvāpyaṁ vyāpakastasya samo vyāpyadhikaupi vā."

Nyāyaparipāṇīddhi, p. 100
By Vedānta Desīka.
noticeable that the character of having universal concomitance or invariable spatio-temporal co-existence belongs to the vyāpya or the hetu. For the instrument (karana) of inferential knowledge is, according to these thinkers, the recollection or rather recognition (anusañdhāna) that the mark has the character of universal concomitance with the inferable thing. By observing the mark which is already known to have invariable co-existence with the thing to be proved, the latter (sādhyā) is asserted to be present in an instance where it is not actually observed. Thus the inferential process is a process from a known fact to an unknown one, from what is already an established fact to what is not established at the outset. This is made possible by the knowledge of vyāpti or this type of universal concomitance. On account of this it is that it is said that the knowledge of the relation of vyāpti is the ground of inference.

Now we shall consider whether there is any explanatory ground for vyāpti itself or the relation of implicative concomitance. Why do the said two things or phenomena co-exist invariably or why is one necessarily accompanied by the other?

The Buddhists (Vijñānavādins) say that the two things invariably co-exist, because they are universally related with
the relationship of either cause and effect or that of identity. So according to them, the ground of implicative concomitance is the relation of cause and effect (tadutpatti or kāryakāraṇa-saṁbaṇḍha) or of identity (tādātmya saṁbaṇḍha)¹⁷ between two things or phenomena. But Nyāya does not think there is any such ground for the justification of vyāpti or implying concomitance. It is just a matter of fact which we experience in the course of our life - we just find, that certain things go together. For instance, rain and moisture occur together. It is not easy to find out the ground of the relation of vyāpti as a necessary relationship of cause and effect or that of identity. Nyaya argues against the Buddhist contention regarding the ground of such universal relationship that the relationship of vyāpti, as we observe it, is much wider than the relationship of causality or identity; for we find that instances of universal concomitance like i) "whatever is knowable is nameable", ii) whatever is an effect or a product is transitory", etc. certainly are not cases of either causality or identity. The judgment of universal concomitance may be analytic in which case, it

¹⁷. Tādātmatadutpattibhyāmevāvinābhāva iti saṅgataḥ.

Nyāyaparīśuddhi, p 107.

Chowkhamba Edition.
would indeed be based on identity. But it may also be
synthetic and then it may indeed be based on some causal re-
lation; but it may also represent such relations as that
between a substance and its character which is not caused
by it, e.g., a universal which inheres in it. So vyāpti is
not confined merely to the relationship of identity and
causality.

Some Rāmānujites also have tried to trace the ground
of universal concomitance to the fact that a certain thing
is not explicable without the existence of another thing.
For example, the existence of smoke cannot be explained
without the existence of fire in a place; that is why it is
recognised that there is invariable concomitance between
them.

Advaitism, however, like Nyāya, finds no ground for the
relation of vyāpti except the fact that a thing or a pheno-
menon is found to co-exist with another and never known to
exist apart from the other.

Sometimes, the relation of universal concomitance
(vyāpti ) is more specifically stated by certain followers
of Rāmānuja to be a kind of invariable concomitance of the
probans and the probandum, provided this connection is not
conditioned by a third element technically called 'upādhi'.

But if we take it seriously and understand it in a straightforward sense, this would appear to be a circular definition of vyāpti; for upādhi is defined as a thing which is uniformly concomitant with the inferable thing but which is not so concomitant with the mark. So such a definition of vyāpti already involves the term vyāpaka or 'universally concomitant' and hence universal concomitance itself.

But Vedaṭa Deśika (Veṅkaṭanātha) has tried to avoid this difficulty with the plea that he intends to mean by upādhi a thing which exists in all the loci in which the inferable thing exists and which does not exist in every locus where the mark exists. Thus in the definition of upādhi, the notion of vyāpti in the technical sense of the term is not involved. But this defence is hardly justified. For universal


Nyāya pariśuddhi. p 102.
By Veṅkaṭanātha.
Chowkhamba Edition.
concomitance (āvinābhāva) of smoke and fire just means such existence of fire in all loci of smoke. But by this what perhaps Veṅkaṭanātha means is not the fundamental notion in terms of which vyāpti is to be defined, but to point out that if the observed instances of āvinābhāva of x and y be conditioned by z which has āvinābhāva with y but not with x, then in spite of all observed instances of āvinābhāva of x and y, we cannot recognise that x has vyāpti or āvinābhāva with y. Even so, the introduction of the notion of upādhi in the definition of vyāpti would not be proper except as a safeguard against mistaking what is not vyāpti as vyāpti.¹⁹

In the context of inference, upādhi, as we have already stated, means a factor which invariably accompanies the inferable thing but does not invariably accompany the mark. Such a thing is sure to indicate that there is some exception to the alleged universal relationship of concomitance between

¹⁹. The author of "Mānameyodaya", a hand book of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā, to which we have already referred has also mentioned "freedom from any vitiating condition" (upādhirāhityam) in the definition of vyāpti.

the probans (vyāpya) and the probandum (vyāpaka). This we see when a person tries to infer the existence of smoke by observing fire. In such an instance, we may bring to the notice of the inferring person that "conjunction with wet fuel" (ardrendhanasāmyoga) is universally concomitant with the inferable thing smoke, but it is not so concomitant with fire which is the mark, as we see fire in a red hot piece of iron, in which there is no "conjunction with wet fuel". On account of this, we can know that there is no strictly implying concomitance of fire with smoke and so the said inference is invalid. If we use the symbol A for the mark, B for the inferable thing and C for the upādhi, then the above situation can be symbolised as follows:

Given
\[(1)\] B ⊃ C
\[(2)\] ~ (A ⊃ C)

To prove
\[(3)\] ~ (A ⊃ B)

Proof.
\[(4)\] ~ B v C ............. 1 Imp.
\[(5)\] ~ ( ~ A v C) ....... 2 Imp.
\[(6)\] A ~ C ................. 5 De. M.
\[(7)\] A ..................... 6 Simpl.
\[(8)\] ~ C ..................... 5 Simpl.
\[(9)\] ~ B ..................... 4,8. D.S.
\[(11)\] ~ ( ~ A v B ) ......... 10 De. M.
\[(12)\] ~ ( A ⊃ B ) ........... 11 Imp.
Or in a less formal way we can demonstrate the same thing thus: 1) since it is not true that if A, then C, there must be at least one instance K where there is A, but no C. 2) But since it is given that wherever there is B, there is C, it follows that wherever there is no C, there is no B. 3) Now there is no C in K, hence there is no B there. 4) But we know that there is A in K. 5) Hence in K, there is A, but no B. 6) So A is not uniformly concomitant with B. That is, it is not true that if A, then B. This means that if such a C can be pointed out, then we cannot accept that there is universal concomitance between A and B. A defective mark of this kind is technically called a 'sopādhika hetu' (which literally means a mark with an extraneous adjunct). The upādhi or the vitiating factor acts as a hindrance to our recognising any relation of universal concomitance between the mark and the inferable thing.

Veṅkaṭanāṭha says that the universal concomitance, whether in the positive or in the negative form, may be vitiated by an upādhi. He defines an upādhi as that sort of thing with which the mark has no implying concomitance, although the inferable thing is symmetrically concomitant (samavyāpta) with it, and which at the same time is different from a character of the mark.²⁰ So far as the point that the upādhi

²⁰ Sādhyavāpakatve sati sādhyasamavyāptaḥ sādhanadharma-vyatirikta dharma upādhiḥ.

Nyāyapariśuddhi, p. 108.
By Veṅkaṭanāṭha.
should be symmetrically concomitant with the *sādhyā* is concerned, Veṅkaṭanātha has merely accepted the view of Udayana, the great Nyāya philosopher. In any case, Veṅkaṭanātha's definition traces three different features on account of which a thing should be regarded as an *upādhi* or a vitiating factor in an inference. These three factors are as follows:

i) An *upādhi* is a thing with which the inferable thing is symmetrically concomitant (*sādhyasamavyāpta*); i.e. the inferable thing both implies, and is implied by, the vitiating condition, or less technically we can say that the inferable thing and the *upādhi* co-exist and *vice versa*;

ii) an *upādhi* is a thing with which the mark has no implying concomitance (*sādhanāvyāpaka*);

iii) and that the *upādhi* must be different from any character possessed by the mark.

These three different features have been attributed to an *upādhi* by Veṅkaṭanātha in order to avoid too wide a definition of it, i.e., in order that it may not apply to a thing which is not really a vitiating condition of an inferential mark. Thus in inferring that an object is impermanent (*anitya*)
by the mark that it has "the character of being a composite whole" (sāvayavatva), one may urge that "the character of being produced" (krtaṇya) should be considered to be a vitiating condition. But the significant phrase "with which the mark is not universally concomitant" of the definition of upadhi precludes this possibility. For it is not true that wherever there is the character of being produced, there is not "the character of being a composite whole". On the contrary, the character of being produced implies the character of being a composite whole; for example, we find in a pot.

And in the inference of a thing to be transitory from "the character of being produced" (krtaṇya) "the character of being a composite whole" (sāvayavatva) could be counted as an upādhi, if in the definition the phrase "that with which the inferable thing is co-extensive" were not added. For here that the inferable thing, transitoriness (anityatva) is not co-extensive with "the character of being composite whole" (the alleged upādhi), since we know that colour, though it is transitory, is not a composite whole. So transitoriness is not universally concomitant with "the character of being a composite whole". So it is not a vitiating condition of our inferential mark in the true sense of the term. Moreover, the phrase "the inferable thing is symmetrically concomitant (samavāpta) with the vitiating
condition" is added in order that the character of "difference from the inferential subject (pakṣetaratva)" may not be considered an upādhi. For without this restriction of samavyāpti in the definition of the upādhi, in any valid piece of inference pakṣetaratva could be thought of as an upādhi. So Veṅkaṭanātha, following Udayana has precluded the possibility of regarding valid instances of inference from being considered invalid, by adding the above phrase in the definition of upādhi. This will be clear if we show it with a concrete example. In the inference, "The hill is that which possesses fire; because the hill is that which has smoke", smoke is the mark, fire is the inferable thing and the hill is the subject (pakṣa) of the inferential judgment. Here pakṣetaratva, i.e. the character of being different from the subject of the inference, i.e. the character of being different from the hill (in our example), may be considered as a vitiating condition of the mark. For this factor (pakṣetaratva) i.e., "difference from the hill" is co-extensive with the infererable thing 'fire', for instance in a kitchen, but it is not co-extensive with the mark smoke; for in the hill, there is smoke but there is no "difference from the hill" there. Hence "difference from the hill" should be counted for an upādhi; and this would be the case in any valid instance of inference, if in the definition of upādhi the phrase "Sādhyā samavyāpta were not included. But this is avoided by
this phrase, because in an instance of inference "the difference from the subject of an inferential judgment" is not symmetrically concomitant with the inferable thing.

The clause that "an upādhi must be a character which is different from a character of the mark" which occurs in the definition is intended to avoid a too wide definition of upādhi. For in the valid inference that an object is conjoined (with some other substance, i.e., samyogi) by the reason of its being a substance, "the character of being a substance" would have to be regarded as an upādhi, if this cause be not inserted, although the mark which is employed here is quite valid. So as a rule Vehkaṭanātha states that the same thing or character cannot be regarded both as the mark and the upādhi of an inference. But I think that the use of this third phrase in the definition is unnecessary. For a character which is the same as the mark cannot possibly be non-concomitant with the mark, the vitiating factor must necessarily be involved in saying something should not be mentioned separately, especially in a definition which must not contain more or less than what is required for exact and correct statement.

A vitiating condition or upādhi of an inferential mark is of two types, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as well as
Visiṣṭādvaita Logic. One type is called niścita upādhi i.e., a factor definitely known as upādhi and the other type is called saṃdigdha upādhi i.e., a factor about which one can entertain a doubt that it may possibly be an upādhi. The first type has been illustrated in the fallacious inference "service of God is a cause of unhappiness, because it is a service". Here the initiating factor is "the character of resulting from the satisfaction of evil desires", for this is definitely known to be co-extensive with the inferable thing while the mark is not so co-extensive (avyāpaka) with it. In the above example, "the character of being a cause of unhappiness" i.e., the inferable thing, is co-extensive with "the character of resulting from the satisfaction of evil desires", which is the upādhi; but the mark, servicehood is not universally concomitant with this; for though service of God is a service, yet it is not accompanied by "the character of resulting from the satisfaction of evil desires", and all this is known with certainty. But in the inference, "The individual self attains liberation after the cessation of this body, because he, then, realises saṃādhi".

21. During the life-time, the individual self (jīva), as believed by the school of Rāmānuja, enjoys all the fruits of prārabdha karma, i.e., past actions which were guided by desires, and with the cessation of its body, the results of past actions also cease to exist if and only if he (jīva) has performed religious duties and earnestly desires to know the Absolute
here "the cessation of all results of action" can be adduced as the vitiating condition; and this is an upāḍhi of the dubitable type (aniscita upāḍhi). For, here, there is only doubt and no sure knowledge that the inferable thing is co-extensive with the condition, "the cessation of all results of action", and also it is not certain whether the mark, "realisation of samādhi" is universally concomitant with the supposed vitiating condition.

In short, an upāḍhi or vitiating condition of an inferential mark (as thus defined) being an invariable accompaniment of the inferable thing, but not of the adduced mark is an obstacle to the recognition that there is invariable relationship between the mark and the inferable thing, and thus precludes the possibility of proving the said inferable relationship between the mark and the inferable thing, and thus precludes the possibility of proving the said inferable thing with the help of the said mark.

In this connection, we may consider how Indian logicians tried to ascertain the universal relationship of vyāpti on the basis of which they sought to attain some new knowledge. Here also we find that the Nyāya logicians have discussed the point more thoroughly than other schools. Some maintain that

(21. Contd...) Brahman, and has practised samādhi; so after the cessation of the body, he attains the Absolute knowledge. Samādhi is nothing but a state of consciousness when its sole object is Brahman Itself and nothing other than Brahman.
repeated observation of the co-presence and the co-absence of two things, say, \( x \) and \( y \), in the forms respectively, "Wherever there is \( x \), there is also \( y \)"; and "Wherever there is absence of \( y \), there is also absence of \( x \)"; together with the non-observation of the contrary is the principal means for the apprehension of universal concomitance. It would seem that repeated observation of this kind of co-presence and co-absence can very well be considered to suggest a real relation of invariable concomitance between the two; and this can also be regarded as being confirmed by our non-observation of the contrary, i.e., of any exception to such co-presence and co-absence. For example, if we observe, in several cases, smoke and fire to be co-present and to be co-absent in the manner described above and if further we never observe smoke to exist without fire, we can perhaps say safely that smoke has universal concomitance with fire.

Although primers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logic often admit that repeated observation is one of the steps of ascertaining universal relation of **vyāpti**, the more precise and technical formulation of the method for the apprehension of regular concomitance between two things which is given by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians, especially after Gaṅgeśa, is somewhat
different from this. They think that repeated observation
of compresence (bhūyodarsāna) is not a cause of the appre-
hension of universal concomitance, although repeated obser-
vation is occasionally useful for such apprehension by
removing doubt about there being exceptions to a suggested
universal relation. The reason which makes them think so
is that on certain occasions, the observation of a single
instance of universal relation suffices for the apprehension
of this relation and hence repeated observation, if it be
necessary at all, must be assigned some other function than
that of causing the apprehension of the universal relation
as such. What are stated by these logicians as causes of such
apprehension are the observation of compresence and the non-
observeration of non-compresence. It is Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā which
unambiguously recognises repeated observation as indispensable
for the knowledge of universal connection. But Prabhākara
Mīmāṃsā, in this matter, as in certain other epistemological

22. Kvācid vyabhicāraśaṅkāvidhūnanadvārā bhūyodarsānamamu-
payujyate.
Muktāvalī, Kārikā 137

23. Ataḥ bhūyodarsānagamaiva nirupādhikasāṃbāndharūpā
vyāptiḥ.
Ślokavārtika Anu. p 12.
Cf. Mānameyodaya, p. 34
and metaphysical views, agrees with Nyāya. As will presently appear, the logicians of the Rāmānujite school are not un-anonymous about how vyāpti is apprehended. Some of them (for example, Veṅkaṭanātha) support the Bhāṭṭa view, while others the Prābhakara and the Nyāya view.

But the relation of vyāpti must be unconditional i.e., should not be conditioned by some other factor or thing which is technically called upādhi. So the next method to ascertain vyāpti is to examine carefully whether, in the set of positive instances where both the mark and the inferable thing are present, something else is also constantly present, and if there be such a thing, then whether, in the set of negative instances from where both of them are absent, this something else is also constantly absent. If we see no such third factor, we can ascertain that there is the relationship of invariable and unconditional concomitance between the said mark and the said inferable thing. This method is called 'upādhinirāsā'.

Nyāya logicians also employ what they call tarka, i.e., a method of showing the absurdity of the opposite of the suggested universal proposition in order to remove doubt about the said universal proposition or vyāpti. They especially apply this method in order to refute the sceptic's objection that the relation of vyāpti can never be established.
In this connection Nyāya refers to its doctrine of samānyalaksanā pratyāsatti. Against the possibility of apprehending a universal connection, such as that of smoke and fire, the sceptic (the materialist Carvaka) raises the objection that a universal relation between smoke and fire means the presence of fire in every instance of smoke, past, present or future, near or far and it is not possible to observe all these instances of smoke and fire; for observation amounts to perception which requires sensory contact with the objects which are perceived and certainly a man's senses can never be in contact with things which are not present and near at hand. Nyāya admits the cogency of this objection, but urges that on account of certain reasons we have to recognise a peculiar type of sensory contact (which is not ordinarily recognised by people in general) on account of which a person can be said to have this sensory contact with every instance of smoke when he has the ordinarily recognised type of sensory contact with a single instance of it. Thus when the visual organ is in contact with the smoke

24. Gaṅgesa in his Tattvacintāmani has stated, discussed, and supported these reasons in detail. We must refrain from stating them here.
of a burning oven and I have the perceptual cognition, "This is smoke", I know the 'this' as smoke, i.e., as characterised by the universal which may be named smoke-hood; this means that my visual organ is in contact not only with the particular smoke of the oven, but also with the universal smoke-hood which inheres in that instance of smoke as well as the relation of inherence (समावया), and as a result of this, I have the perception of the particular smoke, of the universal smoke-hood and the relation between them. Now when I have the perceptual knowledge of the universal smoke-hood, this knowledge of the universal (समान्य) can be considered to serve as a particular type of contact of my visual organ with all particular instances of smoke and provide me with some sort of perception and sensory contact which is not ordinarily recognised by the man on the street (लोक), and can, therefore, be named extra-ordinary (आलूकिक). This extra-ordinary type of sensory contact which is constituted by the perceptual knowledge of a universal is called समान्य (ज्ञान) लक्षणाप्रत्यासत्ति. So Nyāya maintains that when I perceive that a particular instance of smoke is compresent with an instance of fire, I also perceive, in a peculiar sense, every instance of smoke to be compresent with an instance of fire.
In support of this doctrine of Nyāya, all that we can say, here, is that there is indeed a sense in which it can be said that when I perceive a single instance of smoke to be an instance of smoke, I in a way perceive what an instance of smoke is like, wherever and whenever it be. But this should not be considered to be a right method of deciding whether a suggested universal connection is really true. Nor does Nyāya offer this theory for the justification of a general proposition. It would appear that this is offered merely to provide for the psychological possibility of apprehending a universal connection. The validity of a universal judgment, as indeed of any judgment whatsoever, has to be ascertained in a different way; and this is done by an act of inference, based on successful activity (pravṛtti-sāmvāda) which is initiated by a cognition.

The Advaita school of Vedānta as well as Mīmāṃsā does not recognise sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti. Some Advaita writers merely accept the Nyāya view that the observation of the co-existence of two phenomena and the non-observation of its contrary is sufficient for the apprehension of universal relationship of vyāpti. Even a single observation of co-existence


Vedānta paribhāṣā
Chap. on Inference, p. 55.
Edited by S.S.Suryanarayana Sastrī.
of the two can (together, of course, of the non-observation of the contrary) yield the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between them. These thinkers say that it is necessary to see that the two phenomena or things in no case go apart from the other. And repeated observation is necessary only in cases of doubt about their co-presence.

Rāmānuja himself is silent in this matter. And his followers are not unanimous about how vyāpti is apprehended. Thus Varadaviṣṇu Miśra, a prominent Viśistādvaitist, says that the invariable relationship of vyāpti cannot be known and ascertained by merely a single observation of co-existence of the two phenomena. According to him, this relation can be grasped and ascertained only by the repeated observation of their co-existence.

But in the opinion of the author of "Tatvaratnakara", the relation of vyāpti, can be known and ascertained by only a single observation of the two things to co-exist in a certain place. For he says that when a single instance is not observed to violate a rule, then even a single observation of the co-presence of the phenomena can yield the necessary knowledge.

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26. Yathopalamābham bhūyobhīrdardsānaīrgamyate tu sā; Sakṛdevānvacchinnaśaṁbaṅdhoh nahi bhāsate, taduktam Varadaviṣṇu Miśraiḥ.

Nyāyaparīśuddhi, p. 103, 104.
two phenomena should be sufficient to give us the knowledge of the relation of vyāpti between them.²⁷

Though Venkaṭaṇātha grants the correctness of this view, yet he says that in order to dispel doubt about their invariable and unconditional (nirupādhika saṃbhādha) relationship, repeated observations are necessary. As we have already stated, Venkatanātha says that by repeated observations of a set of positive instances where both the implying concomitant (hetu) and the implied concomitant (sādhya) are present, we have to see carefully that no other third factor is constantly present, and in a set of negative instances from where both the sign and the significate are absent, we have to examine carefully that no other third condition is constantly absent from those instances; and by this we can be assured that the relation is free from upādhi and it is a true universal relationship of vyāpti.

According to the school of Rāmānuja, as to that of Mīmāṃsā, in order to make a valid inferential judgment, we must know that the mark possesses the following two characteristics: i) it must have universal concomitance (vyāpti) with the inferable thing and ii) it must exist in the subject of the inferential judgment. The existence of the mark in the subject is technically termed as paksadharmatā which is a character of the mark.

The Rāmānujites are at one with Nyāya regarding the five characteristics of the valid mark of an inference. According to both, the first characteristic is that the mark must exist in that which happens to be the subject (pakṣa) of the inferential judgment - in the stock example of inferring fire in a hill by means of the mark smoke, it (i.e., the mark 'smoke') must exist in a hill. The second characteristic of

28 (a) Pakṣatā is a different term which means that peculiar character by virtue of which a thing is a true pakṣa, i.e., a true subject of an inferential judgment. A true pakṣa is defined by the Viśiṣṭādvaita logicians as that which is to be proved to possess a certain character (namely, the sādhyā). For example, when the existence of fire in a hill is inferred, the hill where the existence of the inferable thing is intended to be proved is regarded as the proper subject of an inferential judgment.

Contd...
a valid mark is its existence in what is already definitely known to possess the character intended to be proved (sapakṣe satvām), e.g., the mark smoke must exist in an oven which is definitely known to possess fire. The third characteristic consists in the non-existence of the mark in all instances which are definitely known not to possess the inferable thing (vipakṣat vyavṛttih) e.g., the non-existence of smoke in all such things as a lake where fire is definitely known not to exist. The fourth characteristic of a valid mark is that the existence of the probandum which the proffered probans is to establish, is not contradicted by some stronger instrument of knowledge (abādhitavisayatvām) e.g., the existence of fire which the mark smoke is to prove must not be contradicted by other stronger instruments of knowledge such as perception. Finally, the fifth characteristic of the mark is that it must not be opposed by a rival mark which is offered to establish the opposite of what the original mark is intended to prove (asat pratipaksatva).

The mark which possesses these five characteristics is considered to be a valid mark for an inference.

(28 Contd..)

(b) Sisādhayiṣitadharmaviṣṭa dharmī pakṣaḥ.

Yatindramatadāpi, p. 7

Chowkhamba Edition.
But Venkaṭanātha says that to make a valid inference only two things are necessary: i) there must be universal concomitance between the mark and the inferable thing and ii) the mark must exist in the subject of the inferential judgment. On the basis of these two fundamental conditions, we can arrive at a valid inferential judgment. The above five-fold characteristics, says Venkaṭanatha, are but an amplification of these two essential conditions.29

Indian logicians, in general, except some such as those of the Advaita vedānta and the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, who accept inference as a valid method of knowledge, maintain that the relation of universal concomitance between the mark and the inferable thing may assume either a positive or a negative form, the former is like "Wherever there is the mark, there is also the inferable thing". This is called


Nyāyaparīṣūddhi, p. 117, 118.
By Venkaṭanātha.
Chowkhamba Edition.
anvaya vyāpti or concomitance by co-presence. The universal relation may also assume a negative form like "Wherever there is the absence of the inferable thing, there is also the absence of the mark". This is called vyatireka-vyāpti or concomitance by co-absence. The first type of concomitance namely anvayavāpti may be symbolically represented as "Wherever there is A, there is B" or "If A, then B", while the second type called vyatireka vyāpti may be symbolically expressed as "Wherever there is absence of B, there is absence of A", or "If not-B, then not-A". Both these forms, however, are to be considered as the implicative concomitance of A with B. We can infer the presence of fire in a hill by observing the positive concomitance of smoke with fire. We can infer fire by smoke also when there is negative concomitance of smoke with fire, i.e. concomitance by co-absence of the type which has been indicated above. It should be specially noted that although vyatireka-vyāpti or concomitance by co-absence is really the concomitance of the absence of the inferable thing fire, with the absence of the mark, smoke, still this is considered to be a mode of concomitance of the mark 'smoke' with the inferable thing 'fire', and such concomitance by co-absence is considered to entitle one to infer fire with the help of smoke and not merely the absence of smoke with the help of the absence of fire. That the concomitance "If A, then B" is logically
equivalent to the concomitance "If not-B, then not-A" is clearly recognised in Western logic and the operation by which we pass from one of these equivalent implicative propositions to the other is called 'transposition'\(^{30}\).

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Bauddha, the Rāmānuja school of Vedānta and certain other schools of logicians accept both these processes of inference as valid. But the Advaita Vedānta and the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃśā hold that the inference of a thing with the help of a mark can be based only on what is called positive concomitance of the mark with the inferable thing i.e., only on "concomitance by co-presence" ( anvayirūpa-ekameva )\(^{31}\). They justify this view by an argument like the following - if we are to infer B by means of A, then we must depend on the concomitance of the form "If A, then B", i.e., by learning the fact that A uniformly co-exists with B in the same locus. It would be

\[ \text{Transposition} \quad (\text{Transp.}) \quad (p \rightarrow q) \equiv (\sim q \rightarrow \sim p) \]

\(^{30}\) Transposition (Transp.) (p \rightarrow q) \equiv (\sim q \rightarrow \sim p)

Copi's Symbolic Logic, p. 41.
2nd Edition.

\(^{31}\) Vedāntaparibhāṣā, p. 55.
By Dharmarajadhyarindra.
Edited by Suryanarayan Sastri.
artificial to infer B by means of A, on the basis of the concomitance or co-existence of not-B with not-A, which may indeed serve as a basis for validly inferring the non-existence of A in a certain thing by observing the non-existence of B there; the concomitance of not-B and not-A cannot be a natural basis for inferring that there is B in a thing by observing that there is A there. Of course, when we naturally and also validly infer the absence of A by means of absence of B, basing our inference on the universal relation, "Wherever there is absence of B, there is absence of A", according to all these schools, we have recourse to what Nyāya calls anvaya-vyāpti (i.e. concomitance by co-presence).

So the Advaita Vedānta and the Bhātta Mīmāṃsā thinkers maintain that there is only one kind of inferential concomitance (vyāpti), namely, "Concomitance by co-presence" which can serve as a valid basis for the natural process of inference. One should, therefore, reject the Nyāya division of marks into three kinds, namely, i) anvaya-vyatirekin, ii) Kevala-vyatirekin, and iii) Kevala-anvayin, i.e., i) a mark which has concomitance with the inferable thing by both co-presence and co-absence ("If A, then B", as well as "If not-B, then not-A"), ii) a mark which has such concomitance by mere co-absence ("If not-B, then not-A") and
iii) a mark which has such concomitance by mere co-presence ("If A, then B"). The reason why this division is rejected by these two schools is that they do not consider what Nyaya terms **Vyatireka-vyāpti** of A with B, i.e., concomitance by co-absence (If not-B then not-A) to be a (vyāpti) concomitance of A with B—in their view, this should rather be regarded as a **vyāpti** (and, of course, anvaya-vyāpti), i.e., positive concomitance (by co-presence) of non-B with non-A. Since there can be no **vyatireka-vyāpti** of the probans with the probandum, in this fashion, hence no probans can be **anvaya-vyatirekin**, i.e. concomitant with the probandum by both co-presence and co-absence. For the same reason, Advaitism and Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā hold that we must reject also Nyāya's second type of probans, namely, the **Kevala-vyatirekin** i.e. the probans which is concomitant with the prabandum by mere co-absence, since it would be improper to hold that a probans A could possibly have concomitance with a probandum B by co-absence. The third type of probans namely, **Kevalanvayin**, recognised by Nyāya i.e., the probans which is concomitant with the probandum by mere co-presence would be acceptable to the Bhaṭṭa and the Advaita schools, except of the word "mere" (kevala) which implies the notion that there can be such a thing as concomitance by co-absence' (vyatireka-vyāpti), too.
Advaita Vedānta has also some special metaphysical reason, for rejecting the kevalānvayin hetu. It points out that the "merely co-present mark" is unacceptable to any one who believes in the Upaniṣadic doctrine that Brahman or Ultimate Reality is devoid of every empirical object, i.e., in every empirical object is absent from Brahman. Nyāya defines the merely co-present mark to be that which is to prove a thing which is not absent from anything of the universe. But since every object is absent from Brahman, there can be no such thing as is "not absent from anything of the universe", so that the idea of Kevalānvayi-hetu which involves the idea represented by the phrase within quotation marks must be rejected. As an example of this kind of probans, Nyāya would cite the following: "This object is nameable, because it is knowable; for whatever is knowable is also nameable, for instance, the book in my hand". Here the probans is 'knowability' and the probandum is 'nameability'. Now there is indeed available positive concomitance of 'knowability' with 'nameability' in any object of the world; but the negative concomitance of the type "Wherever there is absence of nameability, there is absence of knowability" cannot be illustrated in any object

32 Kevalānvayisādhyakaḥ hetu, where Kevalānuayin means atyantabhāvapratiyogin.
of the world, for every object is both nameable and knowable. But Advaita Vedānta maintains that there is no such character as is not absent from Brahman. Hence there is nothing in the world which can be said to be present in everything; for everything is absent from Brahman. Brahman is not even nameable, in the literal sense of the term 'nameable'. This means that there can be no-'merely co-present mark' which by the word 'merely' implies that there are certain things which are not absent from anything whatsoever.

Nyāya, would, of course, refute this contention of Advaita Vedānta by holding that the notion of Brahman as what is devoid of all attributes and objects of the world is not true. This notion is also not accepted by any other school of Vedānta.

Of course, as we have already stated, both the Bhāṭṭa school of Māmāṁsā and the Advaita school of Vedānta reject the notion of the 'merely co-present mark' on the ground that this implies the notion that a probans could sometimes be concomitant with the probandum by co-absence. They would certainly grant that the inference "This is nameable, because this is knowable" is quite valid. They would only object to recognising the probans of this inference to be a special
kind of probans, According to them, such a probans is of the same kind as any other valid probans – all valid marks are of the same kind, being uniformly co-present (anvayirupam) with the inferable thing. If inference consists in knowing something y with the help of the mark x, then if we are to infer y with the help of x, we should already know the uniform compresence of x with y in the same locus, i.e., the anvaya vyapti or concomitance (by co-presence) of x with y – what is called concomitance by co-absence, i.e., the concomitance of 'absence of y' with 'absence of x' should be regarded as useless for inferring y with the help of x.

But against this contention, the Nyaya argument is that an inference can be validly made by the knowledge of what is termed 'vyatireka vyapti' i.e., 'concomitance by co-absence'. Occasionally, we validly infer y with the help of the mark x, without first knowing any locus where x is compresent with y, although we have found instances in which there are such loci where absence of y and absence of x co-exist. In such instances of valid inference, we certainly depend upon some uniform concomitance of x with y; and this concomitance is what Nyaya calls concomitance by co-absence. For example, a person may observe the fact that
there is no smoke where there is no fire, but he may not observe the fact that where there is smoke, there is also fire. Now if he, by observing smoke at a distance place, concludes that there is fire there, does he not infer fire with the help of the mark 'smoke'? If he does so, would it not be correct to say that he does so on the basis that smoke is uniformly concomitant with fire? This shows that the uniform compresence of 'absence of fire' with 'absence of smoke' is also a type of uniform concomitance (vṛāpti) of smoke with fire.

We have already seen that the main objection of the Advaita Vedānta and the Bhāṭṭa school against this is what our knowledge of universal concomitance of 'absence of fire' with 'absence of smoke' can indeed justify us to use 'absence of fire' as a valid mark for inferring 'absence of smoke'—our knowledge of such negative concomitance, by itself cannot be considered as a sufficient ground for employing 'smoke' as a mark for fire. Of course, these two schools would not deny that after we have acquired the knowledge of such negative concomitance of 'absence of fire' with 'absence of smoke', we can legitimately pass from the immediate knowledge of smoke at a place to the mediate knowledge of fire at that place. But these schools would at the same time deny that this is an
instance of inferring fire with the help of the mark 'smoke'. On the contrary, on their view, this would be an instance, not of inference, but of what they call postulation (arthāpatti). They would describe the cognitive process here thus: The presence of smoke in that place cannot be understood or is not intelligible, without the postulation or presupposition that there is fire there. This is all that we naturally do when on the basis of our knowledge 'If no fire, then no smoke', we proceed to the assertion of fire by observing smoke.

The Rāmānuja school of Viśiṣṭādīvaita Vedānta mostly agrees with the Nyāya view, regarding the nature and method of inferential knowledge, and greatly differs from the Advaita view. A follower of Rāmānujite Vedānta like a Nyāya realist holds that the universal concomitance of the probans with the probandum can be by both co-presence and co-absence. So he readily accepts two types of valid inferential marks, namely, i) the merely co-present mark (kevalānvayi-hetu) and ii) the mark which which is both co-present and co-absent (anvaya-yyatirekī-hetu). The Rāmānujite defines a 'merely co-present mark' as the corresponding to which there are only similar

33. Agnim vinā parvatasya dhūmavatvam anupapannaṁ.

34. Evambhūtam vyāpyaṁ dṛṣṭividhaṁ
Anvayavyatirekikevalānvayībhedat.

Yatīndramatadīpikā, p 8.
Chowkhamba Edition.
instances (sapakṣa, i.e., instances which are definitely and already known to possess the inferable thing), but corresponding to which there are no dissimilar instances (vipakṣa) i.e., instances that are already known for certain to be devoid of the inferable thing. Thus 'knowability' is a merely co-present mark (kevalānvayi-hetu) if we infer that a certain thing is nameable on the ground that it is knowable. Not much consideration is required to understand that this definition amounts to the Nyāya definition that a merely co-present mark is that which is offered to prove a thing which is not absent from anything. For there can be no contrary instance (vipakṣa), if there is nothing from which the inferable thing is absent. Venkatanātha, the great exponent of Rāmānuja's theory of knowledge, illustrates this type of inferential mark by inferences of the following kind:

1) Brahman has some name or other, for He is real, and all real things have some name, for example, a pot.  ii) Consciousness is known, for it is real, and all real things are known (to God); for example, a pot. In these cases, we

35. Venkatanātha makes this inference in defence of Rāmānuja's position that knowledge or consciousness can be known and to refute Saṅkara's notion that knowledge or consciousness cannot be known, because it is self-luminous in nature. As we have stated in Chapter (1), a Rāmānujite, too, maintains that knowledge or consciousness is self-luminous, though it can be the object of some other knowledge.
cannot find out any instance from where the inferable thing is absent. So here we fail to show that the absence of the inferable thing is accompanied by the absence of the mark. That is why it is proper to recognise "the merely co-present mark" (kevalānvayi-hetu).

Veṅkaṭanātha argues that a merely-co-present mark is certainly valid because it fulfils the principal condition of a valid mark, namely, that the mark of an inference must not exist in instances where there is absence of the inferable thing. Since, here, the mark has no vipakṣa, so the question of its existing in a thing from which the inferable thing is absent does not arise at all.

As we have already remarked, the school of Rāmānuja recognises also the validity of that kind of inference in which the mark has invariable concomitance with the inferable thing by both co-presence and co-absence (anvaya-vyatireki hetu). According to both the Nyāya and the Rāmānuja school, we can infer a thing, with the help of a mark which has concomitance with the inferable thing by both co-presence and co-absence. For example, we observe that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen. This is the concomitance of
smoke with fire by co-presence ( anvaya vyāpti ). Again, we find that wherever there is no fire, there is also no smoke, as in a lake. This is the concomitance of smoke with fire by co-absence ( vyatireka-vyāpti ). Now if by observing smoke in a distant hill, we infer fire there, this would be an inference with the help of a mark which is concomitant with the inferable thing by both co-presence and co-absence ( anvaya-vyatireki-hetu ).

The Nyāya school recognises a third type of inference which is constituted by a mark which has concomitance with the inferable thing only by co-absence ( kevala vyatireki-hetu). This is illustrated by the inference, "Earth is different from all other things, for it possesses smell". The universal concomitance which is available here, is "whatever is not different from other things does not possess smell, as for example, water". The Nyāya applies this type of inference where the concomitance by co-presence is not available by any means, i.e., in those cases where there is no sapakṣa or where there is not a single instance which is definitely known to possess the inferable thing. So here by employing

36. Vyatirekamatravyāptikāṁ kevalavyatireki yathā prthiviterēbhyaḥ bhidyate gāndhavatvāt.

Tarka Samgraha, p

By Annaṁ Bhaṭṭa.

Edited by Chandrodaya Bhattacarya.
'concomitance by mere co-absence' (which is regarded by the Nyāya as a valid type of concomitance), the inferable thing is proved.

Nyāya has to face certain formidable objections against the above type of inference raised by both Advaita Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā. They argue that the universal concomitance of A with B cannot be established by observing the concomitance of not-B with not-A (which Nyāya regards the concomitance of A with B by co-absence, i.e., vyatireka-vyāpti); so the merely co-absent mark (kevala-vyatireki-hetu) is not a valid mark for inferring B with the help of the mark A. In those cases where concomitance in the sense of co-presence is not available or even not possible, we have to apply another instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa), called postulation (arthāpatra). It is a distinct instrument of knowledge which, in their opinion, is different from inference. Here, the mental process of mediate knowledge, they maintain, should be represented as follows:

A fact is found to be incapable of being accounted for without postulating another fact so we have to assume or postulate this other fact, in order to explain, account for, or make intelligible, the first fact.
Arthāpatti or postulation is a process in which the knowledge of some fact which has to be explained leads to the knowledge of the fact that explains it. Usually the following is given as an example of postulation: Suppose we find Devadatta to be plump, though he does not take any food during the daytime. Now such plumpness of Devadatta in spite of his not taking food at daytime is something which makes us seek its explanation; and it cannot be explained without the postulation of his taking food at night. Thus the knowledge that Devadatta who does not take any food by day is plump leads, by postulation, to the knowledge that he takes food at night. The Nyāya school argues that there is no necessity for accepting postulation as a new instrument of knowledge to account for such a case. This can be easily substituted by vyatireka-vyāpti anumāna or inference by a mark which has negative concomitance with the inferable thing. For the absence of "eating at night" is concomitant with the absence of "plumpness while fasting during the daytime" and this is the negative concomitance (vyatireka vyāpti) of "plumpness while fasting during the day time" with "eating at night". Hence "plumpness while

37. Tatra upapādyajñānena upapādaka kalpanām arthāpatteḥ. Tatra upapādyā jñānam karaṇam upapādakajñānamājātām.

Vedāntaparibhāṣa, p. 88

By Dharmarājādharindra.

Edited by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastrī
Published by Adyar Library.

38. This becomes quite obvious, if we put the particle, 'non' for 'absence of', y for "plumpness while fasting Contd...."
fasting during the daytime" can be a valid mark for inferring "eating at night". Thus the Nyāya logicians with the help of what they call a co-absent mark provide for the mediate knowledge of a thing in those instances which Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta consider to be cases of arthā-patti and thus reject "Postulation" as a method distinct from inference.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Rāmānuja does not believe in the validity of a 'merely co-absent mark' as a valid mark of an inference. They are in agreement with the Advaita school of Vedānta in their criticism of the Nyāya notion of the "merely co-absent mark". The main argument by which Rāmānujites reject the validity of a 'merely co-absent mark' is that in an inference, initiated by a 'merely co-absent mark', before the process of inference is to begin, not even a single instance is available where the inferable thing is already known to exist. But this constitutes the flaw of what is called the "unknownness of the inferable thing"

(38. Contd..)

during the day time", and x for "eating at night".

For then we get "non-y" is concomitant with non-x", but this is the negative concomitance (vyatireka vyāpti) of x with y, i.e., of "plumpness while fasting during the day time" with "eating at night".
And the knowledge of the inferable thing at some place is essential for the knowledge of vyāpti. The only instance where the inferable thing can possibly be said to exist in the present case would be the subject of the inferential judgment which is going to be established; but there ex hypothesi its existence is yet to be proved. So the inferable thing, here, not being already known to exist somewhere, cannot be taken to be a real thing at all and therefore to characterise any truly existing thing – it thus fails to have what is called the initial probability of characterizing the subject of the inferential judgment with the character which is to be inferred. The inferential judgment ( anumiti ) which is to be attained by a mark must already be understood as a judgment in which the pakṣa can possibly be characterised by the inferable thing (sādhya). But this is not possible where the inferable thing is not known to exist anywhere else than in the subject where it is to be proved to exist. This in technical language is called the defect of "the unknownness of the inferable thing" (sādhya-prasiddhi).


Nyāyapariprāśa, p. 142.
By Veṅkaṭanātha
Chowkhamba Edition.
As already stated, Nyāya generally gives the following inference as an illustration of the "merely co-absent mark", and we will show how it suffers from the defect of sādhyāprasiddhi: "Earth is different from other things because it has smell". Here earth is the pakṣa and "difference from other things" ( itarabheda ) is the inferable thing or the sādhyā. The inference is to prove with the help of the mark "smell" that earth possesses "difference from other things" which is the sādhyā. Now this must be known beforehand to exist in some locus other than the subject before we can proceed to prove that it exists in earth which is the subject of the judgment which is going to be established by the inference under discussion. But the present sādhyā, namely, "difference from other things" is such a character that it cannot exist anywhere except in earth which is the subject or pakṣa. But an inferential judgment is a judgment having a subject and a predicate, where the subject is the pakṣa and the predicate is the sādhyā which characterises the pakṣa. And the possibility of such a judgment requires the previous knowledge of the thing which is to serve as its predicate or character (not of course, as the character of the subject of the present judgment, but still as a thing which exists somewhere ). But if the sādhyā is not known to exist in any such locus at all, how can it possibly be known to characterise our particular subject? This problem has been raised against the Nyāya concept of Kevalavyatireki anumāna by both the
Venkaṭanātha raises the objection against this concept in a slightly different manner. Though he accepts "concomitance by co-absence" as a type of "inferential concomitance" (vyāpti), yet he thinks that the knowledge of universal concomitance is first apprehended by observing co-presence of the two and this is the original and the principal way for grasping the relation of vyāpti. Moreover, the knowledge of concomitance by co-absence is based on the knowledge of the co-presence of the mark and the inferable thing, which was attained beforehand. For in order to know the absence of something, we have to know that something (pratiyogin) first. So in vyatireka-vyāpti we should have previous knowledge of the inferable thing so that we can have the knowledge of its absence. Thus Venkaṭanātha comes to the conclusion that concomitance by co-absence is not shown in some similar instance (sapakṣa) where the


Nyāyaparīṣuddhi, p. 142, 143.
By Venkaṭanātha.
Chowkhamba Edition.
hetu is known to co-exist with the inferable thing. In the case of 'a merely co-absent mark', as there is no similar instance, the inferable thing is not capable of being shown to exist at all, so such a mark is not a valid mark of inference.

We will now consider another division of inference which Indian logic generally recognises. This is its division into the two kinds: i) that kind of inference which one naturally employs for one's own sake (svārtha-numāna), and ii) that which one employs for the sake of other persons (parārthānumāna). The Nyāya logicians hold that the first kind of inference (in spite of its appearing to contain only three judgments) really involves five.

i) First, a person, by observing in several instances that two things or phenomena such as smoke and fire invariably go together, learns that the two invariably co-exist in the same locus. For example, he, in this way, learns that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen. So the knowledge of vyāpti or invariable concomitance is the first judgment.

ii) Then, he may observe smoke in a certain place such as in a hill.
iii) After this, he is likely to remember that smoke is universally concomitant with fire. That is, he may recollect that smoke is a sort of a mark or a sign indicating the presence of fire.

iv) He then naturally combines, in his mind, the two facts which are known in the second and the third judgments thus: In the hill, there is smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire (and therefore smoke is a sign of fire).

v) After this, he comes to the conclusion that there is fire in the hill. The knowledge that there is smoke in the hill is technically termed in Nyāya logic as pakṣa-dharmatā-jñāna, i.e., the knowledge that the mark is in, and is, therefore, a character of the subject of the inferential judgment. This is analogous to knowing that the minor term in the Aristotelian syllogism, is connected with the middle term. Then there occurs the memory knowledge of vyāpti, i.e. the knowledge that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. The fourth step consists in the knowledge that the hill possesses smoke which has universal concomitance with fire. This, therefore, can be regarded as a synthesis of the two cognitions which immediately precede it. In the technical language of Aristotelian logic, we can
say that this complex proposition is a combination of the two premises of the syllogism assuming a form like "Socrates possesses 'the character of man' which is universally concomitant with 'mortality' - and thus combines, in its content, all the three terms, the minor, the middle, and the major appropriately related with one another. This complex judgment is called by Nyāya tṛtiya-linga-parāmarśa or simply-liṅga-parāmarśa or more simply paramārśa and is considered to be the most important step for reaching an inferential judgment. Immediately after this paramārśa, a person comes to the conclusion that the hill possesses fire. So the fourth step or liṅga-parāmarśa is regarded as the most effective (sādhakatama) or the instrumental cause (karana) of inference. But the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita schools do not recognise the necessity of paramārśa at all for inference. They are of opinion that the knowledge of the universal concomitance between the mark and the inferable thing and the knowledge that the subject is characterised by the mark, are sufficient for the knowledge of the conclusion that the subject possesses the inferable thing.

41. As already stated, Nāmanujites define a karana or instrumental cause as the most effective cause (sādhakatamāṃ kāraṇāṃ karaṇāṃ).
To come now to the second kind of inference, namely, inference which is offered by a person to convince others about the truth of some proposition. Nyāya recognises that for this it is necessary to employ five statements, one after another, all the five making a single complex statement. These are as follows: i) Pratijñā or the assertion (of the proposition to be proved, as for example, the hill possesses fire); ii) the hetu or the statement of what is the reason (for instance, in the stock example of inference of fire in a hill from smoke, it is stated thus, "on account of its possessing smoke"); iii) the Udāharana or illustration, i.e. the statement of invariable concomitance of the mark with the inferable thing together with an illustration in which this concomitance can be readily recognised. (It is expressed thus: Whatever possesses smoke possesses fire, as for instance, a kitchen;), iv) the Upanaya or the application of this invariable concomitance to the case under consideration. This is stated thus: This (i.e., the hill) is also like that (i.e., the kitchen) in respect of possessing smoke which is compresent with fire, v) the nigamana or the conclusion which is expressed as "on account of this, it (i.e., the hill) is like that (i.e., possesses fire).

42. The prefix upa means proximity, nearness, similarity, etc., and upanaya literally means a statement which

Contd....
This five-membered syllogism is used by one for the sake of making another person recognise, by inference, a fact which one already knows. All the five statements together from a single complex statement and are together called 'nyāya-vākya' or pañcāvavya-vākya (i.e., five membered sentence). The purpose of this five-membered syllogism is to produce, in the mind of another person, a process similar to the one which, in svārthānumāna or the first kind of inference, takes place in one's own mind, when by seeing a mark or a sign, one naturally infers the existence of what the mark signifies. Thus when, in parārthānumāna, I make the assertion that the hill possesses fire, I draw the attention of the hearer to the proposition which he will presently be able to infer with my help. Then I tell him that this is so, because the hill possesses smoke. By hearing the second member of this syllogism, he recognises the existence of the mark in the subject of the inferential judgment. This corresponds to the second step of svārthānumāna, except to the extent that it may not be preceded by its first step when the hearer, by chance, may not already know that smoke is

(42. Contd.)

points out the similarity of the case under consideration with the illustration which has been cited in the previous step.
invariably accompanied by fire; and the third member of the syllogism, "wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as for instance, in a kitchen" produces this knowledge or its recollection in his mind, and this corresponds to the third step called 'vyāpti-samarana' in svārthānumāna. It should be observed that corresponding to the first step of svārthānumāna i.e., the primary apprehension of universal concomitance, there is no member in the five-membered syllogism, except its third one which does for both the first and the third step of svārthānumāna. Next comes the fourth member called upanaya assuming the form "This is also like that", i.e. "This hill also has smoke which is universally concomitant with fire". This corresponds to the liṅga-paramāra of svārthānumāna. Really speaking, this should be sufficient to give rise, in the mind of the hearer, the inferential judgment "The hill has fire" because paramāra being the karāṇa of anumīti should be immediately followed by anumīti. The fifth member, i.e., the conclusion of parārthānumāna is still employed in order to assure the hearer that the conclusion, as thus issuing out of the paramāra, stands uncontradicted and sure and certain.

Thus in both svārthānumāna and paramārthānumāna, the most important and proximate cause (karāṇa) of inferential judgment is paramāra illustrated by the judgment "The hill has smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire".
The Advaita school of Vedānta and the Mīmāṁsā do not accept the five-membered syllogism. They hold that for the purpose of inferential demonstration of a truth, all the five members are not necessary. It is sufficient to state either the first three or the last three members and among these three, that member which states the universal proposition, supported by a concrete illustration, is the most important.

But Nyāya logicians argue that all the five members are quite necessary; for a person is to apprehend the existence of a thing by being informed of a mark which is related with that thing by invariable relationship. If the first three steps of an inference have been taken as sufficient to convince others, as Advaita and Mīmāṁsā hold, the fourth which is called the upanaya would not be required. But Nyāya argues that the fourth member ( liṅga-parāmarsa ) is the most important in an inferential argument, for this proposition produces the knowledge that there is in the subject ( pakṣa ) the mark or probans which is universally concomitant with the inferable thing or the probandum ( sādhyā ). Liṅga-parāmarsa is, according to the Nyāya school, the most effective and promimute cause of the final knowledge of the
conclusion. And if the last three propositions are stated in an inference, the second step which is called the reason (hetu), on the basis of which, the inference is made possible, would be absent. But this, too, is as necessary as the fourth step. So in their view, all the five members of a syllogism, as properly stated, are necessary.

The Rāmānuja school of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta is liberal in this matter. According to this school, there is no hard and fast rule about the number of the members of an inferential syllogism. An inference for the sake of others (parārthānumāna) may consist of either two or three or even five members. The number required in an inference would be determined by the degree of intelligence and the capacity of understanding of the person to whom the syllogism is presented. A man of extra-ordinary intelligence can arrive at the inferential judgment even from the assertion (pratijñā) and the reason (hetu) alone, and a man of average intelligence may be able to do so with the help of only three members, while five may be required for a man of less intelligence. Thus the Viśiṣṭādvaitist would not like to be dogmatic about this point. Bradley says, "Logic sets no limit to the number of premises which may precede
the conclusion; and it is the weakness of our heads which narrows our constructions and narrows them sometimes to the prejudice of our inference.\footnote{The Principles of Logic. Vol. I, p 260.
By Bradley. Book II, Part I, Chap. III}

Nevertheless, the Rāmānujites hold that the two members, the illustration (udāharana) and the application (upanaya) are the most crucial in an inference; for it is by these two that a person comes to know the universal concomitance of the mark with the inferable thing and the existence of the mark in the subject of the inferential judgment.\footnote{Nyāyaparisuddhi, p. 160.
By Venkaṭanātha.}

That is to say, they provide for vyāptijñāna and pakṣadharma-jñāna and these two are sufficient for an inference whether it is meant for one's own self or is formulated in words and intended for the sake of others.

But Veṅkaṭanātha explicitly, and we think quite justifiably, says in his Nyāya-parisuddhi that inference whether svārtha or parārtha, must ultimately be considered to be a process which one must oneself go through and is thus, in final analysis, svārtha-numāna.\footnote{Sarveśāmanumānanām svapradhānānādibalena pravr- 
ttatayā svavyavahāraṁtrahetutvena ca svārthatvāt.
Nyāyaparisuddhi, p. 154.
By Veṅkaṭanātha.}

\footnote{Yadyapyudāharānopanayābhyāmeva vyāptipakṣadharma-tayoh siddhatvādāvadeva tadvababaktumucitam.
Nyāyaparisuddhi, p. 160.
By Venkaṭanātha.}
by a person out of his own needs and by his remembrance of
the universal concomitance of two things which he has already
learnt. Even when a person goes on to infer after hearing
the syllogism of a learned man or a scholar, he himself
makes the inferential judgment by remembering the universal
concomitance of two things and by observing the existence
of the mark in the subject of the inferential judgment. This
view of Veṅkaṭanātha can indeed be said to be based on the
view that knowledge, in the true sense of the term, is a
process which one acquires by the exercise of one's own
intellectual capacity. Even verbal knowledge is not an
exception to this rule, for though it is the result of hear-
ing a combination of words, yet verbal knowledge (Śabda-
jañña) is also a result of certain mental functions of the
hearer, such as the remembrance of the meanings of the
several words by hearing them.

Moreover, there is no special reason, argues Veṅkaṭanā-
tha, why the distinction between svārtha and parārtha should
be recognised only in inference and not in other kinds of
knowledge such as perceptual, verbal, etc. So Veṅkaṭanātha
suggests a general division in every kind of knowledge –
that knowledge which is gone through by one's own self
independently of others' words and that which is gone
through by hearing them. We are of opinion that Venkaṭanātha by being the first person to draw attention to this point deserves some credit of originality. There may, however, be some doubt as to whether the same distinction can be drawn in regard to words, as an instrument of knowledge (śabda-pramāṇa) for words would seem to be employed principally with a view to the communication of ideas and hence meant for persons different from him who employs them, so that this instrument of knowledge would seem to be essentially parārtha or meant for others. Of course, while perceiving or inferring, one may have recourse to words. But in such cases, words do not function as an instrument of knowledge.

Nyāya logicians and others who accept anumāna or inference as a distinct source of knowledge take care to define and enumerate the various kinds of defective marks which many times lead us to erroneous conclusions and thereby impede the way to the successful attainment of ends. By inference, we want to establish something on the basis

46. Dhīvidhāni pramāṇānī. Svayameva siddhāni parāvākyaprūvāni ceti. Śāmānyata eva vibhāga kārya iti.

Nyāyaparīṣuddhi, p. 155.

Chowkhambara Edition.
of another thing which is the mark; now if there be some defect in the mark as a mark, it will fail to establish the inferable thing. Such defects of a mark or defective marks themselves are technically called in Indian Logic 'hetvābhāsa'. The word 'hetvābhāsa' in the sense of a defective mark means a mark which looks like a real mark without truly being so, because of its similarity with a true mark. 'Hetvābhāsa' in the sense of a defective mark, is defined

47. Hetuvadābhāsate iti hetvābhāsaḥ.

Tarkasaṅgraha-Dīpikā,
Section on Hetvābhāsa.

48. It has been suggested by some modern writers that in Indian logic the psychological process of inferring is not clearly distinguished from the logical process of inference, so that in the treatment of inference, both psychological and logical aspects are mixed up. Some have even suggested that they are confused. The flaws (hetvābhāsas) which Indian logicians point out in a proffered syllogism, which is defective, are not, it is maintained, mistakes in the process of inference but what psychologically act as hindrances to the process of inference in the mind of a person to whom the five-membered syllogism is presented in order to produce in him the said process of inference "The so-called hetvābhāsas are rather errors of inference" (Gaṅgaśa's Theory of Truth) p. 50-51

Introduction

By Dr. J. N. Mohanty.

Contd....
as that which has corresponding to it something, the knowledge of which obstructs inference with the help of that mark. And the word 'ḥetvābhāsa' meaning the defect of a mark is defined as that the correct knowledge of which

( 48. Contd. )

It appears, however, to us that the various defects of a mark which are recognised by Indian logicians can be shown to be roughly analogous to those particular flaws of an Aristolelian fallacious syllogism which are connected with transgressing the rules that the middle term should be present in both the major and the minor premise and that at least one premise should be universal. What we should like to point out just now is that anything that psychologically obstructs the process of inference, for example, a pain or an aversion is not regarded, in Indian logic, as a defect of a mark, unless this obstruction comes from the sure knowledge of that thing and unless the said obstruction is causally connected with the mark in its function of leading to the inferable thing. Of course, the defect of a mark, as conceived in Indian logic is not a formal flaw. On the contrary, it is some matter of fact. But perhaps, some of the formal inferential flaws recognised in Aristolelian logic, can be shown to be based on such matters of fact.

49. Pare tu yadviṣayakatvena jñānasyānumitivirodhitvām tadvatvāḥ hetvābhāsatvāḥ.

*Siddhāntamuktāvalī. Karikā 71, p 381*

By Visvanatha.

(Edited by Pancanana Sastrī, Second Edition)
obstructs inferential knowledge\textsuperscript{50}. But both the definitions convey practically the same meaning; for a defective mark means nothing but a mark having some defect, and its knowledge would certainly be a hindrance to the process of inference. For one who knows that fire can exist without being accompanied by smoke, as in a red hot iron hall, cannot possibly draw the conclusion that the hill possesses smoke on the ground that it has fire; and this fact that fire can exist without being accompanied by smoke is a defect (technically called \textit{vyabhicāra}) of the mark fire, when this is offered as a sign for inferring smoke.

\textsuperscript{50} The term \textit{hetvābhāsa} means both a defective mark" and the "defect of a mark". Now certainly, if I know for certain that there is something which is a defect of an offered mark I shall certainly fail to infer the inferable thing with the help of that mark. Conversely, if after knowing, for certain, some fact, I fail, on account of such sure knowledge, to infer something with the help a proferred mark, then such a fact must be construed to be or to contribute to, the defect of a mark. Consideration would show that these facts directly or indirectly pertain to the failure of the mark to be connected appropriately with the subject (\textit{pakṣa}) and/or the inferable thing (\textit{sādhya}).
Defective marks are divided into five kinds, namely,
i) **Sāvyabhicāra** or anaikāntika, i.e., a mark which is irregular in being compresent with the inferable thing;

ii) **Viruddha** or a contradictory mark i.e., a mark which is concomitant with the absence of the inferable thing and not with the inferable thing;

iii) **Asiddha** or an unestablished mark;

iv) **Satpratipakṣa** or a counter-balanced mark; and

v) **Kālātīta** or kālātvyāpadiṣṭa or Bādhita, i.e., an invalidated mark. As already stated, the knowledge of these defects of a mark hampers inferential knowledge. Thus it can do directly, i.e., by obstructing the rise of the inferential knowledge itself - for instance, some one may try to prove to me that water is hot on the ground that water is a substance just as fire which is a substance and is hot; but if I know by perception that water is not hot, then in spite of all his efforts, my sure knowledge that water is not hot, would directly hinder his proffered mark from producing in my mind the inferential judgment, "Water is hot". The defect called 'counter-balance' also obstructs inferential knowledge in the same direct fashion. The other
defects, however, do so indirectly, be obstructing the rise of the paramārṣa which is to yield the inferential knowledge in question.

The logicians of the Advaita school of Vedānta have not treated this subject of 'hetvābhāsa' in such details as the Nyāya logicians. But the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja has paid some attention to this topic. Their view is mostly in agreement with the view of the Nyāya school. They define 'hetvābhāsa' as that which looks like a mark without truly being so. So according to their view, hetvābhāsa primarily means a defective mark (rather than the defect of a mark). They also admit the five kinds of defective mark which are recognised by Gautama in his "Nyāyasūtra".

The first type of hetvābhāsa is savyabhicāra which may be translated as the 'irregular mark' or the mark having variation in respect of "compresence with the inferable thing in the same locus". The concept of universal

51. Hetuvad bhāsamāna hetvābhāsaḥ.

Yatindramatadīpikā, p.
Chapter on Inference.
Chowkhamba Edition.
concomitance implies that the mark co-exists with the inferable thing without any exception. Rather, we may say that the mark, i.e., the probans must not exist in a locus where the inferable thing or the probandum does not exist. So, if in any case, the mark is seen to exist apart from the inferable thing, the mark is regarded as irregular or inconstant (śavyabhicāra), i.e., not universally concomitant with the inferable thing. If we come to know this fact of the marks irregularity or inconstancy in respect of being accompanied by the inferable thing, it would hinder the cognition of universal concomitance which is the basis of inference. Nyāya classifies such irregular marks into three types, while a Rāmānujiite classifies them into two types.

Every type of this śavyabhicāra hetu or irregular mark has this defect that it lacks invariable concomitance with the inferable thing. The first type is called the common irregular mark (sādhārana anaikāntika) because it is common to both contrary instances and co-instances (vipakṣa and sapakṣa), i.e., it is found in some instances, where the inferable thing is definitely known not to exist (vipakṣa) as well as in some cases where the inferable thing is known to exist (sapakṣa). Venkaṭanātha
illustrates the common irregular mark by an inference like, "sound is eternal\textsuperscript{54} for it has knowability". Here the mark 'knowability' is found both with eternity (for example, in 'Time') and with non-eternity (for example, in a pot).

The second type of irregular mark is called the uncommon (\textit{asadhārana}), because it is not to be found in either a co-instance or a contrary instance, i.e., it is not found not only in an instance where the inferable thing is definitely known not to exist (\textit{vipaksa}), but also in an instance where the inferable thing is definitely known to exist (\textit{sapaksa}) — it exists only in the subject (\textit{ākṣa}) of the conclusion. Evidently, such a mark

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{52} We are translating \textit{nitya} as eternal. But eternal, in this sense, is not to be understood as what is timeless or beyond time, but as what is in all times, past, present and future. What exists (of course, in time) but has neither origination nor end. 'Time' itself is called eternal, although it cannot be said to exist in time except by the relation of pure identity (\textit{abheda}) in the sense in which Nyāya says that a \textit{ghaṭa} exists in the same \textit{ghaṭa} by the relation of identity.
\end{footnotesize}
cannot be shown to have invariable concomitance with the thing to-be-inferred. For instance, when one tries to prove that 'Earth is eternal on the ground that it possesses smell' - "smell" is an uncommon irregular mark here. For there are certain things which are definitely known to possess eternity, e.g., a soul, time, etc. but none of them is found to possess smell; there are also non-eternal things such as particles of water, fire, etc., but they, too, are devoid of smell. Hence, the probans "smell" is absent from all similar and dissimilar instances, i.e., from all objects which are known to possess, as well as all objects which are known not to possess, the inferable thing (sarva-sapakṣa-vipakṣa-vyavṛtta) - it is present only in the subject of the inferential judgment (pakṣa-mātra-vṛtti).

Nyāya speaks of another type of irregular mark which is called 'anupasaṁkāri', meaning inconclusive. A mark is inconclusive which has, neither a sapakṣa nor a vipakṣa, i.e., neither "similar (sapakṣa) nor a dissimilar (vipakṣa) instance, where its concomitance with the inferable thing either by co-presence or by co-absence could be shown. For example, in the inference "All things are non-eternal, on account of the fact that they are
knowable", the mark is inconclusive. Here, all things are included within the subject of the inferential judgment. So no illustration is available where concomitance by either co-presence (in a similar instance or sapakṣa) or co-absence (in a dissimilar instance or vipakṣa) can be exhibited and this precludes the possibility of showing that the mark is concomitant with the inferable thing in any instance; for whatever is taken as an instance, would be considered as falling within the subject.

The Rāmānujites do not enumerate this third type in their classification of an irregular mark. They think that this can be included within the uncommon irregular mark (asadāhāraṇa anaikāntika). They argue that as here there is no instance available where the concomitance of the mark with the inferable thing can be shown, the mark cannot prove the inferable thing. They think that there is no necessity of considering it as a distinct type of irregular mark53, because it can be conceived as an uncommon irregular mark, where the mark is found neither in the similar nor in the dissimilar instances, so that its concomitance with the inferable thing even by co-absence cannot be shown. Of course, according to them the knowledge of concomitance by co-absence is ultimately based on the knowledge of concomitance by co-presence of two things.

53. Nanvanupasāmārītayā tasya prthagdhetvābhāsatvamiti Contd....
The contradictory mark (viruddha-hetu) is that which is universally concomitant not with the inferable thing but with its absence. It hinders the knowledge of invariable concomitance of a mark with the inferable thing since the mark is known to be universally concomitant with the absence of the inferable thing. For example, in the inference, "Nature is eternal, because it is an effect", the character of being an effect (which is the mark here) is universally concomitant with non-eternity, i.e., with 'absence of eternity'. So the mark is contradictory and cannot lead to the knowledge that what possesses this mark is eternal.

The third kind of hetvābhāsa or defective mark is called asiddha or unestablished. Like Nyāya, a Rāmānujite also holds that a mark may be unestablished in three different ways:

i) it may be unestablished in respect of its substratum (āśrayāsiddha);

ii) it may be unestablished in respect of its own being (swarūpāsiddha); and

(53. Contd..)

cettathā vyāptigrahasthalarahitasaivānupasamhāri-sabdārthatvena vyatirekinoapi tathātvenānupasamhāri-tayābhāsatvameva syādīti kim prthaghetvābhāsakal-panayā.

Nyāyasāra in Nyāyapariprāśi, p. 287.

By Srinivāsācārya.

Chowkhamba Edition.
iii) a mark may be unestablished in respect of its concomitance with the inferable thing (vyāpyatvāsiddha).

In order to establish the inferable thing in the subject (pakṣa) with the help of a mark, we have to see first that the mark is in the subject. And to know that the mark is in the subject, we have to know first that the subject is real i.e., it is an existent thing; and then only we can assert that the mark really exists in the subject. If in a case we come to know that there is no such subject at all, how can we possibly assert that the mark is in the subject? In such a case, the mark is said to be unestablished in respect of its substratum (āsravā-siddha). As for example, in the syllogism, "The sky-lotus" which is taken as the subject of the inferential judgment is non-existent, so it cannot serve as a substratum of the mark, 'lotushood'. In the technical language of Nyāya, the character which determines subjecthood (paksatāvacchedaka dharma) is not present in the pakṣa i.e., in the thing which is taken as the subject. In the above inferential judgment, the character of "being in the sky" which as the adjectival part of the subject is what determines subject- hood is not present in what is named, 'sky-lotus', since no lotus is characterised by "being in the sky".
The second type of such a mark is called unestablished in respect of its own being (swarūpa-siddha). This is illustrated in an instance where the mark is known not to exist in the subject (pākṣa) of the inferential judgment. For instance, in the syllogism, "The finite soul (jīva) is non-eternal, because it has visibility, just like a pot," the character 'visibility' which is the mark here, is not present in the finite soul. So the mark is unestablished in respect of its own being, i.e., of its being in the subject (swarūpa-siddha). Both these defective marks obstruct inferential judgment, for when these defects are known, there can be no reflection of the mark (linga-paramārśa), since this reflection consists of a complex judgment that the subject possesses the mark which has universal concomitance with the thing to be inferred. And thus reflection is a very important, nay, according to Nyāya, the most important factor in the process of inference.

The third type of these defective marks is called unestablished in respect of its concomitance (with the inferable thing, called vyāpyatvāsiddha) either because there is no instrument of valid cognition by which the concomitance between the two can be known or because the
concomitance cannot be apprehended on account of some vitiating condition (upādhi). The Rāmānujites give the example of the first type of defective mark by "Reality is momentary, as it has momentariness". Here no valid cognitive instrument enables us to apprehend the concomitance between momentariness and reality. The relation of concomitance is sometimes vitiated by a third factor called upādhi. This vitiating condition, as we have already stated, is defined by both the Nyāya and the Rāmānuja school as something which invariably co-exists with the inferable thing but does not invariably co-exist with the mark. The knowledge of the presence of such a factor hinders the apprehension of the relationship of invariable concomitance between the mark and the inferable thing; and such a mark is said to be unestablished as regards concomitance (vyāpyatvāsiddha).

The Rāmānujites illustrate such a defective mark by the syllogism "killing animals in a Vedic sacrifice causes demerit, because it is an act of violence (himsā). Here scriptural prohibition (migiddhatva) is said to be an

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54. Sadhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvāṃ upādhiḥ. Yatindramatadīpikā, p. 7

Chapter on Inference.
upādhi or a vitiating condition because the inferable thing 'causing demerit' is universally concomitant with the upādhi "scriptural prohibition" but the mark violence (himsā) is not universally concomitant with prohibition (nisidhvatva) as is proved by Vedic statements prescribing killing of certain animals in certain sacrifices. So here the mark has the defect of being unestablished in respect of concomitance (vyāpyatvāsiddha).

The fourth kind of defective mark is named prakarana-sama or satpratipakṣa by the Nyāya and the Rāmānujite logicians. This is a mark which is opposed by another rival mark which is offered by an opponent to prove the opposite of the inferable thing. The term 'satpratipakṣa' may be translated as the counterbalanced mark. This is illustrated by a Viśiṣṭādvaśitaist in the syllogism, "God is eternal, since He is destitute of non-eternal characters" which is rivalled by the syllogism, "God is non-eternal, since He is destitute of eternal characters". Here we see that there are two rival marks apparently of equal strength which are offered by two disputants to establish two opposite things in the subject. So one who goes to infer either conclusion, cannot do so, as long as the marks appear to have equal strength, so that neither mark can prove either.
the inferable thing or its opposite. Such a mark which is opposed by a rival mark of equal strength to prove the opposite of the inferable thing, is regarded as a counterbalanced mark. Here, as long as one cannot decide which of the marks is wrong or of doubtful validity, he cannot infer either of the two mutually opposed conclusions, because he cannot arrive at the complex judgment called parāmārṣa that must necessarily precede any inferential judgment.

The recognition of counterbalance as a defect of a mark clearly shows that, in Indian logic, the process of inference is more concerned with objective situations that give rise to controversies in actual life, than with what is known in the West as formal validity which is altogether abstract and mostly useless for practical life.  

55. The treatment of inference, in Indian logic, takes care not only of formal validity of reasoning, (of course, not very explicitly) but also is concerned with the material truth of our thought (and this quite explicitly). It primarily attempts to provide for the material truth or validity of an argument and thereby also for its formal validity. For what is materially true must also be formally valid. We find in our illustration of the counter-balanced

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The fifth kind of hetvābhāsa is called by older Nyāya the Kalātyayāpadistā or kalātīta, literally meaning "a mark which is cited when it is already past, i.e., "a temporarily past mark". This is so called, because, here the mark or the adjectival part of it is no longer in existence when it is to establish the inferable thing. This is illustrated by the syllogism, "sound is eternal on account of the fact that it is manifested (vyakta) by the conjunction of two things, just as in the case of colour". But a sound is apprehended even when, for example, the conjunction of the wood-cutter's axe with a piece of wood is no longer in existence. So here the mark that both the arguments respectively offered by two opponents are formally valid, but as they lead to two contradictory results, both are rejected as incapable of proving their respective theses, before the mark of one of these rival arguments is rejected.

56. This example is taken from Vātsāyana's commentary on Gotama's Nyāya Sūtra 1.2.9. A Mīmāṃsā philosopher may be supposed to offer this argument. The point of the argument would seem to be as follows: A colour is made cognitively manifest, i.e., is revealed or is known, only when there is the conjunction of light with the coloured substance. A colour can therefore, be described as "what is manifested by conjunction". And we find that a c  

Contd...
adjectival part of the mark (i.e., "by the conjunction of two things") is past when the manifestation of sound is present, i.e., at the time when a person apprehends the sound; and all this is known by perception. So a mark of this type cannot establish the inferable thing in the subject from where (a part of) the mark itself is absent. This is how older Nyāya understands the nature of this defective mark. But later Nyāya as well as a Rāmānujite logician understands it in a different way. According to it, and also to a Rāmānujite thinker, this is a sort of defective mark in which the subject is known to lack the inferable thing—known by some instrument of valid knowledge which is more powerful or has greater evidential value. For example, someone may falsely infer that fire is not hot, on the ground that it is a substance, just like water which is a substance but not hot. But here by perception it is known that the mark is intended to establish a thing or a property which is really absent from the subject (pakṣa). And perception, as an instrument of knowledge, has greater evidential value than inference; so here the conclusion

(56. Contd..)

a colour is a persistent entity, existing even before and after its manifestation as well as before the conjunction that brings about its manifestation, i.e., it does not exist merely at the time when it is manifested or apprehended—on the contrary, it precedes and succeeds its apprehension or manifestation. This example enables the Mīmāṃsā philosopher to hold that "manifestation by conjunction" is concomitant with persistence.
sought to be established by inference is invalidated by perception. This is the interpretation of this *hetvābhāsa*, given by later Nyāya and is renamed *bādhita* which means a mark which is offered to establish the existence of a thing which is known to be absent by some stronger evidence 57.

Veṅkaṭanātha, who is the most prominent logician in the Viśistādhyāta school and on whose work we have depended to a very great extent, for our presentation of Rāmānuja’s theory of knowledge, gives a detailed account of *hetvābhāsa* while he treats inference. He defines *hetvābhāsa* as that which is treated like a mark in spite of its not being a mark truly 58. In other words, it is something which is not a mark but is offered

57. Kalātyayāpadiṣṭastu balavanmānabādhitaḥ
kalātītoatitakālo bādhitasca sa kathyate.

*Nyāyaparīśuddhi*, p. 297.
By Veṅkaṭanātha.
Chowkhamba Edition.

58. Hetuvinnatve sati hetuvyavahāra viśayatvam
hetvābhāsasāmānyalakṣaṇam.

*Nyāyasāra*, a commentary of
*Nyāyaparīśuddhi*, p. 271
By Śrīnivāsaśācārya
Chowkhamba Edition.
as such. According to Venkaṭanātha, a hetvābhāsa, as we have already started, may have one or both of the two fundamental defects (which he specifies) on account of which it fails to prove the inferable thing. The proffered mark would have the first defect, if it lacks invariable concomitance with the thing intended to be proved with its help, and it would have the second defect if it has not the character of being in the subject (pakṣadharmata), i.e., if its subject does not possess the mark. A thing cannot be a mark if it lacks either of these two characteristics stated above. All other defects of a mark which either the old or the new school of Nyāya recognises are but variations of these two fundamental defects\(^5\). That is, all hetvābhāsas can be put under these two main heads, namely, the defect of lacking concomitance (avyāptatva) and the defect of lacking the character of being in the subject of the inferential judgment (apakṣadharmatva). We shall give here a brief account of how Venkaṭanātha shows this.

\(^5\) Nyāyaparīsūḍdi, p. 271.

By Venkaṭanātha.
The first which we are likely to notice is the defect of savyabhicāratva or anaikāntikatva which is the irregularity of the mark in respect of its staying always in union with the inferable thing. This defect is of two kinds in his opinion - the mark may have that kind of irregularity which is attributed to what is called the common mark (sadhārana hetu), or it may be possessed by what is called the uncommon mark (asadhārana hetu). An irregular mark, as we have already stated, is called common, if it exists in instances both where the inferable thing is definitely known to exist and also where the inferable thing is known not to exist. And an irregular mark is called uncommon if it is known definitely not to exist in any instance other than the pakṣa, i.e., the thing in which the mark is intended to show the existence of the inferable thing. Thus in both these kinds of defective mark, the mark will have that defect on account of which we cannot show its invariable relationship with the thing to be inferred. That is, the universal concomitance between the two would remain unestablished. So, this defect of a mark is nothing but the lack of concomitance between the mark and the inferable thing (avyāptidosa). It obstructs the liṅga-parāmarsā which is essential for an inferential judgment.
The contradictory mark (viruddha hetu) is that which is concomitant with the absence of the inferable thing. So the defect of this mark also consists in its lack of concomitance (vyāptābhava) with the thing which is to be inferred.

The defective mark called asiddha-hetu, i.e., the unestablished mark is, as already mentioned, of three kinds. It would appear that each of them has either of the two fundamental defects stated by Venkatanātha. Those which are unestablished as regards their substratum (āśrayasiddha) and those which are unestablished as regards their own nature (svarūpasiddha), lack the character of being in the subject (pākṣadharmaṇavivarjita). And the mark which is unestablished in respect of concomitance evidently lacks concomitance with the inferable thing. This hinders the rise of the inferential judgment by hindering the complex judgment about the mark which is called parānarsa. Thus the defect of unestablished mark is, according to Venkatanātha, either the mark which has no concomitance with the thing to be inferred or the mark which is not definitely known to exist in the subject. The defect called "counter-balances" (satpratipakṣatva) is what

60. Tatra vyāptipakṣavṛttniscayarahitāsiddhaḥ.

Nyāyaparipṛṣuddhi, p 279.

By Venkatanātha.
weakens the capacity of the original mark to establish the thing which it is intended to establish, on account of there being another rival mark which tends to prove just the opposite of what the former intends to prove. As both the mutually opposed marks would have equal strength, none of them can prove its thesis; for in the presence of these mutually opposed marks, it is not possible to ascertain that either the one or the other has universal concomitance with its intended inferable thing. So Veṅkaṭanātha says that the defect called counter-balance is nothing but that defect of a mark which consists in its lack of invariable concomitance (avyāptatvadosa).

The defect of kālātyayāpadistā or bādha (invalidation) is the defect in which the existence of the probandum in the subject is negated by some more trustworthy instrument of knowledge than the inference which employs the invalidated mark. Here one doubts whether the thing taken as the mark has concomitance with the probandum, since the probandum is shown to be absent from the subject. So according to Veṅkaṭanātha such a mark also lacks certainty about invariable concomitance.

It would appear, therefore, that he is justified, to a very great extent, in holding that all the defects of the
mark stated by Nyāya are but variations of the two main defects of a mark, namely, i) the absence of its concomitance with the inferable thing and ii) its non-existence in the inferential subject.

There is another defect to which some thinkers have given an independent status. This defect is called "siddha-sādhana" i.e., the act of proving a thing which is already established. This, too, is recognised by Veṅkaṭanātha, but he thinks that this is the same as that defect of a mark which consists in its lacking the character of being in the subject. In the first place, in a case of siddhasādhana, we find that the subject of the inferential judgment in question has not the character of true subject-hood (paksatā). For here the existence of the inferable thing in the subject is already known for certain; so the alleged subject cannot be considered to be a proper subject of an inference, in accordance with the definition of a pakṣa as that which is not definitely known to possess the sādhyā. Since it is not

61. Sisādhayiśā viraha viśiṣṭa siddhyābhavaḥ pakṣatā.

_Bhaṣāpariccheda_, Kārikā 70 p. 365.

By Viswanatha.

Bengali Edition by Panchanan Sastri.
a proper subject, so the mark cannot be said to have the character of being in the subject. That is, the mark, in a case of \textit{siddhasadhanata\texttext{\textemdash}}, lacks the character of being in a proper subject of inference (\paka\text{-}dharmataviraha). We can also say that this is the same as the defect "\textit{\textbackslash asrayasiddhi}" i.e., the defect of a mark's being unestablished in respect of its substratum.

Venkatanatha, in the chapter of inference, has given a detailed account of various kinds of debate (\textit{tarka}) and occasions of an opponents' discomfiture (\textit{nigrahaasthana}). But this mostly follows the Ny\text{\textemdash}ya account, although he, it appears to us, often treats these topics in a somewhat novel fashion.