CHAPTER II

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After analysing the distinctive characteristics of aesthetic perception in the first chapter, now we have to know, whether this artistic capacity is purely subjective in character, or wholly depends upon objective situations. We have to consider also the third view, that this perceptual process depends upon the reciprocal relation between both the subjective and objective conditions. It is well known that our perceptual knowledge comes from two sources. It comes either from our objective observation or it is got from our own subjective experiences. There are three main factors involved in a perception. The outer pole of the perception, is the 'object', the inner pole of the perception is 'consciousness' of a being, and the third factor is the relation between these two extremes.

To start our discussion at present, we have to state only a workable definition of 'object' - as a source of our sensations, 'subject' - as the conscious awareness for which significant meaning and contents exist. Relation may be analysed as a physical external relation, or a logical internal relation, such as identity, inherence and organic relations. It is not easy to distinguish this subject-object problem, and we get a lot of discussion in this regard in the field of epistemology. In the field of aesthetics at present, we are
facing the same problem as Harold Osborne⁴ describes in his book, 'Aesthetic and Criticism'. Though we always try to draw a sharp line between the two, it is so complex a process, that we cannot break the process in a certain stage and say that this part is objective, and that part is subjective. The entire process has a unity, and is continuous. The subjective process of artistic creation starts with a neurophysical stimulus and proceeds step by step to objective reproduction, and its different effects are all included in one unitary perceptual process. On the objective side it starts with physical creation of sound and light and gradually develops into meaningful understanding and imagination - identity - pleasure - all other mental phenomena are the consequent effect of the same process.

But though it is a unitary and continuous process, some eminent subjectivist thinkers believe that it is due to our subjective capacity, and our conceptual process should be given the highest emphasis in perceiving an object. These subjective thinkers hold that our perception of the world is due to the exercise of our constructive ability. We gather informations from the world and with the help of these materials we construct and produce our percepts. The goal of perception seems to be to achieve clarity of the percept. Our perceptual organism adjusts itself in order to get maximum meaning out of stimulation.

1. Harold Osborne, Aesthetic and Criticism, p. 213.
When ambiguous 'stimuli' are excited, they are meaningfully interpreted under certain conditions. There is a strong tendency to resolve ambiguity into a meaningful percept. This tendency seems to be determined by the organism's past experience, present motivational condition and its 'set'.

The term 'awareness' and 'consciousness' as we use it in our definitions of perception have always a subjective implication. One's awareness and one's consciousness are truly one's own. Personal experience is unique and one can never be sure that his personal experience is the same or identical with the personal experience of some one else. This theory, that our perceptual processes mainly depend upon our subjective contents was very forcefully pressed by George Berkeley. He argued that what we perceive as object of our perception are nothing but the impressions of our senses. He says¹ in his 'Of the Principles of Human Knowledge' "that, neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what everybody will allow. And it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however, blended or combined together, cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them".

As we are specially interested in the field of Aesthetic, we have to deal with the bearing of this problem on artistic perception. In western history of aesthetics we find from

¹. The English Philosophers (Edited by Edwin A. Burtt.), p.523.
Croce onwards, there are different aestheticians, who support the view that aesthetic perception is a purely subjective perception and the role of object is indifferent or passive.

Benedetto Croce, the famous aesthetician and intuitionist thinker, has criticised the concept of objective or physical beauty in different parts of his writings.¹ The very combination of the two words, he holds, constitutes a 'verbal paradox', because beautiful is not a physical fact; it does not belong to objects, but to the spiritual energy of man. Art is not identified with some physical, public objects but with a specific creative cognitive and spiritual act. According to him, Art is the first stage of knowledge in which certain human beings (Artists) bring their images and intuitions into lyrical clarification. So, it is an awareness, non-conceptual in character, of the unique individuality of things.

In Croce's version, the physical objects are simply a to the reproduction of the beautiful. These aids can be called 'beautiful objects'. Natural objects are beautiful only for a perceiver who contemplates it with the 'eye or ear of the artist'. Without the aid of aesthetic imagination no part of natural object is beautiful. The artist has every stroke of the brush in his mind as completely before he executes it as after. The suggestion is that, using the brush adds nothing

to his inward or mental imaginary art-work. He says, 'that a natural beauty which an artist would not to some extent correct, does not exist.'

We all know that he is an intuitionist aesthetician. By 'intuition' is frequently understood perception. He also says 'certainly perception is intuition'. An 'intuition' is the inward vision of the artist, which is the only true expression. External objects which mediate these intuitions are, strictly speaking, only superfluous.

His considered opinion in this regard, is that, natural beauty is simply a stimulus to aesthetic reproduction, which presupposes previous production. Without the previous aesthetic intuitions of the imaginative nature no perception of art can be possible at all.

In western aesthetics, we find two other followers of Croce, who are influenced by him, and set forth their own subjective view point about artistic perception. They are R.G. Collingwood and Jean-Paul Sartre. According to them a work of Art must be distinguished from all physical objects even from such objects as picture, musical sounds and printed words from which a literary work is being read. One reason given by these thinkers is that although a work of Art cannot be communicated to others without a physical vehicle, it can be imagined, and thus internally produced by an Artist, and
he may not choose to produce it externally. Physical labour is not essential to a work of Art which must be an "Imaginary Object", and, therefore, the perception of those 'Imaginary Objects' will also be subjective in character.

Particularly, Collingwood,\(^1\) accepted the view that though in art, a subject and an object, a contemplator and something contemplated, are always involved, yet 'Imagination' is the sole activity of that subject, and that object is also an imaginary object, even the relation between them is such that the act of imagining creates the object.

On the other hand, in knowledge, the object is real. The relation between them is that the empirical act of knowing presupposes the object and does not create it.

In Collingwood's version, the object, in the case of art is an imaginary object, not a real object. That means, to imagine an object is not to commit oneself in thought to its reality. So, following Collingwood, we can say, that an imaginary object is not an unreal object, but an object about which we do not hesitate to ask whether it is real or unreal. He says, "Shakespeare's printed text is a real object, and really lies before me, but to contemplate the tragedy of Hamlet is not to perceive this printed book but to 'see' Hamlet himself as

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1. R.G. Collingwood, Outline of a Philosophy of Art, pp. 11,12.
Shakespeare 'saw' him. This 'seeing' is the contemplation of human character, human words, human actions; but the character, words and actions of an imaginary human being.

Even when he is describing the nature of Beauty, he does not recognise the aesthetic act as an act of sense perception and therefore, aesthetic objects do not and cannot either assert or deny reality.

So, we can conclude this matter after Collingwood, that the distinction between natural object and artistic object is not a metaphysical distinction, irrelevant to the artist as such, but a distinction between two kinds of aesthetic experience. Both the natural object and the work of art present themselves to the artist himself as real and not merely imaginary. Their reality enters into his aesthetic experience as a constituent element, giving it a quality of its own, and their different origin further differentiates and specifies this quality.

Another follower of Croce, and famous existentialist thinker, J.P. Sartre (1905-1980) also says about the unreal character of an aesthetic object. Even according to him, perception of 'beautiful' is not possible, and that perception is certainly, some sort of objective aesthetic perception. In this connection he criticises the popular view that the artist first has an idea in the form of an image, which he then realises on the canvas. The 'transition' from the mental-image-to-the-real.
object is in no way a true process in the creation of art. The artist has simply constructed a material 'analogue' of such a kind that everyone can grasp the image provided he looks at the analogue. But the image thus provided with an external 'analogue' remains an image. There is no realization of the imagination nor can we speak of its objectification.

Ernst Cassirer, 1 another 20th century thinker, says on art, that our aesthetic perception exhibits a much greater variety and belongs to a much more complex order than our ordinary sense perception. In sense perception we are content with apprehending the common and constant features of the objects of our surroundings. But aesthetic experience is incomparably richer. It is pregnant with infinite possibilities which remain unrealized in ordinary sense experience. In the work of the artist these possibilities become actualities, they are brought into the open and take on a definite shape. The revelation of this inexhaustibility of the aspects of things is one of the great privileges and profound charms of art perception.

The subjective characteristics of aesthetic perception be confirmed more clearly from the experience of the painter Ludwig Richter. Once when he was in Tivoli, as a young man he and three friends set out to paint the same landscape. They were all

1. Problems in Aesthetics, pp. 115, 127 (Art - Ernst Cassirer).
firmly resolved not to deviate from nature. They wished to reproduce what they had seen as accurately as possible. But surprisingly, the result was four totally different pictures, as different from one another as the personalities of the artists. From the painter Ludwig Richter's experience one can conclude that there is no such thing as objective vision, and that 'form' and 'colour' are always apprehended according to individual temperament.

Ernest Cassirer also says "art gives us the highest pleasure, perhaps the most durable and intense pleasure of which human nature is capable." No doubt that 'pleasure' is the immediate experience which we gather from aesthetic perception of art work, but at the same time we have to accept that this 'pleasure' must vary in quality and degree from one individual to another individual.

George Santayana also supported this view. He says that, "It is unmeaning to say that what is beautiful to one man ought to be beautiful to another. If their senses are the same, their associations and dispositions similar, then the same thing will certainly be beautiful to both. If their natures are different, the form which to one will be entrancing will be to another even insensible, because his classifications and discriminations in perception will be different, and he may s
a hideous detached fragment or a shapeless aggregate of things, in what to another is a perfect whole—so entirely are the unities of objects unities of function and use. It is absurd to say that what is invisible to a given being ought to seem beautiful to him. Evidently this obligation of recognizing the same qualities is conditioned by the possession of the same faculties. But no two men have exactly the same faculties....

Another strong supporter of this view, is H.R.Marshall. The problems of aesthetics are envisaged by him, from a purely psychological point of view. According to him, beauty is a subjective quality, attached to states of reflection, sensation, volition and emotion. It is neither an objective quality of things, like symmetry or order, nor as the metaphysicians have claimed, the momentary revelation to us of a special aspect of the Absolute.

Some Indian aestheticicians also do not consider beauty as a purely objective reality. They attach great importance to 'Rasa' which is the key-term in the Indian Theory of aesthetics. Some of them deal with the perception of the beautiful which is

2. The Earl of listowel, Modern Aesthetics, p. 5.
an enjoyed content rather than a substantive entity. Even some Indian philosophers tend to interpret the ultimate truth and reality in terms of beauty as a subjective relish, and cognition as an element in aesthetic perception. Here we can remember the Upanisadic words like "Raso vai sah".

The concept of 'Maya', which is the most important theory in Vedanta philosophy concerning the truth of this Universe, can have meaning only in a subjective aesthetic perception. This 'Maya' theory can be described as subjective, though there may be differences of opinion on this matter. Abhinavagupta, Dhananjaya and others describe aesthetic perception as subjective, but this 'subject' is not at all the individual subject. They always recognised only universalised subject.

Abhinavagupta admits that aesthetic experience begins with direct perception of the 'pleasant objects', by two accepted aesthetic senses, namely, sight and bearing. But those 'pleasant objects' can only be recognised as the medium, but not as the object of aesthetic experience. Because aesthetic experience is not simply a mental picture of the objects, a real aesthete will never recognise an object to be beautiful if it

simply pleases the senses and does nothing more.

He states in his own way that aesthetic experience at its highest level is the experience of the Self itself, as pure and unmixed bliss. He distinguished the subjective perception, which arises from witnessing a 'dramatic performance' or 'reading a good poem', from the experience, which we get from objective perception of a pleasant object. This distinction arises because aesthetic experience is characterised by freedom from all elements of individuality. It is an aesthetic perception in which the self-luminous aspect of the universalised subject is thrown into the background. Thus, according to Abhinavagupta, the final stage in aesthetic perception, is that in which there is the experience of 'Paramānanda' and even the basic mental state sinks into the subconscious. He describes this mental condition as 'Vyatireka Tyāyātīte', in which all objectivity merges in the subconscious and the subject, the Self, shines in its Ananda aspect.

Another Indian aesthetician Dhanañjaya1 says about the subjective character of aesthetic perception in his 'Dasārūpaka' as follows, '........basic mental state is Rasa, because it is relishable. This relish consists in the experience of blissfulness of the subject, that is free from limitations of individuality........' He follows Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, according to whom 'Rasa' consists in the realisation of blissfulness of

the universalised subject, affect by a universalised basic mental state and accompanied by a corresponding condition of heart.

Actually Abhinavagupta's aesthetic theory is based upon the Saiva Metaphysics and epistemology. The Saiva view of the Self is that it is introvert and not extrovert. Whereas Buddhists maintain that it is introvert and extrovert, because, it is self-shining and it illumines the external objects.

Therefore, Abhinavagupta's theory accepts neither objective nor external contents. As some aestheticicians hold that aesthetic perception is solely subjective, so others declare that it is objective. Though they cannot wholly separate this perception from subjective capacity, yet they attach much importance to the objective form of artistic perception.

One of the famous Aestheticians in modern western aesthetics Susanne K. Leuenger, observe that the primary function of art is to objectify feelings. We can contemplate and understand it only because of its objective character. It is in this sense of an apparition given to our perception that a work of art has an objective form. It may be a permanent form like a building or sculpture or a picture, or a transient dynamic

1. Philosophical Sketches, p. 80.
form like a melody or a dance. Even that objectified form may be given to imagination, like the passage of purely imaginary, apparent events that constitute a literary work.

Miss Margaret Macdonald (1903-1956) tried to show in her article 'The Work of Art as Physical',¹ that the aesthetic theories of Croce, Collingwood, Sartre and other idealists who equate works of art with works of imagination or with what is mental or physically unreal, do not satisfactorily elucidate our use of the term 'work of art'. She was influenced by the philosophical movement, called "the philosophy of ordinary language". That movement initiated by Wittgenstein has always insisted that meaning is shown by the way in which people actually use words.

She says that the work of art are primarily, public and perceptual objects made by someone using his technical skill. She never accepts the person as an artist, who has never 'produced' a public work. According to her statement, one who never 'exhibits' his artistic skill is not an artist but a fraud.

Written and printed texts and sources of music are not necessary for the existence of literature and music. The primary form of such works is vocal and their survival

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primarily depends entirely upon memory and oral transmission. Spoken narratives, recitations, songs are not physical objects. They are rather physical events which begin, continue and then cease to exist. But such events are also publicly perceived by all observers while they exist. This 'public objective perception' can be also applicable to literary and musical performance.

Even Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923), a distinguished British Idealist Philosopher, criticises Croce for his 'false idealism', i.e. the theory that 'beauty is for the mind and in the mind'. Bosanquet¹ says, that Art always evokes an integrated response of the whole 'body-and-mind'. This response is 'feeling', and that feeling always must be embodied in an object. He explains the aesthetic perception as 'I mean it is attached, annexed, to the quality of some objects - to all its details....... My feeling in its special quality is evoked by the special quality of which it is the feeling and in fact is one with it'.

Things, according to him, are not complete without minds, again, minds are not complete without things. So, to reject the function of the body as well as the objective character of art is not to honour but to degrade the spirit of Art.

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Another aesthetician David Wight Prall (1886-1940) to some extent supports objective perception in his book Aesthetic Judgement. He says, 'It is characteristic of aesthetic apprehension that the surface fully presented to sense is the total object of apprehension...'. He also says that artists have had to consider many non-aesthetic aspects of the physical media that are the bearers of aesthetic form and quality.

While subjective thinkers regard aesthetic perception as a subjective phenomenon, others challenge this view, and advance an objective theory in its place. But recent trends among the aestheticians are, that the problem must be solved from a dual subject-object point of view. As perception in general involves both subjective and objective aspects and can be understood only in the light of both points of view, in case of aesthetic perception also the same rule should be followed.

As in case of general perceptual problem, A. Campbell Gethen says, 'Self or consciousness or their acts, as distinct from the constantly changing flux of qualitative and variously formed and related items traditionally and misleadingly called their objects or contents. This flux of experience

must be recognized as part of a world flux of 'pure experience' or experience stuff and each person's experience (some part private and other parts shared with others) is a cross-section of part of the world stream, selected by the interaction of the physical organism with its environment.

Modern thinkers, like Ward, Moore, Stout and others also refuted Berkeley's view that the objects of perception are subjective consisting of clusters of our sensation. It is now very generally recognised that sensation is a very ambiguous term. It is ordinarily used in two different senses, firstly, 'as a process of apprehension', and secondly, 'as the object apprehended'. In the former sense it is subjective. But in the second sense it may be regarded as an object revealed in and through the subjective process of sensing. In this sense, sensation can by no means be regarded as subjective. For example, 'Red' is a matter of sensation, but it is undoubtedly an objective content. It is not merely an internal state of the subject, but an object presented to the subject. Thus it is obvious that the subjectivist argument is based upon a fundamental ambiguity in the use of the term sensation.

Bertrand Russell in his 'Problems of Philosophy' has subjected Berkeley's idealism to severe criticism. Moore, Perry and other philosophers have rejected subjective idealism on different grounds.
Even Berkeley\(^1\) contradicts himself when he emphasizes the fact that perception does not depend upon our will, in the following lines: 'I find the ideas actually perceived by senses have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad day-light I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or not or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is, therefore, some other will or spirit that produces them'.

Therefore, we can say that perception is not solely dependent upon our subjective impression. It is not cut and out subjective in character. On the contrary, we cannot also say that it is thoroughly objective in its essence determined solely by the external order. Rather we can say that it is partially subjective and partially objective.

The dual character of aesthetic perception is forcefully brought out by Hegel\(^2\) in western aesthetics. He defines beauty as "the sensuous appearance or show" of the Idea. The Idea is true in itself as Idea. It is not true merely

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in its sensuous outer existence. But at the same time the Idea is beautiful in so far as it is accessible to consciousness in outward form, so that the concept or Idea is unified with its outer appearance. And all we know that without objective aid outer appearance is impossible. In respect to the art-product viewed as an object, Hegel says, that it is presented to sensuous apprehension. It is submitted to the emotional sense, whether outer or inner, to sensuous perception and the imaged sense, precisely as the objective world is so presented around us, or as is our own inward sensitive nature. The work of art is not exclusively directed to the sensuous apprehension, viewed, that is, as an object materially conditioned.

The mind is intended to be affected by it and to receive some kind of satisfaction in it. The mind, however, does not rest in the mere apprehension of external objects through sight and hearing, it makes them objective to its own inward nature.

In Hegel's version, Sculpture resembles architecture in its use of three-dimensional solid matter. It differs in the clarity and spirituality of the idea it wills to deposit in stone.

In painting, the 'burden of real' or objectivity that is, 'three-dimensional space' is gone, and an ideal space takes its place. Light, is 'visible spirit' according to Hegel, which offers no resistance and carries no weight.

Music, Hegel says, goes further than painting in refusing to labour with the heavy weight of the material world for its expression. In music, space is no longer merely contracted from three dimensions to two, but disappears entirely and the vibration of string or membrane is substituted for a solid existent. Even the sense of hearing is more ideal than the sense of sight, because in listening to music, we do not contemplate an object over against ourselves, but seem somehow to be following the very movement of the soul itself. Actually the observer in this case fuses with the object, the emotion in the melody is accepted as the emotion of the soul. Most of what is accepted as the beauty of the music is the dead vibration held in the recollection and there fused by an act of mental synthesis with what is actually beating upon the ear.

So, from different representations of aesthetic perception, Hegel wanted to establish that the spirit or soul is embodied in the material objects and though we perceive some objective aesthetic representation - as art, its spiritual meaning, which is subjective in character, is actually perceived by observer in art.
In Indian aesthetic we find the same truth illustrated by Bharata in the conception of Rasa\(^1\). Bharata was concerned with 'Rasa' - as an object which is responsible for aesthetic experience. Actually he talks of the subjective conditions necessary for relishing it, but that he does, because the object, with which he is primarily concerned, is after all enjoyment by the spectator.

In the discussion of aesthetic object Bharata further says, that the aesthetic object cannot be classed with any object that we ordinarily perceive in the world. It cannot called a 'real' object. It is neither natural creation, nor is its casual efficiency the same to all the perciptents. It cannot be called also unreal in the same sense as that the sky-flower is unreal, because aesthetic objects have a real existence. Even aesthetic objects cannot be classed with illusory objects. Because, an illusory object in its essential character is not what it appears to be. But on the contrary, an aesthetic apparently and essentially is what it appears to be. So, according to Bharata, an aesthetic object has its own world, which is different from the world of daily life and may be called the aesthetic world.

Again, Bharata, has not totally ignored the subjective condition of perceptions, necessary for aesthetic experience.

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1. Bharata Natya Sāstrā, 27th Chapter.
According to him the following conditions are most important in them:

1) Intellectual background of the perceiver.

2) Perceiver's knowledge of the various types of aesthetic configuration, knowledge of various language, the capacity to concentrate, quick understanding, etc.

The Nyaya system is another supporter of dual perceptual theory. It is a realistic system and holds that the objects of experience are not mere illusions or subjective ideas in the mind, of knowing subject. They have an existence outside the mind. According to it every perception involves (i) the object (ii) the external medium, such as light, in case of visual perception; sound, in case of audible perception; (iii) the sense-organs of the perceiver, (iv) Manas and (v) the cognising subject or Soul. All these factors are equally necessary in a perception and if any one of them does not function properly illusion arises. Of these five factors, first two are objective and other three factors are subjective.

According to Sankhya\(^1\) theory of aesthetic, there is a casual relation between the situation etc. and the basic

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mental state. The exponents of this theory took the 'basic mental state' to be identical with aesthetic experience. The former is constituted by the sum total of external causes. These external causes are responsible for the being of the mental state which is essentially an inner state of pleasure and pain.

Isvarana Krsna (2nd Century A.D.) the author of the Sankhya Karika, maintained the view that aesthetic experience is due to the subjective cognition of the presented, including the basic emotion. But it is different from ordinary worldly cognition and does not give rise to ordinary attitudes and responses because the spectator is de-individualised exactly as Purusa is when the knowledge of distinction between himself and Prakrti dawns. Sankhya Karika refers to what happens in Drama. The actor in drama, does not imitate but himself becomes the hero. The relation between the actor and the hero is similar to that between the subtle body (Suksha-sarira) and the gross body. Some modern Western aestheticians have also accepted the dual character of aesthetic perception.

Samuel Alexander\(^1\) says, that the object of art may be contrasted with the mere percept where also half of what is perceived comes from the perceiver's mind and half from what he directly sees: the coloured moving shape is perceived to

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1. Philosophical and Literary Pieces, p. 259.
be a man, though sight alone without memory does not determine the percept as a man. "The contrast .......... is this: the characters we impute to the object perceived, if we perceive correctly, really do belong to the object, and may be sensed there under proper conditions; the coloured shape is the visible surface of a man; but in the work of art there is always illusion, the artistic illusion is unlike ordinary perceptual illusion, for that illusion disappears with better acquaintance and is recognized to be an illusion. Whereas the illusion is of the essence of the work of art — ceases therefore, to be illusion and makes the object significant."

Paul Ziff\(^1\) discusses more clearly this view of Alexander in his article 'Art and the object of Art'. Taking an example of Cezanne's painting 'still-life' of some apples, he says that we describe it, as 'the apples are solid, round full volumes — like tangible three-dimensional things. The painting has great depth'. But objectively, a painting is a thin strip of canvas covered with tiny pellets of pigment. Though the canvas is flat, the work of art has great depth. So we can say that the work of art is distinct from the painting, the characters we impute to the painting do not belong to it. So, it is an illusion, and this illusion is the object of art, that which we call beautiful, which we judge, criticise and appreciate.

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Another aesthetician who has been influenced by Gestalt theory is Rudolf Arnheim\(^1\). He also gives us a relative theory of aesthetic perception. According to his theory, we perceive pure sense-data and then associate feelings and ideas with these original data. As for example, when we perceive the flames of a fire, we simply perceive bright reddish shapes in rapid movement. But from past experience we know that fire hurts and destroys. It may remind us of violence. Perhaps, we also associate red with blood. The flames may seem to be moving like snakes. It consequence of all this we cannot see only the colour and shapes in motion, but are also struck by frightening, violent, passionate sights. Long before, R. Arnheim, Berkeley had given serious support in this regard in his essay on 'New theory of vision'. He says, 'The observer sees shame or anger in the looks of a man. Those passions are themselves invisible; they are nevertheless let in by the eye along with colours and alterations of countenance, which are the immediate objects of vision, and which signify them for other reason then barely because they have been observed to accompany them. - without which experience, we should no more have taken blushing for a sign of shame than gladness'.

An interesting interpretation of this dual theory of aesthetic perception has been advanced by the proponents of

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'empathy'. 'Empathy' means literally 'feeling into' and main advocates of this theory are Vernon Lee (1856-1935) and Theodor Lipps (1851-1941).

According to them, the formal elements or objects acquire meaning for the imagination only because we project our activities and feeling into them. From empathetic point of view aestheticians are now prepared to define more precisely the nature of aesthetic perception. That perception may be analysed into two factors: first, there is the inner perceptual activity, the emotion of pride, the feeling of vigour or freedom etc; second, there is the external sensuous content as bare physical stimulus. The aesthetic perception is possible as a result of the fusion of these two factors. And ultimately the ego or subject unconsciously supposes himself as one with the object, and there is no longer any duality. Commonly 'Empathy' means the disappearance of the two-fold consciousness of subject and object, and the enrichment of experience that results from this fusion of perception. So, in empathetic perception the subject is transported into the object, as the contemplator of the statue, for example, may unconsciously imitate its posture and implied movement by definite muscular adjustments.

'Empathy' involves a transference of vital feelings from the subject to the object and it is the result of a happy sympathetic relation between man and the outside world. In the language of Vernon Lee, 'Empathy as a metaphysical and quasi-mythological projection of the ego into the object or shape under observation; a notion incompatible with the fact that Empathy, being only another of those various mergings of the activities of the perceiving subject with the qualities of the perceived object wherewith we have already dealt, depends upon a comparative or momentary abeyance of all thought of an ego, ..........'

Theodor Lipps, another like-minded aesthetician, recognises the existence of such 'Empathy', but he differs from Vernon Lee to some extent. He insists that 'Empathy' does not consist in the body feelings thus aroused. Aesthetic perception in each individual is a feeling of pleasure or joy, which is coloured in some specific way and ever different in each new aesthetic situation. According to Lipps, aesthetic object is always sensuously perceived or imagined. In his own words, 'I have this feeling in viewing the sensuous perception or image, in which form the beautiful object immediately presents itself to me. I have it while I view this object, that is, bring it into clear attention, apperceive it. But only the sensuous

appearance of the aesthetic object, for example of the work of art, is attended to in esthetic contemplation. It alone is the 'object' of the esthetic enjoyment, it is the only thing that stands 'opposite' me as something distinct from myself and with which I, and my feeling of pleasure, enter into some 'relationship'. It is through this relationship that I am joyous or pleased, in short, enjoying myself.

After surveying different opinions about aesthetic perception we come to the conclusion that, no art perception can be genuinely 'objective' in the sense in which this term might be applied to a work of history or to a scientific treatise; nor can it be 'subjective' in the ordinary acceptance of that term, as a personal feeling. 'Objectivity' and 'Subjectivity' are a pair of opposites which when applied to aesthetic perception in their mutual exclusiveness soon lead to confusion. But on the whole it can be said that aesthetic perception is objectified self-enjoyment, or as Rabindranath Tagore puts it "perceiving oneself as projected in the external world". 1 Schopenhauer also offers an analogous conception in his third book of "The world as Will and Idea". Art perception or aesthetic contemplation consists in just this, that in it man is released from his individuality.

1. Rabindrenath Tagore, Sahityer Patha, p. 10.
from his will, and remains only a pure subject as a clear mirror of the object. "And just thereby is the one engaged in such contemplation no longer an individual, for this individual has in just contemplation lost himself; but he is the pure will-less, painless, timeless subject of perception".  

1. Schopenhauer, The world as Will and Idea.