CHAPTER 4

MORALITY AND AESTHETICS: THE ROLE OF INTUITION

In the previous chapter we confined our discussion to the knowledge of objects by means of sensibility and understanding. At the end of the chapter we have pointed out that this may not be the only type of experience. All our experiences cannot be explained in this way. Kant also recognized moral and aesthetic apprehensions as distinct types of experience, though, he refused to call such apprehensions cognition. Evidently, objects of moral and aesthetic experience cannot be known through sensibility and understanding. Perhaps some kind of non-sensuous awareness may give an access to the fields of moral and aesthetic experience. The present chapter will show how Kant would explain moral and aesthetic apprehensions by means of moral and aesthetic intuitions. First, we should turn to Kant's moral philosophy.

Section I

MORAL INTUITION

1. From Speculative Reason to Practical Reason:

"Metaphysics," says Kant, "is divided into that of the speculative and that of the practical employment of pure reason, and is therefore either metaphysics of nature or metaphysics..."
of *morals* \(^1\) (italics author's). In the *Critique* Kant dealt with the 'metaphysics of nature' of which we can claim knowledge proper. We can know only the objects of nature. Consequently, knowledge was limited to the world of appearances. But it was also indicated there that Kant would speak of a widening range of experience which may be approached through the employment of reason in a manner other than the theoretical one. The task of reason in its theoretical aspect is merely logical. It systematizes and unifies knowledge gained through sensibility and understanding. But empirical knowledge is conditioned knowledge. Reason, on the contrary, strives for the unconditioned that is implicit in its nature. Reason seeks the unconditioned for the conditioned knowledge in order to bring its unity to completion. Therefore, reason proceeds upwards; it proceeds through a chain of pro-syllogism. The three kinds of syllogistic inferences give occasion to the three unconditionals, viz. immortality of soul, freedom of will and the existence of God and they are called the ideas of pure reason. Traditional metaphysics pretends to know the unconditioned which are super-sensuous objects. Kant is rejecting such metaphysics. Though the ideas are the products of reason, they are not cognitions. Kant says with emphasis that these ideas are uncognitive. We can claim no knowledge of the ideas because no corresponding intuitive sense

\(^1\) Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, *op. cit.*, A841 = B 869, p. 669.
can be supplied by our experience. Intuition, however, is indispensable as a factor in knowledge. Ideas should not be refuted as meaningless either. Unlike positivists, Kant attributed meaning and value to them in the *Critique*. The self-contradictions of reason reveal the problematic nature of these ideas and no objective reality has been attached to them since theoretical reason cannot prove the existence of the ideas. They have only a regulative use in theoretical knowledge.

But the resolution of the antinomies uncovers a field in which reason may be used in a different way other than the theoretical one. This is reason's practical use. That reason can control human action implies that it may be practical. Now, the field in which reason has its practical employment is the field of morality. Morality requires the postulates of freedom, the immortality of soul, and the existence of God. Reason in its practical aspect can penetrate into the world of ideas. Thus the ideas of speculative reason gain a type of objective validity, as they become related to the moral law. Of course, Kant would not say that we experience the ideas in the same way as we experience the physical objects.

According to Kant, ethics like physics has an a priori as well as an empirical part. The moral principles, which

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are independent of actual human behaviour, constitute the a priori part of ethics. It is not possible to derive the moral 'ought' from sensuous experience. In the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals and in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant is concerned with this a priori part of moral philosophy. The Metaphysics of Morals has been chiefly written for the purpose of formulating the supreme principle of morality. Kant begins his enquiry with the conditions under which our ordinary moral judgments claim to be true. Only in the last chapter of this book Kant justifies the moral law by deriving it from pure practical reason. The Critique of Practical Reason contains a detailed discussion of the last point.

2. How Can Reason be Practical?

The moral law or the categorical imperative cannot be derived from experience; experience cannot exhibit a law having the characteristics of universality and necessity. An a priori law can only be derived from pure reason. But the moral law is a practical law because it guides us in action. Pure

3 Henceforth the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals will be mentioned as The Metaphysics of Morals.

4 Afterwards I shall use the short title 'Practical Reason'.

5 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (translated by L.W. Beck), New York, Indianapolis, 1956; p. 31.
reason in its theoretical aspect cannot provide us a law valid for practice. Therefore, pure reason, which is the seat of the moral law, must also be practical; otherwise morality would be a mere chimera. Hence 'Pure practical reason is the faculty of providing an unconditioned condition for voluntary action,...'6

Kant often speaks of will as it it is identical with practical reason. In his own words, "Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is according to principles, i.e. have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason"7 (italics author's). At the same time he says that practical reason infallibly determines the will.8 The same idea is also found in the Practical Reason. "Assuming that pure reason can contain a practical ground sufficient to determine the will, then there are practical laws."9 In fact, there is no contradiction in saying that will is practical reason and that pure reason can determine the will. Will may be defined as an impulse guided by reason and in this sense our willing is rational; not a blind and unconscious force. On the other hand, reason can determine will means that ".... volition has a cognitive aspect, which can be considered in abstraction".10 We may restate the

7 Kant, The Metaphysic of Morals, op.cit., p. 29.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
position in the way Mr. Beck puts it: "Reason determines the action by which impulse is to be satisfied; when it does so, it is called 'practical reason', and the action chosen is called an 'act of will'."

3. Freedom of the Will and Practical Reason:

We should find out the character of the will which is determinable by a law. The very word 'will' means that human will, so far as it is rational, is free. Kant defines will as".... a faculty to choose that only which reason independent on inclination recognizes as practically necessary, i.e. as good"\textsuperscript{12} (italics author's). That will is a faculty of choosing inevitably leads to the conclusion that will is free. I can choose among possible actions only if I am free. The freedom of the will can also be established in a different way. The determining ground of the will is the form of the law which is grasped by reason alone. The form of the law, therefore, does not belong to appearances which are objects of the senses. Naturally, the determining ground of the will must be different from the determining ground of the natural events that are governed by the law of causality. It is evident that will is independent of the law of causality; that is to say, it is not caused by something else. It is self-legislative, autonomous. Therefore, will enjoys freedom.

\textsuperscript{11} L.W. Beck, A Commentary, op.cit., p. 39.

\textsuperscript{12} Kant, The Metaphysic of Morals, op.cit., p. 29.
However a free will, though it is not subject to the law of causality, does act under some law. If free will acts independently of any law, it would cease to be a will and would become a mere caprice. Freedom of the will can obey only a law which is not other-imposed but self-imposed. Will, as it is free, must be self-legisitating, autonomous faculty of its own laws and thus is identical with the autonomy of the practical reason. "The autonomy of the will", according to Kant, "is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them; ...."\(^{13}\) (italics author's). Hence a free will does act under moral laws.

4. **Objective Validity of the Idea of Freedom**

"Thus freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other".\(^{14}\) The question naturally arises: whether the moral law is to be deduced from freedom or the latter is to be deduced from the former. According to Kant, we do not immediately know freedom; experience cannot produce an example of freedom and so we form a negative concept of it. But we become directly aware of the moral law which imposes an obligation that we experience at every time of constructing a max\(i\) for the will. And obligation implies freedom. Thus the moral law directly leads us to the concept of freedom. Moral law is the "ratio cognosendi" of freedom while freedom is the "ratio

\(^{13}\) Kant, *Practical Reason*, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
"essendi" of the moral law. The consciousness of this fundamental law is not given to us as an empirical fact is given. It is "... the sole fact of pure reason, which by it proclaims itself as originating law(.....)".

The moral law is a synthetic a priori judgment because the concept of obligation is not contained in the concept of the good will. But a deduction or justification cannot be shown as it is easy in case of the principles of pure theoretical reason. The principles of theoretical reason refer to the objects of possible experience. But an empirical proof of the principle of practical reason is not possible because pure practical reason prescribes the law independently of experience. The moral law is given as an apodictically certain fact of pure reason and we become a priori conscious of it. The moral law is confirmed by itself.

Yet, the question remains, how is the synthesis of the good will and the obligation made possible? The synthesis, Kant tells us, is possible by means of a third term and this third term is the idea of freedom. Mr. Beck explains the point in the following way. The synthetic a priori judgment of the moral law cannot be justified "... by finding an intuition (......) but by adding some substitute for intuition.

15 Ibid., Preface, p. 4 (F.N.)
16 Ibid., p. 31.
17 Ibid., p. 48.
It must be purely intellectual, and therefore a moral sense will not suffice. It must be a priori, for otherwise the synthetic judgment would not be a priori. And it must, like intuition, have an independent warrant; that is, it must not be just a product of the thought it is to justify. This third thing, this substitute for intuition, is the Idea of freedom. And freedom is not given at all! Only its Idea is given" (italics author's).

The moral law itself needs no deduction or justification; but it is the principle from which freedom can be deduced. Thus Kant proves that freedom is not only possible, as speculative reason showed, but actual and has objective reality. Freedom is actual for beings who experience the moral obligation. In fact, the moral law is also a law of causality but it is not bound to the sensible world. That means, the moral law is a "law of causality through freedom". This suggests that moral law may have access to a supersensuous nature. Thus the moral law defines the concept of freedom of which speculative philosophy formed only a negative idea, and thereby also gives objective reality to the concept of freedom.19

Thus the problematic concept of freedom gains objective reality through the moral law. Consequently, freedom becomes

19 Kant, Practical Reason, op.cit., p. 49.
the 'credential' of the moral law. Pure practical reason can confirm freedom transcendently ".... in the absolute sense needed by speculative reason in its use of the concept of causality, for this freedom is required if reason is to rescue itself from the antinomy in which it is inevitably entangled when attempting to think the unconditioned in a causal series". 20

So far we have seen that the pure practical reason is the source of the moral law. Freedom is also deduced from the moral law and thereby freedom gains objective validity through the moral law. Therefore practical reason is the foundation of the moral law as well as of the freedom.

5. **Objective Validity of the two other Postulates**

The other two ideas of speculative reason, viz. the idea of God and the idea of the immortality of soul, also become objectively real when they are connected to the moral law. They are regarded as postulates of morality. A postulate, according to Kant, is a theoretical proposition which cannot be demonstrated but it is inseparably connected with an unconditionally valid practical law. 21 The idea of God and the idea of the immortality of soul are postulates in the true sense because we cannot deduce them from the moral law as freedom was deduced. But human reason requires them in order

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to establish the possibility of the 'summum bonum'. So far there is no problem. But inconsistency arises when the idea of freedom is also called a postulate of morality. Kant demonstrated freedom from the moral law and admitted that it is the only idea of pure reason that we can know. Yet, Kant called it a postulate. Why did Kant consider freedom a postulate? In the Practical Reason Kant says that the postulates "...give objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general."22 Perhaps, Kant considered freedom a postulate in this sense because the idea of God and the idea of the immortality of soul gain reality when they are connected with it.23 Mr. Beck points out this fact. He also gives some other explanations. But for the lack of details we should only say that "The doctrine of freedom as a postulate is, in fact, earlier than the deduction of freedom."24

Let us see how the ideas of God and the immortality of soul gain reality through their connection with the moral law. The object of the moral law is the highest good. Virtue and happiness are necessarily connected in the concept of the highest good. The complete fitness of the will to the moral law is holiness. In other words, this is virtue or perfection.25 But no rational being is capable of possessing virtue or holiness in this world at any time. Virtue may

22 Ibid., p. 137.
23 Ibid., p. 4.
24 L.W. Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, op. cit., p. 208.
25 Kant, Practical Reason, op. cit., p. 126.
be achieved through an endless progress towards it. Such a journey is possible under the presupposition that soul endures infinitely. In order to make the highest good possible the supposition of the immortality of the soul is necessary.

Having established the objective validity of the immortality of the soul Kant should turn to the other element of the highest good, i.e. happiness and he would show how the idea of God gains reality by means of it.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 128 -130.}

From our standpoint happiness consists in complete harmony of nature and the principles of one's will. But nature is not governed by his will. Therefore, there cannot be a complete harmony between nature and a man's will. Man cannot establish the a priori synthetic relation between virtue and happiness. Therefore, either there is no ground in the moral law that can make the connexion possible or there is no necessary connexion between virtue and happiness. But the moral law commands to seek the highest good. It is possible only on the supposition that God is the cause of the whole of nature, who is distinct from nature, who contains the ground of this connexion, namely, of the exact harmony of happiness and morality. Such a being can act with understanding and will.
6. Practical Knowledge and Rational Faith:

The upshot of the whole discussion is that the moral law is the ground of the postulates of freedom, immortality of soul and God. The moral law itself is derived from pure practical reason. Therefore, practical reason is the foundation of the moral law and its postulates.

Despite the fact that practical reason grounds the whole sphere of morality, Kant has not given the same status to the whole sphere of morality in respect of its epistemic character. The recognition of the postulates except that of freedom does not extend the possibility of knowledge (practical). Kant only deduced freedom from the moral law and thereby showed how it is necessary for moral law. But he has not proved that God exists or that soul is immortal. His theory of morality does not presuppose religion. The idea of God or the idea of the immortality of soul are not even necessary for the recognition of the moral law. The world of morality, therefore, has been distinguished between (a) practical knowledge and (b) rational faith.

But Kant is not clear about practical knowledge. Perhaps, he means by it that kind of knowledge which guides a moral agent to act. Kant thinks that in order to act morally a man should know that his reason is the source of the moral law; and he must be aware of his freedom. Now, the question is whether
moral law and freedom are cognitions. According to Kant, knowledge is expressed in the synthetic a priori judgment. Moral law or the categorical imperative is also a synthetic a priori judgement since the obligation is not contained in the concept of the good will. Therefore, the moral law is a cognitive fact. But the cognition depends solely on pure practical reason. Practical reason produces the law and it is known intuitively.

But the moral law is not something independent of actions. It has relevance only in the context of actions. Just as objects of sense give the relevant conditions for the a priori intuitions of space and time, similarly, the moral law is known intuitively in an a priori manner. But it is known such as the occasion of moral action arises. Thus, the practical reason producing the moral law makes us aware of the freedom of will as the basis of all our moral actions. Kant says that in our knowledge of objects the sensibility provides the raw materials which are received in the forms of space and time contributed by the mind. In the case of moral action also, a similar situation develops. The experiences of moral actions provide the raw materials which are received by the form of freedom, for every moral action is possible through the idea of freedom. I am not sure whether such a comparison holds good. But if it is allowed then the idea of freedom may be an object of practical reason, just as space and time are the a priori intuitions of theoretical reason.
Freedom is the only idea that has been proved by the apodictic law of practical reason. The moral law manifests itself in freedom, for only through freedom can the moral action be exercised. So freedom becomes the form through which moral actions are organized. Thus freedom is the object of practical knowledge, which means that certain things have to be accepted as true to make actions possible. These things may not be as real as the objects of sense, but also they cannot be said to be unreal as the chimera. Freedom enjoys such a status of objectivity, though not of reality. Kant himself says that freedom is ".... among all the ideas of pure speculative reason, which brings such a great extension in the field of the supersensuous, though it is only practical knowledge which is enlarged,..." 27

But, Kant did not say clearly anything about the epistemic character of the idea of freedom. That freedom is indispensable for moral action suggests that we should become aware of ourselves as free when we act morally. Unless we become acquainted with freedom in some way, how can we say that through it the synthesis of the good will and the obligation, is made possible? Reason constitutes the idea and confers it a sort of intuitive nature, as the freedom is realized without any intermediate categories. It seems that Kant is admitting the possibility of

27 Imd., pp. 128 - 130.
some sort of rational intuition for the cognition of freedom. I think that Kant would not fall into a contradiction if he introduces the idea of a sort of rational intuition for the knowledge of morality. It need not be the type of intuition creating its own object but it may be an intuition guaranteeing the existence of something without which action would be impossible.

In the Critique what Kant denied is the intuitive understanding. Understanding for human beings cannot be intuitive. Later on Kant distinguished reason from understanding. He also drew the distinction between different employments of pure reason - theoretical and practical. This may suggest that Kant would recognize some other kind of awareness other than the sensuous one. Human beings are capable of enjoying a non-sensuous intuition. There may be a kind of non-sensuous awareness of freedom by means of practical reason.

Kant's definition of knowledge in terms of sense-materials organized by categories, prevents him from giving such awareness the status of knowledge. But if the characteristics of knowledge are present in other types of awareness, it is not clear why the awareness of freedom should not be called knowledge. In knowledge, there must be an evidence which gives certainty to the idea. In moral action, the individual is aware that he is free and he also realizes that without freedom no such action
is possible. The 'I think' that accompanies all experiences gives unity to the manifold of experience, but 'I think' cannot be brought under any category and so does not amount to knowledge. But 'I choose' or 'I am free' is present in every moral action and without the certainty of 'I choose' the action cannot have the character of a moral action. The idea of 'I choose' or 'I am free' is therefore an undeniable fact providing the basis of the knowledge of freedom.

We know freedom or the moral law, but we should not claim knowledge of the soul or God. We have a strong conviction which can be supported by reason. These two ideas are important for the pursuit of moral good. But these are not the conditions of the moral law. Neither we become directly or indirectly aware of them. Kant, sometimes, identifies God with the moral law. "God is not a being me, but merely a thought in me. God is the morally practical reason legislating for itself. Therefore, there is only one God in me, about me, above me". If this is so, Dr. Radhakrishnan is right in saying that God "...is founded in the secret places of the soul and its validity is self-established by reason of the soul's trust in itself".


29 S. Radhakrishnan, op.cit., p. 446.
identified God with the moral law, we know God. But in his *Practical Reason* he denied knowledge of God. We have only faith in him.

On the whole, it is more or less clear that Kant is speaking of a sort of rational intuition produced by practical reason. We know the moral law or freedom but not through understanding or scientific thinking. With immediate certainty, we know the moral law and also realize the deeper significance of life. This is possible only through the will or practical reason. Speculative reason may be described as understanding from outside, quantitative and superficial. The function of speculative reason should be confined to the domain of science and criticism. And practical reason will give us knowledge of morality; it expresses itself in "appreciation, creation, spiritual affirmation". 30

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Section 2

AESTHETIC INTUITION

1. Judgement as a Form of Apprehension:

In our previous discussion we have demonstrated how, according to Kant, understanding and reason are entirely two different modes of consciousness. Each of them points to a distinctive type of experience. But these two types of apprehension do not exhaust the possibility of human experience. There may be some other kind of apprehension, such as the apprehension of beauty, not possible either by understanding or by reason. Kant is now introducing another mode of consciousness, i.e. judgement, for aesthetic experience. In this section we shall see how judgement can give us knowledge of the aesthetic object. Perhaps, it would be better to sum up the main points of the first two Critiques before we direct our attention to the aesthetic experience.

The first Critique establishes Kant's thesis that knowledge depends on two concepts of sensibility and understanding. This suggests the idea that according to him experience should remain confined to our sense-perception of physical objects and its extension into the domain of the scientist's view of nature. The object that is known by us is not the same as it is in itself; but as it is determined by our consciousness.
Consequently, it directs our attention to the supersensible substrate of which we know nothing.

On the other hand, the Practical Reason establishes the thesis that reason should not be satisfied with the partial knowledge given by understanding. Kant thinks that reason may have access beyond the sensible world. In its theoretical aspect reason attempts to reach the unconditional but in vain. Theoretical reason only gives us hypothetical knowledge. Truly speaking this is no better than understanding and ".... its objects are not a different kind of perceptions but phenomena to the nth power". But reason has a different use in its practical context. Practical reason or reason in its practical aspect uncovers a field in which it is the sole authority and prescribes laws a priori by means of the concept of freedom.

Understanding and reason thus form ".... two distinct jurisdictions over one and the same territory of experience. But neither can interfere with the other". The concept of freedom represents its object as a thing-in-itself and man as a moral agent belongs to the supersensible world. But neither understanding nor reason can afford us a cognition (theoretical) of the supersensible substratum though the idea of it lies at the


basis of all objects of experience, whether theoretical or practical.³

Now, it is evident that this inaccessible realm of the supersensible is the hindrance to our way of passing from the one realm to the other. But such a transition is necessary; though the realm of nature does not influence the sphere of practical reason, the latter must influence the former if "... the concept of freedom is meant to actualize in the sensible world the end proposed by its laws; ...."⁴ Accordingly, nature must be regarded as compatible with the possibility of the actualization of the ends proposed by practical laws. We are thus led to the conclusion that there must be a ground or principle of unity which enables us to pass from the one to the other realm of experience.⁵ To put it differently we may say that Kant feels the necessity of a connecting link between the theoretical and moral philosophy. Doubtless, this connecting link or the principle of unity is the supersensible substratum to which both understanding and practical reason direct our attention.

The problem arises: how is this reality to be apprehended? Do we possess a higher form of apprehension? If so, what is the mode of such apprehension? Kant thinks that a possible

³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid., p. 14.
⁵ Ibid., p. 15.
answer can only be given by introducing the faculty of judgement as a means of cognition. He therefore includes judgement "... in the family of our higher cognitive faculties...." and it lies between understanding and reason. It is therefore judgement which functions as a mediator between the world of phenomena and the world of freedom.

According to Kant, nature constitutes a well-ordered whole. On the assumption of such a principle of unity we can interpret nature as intelligible to ourselves. The concept of nature as unified through the common ground of its laws which adapts the system to our cognitive faculties is the concept of the purposiveness or finality of nature. This concept represents nature as if an understanding contains the ground of the unity of its laws. In fact, this principle of purposiveness must be transcendental, since it cannot be borrowed from experience. It must be derived from the intellectual faculty. But Kant insists that we need not assume that there actually exists such an understanding. According to Kant the faculty of judgement can estimate nature as having a final purpose and it is possible according to the a priori principles of judgement. He thinks that understanding gives us the idea of nature which is an appearance and thereby points to the supersensible substrate but leaves it quite undetermined. But judged through the a priori principle

6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., pp. 19 - 20.
of finality nature appears as object of art having an end. That means judgment by its a priori principle determines the supersensible substrate. But nature is realized as freedom only in the realm of practical reason; i.e. reason also gives determination to this supersensible substrate a priori by its practical law. "Thus judgment makes possible the transition from the realm of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom". According to Kant there is another ground upon which it is possible to show the transition from one realm to the other by means of judgment. The faculties of the soul are reducible to the following three: the faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and the faculty of desire. Understanding is the faculty of cognition and prescribes laws by means of concepts of nature. For the faculty of desire reason provides the a priori laws by means of the concept of freedom. Now, feeling of pleasure stands in between these two faculties. We may expect that judgment also contains an a priori principle of its own and a transition from the realm of concept of nature to that of freedom will be possible by means of judgment since the faculty of desire is necessarily connected with the faculty of pleasure or displeasure.

But the judgment of which Kant is speaking is not an ordinary determinant judgment, which subsumes the particular under

8 Ibid., p. 38.
9 Ibid., p. 17.
a given universal. The judgment which Kant seeks must be immediate and go as deep as the moral judgment. Kant is now introducing the concept of reflective judgment. But the word 'reflection' as Kant used it in the Critique of Judgment seems to be highly technical. It is better to spell it 'reflection' as Mr. Macmillan suggests. In reflection there is an immediate reference to the feeling of totality. The reflective judgment itself reaches the idea of nature as having a finality and through it gives a law to itself. It does not, therefore, determine anything in nature. It only gives us pleasure in viewing nature in this way. Reflective judgment in the form of immediate experience thus conditions all other forms of experience and is itself the highest form of experience. Kant ascribes the original synthetic activity of the mind to the power of judgment.

2. Reflective Judgment: Aesthetic and Teleological:

The purposiveness in nature may be viewed in two different ways. To judge something in accordance with the formal finality

10 Ibid., p. 18.
11 Ibid.
12 R.A.C. Macmillan, op.cit., p. 33. The word 'reflection' was also used by Locke. For him reflection means internal perception. But for Kant it is "a higher apperception on the basis of the ordinary process" (ibid.). It is, therefore, better to spell reflection to distinguish Kant's concept of reflective from its use in Locke and other writers.
means to judge aesthetically. But when we judge according to real finality, the teleological judgment results in. Corresponding to the two divisions of judgment the Critique of Judgment divides itself into the critique of aesthetic judgment and the critique of teleological judgment. Each of these parts intends to prove that we do possess a higher form of apprehension than understanding, in which we touch the reality. I should turn only to an analysis of aesthetic experience, for, I think that it is the best type of apprehension in which reality reveals itself in the phenomena of beauty. We cannot deny the metaphysical significance of aesthetic experience. We may say with Zimmerman that ".... the experience of natural beauty, is experience of the noumenal world as it filters through the phenomenal world, and, that in order to secure the experience of natural beauty, the human mind must act passively in receiving its contents and not actively in organizing them". 13

3. Characteristics of Aesthetic Judgment:

If something is judged to be beautiful by means of imagination, it refers to nothing in respect of the object but merely the effect of its representation upon the subject's mind i.e. its feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The judgment which results is, according to Kant, an aesthetic judgment and taste

is the faculty of judging aesthetically.\textsuperscript{14}

In an aesthetic experience, therefore, we are not concerned with the real existence of the object but with the reaction of the representation in the subject's mind, we merely become conscious of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure aroused by the representation. The analysis shows that the determining ground of the aesthetic judgment is not a concept, the delight itself is sufficient to determine it. "Delight in the beautiful must depend upon the reflection on an object prescursory to some (not definitely determined) concept".\textsuperscript{15} The indifferent attitude towards the existence of its object in an aesthetic judgment demands that it be free, pure experience of the in-itself entity which denies any conscious determination. It is the product of subject's estimation of the object ".... on mere contemplation (intuition or reflection)".\textsuperscript{16} At the same time Kant points out that a feeling of satisfaction may also be aroused by the agreeable and the good. But the difference lies in the fact that the satisfaction in the agreeable and the good is coupled with an interest; because there is an objective reference in the agreeable and the good.

\textsuperscript{14} Kant, Critique of Judgment, op.cit., p. 41.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 46.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 43.
4. **Aesthetic Experience as different from a Cognitive Judgment**

From the above analysis it follows that an aesthetic judgment differs from a cognitive one. The distinction is made on the following grounds.

1. An aesthetic experience is not determined by a concept. The concept-producing power of the understanding has nothing to do with it. Aesthetic judgment only refers to the immediate feeling of the subject on a given representation. The determining ground of an aesthetic judgment is the subject's feeling of pleasure in the beautiful.

A conceptual judgment, on the other hand, always refers to an object and understanding organizes the representations according to its concepts. A cognitive judgment may have a reference to the subject's reaction of the representation, but it is not directly important like that of an aesthetic judgment.

2. All aesthetic experience involves a delight in the object. But the delight is not present in a cognitive judgment.

3. Imagination, that plays a dominant role in aesthetic judgment, is productive, whereas it is reproductive in case of cognition. Understanding, rather, plays a subordinate role in the former kind of judgment.

4. Besides, what is revealed in an aesthetic experience is an unorganized, in-itself entity. The cognitive powers are
in mutual accord in it. But the object of cognition is not the thing as it is in-itself; it is determined by the concepts of understanding and thereby gains a definite meaning.

According to Kant, knowledge is only universally valid and communicable. If so, does it not suggest the idea that an aesthetic judgment is private as it is based on subject's feeling of pleasure? To come out of the solipsism Kant, therefore, must find out some common ground of feeling in aesthetic experience. Otherwise it would lose much of its significance. He thinks that feeling is private so far as one feels it. But the process which produces the feeling of delight in the beautiful must be common for all. It would be more clear if we take the example given by Mr. Zimmerman in his article "Kant: The Aesthetic Judgment".\(^{17}\) Let us suppose, a person touches the stove and says that he is experiencing a sensation of heat. It implies that (1) he feels the warmth and (2) under the same conditions everyone with normal sense organs would feel the same sensation. Just like this an object of aesthetic experience is deemed to be beautiful for everyone if the conditions, (i) the delight in the object is pure\(^{18}\) and (ii) harmony between understanding and imagination,\(^{19}\) are fulfilled.

As knowledge is communicable and universally valid, its condition must be of the same nature. The condition that both

\(^{18}\) Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, *op.cit.*, p. 50.
imagination and understanding must be present in harmony in the subject's mind, is necessary and what is experienced must be communicable for the possibility of cognition. Kant, thus, finds his common ground for feeling in the condition of cognition in general. Now, he would have to show that the aesthetic feeling consists in the harmonious play of imagination and understanding, though the way in which these two faculties are brought into activity in aesthetic judgment is different from that in the cognition of objects.

5. Universality and Necessity in Aesthetic Experience:

Thus grounding the feeling on the condition of knowledge Kant proves the universality and necessity of aesthetic judgment. Let us see how the conditions of cognition are brought into activity in order to produce aesthetic pleasure.

To be acceptable as a condition for knowledge the feeling of delight has to be universally communicated. There is no doubt that the representation which produces delight has an objective content. It is the determining ground of judgment. The cognitive powers are brought into play by this representation and they become engaged in a free play, as no definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. The mental state in this representation will be a feeling of the free play of the powers of representations.

20 Ibid., p. 68.
representation will involve imagination for bringing together the manifold of intuition and understanding will supply the unity of the concept which will unite the representations. Kant insists on such harmonious unity of imagination, intuition and understanding. Concepts do not play a dominant role, as we find in the case of knowledge of objects. But intuition and imagination are more important and understanding only provides the basis of the unity of other faculties. Therefore, he calls the mental activity in such cognitive process a free play in which the representation by which the object of beauty is given admits of universal communication. Kant also states that such representation is valid for everyone.

The subjective aspect of the universal communicability of the mode of representation exists apart from the influence of any definite concept. It is nothing else than the mental state present in the free play of imagination and understanding. Kant holds that this subjective relation is the most suitable for cognition in general and is valid for everyone. This universality of the subjective validity of delight and as a result, the object with which the representation is connected is called beautiful.

The charge, often, brought against Kant is that he bases aesthetic judgment on the condition of cognition in general, and thereby he turns it into 'intellectual cognition'. Indeed, the charge arises because of our misunderstanding of what Kant
actually says. Mr. Macmillan rightly says that though Kant "... brings Feeling back to functions of knowledge, in the process of proof he lifts up knowledge into relationship with the personal, free activity of mind. Reflexion is not debased to Understanding but Understanding is elevated by its subordination to Reflexion". The representation, Kant insists, which occasions the judgment of taste and in which understanding and imagination are united is not in nature intellectual. The judgment of taste determines the object independently of concepts. There is no other way of the subjective unity of the different faculties. The play of both faculties to an indefinite, yet a given representation produces a harmonious activity which belongs to cognition in general. We can also think of an objective relation in this respect, as though it is subjective. It may be felt universally in all the minds. Kant, therefore, comes to the conclusion that a representation, which is singular and is in harmony with the condition of universality, is necessary for everyone. "... who is so constituted as to judge by means of understanding and sense conjointly (i.e. for every man)".

The aesthetic judgment is therefore that in which we come to know that "The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, pleases universally" (italics author's). And this mark of universality in aesthetic judgment enables Kant to differentiate

22 Kant, Critique of Judgment, op. cit., p. 60.
23 Ibid.
it from the aesthetic judgment of sense in which this mark of universality is lacking. An object of art may also produce pleasure. But mere pleasure would not possess more than private validity. Such validity cannot satisfy the condition of knowledge. So, Kant calls the former aesthetic reflective judgment. Aesthetic enjoyment should not be identified with mere sense pleasure.

The conditions of knowledge, according to Kant, are that what one knows must not only be universal, but also necessary. Kant proceeds to show next that an aesthetic judgment possesses necessity. He states if judgments of taste had a definite objective principle then everybody who would follow such a principle would claim unconditioned necessity for it. Therefore such judgment must have a subjective principle. It will determine what pleases or displeases, by means of feeling only and not through concepts, yet such determination will have a universal validity. This principle is called common sense. It is different from common understanding, for understanding only judges by concepts while common sense judges by feeling. The judgment of taste, therefore, depends on the presupposition of the existence of a common sense.

Judgments must be universally communicated. If such a communication is to be possible, a given object has to set the imagination to work in which the manifold will be organised and

24 Ibid., p. 82.
25 Ibid., p. 83.
imagination in turn will stimulate the understanding for bringing them under the unity of concepts. There is a disposition which can work best for producing the harmony of imagination and understanding and as such disposition can be determined through feeling, it must be universally communicable. But the universal communicability is possible only if we think of a common sense. We have to assume a common sense as the necessary condition of universal communicability of knowledge. Such presupposition is made in every principle of knowledge.

In all judgments we do not accept the idea that the notion of beauty differs from person to person. When we describe anything as beautiful, our judgment does not rest on concepts but on feeling. Kant thinks that this fundamental feeling is not a private feeling, but a public sense. But the assertion Kant makes is this that it is not "... that everyone will fall in with our judgment, but rather that everyone ought to agree with it."26 (italics author's). He points out that commonsense is a mere ideal, norm. With this presupposition an aesthetic judgment becomes a rule for everyone. The principle, though it is subjective, yet is objectively universal and as it concerns the universal agreement of the different judging subjects, it would demand universal assent like an objective principle. 27

26 Ibid., p. 84.
27 Ibid., p. 85.
Kant comes to the conclusion that the aesthetic judgment gives us the knowledge that "The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, is cognized as object of a necessary delight" (italics author’s).

Imagination which produces the aesthetic judgment in relation with the representation and the understanding is productive in character. It is tied down to some extent to a definite form of object, but it is easy to conceive that imagination may supply a new arrangement of the manifold and it will still produce an aesthetic judgment in conformity with understanding. If imagination has to follow something definite, then it will lose its freedom and it will fail to give us the delight, as we experience in aesthetic judgment. Hence in aesthetic judgment there is conformity to a law without a law and a subjective harmony of the imagination and understanding without an objective one. This freedom of the aesthetic judgment gives it a unique character because it is able to produce a universal delight which has the characteristics of universality and necessity, even though it is independent of the rule of concepts.

28 Ibid.
6. Aesthetic Judgment as a distinct type of Apprehension:

This analysis of the formulation of aesthetic judgment shows that such judgment can give us knowledge of beauty, for it possesses the essential characteristics of knowledge, such as universality and necessity. Still, Kant refuses to ascribe any cognitive value to aesthetic judgment. As it is not a conceptual judgment the apprehension of an aesthetic judgment differs from the apprehensions by understanding and practical reason. The immediately felt apprehension of beauty may be described as 'aesthetic intuition'. The characteristics of intuition, viz., the individuality, the directness and the immediacy, all are present in aesthetic experience. But the term 'intuition' is not to be understood in the sense in which Kant used it in the first Critique or his implicit use of it in the Practical Reason. In the latter book Kant did not use the term 'intuition' at all. But his formulation of the moral consciousness implies that it is intuitive. Moral intuition is based on reason. Reason may have a direct insight into reality in its practical aspect. Aesthetic intuition may easily be distinguished from it since it is independent of concepts. But the confusion arises with regard to sensuous intuition as it has been used in the first Critique. The term aesthetic misleads us. The word 'aesthetic' in the Critique of Judgment is to be distinguished from sensibility. In the Critique of Pure Reason intuition means 'sense-awareness'. At this level man
becomes aware of something but cannot express it. Sensible intuition depends on sense-qualities. It cannot go beyond mere sense-awareness. The case is different with aesthetic intuition. It comes out from its narrow conception and thus gains a profound meaning. Sense-qualities cannot be the basis of aesthetic intuition. Sense-qualities may be admitted in aesthetic intuition only in the sense that they make the aesthetic form "completely intuitable". It seems that Kant is emptying form from its content since according to him, sense-qualities are not important in aesthetic experience. I think that Kant does not mean to say that sense-qualities are not necessary for aesthetic intuition. What he actually says, it seems to me, that in aesthetic intuition particular sense-qualities are not important, what is important is the form, the shape that is made of sense-qualities.

Doubtless, experience occasions aesthetic intuition as it produces sensible intuition. It is also true that in aesthetic intuition we cannot say what beauty is but unlike sensible intuition we can, at least, say that of what I am intuitively aware is beautiful. That means I can express my feeling by saying that I am experiencing something beautiful. But this is impossible in sensible intuition.

The superiority of aesthetic experience lies in Kant's not introducing a different faculty for aesthetic apprehension.

29 Ibid., p. 68.
Aesthetic intuition is not a mysterious faculty. It may be defined as an unorganized harmonious play of understanding and imagination occasioned by experience. Perhaps, Mr. Greene is right in pointing out that by aesthetic response Kant conceives nothing more than a 'hightening' and an 'intensifying' of normal sense-perception. This account of aesthetic intuition by no means precludes the possibility of recognizing its qualitative uniqueness which differentiates it from mere sense-intuition where immediacy is the main point. Aesthetic experience, thus, is a generic type of experience. It is based on aesthetic intuition. ".... true aesthetic response, expressing itself in the judgment of taste, is certainly an unique type of satisfaction occasioned by a distinctive intuition of a distinctive type of object." Taste is the intuitive apprehension of beauty. According to Kant pure judgment of taste is intuitive or contemplative.

7. Aesthetic Apprehension and Cognition:

Let us see whether aesthetic apprehension can really be called knowledge because it is independent of concepts. The question arises whether intuition can give us knowledge, whatever the nature of that knowledge may be. Can intuition independent of concepts give us knowledge?

31 Ibid., p. 229.
32 Kant, Critique of Judgment, op. cit., p. 43.
The essential marks of knowledge, viz., universality and necessity, are present in aesthetic experience and beauty as a form is aesthetically apprehended. This suggests that aesthetic judgment has cognitive value. Kant's aesthetic intuition, thus, overcomes the main defect, which is generally, brought against intuition, that it is a private feeling and so it cannot be accorded the status of cognition. Moreover, Kantian aesthetic intuition provides a method whereby disagreement can be solved. In order to experience an aesthetic object some conditions must be fulfilled, of which the most important condition is the mental harmony of imagination and understanding. A disagreement can take place only if one party fails to fulfil the conditions necessary for aesthetic appreciation.

The question may arise: if the marks of knowledge are present in intuitive apprehension why should we not call it knowledge? The definition of knowledge in terms of intuition and concept precludes Kant from calling aesthetic experience knowledge. For him, aesthetic quality can only be felt by aesthetic intuition, it cannot be interpreted in terms of a definite concept. But intuition without concept is blind.

If fact, we cannot define an aesthetic experience by means of a definite concept. It does not mean that no concept is used in aesthetic judgment. Though Kant excludes concepts from his account of aesthetic intuition, it involves concepts
implicitly. In order to arouse an aesthetic satisfaction, understanding must be brought into play with imagination. Can understanding act without any concept? That aesthetic intuition apprehends independently of concepts may suggest that the concept does not play a dominant role in aesthetic experience. It is subordinate to intuition and imagination. There is an implicit application of the category of substance without which it is impossible to perceive even the aesthetic object. "The individuality which Kant rightly attributes to the aesthetic object is possible only through the use of this category in integrating the sensuous manifold". This analysis shows that aesthetic intuition is not devoid of all concepts and understanding. In aesthetic intuition "... a genuinely objective quality can be genuinely cognized without appeal to explicit concepts or the application of rules and principles". Mr. Greene rightly points out that Kant did not believe that concepts are the only media of thought and communication. The interpretation of cognition in this wider sense is implicit in Kant's doctrine of "aesthetical Ideas".

We may conclude, therefore, that there are different types of cognition all of which do not involve explicit concepts.

34 T. M. Greene, op. cit., p. 346.
35 Ibid.
Intuitive knowledge is that in which we do not distinguish between different levels of cognition as we do in apprehension by understanding. In intuition the whole mind is in activity. Moreover, it is not correct to say that the reality which we know in aesthetic intuition must be brought under the same conditions in which we know only the phenomena. And that aesthetic intuition cannot be arranged according to the concepts of understanding does not suggest that it is not cognition. Aesthetic experience may be the highest type of experience; reality is truly grasped in it. Mr. Basch is right when he says, "the individual is more truly himself when he feels".36

The distinction between knowledge and aesthetic experience may be explained with reference to Bradley's well-known distinction between 'that' and 'what' aspects of object. In cognition, in the sense of sense-perception, what we know is 'what' aspect, that means, we know 'what an object is' and it is known by discursive understanding of Kant or by relational thought of Bradley. But in aesthetic experience we do not know 'what beauty is'. What I know is simply that 'that it is beautiful'. The 'that' aspect cannot be known by description but it is to be known in a direct contact. In Zimmerman's words, "Beauty ultimately is felt and no amount of reasoning concerning it can result in the same feeling as direct contact. There is no

36 Quoted by R.A.C. Macmillan in his The Crowning Phase of the Critical Philosophy, op. cit., p. 59.
knowledge by description, only knowledge by acquaintance". 37

I shall add that both aesthetic and moral intuition are on the same level and in both there is a grasp of the real in-itself. I think that Kant starts with the distinction between intuition and understanding, the Bradleyan 'that' and 'what' and then tries to solve the dichotomy between the two in three distinct approaches. Mr. Macmillan says, "Indeed Kant ultimately shows that in Aesthetic we make the nearest approximation to divine Understanding, for its objects are those which our mind would create for itself if it had creative power". 38 Rather, I should say that both aesthetic and moral intuition approach nearest to divine understanding, because in both there is a grasp of the real directly.

Of course, the object which we know and the way in which we know in aesthetic and moral apprehensions are different from our apprehension of ordinary objects. From this point of view Kant has done nothing wrong by distinguishing aesthetic and moral intuition from knowledge in the strict sense. Presumably, in order to avoid confusion Kant refuses to call each type of apprehension knowledge. He restricts the term cognition to apprehension by understanding with which he was engaged in the first Critique. But he does not reduce the significance of the

apprehensions by aesthetic and moral intuition. Attributing the characteristics of universality and necessity to each kind of apprehension, Kant raises all of them to the same rank. In each of the three Critiques he isolates and analyzes a distinctive type of human experience with its a priori characteristics and thus constructs, "... a synoptic metaphysic .... to define the ontological status of the "objects" of these experiences and, on the other hand, to relate these several "objects" and types of experience to one another". 39

39 T.M. Greene, op. cit., p. 338.