CHAPTER III

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Hume conceived of man as a creature who has been destined by Nature to judge, feel and act. In his observations, the basis of a man's action is his feeling, and that of his judgment is his understanding. Feeling or affection and understanding are therefore the two main ingredients in man's nature (T 493). Hume's 'science of human nature' proposes to study man both as a creature of understanding and as a creature of feeling. However, the study of understanding gets priority over that of feeling. Not all sciences are concerned with feeling. But every science reasons concerning its own subject of study. In so far as a science reasons, it lies under the cognisance of men, and are judged by their powers and faculties. In Hume's opinion, reason or understanding could itself be the subject of study which no science had yet taken up. Thus, he hoped that his 'science of Man' would be of relevance to every other science in so far as it took up understanding as its subject of study.

The new science, in Hume's opinion, would bring about changes and improvements in sciences like mathematics, natural philosophy, natural religion, and so on, by getting us
acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding and explaining the nature of the ideas we employ and of the operations we perform in our reasonings. The extent of human understanding is determined by the stock of ideas and its force is measured by the powers and faculties of mind. As may therefore be expected, Hume began his study of human nature with ideas.

The Way of Ideas

The Treatise of Human Nature opens with the classification of what Hume calls 'perceptions of the human mind'. There he argues the four main positions: 1 (1) that perceptions of the mind are divided into impressions and ideas; (2) that the difference between impressions and ideas is a difference in force and liveliness; (3) that every idea is an exact image, replica or copy of the impression which corresponds to it; and (4) that perceptions first exist as impressions and ideas are causally dependent upon the impressions.

First, perceptions are divided into impressions and ideas. Impressions are sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. The ideas are the faint images of these impressions in thinking and reasoning. The difference between impressions and ideas is the same as the difference between feeling and thinking; and, according
to Hume, the difference is so obvious that a man under normal circumstance does not fail to perceive it.

Secondly, Hume asserts that the difference between impressions and ideas, which is obvious to a normal man, is the difference in force, liveliness and vivacity. That means, the difference between these two categories of perceptions is one of degree and not of kind.

Thirdly, impressions and ideas resemble each other in every respect except their degree of force and vivacity, 'the one seem to be in a manner the reflexion of the other' (T 2). Thus, according to Hume, 'all the perceptions of the mind are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas' (T 2-3). 'Ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other' (T 3). However, according to Hume, this resemblance does not always hold between complex impressions and complex ideas. Complex impressions are those that enter into the soul through more than one senses and can be distinguished into parts. Similarly, complex ideas also can be distinguished into parts, but they may be formed in the mind through the operations of imagination. When we analyse these complex ideas into their parts we get simple ideas, which, however, without exception resemble their correspondent simple impressions. Thus, 'the rule here holds without any exception, and that every simple idea has a simple impression, which resembles it; and every simple impression a correspondent idea' (T 3).
Fourth, the most important difference between impressions and ideas is not only one of force and vivacity, or of the original and its image, but that one between the cause and its effect. Impression is the cause of the idea and not the reverse.

For the assurance of this causal relation, Hume wanted to establish a general proposition, "That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent" (T 4). He said that simple impressions and ideas are always attended with each other. And from this constant conjunction he concluded that there is a great connection between our correspondent impressions and ideas. One has the influence upon the other. According to Hume, such constant conjunction can never arise from chance. It proves the dependence of the impressions on the ideas, or of the ideas on the impressions. To know whether impressions depend on the ideas or ideas on the impressions we have to find out the order of their first appearance. But by our constant experience we find that the simple impressions always take the precedence of their correspondent ideas. For Hume, then, impressions are prior to ideas. This priority proves that 'Our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions' (T 5).

Hume goes to prove the thesis — no impression, no idea — by means of two arguments. The first argument is psychological.
If we look into our own mind we find that every idea is derived from a corresponding impression. To have an idea of scarlet is to see an actual scarlet. The idea of the taste of pine-apple presupposes the actual taste of it. Sometimes we find that the ideas at first sight are not derived from this corresponding impressions. But upon a closer scrutiny, it will be revealed that such ideas also arise from reflecting on the operations of our own mind. The second argument is a logical one. The deficiency in, or absence of, any organ to have impression is followed by the corresponding failure to have an idea. 'A blind man can form no notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds' (E1 20). This argument misses much of its significance if the words 'blind man' and 'deaf man' are not taken to mean born blind or born deaf. It is omitted in the Enquiry, but in the Treatise Hume points to a solitary case of forming the idea of a particular shade of missing colour amidst the different shades arranged from the deepest to the lightest even without any prior impression. He accepts the phenomenon as being a genuine exception. Even then, he easily dismisses this contrary instance by saying that 'the instance is so particular and singular, that 'tis scarce worth our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim' (T 6). For Hume, this exception, as it were, proves the rule. Hume also takes note of another limitation to which the maxim is subject, viz. 'that as our ideas are images of our impressions, so we can form secondary ideas, which are images of the
primary' (T 6). As the secondary ideas duplicate the original impressions, the general proposition — 'that all our simple ideas proceed either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent impressions' (T 7) — is verified and confirmed.

The principle that every simple idea is preceded by corresponding simple impression is regarded by Hume as the 'first principle' in the science of human nature (T 7). Hume uses this principle at once to settle the issue about 'innate ideas'. The principle shows the impossibility of innate ideas, meaning by 'innate' what is original and not copied from precedent perception. In this sense, only impressions are innate but not ideas.

Hume further clarifies the principle that impressions are prior to ideas by bringing in another important classification between 'impressions of sensation' and 'impressions of reflection' (TI i 2). Impressions of sensation are those that arise in the soul originally from 'unknown causes', but impressions of reflection are derived in a great measure from our ideas. An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, and so on. The copy of this impression is called an idea. This idea of pain or pleasure then returns upon the soul and produces new impression of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which are called the impressions of reflection. These again are copied by memory
and imagination and become ideas, so the impressions of re-

So far a great deal of attention has been paid to Hume's
to Hume in his philosophical system. Not infrequently the
theory about impressions and ideas and the many uses put to
commentators want to know about the status of the principle:
it by Hume in his philosophical system. Not infrequently the
Is it an inductive generalisation based on the reports of
the many uses put to it by Hume in his philosophical system. Not infrequently the
is it just a logical principle? In laying
species of perception is given in psychological terms, for
the distinction is made in terms of characters verifiable
He proceeds to prove his principle, as Basson
in experience. He proceeds to prove his principle, as Basson
the distinction is made in terms of characters verifiable
points out, with the help of 'a report, a request, and a
He reports that all his own ideas are copies
He also requests us to look into our own minds
and see the truth of what he says. Then he throws a challenge
to his opponents to find out an idea which is not the copy of
some impression or other. Flew points out that the challenge
for producing a counter example to the principle is an inte-
for producing a counter example to the principle is an inte-
Most of the time such sentences as
'real our ideas .... are copies of our impressions ....' 
by Hume as contingent generalisation. But at moments
of crisis he apparently construes them as a necessary
proposition, and any recalcitrant instance is at once rejected as being meaningless word. Thus Basson warns:

No matter how he purports to prove his principle, the use he makes of it shows that for him an idea is by definition a copy of an impression.

Hume's first principle of human nature gives rise to a theory of meaning. Sometimes Hume speaks of ideas as 'representing' the correspondent impressions. This is sometimes taken as showing that he regards them as ideas of their impressions, i.e., meaning them, referring to them. N.K. Smith, however, has no hesitation to refuse the suggestion that Hume ever advocates the referential theory of meaning. For Hume, words stand for ideas, and ideas copy impressions. If there are no impressions then there are no ideas and if the words are used without ideas then they are meaningless.

Thomas Reid observed that Hume used his theory of impressions and ideas as 'articles of inquisition' all through. Hume's theory of meaning is developed out of this distinction between impressions and ideas, and the theory is happily applied by him to dispose of many philosophical terms as empty words without meaning.

Hume's theory about impressions and ideas may not really be the 'articles of inquisition', as challenged by Mrs. Maund and N.K. Smith, but in many places of his work he really
applied his instrument to critical purposes. The whole of Hume's elaborate enquiry into cause and effect in the *Treatise* is in form a search for the impression from which the idea of necessity is derived. Regarding 'time and place' Hume said, *interalia*.

If it be a sufficient proof, that we have the idea of a vacuum, because we dispute and reason concerning it; we must for the same reason have the idea of time without any changeable existence; since there is no subject of dispute more frequent and common. But that we really have no such idea, is certain. For whence should it be deriv'd? Does it arise from an impression of sensation or of reflection? Point it out distinctly to us, that we may know its nature and qualities. But if you cannot point out any such impression, you may be certain you are mistaken, when you imagine you have any such idea (T 64-65).

Concerning matter (the idea of external existence) Hume said,

nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas,... Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are deriv'd from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows, that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions (T 67).

Of spiritual substance he said,
I know no better method, than to ask these philosophers in a few words, What they mean by substance and inhesion? .... As every idea is deriv'd from a precedent impression, had we any idea of the substance of our minds, we must also have an impression of it (T 232).

Of the self he said,

THERE are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; .... Unluckily [for them we have no] .... idea of self, after the manner it is here explain'd. For from what impression cou'd this idea be deriv'd? This question 'tis impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity; and yet 'tis a question, which must necessarily be answer'd, if we wou'd have the idea of self pass for clear and intelligible. It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea .... [And after some argument]. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv'd; and consequently there is no such idea (T 251-252).

Despite the many critical uses put to the theory of ideas expounded in the opening section of the Treatise, N.K. Smith advances elaborate arguments to show that the analysis of experience provided by this theory is not final and decisive in Hume. In Part III and IV of Book I of the Treatise, Hume supplements his theory of ideas by introducing the 'object of belief' and the 'object of knowledge' which are
distinct from both impressions and ideas. The object of belief and the object of knowledge, when analysed in terms of impressions and ideas, leave a residue. The residue in the object is sought to be explained by tracing back to its source in human nature.

Certainly, there are constructive and destructive designs in Hume's philosophy. Hume's destructive designs are largely fulfilled by his theory of ideas as expounded in the opening section of the Treatise. At the same time, the theory is used to expose the limitation of the ideas in providing a basis for our understanding of the world around. This makes it necessary that a new basis for understanding must be found out. Hume's philosophical enquiry is in large measure an enquiry into the new basis of human understanding.
Hume, like his predecessors, assumes that impressions come into our minds through the senses as single, simple items. The philosophers do not raise any difficulty about single impression. Complex impressions, according to Hume, come through more than one of the senses at the same time. Now the imagination may, in forming an idea, join different parts of such a complex impression with parts of other complexes, or with simple impressions which came originally at a different time. Although to a certain extent the imagination is free, there are limitations on its freedom. The imagination, in contrast to memory, is free from external control, but is none the less, Hume teaches, determined by 'universal principles, which render it in some measure, uniform with itself in all times and places' (T 10). Hume argues that, although the imagination is free to join ideas together in any way that it pleases, yet it does not always join ideas at random. There is a kind of bond between different separable ideas, by which one idea 'naturally introduces' another. This 'bond of union' or the 'uniting principle' among ideas is what Hume calls 'association of ideas'. He looks upon this principle as a 'gentle force' whereby the mind is led from an impression to an idea, or from an idea to another idea. Hume does not introduce any rational faculty of the mind to explain the order of our thoughts. For him, experience generates

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some associating quality by which one idea naturally introduces another. Association for him, does not completely determine a train of thought. It exercises a gentle guidance, rather than a rigid control and prevails only if there are no stronger counteracting forces. Thus, he seems to preserve some element of freedom in our thinking.

Hume introduces, both in the Treatise (TI i 4) and in the Enquiry (E1 Ill), three principles of association. These three principles are resemblance, contiguity in time or space, and causal connection. These are universal principles of association or 'of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind' (E1 23) by which the mind is conveyed from one idea to another (T 11).

Hume offers a sort of proof of the principles. First, he appeals to the fact, verifiable in a common observation, that any idea which intrudes into a train of thought or conversation without any connection with the preceding theme is liable to be rejected. This shows that our train of thoughts is expected to be guided by some principles. Secondly, Hume appeals to a phenomenon which transcends the bounds of any particular linguistic or cultural group. He contends
that even in the most widely separated linguistic groups, the words expressing compound ideas correspond to each other. This shows that the principle in accordance with which ideas are connected with each other is universal and has 'an equal influence on all mankind' (E1 23). Association, regarded as a gentle force,

commonly prevails, and is the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly correspond to each other; nature in a manner pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most proper to be united into a complex one (T 10-11).

Hume admits of the universality of the principles of association or of connection among ideas. The universality of the principle of connection among ideas may be accounted for either (1) by assuming that it lies in the nature of the ideas themselves or (2) by supposing that they are rooted a priori in the nature of the human mind, or (3) by supposing a universally detectable but contingent feature of all our experience. The way Hume proves the universality of the principles suggests that he is in favour of the third alternative. But actually he resolves the qualities by which ideas are associated or connected together into the original qualities of human nature.
These are therefore the principles of union or cohesion among our simple ideas, and in the imagination supply the place of that inseparable connexion, by which they are united in our memory. Here is a kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various forms. Its effects are every where conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and must be resolv'd into original qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain (T 12-13).

The above passage shows that Hume is disposed to think of association as rooted a priori in the nature of the human mind. The formulation of the laws of association does not simply describe the qualities of the ideas, it also refers to certain original qualities of the human mind because of which it is more proper for certain simple ideas to be united into a complex one in imagination. Moreover, Hume considers 'association' to be natural relations. 'Natural relations are those which unconsciously join one idea to another in his mind' (E1 xvi). The source of natural relations is mind itself. Incidentally it may be pointed out that in Hume, the word 'natural' has been used as an equivalent to mental

Commentators many often think that Hume attempted to develop his philosophy of mind on the model of Newton's mechanics. Hume's laws of association and Newton's law of gravitation
serve their point of comparison. In the *Abstract*, (writing anonymously in the third person) Hume writes:

Thro' this whole book, there are great pretensions to new discoveries in philosophy; but if any thing can intitle the author to so glorious a name as that of an *inventor*, 'tis the use he makes of the principle of the association of ideas, which enters into most of his philosophy (A 661-662).

He also speaks of association as a kind of 'attraction' which has its extraordinary effects in the mental world (T 12-13). The effects of association in the mental world are comparable to the effects of attraction in the natural world. However, the apparent similarity between the law of gravitation and the laws of association should not lead us to think that the former is the model for the latter. Newton regarded gravitational attraction as a manifest quality of the matter. He tried hard to find an acceptable ultimate explanation of gravity, by trying to deduce the square law from the assumption of a mechanical push. But he failed. Newton acknowledged that the cause of gravity could not yet been discovered. He, therefore, left its cause to be found out. Hume, on the other hand, appears to hold the view that the qualities from which association arises are not the qualities of the ideas themselves, rather they are the qualities of the mind. Moreover, Hume has no hesitation to regard these qualities of the mind.
as 'ultimate'. Newton, true to his scientific attitude of mind, stopped short of recognising gravity as ultimate.

There are many complications in Hume's statements on the principles of association. Sometimes he speaks of 'a principle of connexion' (E1 24), sometimes 'the principle of association' (E1 24) and most regularly 'principles of association'. In Book II of the Treatise, Hume mentions five principles of association. These principles are said to hold among impressions, as well as among ideas.

'Tis evident, then, there is an attraction or association among impressions, as well as among ideas; tho' with this remarkable difference, that ideas are associated by resemblance, contiguity, and causation; and impressions only by resemblance (T 283).

In the first Enquiry and in the first Book of the Treatise, Hume however formulates only three principles of association. They are said to be principles of association among ideas, but by implication these are said to be principle of association among objects. For example, causal relation is said to be both a natural relation and a philosophical relation. As a natural relation it is one of the three principles of association. Now the relation of cause and effect obtains among objects and not amongst their ideas.12 Again, in order to illustrate the principles of association, Hume gives
the example of a picture leading to the thought of the original. Here the resemblance is between the picture and the original, i.e. between the object and the idea. Now, if the principles of association are said to be relations of objects and also relations of ideas, then naturally we may think that the association of ideas is derived from the association of objects. But Hume reduces association to the original qualities of human nature and not to the objective nature. By referring to association as the principle of connection between 'ideas', 'impressions' and 'objects', and by resolving associative qualities into the original qualities of human nature, what Hume really wants to say is that, impressions and ideas manifest certain qualities like resemblance, contiguity etc. for which it is more proper for them to be associated in the mind, but there is no necessary causal connection between these qualities of impressions, ideas etc. and their association in the mind. Mind has its readiness, or a natural tendency to bind certain ideas together, and in so far as ideas possess the qualities of resemblance etc. they get associated in the mind by virtue of its innate disposition.
The Idea of Substance

In the Abstract, speaking in the third person, Hume explains his mode of approach to the idea of substance and essence in the following way:

Accordingly, wherever any idea is ambiguous, he has always recourse to the impression, which must render it clear and precise. And when he suspects that any philosophical term has no idea annexed to it (as is too common) he always asks from what impression that pretended idea is derived? And if no impression can be produced, he concludes that the term is altogether insignificant. 'Tis after this manner he examines our idea of substance and essence (A 648-49).

The above passage may suggest that the idea of substance is, according to Hume, a 'pretended idea'. But in the section of the Treatise where he comes to deal with substance, he points out that the idea of substance 'is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection' (T 16). That means, the term 'substance' is not altogether an empty word without meaning. It is a name which names a collection of simple ideas.
Sometimes philosophers explain the meaning of the term 'substance' in a different way. They say that the term 'substance' stands for the idea of substance and the idea of substance stands for an 'unknown' something in which the particular qualities inhere. This way of putting the idea of substance is, according to Hume, a pretension. The 'substance' of the philosophers is a mere supposition. That does not mean however that the general notion of substance is itself invalid. If Hume would really think that the idea of substance is meaningless he would not find it convenient to distinguish between substance and mode. Hume thinks that there is a valid distinction between substance and mode. Both are complex ideas. Whereas the 'principle of Union' is the chief part of the complex idea of substance, it is not so in the case of any mode (T 16).

Hume denies the idea of a so-called simple substance or of an unknown substratum on the ground that it is not derived either from the impression of sensation or of reflection. If it is derived from sensation then it must be a colour, or a sound, or a taste, and so on, but the idea of substance is not like them. If it is derived from reflection, then it must resolve itself into one of our passions and emotions. But none of our passions and emotions represent a substance. There is no separate impression from which the idea of substance is derived. But the idea of substance is not nothing. It is a complex idea. The complex
idea of substance is formed by the imagination out of simple ideas. In this matter, imagination is not wholly free. It is bound by the 'gentle force' of associative relations. Simple ideas that enter into the complex idea of a substance are connected together by the relations of contiguity and causation. Being natural relations, contiguity and causation exert a sufficient force upon imagination and induce it to form the notion of a substance. Moreover, associations are universal relations. They work in almost the same way in all human minds. Thus it is not surprising that the ideas of many minds about the same substance may often correspond. For example, the word 'gold' conveys the idea of the same substance to many minds. The idea of substance being a complex idea, it is easily understandable how it can be a growing idea. If we have already formed the notion of a substance, say, gold, which is yellow colour, weighty, malleable, fusible, then upon the discovery of its dissolubility in aqua regia, we join that to the other ideas forming the idea of gold.

Thus to sum up, Hume discusses the idea of substance with a view to clearing away the confusions created by the philosophers about the notion of substance. The philosophers' notion of an 'unknown substratum', according to Hume's analysis, is without any foundation. Philosophers have invented the 'unknown substance' to account for our ordinary way of understanding the world of objects and of ourselves. Objects
seem to preserve unity and identity despite many perceivable changes in them. We also think of ourselves to be the same person throughout our life-time. But in Hume's opinion, the unity and identity of the objects and persons are, to a large measure, due to the secret operations of the mind to which philosophers are quite insensible. They, therefore, cover up their ignorance by introducing false presuppositions of substance (spiritual as well as material substance). Hume, on the other hand, removes the false presuppositions and gives, what he thinks to be, the correct meaning of 'substance'. Explained properly, the idea of substance is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, united into a complex by the operation of imagination. Philosophers impute a false meaning to 'substance' in so far as they fail to observe the roles played by mind in the formation of the idea of substance.
Abstract Ideas

Hume treats of general abstract ideas in the first part of the Treatise, in close connection with his analysis of ideas and impressions. He begins by explaining what appears to him to be Berkeley's position with regard to abstract ideas. Hume accepts Berkeley's theory of ideas as 'one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries' and proposes to confirm it by some further arguments. Berkeley, according to Hume, asserted 'all general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them' (T 17).

There are two important aspects in Berkeley's theory of ideas. In the first place, all ideas are determinate, i.e. particularised images. The second characteristic tanet of Berkeley's theory is that, in functioning as 'abstract' ideas they have a representative function. What Hume correctly takes over from Berkeley is solely the view that all ideas are determinate. But he gives a very misleading account of what Berkeley thinks to be the representative function of abstract ideas.13

Hume offers three main arguments to confirm the view that every idea is determinate. First, 'the mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise
notion of the degrees of each' (T 18). For instance, the precise length of a line is not distinguishable from the line itself. We cannot form a general idea of a line without any length at all. Nor can we form the general idea of a line possessing all possible lengths. Secondly, Hume contends that perceptions are impressions and ideas, and that ideas are always exact replicas of their corresponding impressions. Now, every impression is determinate and definite. Since, therefore, an idea is an image or copy of an impression, it must itself be determinate and definite, even though it is fainter than the impression from which it is derived (T 19). 'Thirdly, 'tis a principle generally receiv'd in philosophy, that every thing in nature is individual' (T 19). No triangle, for instance, can exist, which is not a particular triangle with its particular characteristics. To postulate an existent triangle which is at the same time all and none of the possible kinds and sizes of triangle would be an absurdity. But what is absurd in 'fact' and 'reality' is also absurd in 'idea' (T 19).

Since, therefore, every idea is particular, Hume agrees with Berkeley that there are not abstract general ideas. At the same time, he admits that what are called abstract ideas, though they are in themselves particular images, 'may become general in their representation'. The bulk of Hume's
discussion on abstract ideas is concerned with the problem how a particularised image functions 'as if it were universal' (T 20).

Hume's notion of 'as-if-universal' involves a paradox. Hume explains this paradox as 'that some ideas are particular in their nature, but general in their representation' (T 22). He clearly admits that we have a notion of general idea. It serves the purpose of reflection and conversation (T 18). We also use a general name to facilitate reflection and conversation. What Hume contends is that the universal is absurd in 'fact and reality; it is also absurd 'in idea' (T 19), but it has a real function and a real name. The function is the function of custom. The custom is acquired through the observation of resemblance among objects and the name-giving-ceremony. However, the name-giving-ceremony is posterior to the perception of resemblance. Therefore, it is not wholly correct to regard Hume's theory of abstract ideas as a form of nominalism as many writers do. It appears to us that the essence of abstract ideas, according to Hume's analysis, lies in resemblance among objects or several objects. Now, resemblance itself is not an object or an idea, and the general name does not name a particular object of which we have an idea. If we try to track down a general idea in the theatre of our mind, we can discover only a particular image, but in using that general idea in reflection and conversation
we always go beyond that image. That means, there is something surplus in an abstract idea which cannot be found within the given content of experience, that is, the impression or the image of it. The surplus element of the abstract idea follows from mind's activity.

According to Hume, we do not know the essence of mind by virtue of which it acts, but we can empirically discover the manner of its action (T 22). Abstract ideas find their application beyond their 'nature', i.e. the given content of perception. This 'application of ideas beyond their nature', says Hume, 'proceeds from our collecting all their possible degrees of quantity and quality in such an imperfect manner as may serve the purposes of life' (T 20). In spite of the differences of the degrees of their quantity and quality we find the resemblance among several objects. When we find a resemblance among several objects, that often occur to us, we apply the same name to all of them. In this way we acquire a custom. After we have acquired a custom of this kind, the hearing of that name revives the idea of one of the objects, but as the same word is frequently applied to other individuals, that are different in many respects from that idea, the imagination conceives it with all its particular circumstances and proportions. Memory revives only a particular idea, but imagination extends the idea to all resembling individuals. This is what Hume wants to mean by saying that
the use of the general word, by reviving a particular idea and the attendant custom, 'touches the soul' (T 20) of all resembling individuals.

The essence of a general idea does not consist in the general name. However, the name is important. The use of the name revives in memory a particular idea and the attendant custom. The general term has a relation to many other particulars by virtue of that custom. Therefore,

The only difficulty, that can remain on this subject, must be with regard to that custom, which so readily recalls every particular idea, for which we may have occasion, and is excited by any word or sound, to which we commonly annex it (T 22).

The custom of annexing a general term to a particular idea grows, in the first place, out of the perception of resemblance among two or more objects. Now, resemblance is a relation; it is both a natural relation and a philosophical relation. The natural relation is discovered in perception, its effect being mental association. We perceive the resemblance among two or more objects. In perception objects are given in their details. But in forming the general idea we consider the resemblance of objects in certain respect and become insensible of the other qualities of the objects. Moreover, we bring thousand other objects within a general idea which we have not in fact perceived. At least, this is
the way in which we use a general term in a discourse. This becomes possible because resemblance is also a philosophical relation, and the formation of a general idea, though begins in perception, is attended subsequently by a kind of philosophic reflection. We are not always aware of this reflecting act of the mind because, in due course, we become habituated to it.

By this means we accompany our ideas with a kind of reflexion, of which custom renders us, in a great measure, insensible (T 25).
Ideas of Space and Time

Before Hume, Newton and Leibniz had expressed two important views of space and time. Newton distinguished between 'absolute', 'true' and 'mathematical' space and time, and 'relative', 'apparent' and 'common' space and time.

Absolute space, in its own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always similar and immovable. Relative space is some movable dimension or measure of the absolute spaces... 14(a)

Again,

Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external, and by another name is called duration: relative, apparent, and common time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by the means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year.... 14(b)

Newton's motion of absolute space and absolute time is rather obscure. What he wants to say about absolute space and absolute time, in essence, seems to be that infinite, absolute space and time exist in and of themselves, independently of any relation to anything material.
Leibniz protested against Newton's ontology of space and time. As against Newton's conception of the nature of space and time as absolute, Leibniz advocated a relational view of space and time. He was in the habit of summarising his own conception of the nature of space and time by saying that space is the order of the coexisting (simultaneously existing) and time is the order of the non-coexisting (not simultaneously existing).

Though Leibniz criticised Newton's views of space and time for obscurity, his own views of space and time are no less obscure than Newton's. Since both Newton and Leibniz are difficult to interpret, it is not easy to say whether Hume's views on space and time agree with that of Newton or of Leibniz or is different from both. However, there is a tendency among writers to suppose that Leibniz's idea that space is an ordered manifold of elements reappears in Hume as the notion that 'the idea of space or extension is nothing but the idea of visible or tangible points distributed in a certain order' (T 53). Hume opposed the assumption of a void. In this matter, he sided with Leibniz, rather than Newton. But significantly enough, in the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume points out that the dispute between the proponents of the vacuum and of the planum at one level is merely verbal, and at another, ontological level, exceeds all human capacity. Possibly, with regard to his conception of the nature
of space and time, Hume is neither a Newtonian nor a Leibnizian.

According to Newton, absolute space and absolute time are real entities. According to Leibniz, Newton's absolute space is the other name of the void, but the void does not exist. Leibniz admits of the existence of real units or 'substances' and their real order. For Leibniz, the order of the substances is as real as the substances are. Hume's version is that both space and time are ideas. Ideas are derived from sensations, but sensations themselves do not have either spatial or temporal properties. The ideas of space and time are, therefore, complex ideas copied from sensuous points and of the manner of their appearance. However, it is difficult to say what according to Hume, is the ontological status of this 'manner' of appearance.

When Hume deals with the ideas of space and time as complex ideas, he recognises that they are classed by themselves. They are not the products of association. Association in time or place (contiguity) is possible only if the ideas of space and time are already available to us.

Hume speaks of space and time as abstract ideas (T 34-35). We know that 'resemblances and relations' condition the possibility of abstract ideas. But the ideas of space and time are not so like, and so they are not the products of comparison. Space and time relations such as distant,
contiguous, above, below, before, after, etc. presuppose but do not produce the ideas of space and time. Ideas of space and time differ from other complex ideas in another respect. Though they can be known by reference to the simple perceptions, their distinctive feature consists in the 'manner' in which the simples are ordered or arranged. In one case they are spatial, and in another they are temporal. The 'manner' of arrangement, being the arrangement of simple perceptions, is not given in the content of any one perception, and also does not consist in mere summation of them. The arrangement is over and above the perceptions. It is not sensed. It is non-impressional. None the less it is given, not constructed, 'viewed', not merely imagined or thought. 16

Hume maintains the view that the ideas of space and time are genuine ideas. The idea of space is the same as the idea of extension, which, again, is the same as the idea of the extended object. Again, the idea of time is the same as the idea of duration, which, again, is the same as the idea of succession of changeable objects. That means, there is no space or time without sensible objects. Consequently, the notion of empty space or void and the notion of empty time or absolute duration are mere figments of the imagination. They are mere words which do not represent any idea.
Since the ideas of space and time appear to Hume to be genuine, he tries to discover the impressions from which these ideas may be derived. He observes that the idea of extension is derived from the impressions of visible or tangible points, disposed in a certain manner. Similarly, the idea of time or duration is derived from the impressions and ideas of every kind and the manner of their appearance, the manner being the succession of perceptions. Thus the idea of time comprehends a greater variety of perceptions than that of the idea of space, the manner of appearances, however, are different for space and for time. Whereas perceptions giving rise to the idea of time succeed one another, sensations of sight and touch giving rise to the idea of space co-exist.

Hume admits that there are controversies concerning our ideas of space and time. The controversies are there, because they are complex ideas, and complex ideas are sometimes so obscure that it is almost impossible even for the mind, which forms them, to tell exactly their nature and composition (T 33). However, simple impressions and their corresponding ideas are clear and evident, and they admit of no controversy. Therefore, Hume in Book I, Part II, Section III, 'of the other qualities of our ideas of space and time', proposes to examine the ideas of space and time by tracing them back to their ultimate sources in simple impressions. Hume begins
by saying that there is a limit to the minuteness of objects to be sensible. But there is an important theory according to which extension and duration are infinitely divisible. The infinite divisibility of space and time goes against Hume's claim that those ideas owe their origin to sense experience. Hume, therefore, advances arguments to dispose of the theory of infinite divisibility of space and time.

Hume's argument against infinite divisibility of space and time depends on a four linked chain of reasoning (TI ii 4). This chain of reasoning, in turn, substantiates his view that the idea of extension and duration consists of indivisible and simple parts. Hume's reasons are: (1) the capacity of the mind is not infinite; (2) consequently no idea of extension or duration consists of an infinite number of parts or ideas, but must consist of a finite number of parts or ideas which are simple and indivisible; (3) it is therefore possible for space and time to exist conformably to the idea of them; and (4) since the only serious alternative, infinite divisibility, has to be ruled out as contradictory, it is not only possible, but also certain, that space and time do in fact exist conformably to our idea of each.
Hume's chain of reasoning as explained in Section IV, if valid, proves that our ideas of extension and duration are compounded of parts which are indivisible and that it is possible for space and time to exist in conformable to those ideas. The next consequence that follows from this truth about extension and duration is that it is impossible to conceive either a vacuum or extension without matter, or a time without succession or change in any real existence. Thus Hume addresses himself to the imaginary critics who might support the notion of a vacuum and raise objections against his system concerning space and time. He disposes of those objections on the ground that we cannot conceive of any real extension without filling it with sensible objects, or any real time or duration, without any change or succession of objects. A born blind has no notion of either light or darkness because he does not perceive luminous objects. We perceive objects having movement and change. Thus, in imagination we think away the objects and try to conceive of a space and a time in which there is no object. This is just an illusion. We think as if we have formed the idea of a real space and a real time. But on close scrutiny we always discover objects in them. We do not get pure space and pure time even in imagination.

Having disposed of the arguments of the imaginary critics of his system concerning space and time, Hume concludes the subject of extension with a paradox.
This paradox is, that if you are pleas'd to give to the invisible and intangible distance, or in other words, to the capacity of becoming a visible and tangible distance, the name of a vacuum, extension and matter are the same, and yet there is a vacuum. If you will not give it that name, motion is possible in a plenum, without any impulse in infinitum, without returning in a circle, and without penetration (T 64).

There is also a similar paradox with regard to time. The paradoxes arise because Hume cannot or does not deny certain observable properties like movement, change and steadiness, which we generally ascribe to objects but think of space and time as conditions for the manifestations of those properties. Hume resolves this paradox by saying that instead of space and time being the conditions of change, movement etc. the latter are the conditions of our perception of space and time. Then how are movement and change etc. possible in objects? Hume says that we do not really know the secret cause which operates in bodies and gives them a capacity of receiving bodies between them or getting them changed from one form of existence to another form of existence. Then, Hume's arguments only show that 'we have no idea of any real extension without filling it with sensible objects, and conceiving its parts as visible or tangible' (T 64). And similarly we have no idea of a time and duration without any changeable existence (T 65). But his arguments do not
dispose of, what Newton regarded as, relative space and relative time. Newton thought that relative space and relative time would not be explained without postulating the existence of absolute space and absolute time. But Hume thinks that perceivable extension and duration can very well be explained in terms of objects and their manifest properties. Objects possess steadiness, movement and change, but these are not sufficient to generate the idea of space and time. Hume, therefore, speaks of the 'manner' of appearance. But, is this 'manner' of appearance an integral part of the objects? The objects or the ideas of them, as Hume points out, are composed of indivisible and simple parts. These parts may have colour, tangibility, solidity or impenetrability, they may come and go, but do they have any 'manner'? With regard to the idea of time Hume points out:

The idea of time is not deriv'd from a particular impression mix'd up with others, and plainly distinguishable from them; but arises altogether from the manner, in which impressions appear to the mind, without making one of the number. Five notes play'd on a flute give us the impression and idea (T 36).

Or in otherwards, the manner of appearance which is so essential for the development of the ideas of space and time cannot be equated with any or every part of the object.
Hume's analysis of the ideas of space and time clearly shows that space and time are given in experience, and yet, sensations themselves do not account for them. If Hume had the Kantian notion of the *a priori*, he might have regarded space and time as *a priori* intuitions. But as the matter stands, Hume had no clear decision about the ideas of space and time. He regarded them as 'manner of appearance'. In the *Treatise*, Hume made every attempt to show that the ideas of space and time are derived from sense perception. He also regarded geometry as an imperfect science in the *Treatise*. But in the *Enquiry*, he changed his mind and regarded geometry as a perfect science, which obviously implies that the idea of space is not derived from sense experience. However, in the *Enquiry*, Hume did not further discuss the subject of space and time. But it appears that the difficulties of the Humean system concerning space and time can best be solved by resolving them into the original qualities of human nature.
The idea of cause, according to Hume, belongs to that division of complex ideas which are also relations. In Book I, Part I, Section V of the Treatise, Hume distinguishes between the two senses of the word 'relation'. In the first sense, it signifies 'that quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination', by the natural force of association, so that 'the one naturally introduces the other' (T 13). Hume calls these relations natural relations. He lists three different varieties of them, viz., resemblance, contiguity in time and place and cause and effect. Natural relations are distinguished from 'philosophical relations'. Philosophical relations arise out of comparing between ideas. In this sense, ideas are connected not by virtue of association, but by the propensity of the mind to institute a comparison between them. According to Hume, there are seven different kinds of philosophical relations. These philosophical relations fall into two groups. The first group of relations yield certain and infallible knowledge. The second group yield only probability. The cause-effect relation belongs to the second group of philosophical relations. So cause-effect relation is used both as a natural and as a philosophical relation.

Accordingly, Hume offers a twofold definition of the cause-effect relation in the Treatise. A cause is defined
An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac'd in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter (T 170).

Again,

A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other (T 170).

The first definition defines cause-effect relation as a philosophical relation and the second is the definition of the same object as a natural relation. The first depends on comparison of ideas, while the second on an association between ideas. Hume says that these two definitions of cause 'are only different, by their presenting a different view of the same object' (T 170).

There are, however, controversies about Hume's two definitions of cause. According to J.A. Robinson, if these two definitions are explained as 'views of the same object', then these two cannot both be regarded as definitions. In his opinion, the first one can be regarded as a definition but the second one is just an empirical psychological statement about the first. These are not equivalent definitions.
either intentionally or extensionally. The first definition determines a class of ordered pairs \((x,y)\) of particular occurrences, each pair having the completely objective property of being an instance of a general uniformity.\(^{18}\) And the second definition determines a class of ordered pairs \((x,y)\) of particular occurrences by means of a property which is defined quite essentially in terms of certain mental phenomena.\(^{19}\)

Robinson argues that the class of ordered pairs which is determined by the first definition does not contain the same members of ordered pairs which are determined by the second. Thus they do not have the same extension. And, therefore, the two definitions cannot both be considered as definitions of the same term. Robinson also explains that Hume put forward the two definitions, side by side, because he realised that the omission of necessity in the first definition would be shocking to many who wish to include it in the definition. This consideration prompted Hume to offer in the second a 'compromise' characterisation of the cause-effect relation.\(^{20}\)

T.J. Richards does not accept Robinson's interpretation of Hume's two definitions of cause. According to him, Robinson's account is not a true account of Hume's intentions, Hume's two definitions are alternative, which is evident from his stressed and repeated use of 'either or' (T 169-170) in the passage in which Hume introduces his two definitions.\(^{21}\)
Robinson's main argument for the view that Hume offers only one definition of cause i.e. the definition of cause as a philosophical relation, is that there is no fundamental distinction between philosophical relation and natural relation. In Robinson's opinion, Hume is saying that all relations are philosophical by definition, and naturalness is a purely contingent feature of a relation which induces an association between ideas. Since contingent features of a relation cannot be definitive of that relation, the so-called definition of cause as a natural relation is really no definition, but an empirical psychological statement about that which has been defined as a philosophical relation. Now, if Robinson's interpretation of Hume's two definitions of cause is correct then, contra Kemp Smith, Hume was a supporter of the 'uniformity' view of causation. According to the uniformity view of causation, the necessary and sufficient conditions of causation are contiguity, succession and constant conjunction. The first definition expresses all these three conditions, and therefore, is a complete definition of cause.

Richards agrees with Robinson in denouncing N.K. Smith's interpretation that Hume was no supporter of the uniformity view of causation. But he rejects Robinson's thesis that Hume's definition of cause as a natural relation is no definition at all. Richards points out that Hume lists seven different types of philosophical relation, two of which are named
'resemblance' and 'cause and effect', and a third, 'space and time', has a sub-class named 'contiguity'. These three names are also the names of the three natural relations. For Hume, a natural relation is a relation such that when one term of the relation is given to us in perception or otherwise, our mind by virtue of the way we are constituted, runs on to, or associates that term with, the other term of the relation. Thus a natural relation produces an association of ideas. But Hume gives us a list of three types of natural relation, and hence there must be stable differences between the three. Consequently there can be given a definition of 'cause' as a natural relation: a definition that sorts out natural causal relations from other natural relations. In Richard's opinion, Hume in fact did offer a definition of philosophical relation 'cause', along with a definition of natural relation 'cause'. When Hume defined 'cause' as a philosophical relation, 'cause' includes contiguity, temporal priority and constant conjunction, and 'cause' as a natural relation involves contiguity, temporal priority and a belief in or expectation of, continued priority and contiguity. The natural cause-effect relation is distinct from other natural relations in that a cause is prior and contiguous to an effect in such a way that it leads to association of ideas between them. And for this, Hume expressed the phrase in the second definition, 'and so united with it that...'. Thus, according to Richards, Hume's first definition of cause expresses the
conditions under which a statement about causation is true and the second definition expresses the conditions under which a cause may be asserted. Whereas, belief in invariable sequence is necessary for making a causal assertion, no such belief is necessary for making a causal assertion meaningful.

Though Richards thinks that the human factor is essentially involved in making a causal assertion possible, he joins issue with Robinson in denouncing N.K. Smith's view that Hume was no supporter of what is usually made by the 'uniformity' view of causation, that necessity was for Hume the essential differentia between invariable sequence and causal sequence. But what both Richards and Robinson fail to notice is that 'cause' is for Hume an idea, and this idea is the basis of our reasoning concerning matters of fact. If 'necessary connection' were no part of the complex idea of causal relation, it would not in any way make inference about the unobserved, distant or the future object possible. Necessary connection, according to Hume, is the opposite of chance. About this 'necessary connection' Hume writes:

'Tis the constant conjunction of objects, along with the determination of the mind, which constitutes a physical necessity: And the removal of these is the same thing with chance (T 171).

The passage clearly shows that Hume does not reduce physical or causal necessity to the constancy of conjunction. So far
as the operations of Nature are concerned, they are independent of our thought and reasoning. Hume allows it (T 168). Objects of Nature are found to bear to each other the relations of contiguity, succession and constant conjunction. But if they are to be conceived as causally bound then we will have to go further and ascribe a necessary connection to these objects which we can never observe in them. We, therefore, draw the idea of necessary connection from what we feel internally in contemplating them (T 169). Thus, according to Hume, Nature is uniform, independent of our thought and reasoning, but the things of Nature are not causally bound apart from our thought and reasoning. That means, causal relation is more than uniformity.

In the Enquiry, Hume does not make any distinction between philosophical and natural relations in the definition of causation. Nevertheless, the Enquiry retains the second definition of cause of the Treatise. This is an additional confirmation of the view that Hume was no supporter of the uniformity view of causation, that he included the human factor within the causal relation. In the Enquiry, Hume defines cause in this way:

Def.1. A cause is "an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second" (E 76).
Def.1'. A cause is an object followed by another, and "where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed" (E1 76).

Def.2. A cause is "an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other" (E1 77).

Hume offers Def.1' as a clarification of Def.1, which is the same as the definition of cause as a philosophical relation of the Treatise. However, the subjunctive conditional involved in Def.1' cannot be equivalent to the conjunctive proposition occurring in Def.1.\(^{22}\) The 'all' in 'all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second' means 'all known cases', but Def.1' does not have any example. The Def.1' somehow expresses 'necessity' which is more than constant conjunction. For instance, in the case of two similar pendulum clocks arranged to be 90° out-of-phase, the ticks of the two clocks are constantly conjoined, but this does not imply that if the pendulum of clock 1 were arrested, then clock 2 would cease to tick. Thus Hume's inclusion of Def.1' as a clarification of Def.1 indicates that he did not quite equate causal relation and de facto regularity.

Another likely indication of Hume's uneasiness with the merely uniformity view of causation is the fact that he included in the Treatise, tersely and without comment, a list
of eight 'Rules by which to judge of causes and effects' (T 173). Among the rules are versions of the Methods of Agreement, Difference, and concomitant variations, later made famous by Mill. The fourth rule affirms the principle of the uniformity of nature. The rule is said to be derived from experience. But Hume had shown earlier that this principle is neither demonstrable nor the conclusion of a probable inference (T 89-90). It is a natural principle of the understanding implicit in the habit of generalisation. In fact, none of the eight rules have been derived from experience, rather they are, as Hume himself admits, 'the natural principles of our understanding' (T 175). The rules serve as prescription for determining the cause-effect relation among objects. In an earlier section of Book 1, part III, section XIII, Hume had announced that,

We shall afterwards take notice of some general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects; and these rules are form'd on the nature of our understanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects (T 149).

But the logical 'ought' principles cannot be applied to regulate our judgments concerning causes and effects, if a mere regularity view of causation is entertained. For, it is only experience that tells us about the constant
conjunction of objects, but the rules are prescribed beforehand to regulate our judgments concerning causes and effects. The logical rules regarding cause-effect relation must, therefore, follow from a prior notion of cause.

Def.2 of the *Enquiry* is roughly parallel to the Def.2 of the *Treatise*, i.e. the definition of cause as a natural relation. Def.2 emphasises the human aspect of the causal relation. Certainly, Hume speaks of the uniformity of sequence, but he also categorically says that the idea of causality involves 'necessity' (*T* 77). Robinson thinks that the 'necessity' involved in causation refers to the 'new relation' of 'constant conjunction' in addition to the two other relations of contiguity and succession. But, whereas 'constant conjunction' is a relation of objects to be perceived in the world outside, 'necessity', as Hume clearly says, is nowhere in the world of objects. It exists in the mind.

necessity is something, that exists in the mind, not in objects; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, consider'd as a quality in bodies. Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but that determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects and from effects to causes, according to their experienc'd union (*T* 165-166).

N.K. Smith rightly points out that the idea of necessary connection, according to Hume, involves two distinct factors,
the factor which conditions it is constancy of conjunction, and the factor which constitutes it is the feeling of necessitated transition. The uniformity view of causality does not do justice to all the sides of Hume's theory, it sees only one aspect of it. Further, the idea of necessary connection is not entirely subjective; one can even say that it is objective in the sense that the factors which condition and constitute it are common to all human beings. The principle of habit or custom which gives rise, owing to constancy of conjunction, to the feeling of necessitated transition is rooted in human nature which is universal. Thus, the objectivity which the idea of causality possesses, on Hume's theory, is, at least, of the same kind as that which Kant could offer; it is the sense in which objectivity is the same as intersubjectivity. Hume only does not assign to it the dignity of being a priori in its origin, but being a naturalist he does base it on a universal principle of human nature.

According to Hume, all our reasonings concerning matters of fact and existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect. Only the causal relation can carry the mind beyond the evidences of memory and senses to the unobserved and the distant. Now, Hume points out that we are able to reason upon the causal relation and draw an inference from it only so far as causal relation is a natural relation, and it produces a union among our ideas.
Thus tho' causation be a philosophical relation, as implying contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction, yet 'tis only so far as it is a natural relation, and produces an union among our ideas, that we are able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it (T 94).

Causal relation being a natural relation, it determines the mind to pass from causes to effects and from effects to causes, according to their experienced union. What we call causal necessity is an idea derived from this impression or determination of the mind to pass from cause to effect or from effect to cause. This mental determination is not the product of reason or of reflection. No amount of reason can help me to conclude that the future will resemble the past, that the unobserved conjunction of objects will be similar to their observed conjunction. When Hume says that no metaphysical or absolute necessity is involved in causal relation, he wants to say that causal necessity is a matter of belief which is non-factual and non-rational.

In the Treatise, Hume raised the 'question concerning the nature of that necessary connexion, which enters into our idea of cause and effect'. For this purpose he proposed to examine two questions:

First, For what reason we pronounce it necessary, that every thing whose existence has a beginning, should also have a cause?
Secondly, Why we conclude, that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects; and what is the nature of that inference we draw from the one to the other, and of the belief we repose in it? (T 78).

The two questions are clearly not identical. For, the first question is about causality as a general maxim and the second question is about particular causes. Yet he conveniently sank the first question in the second one and expressed his hope that 'will, perhaps, be found in the end, that the same answer will serve for both questions' (T 82). He observed that the necessity of a cause to every new production does not come from knowledge or any scientific reasoning. Therefore, he suggested that the necessity of a cause to every new production must necessarily arise from observation and experience. Again, the idea of particular causality does not arise from a source other than experience. Without consulting experience I cannot say what particular causes have what particular effects (T 173). Therefore, Hume examined the field of experience to discover the source of necessity involved in particular causes and also in the general causal maxim. But after examining all the neighbouring fields of experience he came to the conclusion that causal necessity is the necessity of belief and the source of this belief is mind itself. Experience does not produce but conditions this belief. The principle of universal causality works in us as a natural
belief. Because this belief operates in us silently, we try to discover the relation of cause and effect among particular objects. In this matter, it is only experience that tells us which particular causes have which particular effects. Since we believe that every event has a cause, and since experience tells us that one particular type of objects or events are followed by another type of objects or events without fail, we are inclined to believe that they are causally connected, and in future, they will be connected together. That means, the ultimate source of necessity is human nature. Belief in universal causality is natural. This natural belief gets particularised in connection with experience of particular objects. Then, if natural belief in causal necessity has to serve as the basis of our reasoning concerning matters of fact, this belief must be operating in all human minds in the same way. If it does not do so, then there can be no objectivity of knowledge or understanding. Since, again, natural belief functions in the same way in all human minds, it is clear that human nature is permanent and universal.
Hume's theory of perception and of the external world has been very little discussed. It seems that it has little influence upon his successors. The theory is stated in the section 'Of scepticism with regard to the senses' of the Treatise. And some additional remarks are also made in the sections, 'Of the modern philosophy' and 'Of the immateriality of the soul'. The cause of this negligence is that when Hume came to write the Enquiry, he reduced those sections of the Treatise to a brief and sketchy summary, and omitted the most interesting passages. Another reason for this negligence is that the conclusion which it reaches is to all appearance purely destructive. Hume concludes his discussion as:

Thus there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses; or more properly speaking, betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect, and those that persuade us of the continu'd and independent existence of body (T 231).

Apparently, Hume did not find any theoretical solution for this opposition. He therefore suggested a practical solution 'carelessness and in-attention' (T 218). This apparently desperate conclusion led the readers to infer that Hume's discussions on the subject of the external world cannot deserve
serious and detailed examination. Modern scholars, however, do not share this view. Even those who prefer the *Enquiries* to the *Treatise* lament over the exclusion of those discussions on perception and of the external world in the *Enquiries*.

The problem of the external world is a direct corollary of the theory of ideas that Hume inherited from the Locke-Berkeley tradition. Locke distinguished sharply between ideas (simple or complex) and objective reality, the external world, which the ideas designate. Ideas are within us, whereas real things are outside of us and possess the powers or qualities which excite our ideas. These powers or qualities include primary and secondary types. The primary qualities of objects are their real qualities. They inhere in and are inseparable from the objects themselves. The objects themselves also produce in us those sensations that are not in the objects at all but constitute the secondary qualities which we associate with them.

Locke attributed cause-and-effect relationships to powers residing in external objects themselves. One object has a power which causes changes in other objects and in perceptions or ideas of them. But cause-effect relationship between unknown 'power' etc. and mind's perception is inconsistent with the empiricistic principle that only sense experience can inform us of the presence of the real. Locke's
idea of a 'basic substance' or power that exists as things-in-themselves is an unprovable assumption. In order to partially remove this inconsistency of Locke, Berkeley denied external substance. But this denial of external substance virtually committed him to solipsism. He, however, managed to escape solipsism by introducing God as the Supreme Substance or Supreme Mind. Hume could not accept the Berkelelian solution of the problem of the external world, as Berkeley supplemented one unprovable assumption by another unprovable assumption about the existence of God as the Supreme Mind. Hume saw no necessity of assuming the existence of any spiritual substance as mind or self or soul. He held that the soul is nothing but a set of ideas, 'a bundle of perceptions'. He did not deem it necessary to explain how there could be such ideas and experiences without a mind or agent to produce them. Accordingly, he was left with the ideas alone. Now it was for Hume to explain how a set of ideas could be treated as the external world, and another set as mind. In the Treatise, he first discussed the question of the external world and then of mind.

Hume began his discussion of the subject of the external world with the famous remark:

We may well ask, what causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings (T 187).
Hume's remark is highly intriguing. Various interpretations are possible as to the sense in which he says we can ask a question about body (what causes induce us ...) and the sense in which he says we cannot ask a question about body (whether there be body or not). Obviously, Hume's further remark that the second question is senseless because 'Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless esteem'd it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations' (T 187), also admits of various interpretations. Let us, for the present, try to follow Hume's own arguments without taking any particular interpretation in mind.

Hume disposed of the second question as senseless, and took up the first question for discussion. He divided the question, 'What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?' into two sub-questions. The first is about the continued existence of material objects and the second is about their distinct existence. The two questions are:
(1) why do 'we attribute a CONTINU'D existence to objects, even when they are not present to the senses'? and
(2) why do 'we suppose them to have an existence DISTINCT from the mind and perception'? (T 188). Hume said that the two questions are closely connected with each other and the decision of one question decides the other (T 188).
For, if objects continue to exist even when they are not perceived, their existence is independent of and distinct from the perception. Hume thought that the reverse is also true, that is, if their existence be independent of the perception and distinct from it, they must continue to exist, even though they be not perceived. It is clear that the independent existence of the body follows from its continued existence. But it is not certain if continued existence of the body follows from its independent existence. Bertrand Russell points out that the objects which are immediately present to the senses are distinct from the mind and yet have only a momentary existence, because of their causal dependence on the bodily state of the percipient. However, as a matter of fact, Hume devoted almost all his attention to the first question, treating the second as secondary to it. Therefore, the illegitimacy of the passage from distinct existence to continued existence does not affect his arguments.

Hume pointed out that our senses cannot give rise to the notion of continued existence of their objects, for senses cease their operations from time to time. So bodies do not depend upon the sentient mind for their existence. If we suppose that senses are capable of informing us of the continuing existence of objects which are not present to the senses, then it would be to suppose them to continue to operate after they have ceased to operate.
Hume was impressed by the interrupted and fragmentary character of human sense-experience. He said that in every moment our sense-impressions are our only data. Yet we believe, in spite of their interruptedness, they somehow manifest to us a world of continuously existing bodies, which retain their identity through time and persist in their 'operations' both when we are sensing and when we are not.

There are three kinds of impressions transmitted by the senses: (1) those of figures, bulk, motion and solidity; (2) those of colours, tastes, sounds etc.; (3) the pains and pleasures. For the vulgar, impressions of the first and second groups alone have distinct, continued existence; the impressions of the third group are regarded merely as perceptions, and therefore as interrupted and dependent existents. Philosophers agree with the vulgar's view of perceptions belonging to this third group. They differ only in extending it likewise to the impressions of the second group. Hume maintained that for the senses, all three types of impression are on precisely the same footing.

Upon the whole, then, we may conclude, that as far as the senses are judges, all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence (T 193).

All sense-impressions are of the same kind; they have 'internal and perishing existences' (T 194). Yet philosophers
and vulgar alike identify some of the impressions as material objects having continued and independent existence and believe them to be so. While the vulgar never questions this belief, the philosopher feels the necessity of accounting for it. Philosophical reflections show that there is a manifest contradiction between the supposition that perceptions are the only objects and the belief that material objects continue to exist. Philosophers, therefore, reject the supposition as false, and supplement it by a new supposition. The philosopher's supposition is that there is a distinction between perception and the real object. The real object stands out there, but is unknown and unknowable. It is able to cause perceptions in us, and in so far as those perceptions are involuntary and forceful, we ascribe them to material objects. The philosopher's new supposition makes perceptual belief a cognitive, judgmental or rational belief. But Hume argues that reason is nohow the origin of perceptual belief. Philosopher's arguments are known but to very few, but children, peasants and the greatest part of mankind are induced to attribute objects to some impressions, and deny them to others. Moreover, the argument from the relation of cause and effect clearly fails to prove the existence of object as independent of perceptions. Belief in the continued existence of material body follows upon the supposition that our perceptions are the only
objects, and we must account for the origin of belief upon that supposition.

'Tis indeed evident, that as the vulgar suppose their perceptions to be their only objects, and at the same time believe the continu'd existence of matter, we must account for the origin of the belief upon that supposition (T 209).

Now since senses are at variance with the perceptual belief, and since reason does not give rise to such belief, Hume thinks that there is only another faculty of mind, i.e. imagination, which must be the source of perceptual belief (T 193).

Our belief in the continued and independent existence of material body, as Hume's analysis shows, involves two elements — a living belief as feeling and a false opinion, the former prevailing over the latter. Belief is the reality-feeling associated with our present impressions and the ideas of memory. But the opinion that objects continue to exist even when they are not perceived is not derived either from present impressions or from memory. It arises, says Hume, 'from a concurrence of some of their qualities (qualities peculiar to some impressions) with the qualities of the imagination' (T 194). Hume observes that it is neither upon account of the involuntariness of certain impressions, nor
of their force and violence, that we attribute them to a reality, for, our pains, pleasures, passions etc. are quite forceful and involuntary, though we do not place them in the outer world as independent objects. We attribute continued existence to those perceptions which exhibit a peculiar kind of 'constancy' and 'coherence'. Constancy is uniformity in the appearance of perceptions. Certain perceptions do not change their manner and order upon account of any interruptions in my seeing or perceiving them. These uniform perceptions resemble each other in respect of parts and in respect of order, interruptions in perceiving or seeing notwithstanding.

These mountains, and houses, and trees, which lie at present under my eye, have always appear'd to me in the same order; and when I lose sight of them by shutting my eyes or turning my head, I soon after find them return upon me without the least alteration. My bed and table, my books and papers, present themselves in the same uniform manner, and change not upon account of any interruption in my seeing or perceiving them. This is the case with all the impressions, whose objects are suppos'd to have an external existence; and is the case with no other impressions, whether gentle or violent, voluntary or involuntary (T 194-195).

However, constancy is not sufficient to give us the notion of continued existence, for bodies often change their position and qualities, and after a little interruption may
become hardly knowable. And, therefore, we also observe coherence among perceptions.

When I return to my chamber after an hour's absence, I find not my fire in the same situation, in which I left it. But then I am accustom'd in other instances to see a like alteration produc'd in a like time, whether I am present or absent, near or remote. This coherence, therefore, in their changes is one of the characteristics of external objects, as well as their constancy (T 195).

It may be noted that Hume explained coherence and constancy in terms of objects. But, actually, he was after giving an account of our belief in the continued existence of objects by taking sense impressions as our primary data. Therefore, he might have explained constancy and coherence in terms of perceptions, rather than objects. However, it will not be too difficult to explain constancy and coherence in terms of perceptions by taking Hume's own examples into consideration. Thus Price explains the Humean notion of constancy as a continuous series of impressions, $A_1 A_2 A_3 A_4$, all resembling each other very closely. Then we have a gap filled with impressions of an entirely different kind or sometimes with images. Lastly, we have a new lot of impressions, say $A_{10} A_{11} A_{12}$, resembling each other very closely and very similar to the first lot, the ones which preceded
the gap. Price also explains coherence as follows:

two sense-impressions (or two sets of sense-impressions) having a temporal gap between them are said to be **coherent**, if they respectively resemble an earlier and a later part of a continuous series, which have approximately the same length of time between them; that continuous series being of a kind which has frequently been observed in the past, and always in the same order.

Having explained the nature of constancy and coherence of certain impressions, Hume discusses the manner in which those two qualities concur with the qualities of imagination to give rise to the notion of continued existence. Imagination, Hume points out, functions in four different ways.

In the first place, imagination works as a principle of individuation. The idea of the object involves the notion of identity. Hume points out that the identity of the object is opposed to the idea of unity that one single object conveys. It is, again, opposed to the idea of multiplicity that many objects convey. Since, therefore, each impression is unitary, at first sight it seems utterly impossible that impression should be taken for continued objects. But what is apparently impossible becomes possible because imagination is able to disregard multiplicity as a variation in time. This is a kind of fiction for, time, according to Hume's analysis,
is nothing but a succession of perceptions. Yet this fiction of the imagination almost universally takes place; and it is by means of it, that a single object, placed before us, and surveyed for any time without our discovering in it any interruption or variation, is able to give us a notion of identity (T 201).

Thus the principle of individuation is nothing but the invariableness and uninterruptedness of any object, thro' a suppos'd variation of time, by which the mind can trace it in the different periods of its existence, without any break of the view, and without being oblig'd to form the idea of multiplicity or number (T 201).

In the second place, imagination places the mind in a disposition whereupon closely similar but numerically different objects are confounded with identical ones. The smooth passage of the imagination along the ideas of the resembling perceptions makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity.

In the third place, imagination removes the contradiction, and therefore, of that uneasiness of the mind arising out of the discrepancies between its propension to ascribe perfect identity to the object and the interrupted manner of the appearance of the object. The mind is induced to ascribe a perfect identity to the perceptions. But the interrupted manner of their appearance makes it consider them as so many
resembling, but still distinct beings which appear after certain intervals. The perplexity arising from this contradiction produces a propension to unite these broken appearances by the fiction of a continued existence. When the exact resemblance of our perceptions makes us ascribe to them an identity, we remove the seeming interruption by feigning a continued being, which may fill those intervals and preserve a perfect and entire identity to our perceptions (T 208).

In the fourth place, imagination induces the mind to repose belief in the reality of the material object by means of the present impressions of the memory.

Our memory presents us with a vast number of instances of perceptions perfectly resembling each other, that return at different distances of time, and after considerable interruptions. This resemblance gives us a propension to consider these interrupted perceptions as the same; and also a propension to connect them by a continu'd existence, in order to justify this identity, and avoid the contradiction, in which the interrupted appearance of these perceptions seems necessarily to involve us. Here then we have a propensity to feign the continu'd existence of all sensible objects; and as this propensity arises from some lively impressions of the memory, it bestows
a vivacity on that fiction; or in other words, makes us believe the continu'd existence of body (T 208-9).

Hume discusses not only the causes of the origin of our opinion of continued existence of material body, he also raises the question of its validity. He points out that very little reflection is sufficient to make us perceive the fallacy of the opinion (T 210).

When we press one eye with a finger, we immediately perceive all the objects to become double, and one half of them to be remov'd from their common and natural position. But as we do not attribute a continu'd existence to both these perceptions, and as they are both of the same nature, we clearly perceive, that all our perceptions are dependent on our organs, and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits. This opinion is confirm'd .... by an infinite number of other experiments of the same kind; from all which we learn, that our sensible perceptions are not possest of any distinct or independent existence (T 210-11).

Thus while constancy and coherence of perceptions induce the imagination to ascribe a continued existence to them, double images and the rest make us perceive that those perceptions do not continue to exist when unperceived. Therefore, the foundation of the opinion of continued existence is but error and falsehood; it is not justifiable in any way.
'Tis a gross illusion to suppose, that our resembling perceptions are numerically the same; and 'tis this illusion, which leads us into the opinion, that these perceptions are uninterrupted, and are still existent, even when they are not present to the senses (T 217).

The opinion of continued existence is false, and yet belief as a strong feeling prevails over that false opinion, and the greatest part of the mankind for the most part of their lives are persuaded that there is both an external and an internal world. Therefore, Hume concludes that our belief in the existence of material body is fundamental, which no amount of philosophy can justify and no amount of scepticism can overthrow. The belief embraces a false opinion, and even though philosophy proves the fallacy of that opinion, it has no control over belief. In no way can philosophy persuade the mind to withdraw its belief in the reality of the external object.

Let us now turn to the questions with which Hume started his enquiry. Hume formulated two questions — What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? and Whether there be body or not? He claimed to have discussed the causes and the rationality of perceptual belief within the purview of the first question, and left the second question pass by, as Nature did not allow him to raise the question. But, in fact, he did not discuss the causal questions of
belief. Causal relation, according to Hume, is a relation between objects and events in the material world. We discover that relation after we have observed the objects in regular succession. But here Hume raised questions about the causes of belief in the existence of material body. Perceptual belief is the very condition for the possibility of the experience of the material object. Without that belief, the material object is just a series of discontinuous perceptions. Thus in the name of causal enquiry, Hume really conducted a transcendental enquiry into the a priori conditions of the possibility of perception, to use a Kantian language. In Hume's own language, it is an enquiry into the 'secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations'\* Kant's transcendental enquiries led him to necessarily postulate the 'thing-in-itself', in addition to the forms and faculties of the transcendental mind which make experience of Nature possible. Hume, however, was not concerned with the real existence of the object. He pointed out that our belief in the existence of the object is unquestionable, but the real existence of an object beyond or behind the object of experience is a questionable assumption. So far as our belief in the existence of the outside world is concerned, it is perfectly compatible with & either the existence or non-existence of a real world. Even if such a world exists, mind can find no access to it, for Nature has
not made it that much equipped. Thus it is meaningless to ask, whether there be a (real) body or not. All that we can do is to enquire into those functionalities of the mind which lead us to believe that the material body is there outside.

Hume's analysis of belief in the existence of the material body shows that imagination as the faculty of mind is primarily involved in sense perception. The immediate data presented before the mind are discrete sense impressions, and imagination supplies to them the notion of continued existence to produce the material object of sense perception. H.H.Price points out that the imagination to which Hume granted its role in sense perception is transcendental imagination. In Price's opinion, though Hume never really succeeded in bringing out the distinction between the empirical imagination and transcendental imagination, as Kant did later, the distinction is implicitly contained in Hume's theory of perception, causality, and personal identity. In fact, in a Note to Section IX of Book I, Part III of the Treatise, Hume referred to the two different senses in which the word 'imagination' had been used in his system. In one sense imagination is opposed to memory and in another sense it is opposed to reason. Imagination, as opposed to memory, lacks in belief, but imagination in the second sense is not opposed to belief. However, the primary difference between empirical imagination and transcendental imagination is that, mind in employing the former faculty enjoys freedom to a large extent,
but the latter faculty works by its natural propensity alone. The natural propensity of imagination is irresistible. Again, the former faculty is 'weak' and not absolutely necessary. But the latter faculty is 'strong' and is absolutely necessary. In the absence of the latter faculty, human nature must ruin and go to perish. The similarity between the two faculties is also noticeable. Both are fiction producing faculties, and are equally non-rational. The notion of continued existence produced by transcendental imagination is a fiction, but it is a natural fiction, and a very useful one.

However, transcendental imagination is not all that is involved in sense perception, for in perceiving the material object, mind also utilises the services of memory. In Section III, Part I, Book I of the Treatise, Hume said that the function of memory is to repeat impressions as ideas in their original order, but in sense perception memory is said to repeat impressions as impressions. Where memory functions in repeating impressions as ideas we are sensible to our memory experience. But in sense perception, we are sensible neither to the operation of the memory nor to that of the imagination, and yet they work. In sense perception, the material object appears to be the given object. But analysis shows that the given object is really a constituted object, and in the process of that constitution both the faculties
of memory and imagination have their roles to play. Thus by the same token of arguments which makes imagination involved in perception a transcendental imagination, memory involved in perception must also be regarded as transcendental memory.

But that is not the end of the story. Perception of the material object involves belief in the reality of the object. Imagination in every sense is a fiction-producing faculty. It does not give us belief. 'But as we here not only feign but believe this continu'd existence, the question is, from whence arises such a belief' (T 208). Both sense impressions and memory involve belief. Belief, as is accompanied by sensation and memory, is transferred to the related idea by the mechanism of association. Thus belief in the reality of the material object must be originally found either in the impressions of senses or of memory. In Book I, Part III, Sections VI and X, Hume explained belief as a lively idea or the vivacity of perception. But perceptive belief is somewhat different. It involves an 'assent' or 'opinion' concerning external existence of the material body. The problem with Hume is that he made an over-economy of concepts. He used the same concept all through even though he used it in distinct senses in different places. This is exactly the case with his use of the concept of belief. N.K. Smith rightly points out that, belief of which Hume speaks in the context of his theory of the external world, is natural belief. Hume did not enquire
into the cause of this belief, rather he tried to ascertain the manner in which natural belief operates in us. Hume's analysis ultimately shows that natural belief operates in the mind in close association with its faculties of transcendental memory and transcendental imagination. Behind the apparently given object of perception, mind is involved in it in a very complex manner indeed. It functions through imagination, memory and belief, all of which are prior to the perception of the material object. 'Seeing is believing' — is the popular proverb. The proverb is not probably true, and Hume certainly did not believe it to be true. Belief is a precondition for seeing and other kinds of perceiving.

Hume's theory of perception and of the external world, then, we see, maintains strict metaphysical neutrality with regard to the real existence of the material body. On the other hand, it enunciates those transcendental functionalities of the mind which concur with the qualities of sensations to make possible perception as well as the object of perception i.e., the material body. Thus Hume's theory of perception and his theory of the external world coalesce. However, one may wonder if Hume could do justice to the subject of perception and of the external world without ontology. Sense perception informs us of the existence of the material body which lies out there. According to our ordinary way of thinking, the 'out there' of the object consists in its
spatial position. But, space, according to Hume, has not its independent reality; it is the manner of distribution of the physical objects. Thus the existence of the object is a condition for the possibility of the perception of space, and not the reverse. But here the question is raised about the possibility of perception and the object of perception. Sensations, according to Hume, do not have either spatial or temporal properties. Therefore, 'constancy' and 'coherence', the manifest properties of sensations, do not even obliquely make possible spatial reference. Again, though the vulgar does not make a distinction between perception and the object of perception, he learns to distinguish the material object from his mental image by living in concourse with others. Because the vulgar lives in association with others (including other animals), he understands that the world is the public world. I see the table before me. Others can also see the same table, and we can reach a common understanding of the existence of the table out there. It is this necessary reference to others that makes the material world fully objective. But Hume's theory of perception makes no reference to the other. Hume, of course, says that human nature (also animal nature) is everywhere the same. Thus under normal circumstances every mind interprets the sensations in the same way. But sensations are private. They have, as Hume says, 'internal and perishing existences'. Thus a common ground
for perception is not available in sensations. Again, if each mind is regarded as a separate 'theatre' or a separate 'parliament', as Hume says, then the common ground for perception is not available also on the side of the subject. Yet a common ground is required to account for the public object given in ordinary perception. Probably Kant noticed the shortcomings of Hume's theory of perception and of the external world, and he filled up the lacunae by introducing 'the self-function in general' (the 'I think' or the 'transcendental unity of apperception') and the 'thing-in-itself' by way of 'necessary presuppositions'. But that is not all. Kant also observed that space is a prior condition for the perception of the material body. Therefore, he transferred space from Nature to the mind-in-general as the a priori form of sensation. In this way Hume began the study of perception which Kant later completed. But if the 'necessary presuppositions' of the Kantian system inevitably fill up the lacunae of the Humean system concerning body, then ironically enough, the unknown and the unknowable of the Lockean system, which Hume had originally rejected, got back into it. Probably, Hume noticed the difficulties of his theory of perception and of the external world, and that is why he left the subject out of discussion in the Enquiry. But that is a matter of conjecture.