In this chapter we shall develop a theory of intuition according to which knowledge of any possible object depends on intuition. Intuition, therefore, should not be confined to a particular kind of direct awareness. There are distinct types of objects ('object' in the broad sense); the nature of object will determine the particular form of intuition, whether it is intuition of the sensory type or whether it is intuition of the non-sensory type. Husserl is an advocate of such a theory of different kinds of intuition. According to him, intuition consists in apprehending the self-givenness of objects given to consciousness and this is exhibited in the different levels of cognition. The sensuous, particular objects are to be known by what Husserl calls empirical intuition. In order to apprehend non-sensuous objects we require what may be called a priori intuition. Husserl believes in the transcendental and this can be known by an intuition. There is also something like categorial intuition which presents to immediate insight the logical categories. It will be found, in the course of our discussion that despite the differences, Husserl's theory of intuition has affinity with Plato's rational intuition and Kant's empirical intuition in some respects, while in other respects, it is similar to Bergson's theory of intuition. Our discussion will also make it clear how Husserl gives an intuitionistic interpretation of knowledge.
The Ideal of the Rigorous Science:

Like most philosophers, Husserl's ideal was to establish philosophy as a rigorous science. It is philosophy alone that can give us the knowledge of the essence of things and also inquires into the essence of cognition itself. Philosophy seeks to establish the foundation of all other sciences; and thus it is a universal science. As philosophy lays the foundation of sciences, it is distinct from all other sciences including psychology.

Husserl begins with a comparison between natural sciences and philosophy. In his *Idea*¹ and *The Idea of Phenomenology*² Husserl describes the characteristics of the naturalistic attitude of the mind which mark the nature of empirical sciences. According to the naturalistic attitude, the world is out there and we take it exactly as it is presented to us. Natural sciences are concerned with experience and only tell us how things do and will act and do not make us understand what things are. The natural sciences are not condemnable for taking the naturalistic attitude but for the fact that natural thinking does not question the possibility of knowledge itself. "What is taken for granted in natural thinking is the possibility of cognition"³ (italics author's). The questions arise: how can the subject be certain

---


3 Ibid., p. 642.
that his cognition agrees with the object referred to? How do I, the particular cognizing subject, know that there are objects in themselves over and against my own mental processes? What is the guarantee that through my experience I know them as they are? What is the exact relation between the cognizing subject and the object of cognition? These questions shake off the belief in the self-evident fact of cognition and of the world in natural thinking; and cognition itself appears as a problem that cannot be solved in empirical psychology. Philosophy is the proper study of the problems concerning the possibility of knowledge.

But what would be the proper method of philosophy by means of which it can establish the radical foundation of knowledge? The inductive method, by means of which natural thinking proceeds, cannot be the method of philosophy because it fails to reach certainty in knowledge. It is based on particular facts and by examining them it proceeds to grasp the universal or the essence. But the inductive leap from the particulars to the universal cannot be guaranteed by any means.

In his Philosophy of Arithmetic and in the first part of his Logical Investigations Husserl speaks of eternal truths of mathematics. But the method of mathematics, i.e. the deductive method also seems unacceptable for Husserl's philosophical inquiry. The main defect of the deductive method lies in the
fact that it is completely independent of experience. It is too formal. On the contrary, Husserl is not concerned with the formal character of knowledge. According to him, philosophy must be rooted in experience through which a direct contact with reality is made possible. Knowledge, according to Husserl, must neither be purely conceptual like mathematics nor be purely based on inductive method as the natural sciences. This was also Kant's ideal in his Critique of Pure Reason.

Neither the inductive nor the deductive method is suitable for Husserl's philosophical inquiry into the foundation of knowledge. But the systematic investigation of logic gave Husserl the idea of a new field of inquiry. Logic is an eidetic science in the sense that it is a priori, apodictic and non-empirical. Logic provides the laws of our thinking and claims that the laws are valid universally. To claim that a certain thought is a law or a rule, it is necessary to show that one is concerned with an essence. Logic deals with truths about essences. But the essences cannot be grasped by sense - experience. The essences are grasped by means of a non-empirical insight and it thereby describes them. Such grasping of the essences, Husserl thinks, rests "... upon pure phenomenological descriptions," as the phenomena in which the essences appear are described.

in order to prepare the way of intuition. The phenomenological method, Husserl thinks, must be the method of philosophy since philosophy also claims to be the science of the essences. Husserl's philosophy is also characterized as phenomenology.

In Husserl's own words, "Phenomenology is this denotes a science, a system of scientific disciplines. But it also and above all denotes a method and an attitude of mind, the specifically philosophical attitude of mind, the specifically philosophical method" (italics author's). The phenomenological method ultimately culminates in an intuition of the essences or what Husserl calls 'Wessen' schau'.

2. Clarification of the Concept of Phenomenology:

The term 'phenomenology' ordinarily means the study of phenomena as opposed to reality. The word has been used, implicitly or explicitly, by the thinkers like Kant, Hegel and some others. Kant restricted the scientific knowledge to phenomena. Of course, he never denied the existence of reality or noumena. Hegel thought that only phenomena are to be considered and at the same time he held that phenomena reveal all that is to be revealed by means of the dialectical process.

Husserl is introducing the word 'phenomenology' in a completely different sense. 'Phenomenology', as Husserl defines it, is a descriptive science of phenomena. The proper task of philosophy, according to Husserl, is not to explain or construct theory but to describe. Usually it is thought that the philosophers should explain the phenomena. On the contrary, Husserl thinks that the task of philosophy is to describe the phenomena, rather than to explain. But what are the phenomena that phenomenology wants to describe? The phenomena are, according to Husserl, what are 'given' or 'presented' absolutely in immediate experience. But the word 'phenomenon' is ambiguous because of its double aspect - subjective and objective - the appearance or the mental act and that which appears.

Husserl's phenomenology develops in two stages. According to him, "The phenomenology of cognition is the science of cognitive phenomena in two senses. On the one hand it has to do with cognitions as appearances, presentations, acts of consciousness in which this or that object is presented, is an object of consciousness, passively or actively. On the other hand, the phenomenology of cognition has to do with these objects as presenting themselves in this manner". In the early phase of investigation Husserl used the word 'phenomenology'
in the former sense. In his *Logical Investigations* Husserl was concerned with analyzing and describing the various types of subjective processes. Phenomenology was not at all concerned with the justification of our belief in independent reality of the world. Let us take, for example, the case of seeing. Seeing as a mental act is the object of the phenomenologist. But the phenomenologist is indifferent to the real existence of the object seen. Phenomenology of course should not be confined to the study of the particular mental acts since these are of no value for a science of cognition. It is exclusively the study of essential relations and structures of consciousness. The essential relations and structures are known by means of an a priori intuition. Intuition here means the direct inspection of the essences of the mental acts. Phenomenology at this stage is descriptive psychology and Husserl defines it as a "... pure "descriptive" science of Essential Being,..." (italics author's).

In the later period Husserl widens the scope of phenomenology. Now, it is regarded as the 'first philosophy' and in this sense it is the foundation of all other sciences. In order to reach the radical foundation phenomenology should start with absolutely given, genuinely immanent data which can never be doubted. What is transcendent cannot be given absolutely since it includes existence. Phenomenology as a critique of cognition may ask the validity of transcendent objects.

---

Therefore what is transcendentally posited should be excluded since if I do not know how cognition can reach the transcendent not given in itself "... no cognition or science of the transcendent can help to dispel the darkness. What I want is clarity. I want to understand the possibility of that reaching..." (italics)

Husserl makes us understand his point with the following example:

"I want to make it given to me in an act of "seeing". A "seeing" cannot be demonstrated. The blind man who wishes to see cannot be made to see by means of scientific proofs". Husserl, therefore, proposes to eliminate existence from his phenomenological discussion and proceeds with the pure phenomena what are giv absolutely. But how are we to get at them?

3. The Sphere of Absolute Givenness is the Realm of Pure Phenomena:

Husserl believes that phenomenology as a method can offer us an access to the pure field of phenomena by means of an insight. The insight can grow only after the necessary steps are taken of which the first is what Husserl calls the phenomenological reduction. The method has some affinity with the Cartesian method of doubt. He might have been inspired by the method of doubt but Husserl did not really follow the Cartesian procedure. On the whole, the phenomenological reduction starts

with doubting what is transcendent as the cartesian method did. In fact, the problem of knowledge is the problem of the transcendent perception. We can doubt everything. We can suspend all our beliefs in natural reality. But, at the same time it becomes evident that though I can doubt everything it is indubitable that I am so doubting. It seems unreasonable to doubt the very fact that I am doubting. And likewise with every mental act, for example, perception, imagination, judgment etc. The mental acts may be certain or uncertain, the existence of their objects may be doubted. But it is absolutely clear and certain that I am undergoing these mental acts. As soon as I reflect on my thought processes I see clearly that they are absolutely given and I receive them in pure 'seeing'. "The seeing, direct grasping and having of the cogitation (italics author's) is already a cognition. The cogitationes are the first absolute data"\(^{10}\) (italics author's). "Every intellectual process and indeed every mental process whatever, while being enacted, can be made the object of a pure 'seeing' and understanding, and is something absolutely given in the 'seeing'"\(^{11}\) (italics author's).

Though Husserl begins in a sense similar to the Cartesian method of doubt, he does not really subscribe to it. Descartes thinks that this method ultimately leads him to establish th


existence of the ego as a thinking subject. According to him, the thinking substance is given in absolute immediacy as the cogito is given. Husserl points out that herein lies the main defect of the cartesian method of doubt. On the contrary, Husserl thinks that cogitatio guarantees the fact of pure consciousness, but not the existence of any substantial ego. The experiencing of a psychological ego cannot be the truly absolute data since the mentally active ego includes existence which, therefore, must be put in bracket. The empirical selves including our own self should also be bracketed along with the natural objects. The phenomenological or the transcendental reduction thus gives us an access to the pure or transcendental subjectivity.

Now, in the realm of absolutely pure phenomena we may distinguish between the phenomena and that to which the phenomena are given. Evidently the phenomena are given to consciousness. There must be a recipient of the phenomena. It is the identical consciousness which radiates through the different acts of consciousness and Husserl calls it the transcendental ego. So far we have reached the two absolute data - the ego and the cogito. But this is not all. The ego-cogito would be meaningless unless it is connected with a cogitatum. Even in the realm of pure phenomena the distinction between the appearance and that which appears cannot be denied. The correlation between the

---

12 Ibid., p. 635.
13 Ibid., p. 639.
phenomenon of cognition and the object of cognition leads Husserl to the concept of the intentionality of consciousness.

4. Intentionality of Consciousness:

In his *Logical Investigations* Husserl subjects consciousness itself to a phenomenological investigation. He examines three concepts of consciousness of which the last one, that is, consciousness as an intentional experience or the directedness to objects seems to be the correct definition of consciousness. An act of reflection upon the consciousness reveals that the essence of consciousness is to be 'conscious of' something. The analysis of consciousness shows that an object is not an object unless it is related to a consciousness. An object is an object for a consciousness. In the *Idea of Phenomenology* Husserl said the something. In his *Ideas* Husserl says, "It belongs as a general feature to the essence of every actual cogito to be a consciousness of something.... All experiences which have the essential properties in common are also called "intentional experiences"...." (italics author's). But this does not mean that the subject produces the object. In pure consciousness a


truly objective relationship can be discovered. It is objective because its validity is not derived from the conscious act and is necessary since it could not be otherwise. Every intentional experience, thus, may be distinguished into an 'act' and a 'content', 'experiencing' and 'experienced' or what Husserl calls in the Ideas 'noesis' and 'noema'. Now, we come to realize that the ego-cogito-cogitatum is the structure of consciousness. This wonderful relationship between the act of consciousness and the object known is found everywhere. The intentional structure of consciousness presents the objects as they are given to consciousness. The task of phenomenology is to discover the essences in them and constitute meaning. The phenomena themselves are discrete and by organizing them into a synthetic manifold the constitution of meaning is possible. Objects are constituted in the series of the phenomena. The constituted objects are the meant objects or the essences. According to Husserl, the world that is constituted in and through the given phenomena is intended or meant by the consciousness. The world which is known is the meant world and the objects experienced are the meaning-objects or the essences of the objects. The understanding of the meaning of objects as constituted in consciousness is also the knowledge of the essences. Such a knowledge takes place by the method of intuition, and so it may be said that essences are discovered in the phenomena.

16 Ibid., 3rd Chapter, pp. 255-281.
The essences are presented in the light of pure evidence or self-givenness. The phenomenologist must "... trace all forms of givenness and all correlations..."\(^{17}\) (italics author's) and thereby gives an elucidatory analysis. Phenomenology, thus confines its study to the pure field of consciousness. It is for Husserl a "...pure descriptive discipline which studies the whole field of pure transcendental consciousness in the light of pure intuition".\(^{18}\) (italics author's).

5. **Different types of Cognition in the Sphere of Pure Consciousness:**

Now, having discovered the realm of pure phenomena, i.e. the absolute givenness of the ego-cogito-cogitatum, the phenomenologist begins his inquiry. He would show how cognition is possible of the each component of this sphere of givenness.

(i) **Cognition of the Pure Consciousness:**

The essence of consciousness is to be conscious 'of' something, as consciousness is always consciousness 'of' something. This indicates that consciousness itself cannot be the object of consciousness. The preposition 'of' keeps consciousness as something distinct the function of which is to reveal an object and not to become an object of consciousness. It is not something of which we become conscious:... It is the subjective term of the acts of consciousness. But consciousness,

---

as the pure subject, should not be understood in the sense of a mental activity by means of which we become conscious. Consciousness as the pure subject makes possible the acts by which consciousness of an object takes place. Neither is it substantial subject of the cogito, nor is it the sum total of the cogitationes. Rather, it is the pure subject, the identical consciousness which is revealed in different acts of consciousness.

Pure consciousness is a mode of being, the only kind of being directly available to us. The very act of consciousness establishes the apodictic certitude of the fact of consciousness. Therefore, by means of a simple act of reflexion upon the act of consciousness we know it better. Being lived in we know consciousness. The primary philosophical task is to it by reflexion which wants to catch the lived experience of being. This act of reflexion should not be confused with introspection. Introspection is a method of seeing when one's own mind adopts the naturalistic standpoint and makes consciousness an object and thereby the flux character of consciousness is destroyed. It is transformed into an inert, immobile substance. In other words, introspection analyzes consciousness from an objective point of view, that means, it does violence to the essence of consciousness. Moreover, introspection distinguishes consciousness between that which introspects and that which is introspected. That which introspects remains inaccessible. But in
reflexion consciousness is known as it is itself. In pure consciousness there is no distinction between the subject and the object.

Husserl grants an intuitive certainty to this reflective knowledge of consciousness. Doubtless, reflexion is a kind of intuitive knowledge. The intuition of consciousness is evidently a kind of non-sensuous experience. But it is not a mystic experience, rather, it is the reflexion of reason upon pure consciousness. It is a cognitive fact. Herein lies the difference between Husserl and Kant. According to Kant, the transcendental self is presupposed as the ultimate condition of experience. It cannot be known but is a logical postulate. For Husserl the transcendental consciousness is a cognitive fact and known by reflexion.

(ii) Cognition of the Cogitationes

The cogitationes are absolutely given in consciousness, they are genuinely immanent in the sense that the cogitationes are contained in consciousness. "The "existence" of the cogitation is guaranteed by its absolute self-givenness, by its givenness in pure evidence...."¹⁹ (italics author's). The cogitationes are given to the internal perception just as the physical objects are given to external perception. Husserl thinks that the acts of consciousness or the cogitationes are given in their absolute

wholeness. So, there is no problem in intuiting them; since every mental process is absolutely given in a pure 'seeing' and intuition means the direct seeing of something given to it. In inner perception we know the cogitationes intuitively.

(iii) Cognition of the Cogitatum:

The problem arises with regard to the cognition of the cogitatum or the object towards which consciousness is directed. The existence of the cognitive phenomena is guaranteed by their absolute self-givenness in pure evidence. Clarity and distinctness are the marks of certainty. But the physical objects are not so given, though they are given in a certain sense. The objects to be known have to be brought into self-givenness in evidence, i.e. the objects are to be known intuitively. The cogitata or the intentional objects are of two types: (1) individual, empirical objects that comprise physical objects like chairs, horses, etc., and mental objects (object in the broad sense) like sensation, perception, thinking, surmise, etc. and (2) essences or universals. Corresponding to the two types of objects Husserl speaks of the individual or empirical intuition and essential intuition.

20. Ibid.
6. The Theory of Empirical Intuition:

In his Ideas\textsuperscript{21} Husserl explicitly distinguishes between empirical or individual intuition and essential insight. Husserl's concept of the empirical intuition is somewhat different from the empiricist theory of intuition. According to the empiricist, sensibility is the sole source of intuition. He refuses to go beyond the sensible appearances. But Husserl thinks that we may have intuitions in imagination and recollection, too. On the whole, 'anschauung' or empirical intuition, I think, is Husserl's understanding of knowledge of objects given in sense-experience. In this sense empirical intuition is equivalent to perception. Perception comprises both external and internal perceptions. In external perception the individual physical objects are given in a straightforward way and we know them directly. It is the awareness of a world in space and time.\textsuperscript{22} In inner perception we become aware of our own mental states and ourselves. In both cases Husserl grants an intuitive character. We have already discussed the theory of internal perception. Let us turn to the theory of external perception.

Perception claims to present the object 'itself' and so the intention is not empty but finds fulfilment in the object. According to Husserl, "...... in all cases of 'external' perception, this remains a mere pretension."\textsuperscript{23}

\begin{itemize}
\item 21 \textit{Ed. Husserl, Ideas, op.cit.}, pp. 54 - 56.
\item 22 \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 101 - 103.
\end{itemize}
external perception are never given adequately, absolutely. Our external perception is always imperfect, "inadequate" (italics author's). 24 But the inadequacy does not mean the lesser "clearness and distinctness." 25 The inadequacy of physical objects consists in their presentation as one-sidedly or as successively. A particular, physical object ".... is not actually given, it is not given wholly and entirely as that which it itself is. It is only given 'from the front', only 'perspectively foreshortened and projected' etc. while many of its properties are illustrated in the nuclear content of the percept, ...., many others are not present in the percept in such illustrated form: the elements of the invisible rear side, the interior etc., are no doubt subsidiarily intended in more or less definite fashion, ..., but are not themselves part of the intuitive, i.e. of the perceptual or imaginative content, of the percept." 26 Thus an individual belonging to the world of space and time always appears imperfectly, inadequately; and our knowledge of the physical objects is never adequate. Despite the fact that a material object can only be given inadequately, ".... its complete givenness is nonetheless prescribed, .... absolutely fixed in its essential type." 27

24 Ed. Husserl, Ideas, op.cit., p. 54.
25 Ibid.
Though external perception fails to give us exact knowledge, internal perception provides us exact knowledge. Husserl grants a greater certainty to internal perception rather than to external perception. Objects of internal perception are immanent in the sense that they are contained in consciousness and so they are given absolutely, as they themselves are. Therefore, we know the mental phenomena adequately.

But an empirical intuition, whether it is an internal or an external perception, is not knowledge in the strict sense. Knowledge, for Husserl, always has the character of fulfilment of a meaning intention in a corresponding percept. Perception as embodying a meaning, seems to be fulfilled in the underlying percept. But what we mean in case of an actual perception does not find fulfilment in the underlying percept. Over and above the nominal presentations there are certain aspects of meaning, certain forms which are imposed by us but we seek in vain their corresponding elements in individual intuition. In fact, certain aspects of meaning, a surplus of meaning remains over, a form corresponding to which there is nothing in perception. 28 Let us illustrate it with the following example: This paper is white. Here the intention of the word 'white' partially coincides with the colour aspect of the given object, viz. the paper. A surplus of meaning, a form, viz. being remains over,

corresponding to which there is nothing in the object to confirm it. 29 But knowledge would not arise unless and until all the aspects of the meaning intention get fulfilled.

Besides, the individual phenomena grasped have no scientific value whether it is a phenomenon of internal or of external perception. The particular cognitive phenomena or the individual objects cannot give us strict knowledge. According to Husserl, universals or the essences are indispensable in the knowledge of the particulars. ".... we should not, e.g. rise to the understanding of certain modal truths concerning particulars of certain sorts, unless we had first clearly and intelligently grasped and dwelt on what it is to be of such sorts, e.g. purple in colour, an object of anger, etc. etc." 30 But the essences have no counterpart in external reality. The meaning intention of the essences does not find fulfilment in anything given in straightforward perception. Husserl groups the forms, given through our conscious references, and the essences under the title 'categories'. The categories are non-sensuous, ideal objects. The questions naturally arise: where do the categories belong? How do we know them? Phenomenology as a critique of cognition must answer the questions. In the next two sections we shall be engaged with the categories and their fulfilment in a corresponding intuition.

29 Ibid., p. 775.
30 Ibid., translator's Introduction, p. 20.
7. Categories and Categorial Intuition:

Categories include the logical realm of meanings and the fundamental concepts of knowledge. In the realm of categories Husserl also includes the structural and propositional elements and the essences. The categories comprise the whole field of the predicative thinking. Husserl widens the concept of objects including the categories under it.31 But the categorial objects are ideal objects. They are ideal in the sense that they are not real parts of the objects of sensuous perception. Yet, they are part and parcel of what we know. Corresponding to the wider concept of objects Husserl is now introducing the wider concepts of intuition and perception in which the categories find fulfilment.32

Let us compare Husserl's doctrine of the categories with the categories of Aristotle and Kant. Both Aristotle and Kant admit the important role played by the categories in knowledge as Husserl thinks. While Aristotle speaks of the ten categories in the *Topics* and the *Categories*33 Kant speaks of the twelve categories and Husserl distinguishes between two groups of categories: structural and propositional elements and essences. Husserl also differs from Aristotle and Kant in certain other respects. Husserl and Aristotle would not agree with Kant in

31 Ibid., p. 785.
32 Ibid., pp. 785 & 787.
holding that the categories are merely the pure forms of thought contributed by the mind while it is active in producing knowledge. Aristotle and Husserl believe in the objective reality of the categories. Aristotle goes further and says that the categories are the modes of actual being. Husserl differs from Aristotle in this point. He is not at one with Aristotle in holding that the categories are the actual modes of being since what is actual has been bracketed. Rather, Husserl is interested in meaning intention. Categories are aspects of, forms of, meaning-intention. Categories as forms of meaning are not merely thought of but also intuited and perceived. Herein lies the great difference between Kant and Husserl. In criticizing Kant Husserl says, "In Kant's thought categorical (logical) functions play a great role, but he fails to achieve our fundamental extension of the concepts of perception and intuition over the categorial realm, and this because he fails to appreciate the deep difference between intuition and signification, their possible separation and their usual commixture...."34

In fact, the main obscurities of the Kantian critique of reason depend on Kant's indifferent attitude towards the peculiar character of pure ideation, the adequate survey of conceptual essences, and the laws of universal validity rooted in those essences. Accordingly he did not try to understand the phenomenologically correct concept of the a priori. For this

reason Kant failed to aim at a strictly scientific critique of reason, he did not investigate the pure, essential laws "which govern acts as intentional experiences, in all their modes of sense-giving objectivation, and their fulfilling constitution of 'true being'," (italics author's). But we cannot answer to the questions regarding the possibility of knowledge if we do not have a clear and distinct knowledge of the laws of essence.

We should now turn to the categorical intuition in which categories are given. The categories crave fulfilment but they are not so simple as the case of a proper individual meaning. There is "... nothing that ever could fit them in perception or acts of like order". Categories find no sympathetic element in individual intuition. Let us make it clear with the example of the 'form giving flexion Being'. Neither in its attributive nor in its predicative function being is fulfilled in any percept. We can see colour but we cannot see being-coloured. It is nothing in the object nor anything attaching to an object. Being is neither a quality nor a figure, nor even a constitutive element of the object (italics author's), "... as it is no real (reals) internal feature, so also it is no real external feature,..." (italics author's). Therefore, a meaning corresponding to 'being' can find no possible objective correlate in sense-perception so it cannot be fulfilled.

36 Ibid., p. 779.
37 Ibid., p. 780.
in the acts of such perception. What is true of being is also true of the remaining categorial forms, viz., the propositional elements (e.g., the 'a' and the 'the', the 'and' and the 'or', the 'if' and the 'then', the 'all' and the 'none', the 'something' and the 'nothing', the forms of quantity and the determinations of number), aggregates, indefinite pluralities, totalities, numbers, disjunctions, predicates and the essences or the universals. We seek in vain for their objective correlates in the sphere of the objects of sense-perception.

Husserl is now introducing the concept of categorial intuition. Corresponding to the contrast between sensuous and categorial objects Husserl speaks of the sensuous and categorial acts in which the objects get fulfilled. But as the categorial objects are not so simple as the sensible objects, the fulfilment of the categorial acts is founded upon the acts of sense-perception. Sensuous objects are given in straight-forward perception at a single act level. Sensible objects "... do not need to be constituted in many-rayed fashion in acts of higher level, whose objects are set up for them by way of other objects, already constituted in other acts".39

An act of perception, a straight-forward act, by itself or together with other acts, can serve as the foundation for new acts "... which in their new mode of consciousness likewise

bring to maturity a new awareness of objects which essentially presupposes the old (italics author's). Therefore, the categorial acts are founded acts. Let us illustrate the categorial act with an example, the case of conjunction. Corresponding to the word 'and', nothing is given in perception. To perform a new act of conjunction we base it on two single acts of intuition viz. A and B and thereby mean the aggregate of the objects A & B. But the knowledge, which we arrive at through categorial acts, should not be identified with mere subjective experiences, nor is the categorial act connected with the original act. The new acts set up new objects before us. In it something appears as actual and self-given on the basis of the older ones.

Husserl distinguishes between two sets of categorial acts. The categorial acts, in which the propositional elements are given, include their foundational objects as real parts in themselves. There is a different set of categorial acts which do not include their foundational objects in themselves. Here we enter into the field of the universals or essences and the corresponding categorial intuition is known as 'Wesensschau' or essential insight.

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 798.
42 Ibid., p. 787.
43 Ibid., pp. 788 & 799.
8. The Theory of Wesensschau or the Essential Intuition:

Let us now turn to the doctrine of the essences as presented by Husserl. Husserl is not introducing a metaphysical doctrine of the essences as Plato seems to think. Husserl's theory of the essences also differs from that of the conceptualist and the nominalist theories of universals. According to the latter groups of thinkers universals do not exist in reality, only individuals exist. The nominalist goes further than a conceptualist in holding that the universals neither exist in thought; they are nothing but the names given to a group of particulars. According to the conceptualist, comparing a group of facts, we discover a common attribute and set it off by abstraction. This common attribute is regarded as the universal or the essence of the group of facts.

Husserl did not believe that the essences are mere common characters of the individuals under consideration. Rather, he thinks that the essences or the ideal objects exist genuinely.44 It is a matter of common experience that the essences are seen, they are given. With the appearances the essences are also given. Experience in all possible varieties of presentation reveals something that is identical in all of these presentations. This identical element is the essence of the object concerned.

In respect of this identical element an object is what it is. "What a thing is" constitutes the meaning of the object. An object is meant or named in respect of its identical element. "... while the thing appears, or rather the feature in the thing, it is not this objective feature, this feature here and now, that we mean. We mean its content, its 'Idea'; we mean, not this aspect of red in the house, but Red as such."45 (italics author's). To know the essence of something is to grasp its meaning. For Husserl essence and sense are equivalent. To grasp the meaning of an object is to grasp the sense of, the significance of the object under consideration.

Despite the fact that experience reveals the essences, the essences themselves are not derived from experience. In order to justify the non-empirical status of the essences Husserl cites the examples of mathematics and logic.46 According to him the objects with which these sciences are concerned are not actual, but ideal objects. A number e.g. the number is not a group of two individuals. A number is a concept. Similar is the case with logic. Logical ideas, unitary meanings constitute the domain of pure logic, but these are ideal objects.

46 Ibid., pp. 340 - 341.
Essences are, therefore, the objects of knowledge as the empirical objects are. Not only that the essences are the objects of knowledge, rather, they are the true objects of knowledge since the knowledge of facts presupposes an insight into the essences at least implicitly.

How are we to know the essences? According to Husserl, 'meaning' or essence is given as immediately as an empirical object. Like the positivist and the empiricist Husserl al emphasizes on the 'given'. The difference lies in the interpretation of the 'given'. While the empiricist and the positivist confined the 'given' to the data given to sensation, i.e. to individuals alone, Husserl widens the concept of the given including some non-sensuous objects, e.g. the essences, the categorial objects, etc. According to Husserl, sensation is not the only kind of immediate experience. He holds the theory of a priori intuition. But Husserl's concept of a priori intuition differs from Kant's doctrine of a priori intuition. For Kant intuition is a priori so far as it is presupposed by experience. It is the condition of anything to be given to sensibility. It is not an intellectual function. But Husserl's a priori intuition is a kind of non-sensuous but immediate experience. The essences are therefore known by a priori intuition or what

47 Ibid., p. 400.
48 Of course this is the thesis of Kant as it is stated in the Critique of Pure Reason. Later on, it seems that Kant admitted the possibility of non-sensuous intuition.
Husserl calls 'Wesensschau'. The comparison between the objects as species and the objects as individuals suggests the view that the apprehension of the species is essentially distinct from the apprehension of the individuals. In other words, the act in which we mean the species is fundamentally different from the act in which we mean the individual. 49

By 'Wesensschau' or the intuition of the essences Husserl means to grasp the identical or universal meaning in and through contingent experience. It is an intellectual understanding of something which is concretely experienced; it makes explicit and clarifies the meaning of what we experience concretely. The description of the phenomena reveals the essence of what is described. ".... the phenomenological "intuition" in which the description terminates tells us what its object necessarily is. To know this is to have an "essential" and hence a "scientific" knowledge of being" 50 (italics author's). Although the essences are given with the appearances, they are not given as individual objects are given to us. The essences are not simply there and need to be intuited. The problem of intuiting essences is the problem of bringing them into self-givenness in pure evidence. Husserl is now introducing the concept of eidetic reduction or ideation by means of which we can rise to the essences.

The empirical intuition, in which the individual object is given, is of little importance as a method of knowledge; but it is not totally useless. The perspectival views of the individual objects become the basis of the essential intuition in which the essence of the object may be obtained. "... it is no insight into an essence if one's reflection cannot turn to a corresponding individual, if one cannot work out "a sense of examples" to illustrate his insight". The process of ideation begins with an individual phenomenon, may it be either of perception or of imagination or a combination of both and undergoes free variations. The particulars or the different variations of the same particular are used as stepping stones for ideation. Let us illustrate the process with the following example:

when we mean Red in specie (italics author's), a red object with its emphasized colour aspect, i.e. the aspect red, appears before us and we look at the object and its colour aspect. But in fact, we are referring neither to the individual object nor to the individually definite trait in the object. When the red object with its emphasized aspect of red appears before us, "... we are rather 'meaning' the single identical Red, and are meaning it in a novel conscious manner, through which precisely the species, and not the individual, becomes our object" (italics author's). At the same time, in connection with universal object, there develop the formations like 'red thing', 'this case of red' etc. The relation between the

53 Ibid., p. 340.
individual intuition and the essences in one of founding.

The process of ideation, as described above, is similar to the method of abstraction since the latter is also based on facts. Husserl himself admits that the species arises through abstraction. But he warns us against confusing the eidetic reduction with abstraction in its improper sense by the empiricist. In the Second Investigation of the *Logical Investigations* Husserl strongly opposes the theories of abstraction as upheld by the empiricists, specially the theory of Mill which is known as induction. Induction consists in finding out a common attribute in a group of facts and setting apart by abstraction. This common attribute is essential to the group of facts. According to Husserl, the empiricists confuse between the two following situations:

"(1) Our intention, when we grasp any group of intuitively like objects in unitary fashion, or when we recognize their exact likeness at a single glance, or when in single acts of comparison we recognize the likeness of one definite object to certain others and ultimately to all objects in the group, and

(2) Our intention when, possibly basing ourselves on the same intuitive foundations, we apprehend as an ideal unity the attribute which constitutes the respect in which the things are alike or are compared" (italics author's).

---

54 Ibid., p. 337.
55 Ibid., pp. 343 - 344.
Husserl points out that in our intuition or comparison many like objects may appear but what we mean in the second case is not the 'alikeness' of the objects. What we mean in the latter case is the universal, the ideal unity. The empiricists confuse between the words 'alikeness' and 'identity'. When we speak of identity by means of which the object is meant and named, we mean something different from mere 'alikeness' of the objects of a group. We may observe many like objects in intuition and compare them but their 'alikeness' is not the ideal unity, the attribute which is the constitutive element of a group of like objects. The concept 'alikeness' itself presupposes the identical element, in a group of particulars, in respect of which the particulars are alike.

The method of abstraction as understood by the empiricist suggests the view that the conceptual ideas would not arise at all unless the like objects never appeared before us. But, in fact, to conceive what is the identical element in the objects no intuition of likeness, nor even a comparison is needed. For example, when I recognize this paper as paper and as white, I do not intuit the objects of likeness nor do I compare them. Rather, I am simply making clear to myself the general sense of the expressions 'paper' and 'white' as such. Husserl goes further and says that neither an actual perception is needed for ideation. Even a presentation "... under the form of

56 Ibid., pp. 342 - 343.
fancy, for instance, can, ...., be so perfectly clear as to enable us to see and apprehend perfectly the essential nature of things". 57

On the empiricist account the concepts are produced by abstraction and the empiricists think that the concepts and essences are identical. Husserl argues that in logic and epistemology abstraction does not consist in producing a concept, rather, in abstraction a peculiar consciousness arises which directly apprehends a specific unity on the intuitive basis. The same idea is also found in Husserl's Ideas. There he says that the concepts and essences are not identical. We do possess the concepts of numbers but the numbers themselves are not concepts. Even the essences of physical objects do not arise out of abstraction from particular objects. In his opinion the formation of concept is certainly an act of abstraction but what is produced in the spontaneous act of abstraction is not the essence but the consciousness of it. In Husserl's own words, ".... what is engendered in the spontaneous act of abstracting is not the essence, but the consciousness of the essence,....." 58 (italics author's). Husserl formulates the a priori rule that every original awareness of essences is a spontaneous act, while sensuous apprehension is not so.

58 Ibid., p. 81.
Another objection that Husserl has brought against the theory of abstraction is that it consists in collecting a vast number of facts. Number of facts justifies induction. But experience comprises a few instances of exact similars of a group of particulars but cannot exhaust their total range. How can we speak of the unity of this range if the unity of the species itself lapses?

While rejecting the method of induction as presented by the empiricists Husserl speaks of a different kind of induction which is the proper method of the scientist. According to Husserl, the induction, which the physicist uses, is not based on a vast number of facts. It has no concern with the existence of the objects. He cites, e.g., Newton’s law of gravitation. This law says nothing about the existence of the gravitating masses. It refers only to the essence of the gravitating masses. Induction proper, Husserl maintains, never consisted in collecting a vast number of instances. Number of facts cannot justify induction. It is, rather, the intrinsic clarity of the given phenomena that justifies induction. According to Husserl induction is, as Merleau Ponty says, ".... a process of intellectual analysis whose verification consists in the total, or at least sufficient, clarity which the group of concepts worked out in this way bring to the given phenomena".

60 Merleau Ponty, op.cit., p. 70.
Induction understood in this way is not different from the eidetic reduction. The only difference between 'Wesensschau' and induction is that the former is based on the imaginary 'free variation' of certain facts. The individual fact, with which the process of ideation starts is not grasped, nor assumed as a reality. Merleau Ponty shows that in ultimate analysis these two modes of knowledge are indiscernable and differ only in degree. In fact, Husserl did not make 'Wesensschau' an exclusive possession of the phenomenologist. Rather, he says that ".... everyone is constantly seeing ideas or essences and that everyone uses them in the operations of thought, inspite of the widespread opposition put forth in the name of points of view in the theory of knowledge".

So far we have reached the conclusion that with the appearances the essences are also given. They are given directly, 'bodily' and are known intuitively. With regard to the question of the existence of the essences Husserl's reply is that the analogy with sense-perception makes it necessary to conceive that just as individual objects of sense-perception exist, so also the general objects of essential intuition. In order to illustrate an insight one must point to examples.

61 Ibid., p. 72.
The essences are given absolutely, adequately. Hence our knowledge of them, we may expect, must be adequate, perfect. We begin with individual perception and examining it arrive at an essence. Objects of external perception are given absolutely but not adequately. But their inadequacy does not affect the adequacy of the essential intuition except in one case. The essences of the thing-like (italics author's) objects suffer from inadequacy. The inadequacy that belongs to the thing-like objects not only consists in their one-sided presentation but also in their three-dimensional presentation (italics author's).

The upshot of the whole discussion is that the essences are the true objects to be known since they prove the objective validity of cognition. At the same time it should also be pointed out that the cognition is not so simple a thing, as for example, the case of the intuition of the essence of redness. To understand cognition the forms and types of it are to be distinguished and their essential relations to one another are also to be investigated. This leads to an ultimate explanation of the principles which are the ideal conditions of the possibility of scientific objectivity and thus governs the entire field of empirical science. "This whole attempt at

64 Ibid., p. 54.
the explanation of principles moves throughout in the sphere of essence... which is repeatedly constituted in consciousness on the basis of particular phenomena through phenomenological reduction. Ultimately Husserl ascribes this function of constitution to intuition. Intuition is "original consciousness". Now, we come to realize the meaning and significance of phenomenological reduction that suspended all that is transcendent. It does not mean to negate the world. The world which was phenomenologically disconnected remains still, with a certain change of significance, within the framework of phenomenology.

9. Categorial Intuition and Reason:

The categorial intuition is a special kind of experience different from sense-experience. But the phenomenological intuition is not a kind of mystical experience of the supersensible. In his Ideen III (p. 96) Husserl draws our attention to this fact. He says that his phenomenological intuition is not akin to mystical experience. In intuition we grasp clearly and distinctly the sense of, the meaning of, the object with which consciousness is intentionally related. The cognition

---

66 Ibid., p. 665.
of the categories and the essences need no special faculty foreign to consciousness. The eidetic reduction is an intellectual operation of consciousness. Thus intuition of the categories and essences is ultimately a function of reason which gives rise to clear and distinct knowledge. From this point of view Husserl's concept of a priori intuition is more akin to Descartes and Plato than to that of Bergson.

Husserl, thus, formulates his principle of all principles:
"...every primordial datum Intuition is a source of authority (....) for knowledge, that whatever presents itself in "intuition" in primordial form (....), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself."69 (italics author's).

Every percept grasps its object directly or as it is in itself. But the direct grasping in the percept in wider sense differs from the percept in the narrower sense. That means the direct grasping of the object of sensuous intuition is one kind of experience and it is of another kind in case of categorial intuition. The sensuous or physical objects may be regarded as objects of the lowest level of "possible intuition", categorial or ideal objects are objects of "higher level" of intuition.70

69 Ed. Husserl, Ideas, op. cit., p. 92.
Essences are not ideal objects but they are not also objects of the perceptual type. The givenness of essences demands non-sensuous experience. The essences are also to be known by rational intuition. Husserl did not restrict knowledge to a particular type of objects. Phenomenology would treat every judgment on its own merit. If a judgment demands empirical verification the same may be undertaken. But if a judgment does not demand on it, it should not be rejected. It is rather to be taken to belong to a different kind. According to Husserl, each type of knowledge and its object must be recognized in its own unique character and described as such.

10. The Notion of Self-evidence

According to Husserl, the object of knowledge must be present in itself. Knowledge consists in the adequate fulfilment of the meaning-intention and what is meant. What is meant must be given in itself. Evidence means the actual carrying out of an identification of the meaning-intention with what is meant. The evidence discloses itself in pure intuition and it consists of self-givenness. We achieve self-evidence in the case where there is full agreement of what we know with what is given as such.71

71 Ibid., p. 765.
But the evidence or givenness should not be understood in the sense of the primordial givenness of the perceptual type. The self-evidence or the 'self-given' is not identical with the 'primordially given' or with the 'embodied'. Self-evidence means what is 'seen clearly'. But this seeing is not a matter of simple 'seeing'. The objects of categorial intuition are not 'simply there' and just need to be 'seen'. Rather they are constituted in consciousness and thereby brought to givenness. Evidence is "...being's state of being clearly seen". What Husserl needs is seeing clarity, the clarity of meaning. Mr. Levin rightly points out that the function of Husserlian self-evidence "...is strictly limited to the domain of meaning (....), not the domain of existence (reference) itself."

Husserl's notion of self-evidence differs from that of the rationalist. Mr. Levin points out the differences. Self-evidence for Husserl is not a matter of conviction or a

---

72 Ed. Husserl, Ideas, op. cit., p. 194.
74 Q. Lauer, op. cit., p. 75.
76 Ibid., p. 55.
psychological intuition as the rationalist thinks. Neither he restricted it to the domain of a particular kind of propositions, e.g. the propositions of mathematics, logic, etc. On the contrary, Husserl thinks that the self-evidence is the ultimate criterion of cognition itself. The self-evidence or the inwardly evident is the limiting state where doubt is impossible since the standard of self-evidence has been achieved. Husserl never claims that the self-evidence is the criterion of truth. Rather, he thinks that self-evidence admits of error and revision.

There is nothing mysterious in Husserl's notion of self-evidence. "Self-evidence, in fact, is not any sort of conscious indicator affixed to a judgment (....) and calling to us like a mystical voice from a better world: Here is the Truth!...."77 Rather, Husserl admits different kinds and degrees of self-evidence.

In the Ideas78 Husserl was also concerned with the modes of givenness. He distinguishes between immediate and mediate, original and non-original, assertoric and apodictic, adequate and inadequate evidence in respect to lesser and greater degrees of clearness and distinctness. The apodictic or adequate evidence is the highest form of evidence in which absolute certainty is attainable. Intuition is the best mode of givenness since it is the experience in which we can directly grasp the meaning of the object meant.

77 Ed. Husserl, Ideas, op.cit., p. 400.
78 Ibid., pp. 379 - 387.
An appeal to evidence may be objected on the ground of the possibility of pseudo evidences. Mr. Sinha suggests that the possibility of pseudo evidences may be eradicated by putting the evidence to some sort of test by means of comparing the different evidences. Such a suggestion is valuable but valuable with reference to an evidence that is psychological. But Husserl did not recognize the psychological evidence. It seems that the possibility of pseudo evidences does not arise at all since it derives from reason. How can reason be the source of nonsense? Necessity in the name of reason resides in consciousness. What is necessary is objective. As evidence derives from reason, it must be necessary, i.e. objective. It may also be suggested that the intellectual clarity which Husserl demands would not spring unless the correct evidence is arrived at.

11. A Critical Exposition of the Theory of 'Wesensschau':

Husserl did not restrict the word 'intuition' to a particular type of apprehension. Everything is known intuitively. He speaks of four kinds of intuitive knowledge: (i) the intuition of the self, (ii) the intuition of the empirical objects, (iii) the intuition of the categorial objects and (iv) the intuition of the essences.

(i) That self-knowledge is not possible by means of our ordinary methods of knowing is evident from the writings of Husserl. According to Husserl, an act of reflexion upon consciousness makes us understand what is unique in it. Consciousness is a continuous flow. Only in the act of living can it be grasped. But this knowledge is not a kind of mystic experience. From this point of view Husserl approximates to Bergsonian concept of intuition. Reflexion is an act of intuition. The intuition of the self is distinct from other types of experience, still, it is an experience.

(ii) With regard to empirical intuition no difficulty arises. That in our sense-experience we become directly aware of the individual objects, none would deny. On the whole, empirical intuition is sense-experience of the physical objects.

(iii & iv) The problem arises with regard to the possibility of intuizing the categories and the essences. Categories and essences are not the objects of ordinary experience, they are known by a priori intuition. Is a priori intuition possible? Can reason be intuitive? These are the problems of the categorical and the essential intuition.

Mr. Fink raises the following objections against Husserl's theory of intuition from the point of view of Criticism.

---

Criticism admits the possibility of intuitive knowledge but it limits the possibility of intuition. According to it, intuition cannot be extended beyond the domain of sensibility. Kant speaks of the duality of man's capacity for knowledge-sensibility and understanding. The former is intuitive but the latter is discursive. Knowledge is a joint product of both these capacities. But phenomenology defines knowledge in general in terms of self-giving intuition. Here the model is perceptual self-givenness. According to Criticism, this leads to an empirical interpretation of knowledge including philosophical knowledge. Criticism also points out that phenomenology fails to understand the unique character of the discursive understanding since it admits the possibility of categorial and essential intuition. Another objection is that the phenomenological method of intuitionism depends upon the self-givenness and rests content with the evidence. It does not raise questions as to the legitimacy of the self-givenness. This procedure is unjustified.

But the Criticism's objections are merely apparent. Mr. Fink rightly points out that the objection against phenomenological method of intuitionism does not hold good with respect to Logical Investigations. In this book Husserl was not concerned with the primacy of intuition as a capacity for knowledge but ".... with the primacy of the intuitable nature of all knowledge as opposed to the merely signitive act of
knowledge. The basic character of knowledge is not that it be immediate and simple self-apprehension. Thus it does no violence to the logical knowledge. "Rather knowledge is (.....) at all times and for all types of evidence the self-givenness of those affairs which are given with evidence in the act of knowing (.....); that is, their comprehension and possession as "they themselves are"." The self-givenness or evidence does not mean that the object is simply there and need to be intuited. The self-givenness is constituted in consciousness according to some laws. The self-givenness in categorial and essential knowledge consists in a synthesis of different founding acts. Husserl's metaphorical use of the words "self-givenness", "dator intuition" makes us understand the objects of a priori intuition on the model of the perceptual type. Husserl himself draws our attention to the fact that the 'self-given" and the 'bodily given" are not identical.

As to the discursivity of understanding we may suggest that reason may have two modes of operation - one discursive, the other intuitive. It seems that when Husserl speaks of categorial or of essential insight he emphasizes the latter aspect of reason.

81. Ibid., p. 83.
82 Ibid.
Husserl himself anticipated that the objection may be raised against his essential insight since it is generally accepted that thinking is mediate while intuition is immediate. How can one be transformed into the other? According to Husserl, in spite of its immediacy and passivity, intuition has its manifold implication. Similarly, the thinking activity in and through the active synthesis, perhaps, constitutes the unity of self-giving in thought. Husserl, thus, justified the widening of the concept of intuition. 84

Essential intuition or categorial intuition is a kind of rational intuition. The clarity and distinctness are the marks of intuition. Husserl demands 'seeing clarity'. There is nothing mysterious in it. Neither Husserl confined it to a group of men only. Everyone is capable of enjoying a priori intuition.

Mr. Kolakowski 85 raises the objection that Husserl fails to distinguish between the two kinds of certitude-subjective and objective. How do we know that we have reached the proper meaning by an insight? He further points out that insight is incommunicable and so it cannot give us knowledge as knowledge is communicable. The validity of cognition demands that

its content must be communicable in language.

With regard to the subjective certitude no problem arises since we can achieve subjective certitude by an insight. Feeling of being sure is one of the criteria of knowledge and it may be taken as the subjective certitude since I cannot have knowledge if I do not feel sure about what I claim to know. Insight also involves the feeling of being sure. Therefore, insight can give us subjective certainty. With regard to the objective certitude it may be said that insight would also account for the objective certitude. According to Husserl, essences and the categories are to be grasped through a lived experience. In so far as they are grasped through a lived experience it is concrete knowledge. But in so far as one grasps the intentional object through this experience an intelligible structure imposes itself upon the experiencing subject and a distinct kind of knowledge results in. The subject is no more confined to the particularity of his individual life; but attains an insight which holds for everyone. 86

Again, the problem of the incommunicability of an insight is not a problem, at all. No experience is communicable in the strict sense. But that does not mean that we cannot talk about our experience. Any experience can be communicated in

---

86 Merleau Ponty, op.cit., pp. 54 - 55.
language and the person to whom it is communicated may have an understanding of it but what he lacks is seeing clarity. I may describe my seeing of a land and the person to whom it is described somehow forms a picture of it. Can he possess the same sort of knowledge as I do possess? He, of course would attain the same knowledge if he actually sees the land. Similar is the case of insight. I may describe my insight in some way and the man with the same intellectual capacity may understand what I am saying; but what he lacks is "seeing clarity." He also may have the same experience as I have. But, if one asks what is the guarantee that I have reached the clarity, he may not be satisfied with any answer. The mere fact that a doubt can be raised does not mean that we cannot achieve "seeing clarity" by an insight. Scepticism need not be entertained.

Husserl's theory of essential insight may be justified but what he wanted does not seem to be fulfilled by the method of essential insight. Husserl seeks to offer a foundation of knowledge by means of his theory of essential intuition. But such intuition is based on apodictic evidence, while at the same time, evidence of the apodictic type makes us distinguish between what is valid knowledge and what is not. In such a situation, apodictic evidence serves as the criterion of valid
knowledge. If essential intuition also depends on apodictic evidence, it seems to account for valid knowledge and not to give foundation to knowledge. The problem of criterion and foundation can be solved if we remember that essential intuition creates in its givenness the required self-evidence.

Husserl's transcendental philosophy may have its flaws, but he has succeeded in achieving the ideal of clarity and distinctness of knowledge. In his own words, "Immediate "seeing" (Sehen), not merely the sensory seeing of experience, but seeing in general as primordial datum consciousness of any kind whatsoever, is the ultimate source of justification for all rational statements"\(^{87}\) (italics author's). From this point of view Husserl shows affinity with Descartes rather than with Plato and Kant.

\(^{87}\) Ed. Husserl, *Ideen*, op. cit., p. 84.