CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION
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Conclusion

(I)

As we have discussed in Chapter I, Hume worked in philosophy with a programme in hand. The most important part of his programme was to reform the moral sciences and to reorganise them into the form of a system. The foundation of this system, as Hume conceived it, should lie in a new and scientific theory of mind. Throughout Book I of the Treatise he conducted epistemological enquiries and discussed certain ontological questions in the light of his epistemology, all of which, he believed, culminate in a new theory of mind and give in some particulars 'a different turn to the speculations of philosophers' (T I iv 7). But he had difficulties in formulating his theory of mind in clear terms. In this concluding part of our work, we shall try to see through Hume's difficulties and also to formulate a theory of mind which his teachings seem to entail. But before we deal with Hume, we shall make a brief excursion on some of the traditional systems dealing with the nature of mind. This, we believe, will help us grasp the striking features of Hume's theory of mind better,
for, despite the fact that Hume made little references to other philosophers' works, his theory of mind offers challenge to the tradition on many important issues.

In the tradition of western philosophy, the concepts 'soul', 'self' and 'mind' have been used freely interchangeably to make them represent mental or moral nature as distinguished from physical nature. The tradition discussed three different aspects of mind. They are: (1) mind as substance, (2) mind as distinguished from the body, and (3) mind as a composition of faculties. The first and the foremost of all important philosophers to have discussed all the three aspects of mind is Plato. Philosophical discussions that followed in the history of western philosophy make direct or indirect reference to Plato.

(II)

Plato's theory of self or mind is a counterpart of his theory of knowledge, which is, again, connected as parts of the larger ontological question about the nature of the universe. His system incorporates and transforms the doctrines of his predecessors. Plato shares the scepticism of the Sophists regarding knowledge of sense appearances, and agrees with Socrates that genuine knowledge is always by concepts. He accepts Heraclitus' doctrine that the world is in constant
change, but restricts its application to the world of sensuous appearances. With the Eleatics, he agrees that the real world is unchangeable, but substitutes for Parmenides' unchanging being, his world of eternal ideas. With the atomists, he agrees that reality is manifold, but replaces a plurality of atoms by a plurality of forms or ideas. With Anaxagoras, he assumes that mind is a dynamic factor in the world, and finally he agrees with nearly all Greek philosophers that reality is basically rational.

If we rely solely on sense perception and opinion, Plato argues, then the Sophists are quite right in their contention that there can be no genuine knowledge. Sense perception does not reveal the true reality of things, but gives us mere appearance. Yet opinion may be true or false; even when it is proved true, it rests on persuasion or feeling and hence has no value whatever. As mere opinion it is not knowledge, since, even when it happens to be true, it cannot justify itself. Genuine knowledge, on the other hand, which is based on reason, can authenticate itself. The great majority of men think without knowing why they think as they do. They do not know why they act as they do; they act instinctively, according to impulse, custom or habit like ants, bees, and wasps. Such actions may sometimes be found to be profitable but they are devoid of virtue. Thus, according to Plato, for having knowledge we must be able to
go beyond sense perception. The advance from sense perception and opinion to knowledge is accomplished by dialectic. The dialectical method consists, first, in the comprehension of scattered particulars into one idea, and second, in the division of the idea into species, that is, in the processes of generalisation and classification. In this way alone can there be clear and consistent thinking; we pass from concept to concept, upward and downward, generalising and particularising, combining and dividing, synthesising and analysing, carving out concepts as a sculptor carves a beautiful figure out of a block of marble. Dialectic is the art of thinking in concepts; concepts, and not sensations or images, constitute the essential objects of thought. We cannot, for example, call a man just or unjust unless we have a notion, or concept, of justice, unless we know what justice is; such knowledge alone enables us to determine whether a man is just or unjust.

But, Plato warns us, the concept or idea – of justice, for example – does not have its origin in experience; we do not derive it by abstraction from particular cases of justice. These are merely the means of clarifying and making explicit the concept of justice which already existed obscurely and implicitly in the soul. Experience is not the source of our concepts, for nothing in experience, in the world of sense, exactly corresponds to the concepts of truth,
beauty, goodness. No particular object is absolutely beautiful or good, yet we approach the sense-world with ideals or standards of the true, the beautiful and the good. In addition to these value-concepts, Plato also came to regard mathematical concepts and certain logical notions, or categories, such as being and non-being, identity and difference, unity and plurality, as inborn, or a priori.

Conceptual knowledge, then, is the only genuine knowledge: that was the teaching of Socrates which Plato adopted as the starting point for his inquiries. Conceptual knowledge presupposes the reality of corresponding ideas or abstract objects. Truth is the knowledge of reality, of being as such, of that which is. The world perceived by our senses is not the true world; it is a changing, fleeting world, one thing today, something else tomorrow. Heraclitus correctly described the world of sense, but this world is, according to Plato, mere appearance, illusion. True being is something permanent, unchangeable, eternal— it has the characteristics of Parmenides' being. In order to have genuine knowledge, we must know the permanent and unchangeable essence of things. Thought alone, conceptual thought, can grasp eternal and changeless being; it knows that which is, that which persists, that which remains one and the same in all change and diversity, namely, the essential forms of things.
Plato's theory of knowledge is summarised in the famous figure of the divided line at the end of Book VI, 509-11, of the Republic. A vertical straight line is divided into four segments, each of which represents a level of knowledge; each of the four types of knowledge has its peculiar object and appropriate method of inquiry.

The Form of the Good

Knowledge
- Dialectic
- Science
- Forms
- Mathematical
- Concepts

Opinion
- Belief
- Guesswork
- Material things
- Reflections and images
- Becoming
- Non-being

The line in the above chart is at first divided into two main segments representing knowledge and its relation to opinion. The lowest portion represents mere guesswork or superstition and its objects are shadows, images, and reflections of things - the mere fleeting appearances with which our senses present us. The next represents our common-sense beliefs about material objects and the way they ordinarily behave. These two together comprise the sphere of opinion the object of which is Becoming. Next comes the realm of mathematics -
scientific knowledge, which starts from unquestioned hypotheses and employs sensible objects (such as lines and figures) but which is not concerned with these for their own sakes but only with the ideas they represent. Finally, at the top is the science of dialectic which pursues knowledge of forms as such, critically examining all hypotheses and dispensing with the help of sensible representations altogether. These two sections constitute knowledge proper whose object is Being or Reality, and which culminates in the knowledge of the Good.

Plato's theory of knowledge, as we see, distinguishes between opinion and genuine knowledge. In sensation and opinion, the soul is dependent on the body, but the soul, in so far as it beholds the world of ideas, is pure reason. The body is an impediment to knowledge, from which the soul must free itself in order to behold truth in its purity. The copies of the pure ideas, as they exist in the phenomenal world, merely incite the rational soul to think; sensation occasions and provokes the apprehension of ideas, but does not produce it. The soul must somehow possess an apprehension of ideas prior to its contact with the world of experience. Plato teaches that the soul has viewed such ideas before and has forgotten them. The imperfect copies of ideas in the world of sense suggest to the soul its past, remind it of what it has seen before. Thus all knowledge is reminiscence
and all learning is a reawakening. The myth of the charioteer in the Phaedrus conveys the insight that the soul must have existed prior to its union with the body; the human soul, then, is, in part, pure reason, and this rational part is its most characteristic aspect. When the soul enters a body, there is added to it a mortal and irrational part, which fits it for existence in the sense-world. The irrational is further divided into the spirited part and desire. The union with the body is a hindrance to the intellectual aspirations of the soul, the presence of impulses and desires is a hindrance to the ethical supremacy of reason, which, as Plato shows in his ethics, reason itself must seek to overcome.

Plato's psychology is dualistic in its separation of the soul into a higher, rational, and a lower, irrational part, but since the irrational is further divided into the spirited and the appetitive, his division of the soul is in fact tripartite. Indeed, the meaning of Plato's comparison of the soul to 'the combined power of a team of winged horses and their charioteer' is transparent enough. It is the familiar tripartite soul, in which the charioteer represents the reason, the nobler horse the passionate element, and the baser horse the physical appetite.

The rational faculty is primarily an intellectual one, but Plato seems to include within it such traits of character
as gentleness, humility and reverence, which, though not purely intellectual, are associated with a philosophic disposition.

The spirited faculty is an executive faculty somewhat resembling the will, but it is misleading to equate it with the will as the faculty of decision and free choice. The spirited faculty resembles the will only in being dynamic and executive. Plato embraces within the spirited faculty such emotions, sentiments and traits of character as ambition, anger, resentment and righteous indignation.

The appetitive faculty corresponds very closely to the term 'desire' in modern psychology. Among the bodily appetites listed by Plato are desire for pleasure, wealth, food, shelter and other bodily satisfactions. Pleasure is not exclusively appetitive; there is a kind of pleasure accompanying the exercise of each of the faculties of the soul.

There are controversies among scholars about the significance of Plato's tripartite division of the soul. In many places, Plato's writings suggest that the embodied soul is composed of three 'parts' of which only reason is immortal. That means, the essential soul is reason only. When it is incarnated in the body, there is added to it two other 'parts', namely, spirit and appetite. But in many other places, Plato's writings suggest that the soul in essence is simple, and only
appears composite as the result of its association with the body. Commenting on the tripartite division of the soul, as explained by Plato in the Republic, Morris Cornford says that the three parts of the soul are to be thought of as manifestations of a single force or fund of energy, called Eros, directed through divergent channels towards various ends. Frank Thilly suggests that Plato's tripartite division of the soul is a form of faculty psychology. The soul functions through its faculties, which are to some extent separate and distinct principles. The soul may be pulled in opposite directions by the two, as when reason restrains thirst when only poisonous drink is obtainable, or the spirited faculty rebels against morbid bodily appetites. The observable conflict between the faculties within the soul of each one of us is conclusive evidence of their distinctness. But Plato's separation of the faculties is not so extreme as to preclude their interplay and cooperation. The spirited faculty is frequently the ally of reason in the control of the appetites, and even our natural desires may be in conformity with reason: for example, a moderate desire for food and drink. The soul, despite the plurality and separation of its faculties, possess a unity and indivisibility.

The soul, then, according to Plato's analysis, consists of three 'parts' 'powers' or 'faculties'. It may be debated
whether any one of the three 'parts' or all of them belong to the essence of the soul-substance which survives death. But the more important point about Plato's analysis of the incarnated soul is the relationship that obtains between the three 'parts' of the soul. According to Plato, reason is the noblest element of the soul. It is not that reason always prevails over spirit and appetite, but that it should always prevail over them in a just soul. Reason should prevail over senses etc., in order to have knowledge. Again, it should prevail over bodily appetite, will, etc., for virtuous conduct. Thus Plato accepts the supremacy of reason in matters of both knowledge and conduct. Reason is the eye of the soul. It is capable of beholding or intuiting the object of knowledge and know them, if the bodily senses do not blur its vision. Similarly, pure reason can visualise the good of the individual and guide his conduct accordingly.

Another most important feature of the incarnated soul, according to Plato, is its struggling nature. In the Republic, Plato recognises that conflicts occur in the soul itself, and this internal conflict of the soul is also recognised in the Sophists. Therefore, attention is directed to their regulations rather than suppression. Through regulation of the lower elements of the soul by its higher element, that is, reason, can a person be truly wise and virtuous.
Aristotle, to a very great extent follows Plato in his conception of the human soul. The soul of man resembles the plant soul and the animal soul in some ways. Like the plant soul it controls the lower vital functions and like the animal soul it possesses the faculties of perception, the so-called common sense, imagination, memory, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion. Sense perception is a change produced in the soul by things perceived, through the mediation of the sense organs. The different senses inform the soul of the qualities of things; the common sense, whose organ is the heart, is the meeting place of all the senses; by means of it we combine the qualities furnished by the special senses and obtain the total picture of an object. It also gives us a clear picture of qualities - such as number, size, shape, motion, and rest - which are common to all the senses. The common sense also forms generic images, composite images, and has the powers of retention or memory and associative thinking. The feelings of pleasure and pain are referred to perception; pleasure arises when functions are furthered, pain when they are impeded. These feelings arouse desire and aversion, which alone cause the body to move. Desire arises only on the presentation of a desirable object, one considered by the soul as good. Desire accompanied by deliberation is called rational will.
The human soul has another faculty by which it can think the concept of universal and necessary essences of things. The soul perceives the sensible objects and it beholds the concepts by reason. Reason is, potentially, whatever the soul can conceive or think; conceptual thought is actualised reason. Aristotle distinguishes active or creative reason and passive reason to determine how reason can think concepts. Creative reason is pure actuality. Its concepts are actualised by it, the essences are directly cognised—here thought and its objects are one. It resembles Plato's pure soul which contemplates the world of ideas. In passive reason, concepts are merely potential; passive reason is the matter on which creative reason, the form, acts; the concepts which are potential in passive reason are made real or actual by creative reason.

Aristotle's general philosophical distinction between form and matter when applied to the mental world seems to require him to distinguish between the formal and material phases of reason, between active and passive, actual and potential reason: the concepts which are potential in passive reason are actual in creative reason. Creative reason is not tainted by sense; it presumably exists prior to both the body and the sensuous soul; it is absolutely immaterial, imperishable, not bound to a body, and therefore immortal. The soul, however, does not consist of reason alone; it has an
irrational as well as rational part - the irrational part includes feeling, desires, appetites. With these irrational elements of the soul reason should cooperate in order to realise its purpose. However, in a well ordered soul, reason should prevail over the irrational elements of the soul. Genuine knowledge consists not in mere acquaintance of facts, but in knowing their reasons or causes, why they cannot be otherwise than as they are. In this matter, it is only reason that helps the soul. Again,

Virtue is a disposition, or habit, involving deliberate purpose or choice, consisting in a mean that is relative to ourselves, the mean being determined by reason, or as a prudent man would determine it. 6

Thus, Aristotle is in substantial agreement with Plato in maintaining the view that reason is a superior element of the soul; it is not that reason always prevails over passions, emotions, beliefs, etc., but that it should always prevail over them for the sake of knowledge and for a good conduct.

(IV)

Descartes brought to completion, or very near to completion, the dualism of mind and matter which began with Plato and Aristotle and was developed by Christian philosophy,
for a different reason, of course. The Cartesian system presents two parallel but independent worlds, that of mind and matter, each of which can be studied without reference to the other. Corresponding to this ontological dualism between mind and matter, the Cartesian system also presents an epistemological dualism between knowledge and experience. Knowing is a function of the self's intrinsic nature and is logically independent of the knower's body and its activities. By pure thought alone do we acquire knowledge of the nature and existence of a physical world and by pure thought too do we come to know its nature and existence to be independent of our minds. Never do we perceive the natural world or bodies that people it; we perceive only that which represents, and indeed mainly misrepresents in sensory media, that world and its bodies. But though sensory materials are logically independent of the materials of knowledge, since they contribute nothing that is even partly constitutive of our knowledge, they are not psychologically independent of it. Descartes conceives the dualism of knowledge and sensory experience to be so radical that he does not hesitate to say that if our self had existed apart from our body, and therefore apart from any sensory experience, we could still quite well come to a knowledge of the universe by the self's unaided operations. The fact remains, however, that the self known to each of us is not a disembodied one, and Descartes is well aware of the psychological dependence of the self's
activity on that of its body. Thus sensory experience, a
product of wholly psychological causes, serves as the occa-
sion on which the self that is aware of the confused idea,
its product, initiates its characteristic activity in res-
pect of that obscure content, seeking to replace it by a
distinct idea on which judgments that are certain may be
based and knowledge so attained. Sense experience, then,
has no direct epistemological value. Its value is, in a
wide sense, utilitarian and biological. It is instrumental
in supplying the occasion on which intellect becomes acti-
vely engaged in, say, formulating some hypotheses or solving
some problems. Again, sense experience is instrumental in a
biological sense. In fact, its primitive and principal func-
tion, like that of instinct, is not knowledge but adaptation.
It enables animals, man and non-human, to control their body
or animate machine, and hence their behaviour. Though sense
experience is sometimes instrumentally useful in acquiring
knowledge, it more often is not; and never is it, even partly,
constitutive of that knowledge. Science is developed always
from clear conception, never from unclear appearances.

Plato pointed out that there is something divine in man,
that is, reason. Reason is regarded by him as the 'eye of
the soul'. Reason intuits truth and preserves it in its
heart while it passes through a cycle of births and deaths.
The incarnated soul is not all reason, yet, it is distinguished
from all other elements of the incarnated soul. Even in an incarnated condition, it can recapitulate or recollect the truth that it had perceived in its past and past lives. Knowledge consists in recollecting the latent truth of the soul by the activity of unaided pure reason. The influence of Platonism in respect of the analysis of soul and of the mechanism of knowledge is obvious in the Cartesian system.

Descartes conceives of mind or soul as *res cogitans*. I have a clear and distinct idea of myself in so far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing. Hence, it is certain that I, that is, my mind, through which I am what I am, is entirely and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without it. I can clearly and distinctly conceive of myself as entire, without the faculties of imagining and perceiving; but I cannot conceive these without conceiving myself, that is to say, without an intelligent substance in which they reside. Imagining and perception are, therefore, distinct from myself, as modes are from things. In thought, however, Descartes includes will, and evidently also such higher emotions as are not the result of the union of body and mind. He tells us in his *Discourse on Method* that a thinking thing is one that doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, imagines as well as feels. But other forms of feeling, emotions and sensations etc., are placed on the side of the body and, as we have already pointed out, according to Descartes, they have no roles to play in human understanding.
What particularly attracted Descartes to this extreme dualism of materiality and mentality was that it left nature free for the mechanical explanations of natural science. Mind is eliminated from nature and given an independent territory of its own. Physics is allowed to go its own way, all purposes or final causes are banished from its domain. A division is made between mind and body similar to the division made between theology and philosophy in days of scholasticism. This teaching Descartes applies to the entire organic world, even to the human body. The human body is, like the animal body, a machine. All the functions of the body follow naturally, in this machine, from the arrangement of the organs — as necessarily as the movements of a watch follow from its pendulum and wheels. It is not necessary to assume the presence in man of a sensitive soul or any principle of vital motion other than the blood and the animal spirits. Descartes repudiates the vitalism of Aristotle and the schoolmen, and offers instead a mechanical theory of organic nature. If these two substances of mind and body exclude one another, it follows then that there can be no interaction between them: mind cannot cause changes in the body and body cannot cause changes in the mind. Descartes, however, does not consistently draw the consequences of his premises. There are certain facts which point to an intimate union between body and mind in man: appetites of hunger
and thirst; emotions and passions of the mind which are not exclusively mental affections; sensations of pain, color, light, sound, etc. These we cannot refer to the body alone or to the soul alone, but must explain by the close and intimate union of the two. There is a considerable discussion in the Meditations as to why the mind feels 'sorrow' when the body is thirsty. Though at times Descartes accepts the theory of causal interaction to explain the fact yet the correct Cartesian answer was that the body and the mind were like two clocks and that when one indicated 'thirst' the other indicated 'sorrow'.

Descartes accepted a mechanical theory of bodily states, but in his explanation of soul or mind he fell back upon the tradition set up by Plato and Aristotle. The Platonic idea that knowledge is recapitulation of the truth contained in the soul before its incarnation in the body reappears in Descartes in the form of his theory of innate ideas. Descartes said that as mathematics can give clear and certain knowledge, also we can get certain knowledge from philosophy if we can follow the proper method. Certain knowledge, according to him, cannot spring from the senses, for the senses do not reveal what things are in themselves, but only how they affect us. He said that if we cannot derive true knowledge from sense experience, if genuine knowledge is the result of reasoning from certain basal concepts and principles,
these must be inherent in the mind itself - i.e., innate or a priori. By innate knowledge he means at times ideas or truths impressed upon the mind, principles which the soul finds in itself, and at other times, the native capacity of the soul to produce such knowledge in the course of human experience.

Though mind works according to its innate tendencies, capacities and ideas, it also enjoys basic freedom which is not to be found in the mechanical world composed of bodies. Soul's freedom is the freedom of will. Freedom of will, for Descartes, amounts to our capacity to assent to, or to reject, what is proposed to the self for cognitive determination. The self may be modified or even dominated by its passions which owe their origin to the actions of the body, but is nevertheless competent to resist and act counter to their inclinations. For want of such freedom of will Descartes denies reason or mind to the animals. Animals have no passions even, for passions are passions of the soul, which, from another perspective, are actions of the body. In the case of animals there are only actions of the body which are guided by mechanical laws.

In this way, Descartes completely separated mind from the physical world to which our body belongs, and the animal world to which our living body is an analogue. The soul is not identical either with the non-living body or with the
living body. Quite obviously, the death of the body cannot possibly cause the non-existence of the soul it embodies. Nor can the self cease to exist 'on its own account', as the body does, for dissolution of the body occurs through partition, but the self has no parts into which it could be dissevered. Bodies, human and non-human, are susceptible of decay or partition precisely because they are not substances: selves are incapable of it, precisely because they are. (While there is a plurality of substantival selves, there is no corresponding plurality of substantival bodies, but only one substance, which is all matter and of which particular bodies are modes). The soul is self-subsistent, independent of the body, nobler than the latter, and immortal. At all moments of our conscious life, we are most intimately concerned with the soul and are absolutely sure of its existence as a simple thinking substance. It is because of soul's activities, which are pure thinking, that we have knowledge, and again, it is because of soul's freedom that we have a moral life.

(V)

The traditional conception of man as a privileged creature runs on a single assumption: man has a special means to live by; he has a soul, a special substance, a special reality, the knower and the bearer of moral virtues. Truth resides in
the soul. Thus to realise the soul is to realise the truth, and vice versa. The assumption gave rise to the dogmatic belief that there was nothing much to learn from physical nature, and that, in fact, we knew more of ourselves than of the external physical world including our bodies with which we live. But with the progress of science it began to be evident that our knowledge of physical nature was fast getting ahead of our knowledge of moral nature. It was further evident that our knowledge of moral nature could not be improved unless we followed the methods of studying physical nature. But if we stick to our assumption that man is the soul incarnated, and that the soul is a special substance unlike physical nature, then the methods of studying physical nature could not be applied to the study of man. As a consequence, philosophers began to see the traditional notion of soul-substance with suspicion, and in course of time, the notion came under heavy attack.

So far as science is concerned, it studies Nature not with reference to its essence or substance but with reference to its manifold effects, its different patterns of behaviour. A scientific study of man was possible, if, of course, he too was considered a part of Nature, and not a privileged being by dint of his soul. In that case, man was to be studied as a creature born for actions, and as a creature of behaviour-patterns. But if we take his behaviour, action etc. into consideration, then emotions, passions, sentiments etc. come into
consideration along with his thoughts and reason, which, too, are conceived as behaviours. What was, therefore, necessary was not that man should be reduced to physical nature, but that the notion of a mysterious soul-substance be removed from his essential nature.

The first important philosopher to question the view that a self is a substance was Locke. He did not question this view because he doubted the existence of 'immaterial substance'. Throughout his discussion of personal identity Locke implies that when a person thinks there is always a substance that does the thinking. And he thought it 'probable' that a person's consciousness 'is annexed to, and the affection of, one individual immaterial substance'\textsuperscript{10}, i.e. that when one and the same person thinks on two different occasions it is one and the same substance that does the thinking. But his opinion seems to have been that if a person's consciousness is always 'annexed to' one individual substance, this is so only as a matter of contingent fact, not as a matter of logical necessity. Personal identity, while it may be correlated with identity of substance, does not consist in this, and it 'matters not at all', so far as the nature of personal identity is concerned, 'whether it be the same identical substance, which always thinks in the same person'. It is conceivable, Locke thought, that personal identity can be preserved in the
change of immaterial substance, or variety of immaterial substances.¹¹

However, in advancing the view that the identity of person does not involve the identity of immaterial or spiritual substance, Locke seems to have contradicted himself. According to Locke's own admission, 'our idea of soul, as an immaterial spirit, is of a substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting motion in body by will or thought.'¹² Again, Locke defines 'person' as meaning

a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.¹³

Now, if person are thinking things and thinking things are spiritual substances, then persons are spiritual substances. Therefore, it is self-contradictory to say that the identity of a person does not involve the identity of a substance.¹⁴

Though Locke upheld the notion of an immaterial substance to which thinking and willing are ascribed, in his discussions on personal identity he silently replaced the notion of immaterial substances by the notion of material body, and set the problem of self-identity or personal identity in a new perspective. Philosophers down the present age have been kept alive to this problem for which Locke did not find a satisfactory solution.
Locke began his discussion by introducing a distinction between 'person', 'man', and 'substance' as three different names standing for three different ideas. The idea of a man, according to Locke, does not consist in the idea of a thinking or rational being alone, but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to it. The notion of person, on the other hand, does not involve the notion of body; the essence of a person lies in 'consciousness' (in the sense of reflective consciousness or self-consciousness). Thus, it is self-consciousness that makes personal identity.

For it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed only to one individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances.

But though the idea of a man differs from the idea of a person, the same being is both a man and a person. A man is a person to himself by virtue of his self-consciousness, and he is a man to others by virtue of the fact that he is a thinking being, and has a body.

Because the same being is a man to others and a person to himself, Locke tried to discover a correlation between them, but he observed that self-consciousness can be preserved despite a change within the body.
Thus we see the substance, whereof personal self consisted at one time, may be varied at another, without the change of personal identity; there being no question about the same person, though the limbs which but now were a part of it, be cut off. 19

He further observed that self-consciousness may be preserved even though the body to which it is annexed is replaced by another body. Again, we can suppose the two distinct incommunicable consciousness acting the same body. 20 'So that self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance, which it cannot be sure of, but only by identity of consciousness'. 21

Thus there is an absence of correlation between 'person' and 'man'. As far as self-consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of the person; it is the same self now that it was then. This view seems to imply that if I am conscious of having done a thing then it was I who did it; if I am not conscious of having done it, then, though it was done, it was not I who did it. Locke admitted that there are difficulties in this account of personal identity; but these difficulties he said must not unduly worry us, since we may trust that God in His goodness, where the happiness or misery of any of his creatures is concerned, will not 'by a fatal error of theirs transfer from one to another that
consciousness which draws reward or punishment with it'.

This appeal to the goodness of God shows that Locke realised the great difficulties which stand in the way of the apprehension of personal identity of rational beings; he further hinted that the difficulties are insuperable.

(V)

Hume's discussions of soul, self or mind have two sides, negative and positive. On its negative, destructive or critical side, Hume disposed of the traditional notion of soul or mind as substance, and discussed the various consequences of this denial. The negative discussions are to be found in Book I, Part IV, Sections V and VI of the Treatise. On its positive side, Hume discussed the various tendencies, dispositions and faculties of the mind throughout Book I of the Treatise and the first Enquiry. The discussions were carried over to other parts of his works also, though he had difficulties in synthesising the results of his two sides of enquiry into a unified theory of mind.

So far as the question of mind as substance is concerned, Hume started his discussion where Locke had left it. Locke indeed presupposed the existence of 'spiritual' or 'immaterial' substances and ascribed mental states and activities to them. But when he came to deal with the
problem of self-identity, he observed that the presupposition of the spiritual substance is not very helpful. According to Locke's study, self-identity consists in self-consciousness, but the consciousness of the same self does not involve the consciousness of an unchanging spiritual substance or of body. 23

Even though Locke demonstrated the uselessness of soul-substance to explain the unity of mental life, he still subscribed to the notion of immaterial substance which is soul or mind.

I agree, the more probable opinion is, that this consciousness is annexed to, and the affection of, one individual immaterial substance. 24

The two considered opinions that 'self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance, which it cannot be sure of, but only by identity of consciousness,' 25 and that 'consciousness is annexed to, and the affection of, one individual immaterial substance', together create difficulties. Locke raised the difficulties and asked his readers to resolve them 'according to their diverse hypotheses'. 26 But it appeared to him that 'the difficulty or obscurity that has been about this matter rather rises from the names ill used, than from any obscurity in things themselves'. 27
In Book I, Part IV, Section V of the Treatise, Hume remarks that there are certain philosophers who are curious reasoners concerning the material or immaterial substance, in which they suppose our perceptions to inhere. With them the idea of substance has received an imaginary clearness, which the evidences of experience do not bear testimony. Thus they make an ill use of the word 'substance'. In Part I, Section VI of Book I of the Treatise, Hume argues that the word 'substance', if it means anything, stands for a complex idea. The idea of substance is nothing but the idea of a set of changing qualities united in the imagination around a fictitious unknown 'something' in which those qualities are supposed to inhere. There are certain qualities of perceptions which incite the imagination to produce the fiction of a permanent substance, but ontologically speaking, there is no separate 'something' over and above those changing qualities.

We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it (T 16).

Philosophers, who fail to see the things pretty deep, take that imaginary 'something' to be something real and the word 'substance' is used to stand for that 'something' not known.
But to be more philosophical about it, either we should say that there is no substance, or we should say that substance is 'nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned them' (T 16). With regard to the question of self or mind, Hume feels, much confusions have been created by philosophers' identification of mind with the unknown substance. Hence he proposes to do away with the notion of soul-substance altogether in the study of mind. The notion of self-substance is not warranted by experience. Experience informs us of the existence of perceptions, each of which is a passing phenomenon. Perceptions are either colour, taste and smell, or emotions, passions etc., none of which is like the permanent substance. We have really no idea of a permanent and simple substance.

Though Hume disposes of the idea of a permanent soul-substance by invoking the authority of, what he regarded as, the 'first principle of the science of human nature', he lingers his discussions to prove the invalidity of the idea of soul-substance by setting the traditional arguments, offered by the various supporters of the notion, against one another.

The traditional philosophers agree in their opinion that there is substance, but they are not unanimous in their
opinions about the nature of the soul-substance. The materialists say that soul is a material substance. The theologians, on the other hand, regard soul as a spiritual substance.

Spinoza, the atheist, argues that there is but one substance, and both mind and matter, or thought and extension, are its modifications. The theologians' arguments destroy the claim of the materialists. If mind is material then it is extended, but perceptions cannot be said to be either above or below, right or left, and so on. The local conjunction of thought with matter is inexplicable. The theologians, too, cannot explain the exact nature of the simple spiritual substance. They may say that the idea of substance is definable, and, therefore, real. Substance is defined as 'something which may exist by itself'. But this definition will fit everything conceivable. For what is clearly and distinctly conceivable can exist by itself, as far as possibility is concerned. Hence the definition will not serve to distinguish substance from accident and soul from perception.

The argument shows that the theory of the soul as an immaterial substance is indistinguishable in the long run from what Hume calls the 'hideous hypothesis' of Spinoza. Spinoza argues that, so far as substance is concerned, we cannot distinguish between a material substance and a spiritual substance. Substance is one which is different from both mind and body. If mind is regarded as a substance then there
can be no way of distinguishing between perception and object. In that case, the immaterial soul must be identical, for instance, with tables and chairs. Spinoza thus argues for the existence of one substance, reducing both mind and body to the modifications of that substance.

Spinoza's arguments against the theologians' idea of spiritual substance seem to Hume to be convincing, but Hume's intention is not to argue in favour of Spinoza's monism. He is engaged in an *argumentum ad hominem*, trying to show that the theological view of the soul is as open to criticism as is the theory of Spinoza. The conclusion which he draws is that 'the question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely unintelligible' (T 250).

Thus Hume finally disposes of the idea of soul or mind as substance as it goes against the first principle, 'no impression no idea', and as no supporter of the view can properly explain the idea of soul-substance. At this point he anticipates an objection. People may ask: If there is no substance, material or spiritual, then where do perceptions stand? Hume points out that it is our curious way of thinking that perceptions, if they exist at all, must exist somewhere; they need a container or a support of some kind. But, to say that perceptions must inhere in something is to beg the question in truth, says Hume; an object can exist and exists nowhere.
and I assert, that this is not only possible, but that the greatest part of beings do and must exist after this manner (I 235).

Though, according to our normal ways of thinking, we ascribe actions to agents and qualities to substances, ontologically speaking, there is really no agent and no substance. An occurrence analysis of actions and qualities is not only possible, but, in Hume's opinion, both actions and qualities exist in that particular manner.

(VII)

In disposing of the theory of soul as substance, Hume derives the satisfaction that he has been able to restrain the theologians who advocate for the immortality of the soul on grounds of the simplicity of soul-substance. Referring to soul's immortality, the theologians create a sense of other worldliness and intimidate our moral senses. But Hume wants to show that morality has its basis in our natural moral senses, and it has no more implications for life-beyond or divine providence. We feel love, affection and obligation towards others, and tend to sympathise them, in the same way as we breathe. These have no connections with the so-called eternal moral qualities like virtues and vices etc., nor do they refer to an immortal soul passing through a cycle of births and deaths.

But, if there is no substance, internal or external, spiritual or material, and if all perceptions are of the
same kind, then do we have any ground for distinguishing between mind and body? On this question, Hume sides with the vulgar belief that there is both an external and internal world (T 218). This belief is so fundamental that a man cannot live without it. Yet intense philosophical reflections show that there are no substances with reference to which the two worlds could be distinguished. There are only passing perceptions. Thus the problem for Hume is to explain how a set of perceptions can be said to compose the internal world and the other set of perceptions the external world. He has further to explain how we so commonly believe that mind and body act, one upon another.

Hume has no difficulty in explaining the mind-body relation which is a source of great discomfort in the systems of Plato, Descartes, and others. Hume conceives of mind and body, not as two different substances, but as two different sets of perceptions. Perceptions which exhibit constancy and coherence are treated of as body which has its continued and independent existence. But other perceptions (mainly 'secondary impressions') compose what we call mind or soul. Causality, conceived as a regular conjunction of events, can easily explain how perceptions entering into the composition of mind follow upon perceptions entering into the composition of body, and vice versa (T 248).
Thus Hume distinguishes between mind and body, and explains their interaction in his own way. Though both mind and body are analysed into perceptions, there are differences between them. Perceptions which compose the internal world have the identical soul, self or mind as their centre of reference, whereas other perceptions make references to the world outside the mind. Again, some of the perceptions are viewed as tendencies, dispositions, capabilities etc. of the mind. A study of mind includes the study of the mental contents of experience and the mental operations, faculties etc. The various operations and faculties of the mind, as Hume's studies show, are associative tendencies, memory, imagination, belief and such other instincts, and reason. Hume's task is, in the first place, to explain the proper relationship that obtains among the different operations of the mind, and, in the second place, to explain how the different experiential contents and the operations together form a whole or a unity.

(VIII)

As we have already discussed, Plato divides the self or soul into three 'parts' or faculties, namely, reason, spirit and appetite. Reason is the superior element of the soul, whereas spirit and appetite are its inferior elements. In all likeliness, Plato advocates for the immortality of reason. According to Plato, reason is the principle of knowledge, and
knowledge survives death along with reason. In a new life knowledge is a recapitulation. Virtue, again, is knowledge, says Plato. Thus Plato argues for the supremacy of reason both in the intellectual and in the moral life. He, however, does not discard either spirit or appetite, but he prescribes for their due subordination to reason. In a just life, however, according to Plato, reason prevails over spirit, and both reason and spirit prevail over appetite, and there is a proper co-ordination and harmony of the three faculties on the basis of that subordination and superordination. Plato's conception of the supremacy of reason over passions, emotions, feelings etc. in a just life continues to influence the western thinking for long. With the advent of naturalism in the late seventeenth century in England the scene began to be changed. People began to speak of 'basic nature' instead of 'basic divinity'. Hume, more than anybody else, pictures man as a creature of Nature rather than a creature of God. He observes that so far as the primary activities are concerned, human life is no different from animal life. Animal life is mainly controlled by instincts, habits etc. Hume has no doubt that in the basic and primary level of man, instincts, habits, etc. are the most dominant forces. This is not to say however that reason is of no avail in a man's life. Reason, in Hume's opinion, functions artificially at a higher level. Thus, science and other forms of culture are the
products of reason as applied to the world of experience already provided to man.

Hume, to all appearance, distinguishes between the natural attitude of mind as is involved in our basic understanding of the world and the artificial attitude of the mind as is involved in our understanding of the world due to science and other forms of culture. The natural attitude of mind consists in our belief that the world is there outside, that there is an internal world as distinguished from the external world, that the things have values, that there are others besides oneself, that their conduct can be approved and disapproved, that they can be loved or hated, sympathised or antagonised, and so on. Hume's analysis shows that the basic attitude of life follows certain regular principles which work in the manner of instincts, propensities, tendencies and forces. Reason fails to either justify or remove them, or simply to say, they are non-rational but unavoidable. For all important matters, reason has to accept their authority. It does not and cannot question the validity of the natural attitude of mind. Even if reason questions its validity, it may temporarily create confusions and amazements, but that will not be everlasting. Thus no sceptic practices what he professes. Nature is too strong for those sceptical arguments which are otherwise impeachable.
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hour's amusement, I wou'd return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther' (T 269).

So far as the natural attitude of mind is concerned, men and other animals are on the same footing. Man's reasoned and cultured life is however different. Here reason has its role to play. It passes criticisms and reflections on the ideas with which we move about the world and act on it. For this purpose, reason requires general principles. In Hume's opinion, the principles of reason are derived from experience. Here an objection may arise: if the principles of reason are themselves derived from experience and, thereafter, are applied as instruments of criticism, then they involve circularity. In this sense, the principles of causality etc. involve circularity. Even then, Hume would say that only causally determined belief is justified belief, and he would ask us to commit to flames all those non-causally determined beliefs, as for example, faiths, dogmas, sophistries,
illusions etc. Hume has reason to accept the causal principle as a valid principle, since it is ultimately founded in the basic natural attitude of mind. That means, reason works on the basis of the natural attitude of mind, as subordinate to it.

We have already discussed that in Hume there are two different conceptions of belief, namely, natural belief and empirical belief, and two different conceptions of imagination, namely, transcendental imagination and empirical imagination. Similarly, following Hume's own arguments, we can distinguish between two senses of memory. Reason as a faculty has no hold over natural beliefs which function through the complex mechanism of senses, memory and imagination; it works as subordinate to them, because they are connected with the natural attitude of the mind. But reason can remove such empirical beliefs (for example, our long standing belief that the sun moves round the earth has been removed by modern scientific reasoning) as may later be proved false. It can also resist the course of empirical imagination and channelise it in different directions. In fine, reason is subordinate to animal nature in so far as the basic natural attitude of mind is concerned. But it works as a judge, as a censor, on the cultured level of mind. In this way, Hume's 'science of human nature' determines the proper limit to the application of reason and its proper mode of functioning.
It also points out the proper relationship that obtains between the different elements in man's nature like passions, emotions, sentiments and reason. In this regard, his 'science of Man' rightly claims itself to be the 'geography of mind'.

(IX)

Thus far Hume successfully demolishes the traditional concept of a substantive self or soul or mind, explains the distinction between mind and body, and works out the relationship between the different faculties of the mind. But the greatest difficulty he faces when he comes to deal with the problem of identity. Since he distinguishes between mind and body, he has to tackle the identity-problem for mind and body separately. Following Locke, Hume uses the expression 'personal identity' to make it stand for the identity of mind as distinguished from the identity of body and directs our attention to that region of being into which we can most intimately enter.

Penelhum explains Hume's problem about personal identity as the problem of trying 'to justify a practice which seems at first sight to be strange, and even paradoxical. This is the practice of talking about people as single being in spite of the fact that they are constantly changing, and over a period of time may have changed completely'.

28 As
pointed out by P.K. Mahapatra, this way of putting the problem involves two distinct issues: One concerns the nature of persons — whether persons are, as they are commonly supposed to be, single and unitary beings. And the other concerns the identity of persons through time: What makes a person $P_2$ at a time $t_2$ the same person as a person $P_1$ at an earlier time $t_1$ and what evidence can we have that such persons are same? Mahapatra refers to the second problem as the 'Re-identity question'. At first a mental life is identified as the life of 'a person'. Then, at a later moment, another mental life is identified as the life of the 'same person'. But are we justified in making such identifications?

With regard to the issue that concerns the nature of persons, Hume's statements are somewhat baffling. In Book I of the Treatise, Hume consistently denies the existence of an impression of self 'to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference' (T 251), and even ventures 'to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions' (T 252). Since there is no impression of a separate self, it follows from the 'first principle' of Hume's science of human nature that there is no idea of self, and as such words like 'soul', 'self' and 'mind' are meaningless. However, in Book II of the Treatise, there is a section in which Hume
expatiates on 'the nature of sympathy, as a factor in the level of fame, where he actually speaks of our having an impression of ourselves.' 'Tis evident', he says, 'that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it' (T 317). He further writes 'ourself is always intimately present to us' (T 320). Then, what does Hume think about the nature of mind? Is it the same as the bundle of perceptions, or is it something over and above the bundle of perceptions?

Hume's foremost interpreter N.K. Smith thinks that Hume committed himself to conflicting positions with regard to the nature of mind in Book I and Book II of the Treatise, and he attempts to explain it by the theory that Book II and Book III of the Treatise were 'in date of first composition prior to the working out of the doctrines dealt with in Book I,' and by the assertion that Hume actually overstated his position in the first Book. There are, however, commentators who think that the alleged contradiction did not occur in Hume, that Hume was consistently a supporter of the bundle theory of self. Thus P. Butchvarov is of the opinion that in Book I Hume really denied the existence of self in the manner in which it is conceived of by the traditional philosophers. Traditionally the self is supposed
to exist in the manner of a simple and unchanging substance of which we are aware in every moment of our conscious life. Hume denied the existence of self after that manner (T 251) and affirmed the existence of self in the manner of a stream or a bundle of perceptions. That is to say, he denied one conception of self (self as substance) and substituted it by another one (self as a bundle of different perceptions).

Few commentators would say that Hume denied the existence of self or mind, that words like 'self', 'soul' and 'mind' are, for him, empty words without meaning. If Hume had really denied the existence of self or mind, then he could not sensibly discuss the problem regarding self-identity. He frankly admitted that he was persuaded that there is both an external and an internal world (T 256), and did not hesitate to compare the unity of the internal world with that of vegetables and animal organisms (T 257), and with the self-maintained identity of the political organisation like the parliament. Again, he conceived of philosophy as the 'science of human nature' — which is but the self or mind under another name. He could not work according to this conception of philosophy if he had denied the existence of self altogether.

Hume indeed believed, and for his own philosophical purposes needed to believe, in the existence of bodies as well as selves. But he had difficulties in deciding
what should be the real nature of self or mind. To all appearance, when he discussed the questions of unity and identity of self or mind, he took self or mind for a collection of perceptions. But he failed to provide a real unity and identity to the collection of perceptions. He also could not see how permanent and universal qualities of the mind be referred to a passing stream of perceptions. This created a tension in his philosophical system, which he never succeeded to resolve.

Hume had no doubt that we have a great propensity to ascribe unity and identity to the body as well as to the mind (T 253). But he could not accept the philosophers' claim that this propensity to ascribe unity and identity to the physical object and to the mind is perfectly explicable with reference to an unknown substance (in the case of body or the physical object) and a known simple substance (in the case of self or mind). Hume argues that there is really no evidence, direct or indirect, for the existence of such a substance. Philosophers who advocate for the existence of a simple and perfectly identical self imagine that 'we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity' (T 251). But 'unluckily', says Hume, 'all these positive assertions
are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self, after the manner (underline ours) it is here explain'd' (T 251). For, we have no impression of self that continues invariably the same, through the whole course of our life. Impressions of pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations, etc. succeed each other and never all exist at the same time. Thus if we say that the self is itself an object of perception then the self is nothing but 'a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement' (T 252).

But what makes a number of perceptions a bundle?

Hume clearly observes that all the different perceptions composing the mental life can be divided into several groups, each group of which consists of a number of perceptions occurring simultaneously. The idea of self applies, in the first place, to those different perceptions occurring simultaneously. But how can several impressions and ideas have a reference to one and the same mind, if mind is not one perception among others, and again, if it is not anything over and beyond the perceptions? Hume says that each impression or idea makes a reference to the same mind because the idea of mind stands for the collection of perceptions, and not for a particular perception. But what makes collection
a collection? I say, 'I see a heap of books lying on the table'. But, in fact, I do not see 'a heap', I only see so many books. There is surely a difference between 'so many books' and 'a heap of books'. If the books were there scattered over a large area, I would not and could not say 'I see a heap of books'. The 'so many books' become a 'heap of books' in so far as they are 'closely related' together. In case of perceptions, Hume observes, there are three 'close relations' or 'close links', the three principles of associations, which work as collecting principles. Of the three principles of association, contiguity cannot function in bringing about a collection of perceptions called mind, for perceptions do not occur in space. But the two other natural associative relations, namely, resemblance and causation function to bring several perceptions, at a particular moment, to a unity. Perceptions which enter into the make-up of the mind resemble each other in this regard that none of them can be placed outside as the physical object, for none of them exhibit constancy and coherence; they have no independence. These perceptions are also causally linked up with each other. In this way, several perceptions make a collection or a bundle which goes by the name of mind, self or soul.

Now, what we call mind is not simply a bundle of perceptions occurring at a particular moment. A mental life has its history. In the life-history of the mind, several perceptions
that occur are either contemporary or successive. Perceptions that are contemporary make up a bundle at a particular moment. And taking the life-history of the mind as a whole, we can say that the mind is a bundle of bundles of perceptions. In so far as the mind is conceived as the bundle of bundles of perceptions running through several different moments, the question of identity of the mind comes in along with the question of its unity. If by mind we mean a bundle of several perceptions occurring at a particular moment, then the problem of identity does not arise. There is nothing wrong in saying that an object is made up of parts or a collection of parts, and still it is a distinct object. In a clear sense a bundle or a collection has its identity. Where several bundles pass away with rapidity we have the notion of the stream. The mind is more properly a stream or a theatre, to use Hume's own analogy.

The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations (T 253).

In the theatre of the mind the bundles of perceptions pass away, no two bundles of which are the same. As Hume observes:
Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment (T 252-53).

Thus when Hume ventures to affirm of the rest of mankind, 'that they are nothing, a bundle or collection of different perceptions' (T 252), he is sure to mean that the mind is a stream of bundles of perceptions. Mind being a stream of bundles of perceptions, if try to catch it at any moment, we can only catch a bundle of perceptions. 'I never can catch myself without a perception (a bundle of perceptions)' (T 252). But though I never can catch my mind at any moment without a bundle of perceptions, I never believe that my mind is identical with that particular bundle. I believe that my mind persists, that it passes through several moments of its existences over a long period of time. Now, Hume's problem is that each bundle of perceptions is numerically different. The passing bundles do not even overlap or crisscross to give rise to the notion of one identical mind, and yet the notion of one identical mind prevails. This gives rise to a paradox, and Hume ultimately resolves the paradox by regarding the notion of personal identity as a fiction, a natural and useful fiction notwithstanding.
Several commentators who want to see through the so-called 'bundle theory of mind' wonder how Hume could argue from a false notion of identity. Thus Penelhum points out that Hume failed to discover unity and identity in the mental life, and therefore regarded them as fictions, because of the 'fundamental error is his assertion that the idea of identity is the idea of an object that persists without changing'.36 Surely, such a notion of identity does not apply to the mind. But in Penelhum's opinion, the concept of identity applies to a whole rather than an indivisible entity, and the whole may very well be a succession of distinct entities. He points out that 'Our language is full of class-terms which are applied to a succession of object-stages whose distinctions and difference are quite open to us and do not prevent us from ascribing identity to their totality'.37 Thus 'We do not, and we could not confuse an invariable and uninterrupted note with a succession of distinct but related notes. But we could, unconfusedly, say that a succession of such notes constituted one continuing tune'. Similarly, 'We do not, and we could not, confuse an invariable and uninterrupted perception with a succession of distinct but related perceptions. But we could, unconfusedly, say that a succession of such perceptions constituted one continuing mind'.38

It appears to us that commentators like Penelhum have failed to realise Hume's difficulty and appreciate the points
of his arguments. Hume does not deny that 'our language is full of class-terms which are applied to a succession of object-stages', nor does he say that we have empirical or psychological difficulty in ascribing unity and identity to our mental life. But the actual procedure need not necessarily be our standard of judgment in science and philosophy. Again, the smooth sailing of a naive belief should not be the ground for disregarding the difficulty with regard to that belief at a deeper level of understanding. With regard to personal identity, the difficulty to which Hume draws our attention is the abyss of sense that yawns between the notion of 'one continuing mind' and Hume's ontological findings that what we call mind is only 'a bundle of perceptions', rather 'a bundle of bundles of perceptions'. Penelhum thinks that Hume is arguing from a false notion of identity, which is the notion of an object that persists without changing. But actually, the notion of identity that applies to the mind as well as to the continuing physical object is, according to Hume's analysis, the notion of an object that persists amidst changes. It is what he says, 'pretty exactly betwixt numerical and specific identity (i.e. resemblance of distinct particulars)' (T 257), 'a medium betwixt unity and number' (T 201). With regard to the perceptions of the mind, each one may be regarded as an indivisible atom, a unity, and taking some or all of the perceptions together, they are a multiplicity or number. What, then, is the ontological basis
of the idea of identity, i.e. the medium between unity and number, between persistence and change? In the absence of a real medium, the concept of identity, whether it concerns physical object or the person, creates a paradox of which there is no ontological solution. Consequently, either we must give the notion of personal identity a bye, or some other solution must be attempted. Hume needed a solution of the problem for his own philosophical purposes, particularly for his theory of morality. He thinks that the paradox to which the notion of personal identity gives rise admits of an epistemological rather than an ontological solution. He attempted epistemological solution to the problem of identity as it concerns physical object or the body, and he feels that the same method of reasoning should be continued in resolving the paradox of personal identity.

And here 'tis evident, the same method of reasoning must be continu'd, which has so successfully explain'd the identity of plants, and animals, and ships, and houses, and of all the compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature. The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. It cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects (T 259).
Hume's epistemological solution of the problem of personal identity consists in first, explaining personal identity as a fiction, and then, discovering the secret causes of that fiction. That personal identity is a fiction is not evident to us. But a philosophical examination of the notion of identity discovers a paradox in its core. What is paradoxical is untrue, but reality does not embrace falsity. Therefore, it must be the mind that gets into a confusion and presents the untruth as truth through that confusion. However, the confusion is of such a nature that philosophical arguments cannot permanently remove it. It is something like a standing illusion, whose illusory nature can be disclosed and whose causes and conditions can be explained, but which cannot permanently removed. We submit ourselves to the fictitious notion of personal identity as a matter of course. But a philosopher must live in a clear understanding of the meaning of self and its identity. Thereupon the philosopher not only derives innocent satisfaction from his clear understanding, but he is also prevented from taking many false steps in his future reasonings. This is really Hume's purpose behind contesting the uncontested — the self and its identity.

The notion of personal identity as accompanied by belief, according to Hume's study, is the outcome of the associative tendency of the mind, and the operations of imagination,
memory, and of natural belief. Personal identity being a fiction, it must, according to Hume, proceed from an operation of the imagination on the perceptions. In themselves perceptions are distinct existences having no real bond among them. Nevertheless, they are capable of getting united in the imagination upon reflection by virtue of the natural relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation. The very essence of these relations consists in their producing an easy transition of ideas, and when the passage of the thought from the object before the change to the object after it is smooth and easy, we scarce perceive the transition, and are apt imagine, that it is nothing but a continued survey of the same object. However, reflections cannot be at odd with the distinctive nature of perceptions, and yet the impact created by the easy transition of the imagination is so great that imagination is seduced to invent a fictitious principle of union — the abiding self or mind — that runs between several perceptions. In this way the notion of an identical self or mind — the mind that persists amidst changes of its perceptions — is produced.

Hume observes that though the natural relations of ideas are three fold, only the relations of resemblance and causation have their influence on the imagination in the present case (T 260). So far as resemblance of successive perceptions is concerned, it is memory that has the greatest contribution.
Memory is a faculty by which we raise the images of the past perceptions. And as the image necessarily resembles its object, the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought, convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, and make the whole seem like the continuance of one object.

In this particular, then, the memory not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production, by producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions. The case is the same whether we consider ourselves or others (T 261).

Besides resemblance, it is causation that facilitates the easy transition of the imagination from one perception to the other. The idea of the human mind, Hume explains, is like a system of different perceptions and differences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other (T 261). In this respect, Hume thinks, the mind is analogous to the republic. The individual republic changes its members, laws and constitution, without losing its identity, and whatever changes it endures, its several parts are still connected by the relation of causation. But since perceptions occur in the scene of mind and leave out of existences, if they are to be linked up as causes and effects then mind must be able
to revive them in memory. 'In this view, therefore, memory does not so much produce as discover personal identity, by shewing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions' (T 262).

Though Hume does not explain the role of belief in the conception of personal identity, he says that the identity that we ascribe to the mind is analogous to the identity that we ascribe to the body. In course of his discussion on the subject of body (Tl iv 2) Hume points out that we not only feign but believe in the continued existence of body. In the Appendix and elsewhere, he again points out that imagination, acting alone, does not produce belief. A fictitious idea passes for reality in so far as the qualities of imagination concur with the believing tendency of the mind. In the section 'of personal identity', Hume further points out that we have a great propensity to suppose ourselves possessed of an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course of our lives. Thus it appears that belief in the existence of our enduring mind is, according to Hume, a natural belief, which is complexly conditioned by the operations of memory, imagination and the associative tendency of the mind. In fine, personal identity, according to Hume, is a fiction, but a natural fiction created by some of the tendencies and operations which function uniformly in all human beings.
Of the different parts of Hume's philosophy, that of his theory of mind has invited greater criticisms than the rest. Most of Hume's critics feel that by denying real unity and identity to the mental life he left in it nothing but fleeting ideas dancing about in emptiness. But we need not look forward to Hume's critics. Possibly, Hume is his own best critic. If we carefully examine Hume's own estimate of his solution of personal identity, we may discover the real difficulty of his theory of mind.

After Hume has finished his 'examination of the several systems of philosophy' (T 263) and has decided 'to proceed in the accurate anatomy of human nature' towards the close of Book I of the Treatise, he has no doubt that he has been able to give a satisfactory account of personal identity. But upon a more strict review of the section concerning 'personal identity' in the Appendix to the Treatise, he finds himself involved in such a labyrinth that he confesses, 'I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent' (T 633). Hume's 'former opinion' was that there is no 'strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being', that the unity and identity that is ascribed to it is only a fictitious one, a natural fiction albeit. Even in the Appendix, Hume does not find any fault with his former opinion that there is no substance
either in the external world or in the internal world, that
the soul or mind is nothing distinct from the particular
perceptions. 'So far I seem to be attended with sufficient
evidence' (T 635), writes Hume. But he also cannot deny the
fact that we attribute a real simplicity and identity
to our internal world. Particular perceptions must, therefore,
somehow be connected together, be that principle of connection
a real one or an imaginary one. That our imagination sometimes
insensibly passes for reality is a common phenomenon, for
example, a hallucination. Thus it is not unlikely that per-
sonal identity arises, not from a real unity and identity,
but from thought or imagination of which we are insensible.

In Book I of the Treatise, Hume carried out analyses of
different ideas and these analyses show that the ideas, though
they appear to be given as such to the mind, contain certain
elements which are supplied to them by thought or imagina-
tion. Something similar happens in the case of mind's unity
and identity. Thus, according to Hume's philosophy, we should
not postulate the existence of a separate soul-substance to
philosophically justify the unity and identity that we really
ascrive to the mental life, rather we should try to discover
the manner in which certain faculties of the mind insensibly
operate to produce the notion of personal identity on the
conscious and empirical level. 'The present philosophy,
therefore, has so far a promising aspect', writes Hume, 'But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness' (T 635-36). That which is supposed to unite the various perceptions of the mind is 'fictitious identity', a product of association and the operation of imagination as aided by memory and the propensity to belief. Hume hopelessly discovers that so far he has explained association, imagination, memory and belief as functions, and their ontology in terms of atomic perceptions. Thus, memory is a present perception, which is livelier than imagination and fainter than sense impression. Imagination is a present perception which is totally devoid of the force of sense impression and of memory. Again, belief is defined as an idea having a share of the force of sense impression transferred to the idea. With regard to association, Hume seems to be caught up in two minds. He says both that associations are the original qualities of human nature and that perceptions possess certain qualities in them by virtue of which they get associated in the mind. However, if mind is strictly analysed into perceptions, then associations are to be regarded as qualities of perceptions. Now, the truth about perception is that 'all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences' (T 636). But if perceptions are distinct existences, having no real connection
among them, and if the various operations and faculties of the mind are explained in terms of perceptions, then how can the unity and identity of mind be accounted for with reference to the operations and faculties of the mind? Hume feels that it is not in his power to renounce the truth about perception and yet he does not know how to explain ontologically the operations and faculties of the mind etc. without reducing them to perceptions. Possibly Hume realised that a different ontological explanation of mental behaviour from his own would lead him beyond his system. He, therefore, left the problem of personal identity without any solution:

For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflection, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions (T 636).

(XII)

Certainly, Hume had difficulties in formulating a theory of mind which was in keeping with the basic outlook of his system as explained in the Introduction to the Treatise. Nevertheless, he believed that he had sufficiently explained those qualities, powers and faculties of the mind, which
could serve as the basis for reforming and reorganising the moral sciences of ethics, politics and aesthetics. However, we see, if Hume was prepared to modify his conception of the science of human nature, a clear theory of mind was coming out of what he had already discussed about the qualities, powers and faculties of the mind, and this theory of mind would not necessarily stand in the way to a systematic approach to the moral sciences.

In the Introduction to the Treatise, Hume declared that his science of human nature would go in search for the principle of human nature ('secret springs and principles', as he called them in the Enquiry), and that in pretending to discover those principles his science would not in any way go beyond the evidences of experience. At the same time, he wanted to demonstrate that the principles of human nature are more fundamental than the principles discovered in other sciences, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to the science of human nature, that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they must return back to it by one passage or another (T xv). It is, therefore, evident that the science of human nature could not be one science among other sciences, and its method of approach could not be the same as the method of approach of other sciences. As we have discussed in Chapter II, in spite of what Hume proclaimed, he did not
and could not follow the methods of a strict science. Hume's was a reflective enquiry. In a reflective enquiry, it is the knowledge of the object, rather than the object of knowledge, which is subjected to analysis. Hume's reflective analysis of various kinds of knowledge disclosed certain residual elements in them which could not be derived from sense perception. He, therefore, explained them as qualities generated through the activities of human mind. In this way, Hume shifted his ground, from the contents of perception to the activities of mind. As Robert Paul Wolff points out:

Hume began the *Treatise* with the assumption that empirical knowledge could be explained by reference to the contents of the mind alone, and then made the profound discovery that it was the activity of the mind, rather than the nature of its contents, which accounted for all the puzzling features of empirical knowledge.39

Wolff is quite right in his opinion that Hume explained the puzzling features of empirical knowledge with reference to the activities of the mind. But it is not correct to think that Hume made the 'profound discovery' that all the puzzling features of empirical knowledge are due to the activities of the mind half-way. Hume started his system with a pre-judgment about the existence of mind, and its
powers and faculties as the ultimate court of appeal for decision of certain questions of importance in other sciences. He was quite sure that the extent and force of human understanding was to a large measure dependent on the powers and faculties of the mind, and in the Introduction to the Treatise, he proposed to raise 'a compleat system of the sciences' on a foundation of the general principles concerning the powers and faculties of the mind.

We have already explained that Hume's design in philosophy was only partly critical, but largely constructive. As a part of his constructive design in philosophy Hume, in his theory of the understanding, discussed various epistemological and ontological issues, and through these discussions he tried to elicit the properties of the mind, its powers and faculties, which make empirical knowledge possible.

Thus Hume started his discussions by making a distinction between impressions and ideas, with this assertion that, where there are no impressions, there are no ideas. But as a matter of practice, he started his analysis with the accomplished ideas. His analysis shows the extent to which our ideas are a faithful copy of the original impressions and the extent to which they are the products of various mental operations. In the very beginning Hume
observed that though the impressions occur in the mind as simple, unrelated items, most of the ideas that we have are complex ideas. He observed three fundamental kinds of complex ideas, namely, substance, mode and relation. All of them are products of associations. With regard to associations, Hume says that they are 'universal principles', 'gentle forces', 'kind of ATTRACTION' and 'qualities'. As Hume's analysis later shows, there is no force, or attraction, or anything like that in the world of existences. Thus, instead of regarding associative qualities as the qualities of perception, Hume resolved them into 'original qualities of human nature'. In explaining associative qualities as the qualities of human mind, as distinguished from its perceptions, Hume is clearly presupposing the existence of mind which works according to certain universal principles.

With regard to relations, Hume had reason to distinguish between natural relations and philosophical relations. Philosophical relations are produced by acts of comparison. Therefore, without the presence of the mind those relations could not come into being. Natural relations, on the other hand, are the products of association, which take place even before reflective thinking comes to operate. Associations, as we have just explained, take place due to the qualities of the mind or, which we may regard as, the
associative tendencies of the mind. In other words, all relations are mental products, some of which are the products of 'unconscious' mental operations, and others are the products of conscious mental operations.

Hume's analysis of the idea of substance reveals four parts in it: associative linking or union being the chief part of it. The other three parts of the idea are — a collection of simple ideas, the fiction of an unknown something in which those simple ideas are supposed to inhere, and a particular name assigned to them. Thus, of the four parts of the idea of substance, perceptions or simple ideas constitute just one part, and the rests are due to the operations of the mind. In our section on 'Imagination' in Chapter IV, we have shown that even the assigning of a name takes place through custom, which is a mental operation.

In section, 'Ideas of space and time', Chapter III, we have explained Hume's difficulties about the ideas of space and time. Hume had no doubt that he ideas of space and time are genuine ideas, and yet he could not discover either spatial or temporal properties in simple impressions or ideas. Though Hume had no clear answer as to what should be the foundation of our ideas of space and time, his discussions on the subject of space and time show something for which it is more proper for us to regard them as human qualities.
Hume's discussion on the idea of cause is revealing. As we have argued (section on 'The Idea of Cause' in Chapter-III), Hume was no supporter of the uniformity view of causation. For him, the idea of necessity was the chief part of the idea of cause, and necessity was to be discovered nowhere than on the side of the mind. Causal necessity is the inner determination of the mind to expect the future, unobserved and the distant in accordance with the observed regularities in the past. This expectation is not due to any logic, but to the constitution of the mind, for which a man cannot but believe that whatever has a beginning of existence has its cause. This belief in universal causality is a fundamental natural belief, which, when conditioned by the experience of regular conjunction of events, gets particularised. All our reasonings concerning matters of facts and real existence take place on the basis of our ideas of particular causations which, again, are joint products of 'experience' and 'habit'.

Experience is a principle, which instructs me in the several conjunctions of objects for the past. Habit is another principle, which determines me to expect the same for the future; and both of them conspiring to operate upon the imagination, make me form certain ideas in a more intense and lively manner, than others, which are not attended with the same advantages (T 265).
Habit or custom, as Hume observed, is irreducible to anyone of the items of experience; otherwise, he would not have to recognise it as 'another principle', different from the principle of experience. Hume had no hesitation to regard custom or habit as a principle of human nature, and as we have explained ('The Idea of Causation', Chapter III), the tendency to form particular habits (belief in particular causation) is but another aspect of the belief in universal causation.

That there are principles and faculties of the mind, having their bearings on the perceptions of the mind, but different from them, has been brought to clear light in Hume's discussions on the subject of the external world. We have discussed in the section, 'The Idea of the External World', Chapter III, Hume's recognition of the roles of imagination, memory and belief in the formation of our idea of the external object. Impressions of the mind do not themselves account for our idea of the external object. Certain functions of the mind, in addition to the given impressions, have to be admitted to account for our accomplished or unquestioned belief in the reality of the external or physical object.

Hume, then, made extensive enquiries into those powers and faculties of the mind which make our basic understanding of the world possible. The different sciences have been culturally accomplished on the ground of this basic understanding
of the world. Hume was thus able to establish his claim that all the sciences have a connection, greater or less, to the science of human nature. Sciences take their start from what we may call ordinary or pre-reflective consideration of the world. Hume's enquiries brought home the truth that there are certain secret springs and principles of human nature which operate beneath the level of pre-reflective awareness of the world, and that in scientific or reflective enquiries we cannot go beyond the limitations set up by those secret springs and principles of human nature.

(XIII)

So far Hume's intents were realised. But he was somehow obsessed by the idea of a science of philosophy. Though his conception of empirical science was no less fair, he was unwilling to accept the view that science and philosophy were different kinds of study, and made valiant attempts to give his philosophy the look of a positive science.

One of the important features of empirical science is its positivistic outlook. The principles discovered or formulated by science are 'secret'. They are secret in the sense that they are not evident to the senses, and only masterminds can unlock their secrets. Yet the laws of science, however removed from ordinary appearance they may appear at the
first sight, can be made evident to the plainest of senses by discovering correlations between the concepts used in formulating a law and the sensible objects. Where such correlations are not available, the principle in question is suspected to be an occult quality. It means that the explanatory power of a law of science is not always sufficient; to be sufficient, it must be positive in its approach. Thus, though the explanatory power of Newton's square law was marvelous, yet scientists like Leibniz, and others scented occultism in it, for the law, as formulated by Newton, includes the concept of 'force' as the cause of change of motion, i.e. of acceleration, whether in magnitude or direction. 'Force' was conceived imaginatively as the sort of thing that we experience when we push or pull. For this reason it was considered an objection to gravitation that it acted at a distance without a sensible medium, and Newton himself conceded that there must be some medium by which it was transmitted. Gradually it was discovered that all the equations could be written down without bringing in forces. What was observable was a certain relation between acceleration and configuration; to say that this relation was brought about by the intermediacy of 'force' was to add nothing to our knowledge. Observation shows that planets have at all times an acceleration towards the sun, which varies inversely as the square of the distance from it. To say that this is due to the 'force' of gravitation
is merely verbal. The modern physicist, therefore, merely states formulae which are determined by accelerations, and avoids the word 'force' altogether. 'Force' as the faint ghost by the vitalist's view has been gradually exorcised. This is an illustration of how science tries to be positive about its laws and formulae.

Hume, to be sure, wanted to incorporate the positivistic outlook of empirical science in his science of human nature. For this purpose he refused to go beyond the positive data of experience which, with regard to the subject of mind, consists of simple impressions and simple ideas, and tried to restate the different powers, faculties and operations of the mind in terms of those impressions and ideas and their properties. In one place he even described reasoning as a species of sensation (TII 111 8). Likewise, the mental operations of memory, imagination, belief, sympathy, etc. were pointed by him as certain properties of impressions and ideas. Now, if this positivistic outlook has to prevail upon the science of human nature, then it can only be one science among other sciences, reducible to psychology, psychology to physiology, physiology to physics, and physics to chemistry. But, Hume was not prepared to go to that length, either. His science of human nature was to be a science, and at the same time, a foundational science. He wanted to demonstrate that the fundamental concepts like space, time, cause, body, etc., as are
used in science and other kinds of study, are grounded in the qualities, powers and faculties of the mind. That Hume wanted to preserve the distinctive character of his science of human nature is evident from his treatment of impressions. He regarded impressions, the primary atoms, as that which occur in the theatre of mind without further introduction, and, therefore, he declared that the cause of the impressions could not be enquired into. Once he really suggested that impressions might have their natural and physical causes, the examination of which would lead him too far away from his science of human nature, into the science of anatomy and natural philosophy (T II i 1). But he would not like his science running into other sciences, and in all cautious moments of his reasoning he regarded impressions as ultimately given ontological realities.

(XIV)

Hume, then, according to our study, was torn between two loyalties. He felt a burning passion for philosophy. At the same time, he was inclined towards science. As a philosopher he sounded a warning to science; 'Indulge your passion for science,..... but let your science be human,..... Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man' (E I 9). According to the natural attitude of the mind,
our attention is directed towards the objects of the world. Science tends to regard those objects as ultimate, overlooking the presence of mind in whose power of cognizance science is made possible. As a corrective step, Hume, therefore, reduced the world of objects to the world of human understanding to discover the human factor involved in it. He discovered the presence of mind in Nature's scheme in the shape of powers, faculties, tendencies, dispositions etc. of the mind, which make possible our understanding of the world. But to be true to the positivistic outlook of science, he tried to restate those powers, faculties etc. in terms of perceptions, the positive data of experience, and their manifest qualities. Thereby he lost the very ground he had secured. Though late, he ultimately realised that the source of unity and identity, i.e. mind, was itself deprived of unity and identity.

In this connection, he spoke of an inconsistency of the two principles of his system. They are respectively, 'that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences' and 'that mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences'. Evidently, these principles are not inconsistent with one another. In speaking of their inconsistency, what Hume might have meant is that they are collectively inconsistent with the view that self or mind is composed of perceptions. We all unquestioningly believe, and for his own
philosophical purposes Hume needed to believe, that mind is a unity, and that it maintains identity across time. But the two principles referred to, which Hume believed to be true, shatter the unity and identity of mental life, and hence, there is the inconsistency which Hume could not resolve.

According to our view, the key to the resolution of the conflict of the Humean system concerning mind lies in a separation between the functions of mind and the contents of mind. The two principles referred to by Hume are true with regard to the contents of mind, which are perceptions. Perceptions are the contents of the mind, and yet with regard to perceptions, mind is not their container. What we call mind is a composition of mental tendencies, dispositions, faculties, powers etc. each of which can be regarded as a function. Mind-functions are general, but perceptions on which they function are variables. Since mind-functions function for understanding, we discover a general pattern of human understanding, and the individual variations that take place are due to perceptual variations. Perceptions are the universe of discourse, the total field or the possible values that mind-functions may take in. For each function, there are certain perceptions which may be regarded as its proper values. For example, the proper values for memory-function are perceptions which are more vivid than imagination but fainter than sensation, the proper values of imagination
function are those perceptions which are least vivid. Now, there are two levels of understanding in which mind works. It works beneath the level of perception of objects. In so far as mind-functions operate beneath the level of perception, the values proper to them are sense-impressions. And, in so far as sense-impressions have constancy and coherence, and the mind-functions that operate upon them are memory, imagination and belief, we have both perception of the object and the object of perception. Mind also works to carry its views beyond present perception to the unobserved, distant and the future. Here the mind-functions of association, memory, imagination, belief, custom, sympathy etc. work, and values proper with regard to those functions are present perception of objects (and not sense-impressions), or ideas, either ideas of the memory or the ideas of the imagination. Because of these operations, new and new significations are assigned to the objects and their ideas. For example, an object receives the signification of a cause or an effect when custom operates upon it. The mind-function of custom, aided by the functions of memory, imagination and belief, gives rise to the idea of cause when the values put to it are present perceptions and memory-ideas of objects having regular conjunction. Such types of functional analysis can be given for abstract ideas, ideas of space and time, value-ideas, and so on. Obviously, if such accomplished ideas are
analysed, they dissolve themselves into perceptions as being operated upon by certain mind-functions. So, if we can give an accurate analysis of different mind-functions, and say what values are proper for them, we can also determine the validity of our ideas. Some of our ideas are mere sophistry and illusion as they are the products of mind-operations operating upon misplaced values.

Now, if mind is said to be a composition of functions, and if that is the view that Hume's philosophical teachings correctly entail, then it is evident that Hume was nearer to Kant than possibly what Kant himself believed. Kant got into Hume's philosophical thinking through the Enquiries. Hume's criticism of the concept of causality, as is found in the first Enquiry, is said to have awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber. But if he had cared to read the Treatise, he would have found in Hume more than an adversary to be refuted, rather a precursor of his critical philosophy. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason set a limit to human understanding. The Critique also made it clear that in order to set a limit to human understanding we must admit of its presuppositions. We can 'think' of those presuppositions as delimiting concepts but cannot 'know' them; they lie outside the scope of human understanding. The self-function-in-general is such a necessary presupposition of which we have no knowledge and,
therefore, no science is possible with regard to it. Possibly, a similar idea was expressed later by Wittgenstein:

The subject does not belong to the world; rather it is a limit of the world.41

Further,

The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it.42

Since the philosophical self is not an object of knowledge, it is in vain that we try to reduce it to perceptions or a system of perceptions. Thus Hume's attempts at reducing the mind-functions to perceptions misfired and his conception of the science of human nature received a jolt. But his philosophical enquiries did earn a rightful place for mind in Nature's scheme. Nature becomes man's world or the world of understanding with regard to which science etc. are possible only because mind is functioning in it. And, Hume was thus within his right to remind us that Nature wanted our sciences to be human, above all.

At this point, we may raise a question about the ontological status of the mind-functions. Hume spoke of two different kinds of principles of human nature (anticipating Kant's distinction between transcendental self and empirical
self), some are universal, permanent and irresistible, and others are variable, impermanent and weak. The former are absolutely essential, in the absence of which human nature must ruin and go to perish. But the latter principles, though necessary, are not absolutely essential. With regard to the former principles — Hume said that they are ultimates; they are the 'original qualities of human nature'. Now, if a quality is regarded as 'original' then, ontologically speaking, it is an essence. In this connection, we may refer to an issue in Newton's mechanics. The question was raised about the nature of gravitational force, for it was not a manifest quality. Yet Newton was unwilling to accept the view that his theory of gravitation was an instrumental hypothesis. The theory, he believed, gives us a 'true description' of the world, which is also an explanation of the observable facts. It implies that gravitation, according to Newton, was 'a hidden essence of things'. Newton, of course, did not say that much. He said that while the cause of behaviour of material bodies was known, which was gravitation, the cause of gravitation was yet unknown. Its cause had to be found out. Actually, the essentialist interpretation of Newton's theory is due to Roger Cotes. In his preface to the second edition of Newton's Principia, Cotes said that Newton discovered that every particle of matter was endowed with gravity. It was also, endowed with inertia. Since both gravity and inertia inhere in each particle of matter, it follows that both must
be proportional to the amount of matter in a body and therefore to each other. In other words, Newton's laws of motion simply describe, in mathematical language, the state of affairs due to the inherent properties of matter: they describe the essential nature of matter.

Hume disapproved essentialism and ultimate explanation within the purview of science. In the Introduction to the Treatise he pointed out that the essence of the mind was equally unknown to us with that of external body. And hence he proposed to form a notion of its powers and qualities from the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations. Further, he vowed not to accept any hypothesis that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature. But ultimately he accepted many 'ultimates'. About associative qualities, Hume pointed out that they are the original qualities of human nature' which do not admit of further explanation. Similarly, the tendency to form custom, the propensity to believe in the causal nature of the objects of the world, the tendency to believe in the real existence of the world, the tendency to sympathise others, etc. are, according to Hume, inherent qualities of human nature. By 'human nature' Hume did not mean anything additional to
those of qualities, tendencies etc., which we have explained as functions, but a composition of them. But, if human nature is composed of functions, which are also 'original qualities', then clearly mind is an essence or a composition of essences. This view of mind, certainly, overturns Hume's initial conception of the science of human nature, but that is how the things turn out.

Initially Hume conceived of the science of human nature as a descriptive and an explanatory science of the observable facts of mental life. The principles of human nature, as to be obtained by empirical generalisations of observable facts, were supposed to also explain mental facts and phenomena. Now, empirical generalisations only state regular conjunction of events, and not the inner principles by virtue of which the regular conjunctions take place. The modern science admits that a scientific theory is an instrument for manipulating the world, or at least, it is a description of the world. Hume was sufficiently modern in his conception of science, and in the Introduction to the Treatise he promised not to go in search of essences and overstep the bounds of sense experience. But, by the time he had finished his Treatise, he might have realised that his was not a descriptive science, and in the Enquiry, he clearly said that his science was in search after those 'secret springs and principles', by which human mind is actuated in its operations. It shows that he
had at least implicitly changed his conception of the science of human nature. This changed conception of the science of human nature agrees with the view of science according to which scientific theories describe the 'essences' or the 'essential natures' of things — the realities which lie behind all the appearances. Such theories are neither in need of, nor susceptible of, further explanation: they are ultimate explanation, and to find them is the ultimate aim of the scientist. In this conception, science is indistinguishable from metaphysics. Hume, however, did not explain his theory of mind according to this revised conception of science. But if he had cared to do, an essentialist interpretation of mind was forthcoming. Thereby, the claim of his so-called science of human nature to a positive science would have been outright rejected, but, perhaps, with little or no loss. After all, Hume's were philosophical works, and his theory of mind was a philosophical theory. And, Hume could not either bring honour to philosophy by making it an empirical science, or do justice to the subject of mind, the founding principle, by giving it a scientific treatment. The worthy philosopher did a great service to philosophy by winning a place for mind in Nature's scheme against, what might be the onslaught of Galilian-Newtonian science, and by opening up new directions in the study of mind's resources through reflexions and accurate reasonings.
Finally, a few words on the relation between Hume's theory of mind with that of the tradition beginning with Plato will conclude our study. Hume's rejection of the theory of soul or mind as substance is perhaps less radical than what it appears at the first sight. The tradition regarded soul or mind as having an essence of its own; the essence consists in the spiritual soul-substance. According to Hume's philosophy, the mind-functions themselves constitute the essence of the mind, and there is no additional substance as the substrate of those mind-functions. However, Hume's theory of mind is radical in its conception of the relation between different mind-functions. The tradition granted primacy to reason, and assigned a subordinate role to passions, emotions, sentiments etc., which were collectively called 'appetite' by Plato. Hume's theory of mind, on the other hand, makes reason subordinate to the passions etc. on the basic level of understanding. Reason has, however, its prominent role to play on the secondary level of reflective and critical thinking. Thus Hume's theory of mind does away with the distinction between human mind and animal mind on the basic level of understanding. Hume's theory of mind is remarkable in another way. It is free from the difficulties of mind-body dualism which have plagued the tradition of western philosophy. According to Hume's philosophy, there are
only two categories of being — the mind-functions and perceptions. Much of what the tradition regards as mind and body, dissolve themselves into perceptions, leaving no problem of the relation between mind and body.