Empiricism, on the other hand, holds that sense-experience is the only source of knowledge. But the necessity and universality of knowledge cannot be derived from mere sense-experience. Empiricism leads to scepticism. For sense-experience cannot go beyond the present data. Even in the area of such limited experience, what is derived from the senses can always be doubted. In fact, there is no certainty in the world of experience. Scepticism as a theory of knowledge is self-defeating; for while it denies all knowledge, it claims the certainty for its own position. Scepticism, therefore, is not acceptable.

Kant now enters the controversy. He is dissatisfied with both the theories. According to him, understanding, if it is an independent source of knowledge, should produce its object and at the same time know it. This is, actually, impossible for human understanding which is discursive. That means it depends for its material on some other faculty. If the object is given, understanding can operate its function.

Kant is in agreement with empiricism so far as it holds that sensation alone yields us the materials of knowledge. At the same time Kant disagrees with the idea that the acts of understanding are not necessary for transforming the raw materials into knowledge.

Kant developed his theory of knowledge by combining the two elements, sensibility and understanding. He thought that
each of the theories namely, empiricism and rationalism, has something to contribute to knowledge. The critical philosophy of Kant wants to proceed by inquiring into the limits of sense-experience and pure reason. It is of the opinion that knowledge cannot be a product of either sensibility or reason. It does not start with a notion that there is a pre-ordained object of knowledge. On the contrary, Kant thinks that experience itself deserves to be examined and he undertakes the task. The result of the investigation is the critical philosophy; according to which knowledge involves sensuous as well as an intellectual element. Unlike Leibniz or Hegel Kant thinks that sensibility and understanding are distinct faculties. "... there are two stems of human knowledge, namely, *sensibility* and *understanding*, ..... Through the former, objects are given to us; through the latter, they are thought" (italics author's). According to Kant, one cannot be transformed into the other. The "....... theory of the radical diversity of two sources of knowledge" is "wholly his own work" and this is "....... the most important strategic move Kant made in his philosophical development".

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1 Kant's use of the word 'experience' differs from that of the empiricists. According to empiricism, experience means sense-experience, the only source of knowledge. But for Kant experience and knowledge are equivalent.


The faculties of sensibility and understanding differ from each other, radically, yet, they co-operate in producing knowledge. The objects of knowledge are given to sensibility, it is, thus, in immediate relation to the objects. Therefore, sensibility gives us intuitions and they are thought through understanding.

Kant felt that intuition alone does not constitute knowledge, for knowledge is not confined to the immediate and the present only; it transcends the given. But there is no doubt that intuition is the foundation of knowledge. The question may arise if intuition is sensuous or intellectual. Kant thinks at least in the Critique of Pure Reason that intuition is sensuous only. It seems that Kant's view on the type of possible intuition are completely opposed to Plato's. Plato advocates the view of intellectual intuition.

In the Critique⁴ Kant was concerned to show how knowledge can be possible and this he tried to show with an analysis of scientific knowledge. But his experience at the end of the first Critique revealed that there are some fundamental facts of human life which cannot be established by the laws of sensuous intuition. The incompleteness of the account of human experience led him to a broader concept of intuition which includes moral

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⁴ The Critique of Pure Reason henceforth to be mentioned as Critique.
and aesthetic experiences. Such experiences may establish direct intuition of the truths not obtained by the sensuous nature of intuition. But all this does not mean that Kant advanced the possibility in a systematic manner that intellect would achieve intuitive capacity as is found in Plato. There is also the difference between Kant and Plato about the object of intuition. As Kant believes in the nature of intuition as sensuous, the objects of intuition according to him, are empirical objects. So far he believes in the nature of intuition as non-sensuous, the objects of intuition are the moral good and the beautiful. Plato was not at all concerned with sensuous intuition. According to him, objects of intuition are the Ideas, the true objects of knowledge.

Let us turn to Kant's theory of sensible intuition. His view of non-sensuous intuition, which I would entitle 'moral and aesthetic intuition', will be examined in a separate chapter.

2. Sensuous Intuition and the Human Mind:

In the Critique Kant devoted his attention to isolate the conditions of a priori knowledge. He was chiefly interested in constructing philosophy on the model of sciences like physics and mathematics.

5 In Chapter 2 I attempted to elaborate Plato's view of intuition.
An investigation into the nature and the capacity of human mind led Kant to discover that human understanding cannot produce its objects as the rationalist thought them to be. Understanding should depend on some other source which can give it the raw materials of knowledge. The faculty which serves this purpose is the faculty of sensibility.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique Kant is exclusively engaged with this faculty. According to him, sensibility alone yields us intuitions. In English the term 'intuition' is used to mean a priori insight. But the etymological meaning of the term is 'to look at' or 'to view'. Whenever Kant used 'intuition' in the Critique, he used it in this latter sense. But he did not thereby confine the word to the visual sense alone; it includes all other senses, too.

The faculty of sensibility, Kant argues, is passive. But the object of knowledge can in no other way be given except to sensibility. Human beings do not possess the capacity of producing objects. They are given from outside. The function of sensibility is simply to receive the object given to it. Since the object is given to sensibility, it is in immediate relation with the object. Intuitions thus originate in sensibility. Doubtless intuition is sensuous. In other words, the sensibility is in direct contact with the object; hence it is intuitive. As passive sensibility is the source of intuition; it seems that
intuition is also passive. So far there is no problem. But contradiction arises when Kant says that intuitions take place as soon as the sensibility is affected by the object. This position of intuition suggests that we become aware of the objects on the level of mere sensation. H.W. Cassirer points out that Kant did not believe that the awareness of objects arises on the level of mere sensation. Hence the latter position of intuition contradicts Kant's general view of sensible intuition which is passive and receptive, on the one hand, and direct and immediate, on the other but does not give rise to any awareness of the objects. He also points out that the 'object affects us' implies the causal relationship between the perceived object and the peripient subject. But this view of causal relationship is in no way defensible. Cassirer suggests that in order to avoid contradictions Kant would not say anything about "what was to be held responsible for our sensations and for the state of passive receptiveness which is an essential ingredient in perceptual awareness".

But it seems to me that there is nothing wrong in the assertions that intuition is passive and receptive and that it is in direct and immediate contact with the object. The passivity

6 Kant, op.cit., A19, p. 65.
8 Ibid., p. 28.
of sensibility should not imply that mind does not become aware of the presence of the object. Rather, it means that sensibility does not produce its object. It depends on the given from outside. There will be no problem if it is suggested that the awareness of object (of course 'object' in the loose sense, the undetermined object) may arise on the level of intuition. It seems that Cassirer takes the terms sensation and intuition as equivalent; so he failed to reconcile Kant's views of intuition. If by intuition Kant did not mean something different from mere sensation, we may wonder why the word 'intuition' was at all necessary. The matter cannot be pursued for want of detailed information. About the second point, i.e.: there seems to be a causal relationship between the object and the subject, it may be stated that 'the object affects us' need not indicate any causal relationship. It may be understood as the case of mind's giving attention to a particular object among a lot of objects.

Kant insists that human beings are capable of enjoying sensible intuition alone, because human mind can in no other way be in direct and immediate contact save through sensibility. The faculty of understanding, as it is discursive, should think of an object by means of a general concept. 9

9 Kant, op. cit., A19, p. 65.
3. Different Meanings of Intuition:

Kant did not establish any definite meaning of what he understood by the concept of intuition. Perhaps the idea of Kant's sense of intuition would be clear if we consider his use of it in different contexts. He is not using the word 'intuition' in the sense of 'to intuit' only. Kant often understands it for 'what is intuited'. In the sentence, "Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions;......" (italics author's), the word intuition seems to be used in the sense of 'what is intuited'; "yields intuitions" would not be sensible if intuition here means 'intuiting'. Moreover, the term intuition has been used in the plural. We cannot think that a verb may be used in the plural. Besides, whenever Kant speaks of space and time to be intuitions and not concepts, he definitely means by intuition 'what is intuited', not 'intuiting'. Now, let us consider the sentence "The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is entitled appearance" (italics author's). Here the expression 'intuition' has been used in the sense of 'intuiting'. Whether the word is used in the former or in the latter sense I find no difficulty in understanding Kant's notion of empirical intuition. 'To intuit' implies that there is something which is to be intuited

10 Ibid.
12 Ibid., A20 = B34, p. 65.
and that something may be also called intuition. At the same
time that something is to be intuited implies that there is a
faculty by means of which we intuit; that faculty is intuition.
Therefore, neither of the uses does any harm to the real mean-
ing of the sensuous intuition. The attentive reading of the
Critique reveals, I think, that in most of the contexts Kant
used the word intuition in the sense of 'what is intuited'.

On the whole, intuition may be defined as an immediate
awareness of something which is given by an independent reality.
But this definition is not co-extensive with Kant's theory of
intuition which covers pure intuitions.

4. Kinds of Intuition : Empirical and Pure :

Kant distinguishes between two kinds of sensible intuition -
empirical and pure - with reference to its matter and form.
"That intuition which is in relation to the object through
sensation, is entitled empirical" \(^{13}\) (italics author's). Matter
of intuition, according to Kant, is sensation. \(^{14}\) Elsewhere \(^{15}\)
Kant says that matter of an appearance corresponds to sensation.
It seems appearance is here equivalent to intuition. But I feel
difficulty in understanding what Kant exactly means by the

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., A42 = B60, p.62.
15 Ibid., A20 = B34, pp.65-66.
matter of intuition. Is it sensation itself or that which corre-
esponds to it? In order to avoid difficulty Paton\textsuperscript{16} describes
it as the sensation which results from the affected mind. Of
course, I do not think that sensation and intuition are identi-
cal. If it were, the awareness of objects would take place at
the level of mere sensation. In fact, this is not the truth.
Sensation is a subjective state of mind that is immediately
related to the object.\textsuperscript{17} But intuition is not this or that
particular sensation. Intuitive awareness takes place only when
the particular sensations are arranged in a certain way. What I
want to say is that intuition is the awareness of the object,
though at this level we do not know it to be this or that object.
If intuition is nothing more than mere sensation or sense-
impressions, why did Kant borrow such a technical term like
'intuition' other than sensation or sense-data or sense-impre-
ssions? It seems to me that intuition in the sense that aware-
ness of objects may take place, though in an undetermined sense,
makes Kant's view of empirical intuition more plausible. Paton
also points out that sensation is an element in intuition and
that intuition is in relation to its object through sensation
suggests that it is not mediate.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} H.J. Paton, \textit{Kant's Metaphysics of Experience}, London,
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1936; p. 95.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Kant, op.cit., A320 = B376, p.314. Cf. A20 = B34, p.65.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Paton, op.cit., p. 97 (F.N.5).
\end{itemize}
Intuition also contains a form. That in which sensations are arranged in a certain relation is the form of intuition.\(^{19}\)

There are, according to Kant, two forms of intuition, namely, space and time. The reason is that to intuit an object (object in the loose sense) we intuit it in space and time. Anything to be given to sensibility must be given through space and time. We cannot think of an object without its spatial and temporal relations. Space and time are, thus, the forms of intuition. Space is the form of outer intuition but time is the form of both outer and inner intuitions.\(^{20}\)

The matter of intuition is given to us 'a posteriori' but its form is not so given. The forms lie 'a priori' in the human mind. The forms are that in which the appearances should be ordered and hence forms cannot be derived from sensation. In fact, the forms, space and time cannot be given in the sense a colour is given to us. That which does not belong to sensation is a 'pure representation'. "The pure form of sensible intuitions in general, in which all the manifold of intuition is intuited in certain relations, must be found in the mind a priori. This pure form of sensibility may also itself be called pure intuition"\(^{21}\) (italics author's). Space and time are the forms of intuition as well as they themselves are pure intuitions.\(^{22}\)

\(^{19}\) Kant, \textit{op. cit.}, A20 = B34, p. 66.

\(^{20}\) \textit{Ibid.}, A24 = B39, p. 68; A34 = B51, p. 77.

\(^{21}\) \textit{Ibid.}, A20 = B35, p. 66.

Kant often speaks of space and time to be the forms of appearances, forms of sensibility and forms of intuition as if one may be substituted for the other. 23 Paton clearly distinguishes between these expressions. 24 Let us try to find out what Kant means by these expressions. We have said beforehand that we cannot intuit anything unless it is ordered in spatio-temporal relations. So anything to appear to the senses must be arranged in those relations. This arrangement is possible only through space and time. Space and time, therefore, are the forms of appearances.

Everything to be given to sensibility must be given through space and time. They themselves are not given to sense. The nature of our mind is such that it imposes space and time on the appearances. In this sense space and time are the forms of sensibility.

The form of intuition may be substituted for either of the form of appearance or of the form of sensibility. If intuition means appearance, the form of intuition and the form of appearance are identical. When intuition is used in the sense of intuiting, the form of intuition is equivalent to the form of sensibility.

Now, it is evident that the empirical intuition as well as a priori intuition contribute something to human knowledge. Empirical intuition gives us the raw materials out of which knowledge is produced. In a word, it is the content of knowledge. Without the content of knowledge understanding with its concepts is empty. For the materials of knowledge we should depend upon empirical intuition.

But the criteria of necessity and universality required for knowledge cannot be derived from the side of the object. The necessity and universality should be derived from the subject himself who knows. There may be a common structure of the human mind to which object must conform. The pure intuitions of space and time serve as such a common structure providing the conditions of everything given to sense. Anything given to sensibility must be given through them. If so, there must be a universal, necessary way of receiving intuitions. The universal and the necessary forms in which things are given to sensibility are the pure intuitions.

5. **Doctrines of a priori Intuition is not Acceptable:**

In the last sections I have described Kant's theory of sensuous intuition in general - in its empirical and pure form. The doctrine of empirical intuition as it is stated above does not give rise to any serious difficulty. The doctrine of pure
intuition becomes sensible and is defensible so far as Kant means by it the form of intuition which cannot be derived from experience, and serve as the condition of everything to be given to sensibility. There is also textual evidence in support of this interpretation. In Kant's own words pure intuition is that which "... exists in the mind a priori as a mere form of sensibility" (italics author's). It appears that we arrive at the pure form by abstracting the elements that belong to sensation. This may suggest that the mind is confronted with the empirical intuition and by an analysis of it we may reach the formal element of intuition.

That space and time are forms of intuition is clear enough from the fact that to perceive anything we are bound to perceive through them. Even at the perceptual level intuition should be organized to some extent. And the ordering of the sensible intuition is made possible by means of space and time. Space and time, thus, impose a certain form on the empirical intuitions. "The ordering is a condition of awareness or consciousness, not a consequence of it".

Though it seems that the doctrine of a priori intuition in the above sense will strengthen Kant's doctrine of intuition, he did not use the concept of 'a priori' intuition only in this

25 Kant, op.cit., A21 = B36, p. 66.
sense. Kant goes further and says that space and time themselves are pure intuitions. As his theory develops Kant expressly asserts that "space and time contain a manifold of pure a priori intuition, ...." (italics author's). In a passage at 160 B Kant says "But space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but as themselves intuitions which contain a manifold of their own, ...." (italics author's). Yet, Kant did not explain what he meant by a priori intuition in this latter sense. Rather, he offers certain proofs for his belief that space and time are a priori ideas. His arguments run as follows:

In the metaphysical expositions of space and time Kant shows, in the first place, that they are a priori ideas because they are the conditions of the possibility of experience and as such they themselves cannot be derived from experience. We can think of space and time as empty of objects; but we can never think of an object save through space and time. Thus space and time are known to be the universal and necessary conditions of the possibility of experience.29

Secondly, space and time are intuitions for they are individual ideas in contrast with general concepts. A concept is

27 Kant, op. cit., A77 = B102, p. 111.
derived from common features of individual instances of a
class. On the other hand, space and time contain no instances
of their own. They are one and infinite. Different spaces or
different times are not instances of space or time; they are
the parts of one space and one time. They are, therefore, in-
tuitions, not concepts. 30

In his transcendental expositions of space and time Kant
indirectly proves that they are a priori intuitions. He shows
that certain synthetic a priori knowledge is possible on the
presupposition that space and time are a priori intuitions.
According to Kant, mathematical judgements are synthetic and a
priori. 31 Let us take, for example, geometry, a particular
branch of mathematics. Geometry as a science determines the pro-
erties of space; and geometrical propositions are synthetic
as well as a priori. Geometrical propositions are synthetic
since they give us new knowledge of the empirical world. They
are necessary in the sense that the geometrical propositions are
always true of the empirical world. But this is possible if the
representation of space were grounded in intuition, since from
the mere analysis of a concept we can get no new information.
On the other hand, this intuition should not be empirical, for,
in that case it would not be necessary. Intuition, therefore,
must be a priori. It must be a priori in the mind which is the

31 Ibid., B15-17, pp. 52-53.
very condition of objects given to us. "... it is then quite easy to conceive and at the same time is proved irrefutably: that all outer objects of the world of our senses must necessarily agree in all exactitude with the propositions of geometry, ...."32 Similarly, Kant shows that "... the possibility of that body of a priori synthetic knowledge which is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion, ...."33 (italics author's) depends on the presupposition that time is an a priori intuition.

As Kant develops his doctrine of a priori intuition, it appears that he is introducing a different view of intuition. It follows from the above arguments that a priori intuition need not have any direct reference to its objects. Otherwise Kant would fail to account for a priori intuition. A priori intuitions of space and time precede their objects. That means they have no immediate relation with the objects. Space and time are intuitions because they are individual representations. Does it not suggest that individuality is the criterion of intuition? But in the context of empirical intuition Kant says that "Intuition is a representation, such as would depend directly on the presence of the object".34 Now, it seems that directedness or immediacy is an independent aspect in Kantian concept

32 Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics (translated by P.G. Lucas), Manchester University Press, 1962 (3rd Imp.); p. 44.
33 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, opcit., B49, p.76.
34 Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, opcit., p.37.
9. The Unity of Apperception;

Still, something is lacking. We should not claim, even now, that we are knowing. Knowledge also demands unity in consciousness. Therefore, Kant introduces the concept of unity in consciousness in conjunction with the syntheses of imagination and its recognition in a concept. The possibility of the application of a priori concepts or categories implies that there must be a unity in the manifold. The reproduction of representations would be meaningless but for the fact there is some unity in the manifold. In fact, if I do not identify what is reproduced with that what was apprehended before, what would be the necessity of reproduction? But, wherefrom does this unity derive? Kant would say that our consciousness can impart this unity to the manifold. Consequently, the unity in the object entails that there must also be a unity in consciousness. That knowledge is possible implies that there must be some one to whom all the items of knowledge should belong. The expression 'I think' is the accompanying principle of one's all representations. "All the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found. But this representation is an act of spontaneity, that is, it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it pure apperception, to distinguish it from empirical apperception, or, again, original apperception, because it is that self-consciousness which, while
generating the representation 'I think' (........), cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation. The unity of this apperception I likewise entitle the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of a priori knowledge arising from it. For the manifold representations, which are given in an intuition, would not be one and all my representations, if they did not belong to one self-consciousness (italics author's).

The transcendental unity of apperception is, thus, the most important foundation of knowledge. Kant also says that "... I am conscious to myself a priori of a necessary synthesis of representations - to be entitled the original synthetic unity of apperception - under which all representations that are given to me must stand,..." (italics author's). But what is its status? It cannot be known under the conditions of human experience since the transcendental self is not given in sensuous intuition as the objects of experience are given. Kant experiences the difficulty of establishing the transcendental self though he understands that without it no knowledge is possible. So far as the Critique is concerned Kant finds no other solution than to establish it as a logical fact. The 'I think' only suggests that it should be attached to all of one's representations. It is an analytic proposition. Thus Kant

72 Ibid., B135, p. 155.
is in a peculiar paradox which shows that knowledge depends on a foundation which is unknown. The way out of paradox does not lie in the structure of knowledge as formulated in the Critique, but in establishing that we can have a direct awareness of the transcendental unity of apperception. Such awareness may not fit in with the account of scientific knowledge, but can claim a sort of undeniable reality.

Let us briefly sum up the results so far attained. Sensibility and understanding are the two faculties of knowledge. The former is directly related to the object since the object is given through sensibility and hence it is intuitive. Sensibility yields us intuitions. But intuitions are not knowledge. In order to be objects of experience, intuitions are to be subsumed under the categories of understanding. On the other hand, understanding itself does not produce knowledge. The categories of understanding are objectively valid only when they are applied to intuitions. Understanding cannot produce its object since it is discursive. Sensibility alone yields us intuitions. The theory of sensuous intuition limits the possibility of knowledge to the phenomenal world. We can never penetrate into the world of noumena or things-in-themselves. For we have no power of intellectual intuition. In the Dissertation Kant says that "The intuitive power (....) of our mind is always passive; and is only possible so far as some object can affect our senses; but the intuitive power of God,
which is not the effect of objects, but their cause (......), since it is independent of them, is their archetype, and hence is completely intellectual ". Therefore, human beings are not capable of enjoying intellectual intuition. Though heterogeneous in nature, sensibility and understanding co-operate in producing knowledge.

10. Some Difficulties in Kant's Theory of Knowledge:

In spite of the fact that sensibility and understanding produce knowledge conjointly, there is an ambiguity in Kant's formulation of the roles of intuition and categories. Sometimes it seems that intuition is more important. According to Kant, intuitions are the raw materials of knowledge and these must be organized and unified in a systematic manner. Otherwise, knowledge would be impossible. Kant ascribed this function of unification to the categories. So categories have been introduced. This is the case where, I think, neither intuition nor concept should claim a supremacy to the other. Kant himself says that no preference may be given to either of the cognitive powers. But, the categories originate in understanding, they themselves cannot be applied to the intuitions. Therefore, categories should be schematized by bringing them in the determinations of time. But time itself is an intuition. This may suggest that intuition is more important.

75 Quoted from:
C.G. Webb, Kant's Philosophy of Religion, Oxford,
At the Clarendon Press, 1926; p. 44.
Kantian theory of knowledge can be criticised from the Hegelian point of view. According to this view, the faculty theory of mind as dividing the mind into distinct areas is not justifiable. Hegel thinks that if the cognitive powers are fundamentally distinct from one another, they should not co-operate in producing knowledge. But in reality, this criticism does not have much value. Kant did not believe that the cognitive powers are initially distinct. They have been distinguished only for the sake of analysis of experience.

But Hegel rightly points to the basic fact that Kant's concept of knowledge is too narrow. It seems that Kant is thinking of only one kind of knowledge, i.e. empirical knowledge. In fact, there are different types of experience, all of which cannot be brought under the same conditions. Hegel takes, for example, philosophical knowledge. It cannot be explained on the basis of Kant's formulation of knowledge. The fundamental propositions of the theory of knowledge cannot be brought under the conditions of knowledge; since no corresponding intuition of the propositions can be found in the world. If so, how is philosophical knowledge possible, at all? Is it knowledge or mere thinking? Kant did not answer the questions.

The transcendental unity of apperception is the 'I think' which accompanies all the aspects of experience. But it is not 'I know'. It is a logical presupposition, but not a matter of
cognition. Can the mere logical 'I think' unify the different items of experience which are supposed to constitute knowledge, if the ground in which the unity takes place is a logical postulate, but not an entity which fulfils the conditions of knowledge? Is it necessary that knowledge of 'I' has to be brought under the same conditions, as the knowledge of objects? Is not this lack of the transcendental unity of apperception as the self-knower and conditioning all other cases of knowledge obstructing the sense-manifold to be transformed into knowledge?

In his transcendental dialectic of the Critique Kant makes a distinction between understanding and reason. Ideas are the products of reason. Reason also plays a role in empirical knowledge. It regulates the function of understanding and seeks to unify the objects of knowledge in accordance with a higher principle. But reason should not rest content with the sphere of the conditioned. It tries to come out of this sphere in order to know the unconditioned; thus, reason gives rise to certain ideas.

According to Kant, the ideas of pure reason are (i) the self as the permanent ego, (ii) the idea of the world and (iii) the idea of God. Kant thinks that the ideas remain outside the sphere of knowledge; since we cannot show the corresponding intuition of the ideas. I do not want to commit myself to the view that a reality like God or something else exists as distinct
from appearances, so the question does not arise, at all, whether or not it is known by a kind of non-sensuous intuition. But the problem of the self gives rise to a different idea. It is something of which we seem to have a knowledge, though we cannot explain it. The knowledge of the self presupposes a kind of direct awareness. Evidently, it cannot be sensuous awareness. The self must be grasped in its activities, but this is not possible either by sense or by understanding or conjointly by sense and understanding. Mr. Coplestone rightly says that if Kant does not admit an intuitive knowledge even of the permanent ego, his idea of intuition would be too narrow. "In any case it might be argued that the presupposition and necessary condition of all experience is precisely a permanent ego, and that if experience is real, its necessary condition must be real." 76 It seems unreasonable to say that we have experience but we do not experience the necessary condition of all experiences.

But Kant refuses to assign a different status to the self other than that given to an object. The self as it becomes known has the status of a mere appearance.

Kant was very much influenced by the pattern of scientific knowledge and so he failed to realize that his own philosophy is based on some sort of self-awareness and this power of self-awareness enables us to throw some light on the knowing subject. 77

76 F. Coplestone, op cit., p. 79.
77 W.H. Walsh, op cit., p. 211.
Hegel interprets the self in terms of "pure spontaneity". Kant did not offer us any satisfactory account of the self. That there is no other sort of intuition other than the sensible one or that intuition is only either sensible or intellectual is really a dogmatic assumption. It is possible that intuition of self does not satisfy the conditions of either of the two, yet may give us knowledge. It seems that though Kant thought of scientific knowledge as the only ideal of knowledge, he believed in different types of experience. Presumably, this recognition leads him to distinguish between the constitutive principles of understanding and the regulative ideas of reason. "In fact, even scientific knowledge depends on data and principles of which no account can be given in purely scientific terms. In other words, mere mechanism is not adequate as an account even of the method of science".78 Unless we admit that there are distinct types of experience we would not be able to explain a vast realm of our life.

Reason which thinks and realizes the ideas of pure reason opens to us a world of experience beyond the spatial and temporal world of existence. It is no doubt true that this world of experience should not be brought under the same conditions of sense-experience; sensibility limits understanding but it does not

restrict reason. The ideas of reason are not the subjective
cancies nor are they the ethical postulates. For a rational
being the reality of the ideal world is not less certain though
this is not real in the sense an object of sense-experience is
real.79 The failure of sense-experience speaks, perhaps, of
another type of intuitive realization of these realities of
experience. Doubtless the ideas are not objects of logical
knowledge; we know them intuitively. "Kant's successors realize
that the true or the objective is what thought is compelled to
think by its own nature. Whatever we are constrained to think
is real. When Hegel said the real is the rational, he is taking
this important truth".80

Kant's solution of the problem of our ordinary experience
on the model of scientific knowledge is really an excellent one.
But it is not correct to limit experience to the sensible world
alone. Sensibility should not limit reason. It seems that Kant
also realized this; so he brings reason to play another role
in knowledge. It is also remarkable that Kant did not use the
concept of intellectual intuition or rational intuition in the
Critique. What he said there is that intuitive understanding
is not enjoyed by human beings. This suggests that reason may

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80 S. Radhakrishnan, "Intuition in Kant's Philosophy of Religion" in Malaviya Commemoration Volume, Benaras Hindu University, 1932; p. 445.
have an intuitive power. We should expect that Kant would revise and extend his notion of experience by means of reason; we will be able to discover new senses of reason and intuition in his theory of moral and aesthetic experience.