ENGLISH TRANSLATION
Having paid homage to Mahādeva (lit. one who has the moon on his head), the spouse of Gaurī, the first and foremost light, I (proceed to) compose a treatise on the figures of speech based on varieties of ideas, having a wide range and clarity of theme.

Literature is of three types, namely, Dhvani (suggestion), Guñībhūtavyāṅga (with Suggestion as Subordinate) and Citra (Embellished).

Now, that is to be designated as Dhvani (kāvya) where the suggested sense is more prominent than the expressed sense. As for example,

The drops of the first shower (when the season set in) stood for an instant on her (thick) eye-lashes, hit her lips, were pulverized by falling on her rising breast, were obstructed in the wrinkles (round her middle), and entered the navel after a long while.

Here, the position befitting the state of meditation of the goddess is revealed by the description of the natural movement of the first rain-drops on the body of the goddess, practising penance, and thereby, the state of meditation, undisturbed even at the advent of the first rain, which causes agitation owing to the feeling of pleasure while falling on one's body, heated by prolonged summer, is suggested. Thus, the state of those absorbed in meditation is described in these words: -

Firmly fixing the chest at first, one should meditate inwardly upon the deity
with one's eyes fixed on the nose-tip, lips tightened and (the body) absolutely motionless.

Here (in this illustration), the half-closing of eyes in the form of fixing of the eyes on the nose-tip, is suggested by the expression 'pakṣamsa sthitā' (i.e. 'resting on eye-lashes'). For, if the eyes were fully opened, the eye-lashes would have remained erected and if the eyes were fully closed, the eye-lashes would have remained downwards, and in either way the drops of (rain) water could not exist there. That her lips are tightened is suggested by the statement that the (rain-drops), fallen from her eye-lashes, rolled on the upper and lower lips, without entering into the mouth, and fell therefrom. Again, that she kept her chest fixed is suggested by the description of their falling (i.e. falling of rain-drops) on the height of her breasts therefrom; for, if she had a leaned posture as in an idle state, they (i.e. rain-drops) could not fall on the height (of her breast) as the pair of breasts would have an inward contracted shape. Even if somehow they fell therefrom and reached the threefold wrinkle, they would have a tortuous movement (in the wrinkles) and could not reach to the region of navel and could not enter into her deep navel. That she is motionless is suggested by the statement of falling (of rain-drops) from her eye-lashes, lower-lip etc. step by step; for in the case of movement of her face etc. falling (of rain-drops), that had (already) fallen on her eye-lash, from her lower-lip, breast etc. step by step would not have been possible. Further, by these very epithets, the uncommon beauty of the goddess is suggested. Thus, that her eye-lash was thick is suggested by the epithet 'sthita' ('resting'). (Similarly) smoothness of them by the expression 'ksañam' (for a
while'), excessive softness of (her) lower-lip by the statement of oppression (on the lower-lip) by the rain-drops which had a slow movement on account of falling from the eye-lash, excessive hardness of (her) breasts by the description of their (i.e. the 'water-drops') pulverization on the slope of the breast, (although) having a slow movement on account of falling from the eye-lash, lower-lip etc., prominence of the wrinkles by the statement of their (i.e. the 'water-drops') movement over the wrinkles inspite of keeping of the chest fixed, excessive deepness of the navel by the statement of entering of all the rain-drops solely into the navel are suggested. Thus, this is an illustration of Dhvani as the suggested sense is more prominent than the expressed.

Similarly (the following verse is an example of Dhvani).

Oh, the liar messenger! slopes of your breasts have their sandal-paste completely removed, your lower-lip has completely lost its redness, eyes are destitude of collyrium at the corners, this slender body of yours is still thrilling; you are not aware of the advent of agony of your friend and you went from here to the tank to have a bath and not to that wretch.

Here, that you had gone nowhere but to that wretch for dalliance is suggested mainly by the word 'adhama' ('wretch') whereas the expressed sense is that you had gone to the tank to have a bath and not to him. Thus, wretchedness is lowness, which is possible by caste or deed. Now, a heroine of high order ('Uttama-nāyikā')
does not speak of the hero’s lowness by caste. Again, it cannot be by any other deed than the low act, such as the dalliance with the messenger which is tantamount to his own fault. Deeds like those (other than dalliance with a messenger) committed before this dalliance with the messenger have been tolerated and need not be spoken of. Otherwise, sending of the messenger by herself cannot be justified. Even thereafter, since there can be a low conduct of dalliance with the messenger, sent by herself, which can be known by the exposed signs (with her) and which is indicated by the word ‘adhama’, it is suggested that you had gone nowhere but to him for dalliance. The clauses in ‘nīhēśacyutacandanaṁ stanatātam’ etc. play the role of helpers (in understanding the suggestion) by disclosing the signs of dalliance. How? In the expression ‘nīhēśacyutacandanaṁ stanatātam’ the adjunct ‘nīhēśa’ (‘completely’) is used to avoid the fault of accidental circumstance in the form of the removal of sandal paste by the pulling of upper garment, which will support here the expressed meaning that you had gone to the tank for a bath. The (word) ‘ṭaṭa’ (‘slope’) is used to disclose the sign of dalliance by way of removing the possibility of removal of sandal-paste which is common to (dalliance as well as) bathing. For, in the case of bathing, sandal-paste would have been removed from the entire body; but in your case (wiping of sandal-paste) is marked on the slope i.e. on the height of your breasts only and this (must be) due to embraces only. Similarly, in ‘nīmrṣṭārago’dharah’ complete wiping of the redness is said in the expression ‘nīmrṣṭarāgah’ in order to avoid the fault of accidental circumstance in the form of partly wiping of the earlier redness due to the delayed taking of betel-leaf. Again
'adhara' ('lower lip') is specifically mentioned to disclose the signs of dalliance by way of distinguishing it from the signs common to bathing (also). That (her) upper-lip remains with redness while the redness of the lower lip only has been completely wiped off, is undoubtedly due to kisses. In the expression 'netre dūram anañjane' the epithet 'dūram' is used to avoid the fault of accidental circumstance (in the form) of partly rubbing out of the collyrium, applied in the morning, due to the passage of time. 'Dūram' apparently means 'excessively'. Collyrium would have rubbed out from everywhere (i.e. from the entire eye) in the case of (passage) of time or bathing; but in your case, some corner (of your eyes only) is devoid of collyrium and this must be due to kisses. In 'pulakītā tānvī taveyam tānūḥ', apparently the signs of bathing have been presented by the mention of the thrilled (body) in the epithet 'pulakītā', along with the statement of natural slenderness, in the epithet 'tānvī'. But the (real) syntax lying in heart (of the speaker) is 'pulakītā-pi tānvī vartate' (i.e. 'your body remains slender although thrilled'). Thus, a body thrilled by a bath becomes slightly swelled up. But this (body) is not so and hence the slenderness and the erection of bristling hair are due to the languor of sexual enjoyment only. This is the explanation of the inner meaning. Similarly, the address 'mithyāvādini' relating to an idea conforming to (the statement) that you had gone to the tank for a bath which we get at the prior stage of expression, leads to the idea conforming to the suggestion that you had gone nowhere but to him for dalliance which is being suggested by the epithet 'adhama' based on these statements. Hence, this is also an illustration of
Suggestion, as the suggested meaning of this (verse), to which the expressed meaning is made subordinate, is more prominent than the expressed meaning.

Where the suggested sense is not more prominent than the expressed sense, that is called Guṇībhūtavyaṅga (Suggestion as Subordinate).

For example —

O Accyuta, I am going. Is any satisfaction to be obtained from merely looking at you? In fact, "if we remain together in this solitary place, wretched people will think quite otherwise". — After the cow-girl had signified her depression and languor due to the futile stay by the special form of address, Kṛṣṇa embraced her and the hairs on his body were thrilled. May Kṛṣṇa, in this condition, protect you.

Here, the words of taking leave, such as 'May I leave Accyuta', suggest that I waited so long to enjoy your company but could not get it. This establishes the expressed idea 'ityāmantraṇabhaṅgisūcitavṛthavasthānakhedālasām' ('one, who had signified one's depression and languor due to futile stay by a special form of address!'); hence it is subordinate to the latter and therefore does not exceed the expressed idea. Thus this is a case of Guṇībhūtavyaṅga.

Another example of this type is the following verse —

Would you, my lord! be back to this place on the expiry of a 'prahara' (part
of the day) or at noon, or even later, or at sunset' — with such bewailings attended with flowing tears, a girl prevents her husband from his journey to a place that requires one hundred days to be reached.

Here the suggestion, viz., that the entire day is the maximum limit after which I cannot bear life any longer, establishes the expressed sense, namely, preventing her beloved from the journey; as such it is subordinate to the latter and, thus, not more charming than the expressed sense. Therefore, this is also an illustration of Gunābhūtavyāngya.

That is to be called Citra (Embellished) which is charming although void of any suggestion.

This is of three types, namely, Sabdacitra ('striking in words'), Arthacitra ('striking in sense') and Ubhayacitra ('striking in both'). The following is an illustration of Sabdacitra —

He saw before him the spring, fragrant with an exuberance of flowers, under whose influence the Palāśa forest had assumed a fresh foliage, the lotus was filled with manifest pollen and the tender ends of plants were fading.

An example of Arthacitra is the following —

That column of dust separated from the surface of the earth (lit. cut asunder from its root) by blood and wafted by the current of the wind over it, looked like the smoke, that he had raised before, of the fire which now remains in embers only.
The following is an example of Udbhayacitra —

May He, the Divine Boar, who at the end of the Kalpa (cycle of creation) upheld the earth agitating the water of the ocean, shower blessings on you. The cracking sounds of crores of stones split by the kicks of his hoofs and then knocking downwards from the tops of the big mountains, obviously served as the sounds of the auspicious drum.

Of these three types of literature, elaboration with regard to Dvani and Gunibhutavyangya has been made elsewhere by us. As the Sabdaciditra is mostly insipid, poets do not respect it. Moreover, we do not find there matters deserving much consideration. This is why, leaving the portion relating to Sabdaciditra, a lucid and extensive treatise on Arthaciditra is being commenced.

In offering definitions and examples, while a group of figures is to be considered, verses mostly of the elders are cited here.

Here ends the introduction to the text of Citraminamsa.

-- oOo --
Upamā (Simile), the unique actress, plays different roles and delights the hearts of connoisseur dancing on the stage that assumes the form of literature.

The presentation of similarity (noticed) in the expression 'the face looks like the moon', the figure is Upamā (Simile). That very Upamā assumes the form of various figures of speech according to variations in the modes of expression. As for example: In 'the face is like the moon and the moon is like the face' — the figure is Upameyopamā (Reciprocal comparison). In 'the face is like the face' — it is Ananvaya (Self-comparison). In 'the moon is like the face' — it is Pratīpa (Converse).

In 'having seen the moon I remember her face' — the figure is Smaraṇa (Reminiscence). In 'the face itself is the moon' — it is Rūpaka (Metaphor). In '(he) is relieved of agony by her moon-like face' — it is Parināma (Commutation). In 'Is it a face or the moon?' — the figure is Saṃdeha (Doubtful). In 'the Cakora birds taking your face for the moon are running towards you' — it is Bhrāntimān (Error). In 'the Cakora-birds and the bees are getting attracted taking your face for the moon and the lotus respectively' — the figure is Ullekha (Representation). In 'it is the moon and not a face' — it is Apahṅava (Denial). In 'Surely it is the moon' — the figure is Utprekṣā (Poetical Fancy). In 'this is the moon' — it is Atiṣayokti (Hyperbole). In '(both) the moon and the lotus are defeated by (your) face' — the figure is Tulyayogitā (Equal Pairing). In 'the moon and your face shine at night' — it is Dīpaka (Illuminator). In 'I am attracted only by your face, whereas the Cakora bird is delighted (lit. gets ready) by the moon only' — it is Prativastūpamā (Typical
Comparison). In 'the moon in the sky, your face on the earth' — the figure is Drṣṭānta (Exemplification). In 'your face possesses the luster of the moon' — it is Nidarsanā (Illustration). In 'the spotless face of yours excells the moon' — it is Vyatireka (Contrast). In 'at night, moon along with your face, looks beautiful' — it is Sahokti (Connected Description). 'Your face, beautiful owing to the lunar-marks (therein) in the form of eyes is decked with moonbeams in the form of your smile' — here it is Samāsokti (Speech of Brevity). 'Your face bears resemblance to the lotus which has connection (āhita-śakti) with water (hari) or with the moon born of the ocean (abja) having connection with the deer (hari-āhita-śakti)' — here the figure is Śleṣa (Paronomasia). In 'the moon looks gloomy in the presence of your face' — the figure is Aprastutapraśaṃsā (Indirect Description). Thus, this figure Upāmā assumes the appearances of several figures as stated above.

As this wonderful universe becomes known with the realisation of Brahman, similarly, the entire realm of embellished poetry is known with the knowledge of Upamā. Hence, this figure, with all its varieties, is being defined in the beginning.

This figure has been defined thus —

The charming similarity between two ideas (one) having the capability of being an Upamā (standard of comparison) (and the other) an Upameya (subject of comparison), is designated as Upamā by the literary critics.
The similarity (between two ideas) having the capability of being an Upamâna and Upâmeya in accordance with the literary convention only, is called an Upamâ but not so when the similarity is otherwise. This is why, 'the face is bright like the lily' etc., are not cases of Upamâ. Similarity, not charming on account of being based on matter, substance etc., is not a similar case even if it fulfills the said condition. Only the charming similarity, viz., delightfulness etc., (is considered as component of an Upamâ). All the figures of speech, only when they embellish the literature strikingly in accordance with the literary convention attain recognition as 'alâmkâra' (i.e., a figure of speech). Hence, the expression 'the gavaya is like a cow', is not a case of Upamâ. 'The Vâhika is (like) a bull' — is not a case of Rûpaka (Metaphor). 'Whether it is a post or a man' — is not a case of Sasandeha (Doubtful). 'It is silver' — is not a case of Ehrântimân (Error). 'This is not a snake' — is not a case of Ap ahnuti (Denial). 'The faty Devadatta takes no meal at day-time' — is not a case of Paryâyokta (Periphrasis). 'The mountain is fiery' — is not a case of Anumâna (Inference). 'He is Devatta' — is not a case of Smaraâna (Reminiscence). 'tas, thas, tha and mip (are replaced by) tam, tam, ta and am (respectively)' — is not a case of Yathâsâmkhya (Relative Order). 'The father has come with the son' — is not a case of Sahokti (Connected Description). 'He has gone without him' — is not a case of Vinokti (Speech of Absence). 'śveto dhâvati' — (1) the white (horse) is running and (2) the dog runs (from this place) — is not a case of Ślesa (Paronomasia). (Similarly) other examples are to be understood. Now, why the adjunct 'âvayoh' is (included) here, is being considered. If you say that in order to exclude the figure
Ananvaya, in which the similarity is expressed by comparing an object to itself (the adjunct 'dvayoh' is included in the definition), then also it would be too wide a definition with regard to Pratīpa (Converse) where the Upamāna is conceived as the Upameya, and Upameyopamā (Reciprocal Comparison) where two objects are conceived as Upameya by rotation. If you want to take them as Upamā on the ground that the description of similarity exists there also, then the figure Ananvaya also would deserve inclusion (there) and hence meaningless would be the word 'dvayoh'. Thus, the term 'bheḍa' included in the definition (of Upamā) offered in the Kavyaprakāśikā, namely, 'Upamā is (the description of) similarity of (two) different objects' with a view to excluding the figure Ananvaya, is hereby refuted. Not that the description of real similarity only constitutes Upamā, so that the exclusion of Anānvaya due to impossibility of similarity with its own self and the inclusion of the other two would be possible. If it would happen so, then in the example like 'your glorious performance as white as that of a goose is bathing in the heavenly Ganges' etc., where the figure Upamā is drawn from a similarity fancied by the poet (only), the question of absence of Upamā would arise. Moreover, even taking it granted that there is the eligibility of being an Upamāna and an Upameya and the charmingness too, it would be too wide (a definition) with regard to an Upamā, faulty on account of divergence in gender, number etc. as (is found) in 'the moon is white like a goose (and) the sky is clear like pools' etc. It would be too wide (a definition) with regard to the suggestion of Upamā to be exemplified later on. This is, by no means, a figure of speech as that itself is the subject of embellishment and as the
appellation of Alärkaprakaṣā (i.e. suggestion of a figure of speech) has been decidedly accepted (by them) by the maxim (brahmanasramana) (i.e. the Brahmin turned to a Buddhist monk). If you take the definition of Upamā in general irrespective of faulty or faultless and subject of figure or a figure and say that the aforesaid fault of (being) too-wide a definition is not involved then the adjuncts (upamānopameyatvayogyayoh' and 'hrdayam' also become meaningless, for (in that case) Upamā although faulty on account of the lack of literary convention would have to be admitted.

As regard the definition (of Upamā) offered by Śrī Vidyānātha (it runs thus) —

That is to be called Upamā where the natural (ṝharmataḥ) similarity of the subject of description is expressed once with something else (i.e. Upamāna) which is established, different (from the Upamāya) and agreeable (to the poets).

Here, the figure Utprakṣā is excluded by the adjunct 'svatahsiddhena' as the Upamāna there, is not widely known among the people at large owing to the fact that it is fancied by the poet. Exclusion of the figure Ananvaya is made by the adjunct 'bhinnena'. Exclusion of all types of faulty simile is made by the adjunct 'sammatena'; since all types of simile which are not fit to be employed owing to lack of familiarity in the circle of poets or owing to (faults like) divergence in respect of gender and gender, are excluded by the term 'sammatā'. The figure Śleṣa is excluded by the term 'dharmataḥ'. In Śleṣa, as in examples like 'sakalakalam
puram, tajjatam sampratisudham subimbam iva (i.e. 'this city has become sakalakala, full of noise and hence resembles the disc of the moon which is 'sakalakala', i.e. complete with all its digits), similarity in point of words only is conveyed by the term 'iva' and not the similarity from the standpoint of attribute or action. The (figure) Pratipta is excluded by the expression 'anyena varnyasya', because, there the similarity of the non-contextual idea with the subject of comparison is described. The figure Upameyopama is excluded by the term 'ekedā'. Suggested simile is excluded by the term 'vācyam'. Now, the statement, that for the exclusion of the figure Utpreksa the term 'svataḥsiddhena' is used — is unjustified; since, the Utpreksa where the expression 'iva' gives the idea of possibility of identity etc., between the Upamāna and the Upameya, the similarity is not expressed there and thus it (i.e. Utpreksa) would be automatically excluded. Hence said Chakravartin :-

Where the element of comparison is well-known among the people, there it is an Upamā and in that case, the term 'iva' is an expressive of similarity.

But, if this element is not well-known among the people and has its origin in the poet's fancy, the figure will be Utpreksa.

Moreover, the term 'iva' as expressive of probability is also noticeable in the popular usage as in 'the man standing afar appears to be Devadatta'. How again
can the exclusion of Utpreksā be done by this (use of) ‘svataḥsiddhena’, since in the very following verse —

The king of Navakākati, delighting (the people) by his own lustre shines on earth as if the moon which (having thought) that there is no completeness here (i.e. in the sky) for all time, has descended on earth leaving the firmament.

(which is) an example of Utpreksā, given by himself, the element of Upamāna is already established. If you say that the moon is poetically fancied in respect of its descend on earth (only), then the definition will be too narrow to cover the following verse given as an example of Asambhābitopama (i.e. simile involving impossibility) —

Like poison (issuing) from the lunar disc, like fire (issuing) from sandalwood, from this face issues harsh words. This is an example of 'Asambhābitopama'.

Since, though poison and fire are real by their existence, the statement of the moon and the sandal as their origin is a feat of poetic imagination.

(Moreover), the definition will be too narrow by all means to cover the following verse given as an example of Upamā where the element of Upamāna owes its origin to poetic imagination (only) —

Had a couple of separate streams from the water of the 'Heavenly Ganges' fallen on
the sky, (then only) his chest which is as dark as that of a Tamāla tree and (decorated) with a hanging string of pearls might be compared with it.

The term 'abhinnena', included (in the definition) with a view to excluding the figure 'Ananvaya' is also unjustified. For, in

Being a mine of an endless quantity of gems, — the snow on the top of this mountain could not efface its attractiveness; for one solitary fault merges in an accumulation of (a great many) merits as the stain of the moon merges in its rays.

where the simile is drawn for supporting an idea, it will be found too-narrow; since, in this case the particular blemishes and qualities viz. the 'stain' and the 'rays' respectively are included in the general blemishes and qualities of the Upameya and hence cannot be deemed as distinct from one another. If however, it is said that the distinction of the Upamāna from it (i.e. the Upameya) consists in the distinction of the determining property of the Upamāna, which is different from the determining property of the Upameya, that also would not be justified; since (the definition) would suffer from being too-narrow in an example of Raśanopamā (Chain of Similies) as stated below :-

When the king brings together hosts of supplicants like waves on his hand which is full of water used in his continuous
gifts of gold, his mind is like his words, like his mind are his actions and like his actions is his highly pure fame.

since, 'matitva' etc., which are the 'upamānatāvacchedaka's i.e. determining properties in respect of Upamāna (in the succeeding ones) have no distinction from the determining properties in respect of the Upameyas (applied in the preceding clauses). Moreover, the term 'ekadā' (used in the definition) turns to be redundant as the exclusion of Upameyopamā is established by the very adjunct used beforehand, (viz., 'bhinnena') because of the absence of mutual distinction in both the two determining properties of Upamāna, used in the figure Upameyopamā. Again, in

Covering the sky with the dust thrown up by the chariots, and earth with the dark cloud-like elephants, Raghu changed the sky into the earth and the earth into the sky.

which is to be cited as an illustration of 'Parasparopamā' in the section dealing with Upameyopamā, it (i.e. the definition of Upamā offered by Vidyānātha) would become too narrow. Now, if it is argued that the difference of Upamāna (from the Upameya) consists in its being characterised by an attribute which is distinct per se from the determining property of the Upameya in question, that too would not be proper; for, the definition would be too narrow to cover the following examples of 'abhinna-dharmikopamā' (i.e. Upamā, based on objects which are virtually identical)

The thousand-beamed luminary (the Sun) held over his head a sun-shade newly made by the artisan of the gods. When the crest of the
Lord was not very far from its white silken fringe, it seemed as if the stream of Ganga was falling upon his head.

The beggar, going door to door, does not beg but teaches thus — 'Be like yourself by giving and be not like myself by giving nothing.

Since, the very determining factor of the Upameya in question, viz., 'paramesvaratva' or the like turns to be the determining factor of the Upamāna too. It would also be unjustified to say that the adjunct 'dharmatah' is used to exclude the figure Śleṣa, for, not only the similarity in words but the similarity in respect of attributes too is expressed there by the term 'iva' and hence the figure Śleṣa could not be excluded. It would also be incorrect if you say that in the case of the city 'sakalakalatva' means 'full of rapid loud sounds' and in the case of lunar orb it means 'complete aggregation of lunar digits' (and thus) there is no common property available here — because, the commonness of property is admitted here by the 'bhide'bheda' (i.e. imagination of identity although different are the objects) variety of the figure Atisyayokti, basis of which is the complete identification based on Śleṣa. Not that the figure Upamā consists in the primary commonness of the property belonging to Upamāna and Upameya both; since, in

Here sits the king of Pāṇḍus, who had applied scented paste of sandal to his body, from whose shoulders hang down the
pearl-garlands and who looks like the king of the mountains whose summits are reddened with the rays of the morning sun and which has rivulets flowing downwards.

e tc., commonness of property subsisting between 'scented paste of red sandle' and 'the morning sun' and pearl-garland' and 'rivulets', has been admitted although considered on the basis of 'Bimbapratibimba-bhāva' (i.e. process of reflected representation). If it is said that as in 'sakalakalan' etc., too, there exists the similarity in attributes and as such it may be a case of Upamā, (then also it may be contended) that, should it not be a case of Upamā even where it is based on the similarity in words only. For, this is not a convention that similarity in attributes etc. other than that in verbal expression only is the determining factor of Upamā and not the similarity in verbal expression, because, Upamā is admitted in (the following verse)

He became king in the real sense of the word on account of his pleasing disposition towards the subjects, as the moon (verifies the signification of its name) on account of its power to please and the sun on account of its scorching brightness.

(also), where similarity is found with regard to an expression in the form of a significant name (only). But as the figure Śleṣa has no scope exclusive of any other figure and hence stronger (than other figures) due to its 'scopelessness', it will supersede other figures and hence, it is the figure Śleṣa, which is responsible for the cognition of Upamā, to be admitted though there is an appearance
of Upamā. This has been admitted by (the rhetoricians like) Mañkhaka and others. Thus, as Ślesa is a bar where the appearance of Upamā is found to be based on the simi-
larly in words and as the same may be similarly maintained where there is an appearance of Upamā which is based on similarity in common attributes attained through complete identification based on Ślesa, the expulsion of commonness in attributes for the sake of that (i.e. 'bādhakatva') is not justified. What has been said by Rudrata while justi-
fying the figure Upamā in the expression 'sakalakalam' etc. (is this) —

Upamā and Samuccaya (Conjunction) are clearly figures based on ideas; but in the case in question (of the passage 'sakalakalam' etc.) also they are possible on the basis of the similitude in verbal expression only.

Here, the point of similarity with regard to verbal expre-
sion only is mentioned. But it becomes clear in the end that it has been said with this intention in view that Upamā can be supported even based similarity in respect of verbal expression only and not to say that commonness of attribute is not possible by complete identification also; because, similarity, by means of complete identifi-
cation, in the adjuncts pertaining to Ślesa also, has been accepted by all in other figures of speech. Thus Ślesa cannot be excluded by the expression 'dharmaṭaḥ'. In fact, in 'sakalakalam' etc., obviously the figure is Upamā and hence redundant is the adjunct 'dharmaṭaḥ'. The scope of Ślesa as different from that of other figures, will be shown in the section dealing with it.
Moreover, the argument that Śieṣa will supersede other figures as it has no separate scope, is also unjustified, since, the hurdle of scopelessness is overcome by merely having a field (for it) and thus the dispute with regard to 'separate scope' is out of question. This is not the popular convention noted in the science of poetics that there should be a separate scope (for everything); since, unperforated gems, (the use of which is) dependent on (the use of) gold, as being causes of beauty are treated as separate ornaments (viz. gem-ornaments) although they have no scope without being used with gold. Otherwise, the status of gold as ornament, to which the unperforated gems are dependent and which has (many) scopes, would have been checked by the unperforated gems, laid on (an ornament). It is not a 'shastric nyāya' (i.e., a rule prevalent in a particular science) agreeable to the Mimāṃsakas, since, the individual existence of the (vedic) statements like 'pade juhoti' etc., having a mere scope, is established like the statements like 'uttārārdhe juhoti' etc., although having no scope outside the range of Āhavaniya Shastra etc. It is not a special rule relating to this science i.e., the science of poetics also. Though Sahokti etc. have no separate scope from that of Atisāyokti etc., the formers are accepted as separate figures of speech without barring the latters and thus the want of opposition lies the same here also. Therefore, the statement that here the figure is Śieṣa giving rise to the cognition of Upamū, is unjustified. On the contrary, Upamū is (the figure) here giving rise to the cognition of Upamū, is unjustified. On the contrary, Upamū is (the figure) here giving rise to the cognition of Upamū, is unjustified. 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'sakalakalam' in the context of description of the city, is not possible unless the simile in 'suñhamsubimbarva' which is a qualifying expression to that is used. The statement that in order to exclude the figure Pratipa, the expression 'anyena varṇyasya sāmyam' has been used is unjustified; since, then the expression 'anyena' is rendered tautologous by the adjunct 'bhinna'. Moreover, if the idea of the similarity of the contextual with something non-contextual i.e. different from the 'varṇya' i.e. 'prakṛta (i.e. contextual) is intended, then it will be too-narrow to cover the following example of Samuccitopama (i.e. Upama involving the idea of conjunction):

Other demons also fell on the crores of monkeys. They appeared like dust raised from the battlefield falling upon the streams of their blood. because, the fall of dust on blood as part of battle also is the subject of description (i.e. contextual) here. If the idea is that (of similarity) with something somehow virtually different from the contextual irrespective of whether it is contextual or non-contextual then in Pratipa, where owing to superb qualities even the Upamāna seems to be improper, it would be too-wide. As for example:

O poison, do not you, my dear, be puffed up at the idea that you are the greatest of terrible things; verily there abound in this world the words of the wicked, which are just like yourself.
Here, for the commonness of the words of the mischievous persons, which (in the present context) form the subject of comparison, with the Hālāhala (i.e. a type of deadly poison), which is being considered as unfit to be the Upamāna for its very prominent, the figure is Pratīpa. Here, the expression 'varṇyasya' (used in the definition offered by Vidyānātha) also, is unjustified; since, it will be too-narrow to cover the following example of Upamāna inter-mingled with Aprastuṭaprasāṃsā — "the moon light, before the glorious performances of yours, looks gloomy by its darkness (from stain)" — because, moonlight is not the subject of comparison owing to the fact that it is the glorious performance which is the subject of comparison here. Moreover, what does the expression 'anyena varṇyasya sāmyaṃ vacyan' mean? Whether the similarity pertaining to the subject of comparison having a counter-entity from other or the similarity determined by both the subject and standard of comparison attained through somehow or the similarity pertaining to the subject of comparison is expressed? In the first case, it would be too-narrow to cover such example of Udbhayaśrānta-sādṛṣyopama (i.e., Simile, where the similarity is established on both sides) as noticed in "This lotus and the face of hers are the same (in beauty) and hence (it) causes delight in my heart". In the second case, it would be too-wide with regard to the well-known examples of Pratīpa and the condition lies the same. Similarly, in the third case, as the desired meaning is achieved by the mere expression 'varṇyasya sāmyam', the term 'anyena' becomes useless. The adjunct 'ekaḍā', used with a view to excluding the figure Upameyopama, also is unjustified, since, though the fault of being too-wide a definition with regard to Upameyopama where the
figure is introduced (through the interchange of Upamāna and Upameya) in seriatim as in the example like "the water is like the sky and the sky is like the water" etc., can be avoided by it (i.e., the term 'ekadā'), the fault of being too-wide (a definition with regard to Upameyopamā) where the interchange is simultaneous, as noticed in the following verse, cannot be avoided.

Let therefore the two obtain at once mutual similitude by their sweet simultaneous opening — the two, namely, your eye with the pupil, far from rough, rolling about within, and the lotus with a black-bee moving inside.

Moreover, it would be too-narrow to cover such an example of Mālopamā (as given below) where the common properties are different as the similarity is established there in diverse ways —

A woman of attractive buttocks is a delight to the eyes like the moon, a cause of intoxication like wine and an attraction to all people like sovereignty.

It is not worth saying that the figure Mālopamā is not a single figure as it is a collection of many similies and the characteristic (of Upamā) is indeed present in each case; for, in that case, as Upameyopamā is an amalgamation of Upamā and Pratīpa, the use of another adjunct for the exclusion of that becomes irrelevant. The statement of other authors on poetics regarding figures, distinct from Saṃśṛṣṭi and Samkara, remains the same with regard to
both (i.e. Mālopaṁā and Upameyopamā). Similarly, it would be too-narrow to cover such example of Paraspārpaṁā, namely, "rajobhiḥ syandanoddhūtaih" etc., which is to be exemplified in the section on Upameyopamā. The statement that in order to exclude suggested Upamā, the term 'vācyam' is used (in the definition), — is also unjustified; since, the question of being too-narrow (a definition) will nag to the following example of 'Tattvākhyānopamā' (i.e., Upamā based on statement of facts) would arise, since the commoner is not expressed (true).

This is not a lotus, but really a face; these two are not bees but eyes. —
This is certainly (an example of)

Tattvākhyānopamā.

The question of being too narrow to cover such example of Viśiṣṭopamādyākṣiptavisessanādyupamā (i.e., Upamā, based on attributes etc., implied by the simile based on the qualified) as noticed in (verses) like the following one also, would arise.

Your face, with tender eyes and displaying shining brilliance of teeth, shines like a lotus which displays (shining) filaments and wherein bees hover.

The objection of being too-narrow to cover such example of 'Vācakaluptopamā' (i.e., Upamā, where the word expressive of similarity is dropped) as noticed in "one (female) having scimitar-bluish lustre" etc., and 'Sāmyalakṣākapādaṇḍupamā' (i.e., Upamā, where there is a word indicating i.e., conveying by Lakṣaṇa, similarity) as noticed in "face, intimate to the moon" etc. also, will arise.
Moreover, (the question) whether in the expression 'vācyam', expressiveness is intended as predicate or as a subject. In the first case, this definition will be applicable only in examples like the following one —

He, leading with him his great army going toward the eastern sea, looked like Bhagiratha who led the Gāṅgā fallen from the matted hair of Hara.

But it would not be applicable in the following example and the like.

He, equal to Indra in his valour, marched first of all towards the east, menacing his enemies, as it were, with his flags unfurled in the air.

In the second case, it (i.e., the definition of Upamā) will be applicable also in the following example of Vyatireka where the similarity is a subject owing to its having a negation as predicate as in the following example — "The moon is not equal (in beauty) to your face which is without any stain."

It is not so.

Nor that 'vācyam' has to be qualified as standing against the counter-entity of negation (niṣedhāpratiyogī), since, even then, it would be too wide with regard to the following example of Vyatireka —

This person, possessed of great dignity, did not become proud like other inferior persons, when suppressed his enemies with the help of his sword only.
It is not so

May that 'vācyam' has to be qualified as not included in the counter-entity end of negation, since, it would be too narrow to cover the following example (of Upamā) of which the standard of comparison is dropped:

O my hornet! why do you wonder in vain in various regions of the garden? Even if you wonder, nowhere would you find (a flower) similar to this Mālatī (one).

Since, the similarity too, is set inside the counter-entity end because of (its) negation of the discovery of a similar one there. Hence, the definition said by Vidyānātha also, is unjustified.

As regards the following definition offered in the Sarasvatīkāntābhārana —

What is a close mutual connection of common properties of two ideas in accordance with a convention, is intended here to be Upamā.

that too, is too narrow to cover the following example of Upamā where the mutual similarity with regard to attribute, action etc. is described.

Trodden by hoops of horses, the dust of Elā (cardamom) fruits rose up and clung to the temples of the infuriated elephants, having a similar odour.

It would also be too narrow to cover the cases of Kalpitopamā (Upamā drawn through poetic fancy) as noticed in the following instances and other, where the standard of comparison is not based on convention:-
The disc of the moon, as brown as that of a full-grown lotus-stalk and which looks like the setting of the raised breast, fallen on account of being pressed at the time of dalliance with the Hûna, advanced in pregnancy, manifests the first stepping of Lord Viṣṇu, by its fresh rays.

and "The orange viesing with the chin of a drunken Hûna, just shaven."

The author of the Alamkâra-sarvasva has stated as follows — "Upamâ consists either in the commonness of property or in the similarity admitting of (both) the distinction and identity between the standard and subject of comparison. There are three varieties of commonness in property: where the distinction is predominant, as noticed in Dîpaka (Illuminator), Tulyayogitā (Equal Paring), Drâštânta (Exemplification), Prativastûpamā (Parallel), Sahokti (Speech with 'With'), Vyatireka (Distinction) etc.; where the identity is predominant, as noticed in Rûpaka (Metaphor), Parināma (Superimposition), Bhrântimag (Error), Ullekha (Representation) etc.; where both the two are equal (in predominance), as noticed here in Upamâ. Here, from the standpoint of special attributes relating to the standard and subject of comparison, there exists a distinction, but identity from the standpoint of common attribute and thus both are equal." That too, it is evident, is faulty on account of being too wide etc. relating to the standard and subject of comparison. Thus, it is difficult to offer a definition of this (figure).

It may be stated here:
If the function of comparing is desired to last until the culmination of action, the figure of speech is Upamā.

(Here), 'Upamānavyāpāra' (i.e., the function of comparing) means the function that establishes the description of similarity; (or in other words), the description of similarity (itself). If that (function) is desired to culminate in comparison — (it merges as) the figure Upamā. This is the explanation (of the definition). Thus, it would not be too wide with regard to Vyatireka, since, the description of comparison is not established there as because of a direct negation (of similarity) noticed in the example "with (your) face which is stainless" and a negation of attributes leading to that (i.e. similarity) as noticed in the example "Not like other inferior persons", although there exists the description of similarity. Nor would it be too wide with regard to Ananvaya, since, there also, the function relating to comparison is not established, as the similarity with itself is described as a foreword to (the idea) that there is nothing like it, like the description of admonition or admiration from some non-existent ideas met in the Arthavāḍavākyas like "Rudrarodana" and "Vapotkhanana" and others. Otherwise, had the comparison with itself been established, the suggestion of uniqueness from all aspects, inspite of the idea of exclusion of a similar one, could not be obtained. Whereas Bhāmaha and others have pointed out that very (idea) as the resultant of that —

Where an object occupies the position of both the standard and subject of comparison
with relation to its own self, that is the figure Ananvaya — they say, with an intention (on the part of the poet) to express the idea of having no similar one."

This is why the authors of Alakārasarvasva and others recommend the derivation of the word 'ananvaya' from the idea that the description of commonness of property with itself does not suit, although described. Thus, as by applying alum-powder to water, water is rendered absolutely clear by means of elimination of other particles of dust (at first) and then vanishing of the dust of alum-powder itself, similarly, as after the exclusion of a similar one while comparing something to itself, it becomes impossible to have a simile in fact with itself as noticed in (the example) "The fight between Rāma and Rāvaṇa is comparable to the fight between Rāma and Rāvaṇa (only)," the convention among the poets is the idea that unique is the fight between Rāma and Rāvaṇa, and thus, as the description of similarity does not culminate (in comparison) — there is no scope of doubt of being too-wide with regard to Ananvaya. Similarly, in Pratīpa too, wherealso the description of similarity does not culminate (in comparison), as noticed in the following verse and others, there is no apprehension for being too-wide (with regard to it), since, it is devoid of culminating in comparison.

Listen to this censurable (scandalous) statement that has spread over the earth, lotus-eyed one; the uncultivated boors compare the moon to your charming face.

The following verse —
O my good lady, why do you bear this unjustified pride on account of your pairs of eyes? Indeed, there are such blue lotus flowers in lakes in every direction.

and the like are to be taken as cases of both Pratīpa and Upameyopamā and thus to cover them (i.e. the above verse and the like) is not a fault of the definition. Thus, the figure Pratīpa, met in the (above) illustrated verse, is a particular variety of Upamā only, since, reminiscence, metaphor, doubt, illusion, concealment from different aspects, imagination, support from a relation of possible connection etc. also, consisting in the description of similarity relating to the non-contextual, are not admitted as figures separate from those relating to the contextual. In default, it is to be presumed that status of figures of speech with regard to Smaraṇa, Rūpaka, Sasandeha, Bhrāntimāṇa, Ullekha, Apahnuti, Utpreksā, Nīdasānā, Arthaantaranyāsā and the like is to be admitted in cases of objects which are contextual only and not the same in cases of objects non-contextual. That reminiscence etc. are treated as figures of speech in objects which are not contextual as in objects which are contextual, would be exemplified in the relevant context. There is no such rule regarding Upamā that the figure will arise only in the form of a description of similarity subsisting between an object which is contextual and (another) non-contextual; since, in the illustrations of Samuccayopamā etc., Upamā is admitted in the description of similarity where (both the two are) either contextual or non-contextual. Similarly, it is justified to say that the description of similarity of an object which is non-contextual with an object which is contextual, is also, obviously a case of
Upama. Similarly, figure Upameyopama also does not occupy the status of a separate figure as it is formed of a couple of similies subsisting between an object which is contextual and (another) non-contextual. In default, the question of admitting Parasparopamā, example of which is being given in the chapter on that (i.e. Upameyopamā), as an individual figure arises and the status of a separate figure has also to be admitted in the cases of (poetic devices) arising out of reciprocal error etc. Nor can you say that it is unjustified to admit that out of the figures Ananvaya, Pratīpa and Upameyopamā, Ananvaya would be excluded from and the other two be included in Upama, since, description of similarity and a particular mode of description are common to all these. For, the distinction between them is quite clear, as, where the description of similarity is accomplished we find the word Upama having its use and where that (i.e. the description of similarity) is not accomplished, the same is not found. With this particular end in view, much care has been taken in the definitions met in Kavyaprakāśikā and others to exclude the figure Ananvaya and not to exclude the figure Upameyopamā. Even if Upameyopamā and others are included in Upama, there exists no contradiction in considering them as separate figure, because of (their) individual variety arising out of suggestion etc., as in the case of Rūpakā and Pariṇāma. That (this) definition does not cover the illustrations like "Had there been two separate streams in the firmament", is not a fault, since, had there actually existed two streams as described, then it might be compared. But those (two) are not possible and hence no one compares (the bosom with such a pair of streams). Thus, it becomes a variety of Upama. Accordingly, even if Upama is admitted in a case where the
function of comparing is not accomplished, the term Upamā becomes a technical one. In fact, there the figure is a particular variety of Atiśayokti. This is why, in the Kāvyaprakāśikā, the variety 'prastutasya yaḍämṛtyam yadyarthoktau ca kalpanam' (i.e., otherwise representation of the contextual matter and imagination of an idea expressed by if) has been included in the figure Atiśayokti and the verse —

If the body of the moon were to be spotless on the full-moon night (rākṣa), then her face would suffer the defeat of resemblance.

has been cited as illustration of 'Yadyarthokti' ('expression by if')

If a flower reclined on a delicate leaf, or a pearl were placed upon a spotless coral bead, then there would be an imitation of her bright smile, with its lustre spread over her scarlet lips.

The above verse is an example of what is known as Utpūdyopamā (Upamā, based on poetic invention), where the standard of comparison is invented by the poet. As the standard of comparison, presented by the term 'yadi' (i.e., if), is possible in this case, the function of comparing is established and hence there is no (fault of being) too narrow, since the characteristic (of Upamā) is obviously present there. Similarly, nor would it be too narrow to cover the following example of Asambhāvitopamā (Upamā, based on unreal ideas), namely, "Like poison issuing
from the disc of the moon", since, the function of comparing, with the very standard of comparison which is not real, has been established, since it is desired by the poet and since the function of comparing is found to be acknowledged as established according to the desire (of the poet). Nor that the definition is desired to run thus : "Figure Upamā is the function of comparing based on objects which are real." In fact, it is based on how the poet desires to say. This is why, the adjunct 'desired' used in the verse, is significant. In default, the definition would not suit even in the expressions like "The face is like the moon", since, there exists no way except following the desire (of the poet), as the face, in fact, lacks in the luxuriance of loveliness resting in the moon. The definition would by no means be able to cover the expressions like "Fame white like the moon", since, there exists not even a iota of whiteness in fame. Nor can you say similarly that in Anavayā too, accomplishment of the function of comparing with itself is possible owing to the intention of the poet; since, there cannot be any question of intention like that where the poet has made effort to suggest lack of comparability in all respects. It would not be too narrow to cover the expressions like "O my hornet! why do you hover in vain" etc., since, the function of comparing is accomplished there, because the knowledge of similarity, which is not being obtained, is somehow experienced, although there is an ultimate negation of similarity due to the lack of another substratum of similarity. This is why, the above example is a case of Upamānaluptā (Upamā, where the standard of comparison is elided) owing to the lack of its (i.e. Upamāna's) mention in particular. Consequently, the following definition also deserves consideration:
That is to be called Upama, where the similarity, which is being described by the poet, does not culminate in its own negation.

Upama consists in a description of similarity having the function of comparing accomplished.

(Also), Upama consists in the description of similarity which never culminates in its own negation.

Both the (above) two are but the characteristic of Upama in general. The definition of Upama, however, when treated as a figure, is also the same but qualified by the adjuncts 'devoid of any fault' and 'not conveyed by suggestion'. Since, in the cases of Upama, such as the one relating to the qualified (visistopama), the similes relating to the adjuncts etc., are accessories to the establishment of the simile relating to the qualified which is expressed, they are cases of 'subordinated suggestion leading to the establishment of the expressed idea' ('Vacyasiddhyangarupagunibhutavyangya') and consequently they are not to be reckoned as figures; hence, not to cover them is not a fault. In the expression like "This is not a lotus but a face", — the figure is not Upama; since, both the error, as it happens to be suggested by negation, and the simile causing that (Bhrantiman), are suggested. Still, Danandin, who considered figures like Bhrantiman etc. too, based on nothing but similarity, to be included in Upama, and used the name 'Tattvakhyanopama'; but there also, for reasons stated above, the fault of being too narrow is not involved. This much is enough.

This Upama is of two types — Complete and Elliptical.
It is complete when the standard of comparison, the subject of comparison, the common property and the word expressing comparison -- these four are mentioned.

It is Elliptical when one, two or three of them are omitted.

In the Complete the common property is somewhere described by conformity, somewhere by the relation of prototype and copy (Vastuprativastubhāva), somewhere by the relation of original and image (Bimbapratibimbabhāva), somewhere by pun, somewhere by a secondary meaning, somewhere by accepting a different compound and somewhere by their combination as far as practicable. But there is no such variety in Elliptical. For, the rule, that the common property must be in conformity, prevails there. But varieties of it from other perspectives, will be noted (later on). The conformity of common property in the Complete is exemplified in the following verse:

For the right understanding (or the proper knowledge) of words and their meanings, I bow down to Pārvatī and Paramēśvara, (the greatest of the gods), who are the parents of the universe and the perpetual relation between whom is as close as the one subsisting between words and their meanings.

The eternal co-existent relation between word and its meaning is proverbial in the Mīmāṃsā rule — "autpattikas tu śabdasyārthemasambandah" ('the relation of words with meaning is eternal'). As the separate existence of the moon and the noontime cannot be imagined, similar is the case with these Uma and Maheśvara too. This is (also)
well-known. Thus the eternal relation as the common property is here indicated by conformity. Although the deep conjugal love between Umā and Mahēśvara and their great majesty are suggested by describing their eternal relation like the relation between the word and its meaning, yet it cannot be deemed as a case of suggestion or a subordinated suggestion. It is not that by the mere appearance of a touch of suggestion, beauty is apprehended here; but it is apprehended also from the appearance of a variety of meaning directly expressed. Hence, various figures of speech are often illustrated without taking into consideration the manifestation of possible Rasa (aesthetic pleasure) and the like or any other suggested figure of speech.

That is to be called Vastuprativastubhāva where the same property is mentioned in two (different) ways on account of their connection with different objects. But that cannot be pure for either in the form of attribute or in the form of a qualified, there must be an inter-mixture of a Bimbapratibimbabhāva. In fact Bimbapratibimbabhāva consists in twice mentioning of two properties that are (mutually) different but turned to be identical on account of their mutual resemblance. Of them, an example of the Vastuprativastubhāva relating to an attribute, is the following one —

While going, she, with her eyes having graceful eye-lashes (and) having that face with the neck repeatedly turned backwards and thus resembling a lotus with its stem twisted, planted deep in my heart a sidelong glance, steeped in nectar and venom.
Here, the identical property of shoulder and lotus-stalk, which are presented as original and image by the words 'valita' and 'āryta', is indicated as related to attribute. Vastupratiyastubhāva relating to qualified is seen in the following verse —

That chaste woman, trembled in fear, was forcibly captured by him, just as a creeper, shaken by wind is grasped by an excessively restless (i.e., always jumping from one spot to another) monkey.

Here, the identical property of fear and wind which have attained the Bimbapratibimbabhāva, has been indicated as qualified by the words 'kampita' and 'dhūta'. Bimbaprati-bimba relation as Pure is seen in the example "pāṇḍyo'yam ansārpitalambahārah" etc. Here, the red sandle-paste and the morning sun, as well as the necklace and the fountain are described in a Bimbapratibimbabhāva. Use of pun is seen in the following verse —

O, Narasimha! the sovereign! all your enemies, who have been removed from their positions, have assumed a state equal to the ocean. In case of pun —

"O, Narasimha! the sovereign! all your enemies have assumed a state equal to the ocean (which has forgotten) the Lord Acyuta, having his sleep (in it)."

Use of secondary meaning is seen in the following verse —

Then, in wonder, eagerly they beheld the prince like the sun with its shooting rays rising from the 'golden-mountain' ('Sumaru'), with their eyes like fully blossomed lotuses.

Here, the blossoming, which is (in fact) an attribute of the flower, is superimposed on the glances (of
the Upameya here. An example of the use of different compounds is seen in the following verse:

As when the earth is visited by autumn with increased brightness of the moon comparable to a face, waters are limpid and thus comparable to a delighted mind, and lilies bloom and thus deserve comparison with opened eyes; similarly, when Śiva came close to the bride with the enhanced brilliance of his moonlike face; his eyes comparable to lilies, expanded with joy, and had his mind delighted and thus comparable to limpid water.

Here, the adjunct 'vivrddhānanacandrakāntyū' goes with (both) the goddess and the autumn by means of the adoption of different compounds. As regards combination, an example of combination of conformity and the relation of original and image, is seen in the following verse:

By the combination of fierce yet amicable virtues he was to his dependents non-assailable as well as accessible as is the ocean owing to its sea-monsters and jewels.

Here, non-assailability and approachability have attained the existence as the common property depending on an idea of a Bimbapratibimbabhāva, observed in the qualities of the king as well as sea-monsters and jewels (of the ocean). The combination of conformity and pun is seen in the following verse --
Oh my son! as your brother passed away, the great lunar race of ours due to the absence of progeny (in case of Śūlaka — lack of Pārijāta tree) did not shine for long like the garden of Indra, prior to the churning of the ocean.

Here, the idea of 'devoid of beauty' has attained the character of the common property depending on the pun residing in the word 'santāna'. The combination of conformity and secondary meaning is seen in the following verse —

Having seen the army of the king of Kurus, Uttara, shivering with fear and having perspiration (on his person), caught hold of the sword bright like the lightning, like a lady love embraces (her lover) shivering in fear and having perspiration.

Here, the idea of the agency of embracing, which has attained a charm here depending on 'shiveringness' as the property in conformity, has been superimposed on 'fear'. The combination of conformity and adoption of compound is seen in the following verse —

The quarters having their grey locks in the form of hawk's wings, with their clothes steeped in blood in the form of evening clouds and therefore like women in their menses, with their grey locks of hair comparable to hawk's wings, and garments wet with blood comparable to evening cloud, were not fit to be looked at.
Here, the property in conformity, namely, the state of being unfit to be looked at, attains the exuberance of beauty, depending on the common property attained through the adoption of different compounds in the two adjuncts 'syaṇapaksaparidhūsara' etc. An example of the combination of a 'Vastuprativastubhāva' and a 'Bimbapratibimbabhāva' is seen in the following verse —

Those (kings) who had suppressed all outward expression of feelings of dissatisfaction under the garb of joy, like clear lakes with alligators concealed within, bade good-bye to the lord of Vīgarbhas, and went away having repaid the honour to him under the pretext of marriage gifts.

Here, by the words 'saṃvyta' and 'guḍha', one single property (i.e., a common property) residing in anger and 'alligator', assuming the state of a Bimbapratibimbabhāva, has been mentioned and thus it is a case of Bimbapratibimbabhāvavastuprativastubhāva (i.e., Vastuprativastubhāva derived through Bimbapratibimbabhāva). Again, there is an idea of a Vastuprativastu relation residing in the signs of joy and clearness (of water). The combination of pun and a Bimbapratibimbabhāva is seen in the following verse —

The princes, being delighted at the fall of Pārtha, shed tears (and thus) pretended to be grieved, and looked like lakes, with waters on the surface heated in the sun but having cold water inside, emitting vapour.

Here, the beauty of the pun, used in the word 'Bāspa', is dependent on a Bimbapratibimbabhāva to be
found in the adjuncts relating to the 'prince' and the
'lakes'. Combination of secondary meaning and a Bimba-
pratibimbabhāva is seen in the following —

That lady of violent disposition,
being assured by her husband, pronounced
the two boons that had been promised to
her, as the earth showered upon by Indra
(rain) throws out a pair of serpents,
lurking within its holes.

Here, 'udvamana' i.e., 'vomiting', has been super-
imposed on both the Upamāna and the Upameya in considera-
tion of the Bimbapratibimba relation between 'āśvāsita'
(assured) and 'indrasikta' (showered upon by Indra) as
well as 'vara' (boon) and 'uraga' (serpent); since, the
primary meaning (of it) is unsuitable in both the cases
and also for the fact that in the primary sense the fault
of vulgarity is involved. Thus it is said —

Words like 'nisthyūta' (spitting)
'udgīrṇa' (belching) and 'vānta (vomiting)
and the like are very pleasing when used
in their secondary function only; other-
wise they plunge into vulgarity.

Similarly, other combinations of two factors are
to be understood. An example of the combination of (spīti-
21
and an adoption of a different compound is
seen in the following verse —

She, who was destined to become the
wife of another, with a beautiful navel
resembling a whirlpool, passed by that king, as a river, with its whirlpool comparable to a heroine's attractive navel, bent on going to the ocean, passes by a mountain coming across its course.

Here, the expression 'vyatyagāt' ('passed by') is the property in conformity. There is a Bimbapratibimbāl-bhāva in the expression 'anyavadhūr bhavitī' (destined to become the wife of another) and 'sāgarāgāmini' (bent on going to the ocean) and the adoption of a different compound is to be found in the expression 'āvarta (whirlpool) and mārajanālīti (attractive navel). They all are combined (in the aforesaid verse). The combination of a property of conformity, pun and superposition is seen in the following verse —

Like Hanumān, (i) having his beautiful locks kissed by the wind-god, (ii) the leader of the army of the delighted husband of Tārā (Sugrīva), and (iii) eagerly looked at by Rāma, separated (from his beloved) — has this spring-time arrived (i) having its pollens of its (flowers) wafted by the breeze, (ii) harbinger of the disc of the bright moon, and (iii) eagerly looked by the afflicted eyes of the women separated (from their lovers).

Here, in the expressions 'āturaṇḍraṭivikṣita' etc., there is the property of conformity. There is Sīla in the words 'Rāma' etc. There is superposition in the word 'cumbita' with relation to spring — all these are
combined (here). Similarly, other instances of combinations may be found out by one's own self. There is a peculiarity in the examples relating to the Bimbapratibimbabhāva. Somewhere Bimbapratibimbabhāva between two clearly appearing common properties is drawn on account of their well-known similarity as met in (the example) — 'pañjydyam aṃsārpitalambahāra' etc. Somewhere, Bimbapratibimbabhāva between two common properties admitted somehow is drawn on account of their similarity being not well-known as met in (the example) — 'tayā vivṛddhānanaacakrāntyā' etc. Here, the commonness between 'autumn' and 'Aparṇā' is by nature not well-known. But the Bimbapratibimbabhāva between (those) two common properties, attained through the adoption of a different compound in the words 'vivṛddhānana' etc., (is admitted). By no means is Bimbapratibimbar relation possible unless there is a knowledge of similarity somehow accepted. Now the question arises — how does the Viparītopamā stand in the following verse —

In this world, as you are endowed with merits — worthless so is your enemy — here the standard of comparison is to be taken as contrary (i.e., it is a case of Viparītopamā).

There is no apprehension of commonness between the state of being endowed with merits and that of being bereft of merits in point of properties mentioned or implied. This is not a fault; since there exists an apprehension of commonness between them in point of (their) implied attributes, viz. the state of being too much, naturality etc.
Otherwise, the commonness expressed by the term 'yathā' would have been baseless. Complete (Upamā) is thus hinted at.

Elliptical (Upamā) is of eight types; such as — Vācakaluptā (where the expressive word is elided), Dharmaluptā (where the property is elided), Upamānaluptā (where the standard of comparison is elided), Vācakopamānaluptā (where the expressive word and the standard of comparison are elided), Dharmopamānaluptā (where the property and standard of comparison are elided), Dharmavācakaluptā (where the property and the expressive word are elided), Vācakopameyaluptā (where the expressive word and the subject of comparison are elided) and Dharmopamānavācakaluptā (where the property, standard of comparison and the expressive word are elided). Examples are being given in seriatim —

Be it known to thee, that my name is Kumbhodara, as equal to Nikumbha; and I am a servant of the eight-formed God (Śiva), and my back is sanctified by the favour of the placing of his foot-steps (on it) when wishing to mount his bull white as the mount Kailāsa.

Here, in the expression 'kailāsagouram', there is the elision of the expressive word; in the expression 'nikumbha-tulyam', elision of property is (met with). Elision of expressive word is always governed by the rules leading to compounds etc. Elision of property is optional; since it can also be said that (he is) equal to Nikumbha in respect of (his) power etc.
That there was a meeting between him and the thieves and that he was killed by them — alas, all these happened all on a sudden like the coming of the crow and falling of the palm (post hoc ergo propter hoc).

Here, the words 'kāka' and 'tāla' are connected with their respective verbs related to crow and palm in the sphere of vṛtti. Thus 'kākāgamanam iva tālapatanam iva ('as is the coming of the crow so also is the falling of the palm') — gives the form 'kākatālam' and thus it is a case of the compound of the Supsupa type in the sense of 'iva' (similarity) by the indicatory rule 'ساماسا ca tadvīśayat'. Coming of Devadatta and the arrival of the robbers are the subject of comparison respectively in the (above) two cases. Thus, the meaning that the meeting between Devadatta and the robbers is similar to the coming of the crow and the falling of the palm, is arrived at. Then adding the suffix 'oh' by the rule 'ساماسا ca tadvīśayat' in the sense of the second 'iva', we get 'kākatālam' > 'kākatāliyam'. Thus it follows — as the death of the crow by the falling palm (happened), similarly the murder of Devadatta by the robbers, arrived on the spot, (took place). Thus says the venerable Bhāṣya-kāra (author of the Mahā-bhāṣya) — "Thus, there are the two senses of 'iva' as follows — kākāgamanam iva tālapatanam iva kākatālam, kākatālam iva kākatāliyam (as is the coming of the crow so also is the falling of the palm — this gives the form kākatālam. What is similar to kākatālam is kākatāliyam)." This again has been explained by Kaiyāṭ̐ahan —

"Here, the coming of the crow is the standard of comparison for the arrival of Devadatta. (Similarly) the
falling of palm (is the standard of comparison) for the arrival of the robbers on the spot. That the crow is killed by the palm is the standard of comparison for the murder of Devadatta by the robbers. Arrival (of them) all on a sudden on the spot is the common property. That is why the author of the Vṛtti says — "Kākatāliya, then, means a surprising incident occurring all on a sudden." Thus, it is an instance of the elision of the standard of comparison in an Upamā based on the meaning of a suffix, since, the Upamāna, in the form of the combination of the arrival of the crow and the falling of the palm as well as the death of the crow caused by the falling palm, is not mentioned. Considered as an Upamā consisting in the meaning of the compound, it is a case of the elision of the expressive word and the standard of comparison. It is a case of the elision of the common property and the standard of comparison in an Upamā based on the meaning of a suffix, if here, the third quarter is read as 'kim iti brūmo vayam idam' ('how should we name it'). With this reading considered as an Upamā consisting in the meaning of a compound, it is a case of the elision of common property, standard of comparison and the expressive word. Here (i.e. in the case of a Triluptā Upamā), only the elision of property is optional.

Oh the tiger in the race of Raghu! 

the duty which you are following 

in your profession and religious austerities, may protect you on all sides.

Here (we find) the elision of property and the expressive word in the compound in the sense — 'Rāghava i.e. the descendant of Raghu, is like a tiger' — governed by the rule 'ūpamitaṁ vyāghrādibhiḥ sāmāṇyāprayoge'. Here
the elision of (common) property also, like the elision of
the expressive word, is prescribed by the science (of
grammar). Since, this compound has been prescribed only
where the common property is not mentioned. Elision of
common property is optional in case of the elision of
common property and the expressive word. As for example —

The mortal being who does not worship
that Lord Śiva (lit. the bearer of the
lunar digit), to whose worshippers the
worldly existence acts as salvation, is a
straw-man in (this) world.

Here, the word 'apavargati' is used in the sense
'apavarga iva ācarati' (i.e. acts live salvation) and thus
there is the elision of (common) property also like the
elision of the expressive word, as, the suffix 'kvip' giving
the sense of 'ācāra' ('behaviour') is elided. In the
word 'caṅcā', the suffix 'kan' is used in the sense 'caṅcā'
i.e. trṇapurūṣa iva ('like a straw-man') governed by the
rule 'iva pratikṛta' and that again is elided by the rule
'lum manuṣye' and thus it is a case of the elision of the
expressive word and the elision of the (common) property.
In both the cases
the mention of common property is also possible if this
verse is read as —

The mortal being who does not worship
Śambhū, to whose devotees this worldly
existence, full of enjoyments, acts like
salvation, is nothing but a straw-man as he
does no good to himself.

This person, having his figure more
attractive by virtue of its beauty, youth
and charm acts to himself like the Cupid,
in presence of the fawn-eyed girls.

Here, there has been the elision of the expressive
word and the subject of comparison. Here, the elision of
the subject of comparison, namely, 'svātman' i.e., his own
self, is an option to the poet, since the idea that he is
acting to himself like the cupid is understood by virtue
of his attributes, namely, beauty, youth etc. Such a
doubt, that there is the mention of the subject of compari-
son, namely, the word 'eṣa', cannot be raised, for unless
there is a second case-ending of it (i.e., of the word
'eṣa'), that cannot plunge into a subject of comparison
in the expression 'puṣpāyudhīyati'. In this very (instance)
if the idea, namely, "their eyes are as large as the eyes
of a fawn", is considered, there is an elision of (common)
property, standard of comparison and the expressive word,
in the word 'hariṇākaṃūnām'. The entire elision is governed
by the rule 'saptamupamānapūrvapadasya' etc. In cases of
elision of (all the) three, the elision of the (common)
property may also be optional as is seen in an example of
Samāsārtthropamā (Upamā, based on a meaning attained through
the adoption of a compound) found in the second reading of
the verse 'ya corāṇām asya ca' etc. Thus eight varieties
of the Elliptical are shown (hereby).

Author of the Kāvyaprakāśikā and others admit six
varieties in the Complete whereas in the Elliptical, nineteen
varieties by some and twenty by others have been
shown on the basis of sub-divisions in the
categories of Dharmaluptā (i.e., where the common property
is elided) etc. There, the division is made thus — Complete
is divided into two — Srauti (Explicit) and Arthī (Implicit). That is Srauti which comprises words like 'yathā', 'iva', which expresses similarity only. That is Arthī which comprises words like 'tulya', 'sārṣa', 'saṁkāsa' and others, capable of indicating object possessing similarity. Both these two varieties may relate to a sentence, a compound or a secondary suffix and thus the complete is of six types. Upamā, with the elision of (common) property also has its divisions like the Complete. But as Srauti relating to a secondary suffix is not possible, it (i.e. Lupta Srauti) possesses five varieties. Vācakalupta (i.e., where the expressive word is elided) is divided in consideration of its occurrence in a 'ṇamul' geund with object or subject prefixed, in a 'kyac'-derivative with an object or a substratum, in a 'kyañ-derivative, in a 'nin'-derivative and in a compound — and thus it is of seven types.

Upamānalupta (i.e., where the standard of comparison is elided) being possible in a sentence and a compound has two varieties. Dharmavācakalupta (i.e., where the common property and the expressive word are elided) is divided into two with regard to its occurrence in a 'kųip'-derivative and in a compound. Dharmopamānalupta (i.e., where the common property and the standard of comparison are elided) is of two types as it occurs in a sentence and a compound. Upameyavācakalupta (i.e., where the subject of comparison and the expressive word are elided) is of a single type occurring in a 'kyac' derivative (only).

Dharmavācakopamānalupta (i.e., where the common property, expressive word and the standard of comparison are elided) also is of one type relating to compound only. Thus it is said —

(Upamā) is divided into two — Complete and Elliptical; that again is divided (into
two) — Explicit and Implicit. The first one of the two occurs in a sentence, in a compound and in a secondary suffix.

When the (common) property is omitted (in the Elliptical) it would be like that (i.e., like the complete); but in the (Elliptical), the Explicit does not occur in a secondary suffix. There are two varieties in respect of the elision of 'iva' etc., one each in respect of its occurrence in a 'namul' gerund, in a 'kyac' derivative, and in a 'kyan' derivative.

Similarly in a 'nini' suffix and in a compound also and (thus) it is stated to be of seven varieties. In consideration of its elision of the standard of comparison, it is divided into two, namely, occurring in a sentence and in a compound.

In case of elision of the (words) like 'iva' and the (common) property also, it is of two types — occurring in a 'krip' suffix and in a compound. In consideration of its elision of the (common) property and the standard of comparison, it occurs in a sentence and in a compound.

It occurs in a 'kyac' suffix where there is an elision of the two — namely, words like 'iva' and the subject of comparison. It occurs in a compound where there is an elision of words like 'iva', the (common) property and the standard of comparison.

Here we are collecting examples following his opinion —
Salutation to that Sambhu having an appearance as delighted as that of the moon, whose order is borne on the head (lit., carried out) like a garland, by the groups of gods, who after fastening sets free men like animals, whose wealth is like that of the clouds and whom, the agreeable and having similarity with the essence of bliss, the blessed persons worship along with their valuable treasures.

Here, all the six varieties of Complete are exemplified. Of these, in the first line we find Explicit occurring in a sentence; in the second line we find the Explicit occurring in a compound, since, the expression 'pāsūn iva' is considered a compound word governed by a statement of the author of the Vārtikas, viz., 'ivena nityasamāso vibhaktyalopapā purvapadaprakṛtisvaratvam ca'. In the third line we find the Explicit occurring in a secondary suffix; since, in the expression 'abhavat' the suffix 'vati' in the sense of 'iva' ('like') is applied after the Saṅhitāsamāsa, governed by the rule 'tatra tasyevā'. In the expression 'hrdayam şeveadhīnā sāman hṛdi bhajanti' we find the Implicit occurring in a sentence. In the expression 'anandasāropamam' we find the Implicit occurring in a compound. The adjunct 'hrdayam' is required here also; otherwise it would be considered an Upamā with the common property elided and not a Complete one. In the expression 'sāsitvat' we find the Implicit in a secondary suffix, since, the suffix 'vati' appearing there has been added in the sense of 'tulya' (similar) governed by the rule 'tena tulyam kriyā ced vatiḥ'.

This sovereign of gods, whose figure is like
the new nectar, of whom the lusture of neck
is like that of an Indranīla gem, whose locks
of hair bear close resemblance to lightning,
human skulls on whose person is like gold,
whose feet bear semblance with a lotus, may
rest in my heart.

Here all the five varieties of the simile with the
elision of common property are exemplified. Of these, the
expression 'mūrṭir yathā navasudā' relates a sentence.
'Balabhīn maṇīva kaṇṭhaphrabhā' is Explicit relating to
Compound. Had in both the cases a verb like 'bhati'
(shining) been mentioned, it would not remain a case of
elision of common property and hence the same has not
been mentioned. Explicit however, with the elision of
common property is not possible in the secondary suffix,
since, the suffix 'vati' used in the sense of 'iva' (like)
added either to a word in sixth case-ending or a seventh
case-ending, does not suit well in its syntactical rela-
tion without the mention of the (common) property. Nor
can it be said that there exists non-expectancy of the
secondary suffix added in the sense of 'iva' under the
heading 'ive pratikṛtāu' even without the mention of the
(common) property, since, uses such as 'kuśāgriyā
buddhiḥ' ('penetrating intellect like the sharp point of a
kūsa grass'), 'śaileyam ādhiḥ' (curd with mountainous
hardness), 'paṃḍarikam mukham' (face with whiteness of a
white lotus) are to be found and thus Explicit with the
elision of (common) property in a secondary suffix can be
exemplified. Because, suffixes mentioned under the heading
'ive pratikṛtāu' are prescribed to be used in the sense of
'similar' only. Otherwise, as in examples 'kuśāgriyā
buddhiḥ' etc., because of the lack of a sense of culmination
in an object qualified by similarity, there would be a lack of common substratum of the \textit{Upamēya} (with the \textit{Upamāna}), whereas they are actually found to be referring to a common substratum, even the statement of similarity would culminate in the idea of a 'similar'(object); and thus the mention of 'iva' in the sūtra ('iva pratikṛta') is not inconsistent. In the three lines beginning with 'susādṛśas ca', there are Implicit (similēs) in a sentence, in a compound and in a secondary suffix respectively.

The suffix 'deśya' although prescribed in the sense 'falling a little short of (something)' in the expression 'abjadesyam', is (at times) used in the sense of similarity and that again culminates in a sense of a 'similar (object)' as it exists in a common substratum. Now the question arises — justified that it is Implicit where words like 'sādṛśa' are in use, since, it culminates in an object qualified by similarity; but is it Explicit or Implicit where words like 'sādṛśya' are used? For example, in the following verse and the like, we say, it is Explicit.

They beheld a (marked) similarity of each other's eyes in the pair of antelopes which had withdrawn to a little distance from the road and had fixed their eyes on the chariot.

The reason is this: Here, though by the stem, to which a secondary suffix has been added, an idea culminating in a qualified object is expressed, it is similarity, expressed by the suffix,which is predominant (in the entire derivative), is construed with the meaning of the (entire) sentence.

I worship him — having seen whom the God of love is destroyed instantly as an insect
is destroyed on seeing a lamp, who acts like a harem in his heart who worships him excessively and who very soon acts to him like the Kumāra (i.e., Skanda), who acts like the main pillar in the construction in the form of the three worlds, seated to the left, whom, a heavenly creeper, having the voice like that of a cuckoo and blue complexion of a kuvalaya (i.e. a blue-lotus) take resort to.

Here, all the seven varieties of the elision of expressive word are shown. Here, (Upamā with) the expressive word elided, is to be noted in the following order — in the 'namul' gerund prefixed by an object in the expression 'dipadarśam' used in the sense of 'like seeing a lamp'; in the 'namul' gerund prefixed by a subject in the expression 'kītanāśāsta' used in the sense of 'destroyed like an insect'; in the 'kyāc' derivative denoting a substratum in the expression 'antāḥ-purīyati' used in the sense of 'acts like a harem in his heart'; in the 'kyāc' derivative prefixed by an object (in the expression 'kumārīyati') used in the sense of 'acts like Kumāra i.e. Skanda'; in the 'kyān' derivative prefixed by a subject in the expression 'mūlāstambhayate' used in the sense of 'acts like the main pillar in the construction of the three worlds'; in the ūni suffix in the expression 'kokilālāpinī' used in the sense of 'speaking in the voice of a cuckoo'; in the compound in the expression 'kuvalayaśyāmalā' used in the sense of 'having a complexion blue like a kuvalaya (i.e. a blue-lotus)'.

May my mind, giving up other fickleness, perform the worship to the Lord Purāri (i.e.
Siva), pleasing and benevolent like whom is not seen and nothing like whom is heard of.

Here, both the two types of (Upama with) the elision of standard of comparison are exemplified — (one) in a compound to be found in the word ‘yatsamam’ and (the other) in a sentence to be found in the expression ‘yena sadrsam’.

Alas! in vain is my mind wandering while Mahesvara is there. Is anyone equal to him heard of or is anyone equal to him remembered? Let it ever act like a black-bee to the couple of his lotus-like feet and let it act like a Cakora-bird calmly to his face possessing the glow of the moon.

Here, remaining six types of (Upama with) elision have also been exemplified. Thus, in the second quarter, two varieties, namely, elision of (common) property and the standard of comparison occurring in a sentence and a compound, in the third quarter (another) two varieties, namely, the elision of (common) property and the expressive occurring in a ‘kvip’-derivative and a compound, the expression ‘cakorikiyatu’ as an example of the elision of the expressive and the subject of comparison, the expression ‘sasiprabhe’ as a case of the elision of (common) property, standard of comparison and the expressive — are to be considered in seriatim.

Such a division of the Complete and the Elliptical in respect of their occurrence in a sentence, a compound and a particular suffix is for exhibiting the knowledge and skilfulness of grammar only and does not deserve to be essentially acquainted with so far as the science of poetics is concerned, nor is this division of elisions
exhaustive. Thus, (similes with) the elision of (common) property, occurring in a sentence, a compound and a secondary suffix are exemplified; but this may be found in re-duplication also as (the expression 'pañcatañur devadattaḥ' (Devadatta is almost an expert), since, the re-duplication is prescribed here in the sense of similarity, governed by the rule 'prakāre guñavacanasya'. It means 'resembling (i.e. almost) an expert'. One, who acts like an expert although being unacquainted with scriptures etc., — is called a 'pañcatañu'. It is not a case of the Upamā with elision of (common) property in a sentence, since, it has been established as a unified word for its treatment like a compound, governed by the rule 'karma-dhāraya vadd uttaratāyasyu'. Hence it cannot be an (Upamā with) elision of (common) property in a compound also. Some have established six varieties of (Upamā with) elision of the expressive without considering (its occurrence with the suffix) 'ṇini'. Including (its occurrence with the suffix) 'ṇini', others have admitted its seven varieties. It's occurrence with the suffix 'kvip' and secondary suffixes also are found as in the following verse —

The mortal being who does not worship Śambhu, to whose devotees this worldly existence, full of enjoyments, acts like salvation, is nothing but a straw-man as he does no good to himself.

This has been explained beforehand. Upamā, with the standard of comparison elided, occurring in a sentence and a compound also has been exemplified. It is found in a secondary suffix also as noticed in — 'Upanatamastad akasmad asid vata kākatāliyam' ('Alas! all these happened
all on a sudden like the coming of the crow and falling of
the palm'). (Upamā) with the expressive and standard of
comparison elided, as such has not been exemplified. That
also is found in the compound standing as the basic word
of (the compound) Kākatāliyam. Even, (Upamā) with the
(common) property and standard of comparison elided,
occuring in a secondary suffix, is exemplified in the
word 'kākatāliyam'. (Upamā) with the (common) property
and the expressive elided, is seen in a secondary suffix
also as in a 'kvip' derivative and a compound. It has been
exemplified beforehand in the hemistich "tām jagatyabhajan
marttyaś caṇcā candrakalādharam" (i.e. 'the mortal being,
who does not worship that Śiva, lit., bearer of the lunar
digits, is a straw-man in this world'). Thus, this is
only an indication to the division of Elliptical made by
the old (critics) and not an exhaustive division. Other
divisions of Upamā as given in the works like kāvyāloka
etc., are all to be gathered from those books concerned
only. Heretoo, a few have been shown in the section on
the consideration of the definition. We shall
show some (other) divisions of its in the section
on Rūpaka (Metaphor).

Again, this Upamā is broadly threefold; somewhere
it culminates only in its own charmingness, as in the
dexample like — 'sa cohimamūlaḥ kṣatajena reṇuḥ'; some-
where it establishes the said object as in 'anantarata-
prabhavasya' etc., or in the verse —

The crime of betrayal on the part of a
villain which enrages a hero, brings about
his own destruction just as the sound,
produced by the uprooting of forest trees,
which disturbs the lion's sleep brings about the death of the elephant.

Somewhere it has the suggested sense predominant. As suggested sense is of three varieties, namely, (bare) idea, figure of speech and aesthetic taste (Rasa), it is of three varieties. Of these, an example of the suggestion of idea is the following verse —

In whose hand the sword was seen by the heroes in battle, resembling the wrath-red glances of the goddess Kāli, since it shone red through the thick blood on being struck against the hard surface of the forehead of redolent elephants blinded with intoxication.

Here, by describing the similarity of the sword with the glances of the angry goddess Kāli, the idea, that the entire enemy force would be destroyed within a moment is suggested. An example of the suggestion of a figure of speech is the following verse —

O King! as your fame, as white as the rays of the moon, spread forth, the sky (lit. the abode of Lord Viṣṇu) looks like a hornet on a white-lotus.

Here, as by the figure Upama, the sense of abundance of fame like white-lotuses and the scantiness of the sky like hornets, is conveyed, the figure Adhika (Exceeding) which is characterised by dissimilarity between an 'āśraya' (substratum) and an 'āśrayakṛita (the contained), is suggested. An example of emergence of aesthetic taste (i.e. suggestion of Rasa) is exemplified in the example beginning with 'vägarthātiva'.
Somewhere all the three varieties of suggestion are found in the same place. For example the following verse may be cited.

See, the crane on a lotus-leaf is seen here, like an oyster-shell placed on a vessel made of yellow pearls."

To indicate the rendezvous, this expression of a wise lady love, who, from a gesture, has come to know the intention of her secret lover, who wants to ask but has not actually asked in public — 'what should be our rendezvous?' Here, as by narrating similarity between the crane seated on a lotus-leaf with an oyster-shell placed on an emerald vessel, its (i.e., the crane's) throblessness is understood, confidence (on the part of the lady-love) is suggested. Thereby, solitariness of that place (of appointment) is suggested and thus it is a case of Vastudhvani. Hence, the meaning — 'this very place is our rendezvous' is expressed; therefore, this is a case of the suggestion of the figure Sukṣma (subtle) consisting in the presentation of a subtle idea as marked here. Thus, as the description is in conformity with their intention, sentiment of love pertaining to each other is suggested and hence it is a case of Rasadhvani.

That the suggestion of Rasa and the like has no noticeable sequence — is well-known; then how its suggestion through resonance (as it were) is admitted here? Such an objection cannot be raised. There it is 'asamlaksyakrama' where the development of aesthetic taste quickly occurs owing to the function of Vibhāva (i.e., the objective condition of producing an emotion), Anubhāva (i.e., the bodily expression by which the emotion is

expressed) etc.; elsewhere, even the suggestion of the Rasa and the like appear in noticeable sequence. Thus it has been said by the venerable Abhinavagupta — "Though the idea, such as Rasa and Bhāva are always suggested and never expressed, yet all these do not fall under the purview of suggestion which has no noticeable sequence." This is why, even Dhvanikāra (author of the Dhvanikārikās) admitted suggestion through resonance of the Saṅcāribhāva (the transient sentiment) namely, bashfulness, in the following verse —

While the heavenly saint was speaking thus, Pārvatī, who was then close to her father, with her face bent down, began counting the petals of a lotus, which she held as a play-thing (in her hand).

Now in the context of suggestion from the Upamā, varieties of the suggestion of Upamā are being shown. Of these, the suggestion of Upamā based on the power of words is seen in the following verse —

That a few blossom and a few not while the moon pours out a heap of excessively white rays profusely on flowers, is due to their (particular) nature only. (or, that a few acquire knowledge and a few not while the master of arts spreads a heap of clear knowledge profusely to students, is due to their respective nature only.)

Here, in this very example, figure Upamā is suggested, since, the non-contextual is considered an Upamāna to the contextual in the following sense — the distinction
in (a group of) students receiving their learning from the same preceptor, of whom a few becoming strong and quick in answers while others not, is not due to any speciality in teaching applied to those students by the preceptor who teaches but is due to their respective character. As this distinction, namely, a few (of the flowers) blossom but others not while the moon is pouring out its heap of rays uniformly on all flowers, is due to the nature of the particular flower only and not caused by the difference in rays of the moon, similarly the distinction, namely, knowledge and ignorance in them (i.e. the students) while the preceptor delivers his speech uniformly to all students, is due to their particular nature only. Thus, owing to the impossibility of replacement by synonymous like 'vāk' for punning words 'go', 'sumanas' and 'kalānīshti', it is a suggestion through resonance based on the power of words.

Suggestion of Upamā by a bare idea based on the power of meaning is seen in the following —

O wind! blow you from that place where resides my beloved (at present) and having touched her touch me also please. Contact of my person with you is tantamount to the contact of glances with the moon.

Here, similarity of Sītā's face with the moon is suggested through the power of meaning by the (statement) — 'candere drṣṭisamāgamah' i.e., contact of glances with the moon. Suggestion of Upamā by a figure of speech is seen in the following —

(Oh king)! by whom at that time, while smashing the enemy, you, with a blow of
of barbed dart fallen on your forehead (and) the front part (of the body) reddened with the swollen flow of blood, were looked at in battle, astonishment of their’s with regard to Śiva (lit. enemy of the demon Pura), glittering with the burden of a multitude of flames of fire which emitted from his (third) eye and which originated for burning the irresistible body of Kāma, happened to meet cessation.

Here, the figure of speech is Viśeṣa (Extraordinary) consisting in doing something not really possible while something else is aimed at. As it has been described that while seeing you in the said form, he beheld Lord Puraripu (i.e. Śiva) qualified by the adjuncts as said (above), and as doing (something) which means action in general, applies to the action of seeing also, though this idea, it, is not expressed, it is still suggested because of the description of cessation of astonishment. Thus, the simile viz. then you remained at that time like Śiva of that description, has been suggested (here). Upamā is thus hinted at with example.

Now, blemishes of the figure Upamā are being considered; they say, six are its blemishes; namely, deficiency, surpassingness, difference in gender, difference in number, lacking in similarity and impossibility. Of these, that is called 'Deficiency' where the standard of comparison is inferior to the subject of comparison. 'Surpassingness' consists in superiority. Each of both these two are divided into three in respect of class, evidence and attribute. Of these, 'Deficiency'
and 'Surpassingness' in respect of class and evidence are exemplified below —

A great adventure has been performed by you as by Cāndālas.

This sun shines like a spark of fire.

This Cakravāka bird, seated on the lotus-seat, looks beautiful, — just like the revered Creator going to create the people at the beginning of the cycle.

Your navel is like the nether world, breasts like mountains, and this staff-like braid of hair is like the stream of the Kālindī.

Here, by the Upamāṇa Cāndāla etc., the intended meaning has become too much distorted and thus 'Deficiency' and 'Surpassingness' culminate in impropriety in meaning. 'Deficiency' and 'Surpassingness' in respect of property are two blemishes, namely, less or redundant use of words. For example —

That sage, marked with a girdle of Muṇja grass and wearing a garment made of the skin of a black-antelope, shone like the sun, embraced by a piece of dark cloud.

That Kṛṣṇa, whose garment was yellow and who had taken his bow, assumed a form attractive and (yet) awful, like a cloud, possessed of lightning and rainbow, connected with the moon at night.
Here, in the first example, as the characterising property, namely, the lightning as an image of the girdle of Muñja-grass, is not mentioned with the Upamāna, there is 'Deficiency'. In the second example, since conch-shell etc., as belonging to Upameya are not mentioned, inclusion of the moon becomes redundant and thus it is a case of 'Surpassingness'. An example of the difference in gender and number is seen in the following —

Oh lord! an object, precious like the Cintāmani gem (Philosopher's stone), even placed on palm, slips off out of ill luck, just as a woman of a noble-birth ultimately widowed passes her days by feeding on pure barley-meal.

These two (blemishes) are included in the category of 'Break of Order'. How? The state of slipping down etc., cannot be the common property here; since it lacks in syntactical relation owing to the fact that there only it (i.e., the common property) may be connected where there exists a semblance of gender and number between the Upamāna and the Upameya. Upamāna or Upameya assumes the respective status only when they are qualified by the given adjuncts. But Upamā is completed with a different property suggested. Thus, as out of the Upamāna and the Upameya one is connected with an adjunct and the other not — it involves (the blemish) — 'Viśeṣanaprakramabhangā' ('Break of Order with regard to Adjunct').

Some take even the difference in tense, person and the meanings of verbal moods etc., as a blemish. For example —

In order to avert this (calumny) I will
abandon the daughter of the king of Videha, being regardless of the consideration that the birth of a child is near at hand, as formerly I did the ocean - girded earth at my father's command.

Here, the syntactical relation is 'samudranemim atyajam' ('I abandoned the earth') and not 'tyakṣyāmi' ('I shall abandon'). An example of the difference in person is the following —

Oh lord of people, like a Nīvāra plant — left with its stem — its produce of crops having been appropriated by foresters, — you are shining in bodily appearance only, with wealth given away to worthy recipients.

With Nīvāra (the third person verbal form) 'ābhāti' may be connected and not 'ābhāsi'. An example of the difference in (meanings like) command etc., is seen in the following —

To you that have attained all fortunes, any other benediction would be a repetition.
May you obtain a son praiseworthy and befitting your excellences as your father obtained you.

The syntactical relation is 'bhavantam alabhata' and not 'labhasva', meaning benediction. In Upamā, the two blemishes, namely, 'Asādṛṣya' (Lack of Similarity) and 'Asambhava' (Impossibility) culminate in a blemish entitled 'Anucitārthatā' (Impropriety of Meaning). An example of 'Lack of Similarity' is the following —
I compose a moon-like poem, which has well-displayed senses resembling rays.

Similarity of poetry with the moon is not well-known. Had the similarity between the meanings and the rays been well-known, similarity between poetry and the moon, although not well-known, could have been imagined by considering their relation as the prototype and its copy. But that also does not exist. Or for example, the verse —

This Vindhyā mountain with its joyous fountains (flowing) in dense groves, resembles the Lord (Śiva) with spreading flames of fire, emitting from the eye of his forehead.

An example of 'Impossibility' is the following one —

Burning arrows fell as it were from his mouth which was at the middle of the curve of his bow, like fiercely burning showers of water from the sun, occupying the middle of the day and possessed of a halo.

Since the burning showers of water falling from the orb of the sun is not possible, (it is a case of) 'Impossibility'.

There are some who consider the absence of currency of the Upamāna as a separate blemish. For example —

The face of the girl, with (her) eyes smeared with tears, looks like a blue-lotus of the river with its petals wet with frost.
Here the blemish is the very non-familiarity of the Utpala as a standard of comparison to face although drawing similarity between the eyes smeared with tears and petals wet with frost, is possible by a relation of prototype and its copy.

Now exceptions to these blemishes are being shown. Deficiency and Surpassingness by 'jāti' (class) and 'pramāṇa' (evidence) are not considered blemishes in the case of uses based on literary convention. For example —

The moon is equal to your face (in charmingness) and your face is similar to the moon. The molecule of two atoms is like the waist (of yours) and the waist resembles the molecule of two atoms.

There is no impropriety here, because of its literary convention. 'Deficiency' and 'Surpassingness' with regard to a property are not considered blemishes if the same is required for a different contextual purpose for the reason that the mention of additional properties of the Upameya or the Upamāna is required for drawing many an Upamā based on each of the properties or for establishing the state of a common property or for achieving a speciality in the nature of the object endowed with a property or for accepting some other means. For example —

She, wearing a linen garment and holding a mirror, appeared excessively fresh every moment like the shore of the ocean of milk having heaps of foam and the autumnal night with abundant moonbeams.

Here, (no blemish is considered) since the mention
of additional adjuncts belonging to the Upamēya is meant for several Upamās based on each of the adjuncts.

The shore of the ocean of the milk, marked with heaps of foams and the autumn night with abundance of moonbeams imitated her who wore a linen garment and held a mirror with glowing transparence.

In this reading of the same verse, mention of many properties belonging to the Upamāna is for drawing a couple of Upamās based on each of the properties and as such surpassingness of the Upamāna with regard to properties, is not a blemish.

Thus requested by the king, the sage remained still for a moment with his eyes closed in deep meditation like a large lake in which the fish are asleep.

Here, the adjunct 'vijñāpita' ('requested') is for establishing the common property with regard to the expression 'āhyānastimitalocana' ('eyes closed in deep meditation') and hence the deficiency (noticed in the verse) is not a blemish.

Then catching the tawning sound of their bow-string Taḍakā whose complexion resembled the appearance of a night of the dark-fortnight and whose ear-rings made of human skulls were dangling, appeared before them like a thick row of clouds interspersed with flocks of cranes.

Here, the adjunct 'nibiḍā' ('thick') is for establishing a common property (by imposing) 'bahulakṣapacchavi'
('complexion resembling a night of the dark fortnight') on 'kālika' ('rows of clouds') and thus the surpassingness (noticed in the verse) is not a blemish.

Kumudvatī got from the descendant of lakūṭṣṭha (i.e., Kuśā) a son named Atithi, as intellectual faculties get clearness from the last quarter of the night.

Here, the adjunct 'atithim nāma' ('named Atithi') is for achieving a speciality in the nature of the object endowed with property i.e., 'putra' and hence the surpassingness (noticed in the verse) is not a blemish.

As the water from the heaven which has but originally one taste, obtains a diversity of flavour in different parts of the countries, so you who are immutable, assume different conditions when connected with different qualities (of sattvaḥ, rajas and tamah).

Here, the adjunct 'ādīvam' (i.e., heavenly) is for understanding a particularity of the object endowed with property and hence, the surpassingness (here) is not a blemish. Similarly, in other function of embellishment and the like too related to the contextual matter, (the same) is to be considered. Thus, when the counter-adjuncts (exactly corresponding) to the adjuncts of the Upamāna and Upamaya are not mentioned, only then deficiency and surpassingness are blemishes, provided that this has got no utility in the presentation of the contextual, which is different (from the non-contextual) and provided that there is no possibility of the establishment of a common property by this (absence of the mention of the counter- adjunct adjuncts) even if there be a relation of the original and its image.
Surpassingness turns to be a Guna(quality) when establishment of commonness (in the adjuncts) is achieved even though the adjuncts are used in conformity with some other purposes or are As for example, in the verse beginning with 'jñānānādam abhīgārmati', the adjunct of Upameya, namely, 'catching the twining sound of the bow-string' is applied for avoiding the impropriety arising out of killing a woman (by way of indicating that) Tāgaka herself, having appeared and being desirous of killing, attacked (him). at first (and consequently) was killed by Rāma. (Here) also ('surpassingness' noticed in the) commonness with regard to the Upamāna (has been turned into a Guna) since, by the figure Atisayokti, the adjunct relating to that (Tāgaka), is supplied to the roaring Kālikā also. Similarly, in the verse (beginning with) 'nṛpam tam āvarta' although the expression 'anyavādhūr bhavitā' means 'swerving (to another), the counter-adjunct to that, namely, 'sāgaragāmini' has been mentioned.

Where the word, expressive of commonness, does not attain any change in its character even in the divergence of gender and number — that is not a blemish there; since, it may be connected with the both. For example, (we may quote the following) — "bhīmakāntair nṛpagunaiḥ". (An example of the divergence in number not considered as a blemish, is the following one) —

Like her gestures, her dress, not common with other women and filled with sweetness, attained the highest splendour.

Divergence in gender and number is seen in the usages of great poets inspite of the question of change in
character of the word, expressive of commonness. For example, the following verses and the like may be considered —

A good man even though an enemy was accepted by him as a medicine is by a sick person, and a wicked man even though dear was rejected by him like a finger bitten by a cobra.

The moon decays as does the sea after having attained growth; but he was one whose growth was like that of theirs and not decaying like them.

There are numerous examples of the divergence of tense etc. Vāmana says — "Divergence of gender etc. noticed in such cases is not a blemish since it is current in the popular usages." (In fact), in the injunction of quality (Guṇa) or blemish — feeling of the connoisseur is the (only) proof. This is why Dandin says —

Where wise men are not displeased thereby,

35 difference in gender or number
or inferiority or superiority

(in the comparison) is not sufficient for

writing a Simile.

This eunuch walks like a woman; this woman talks like a man; this person is dear to me like vital breaths; learning has been acquired by me as if it were wealth.

O, protector of the earth, like you shines the king of gods. The king on
account of his glory is able to ascend to the (high) rank of the sun.

Things like this never lose in charm. But there is certainly somewhat of displeasure (caused) to those who know the language, by such statements as there.

The moon is white like a lady swan; the sky is clear like the lakes; the servant is devoted like a dog to his master, the glow-worm shines like the sun.

Such cases (of the above-mentioned types) are given exemption (from the list of blemishes) by the wise; the cause behind it is to be considered thereof (respectively).

Lacking in similarity is not considered a blemish if current in the circle of poets as noticed in the following and the like — "glorious deeds of yours are white like the moon (beams). Impossibility, with regard to Upamāna, if desired to express impossibility relating to the Upameya, is not considered a blemish. As for example, in the following verse and the like — "like poison emitting from the disc of the moon". Lacking in familiarity is not a blemish where the common property consists of a pun or in other cases too as in an Upama with its Upamāna, which (although) being an imagination (of the poet only) delights the hearts of connoisseurs as noticed in the following and the like —

(She) shines smilingly like a poet's intellect having many disputes, like the
morning time with the couple of Cakravākas united, like the image of Lord Hara with eyes having smākeless fire. (While the pun is considered) — "Cakravandha type of literature (or poetry), well-composed and deserving much endeavour shines glowingly like the intellect........").

The orange viesing with the chin of a drunken barbarian (Hūṇa) just shaven.

Similarly, experts should consider the other varieties of exemption also in respect of blemish.

Here ends the section on Upamā in the Citramīmāṃsā.

Upameyopamā (Reciprocal Comparison) is now being described.

If the two objects attain the state of Upamāna and Upameya by rotation — it is called Upameyopamā, (Reciprocal Comparison).

This is said to be of two varieties.

If it is said — that is called Upameyopamā if something relating to two be described, then it will be too wide a definition with regard to Tulyayogitā. Since, (as in the following), —

In that excessively hot times of summer two things became greatly agreeable to the people — viz. that king and the moon, — both standing in their rise — the one, the service of whose feet was able to remove
misery, the other, the enjoyment of whose rays
was able to remove heat (caused by summer).

Connections of the two, namely, the king and the moon, with
a single property have been described simultaneously. Hence,
'paryāyepa' ('by rotation') has been mentioned.

Still, with regard to the following verse —

on account of the flow of ichor of ele-
phants and the strokes of hoofs of horses
of that (leader), the dust on the road was
turned into mud excessively and mud also
into dust.

it would be found too wide a definition, since, turning of
dust and mud into mud and dust has been described there by
rotation. Hence, 'upamānopameyatvam' i.e., attaining the
state of Upamāna and Upameya, has been mentioned. Even if
it is said that the description of the attainment of the
state of Upamāna and Upameya of the two, is the Upameyo-
pamā, (then also) it will be found too wide a definition
with regard to a simile with its point of similarity rest-
ing in both, as noticed in the following — "Then, both
the advent of dawn and the departure (of Krishna), asso-
ciated with the ladies, afflicted with the pangs of sepa-
ration, were considered equal to the other." Nor can it
be said that in both the two the state of Upameya only as
the substratum of similarity has been established there
(and) not the state of Upamāna as the counter-entity of
similarity and hence (fault of being) too wide a defini-
tion is not involved. Since, the state of Upamāna of those
two with each other can be known by implication although not
established by utterance. For, it is not desired in the
definition that the state of Upamāna and Upameya should
be expressed, as the question of non-inclusion of suggested Upameyopama would arise. Hence is said, — 'by rotation'. Even then, as in the following example of Rasahopama (chain of similes) viz. "\(\sqrt[\text{rotation}]{\text{His intellect is like (his) words, his efforts are like (his) intellect,}}\), intellect and effort have assumed the state of Upamana and Upameya by rotation — it is intended that in order to avoid the fault of being too wide a definition here, the state of Upameya should relate to that by rotation to which the state of Upamana relates.

This is said to be of two varieties. (This) two-fold division is admitted in consideration of commonness in property and the relation of a prototype and copy. The two examples are given below in order —

Your face, fragrant, pleasing to the eyes and crimson by virtue of the intoxication caused by liquor, is like the lotus; and the lotus also fragrant, pleasing to the eyes and like intoxicating liquor is like your face.

Where lakes, with their faces in the form of beautiful lotuses, look like beautiful women, and the charming women with their faces like beautiful lotuses look like the lakes.

Here it (i.e. the above mentioned definition) is being examined — the definition is too narrow to cover the Yugapadupameyopama (Simultaneous Reciprocal Comparison) illustrated earlier with — "\(\text{tad va} \text{lgm} \text{a} \text{yugapad umisitena t\text{a}vat} \)." Such a doubt cannot raise that this
is not an example of Upameyopama but a mere Upama resting on both the sides; since, by the expression 'parasparatulam' the state of being counter-entity of both is being established and thus the meaning of the components of the word Upameyopama remains in tact (here). The reason is also that by virtue of conveying through utterance the state of being counter-entities to each other though otherwise established by implication, the result viz., the exclusion of a third similar one is achieved. Moreover, it would be too wide a definition with regard to Parasparopama illustrated earlier with "rajobhiḥ syandanośbhūtaiḥ". Nor can one admit Upameyopama even there because of the lack of the cognition of the exclusion of a third similar object and also for the inconsistency involved in (its) division by the statement - "dvividhaśa prakīrtitā" i.e., it is of two varieties. Neither the commonness in property nor the relation of a prototype and copy is found here; since, in the similarity of the sky with the surface of the earth, the state of being covered with dust is the common property; whereas a relation of original and its image, met in the elephants and clouds lies in the simile of the earth with the sky and thus the case in question is very much different from the aforesaid one and hence, even the result, namely, the exclusion of a third similar object is not accomplished. Since, that there is not a third similar object similar to these two in this regard results where the mutual similarity, implying on one property is being described. When the similarity of something with something else is described, the similarity of the later with the former is accessible by implication; still, if that be described by utterance that aims at excluding a third similar object and this is not possible in the case of the difference of property also
the very root of the aforesaid result. This is not possible in the case of the difference of property also as in the case of commonness of property. Because, it lacks in establishment of implied similarity of the surface of the earth with the elephants having figures like clouds by the description of the similarity of the sky covered with dust with the earth.

Moreover, it would be found too-wide a definition with regard to the following example of Upamā, based on the relation of an original and its image but involving separate properties —

As that father became one who was rightly possessed of an excellent son on account of that prince who was entirely devoted to win his favour, so that son too became one who should rightly be considered to have had an excellent father on account of that royal father who was kind to his son.

Here, both the son and the father possess the property so as to stand as Upameya and Upamāna. Of them both are mentioned as belonging to the category of common properties, namely, the state of 'having a father' and 'having a son' in turns. The property establishing commonness in them in the form of a relation of an original and its image is the praiseworthiness denoted by the suffixes 'matup' and 'ini'. Obviously, those two suffixes are applied here to denote praise, since, it is useless to mention the mere relation 'having a father owing to the father'. Thus that the state of having a good father and the state of having a good son with regard
to the son and the father (respectively) are the common properties in consideration of their relation of a prototype and its copy intermingled with a relation of an object and its image — is hereby reached. 'adhikavatsalema' and 'samārādhanatatprena' are the adjuncts establishing (that) praiseworthiness of those two, viz., father and the son. Thus, the same father who is the Upamāna to (his) son in a Dharmyupamā ('Simile between substances') stands as the subject of comparison in the mention of the relation of an original and its image establishing that (point of similarity) — and thus the application of the definition is clear. Still, it is not a case of Upameyopamā. The reason is this: In the simile between the substances, namely, the son and the father; the state of having a praiseworthy father and the state of having a praiseworthy son is the common property drawn through a relation of a prototype and its copy intermingled with a relation of an object and its image. Again, praiseworthiness arising out of excellence in affection and in filial duty of the father and the son (respectively), set in the side of the property, is the common property pertaining to both — and thus, since it bears conformity with the previous example and since the (idea of) exclusion of a third similar one is not attained although the idea that the son also is praiseworthy for (his) filial duty as the father is praiseworthy for (his) affection towards offspring is attahed through Samuccayopamā. Nor can it be said that the fault of being too wide a definition would be checked here by the very adjunct 'paryāya', since it lacks in the couple of orders connected with a couple of occurrences of the word 'iva' or the like. There is simile between the son and the father existing in the
side of expression and another simile between the father and the son in the side of suggestion and thus there exists two orders. Expressiveness of the two orders is not intended here so as to check the fault of being too wide a definition due to the lack of two orders connected with a couple of occurrences of the word 'iva'. If that be the case, it has been maintained, that there would be no generalisation with the suggested Upameyopama. Nor can it be said that simile exists in the substance ('dharmins') only; whereas as regards the properties, there appears an identity only and no simile aimed at establishing a commonness between the Upamana and the Upameya. The reason is this: in the following example and the like, viz.,

I, like a honey-bee, having again and again enjoyed the face, which resembled a lotus, of the lady with slender limbs, who was like a lotus-bed, was satisfied.

even the generalisation arising out of similarity in (two) properties has been admitted as leading to the Upamā because simile is noticed, for example, between the lady having slender limbs and the lotus-bed and the like having attained the relation of an original and its image. Hence, the question of being too wide a definition seems to be irresistible there. Thus it is noticed that this definition is unsuitable. (What) we say here (is this):

That is known as Upameyopama where (the description of) mutual similarity (between the Upamāna and the Upameya) is known either by suggestion or by any other
(significative) power on the basis of one
(common) attribute.

It would not be too wide a definition with regard to
Raṣanopamā because of the adjunct 'anyonyena' ('mutual').
Again, because of the adjunct 'to be known either by
suggestion or by any other (significative) power', — it
would not be too wide a definition with regard to Udbhaya-
viṣrāntasādṛṣyopamā (Upamā, in which similarity rests on
both the sides). By the expression 'vā' (i.e., 'either
by' ...... 'or by') which denotes option (of one out of
two) mutually opposed things, the following explanation
(of the definition) is reached at : the simile which
is connected with the state of mutual counter-entities
(and) which is known either by suggestion,

39

having no connection with any other significative
power relating to that (i.e., Upamā) or is known by some
other significative power, having no connection with the
power of suggestion relating to that (i.e., Upamā), —
is to be known as Upameyopamā. Thus, in Udbhavyiṣrānta-
sādṛṣyopamā there is suggestion in the part of the state
of mutual counter-entities and (some) other power in the
part of simile in the form similarity; and thus are
blended (here) and hence there is no apprehension of
being too wide a definition. For the implementation of
the definition in general, suggestion and other (signi-
ficative) power have been accepted (here) as being
collected as mutually related. Thus, the definition
conforms to the following example 'taya grhitam nu
mṛgāṅganābhyah' (i.e., whether she has imitated it
from the doe') where the simile, which has not assumed
the state of a figure of speech is known by suggestion
having dependence on other (significative) power or (elsewhere) in a simile which has assumed the state of a figure of speech and is known by other (significative) power having no dependence on the suggestion. Although in a suggested Upameyopama also words are associates and as such the power in it also is required and also in the expressed (upameyopamā) such as "Like sky is the water and like water is the sky" and the like, where the common property is suggested, suggestion with regard to property in that is required; and hence mutual independence is impossible; still there exists the state of independence of the suggestion with regard to other significative power relating to similarity qualified by mutual counterentities and (again, there exists) independence of other significative power with regard to suggestion relating to that (similarity). This again is the special definition of Upameyopamā as a figure of speech also if the word 'suggestion' ('vyakti') is not taken into consideration. There, (in the definition), giving up the word 'suggestion' the adjunct runs thus — 'known by some other significative power' only. Thus, Ubhayavisṛanta-sāorgyopama is excluded. It is unjustified to say that this (i.e., giving up of the word 'vyakti' i.e., suggestion) is useless, since, there the state of being Upamāna is of a single object only and not of the two and thus exclusion (of it) may be done by the very word 'mutual'; because, although in the description of similarity between a contextual and a non-contextual, it is the non-contextual which attains the state of Upamāna, still, as there is no determining factor where both the two are contextual, the state of being Upamāna to each other is understood. Thus, it would not be
too wide a definition with regard to Parasparopama as met in the verse beginning with 'rajobhih ayandanotkiranaih' since the object of property has been qualified. By virtue of the same adjunct, it would not be too wide a definition with regard to Upama also as is seen in the verse beginning with 'pitä samarradhanatatapareña', since, in both the cases the subjects of comparison possess different properties. Again, the meaning of 'on the basis of one property' ('ekaḍharmasraya') is this — the same property which is common or involves the relation of a prototype and its copy in a simile of something with some other else, should be so in the simile of other with that also and the meaning is not that it would be based on a property in conformity, since that is not found in the relation of a prototype and its copy intermingled with the relation of an original and its image. Thus (Upameyopama) is hinted at.

In fact, it is the definition leading to the state of Upameyopama only. But the definition which is not too wide and applicable everywhere should be taken as follows —

That is known as Upameyopama where

the mutual state of being subject of comparison is intended to exclude a third similar object.

Here the adjunct 'mutual' is to exclude a variety of Pratipa which is noticed in the verse beginning with 'aham eva guruḥ sudārumānām'.

Now follow the examples. Of them, an example in the commonness in property is the following one —
Like sky is the water and like water is the sky; like moon is the swan and like swan is the moon; like lotuses are the stars and like stars are the lotuses.

This is an example where the common property is suggested. Example, where the common property is expressed, is seen in (the verse beginning with) 'sugandhi nayanānandi' and the like.

Or for example, —

This lord of elephants like the mountain is shining very much and the mountain (also) like the lord of the elephants (is shining very much). The flow of ichor like the fountain is flowing (and) the fountain like its stream of ichor is flowing.

Here a special charm is added since the couple of Upameyopamās favour each other.

Example of a relation of prototype and its copy is seen in (the verse beginning with) 'sacchāyūmabhja-vāḍanā' and the like.

It is an example of the relation of an original and its image qualifying the relation of a prototype and its copy. Example of it (i.e. of the relation of an original and its image) being qualified is as follows —

Face of hers is like the lotus and eyes are charming like the hornets. (Again),
the lotus looks like the face embellished by deer-like eyes.

All these are examples of Upameyopamā by rotation.

Example of Yugapadupameyopamā (Simultaneous Reciprocal Comparison) is noticed in the verse beginning with — 'tad valgūnā yugapad umaisitenā'.

There also the varieties as noted before may be understood as far as possible.

Here ends the section on Upameyopamā.

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Ananvaya (Self-Comparison) is now being described.

That is known as the figure Ananvaya (Self-Comparison) where the same object attains both the state of the Upamāna and the Upameya. By the force of the expression 'āva' it has to be understood that the (state of Upamāna and Upameya) should relate to one single function of comparison. Hence it would not be too wide a definition with regard to Upameyopamā and Rasanopamā. An example (of Ananvaya) is the following — "Sky has the appearance of the sky (only); the ocean is comparable to the ocean (only)". Here the attribute is suggested. Example of the figure involving a particular attribute is the following verse —

That beautiful lady of superb charms looks splendid like herself alone; — not this
much only, also her amours, the very abode of Cupid's gentle frolics, are (only) like themselves.

How is it then, that in,

Thus, having obtained the kingdom after having passed the period of exile in forests by the command of his father, Rāma carried on even dealing well with his younger brothers as with virtue, wealth and desire.

the same Raghupati occupies the position of both the Upāmāṇa and Upameya but Anāvaya is not admitted? Since, by Samuccayopama, the idea that he (i.e. Rāma) behaved equally to his younger brothers as well as to virtue, wealth and desire, has been meant to be established and as such exclusion of another similar object is not the purport. Likewise, in the expression "I will abandon the daughter of the king of Videha as formerly I did the ocean-girded earth at my father's command" also both the state of Upāmāṇa and Upameya belong to the same self-object. But there also no Anāvaya is admitted; since, there is no possibility of another similar object in (mentioning) the banishment of Sītā for fear of calumny like the relinquishment of empire by the order of father and as such there is no concern with regard to a result of the exclusion of that (similar object). Similarly, in (the verse) —

The thousand-beamed luminary (i.e. the Sun) held over his head a sun-shade newly made by the artisan of the gods. When the crest
of the Lord was not very far from its white silken fringe, it seemed as if the stream of Gāṅgā was falling upon his head.

also, the state of both the Upamāṇa and Upameya belonging to one object is clear. Nor can it be said that there exists a relation of Upamāṇa and upameya between the behaviour towards religion etc. and that towards younger brothers in one of these examples, or between the relinquishment of kingdom and the banishment of Sītā in another example, or between the falling of the Ganges and the setting of the garments in still another example; but nowhere does the state of Upamāṇa and that of Upameya belong to the same substance because of the property of the association of adjuncts in the case of impediment to the same with regard to the substance (viśeṣya) when there is a relation between the qualified (viśeṣaṇa).

Although the relation of Upamāṇa and an Upameya of the same object may be established in a manner, for example, as he behaved towards the religion, wealth and desire similarly he behaved towards younger brothers still if 'viśeṣaṇasamkrānti' be considered then in the verse beginning with 'pāṇḍyoyam aṁśarpitalambaharaḥ' too there would be a relation of an Upamāṇa and an Upameya between the necklace etc. and fountain etc. only and thus the question of disappearance of examples of a relation of an original and its image would arise and also since it is not required on the part of the rhetoricians who admit the relation of an Upamāṇa and an Upameya in identity too as is noticed in the example 'rāmarāvaṇayor yuddham' etc. to find a solution to impediment to 'viśeṣya'(relation between substances). Thus, presentation of the rule (nyāya), namely, 'saviśeṣaṇe hi' etc.,
in this context, suits the Vākyamāṇsakas only and not literary critics. The Vākyamāṇsakas hold—there exists no relation of an Upamāna and an Upameya in identity and hence in the example ‘rāmarāvaṇyayor yuddham’ etc. they consider the war held in ancient era as the Upamāna to the present-day war (and similarly) the sky of another kalpa as the Upamāna to the sky of this kalpa and so on. Thus, according to the rhetoricians, the relation of an Upamāna and an Upameya of the same object, is seen in these cases and hence the definition involves the fallacy of being too-wide and as such —

We maintain here as follows —

Comparison of something with its own self, based on one single property in conformity, is known as Ananvaya which possesses a connotative name.

It would not be too-wide a definition with regard to Upameyopama and Rasanopama because of the adjunct ‘svasya svena’ (‘comparison with its own self’). It would not be too-wide a definition with regard to the varieties of Upamā already illustrated because of the adjunct ‘anugāmyekadharmikā’ (‘having a single property in conformity’). Although in them in the portion ‘sama vṛttiy prapede’ etc., there has been an infiltration of the property in conformity, yet the property is not a single one; since, that is intermingled with the relation of an original and its image between, for example, the virtue, wealth and desire and the younger brothers. Thus the inclusion of (the adjunct) ‘eka’ (‘single’) is significant. 'Anvarthanāmadheya' (‘name
having connotation') is not part of the definition but is meant for establishing that if the comparison of something with its own self is based on one single property in conformity — then only it is a case of Ananvaya and not otherwise. Comparison of something with its own self, when there is oneness in property, is Ananvaya which is a significant name in so far as it means — that which is not related to (anything else). And as the word means 'having non-connection', it results in the suggestion of incomparability. In divergence of properties, comparison of something limited by a particular property with its own self limited by another property can be connected and in that case the name (i.e. Ananvaya) fails to bear its connotation and moreover, the result, namely, incomparability, dependent on the idea — not related to anything else, is not achieved. This definition establishes the state of Ananvaya. For, the actual definition, what Bhāmaha said — "yatra tenai va tasya syāt", may be considered. The adjunct 'tenai va tasya' is included to avoid the fault of being too-wide a definition with regard to a variety of Atisayokti that involves the presumption of similarity and results in the suggestion of incomparability as is seen in the verse beginning with 'ubhau yadi vyommi prthakpravāhau'.

This Ananvaya may be suggested also. For example —

O Govinda, the feeling of satisfaction that I have to-day by your coming to my house — may this satisfaction be for me again ere long only by your coming here again.
Here the idea that the delight resulting from your arrival is similar to that delight itself only and not to that resulting from anything else, is suggested in the words of Vidura, addressed to Śrīkrṣṇa, who has arrived at his house, in the following manner — the delight resulting from your arrival will be produced again by your arrival only after a long interval and not by any other means. To exclude such type of examples, in the definition of Ananvaya, the adjunct, namely, 'the state of being not-suggested', is to be understood as before.

Here ends the section on Ananvaya.

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Now begins the figure Smarāṇa (Reminiscence).

That is called the figure Smarāṇa (Reminiscence) in which there is reminiscence which is qualified by the epithet 'not-suggested' and is based on similarity and connected with another object.

As for example —

Having at that moment been put in mind of the braided hair of his beloved (queen) interpersed with variegated flowers and the knot of which was made loose in amatory sports, the king did not aim his arrow at the peacock though hopping about his horse, and wearing a beautiful plumage.
Or, for example, —

Śūra (i.e. Śrīkṛṣṇa), having seen in front of him, a lady resembling Laxmī, coming out of water with a shining lotus in her beautiful hand and causing astonishment even to the gods, recollected the churning of the ocean.

In one case the sight of a similar thing causes the reminiscence of another thing having a similar property. In the other case there has been a reminiscence of the churning of the ocean connected with Laxmī, who is similar to the former. In both the cases, reminiscence of another object on the basis of similarity remains the same. And hence, mention of 'vastvantara' ('another object') in the definition is justified as it includes similar or dissimilar objects in general.

"O Laxmana (lit. the son of Sumitrā) ! let us take shelter beneath the tree, since the sun has risen." "O Raghupati! how do you speak of the sun at night? (In fact), it is the moon that is appearing". "O brother! how do you come to know this?" "Since it possess the mark of a deer." "Where are you my dear wife, O Jūnakī, having a moon-like face and deer-like eyes."

Here, out of the recollection of the eyes relating to deer that has been mentioned, there has been a recollection of the eyes of Sītā that are similar to the former and also that of Sītā related to those eyes. But this is suggested and (itself) deserves to be embellished (and not embellishment). To exclude this, there is the
adjunct 'avyaṅgyatva' (′not-suggested′).

On all sides there rise these lofty mountains and wide expanding oceans — though thou bearest all these, yet thou feelest not the slightest fatigue, — all reverence too thee — while, struck with wonder, I was thus singing the praises of the Earth, I remembered your arm, O king, bearing, as it does, the burden even of this earth, and thereupon my speech became sealed.

Recollection of the arms of the king relating to the earth, which is being eulogized, is not based on similarity and hence here the figure is not Smaraṇa. But the figure is Preyas, since recollection, the transitory sentiment, is subordinate to the sentiment of love relating to the king.

He, the chastiser of love, having promised — this shall be done and having departed from Umā with an effort, recollected the seven luminous sages.

Here, reminiscence has, contemplation as its basis. Because of the absence of any special charm, there is no figure at all. To exclude both these two (examples) the adjunct 'sādṛṣyamūlā' is included in the definition. Thus, figures, having at their base similarity which involves difference and identification, have been shown.

Here ends the section on Smaraṇa.

:: oOo ::
Now Rūpaka (Metaphor) is being determined at first in the group of figures having predominance of identity.

That is known as Rūpaka where the superimposed embellishes the subject of superimposition which has not lost its own existence.

Here, by the expression 'āropaviśayasya', figure Utprekṣā and Atiśayokti have been excluded. Since, in those two figures, face and the like do not possess the state of the subject of superimposition. By the expression 'atirohitārūpīnāḥ', figures Sasandēha, Bhrāntimad and Apahnuti are excluded. Since, owing to doubt, error and denial, the subject in them has disappeared. By the expression 'uparanjaka', figures Samāsokti and Parināma are excluded; since, in those two (figures) there exists, in the subject, no embellishment which consists in the state of establishing absence of identity. Because, in Samāsokti, owing to the superimposition of behaviour only, the very cognition of identity is not existent and because in Parināma as the superimposed itself attains identity with the subject (of superimposition), it lacks in attainment of identity of the subject (of superimposition) with the superimposed. This is what the ancients say.

This is being examined here — considering what type of distinction between superimposition and introduction it has been said that the figure Utprekṣā has been excluded by the expression 'āropaviśayasya'? If it has been said with this idea in view that the distinction follows thus — superimposition consists of the cognition of identity between the Viṣaya (subject) and
the Viṣayin (superimposed) expressed, whereas 'introsusception' consists in cognition of identity of the Viṣayin with that (i.e. Viṣaya) by way of swallowing up of the Viṣaya, then (we have to admit that) the figure Utpreksā is based on superimposition only; since, it lacks in that 'nigaraṇa' (i.e. swallowing up) for its mention of the Viṣaya as well as of the face as in noticed in the example — "Obviously (this face is the moon". Thus the fault of being too-wide a definition with regard to that (i.e. Utpreksā) remains unremedied there. Superimposition consists of the cognition of identity — this is their distinction. In the expression "The face is the moon" and the like which are the examples of Rūpaka, by the 'moon-ness' which is the fundamental property of the moon, one understands only the possession of beauty of the face and not the identity with the well-known moon. In an example of Atiśayokti like "It's the moon" having the face as its Viṣaya, it is the identity which is recognised. If it is said, it would be unjustified, since, the contrary also can be spoken of. Nor is it justified to say that in the following example, namely,

The moon-like face of the deer-eyed woman surpasses even the moon (in beauty); (since) although being drunken by gods, it never decays.

as the description of surpassingness of the moon-like face from the well-known moon is not possible if the cognition of identity (is accepted), it is the cognition of sameness
that exists in Rūpaka. Because, if it be so admitted, then, in Atiśayokti, such as —

"O you! please, cast your glances at the top of the palace in front of you and think for a while — who should be this moon without the deer and (seen) not in the sky (but in the garret) and who is emitting white beams having semblance with the ripening of the Lavali fruit and being followed by Cakora birds of the garden, fond of drinking honey.

and in 'Another Indra' and in Utpreksā such as, "As if another Indra" there would only be the cognition of sameness like Rūpaka for its lacking in the cognition of identity with the well-known moon and thus the fault of being too-wide a definition with regard to those two (i.e. Atiśayokti and Utpreksā) would remain unremedied. Now, if it is said that although it lacks in the cognition of identity with the well-known moon and the like, still the cognition of identity with another imaginary moon and the like as mentioned is possible, then, the same may be argued with regard to Rūpaka also and thus the application of the definition would be impossible. Moreover, the fault of being too-wide a definition with regard to Apahnava cannot be prevented by the expression 'atirohitarūpīṇah' inspite of the prevention of being too-wide a definition with regard to Sasandeha and Ehrāntimat. Thus, in the example, "This is not a face but the moon", it lacks in the abolition of the 'viśaya', since the superimposition of the absence of 'faceness' and that of 'moon-ness' on the face [artificial. Application of the definition would be impossible
even in Rūpaka if the artificial superimposition also is taken as responsible for the abolition (of 'visāya'). The adjunct 'āropaviṣayasya' would be useless, since, the exclusion of Utprekaṇḍa which consists in artificial possibility, is established by the very expression 'atirohitārūpiṇāḥ'. In Atisayokti, since the visāya disappears owing to its being swallowed up, its exclusion also would be made by this very (adjunct). Moreover, it would be too wide a definition with regard to Niḍarśanā as in the following —

That the gems in the form of your toe-

46) nails are being dyed with lac

is like rendering the moon

pale with sandal paste.

since, there exists the superimposition of sameness of the meaning in the sentence used as the standard of comparison on the meanings of the sentence used as the subject of comparison. If the expression 'āropaviṣayasya' is taken as an adjunct to 'paḍārthasya' (i.e. of the idea contained in a word) then also it would be found too wide a definition with regard to the following example of Niḍarśanā. "The dyeing of your toe-nails with lac is rendering of the moon pale with sandal paste." It would be too wide a definition to cover with regard to Rūpaka also, as noticed in —

May the sturdy foot of Lord Viṣṇu, thrust upward to vanquish (the demon) Vali, acting as the stalk of the lotus (sprung from Viṣṇu's navel), the abode of Brahmā, be the cause of your delight.

What again has been stated by the author of the Sarasvatīkāṇṭhābharana, viz.,
Then it is called Rūpaka when the words relating to Upamāna, having taken resort to the secondary power, are used to convey the Upameya.

is also found to be too wide a definition with regard to Atiśayokti. Since, rhetoricians have admitted Gaṇasāropalakṣanā (Qualitative Superimponent Indication) with reference to the face in the case of Rupaka such as, "The face is moon" and Śādhyāsānalakṣanā (Intrasusceptive Indication) in the case of Atiśayokti as in "This is the moon". In fact, it can be established that indication exists in Atiśayokti only and not in Rupaka. Since, in Atiśayokti, as no word like 'mukha' denoting the object of superimposition (viśaya) is used, that has to be conveyed only by words like 'candra' and hence, for that word, indication must be adopted there. In Rupaka, the cognition of identity between the object of superimposition and the superimposed which are expressed by the respective expressive words, is possible by virtue of their mere positional proximity. Hence, what is the use of accepting indication there? It is impossible too to admit indication there. Why? In the expression "The face is moon", based on what, the moon-ness, being imposed on face by indication, be conveyed? Is it based on the face-ness or on the particular kind of uncommon beauty of the face, or on the moon-ness, or on the particular kind of uncommon beauty of the moon, or on the commonness of beauty found in both the face and the moon, or on the similarity of the face with the moon? The first possibility cannot be accepted, because it would give rise to tautology caused by the word 'mukha'; since, face-ness has no connection with the primary meaning (of 'candra') and as such indication based on that is not possible. Hence, the second possibility
(also) cannot be accepted; nor can the third and fourth (possibilities) be accepted, since, the properties which do not belong to the face, cannot stand as the cause for the use of the expression in question. The fifth possibility (also) cannot be accepted, since it would give rise to tautology in the expression "The moon-face is lovely" by the word 'kāntimat'. Nor even the sixth possibility can be accepted, since the existence of Rūpaka separate from that of Upamā would (in that case) not stand owing to the similarity being conveyed by words and not suggested and (since) it would go against the decision that in Rūpaka identity is predominant. Thus it should be said that in Rūpaka, the cognition of identity between the object of superimposition and the superimposed, expressed by respective terms, is to be made by virtue of positional proximity only and hence 'Impossibility' also is a fault of (this) definition. But when, in examples such as "That another moon is emerging in the presence of your moon-face" and "O King! two moons are in the world— one that's in the sky and yourself on the surface of the earth", where the cognition of identity of the object of superimposition with the well-known moon is not possible, somehow indication in words such as 'Indu' is taken into consideration with reference to the object of superimposition. Still it is very difficult to overcome the fault of being too narrow a definition with regard to the expression "The lovely moon-face" and the like since it is unjustified to accept there a very far-fetched indication because the cognition of identity is possible by virtue of mere positional proximity as in the expression 'kāṭhakāṭhyārāṇaka' ('He is a professor belonging to the kāṭha school'). Moreover, it would be found too narrow to cover the cases of
suggested Rūpaka as in the following verses and the like —

O Lord! formerly you constructed the bridge with rocks to win over Rāvana (lit. the ten-headed); (but) whom to win over, are you constructing (another bridge) with stones in the form of moon-like fame to-day?

Having seen you, those eyes of mine, that had been eager to see the 'wish-yielding tree' for long, have become fruitful to-day.

Here in the first example, the Rūpaka, namely, 'you are none but Rāma', is being suggested by the idea, namely, 'you constructed the bridge for the slaying of Rāvana', communicated to the lord, who is being described. But there is no secondary word, viz. Rāma with reference to the subject of description. In the second (example), the Rūpaka, namely, 'you are none but the 'wish-yielding tree', is being suggested by the suggested figure Vīśeṣa (Special) in the following manner — 'looking at you, my eyes had the long-cherished sight of the 'wish-yielding tree'. There, the word 'kalpa-vṛkṣa' denotes the very well-known 'wish-yielding tree' and it does not convey the object of superimposition by indication. The point is thus clear.

Moreover, it would be found too-narrow to cover the Rūpaka based on Pure Superimponent Indication as in the following and the like —

Then the direction belonging to Mahendra i.e. the east, was adorned by the moon,
the lord of night-lotuses, pale like the cheek of a passionate woman and the delight of eyes.

Here, the delineation of the state of joy is (done) as it possesses the cause of joy and not on account of comparison. It is unjustified to say that there exists no figure in cases of Pure Superimponent Indication as is seen in the expression "clarified butter is longevity" and the like, since, the question of the absence of the state of a figure of speech in cases of Qualitative Superimponent Indication also, where no special charm is noticed as in the expression "The Vāhika is a bull" and the like, would arise. It can be maintained here too that the state of a figure of speech (is admitted) if variety exists somewhere else although it does not exist in a given example. For example, "By the moon in the form of joy of eyes". (Moreover), since variety is noticed in cases of Pure Superimponent Indication as noticed in the following verse and the like also, (the question of being too narrow a definition would remain as before) —

This king is the very longevity in the joyous giving of gifts, trust-incarnate to vassal princes who bow to him, object of great festivity to the eyes of gazelle-eyed ladies, the great effulgence of spreading fame, joy in bodily form to the good people, the very life of the wealth of valour, and the abode of righteousness; thus ever victorious in this great king of Kaliṅga.
If it is taken as granted that there exists the figure Hetu (Cause) and not the figure Rūpaka by the acceptance of another view, namely, mention of the cause as identified with the effect — is the figure Hetu then the definition mentioned earlier as 'āropaviṣayasya syāt .....', would be found too wide with regard to that (Hetu). Likewise, faults like being too wide a definition are to be understood as far as possible even in the definitions like "The very Upamā, with its distinction (between the Upamāna and the Upameya) elided, is called Hetūśya (Rūpaka)," (or) "The identity between the standard and subject of comparison is Rūpaka". Here we suggest (the following definition) —

Then it is called Rūpaka when the Viśayin i.e., the Upamāna, attains charmingness while the Viśaya i.e., the Upameya, which is not connected (with the Viśayin) by a relation of an original (and its image) and is expressed (in words) and does not involve any negation.

Since it possesses the adjunct 'bimbaviṣiṣṭe' (i.e. which is not connected by a relation of an original and its image), it would not be too wide a definition with regard to Nidarsanā such as 'tvatpādanakharatnānām'. The relation of an original and its image exists there on the basis of the similarity noticed in the following manner — as the moon is white by nature and hence whiteness (in it) cannot be glutened, similarly, the nails are reddish by nature and as such redness (in them) cannot be glutened. It happens so that in other places the lac-dye and sandal paste glutem (their) own colour (to other objects). Thus, 'rendering pale' which is connected with the moon and the
sandal paste and has turned to be the image of that (i.e. bimba), is the cause of charm to the dyeing which is connected with the nails and lac-dye and happens to be the 'original' there. Similarly, elsewhere too, in all instances of Nidarsanā which possesses a superimposition of (identification), such as 'aranyaruditam kṛtam' ('Made in vain'), the standard of comparison, which is qualified by the image of that (i.e. the Original) happens to be the cause of charm to the subject of comparison which is qualified by an object which has attained the state of an original — and hence nowhere it would be found too wide a definition. But nowhere in Rūpaka, the Visaya and the Visayin are mentioned as being qualified by an attribute which has turned to be related as original and its image. In Sāvayava Rūpaka (Metaphor, possessed of parts) also different is the superimposition of parts from the superimposition of the 'whole' (Viśeṣya) and nidadā it a superimposition on the Viśeṣya as qualified by the parts. In the verse beginning with 'āṅghriṇḍo harer ūrdham' also, the sturdy leg and the stalk of the lotus do not possess the relation of an original and its image, since, the relation of a standard and a subject of comparison (may be established) by the mere suggested property in conformity, namely, bluishness, connection with lotus-seat of the Lord and the like. But the subject of comparison is qualified by the adjunct to establish the possession of the common property, namely, the connection with the lotus-seat of the Lord.

It would not be too-wide a definition with regard to Atisayokti where the subject is introsuspected because of the mention of the) adjunct 'nirdīṣṭa' (i.e. expressed in words). In the examples of suggested Rūpaka although
there is no mention of the word expressive of the Viṣaya,  
(still), mention of the Viṣaya is essential and as such it 
would not involve there the fallacy of being too narrow. 

If the opinion, namely, in 'netrānandena' etc., 
the figure is Hetu be maintained, that (i.e. the 
figure Hetu) would be excluded by the expression 'viṣaye' 
meaning 'Upameya' (i.e. in the Upameya). If the opinion 
of the author of the Ekāvallī and others, namely, hereto 
the figure is Rūpaka, be admitted, the word 'viṣaya' 
standing for 'dharmin' (possessed of property) is used 
only for the purpose of clarification.

It would not be too-wide a definition with regard 
to Apahnuti because of the adjunct 'anihmute' meaning 
'nīṣedhāspraśte' (i.e., in a case having no connection with 
negation).

Fallacy of being too-wide a definition with regard 
to Sasandeha, Utpreksā, Samāsokti, Parināma and Bhṛantimān 
(Ekkōṭi) is checked by the expression 'uparaṇjakatām eti' 
meaning 'becomes the object of a supposititious certitude 
of identity'; since, Sasandeha and Utpreksā are lacking 
in the very certitude and since in Samāsokti and Parināma 
no identification with that (i.e. Upamāṇa) is noticed. 
Because in Samāsokti there exists only the superimposi-
tion of behaviour and in Parināma cognition of identifica-
tion of the superimposed with the Viṣaya is noticed. And 
since in Bhṛantimān natural (identification) upto the point 
of certain movements etc. (on the part of the objects 
described), which is either real or imaginary is delineated, 
the same cannot be taken as suppositious.

This is the definition of Rūpaka as a figure of 
speech since it possesses the adjunct 'not suggested' and
thus well-suited is this definition in all aspects. That Rūpaka is of three types — Niravayava i.e. Partless, Sāvayava i.e. Possessed of parts and Paramparitava i.e. Consequential. Niravayava is of two varieties, namely, Kevala i.e. Single and Mālā i.e. Serial. Sāvayava again is divided into two, namely, 'that which relates to the whole object' and 'that which resides in only a portion'. Paramparita being two-fold owing to its resting on punning or non-punning words, is, by virtue of its (further) two-fold division, such as Kevala and Mālā, (altogether) of four types. Thus, the figure Rūpaka is of eight varieties. Of them, an example of the variety of Kevalaniravayava is the following one —

I know that Cupid is engaged in sprinkling the new creeper of love in her mind since she, like a doe, makes motionless her limbs at the sound of music (and) asks her friend news again about her lover although heard before and since she lies inside the house without sleep.

An example of (the variety of) Mālāniravayava is the following one —

That beloved is the river of beauty, the rise of the joy of the excellence of youth, the practice of magic on loveliness, the abode of the flourishing of sportive copulation, the science of crooked words, the visible manifestation of the unlimited skill of the creator, the (very) life of Cupid and the crest jewel of women.
An example of (the variety of) the Sāvayava, dwelling in all the objects is the following one —

This Kāpālikī in the form of night wanderer from continent to continent — (the Kāpālikī) who possesses a white complexion on account of smearing ashes in the form of moonlight, who bears bones in the form of stars, who takes delight in the sport of disappearance (and) who holds in her consecrated skull-vessel in the form of the moon the power of the magic ointment (placed) under the guise of the spot (of the moon).

An example of the variety of the Sāvayava, residing in only a portion is the following one —

Raindrops, the friends of kuṭaja flowers, with their lustre like big pearls, possessed the beauty of the offering of flowers made by lightning in the theatre hall of the atmospheric region.

Here, since the atmospheric region is depicted as the theatre hall, the state of a female dancer of the lightnings is understood by virtue of the expressed idea and hence it is a case of Ekaḍeśavivarti as the expression of the adjunct relating to Rūpakā is applied in a portion only.

An example of Kevalaparamparita drawn through the use of words involving pun is the following one —

O lord, by whom are you not praised, you,
who happens to be a precious pearl in a nice piece of bamboo in the form of your aristocrat family and who have illumined the three worlds with your super-mundane excellent brilliance.

Here, 'yourself are a precious pearl' -- with such a superimposition stands the (second) superimposition, namely, 'Sadväṃśa' -- meaning, an aristocrat family, is a 'sadväṃśa', meaning a nice piece of bamboo; — thus, both the two Rūpakaś are connected consequentially and hence it is a case of Paramparita and it is based on a punning word, namely, 'vamsa'. That itself (i.e. Rūpaka, based on punning words) as Mālāparamparita is seen in the following —

O lord, the swan in the Mānasā lake in the form of the mind of the Mānasā, the sun for the blooming of lotuses in the form of the destruction of the glory of enemies, Śiva in searching Pārvatī in the form of impossibility of the search of (your) forts (by others), fire in the consumption of fuels in the form of the acceptance of (challenge for) battles, Dakṣa showing disaffection towards Satī in the form of being adept in maintaining love for truth, Bhīma in the precedence — in-birth over Arjuna in the form of being dreadful in early achievements of victory, the excellent warrior, gloriously you enjoy sovereignty for a hundred years of Brahman.

An example of the variety of Kevalaparamparita,
not based on punning words, is the following one —

You there, who have assumed the form of a tortoise are the first victorious in this world — you whose position knows no bound and does not depend (on others) and from where lot of festivities do not return to (anyone else) and who are the root of the creeper in the form of the fourteen worlds.

That itself as Mālāparamparita is seen in the following —

The sword of the king of Mālava is winning victory in the battle — the sword which is the bed of the royal fortune decked with yellow gems, the wave of ocean in the form of valour, the playful movement of the swan in the form of fame of the lord of Muralā oppressed by fear in battle, acting as a piece of the cloud of the world. victorious elephants enveloping the very birth of the offspring of defeated rival and like the chamberlain of the world.

This is found in divergence of properties also. An example of this in the Kevala variety is the following —

The stream of blood gushing out from the wounds made by weapons (on the bodies) of elephants, horses and warriors proved
(lit. became) as it were the newly risen sun to the all-pervading darkness caused by dust that obstructed the range of sight in the battle.

An example of Mālārūpaka in the following one —

They who inspired with foolish hopes, have served even these host of kings in the Kāli era — the desert for the water of goodness, the aerial wall for the paintings of noble deeds, the fourteenth night of the dark fortnight for the moon-shine of merit, the very elegance of the dog’s tail in respect of simplicity — for these hard but vain toilers, how much capacity would be required to serve Śiva (lit. bearer of the trident) who is easily accessible by faith alone.

Thus eight varieties of the figure Rūpaka have been shown by the ancients. Such varieties may be spoken of in respect of Upamā also, (but) those are not mentioned, since in a manner shown in one place (similar varieties) can be conjectured in other possible cases also. Thus, in 'vāgarthāviva sampāktau' etc., we have Kevalaniravadvatopama. In 'jyotsneva nayanānandaḥ' etc., we have Mālāniravayavopama.

Thence Raghu, like the sun taking up the sap (of the earth) with its rays, careered towards the direction of Kuvera (i.e. to north) in order to extirpate the north-erners with his arrows.
Here the figure is Samastavastuviśayasāvayavopamā (Upamā, possessed of parts and involving the whole object).

The pools appeared charming at every step with blue-lotuses like eyes, with lotuses like faces and with cakravāka birds like breasts.

Here the figure is Ekadeśāvivartini (i.e. resting in a portion only).

The western direction like a harlot drove away the sun which though very much reddish has the heap of its wealth (of rays) exhausted (like a person who though having much attachment has his accumulation of wealth spent).

Here too (the Upamā is) Ekadeśāvivartini. The distinction (between these two examples) is this — in the former, in the instance of Viśesānopamā, Viśesyopamā is suggested, (whereas) in the latter Viśesānopamā is suggested by the Viśesyopamā.

The shore of the ocean resembling an iron-wheel which is dark on account of the row of Tamāla and Tālī forests, is appearing owing to distance, like a thin line of rust formed on the edge of the wheel.

Here the figure is Kevalaparamparitopamā which is based on non-punning words. Upamā, here, is the ocean with the iron-wheel. (Again), Upamā of the shore is with the line of rust on the edge of a wheel and thus both these
two have turned to be consequential.

Or for example,

While my father, the preceptor of all the foremost archers, is acting like the submarine fire in the midst of the ocean of the rival-warriors licked by the flame of his weapons, remains the commander of the army, there is no ground, O Karna! for this flurry! O Kṛpa, repair to the battle! O Kṛtavarma, give up fear!

While my father, aided by his bow, is bearing the brunt of the battle, where can there be any room for fear?

Here, the simile of Droṇa with the submarine fire is the establishing factor of the simile between the rival force and the ocean and thus both the two similes have turned to be consequential. Likewise, in "This king acts like a flamingo in the Mānasa-lake in the form of the heart (Mānasa) of the wise" the figure is Kevalaparamparitopamā based on a punning word. Mālāparamparita variety in both the cases is to be understood in the same manner. "The pool of blood acts like the morning sun for darkness caused by dust" — here the simile is drawn through difference of property like a Rūpaka. Thus, (in) all aspects (they) are equal.

But the point of distinction is this — Samasta-vastu-viṣayarūpaka (Rūpaka involving all objects) cannot be considered a special type of Rūpaka, since, it is the figure Nidārśanā that has been admitted while the...
between the Viṣayāṇa and the Viṣayin, qualified by a relation of an original and its image is superimposed. But Sāvayavopamā suggests the Viśiṣṭopamā (i.e. Simile resting in the qualified). Since, the similarity of Raghu qualified as 'gone towards the northern direction for extirpating the northern' with his arrows' with the sun qualified as 'gone towards the northern direction for taking up the sap (of the earth) with (its) rays', as the resultant meaning of the verse beginning with "tataḥ prastastē kauverīṁ bhāsvan āiva", is understood. Thus, suggestion somewhere by an Upamā and elsewhere of the Upamā culminates to be four-fold. Somewhere an Upamā between the qualified (is suggested) by an Upamā between the adjuncts, as, in the expression 'viśva- jiś sarvapraśto'tirātraḥ', injunction of the qualified, namely, 'Prastha', can be understood from the injunction of all-pervasiveness relating to (the sacrifice) 'Prastha'. Somewhere the simile between the adjuncts is suggested by the simile between the qualified just as the injunction of the group of various subordinate rites relating to the original sacrifice is indicated by the main rites relating to the branch sacrifice. Both are exemplified as Ekadesā- vivarti. Somewhere an Upamā resting in the qualified is suggested by that resting in the parts, just as the injunction of the performance belonging to the main sacrifice comprising all the subordinate ones can be understood from the group of injunctions belonging to the foremost of the subordinate sacrifices. That has been shown in the example of Upamā relating to all objects. This example relates to the suggestion of simile resting in the qualified by a simile resting in parts in a single sentence. It is seen in the divergence of sentence also. For example —
As much the wicked, like a hand soiled with ashes, oppresses the good, who is like a mirror, so much does he add the shining glory to him.

Here the figure is Avayavopama. Upama relating to the qualified is understood (here) in this manner — as a hand soiled with ashes makes a mirror clear all the more by rubbing (it) more and more, so the wicked, by oppressing the good more and more, makes him but glorious. Somewhere, simile relating to the qualified, suggests the similes of parts thereof, just as statements relating to the attribute and substance are suggested by statements relating to the qualified. For example —

Your face, with the restless eyes and displaying shining brilliance of teeth, shines like a lotus with its filaments slightly visible and bees hovering on it.

Here, from the simile of the qualified with (another) qualified, the relation of a standard and subject of comparison of the eyes and bees, brilliance of the teeth and filaments and of lotus and the face, which happened to be the part of that (i.e. Simile relating to the qualified), is understood. Thus numerous are the varieties of Upama.

Similarly,

Cupid vanquishes the mind of passionate persons with the palm in the form of tender leaves of creepers, with the lotuses in the form of hands (of women), with the faces in the form of lotuses of lotus-beds and with the moons in the form of faces of women.
Varieties of Rūpaka also, such as, the 'girdle-metaphor', are numerous, which may be noticed in the above verse and the like. Thus it is said in Kāvyāloka —

Since there is no limit to the varieties of Upamā and Rūpaka, only a few are shown and the rests not mentioned are to be understood by the intelligents. 

Here ends the section on the figure Rūpaka.

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Now begins the determination of Parināma (Culmination).

"When what is being superimposed turns useful for the contextual — it is called Parināma (culmination)" — this is stated to be its definition. There the questions arise —

O Jagannātha! by (my) mind, speech and body, I take resort to your couple of feet, the boat in the form of mercy for crossing the ocean in the form of birth, old age (and) death.

The cloud, having seen with its eyes in the form of lightning the face of the woman going to meet her lover at night,  

rumbled with extreme pain  
thinking whether it is this moon vomitted (by him) along with the showers (of rain).
See, these are the flowers in the form of fame, white like the moon and grown in the Pārijāta tree in the form of the king of Avantī, which at present I employ as garland of the maids in the form of quarters.

In these verses, although the boat, the eyes and the flower, which are to be superimposed, turn useful to the contextual, namely, crossing, beholding and garlanding, still, by the same author of the said definition, namely, the author of Alamkāra-Sarvasva, figure Rūpaka is admitted.

Know the self to be the passenger of the chariot, the body to be the chariot, intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins.

In Vedic citations like the above one, although the charioteer and the chariot etc., turn useful to the contextual, namely, the attainment of the utmost reach of path (i.e. Salvation), which is going to be mentioned as "He attains that utmost reach of path (i.e. Salvation), namely, that highest (blessed) position of Viṣṇu", figure Rūpaka is admitted by the respected Vādarāyaṇa in the following Sarīrakasūtra (i.e. aphorism of the Vedānta philosophy): "One cannot justify oneself by maintaining that this has also been taken by some to be known by inference, since, this has been accepted as presented with a metaphor drawn from the body and the same is accordingly described." Thus in those cases, the definition suffers from being too narrow. Similarly, the definition would be found too narrow in the following example of Bhrāntimān -
Here the lotus-beds, thinking that it must be the sun (risen) even at night, had their lotuses in bloom while the rays of the moon mingled with various types of rays (emitting) from gems attained thousand-fold in number.

So also in the following example of Apahnuti —

That Kumāra (i.e. Kārtikēya) may shower on you the wealth of celebrity — Kumāra, who ever resides in the heaps of blooming blue-lotuses in the form of the eyes of the heavenly women which were made downwards by the control (over senses) and who does not sit on the beautiful praiseworthy peacock.

So also in the following example of Atiśayokti —

Did a pair of pitchers, appearing on her chest, manifest itself as a fresh present rendered by her (young) age, so that, she, the slender one, having crossed the difficult river of bashfulness, entered the heart of Nala?

So also in the following example of Anumāna (Inference) —

O mosquito! I take you to be (the lord) Mādhava, since you move like a wheel as Mādhava makes his disc wielding, since you remain unnoticed by short-sighted persons from a distance as Mādhava remains to be cast off by evil-eyed persons from the distance (and) since
you play near the ear as Mādhava (i.e. Mādhava's name) ever rings in the ear (of the devotees).

Because, there exists usefulness to the contextual in the rise of the sun (here noticed) in (the instance of) Bhrāntimān, in showering celebacy by the heavenly womens' eyes (here noticed) in (the instance of) Apahmuti, in crossing the river by the couple of pitchers (here noticed) in (the instance of) Atisāyokti and in the moving of the wheel by Mādhava (here noticed) in (the instance of) Anumāna. In Apahmuti, residing in celestial womens' eyes, cast down by virtue of self-control, is useful in bestowing celebacy by the maxim of 'tatkātu' (i.e. that determination), namely, 'one turns to be the same as is one's means of worship.'

The persistent inward agony is alleviated only by talks with friends. Affliction, caused by separation, is relieved by (the sight of) the moon-like beautiful face of dear.

Further, in this (above example of) Pariṇāma mingled with Drṣṭānta, it would be found too narrow. Because, here, the superimposed is useful to the non-contextual which is included in the side of the standard of comparison.

Here it is said: when the superimposed becomes useful as identified with the contextual, it is called Pariṇāma — this is the implication of the definition. If it be so admitted, it would not involve the fallacy of being too wide with regard to the exemplified verses of Rūpakā etc. Because it needs no identification with the
contextual, viz., couple of feet, lightning, fame, the moon etc. for that (i.e. being useful), since, in them, the superimposeds, namely, the boat, the eyes, the flowers, the sun etc. themselves are useful to the purposes like crossing, looking, making of ear-rings, blooming of lotuses etc. since, the said definition inapplicable to Parināma, since, there only the figure Parināma is admitted where the superimposed, being introduced as useful to some purpose, needs identification with the contextual as in itself it lacks in such a usefulness. For example — "the woman with fascinating eyes beholds with (her) delighted lotus-like eyes." It is but the usefulness of the lotus toward beholding is described here. Since, owing to the Mayuravyāpaksaka class of compound, the meaning of the second member attains predominance. It is unjustified to say that let it be granted through the acceptance of Upamita compound that it is the usefulness of the eyes only that is described because of the predominance of the first member (in the compound). For, 'Prasannena' ('delighted') as the common property is mentioned (here) and because the injunction of Upamita compound is (made) only when this (i.e. the common property) is not mentioned by the rule — 'upamitaṁ vyāghradibhiḥ sāmānyāprayoge' (The object of comparison is compounded with words like 'vyāghra' when the common property is not mentioned). Also, the usefulness of the lotus toward beholding is not possible in itself. Hence, the figure is Parināma as it needs the identification with eye which happens to be the contextual. One may say, — if it be so, then in the example (beginning with) 'yāmi manovākkāyaiḥ' and the like also, usefulness of boat etc. toward (the description of) the check of birth and the like indicated by words like 'taraṇa' ('crossing'), is admitted only in the form of the
couple of feet and the like and thus arises the question of admitting Paripāma in those cases too. To say so is unjustified, since 'usefulness' is accepted in case of identification (of the superimposed) with that which has the power of establishing the primary meaning which is comprehended in the very beginning through the use of words expressive of the matter at hand--and thus the power of establishing the primary meaning of the words like 'tarānā'' i.e. boat, is fixed in the words like 'tarānā'' i.e. boat only. Therefore it is nothing but Rūpaka that exists in the exemplified verses and the fallacy of being too wide is not involved in them. (Now), although the said fallacy of being too wide is averted, still, it would be found too wide a definition with regard to the following definition of Aprastutapraśāṃsā—

The extraordinary process of the turning of the tongue (also punningly, inconsistency of speech), that insteadness (also, lightness) of the ears, that sight, which has forgotten its own and others' direction through ichor (also, infatuation), — or what is the use of saying much, O bee, you have forgotten everything, since this elephant (also, this master who turns devoted servants away), whose trunk is hollow inside (also, whose hand is empty), is being inclined to (also, served) (by you) even now. Thus, brother, what obstinacy is this?

Since, the non-contextual, namely, turning of the tongue by the elephant etc. are useful to the matter in hand,
like, as being identified with the contextual, namely, refraining from rendering service and the inconsistency in speech of the bad master etc. As the insteadness of ears of the elephant is responsible for refraining from getting inclined towards it by the bee, it is not so in the case of turning of the tongue and hollowness of the trunk of it (i.e. the elephant). In reverse, it is the attraction toward it, to which ichor is responsible and thus the responsibility for forsaking it is completely turned down. Even in this position, the responsibility for forsaking it, which has been described, is to be accomplished as being identified with the bad master etc. relating to the non-contextuals, namely, elephant etc. Moreover, the same type of fallacy of being too narrow is seen in Parināma exemplified in the verse beginning with 'Satrdālāpenaiva'. Since, the face also like the moon is contextual there and thus having no usefulness in being identified with the contextual. Here it is said — in the expression 'prakṛtātmanā' ('as identified with the contextual'), the word 'prakṛta' ('contextual') denotes only the subject (of description) and thus it would not be too narrow to cover the exemplified verse of Parināma. Usefulness again is intended to be relating to a matter introduced as contextual. In the example of Aprastutaprasamsā (mentioned above), usefulness is to the refraining from getting attracted toward the elephant which indicates the contextual, namely, refraining from rendering service to a bad master; (and) thus, there, it would not be too wide a definition.

If the superimposed exists as identified with the subject of superimposition and turns to be useful to the contextual — it is said to be Parināma.
The above mentioned definition of Vidyānātha, in a like manner, is to be clarified taking the term 'prakṛtasya' as meaning 'prakṛtāgamakasya' (indicating the contextual) as its explanation.

Two-fold is this Parināma again on the basis of its being appositional and non-appositional. An example of (its) being appositional is the following one —

This (Rāma), himself being the third person (i.e. with two others, namely, Lakṣmaṇa and Sītā), having crossed the heavenly river (i.e. the Ganges), the garland on the head of the lord of creatures (i.e. Śiva), offered help in the form of friendship with Lakṣmaṇa (lit. the son of Sumitrā) to that helmsman as the fare (for carrying), while, for a while, he was looked at with trouble by the young mountaineer women with their breasts being carried with their hands stretched and eyes expanded with astonishment. Then he proceeded towards the mountain Citrakūṭa.

Here, the superimposed, namely, the fare (for carrying), turns to be useful to the description of help towards Guha, as being identified with the friendship of Lakṣmaṇa which happens to be the subject (of description) and thus the figure is Parināma. Because of its sameness of case-terminations, it is a case of being appositional.

An example (of it) being non-appositional, is the following one —
They, for a pleasure-trip in the forest, made garlands with multitude of white-lotuses (or, flowers from Nagakesāra tree), girdles with Keyūra (Bakula) flowers and ear-rings with Karṇikā flowers.

Here, the superimposed, namely, garlands etc., are useful to the pleasure-trip in the forest as being identified with the multitude of white-lotuses which happen to be the subjects (of description) and thus the figure is Pariṇāma. Because of its divergence in case-terminations, it is a case of being non-appositional.

This type of being non-appositional is possible in Rūpakā too. For example,

This obesience is to (that) lord, who has the moon as (his) crest, who is the abode of the universe, whose neck bears the shade of cloud, who has the attachment to the daughter of mountain (i.e. Pārvatī) only as his love-sport (and) who is associated with a crest by way of possessing a river (on his head), with a Tilaka (i.e. a mark of sandal-paste etc. on the forehead) by the (third) eye, with weapons by Nārāyaṇa (i.e. by way of receiving them from Nārāyaṇa), with bracelets by the snakes (and) with a home by the mountain.

Here, the case-termination of 'the river' and 'the eye', the subjects (of description), is lacking in the crest and the Tilaka.
Or for example,

The celebrated king Nṛsiṁha is winning victory on earth giving delight to scholars; -- the king, who is a duplication of cupid, a tautology of the heavenly (wish-yielding) tree, an alternative of the Cintāmaṇi gem, a repetition of Karna (lit. born of the body of the sun), twice-mentioning of Indra and duality of the god skilled in the art of destroying the lord of demons.

Here, there is a difference in case-terminations in the subject (of description), namely, the king and the related, namely, cupid, etc.

Now, what should be the example in the suggestion of Pariṇāma?

O Narasipha (or the lion-like man) ! the lord of earth ! who are we to describe you, whose fame pervades invading even the region of the moon.

This is the verse exemplified by Vidyādhara. Here, what has been said, namely, since by the word 'rāja', the moon is mentioned as the subject, the superimposed, namely, the king, is acknowledged as useful to the description of attack and hence figure Pariṇāma is suggested there, is unjustified. (Since), the superimposed, namely, the king, is useful only as the king and not as the moon. Vidyādhara also has admitted Pariṇāma only when the related, by very nature, is not useful to the matter in hand and for being
useful to that, the related turns identified with the subject. Thus it is said —

Where the subject (of description) turns to be identified with the object superimposed for its usefulness to the contextual, that, they say, is Parināma which is two-fold.

Vidyānātha again has exemplified it thus —

This distress of yours would be averted by taking resort to the feet of the king (also, by consuming the rays of the moon). How could dwelling beneath a thorny tree, remove that?

There is no scope of previously mentioned fallacies here: Since, the superimposed, namely, consumption of the rays of the moon, only being identified with the service to the feet of the king, becomes the cause of the cessation of distress, (and) since, though the word 'tāpa', common to the heat of the sun, is desired to mean only the agony caused by the loss of kingdom in this context (and) since, the consumption of the rays of the moon is, by nature, incapable of averting that. Still, this example is in accordance with the view of the ancients. Since, they, in the epithet 'rājapādanīṣevāyā', admit the function of suggestion based on the power of words relating to the consumption of the rays of the moon which happen to be the non-contextual owing to restriction by context. In fact, heretoo in the epithet 'rājapādanīṣevāyā', expression is the function relating to consumption of the rays of the moon also, since, it has been established by us in the
section on pun that expression is the function of words that prevails even in the meaning of the non-contextual. Thus, since the knowledge of identification of the two, viz. the contextual and the non-contextual, can be attained by mere rule of proximity as in figures like Atisayokti, based on pun and since the usefulness to the contextual is attained by the third case-ending nowhere is there the necessity of the function of suggestion. And thus, this is not an example of the suggestion of Parināma. This fault applies to the previous example also. In fact, the following one may be taken as an example —

O mind! for a long time you have endowed agonies. Give up worries. Indeed there exists the cool moon in the form of the nail of the lotus-foot of Kṛṣṇa.

Here, by pointing to the existence of the moon-like nail of the lotus-foot of Hari to a person afflicted with grief for a long time, figure Parināma, namely, 'take resort to him only and by that taking resort to him this grief will subside', is suggested. Thus Parināma, as distinguished from Rūpaka, is determined. When the distinction stands as follows — there, in Rūpaka, contextual assumes the form of a non-contextual, whereas in Parināma the non-contextual assumes the form of a contextual, Chakravartin, basing on this, showed their distinction in a different way. In Rūpaka, such as, 'the face is moon', the face, being superimposed as the moon like a cloth (on an object), gets itself concealed by the form of the moon. But in Parināma, such as, 'agony is subsided by the face in the form of the moon', the face
does not have its own self concealed; since, the moon becomes responsible for the alleviation of the pangs of separation in the form of the face only. Thus it is said —

When there is the concealment of the subject (of description) by way of superimposition of the nature of the related, then in that case the state of the figure Rūpaka (is admitted). There it gives pleasure.

But then it is known as Parināma when the subject (of description), without any deviation from its own nature attains the form of that (i.e. Viṣayin) for its usefulness (toward the description in hand).

This has to be considered here — in Rūpaka, concealment of the subject (of description) is not in the disappearance of its (own) form; since the disappearance of the subject (of description), owing to the artificial superimposition, is not possible as in the case of the nature of pearl-oyster through mistake of silver. In Śāraṅkā (Bhāṣya) also, with this apprehension (in view), viz., that the nature of the function of the chanting (of the Śāmaveda), like the nature of the pearl-oyster while the sight has silver as its object, would disappear if the chanting, in the expression — "one should worship that, which scatter rays, as Udgītha", is taken as the object of the sight of the sun, — it has been stated that the sight superimposed is incapable of causing disappearance (of the subject). This is there a subordination (of the Viṣaya) to the Viṣayin. The same is admitted in Parināma.
too. Since in both the cases the Mayūrvyaṃsaka class of compound, where the meaning of the last member is predominant, remains the same. Hence, the interpretation, that 'sthagana' (concealment) is being qualified by the Viṣayin, is also turned down, since the Viṣayin (itself) is qualified. Therefore, supportless is the statement relating to the distinction based on concealment and non-concealment and hence the distinction of Parināma from Rūpaka is to be endorsed as based only on the usefulness relating to the subject (of description). Enough of elaboration.

Here ends the section on the figure Parināma.

: oOo : -

Now begins the figure 'Doubtful' (Sasandeha).

That knowledge of the non-contextual matter, which involves no ascertaining and appears 60 as based on the contextual matter owing to similarity, is considered to be Doubtful (Sasandeha) by the experts.

And this Sasandeha is of three types, namely, Pure, Containing Certainty in the Middle and Ending in Certainty. Examples follow in order —

O the crest-jewel of kings! having brought the wealth of enemies (conquered by you) in the forest and seen in them an excessively white small-basket which was (like a) piece of a lunar digit, the
foolish mountaineers could not determine whether it was a musical instrument, or a pounding apparatus, or some wealth, or a throwable weapon, or a celestial object.

Is this the Sun? — But the Sun is accompanied by seven horses. Is this fire? — Surely, fire never flames on all sides. Is this the Death-God? — But he has the buffalo as his conveyance. Thus, O king, on seeing you in battle, do your enemies entertain various doubts.

Is it a lotus or the face of a young woman noticed in the lake at a distance? Having doubted (this) for a while, someone, through the gestures not to be noticed in lotuses (lit. those which stay in water along with cranes), arrived certainly.

This is what they say. Here this has to be considered — whether the fifth case-ending in the expression 'sāmyāt' ('owing to similarity'), is intended to convey the causality in the form of a result as is noticed in 'annāddhetorvasati' ('one dwelling for food'), or to denote the causality as such. In the former case, it would mean the result in the form of conveying similarity with the non-contextual. In that case, it would be too narrow to cover the example beginning with 'ānīya dvīṣatām'. There is no poetic effort in conveying similarity of the small-basket with moon-like appearance, with musical instrument etc. On the other hand it has (the same) in
expressing the abundance of prowess of the king (by way of indicating that) the enemy's city reached such a (pitiable) condition. In the second case, the question arises — whether one single simile with the non-contextual as responsible for beautification of all included in the side of doubt or an irregularity of being one or many, is intended (here) by the expression 'sāmyāt'. In the former, it would be too narrow to cover the example beginning with 'ayam mārtāṇḍāḥ kim'; since, it is not so here that a single simile is the cause of the doubt to the state of (being) the sun etc., as is the simile of abundance of beauty in the doubt of Lakṣmī etc. to be found in the expression "Is this Lakṣmī, or Urvaśī, or Rambhā, or Menakā?" But, simile of being looked at with trouble is the cause in the doubt of being the sun; simile of being unassailable is the cause in the doubt of being fire; simile of being destroyer of all in a moment is the cause in the doubt of being Death-God. In the second case, it would be too wide with regard to the figure Vikalpa (Uncertainty) (as noticed) in "Bow your head down here (i.e. on the feet of the king) like the king of Kaliṅga or (bend your) bow like (the king of) Karahāṭa in the beginning of battle."

Since, there exists a knowledge of uncertainty here caused by setting example of that king in the timely direction of a reliable person, namely, bow your head in that manner the king of Kaliṅga, having followed the policy, viz.

When attacked by a (more) powerful (king), take resort to the reed-like attitude and never the serpentine, if want your fortune unhurt.
bent his head down without any hesitation with a view to avert the sure destruction of the fortune of his own kingdom, or bend your bow in such a manner as did the king of Karahāṭa having followed the policy, viz. "Through victory, wealth is achieved, through death the celestial woman", bend (his) bow having accepted the challenge, while the powerful king, engaged in (his) conquest of directions, entered in battle. It is unjustified to say that, there, in the verse, the fallacy of being too wide is not involved for the absence of such knowledge; since, if inclusion of that (knowledge) also is desired to be included in the definition, the question of being too narrow to cover the examples of suggested Sasandeha which are based on doubtful object as in the following one and the like, would arise.

Youngest or eldest, wicked are like a machine for raising water. They are bowing at the time of collecting livelihood (and) having received (it) elevated again (just as a machine for raising water goes downward at the time of lifting water but goes upward after taking it).

For, heretofore, the twofold nature based on the divisions, viz., the expressed and the suggested, like the varieties, namely, the expressed and the suggested in the case of Utprekṣā, has to be admitted; because two types of examples are noticeable.

Moreover, what is meant by 'anavadhāraṇa'? If it be said that this consists in uncertainty, then it would
be found too wide a definition with regard to the verse beginning with 'Bālenduvaktrāpyavikāsabhāvāt' to be exemplified as an example of Utyrekaṇa consisting in probability of identity with that (i.e. non-contextual) based on the similarity with the non-contextual, since probability consists of doubt on two opposite sides. If it be maintained that this consists in (a knowledge) resting in many mutually-contradictory aspects, then also it would be too wide (a definition) with regard to Dāpatra as in 'Moon in the form of a face'. If it is said that this is intended as consisting in (a knowledge) resting in many aspects mentioned as mutually opposite through contradiction, then also it would be too wide a definition with regard to Apahnuti to be exemplified in the verse beginning with 'ānkalam ke'pi śāsamkire'. Since, theretoo, a mutually opposition is established by way of presenting respective opinions in a manner (the same is established) by the word 'vā' in case of doubt or uncertainty. It would be too narrow to cover the following example of Sasandeha also.

In the creating of this woman, was the position of the creator occupied by the Moon, the source of effulgence? Or was it the Love-god himself abounding in the erotic passion? Or was it the season of spring? How else could the ancient sage, whose sensibility had been deadened by Vedic study and whose interest had been withdrawn from all objects, be able to create such a heart-ravishing body?
Since, it lacks in possessing (a knowledge) resting in many aspects, as plurality rests only in the moon etc. possessing an attribute connected with doubt and everywhere the attribute, namely, the state of being the creator of (that) woman, the subject of description, remains 'one' only. It would be unjustified to say that, as the doubt in the expression "Don't know, where, whether to (her) home or to my heart, she has gone herefrom", is not taken (as a case of this figure), (similarly), owing to the lack of being caused by similarity, the figure is not Sasandeha there.

Since, basing on the point, namely, the heroine to be described, possesses similarity with the moon in point of (her) charm and similarity with the flower in point of (her) fragrance and tenderness, the doubt, namely, whether the moon, the store of beauty, on account of its (own) wealth of charm, or the spring on account of its (own) wealth of flower, is the creator of this (heroine), is described and since the state of being caused by that (doubt) has not been rejected in the portion involving the moon and the spring although the portion 'śṛṅgārai- karasaḥ svayam nu mañanaḥ' ends in the indication of the abundance of amorous movements only and is not based on any similarity.

Similarly, the expression 'prakṛtārthaśrayā' also is unjustified (to include). It would be too narrow to cover the doubt as exemplified above, as it is not based on the subject of description, namely, the heroine. Here we say —

That is known as the figure Sandeha where the knowledge, based on similarity (and)
connected with the meaning of the word 'वा' ('or'), pertains to many objects rejecting one another from all aspects.

Although the state of pertaining to many contradictory objects rejecting one another, exists in the figure Vikalpa also, still, there is found not the mutual rejection of those objects from all aspects, but the state of barring the scope for an alternative, opposed to itself, in the form of an alternative making room for itself without barring the scope for that on the other side. It is not so that in the direction of alternation in (the Vedic injunction), namely, "Sacrifice has to be made either by rice or by barley", rice rejects barley and barley rejects rice from (their application) in the sacrifice from all aspects. Since, if it be admitted, the question of non-authority of the Shastras would arise owing to its failing to give any verdict for holding the sacrifice because of its lack of determination. But only the respective alternative performances are prescribed here. This is why, to a person asking through doubt, "व्र्धिबहिन्यावागृह्या याः तववायम्" ("Should I sacrifice with rice or barley"), the sentence in the very form of the question, namely, "व्र्धिबहिन्यावागृह्या याः तववायम्" ("You may sacrifice either with rice or with barley") is seen as the answer to it being the remover of doubt lying at the root of the question and a directive for holding the performance. Since, there is a distinction like this — in the sentence in the form of question the word 'वा' is used for rejecting from all aspects another possibility, (whereas) in the sentence in the form of answer, it is meant for rejecting that alternatively. Similarly, it would not be too-wide a
definition with regard to the figure Vikalpa; since, in the example of the figure Vikalpa also, as both the two scriptural policies are authoritative and hence both the two are justified to be followed in accordance with the respective desire for result mentioned there, — bendings of the head and the bow down, do not reject each other. Although there exists rejection of each other from all aspect, from all aspects, in the instance of Apahnava, it would not be too-wide a definition; since it is not associated with the meaning of the word 'वः'. Since, there, (in the instance of Apahnava) one understands the rejection of each other of the possibilities through the mention of variant opinions with expressions like 'kecit', 'anye' and there is no connection with the meaning of the word 'वः'. It would not involve the fallacy of being too-wide with regard to Utprekṣā also; since, it is not connected with the meaning of 'वः', because, in that figure where one possibility is stronger, there is a lack of the possession of equal strength of the two alternatives relating to doubt. Although, the example (beginning with) 'अयाह शर्गविधाह' is not based on many possibilities which negate one another, (still), it would not lead to the fallacy of being too-narrow, since, it is based on meanings in the form of many such 'धार्मिन्स' (qualifieds). Faultless is thus everything (here).

An example of the suggestion of the figure Sandeha is the following one found in Varadarājavadantisava, composed by Vakṣaṅsthalacārya, who is the origin of our family —

Having seen a woman of golden complexion who appeared like Lakṣmī incarnate, Lord Barada (i.e. Viṣṇu) was doubtful and looked at his chest.
Here, although the doubt is expressed in word, still, that much does not constitute the figure. (and) hence (it is a case of Sandeha). There is a suggestion of the figure Sandeha, since, the expression leading to that figure, namely, Lakṣī, residing in that very chest, having descended therefrom is standing before, which assumes the form of a doubt, is being suggested by the expression, namely, he looked at his chest. Another example is the following one –

(She), having seen behind her own reflection the reflection of (her) lover, seated behind, while, on the mirror, she was looking at the signs of sexual enjoyment (on her person), acted in various manners out of bashfulness.

Though the word ‘lajjā’ has been used for conveying the external manifestation of a particular feeling, indicated in general by the expression ‘kāni kānyapi’, that (bashfulness) has a suggestion, namely, revelation leading to Rasa by means of the relevant Vibhāva (excitant) sentiment and Anubhāva (ensuant). Although by the expression ‘vākṣaḥ-sthalam evaikṣata’ suggestions of various doubts, contained in the expression ‘saṃsāyāpanmah’, are possible, such as – being in doubt as to whose beauty, between Lakṣī and the woman seen in the front, is more, or being in doubt as to how does Lakṣī, proud of possessing peerlessly excessive beauty, stand (even now) beholding her in the front, or being in doubt as to where to place this (woman) in my chest. Still, since all the doubts are based on similarity, it is quite justified to take it as an example of the suggestion of the figure Sandeha (and this would have been
the case) even if a Sandeha with Vyatireka at its root be possible here since that too is somehow based on similarity.

Here ends the section on the figure Sandeha.

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Now begins the determination of Bhrāntimāṇ (Error).

That is known as Bhrāntimāṇ (Error) where there is a knowledge of the superimposed on the subject (of description) which is concealed owing to similarity, agreeable to the poets.

Because of the expression 'pihitātmani', it is intended that the knowledge of the superimposed should be a charming imagination due to poetic faculty. Since, that only can conceal the subject (of description). Thus it would not be too wide with regard to Rūpakā etc. An example (of the figure Bhrāntimāṇ) is the following one --

A cat mistakes the rays of the moon for milk in a potsherd and licks them. An elephant grasps them as they enter through the interstices of a tree mistaking them for lotus-fibres. At the end of amorous sports, the lady-love mistakes them to be the silken garment and removes them. Look, the moon full of lustres, is deluding this world.

Since the description has led to the act of licking etc., here, charming is the error, which has been described
to suggest the exuberance of moon-light through poetic faculty.

Somewhere, charm arises out of gradual elaboration of an error.

O Ballāla! the protector of earth! a Kirāta woman, moving in the city of your enemy, having collected the scattered gems, became doubtful of a big charcoal of khadira-tree (and) having thrown sandal-wood on them and blown into (that), (she), with her eyes closed, doubts of smoke on the groups of bees following the perfume of breaths.

Somewhere charm arises out of gradual presentation of errors belonging to different agents.

The couple of pitcher-like breasts were kissed by the humming bees taking them as filaments (of flowers); hands, having graceful movements arising out of fear from them, were stung by parrots taking them as tender leaves; (they), while making sounds for driving them out, were oppressed by the host of crows taking (the sounds) to be the cries of the cuckoo. Thus, O the lion-like king of the Cholas, even the forest is not fit for shelter for your fawn-eyed enemy-women.

Somewhere (charm arises) out of the mention of errors mutually related. For example —
The bee perches on the beak of the parrot mistaking it for a Palāsa-bud. So also does it attempt to pick up the bee mistaking it for a (black-) berry.

While your fame is in its spread on the surface of the earth, — Vidhiḥ (i.e. Brahmā), Vaikunṭhaḥ (i.e. Hari) and Śamkaraḥ (i.e. Siva) wish to ascend, lay down and reside on it (respectively).

Here the figure Bhrāntimān is suggested.

When the doubt and error are based on something other than similarity, then they do not lead to the figure Sasandeha and Bhrāntimān. For example —

The daring Cupīḍ, furnishing his bow with arrows in order to conquer him, who was self-restrained, staked even his fame (already) attained by conquering the three worlds.

The wrestler Cāṇūra, with his heavy chest smashed by punches from Dāmoḍara (i.e. Krishna) saw the sky with a hundred moons.

In the first example, the doubt in respect of the loss of fame, arises out of bravery showed in venturing to conquer a hard-to-win battle. In the second, the error (in seeing a hundred moons), is due to the heavy punch on the breast.

Here ends the section on Bhrāntimān.
Figure Ullekha (Allusion) is now being determined.

That is called Ullekha (Allusion) which consists in the mention of a single object variously by many on various grounds.

That is Ullekha, where a single object, possessed of many (characteristic) properties, is mentioned in various ways by many perceivers on various grounds in the form of possession of various properties.

(You are) the Himācala for the Ganges in the form of your fame; the Rising mountain for the sun in the form of your vigour; the churning mountain for the ocean in the form of (your) enemy-force and the only sprout for the gems in the form of (your) qualities.

Here, in the above instance of Mālarūpaka, there is a mention of a king in various ways like the state of being a snowy mountain, on account of divergence in grounds in the form of connection with properties like the state of being a famous and to avoid the fallacy of being too-wide (a definition) (noticed) there, the expression 'aneka' is used. There, the mention in various ways is not due to the divergence in perceivers and hence the fallacy of being too-wide is not involved.

The wise, heroes, women and the old are beholding (him), who has arrived (here), with wonder as the receptacle of learning, valour, beauty and penance.

Here, there is a mention of a (single) subject of description by many perceivers owing to the divergence of ground in the form of connection with various properties.
like learning and hence to avert there the fallacy of being too-wide (a definition), the expression 'aneka\dhā' is used. There the mention is due to beholding as such out of wonder only and not in various ways and thus (a verse like) this is excluded. In series of errors belonging to many agents, which is cited in an example (of Bhrāntimān) in the verse (beginning with) "dīnānair mañjarīti stanakālaśa-yugau cumbitaṃ canārīkaḥ", there is mention of the breasts etc., in various ways like the state of filament etc. by many like the bees owing to divergence in grounds like the similarity with filament, and to avert the fallacy of being too-wide (a definition) there, the term 'ekasya vastunāḥ' has been used.

While your fame is spreading, both the Nāgas i.e., the elephant and the snake, taking them as lotus-stalk and milk (respectively), extend their tongues repeatedly.

In this example of Bhrāntimān, there is a mention of the self-same fame in various ways like the state of lotus-stalk and milk by many perceivers, namely, the elephant and the snake and to avert the fallacy of being too-wide (a definition) here, the expression 'nimittabhedā' has been used. Here one single thing, namely, whiteness belonging to fame lies at the root of both the two. Though there exists divergence of grounds in the form of greed for respective favourite food of the elephant and the snake, still, since the absence of one (single) ground is desired by the expression 'nimittabhedā', this (above verse) would be excluded (automatically). If this is to be included, the expression 'nimittabhedā' would result in
the mere statement of nature. Even in this position, if, as in the following example of a variety of Apahnuti, fallacy of being too wide is doubted, then the (mention of) 'anekadhā ulekanam' has to be adjuncted by 'niṣedhā-spraṣṭa' i.e., 'not touched by any negation'.

Some took (your face) to be the moon on account of beauty; others took it to be the lotus owing to (its) fragrance; we say, your face has attained an identity with both by virtue of penance.

There, the first two mentions, possess suggested negation by virtue of presentation of the state of others' opinion and hence the fallacy of being too wide is not involved.

He was taken as the lord Kāma by the women, the heavenly tree by the suppliants, (and) the Death-god by the enemies.

Here, in the mention in various ways, love, the state of a supplicant, fear and the like are the factors in respective ways leading (to the figure). 'Ruci' means love for something. 'Arthitva' is greed. This Ulekhā again is of two types — Pure and Mixed with other figures. Of them, an example of Pure is the following one —

Lord Śauri (i.e. Śrīkrṣṇa) was looked at with wonder as the protector of elephant by the old-aged women, as the lover of Lakṣmī by the youthful ladies, as possessing the usual form by girls.
Here, while entering in the city, Kṛṣṇa was looked at by the old-aged women, seeking protection from him due to the fear of the cycle (of birth), thinking that this is that Primeval Being who promptly saved the afraid and devoted elephant in that manner; (he) was looked at with eagerness by the youthful ladies thinking that this is that divine youngman who for his skillfullness in amorous sporting is permanently dear even to Lāmī, who is noted for (her) fickleness; (he) was looked at as having his usual form and garment by the girls because of their childish nature. Thus, since everywhere the same object has been mentioned in various ways, this is Pure. Or for example, (the following passage) in the description of the land of Śrīkanṭha, in the Harṣacarita, may be considered.

(The land), which was taken as a hermitage by the sages, the home of Kāma by courtesans, a concert-hall by actors, the city of death by foes, the philosopher's stone by the suppliants, the soil of the heroes by the professional soldiers, the preceptor's home by the aspirants to knowledge, the city of Gandharvas by the singers, the Great Artifier's temple by the scientists, the land of profit by the merchants, the gaming house by the bards, the gathering of the virtuous by the good men, the cage of adamant by the refugees, the Rogue's Meet by the clever, the reward of their good deeds by the wayfarers, the cave of demons by the Wālikas, the Buddhist monastery by the quietists, the
Apsaras' City by the lovers, the festival congress by the troubadours, the stream of wealth by the Brahmins.

Here, the mention as hermitage etc., due to the abundance of hermitage and the like, is Pure. In the very same passage, mention of the state of the city of the Death-god etc. is Mixed. If the syntax of the state of the city of the Death-god etc. is as the beautifier only, then, there the mixture is with Rūpaka. Then it is a mixture with Bhṛantimān if (they are mentioned) as the expressive of the knowledge of identity. This Ullēka again, with a view to express superiority of qualities belonging to the subject of description, is found to be applied with non-animates as agents also. For example, in that very book, in the description of Harṣa —

Single as he lay there, he was taken with different lights (by different spectators); riches called him cold, all faults turned from him as inaccessible, the senses felt elated at his love of self-control, the genius of the iron age said 'he is beyond my reach', all vices pronounced him as passionless, dishonour looked him as timid, Love said, 'the workings of his mind are hard to be understood'; Sarasvatī complained that 'he is uxorious', others' wives that 'he is imponent', ascetics said that 'he is a seer of the highest order', harlots that 'he is a deceiver', friends took him to be submissive, Brahmins considered him a servant, the enemy soldiers took him as helpless.
In a similar manner, figures like Bhrāntiman also, are applied with inanimates as agents. (For example)

Here, the lotus-beds, thinking that it must be the sun (risen) even at night, had their lotuses in bloom while the rays of the moon mingled with various types of rays (emitting) from gems attained thousand-fold in number.

The black-bees, eager for honey, and the thirsty Cakora birds are running after the fragrant and lustrous face of yours.

Here the figure Ullekha is suggested. In the verse beginning with 'vidyāvikramasundarya', if (the meaning) does not culminate in the ground for the mere eagerness for the observation of the nature of learning etc., but culminates in the ground for the eagerness for observation like the mention of the state of learned etc., then, there also the figure Ullekha would be suggested, because, the particular charm created by the state of being mentioned in various ways is suggested.

With regard to a single woman, a mendicant, a libidinous person and a dog, have three different ideas; namely, a corpse, a loving woman and a food respectively.

That here also figure Ullekha is desired, is not a case of the fallacy of being too-wide a definition.

There is another variety of Ullekha.
Even in the absence of the divergence of perceivers, mention of a single (object) in various ways on the basis of divergence of subject (of description) and receptacle also, is styled as Ullekha.

Of these, the mention in various ways on the basis of divergence of subject (of description) may be Pure and Mixed.

An example of Pure (is the following one) —

May the good fortune (in the form of Pārvatī) of the compassionate skull-bearing lord (i.e. Śiva) reside in the mind — (the goddess) who is stout at the chest but thin at the waist, big in the eyes but broadened at the hips and with lips that are ruddy.

He is weighty (also, Bṛhaspati) in speech, vast (also Pṛthū, the king) in chest, broad (also, Viśāla, the king) in mind, source (also, Janaka, the king) of penance, sun (also, Sūmitra, the king) in prowess, a good counsel (also Sumantra, the king) in consultation, a learned in the court (also, Bṛhadā in host of luminaries), Arjuna (also, white) in fame, the dreadful (also, Bhīṣma) in arrows. ⋯⋯

In these cases and the like (the figure) is mixed with pun.

In her movements (she is) as if a swan; in conversation, as if a cuckoo; in the love
towards husband, as if a Cakravāka bird;
in the expansion of breasts (also, in the
heaps of clouds), as if the rainy-season;
in the collection of treasures (also, in
the combination of petals), as if the lotus;
in yielding fruits, as if the flowers.

These are cases of (Ullekha) mixed with the figure Utprekṣa. In the expression 'payodharannatau' etc., in the portion of the subject (of description) (it is) again mixed with pun. In examples like "Yudhiṣṭhira in speaking the truth" etc., it is mixed with Rūpaka.

The figure is mixed with Upama in examples like "Like Yudhiṣṭhira in speaking the truth". These and the like have to be understood.

An example of the mention in various ways on the basis of divargence in receptacles, is the following one —

May that (Vāmana) protect you from mishaps. (Vāmana), the thriving, the slayer of Bali (and) whose movements consisted in three steps, on whose person the sun, for a while, acted as an umbrella, on head— a jewel, on forehead — a Tilaka (i.e. a mark of sandal paste etc.), at the end of ears — a (couple of) rings, on the shoulder — a disc, on the chest — the excellent (Kaustubha) gem, on the navel — the Lotus-seated (Brahmā) (and) on the feet — a (couple of) bracelets.
Here, it is mixed with Rūpaka. Again, Ullekhā is mixed on the ground of divergence in perceivers standing in front of particular parts of bodies, namely, the middle of the forehead, end of the ears and the like of the lord. Since, a single perceiver cannot see the sun at the middle of the forehead and at the end of the ears.

In the seraglios of slain rivals, his prowess was, as it were, materialised in the form of the five elements; fire in the hearts (of women), water in the hollows of their eyes, wind in their sighs, earth upon their forms (and) ether in the vacant solitude.

Here, the figure Hetu consists in the expression of identity of prowess with the effects of prowess in the form of heat, vapour and the like which are understood (here) from the words 'vahni', 'jala' etc., and thus there is a mixture with that (i.e. the figure Hetu). In the opinion of others, there is a mixture with Rūpaka.

Let those lustres of the throat of Śrikantha (i.e. Śiva) do good to you; (lustres), which act as the Tilaka (i.e. a mark of the sandal-paste etc.) of Kasturī i.e. musk on the forehead of the goddess; act as black-bees on her lotus-like face; act as a crest of tender Tamāla leaves on her head and act as bloomed lotuses on the ears; and which will stay as black Agaru (i.e. a type of scent) on a part (i.e. the nipple, in this case) of the breast.
Here the figure is mixed with Upamā. Some say —

though the suffix Kvip is added in the sense of simile, it pulminates in a sense of Utpreksā in the light of the possibility of identity with the Tilaka of musk etc., owing to the propriety of particular receptacles and hence the figure is Utpreksā which in the beginning has a sense of Upamā. In that opinion, this is mixed with Utpreksā. In the same manner, amalgamation with other figures has to be understood.

Here ends the section on Ullekha.

Now begins Apahnuti (Denial).

That is Apahnuti, where the state of something else is established owing to similarity, with a denial of the object under description. It is divided into two, — having many sentences and having one sentence.

In Rūpaka, there is only the establishment of something else. In Ākṣepa (Paralepsis), as in "I am not a messenger, but the excessive physical agonies of the fair-limbed one (incarnate)" (?), only the denial of the object of description is there. Both the cases are not adjuncted with similarity. Still, it would be too-wide a definition with regard to Aṭiśayokti as in "Cupid is not five-arrowed, but has more than five arrows," and hence it has been mentioned as qualified (by 'anyatva-prakalpanam'). It would be unjustified to say that it would be too-wide a definition with regard to Tattvākhyānopamā.
as in "This is not a lotus, but obviously the face", as it possesses the denial of the state of a lotus and the establishment of the state of a face (as well). Since, the word 'prakalpana' means superimposition. The definition is not mentioned with the suffix 'khyā' (as would run) — 'niṣidhyat vīṣayaṁ śāmyād anyāropah' i.e., 'having denied the object under description, superimposition of (something else) based on similarity .......'. Since, the question of being too narrow to cover the case of denial preceded by superimposition, the illustration of which will be given later, would arise.

This figure, having many sentences, is seen in the use of particles like 'naḥ' denoting direct negation, in the presentation of others' opinion etc. and in the suggestion of denial by implication. (And the same figure), having one sentence, (is seen) in the use of words like 'chadma', 'nibha', 'kapata', 'vyāja' ('in the guise of'), denoting falsehood of the object (under description) and in the use of words like 'rūpa', 'nāma', 'bhaṅgī' ('in the form of') ultimately conveying the falsehood of the object of description.

Of these, in (the variety, namely,) 'having many sentences', there are two divisions — viz., superimposition preceded by denial and denial preceded by superimposition.

Examples follow in order —

O daughter of the mountain, this is certainly not the spot (of the moon), which, having attained prominence, is shining on the body of the moon, whose splendour is
fully developed. I think this is the beautiful lady in the form of the night, who, being fatigued with enjoyment, is sleeping soundly on his chest, cool owing to the flow of trickling nectar.

Or for example —

This is not the sky, but the ocean; these are not stars, but the fragments of fresh foam; this is not the moon, but the lord of serpents (i.e.  ślęganäga) with a coiled tail; this is not the lord of serpents but lord Muräri is laid down (there).

In the former, Apahnuti is partless, (whereas) here it is possessed of parts, — this is the distinction.

Some have supposed (it to be) a spot; others have thought (it to be) ocean's mud; some have called (it) a dappled antelope; others wished (to see in it) earths' shadow. What is always seen in the moon black as a chip of split sapphire, we declare (to be) thick, densest darkness drunk in the night (and) remaining in (his) belly.

Here also superimposition is proceeded by denial. And the denial is implied by way of presenting others' views.

That Kumära (i.e. Kärtikeya) may shower

on you the wealth of celebacy —

Kumära, who ever resides in the heaps of blooming blue-lotuses in the form
of the eyes of the heavenly women which were made downwards by the control (over senses) and who does not sit on the beautiful praiseworthy peacock.

Here, the denial preceded by superimposition is expressed in words.

The mark of sore, caused by the friction of thousands of stones at the foot of the churing mountain, is seen in the moon. (But) this is a blindly following belief of the foolish in this world, that it is the shadow (of the earth), (or) a deer, (or) a hare.

Here also, the denial is preceded by superimposition. That again is established by the implication of presentation of the statements of the fools. These are the examples 'involving many sentences'. Examples 'involving one sentence' are the following —

Alas, friend, see how much is this enmity of Cupid towards people in love, who have grown emaciated owing to separation from their lovers. Under the guise of the bees shining on the mango-blossoms in the garden, he has displayed the deadly poison on every arrow.

Verily, the love-god, scorched by Śiva, has fallen upon the plump thighs of the fawn-eyed one, — which are like the tank of the nectar of loveliness; as from the hole
of her naval, there is proceeding a line of smoke in the form of the line of hair, indicating the extinction of the charcoal of his body.

In the former, (the idea) that these are not the mango-leaves with black-bees but arrows with the deadly poison, is understood by virtue of the word 'chala' which is expressive of falsehood. In the latter, (the idea) that this is not the line of hair but line of smoke, is understood by virtue of the word 'vapuh' which ultimately conveys falsehood.

Some admit the figure Apahnuti even in the description of similarity for the sake of denial as in the case of denial for conveying similarity. As they say —

That is Apahnuti where there is a denial for conveying similarity. This is also Apahnuti where there is a (description of) similarity for the sake of denial.

And they give examples —

Such is dear to me (also, such is my beloved) which (also, who) catches at my lock of hair tightly at first, then presses face to face, fair-necked which (also, who) claps my neck and bodily enfolds my breasts; that finally having hugged my hips falls on my feet." "My child, you have lost all shame". "No, no; O the crooked-minded (lit. simple-minded), what's shameful in a bodice?
Here, having denied the lover, which is desired to be mentioned, there has been a superimposition of the state of a bodice. And for that purpose, there has been the presentation of common-property between the lover and bodice beforehand. Admittance of Apahnuti here is in accordance with the opinion of Udbhaṭa and others who do not admit Vyājoktī (Statement of Pretext) as a separate figure of speech. Those who like Vyājoktī as a separate figure (and define it thus) — "concealing something which has somehow been expressed, is (the figure) Vyājoktī," — to them, it is the figure Vyājoktī that exists here also and not the figure Apahnuti. This is what Rucaka and others say. But Dāṇḍin, being regardless of the rule of similarity at the root with regard to Apahnuti defined it thus — 'Apahnuti is nothing but the presentation of something else after denying something; and exemplified it it thus —

Where something is denied and another meaning is made clear, then it is Apahnuti. Cupid is not a person with five arrows; his arrows are a thousand.

Sandal, moonshine and the southern breeze which carries fragrance — their nature, (so far as I am concerned,) is full of fire; so far as other are concerned, it is cool.

The moon possesses rays which shed nectar; — this is not my opinion. On the other hand, it is different and has rays which shed poison profusely.
Apahnuti, based on similarity has been named Upamāpahnuti by him.

In the portrait of yours that was painted by a slim girl who was restless out of curiosity, a girl painted (on it) the disc and the Garūḍa bird too. Again, another girl, with her sweating palm, having rubbed it quickly, painted on it the flowery arrow on hand and shark on top.

Suggestion of Apahnuti may be exemplified in the above verse and the like. Here, the idea, viz., this is not an ordinary man but the 'lotus-eyed' (Viṣṇu), — has been suggested by some girl through the painting of the disc and the Garūḍa bird. But another girl suggested that this is not the 'lotus-eyed' (Viṣṇu) but Cupid by rubbing out both those (marks) and by painting flowery arrows and shark on banner, with the intention that such a beauty is not possible even in him (i.e. Viṣṇu).

Here ends the section on Apahnuti.

- oOo -
Now begins the figure Upamā (Poetical Fancy).

The wise call it Upamā (Poetical Fancy)

where the contextual is conjectured as something other (than that) owing to (its) relation to another property.

For example —

The excessively crimson Palāśa buds, arched as the crescent moon since not fully bloomed, shone like the nail-marks of the regions of forest just united with spring.

Here the contextuels, viz. the Palāśa flowers, are conjectured as the nail-marks because of their connection with the properties of the non-contextual, namely, the nail-marks. 'Tarka' means mere possibility and not ascertainement. Since the property of that (i.e. the 'Tarka') is the cause of mere possibility of identity with that and not the cause of ascertainement having an evidence which is associated with universal pervasion and the subject of a syllogism. One should not doubt that the figure is Upamā here since the word 'iva' indicates similarity. Since, Upamā can be admitted with nail-marks found anywhere and (thus) does not depend on the imagination of an adjunct, which is connected with the region of a forest united with spring as the hero. Since, adjunct like that becomes befitting only in the possibility of identity of Palāśa-buds with the nail-marks. Similarly, in other cases also, wherever exists an imagination of an appropriate adjunct in the (imagination of) possibility of identity with the non-contextual, figure Upamā is to be acknowledged invariably. For example —
She, with her creeper-like body, had the braid (of hair) resembling the lines of hornets, which, when loosened on the back, looked as if reflected on account of (its) clearness.

Upamā can be admitted with a braid found anywhere and hence the imagination of the adjunct, viz., the state of being reflected in the front on account of clearness, which is not necessary here, is meant for the possibility of identity. But where a comparison, devoid of the imagination of an adjunct applicable to possibility, is presented, there the term 'iva' indicates similarity and hence the figure is Upamā. With this division in view, Chakravartin has said, "Where the element of comparison is well-known among the people", etc., Daṇḍin too, has said of the suggestion of Utprekaśā from the word 'iva' —

Figure Utprekaśā is suggested by the word 'manye' ('I think'), 'śaṃke' ('I doubt'), 'āhruvan' ('definitely'), 'prāyaḥ' ('most-ly'), 'nunam' ('surely') etc. The word 'iva' also is similar to those.

Here by the word 'ādi', words like 'tarkayāṃi' ('I surmise'), 'sambhāyayāṃi' ('I think it possible'), 'jāne' ('I know'), 'utprekā' ('I imagine'), 'syāt' ('may be') are included. Here again, to avert the fallacy of being too wide with regard to the following verses and the like, the expression 'dharmasambandhāt' has been used.

Had I been the Lord Brahmā, I would have put the entire amount of the quality of small on the tongue of the wicked, having collected it from
the testicles of the musk-deer.

Had the fire been not hot, had the water been not cool, — then only I would admit that the firm Rāma should be untruthful.

In those (examples), which are cases of the figure Atisayokti following the (definition) — "Yaḍyarthoktam ca kalpanam" etc., or of the figure Sambhāvanā following the definition "That is to be known as the figure Sambhāvanā, where for the establishment of the other i.e. the non-contextual, there is a doubt in the form of a question "Had it been so", baseless is the relevant doubt. Still, it would be too-wide a definition with regard to the following example and the like and to avert that the expression 'anyadharmasambandhāt' has been used —

I think, the face of Satyavān possesses all-surpassing beauty by which the fawn-eyed Sāvitrī was moved.

In these examples, the doubt is raised on the basis of its own property, such as, the state of being the agent for rendering the heart of Sāvitrī moved and hence there will be no fallacy of being too-wide.

Since the dust of the earth as ruddy as the crimson twilight, is raising up before me, I think, Bharata, to whom the news of (my arrival) has been communicated by Hanūmān, is coming up to me with his army.

To avoid the fallacy of being too-wide with regard to this, there is the adjunct 'anyatvena'. Here, while
arriving with army, Bharata is doubted as arrived in fact on the basis of a relation of the rising of dust before, which is seen in other (similar) occasions too and not otherwise; hence, fallacy of being too-wide is not involved.

O Narasimha, the protector of earth, people know you as Cupid incarnate. Otherwise, how do your arrows turn into flowers?

To avert the fallacy of being too-wide with regard to the present case, (the adjunct) 'upatarkita.m' has been mentioned. Here, in the case of the figure Anumāna, the state of Cupid in the king is determined on the basis of a liṅga (sign), namely, the state of the possession of flowery arrows which has an invariable connection with the state of the Cupid and not the mere doubt (is here).

In the presence of Sītā, the moon seems to be smeared with collyrium; the eyes of gazells dull, the creeper-like coral, as if has its redness dimmed; the brilliancy of gold darkened; in voice there is, as if, a little hardness in the throats of female cuckoos; the tail of peacocks are full of censure indeed.

To avert the fallacy of being too-wide with regard to the present case, (the term) 'prakṛta' has been mentioned.

Here, the conjecture of inferiority by means of (the description) like smearing with collyrium, on the non-contextuals, namely, the moon etc., which are famous as standards of comparison, is raised through (the description) establishing inferiority even of the standards of comparison for Sītā's face etc. to her faces etc.
bearing unsurpassed beauty and hence the fallacy of being too-wide is not involved. Even at this stage, question arises.

While hearing from you (the stories of) our heroic feats that rendered the gods and demons submissive by means of winning at ease all the three worlds, the daughter of earth (i.e. Sītā) with a mind tinged with hate to her husband, would remain affectionate to me; since, the love of women is fickle due to love for assemblage of higher and higher qualities.

Here, although in fact firmly devoted to her husband, goddess Sītā is conjectured as fickle on the basis of a relation, viz., the state of being associated with fickleness that is noticed in womanhood in other cases. Yet, the figure is not Utpreksā, since, the mere thinking, made by Rāvana in favour of the occurrence in accordance with his desire, as being described, possesses no special charm. It would be unjustified to say that the term 'dharma' ('property') in the expression 'anyadharma-sambandhat' is desired to be causing delight to the heart of connoisseurs as in the case of Upamā and not merely a common property and thus the fallacy of being too-wide is not involved; since, although leading to the mere possibility of fickleness etc. belonging to womanhood, it would fail to lead to the figure Upamā owing to the lack of a common property that causes delight to the heart of connoisseurs. Because, the fallacy of being too-wide would still remain unaverted as in the following verse —

Having definitely taken the creeper, full
of bunches, beautiful like breasts, as Sītā, Rāma ran after (that) with a desire to look at (her).

One should not argue that it is unjustified to say that the state of being used purposely has been taken as an adjunct to 'tarka' (i.e. 'conjecture'), but here the possibility is unpurposed, because, if this be admitted, then, as the possibility noticed in the expression 'sāṅke hanumatkathita-pravṛttiḥ' also is unpurposed, the question of futility of the expression 'anyatvena', which was meant for the exclusion of that (i.e. the imagination of possibility unpurposedly applied), would arise; since 'anyatvena' means 'known as something other than that', that itself culminates in the adjunct, viz., the state of being used purposely.

It may still be argued that this is not the definition, since, the fallacy of being too narrow is involved. Thus, where something is conjectured on the basis of a property belonging to the self (i.e. the object of comparison) only, or belonging to the other (i.e. the standard of comparison) only, it would be found too narrow, since, a part of the definition, viz., 'anyādharmasambandhat' ('owing to the connection with something else') is not found there. For example —

By catching the mass of hair in the form of darkness, with the fingers in the form of its rays, the moon as if kisses the face of the night in which the eyes in the form of lotuses have closed.

Since those are innumerable in the dark
(night) and rare in the moonlit, we think that this moon has been made by the fire in the form of evening with the help of stars being intensely churned in the crucible in the form of the sky.

Here, in the first example, kissing by the moon has been conjectured only on the basis of the property belonging to the self, since, the catching of darkness like the mass of hair with the rays similar to fingers (has been described). In the second, the moon, as being caused by the host of stars, churned in the crucible in the form of the sky, placed in the midst of fire in the form of evening, has been imagined on the basis of the property, viz., the state of being rare and innumerable, belonging to the other only. Moreover, it would be found too-narrow (a definition) in cases of Uttaraka pertaining to a cause, a result and a nature of the property, since, a part of the definition, namely, 'anyatvena', is not found here. For example—

This is the very spot where searching for you I saw an anklet which had dropped down upon the ground — an anklet which kept silent through grief of separation, as it were, from your lotus-like feet.

In this example of Uttaraka pertaining to a cause, on the basis of silence pertaining to the anklet, which is common to the grieved, grief as the cause to that (i.e. the silence) is being imagined as the (common) property on the anklet, and not the identity with the grieved; since, a suffix like 'matup' is not found after the word 'duḥkha'. Similarly,
That the thorny region of forest caused wounds on the skin of the forehead of the (king of) Cholas, fleeing out of fear, was as if to read the letters, — what more will be suffer.

In this example of Utprekṣā pertaining to a result on the basis of causing wounds on the forehead by the trees, which is common to persons engaged in reading the decree of fate, reading of the decree of fate which as the target of the trees is that result, is being imagined as the property and not the identity with the 'dharmin' (substratum), engaged in reading the decree of fate; since, the implication of the term 'āraṣṭum' does not extend up to a 'dharmin' (i.e. substratum). Again, —

The ocean as if grinds the sandal in the form of foam with its crests of waves.
The moon, having taken them, as if smears the maiden of quarters with its hands in the form of rays.

In this example of Utprekṣā pertaining to the nature of a property, on the basis of the state of being a grider of sandle-like foam, relating to the ocean, with (its) crests of waves as hands on the bank in the form of the slope of a sandle-grinding stone and on the implied basis of turning the maidens of quarters etc. white with the hands by the moon, only the grinding and besmeearing by those (respectively) are being conjectured and not the identity with the agent of those grinding and besmeorning. Because, although the verbs, namely, 'pinaṣṭि' ('grinds') (and) 'limpaṭि' ('besmears') are expressives of agents,
the connection of the agent, which is subordinate to the verb predominantly appearing, by the principle — "Verb predominantly consists in action, would be found impossible with other words (in the sentence). This is why, while citing (the chemistich) — "Darkness, as if, smears (my) limbs; the sky, as if, rains collyrium", as an example of Utpreksa, Danin, having doubted Upama relating to darkness and the sky as the agents of besmearing and raining (respectively), because of the mention of the term 'iva' in those examples, decried it thus —

If the agent is considered to be the standard of comparison, subordinate to the verb as it is and thus aiming at establishing its own action, it cannot be related to any other work.

The Creator, who had already fashioned her beautiful thighs, rounded and of a conical form, nor overlong, so much beauty had he lavished upon them, that while fashioning the rest of her frame, he took care for the loveliness that he was to create.

Here, on the basis of (the description of) spending the entire stock of loveliness which is guessed through the creation of excessively lovely thigh, the mere care of the Creator for the production of loveliness, adequate for the creation of the rest (of the body), is being conjectured and not the identity with (the agent) having such a care. (All) this is clear.
Moreover, it would be too narrow to cover the case of Utprekṣā relating to non-contextual property, since it lacks in the portion, namely, 'prakṛtam' ('contextual'). For example —

The orb of the moon was as though, divested of its best parts by the Creator for fashioning the face of Damayanti, appears to be perforated in the middle and displaying the blue sky in the deep pit.

Here, in the expression 'kṛtamadhyavila' ('made a hole in the middle') on the basis of (the description of) possessing that, viz., spot, which has been determined as the state of bluishness of the sky noticed through the hole made in the middle by means of the figure Atisayokti depending on the figure Kavyaliṅga, based on the meaning of a word (viz., 'kṛtamadhyavilam'), or on the basis of the state of being made a hole in the middle, which is conjectured as the cause of the state of bluishness of the sky having a perforated middle, determined as the spot (of the moon), the lunar orb has been conjectured as divested of (its) best parts for the fashioning of the face of Damayanti. It is not so that the face of Damayanti itself, the contextual, is conjectured to be created from the best part of the moon, collected in the said manner; because, it lacks in the connection with words as is noticed in —

May I see her face again which is like the auspicious house of Cupid and as if produced from the best parts collected from the heaps of digits of the newly risen moon.
One should not argue that as in the expression — "Feast a hundred Brahmins", although there is the absence of connection through words, ultimate connection of the verb is with the subordinate, leaving aside the predominant, because of the incompatibility of the relation of the number with the feast, similarly, culmination of the conjecture, namely, the state of being created by the best parts, collected from the lunar orb, should be in the face of Damayantī, which is subordinate, leaving aside the predominant factor, namely, the lunar orb; since, the non-contextual deserves no description; — because, even the description of non-contextual, in the form of the figure Aprastutapaśāmaṇī can be connected with a view to add excess in the contextual. It is unjustified to say that here also as in another example of Aprastutapaśāmaṇī, namely, "indur lipta iva ......", there exists mere possibility and not the figure Utpreśa. Because, though the figure Utpreśa is impossible there owing to the lack of fulfilment of materials for Utpreśa through the lack of the material causing delight to the hearts of the connoisseur, the question of mixture with the figure Aprastutapaśāmaṇī would arise, since, it (i.e. the material for Utpreśa) is available here. Thus, this definition is not correct since the fallacy of being too narrow is involved; — if said so, here we say —

It is not so that the fallacy of being too narrow is involved in the example beginning with 'hṛtasāram', since, the term 'prakṛta' means only that which is considered to be the object of description. Nor can it be said that the fallacy of being too wide will be consequently involved in the example beginning with 'indur lipta iva',
because, although there exists, in fact, the state of other property in the description of the face of Śiśa, the state of other property does not lead to the possibility of besmearing with collyrium relating to the moon, or, because the property (itself) is desired to be the cause of delight to the hearts of the connoisseur. The term 'anyatvena' means 'by another means' and (hence) it would not be too narrow to cover (the example of) Utpreksā pertaining to cause, result (or) nature of the property. Since, the following method is followed everywhere — where another 'dharmā', (substratum) is conjectured as identified with the 'dharmā', there, the another 'dharmā' means 'another means', but where a particular property itself is conjectured as a cause, a result (or) a nature, there the very property is meant by 'another means'. Or, figure Utpreksā has to be admitted on the basis of identification in the examples of Utpreksā pertaining to cause, result (and) nature of the property also. Thus, in the (two) examples, beginning with — "saiś āsthā l yatra vicinvatā tvām" (and) "colasya ād bhītipalavatātasya", which are considered to be the examples of Utpreksā pertaining to cause and result (respectively), properties like the pangs of separation and the reading of the decree of fate, are not conjectured as pertaining to cause or result. But the silence and causing wounds etc., which are caused by motionlessness and contact with thorns, which (again) are the properties of the couple of anklets etc., those only are conjectured as identified with silence from grief and causing wounds for reading the decree of fate. It is a must that there should be an introsusception through identification of both the two types of silence. Otherwise, the conjecture
of grief etc., as the cause etc., in the ordinary silence etc., which are caused by motionlessness etc., would be improper. And the introsusception through identification of both the two types of silence etc. has been admitted by the author of Alamkārasarvasva, who holds that in the example beginning with 'saiśa sthaII', it is the property of grief etc. which is conjectured as the cause of silence relating to the anklet etc. Thus, he maintains —

"In Utpreksā pertaining to a cause, the property, the cause of which relating to the contextual is conjectured, is considered to be the source of Utpreksā and as being identical on account of introsusception". In other places also, in particular examples of Utpreksā pertaining to cause, acceptance of introsusception of identity is found to be necessary in the portion of source. For example —

O beautiful one! I think that the beauty of the lotus attaches itself to your feet, on being happy at the idea that her born enemy, the moon, who does not tolerate her blossoming during the night, has had the pride of his beauty quickly suppressed by the splendour of the face of this girl with eyes like petals of a lotus.

Here, the attachment of the beauty of lotus to the feet, which is considered to be the result of that (i.e. the happiness), is to be termed as source to the conjecture of happiness as the cause. But that is, in all aspects, not an established fact (but only a fancy on the part of the poet). Hence, there, it has to be admitted that the connection of the feet with natural beauty itself, as being introsuspected as attached with the
beauty of the lotus, is the cause (here). Thus, since the establishment of identity is invariable in the portion implying the source, let the figure Utprekšā rest there. It is unjustified to say that another source has to be sought for in that case, since, these are clear that the state of being in the time of separation from the lotus-like feet, is the source in the conjecture of the state of silence caused by motionlessness as the silence caused by grief and (similarly) the state of being at the time of fleeing, raising a question, namely, how much has he to suffer even after this when even being the king, he is suffering thus, (is the source) in the conjecture of causing wounds through contact with thorns as the state of causing wounds for reading the decree of fate.

This view is accepted by Dandìn also. As he says —

When a particular behaviour of an animate or inanimate object is fancied otherwise (by the poet), they call it Utprekšā.

(As for example:) The elephant gets down to the pond, fatigued by the mid-day sun; I think that it is to attempt to pluck off the lotuses who are wives of the sun.

The poet describes the entering of the elephant into water for bathing, drinking and eating the tendrils by poetically conceiving the same aimed at uprooting its enemies.

Here, the action in the form of bathing in water by animate elephant, noticed in a particular manner, for
the sake of averting heat, is conjectured in a different manner, namely, the state of entering into the water due to its enmical attitude and thus this has been connected in accordance with his own definition.

This view is accepted by the author of Kāvya-prakāśikā also. He maintained the characteristic of Utpreṣa in the possibility of identity between the standard and subject of comparison following his definition — "Utpreṣa is that which consists in the probability of the object of description as being identical with a similar object"; and exemplified it with the verse beginning with "unmeṣaḥ yo mama na sahatे". Hence, it is clear, that in accordance with his own definition, this was maintained that the very natural beauty of the feet was conjectured as attached to the beauty of lotus with joy of victory over his own enemy.

Similarly, in the verse beginning with "pinaṭīva taraṅgāgraśāh", considered to be the examples of Utpreṣa pertaining to the nature of the property, the very throwing etc., are conjectured as grinding etc. That the object of throwing is not mentioned, is not a fault; since, the same is justified as in the case of Atiśayokti, because, as Utpreṣa consists in introsusception, complete swallowing of the object appears to be justified there. It cannot be said that another source has to be sought for, since throwing etc., are objects of description and as such cannot be the source, because, the existence of a different source is quite apparent in the following manner — in the conjecture of throwing as grinding, accumulation of sandal-like foam at the shore, is the
source and in the conjecture of covering with rays as besmearing the maidens of quarters, rendering them white, is the source.

The author of Kāvyaprabhāsīka also, who holds that in the example, beginning with "Darkness as if besmears covering has been (my limbs), the sky as if rains collyrium" conjectured as been made in the form of covering and besmearing, has accepted the view, viz., the conjecture of identification in the example of Utprekṣā pertaining to the nature of a property.

Similarly, in the example, "The moon, as if, kisses the face of night" and the like, the relation of the moon, and the face, in the form of the advent (of night), which is introsuspected as the face of night, has been conjectured as kisses. In the example, beginning with "vrṭtānupūrve ca", identification of carefulness has been conjectured on the careless creation of the rest of the figure. These and the like are to be understood.

The expression 'anyadharma' is not desired to be in conformity only, but in all respects like the relation of an original and its image, as in the case of the common property in the figure Upamā. Thus, for example —

She, slightly stooped with the weight of her breasts, having worn a garment as red as the morning sun, looked like a moving creeper, full of leaves and bent with clusters of exuberant flowers.

Here, (figure Utprekṣā) is based on the introsusception drawn through a relation of an original and its image.
I take her to be mounted on the elephant in the form of youthfulness, enthralled with (the fragrance of) lotuses in the form of gracefulness (and) the incarnation of Cupid's wealth of victory over the three worlds.

Here, the connection with another property is due to the commonness of property between the contextual and non-contextual, on the basis of introsusception drawn through the adoption of a different compound. Similarly, in the example beginning with "aṅgulibhīra-viṣṇu", the connection with another property, due to the commonness of property between the contextual and non-contextual, can be easily admitted on the basis of introsusception drawn through the adoption of a different syntax. Hence, the fallacy of being too-narrow is not involved there. It would not be too-narrow a definition in respect of the example beginning with "bhūyastara-vāni", since, the connection of another property, which is indicated by the property mentioned, stands as the source there. There, in the conjecture of being created by hosts of stars, being churned in the crucible in the form of sky in the midst of fire in the form of evening, which relates to the object (under description), namely, the moon, there is an implication of the property, namely, consisting in waxing and waning in accordance with that state of being sparse and abundant relating to the moon, on the basis of the mentioned property in the form of being sparse and abundant, relating to the stars in those particular nights.

Another speciality is this: In the expression 'anyadharma-samvandhāta', the term 'anya' means the 'Viṣayin'
(the superimposed) in the case of the figure Utpreksā pertaining to a 'charmin' (an object having the property), whereas in the case of Utpreksā pertaining to a property, it means the substratum of the property of the superimposed. Under the circumstances, wherever the property, turned to be the source, is not mentioned, such a property which attains the position of a possibility on account of its being related to another object and the object of superimposition as well, has to be sought for. There, in the example, — "The sky as if rains collyrium", where there has been a conjecture of the function of raining relating to the sky, the state of being covered with darkness extending up to the ground by sky, is the source common to the agent of raining collyrium. Whereas, with regard to the case of covering with darkness, where there has been a conjecture of the function of raining collyrium by sky, turning all objects pitchy dark etc. (is the common source). Similarly, in the example like — "As if the shore of ocean in the form of love", the state of being the source of agitation has to be understood as the source suggested. But where, although there exists the mention of property — as the source, but the relation of the object (of superimposition) with that or any other object with that, is not readily understood, there, sometimes, that relation has to be established by effecting identity with some property which is different from the property as the source. Somewhere (it is performed) by effecting an identity of the object (of superimposition) or the other object with substratum of that property; somewhere with both of them jointly (and) somewhere by means of denial of a different property effected by the property mentioned. There, the accomplishment of identification as the source of a different property (has to be established)
by means of the relation of an original and its image and the like, as is noticed in the accomplishment of property in Upanā. These have been shown.

Similarly, accomplishment of identification on the basis of the substratum of property belonging to the object or a different object, is achieved by means of the variety of pun or the like. Of them, an example of the accomplishment of identification of the object with the substratum of property, by means of pun, is the following one —

I think, even the sages are attached to her; for the great Bhṛgu resorts to the mountain of her breasts (also, they resort to the precipice of the mountain of her breasts); the face is pleasant to Nārāya (also, the mouth is pleasing with its various teeth), and, Vyāsa, efficient in the composition of the Mahābhārata, has recourse to her thighs (also, a broad expanse suitable for the performance of a brilliant dalliance attends her thighs).

Here, in the conjecture of attachment relating to Damayantī, on the part of the object, namely, sages like Bhṛgu, the act of resorting to her breasts, which is the source here, does not belong to the object (of description), but to the slopes etc. Accomplishment of its belonging to the object (has been performed) by the punning words like Bhṛgu etc. An example (of the same) through denial, is the following one —

Conflagration, having climbed on trees on
all directions, in the guise of Kimśuka flowers, as if surveys the scorched and unscorched portions of the big forest.

Here, climbing on trees is the source of the conjecture of the action of seeing the scorched and unscorched region of the forest which relates to the object in the form of conflagration. That also does not belong to the object but the Kimśuka flowers. Again, although there exists no climbing in its primary sense, still, the very resorting to the tree by that (conflagration) has been introsuscepted as climbing; thus, the relation to the property has been accomplished there by effecting identification of the object with the Kimśuka flowers by means of denial.

An example of effecting identification of a different property with the substratum of property, by means of pun, is the following one —

(Having seen) the entirely pale face of this pregnant woman, I decidedly take her to be the moon which desires to enjoy the world.

Here, in the conjecture of the face as the moon, desire for enjoying the world is the source; but that does not belong to the moon in the form of a different object, although that belongs to the object. Hence, accomplishment of the property as belonging to that has to be done there by way of effecting identity of the moon with the substratum of property by means of pun in the word 'raja'.
An example of the combination of both, namely, the accomplishment of identity of a different property with the property of source and the accomplishment of identity of the object with the substratum of that property, is the following one —

By means of wrapping with a silken cloth in the form of a slough that had slipped through the force of pulling from the body of the royal serpent, Mandākinī took care clinging to the feet of the ocean as if to remove the pain that it had suffered in the churning.

Here, in the (example of) Utpreksā pertaining to a result in the form of the alleviation of pain, caused by the churning of the ocean, which relates to the object in the form of Mandākinī, accomplishment of identity with coiling at the foot is the source (of that Utpreksā) (and it has been performed) by means of pun in the description of coiling at the foot by the accomplishment of the of identity of the object or by means of denial and thus the accomplishment of the relation of the object to another property (has been effected) by both jointly.

Denial of another property by means of a property mentioned, has already been shown. Thus, the expression 'anyakāharsamandhāt' also invariably exists in all the examples of Utpreksā and hence nowhere would it involve the fallacy of being too-narrow. Everything is thus congruous.

The author of Alamkārasarvasva has shown its division thus: Utpreksā is of two types, namely, the
Expressed and the Suggested. The Expressed occurs in the use of particles like 'iva'; the Suggested occurs when they are not employed. Of them, the Expressed is of four types on the basis of (its pertaining to) a genus, a quality, an action and a thing, which are the non-contextuals and are going to be introsuspected. Since, each of them are divided into two on the basis of their positive and negative nature, they are of eight varieties. On the basis of the occurrence of a quality or an action as the source in them, they are of sixteen varieties. Again, on the basis of the mention and non-mention of the source, they are of thirty-two varieties. Further, on the basis of the conjecture pertaining to a nature, a cause or a result in each of them, they are of ninety-six varieties. Of them, the conjecture pertaining to a nature only is possible with regard to a 'thing' (and) hence Utpekšās pertaining to a cause and a result are to be excluded from that and thus it would be less by sixteen. In the division on the basis of genus etc., also, non-mention of the source in the figure Utpekšā pertaining to a cause and a result is not possible and thus it becomes less by twenty four varieties. Thus, by exclusion, Utpekšā pertaining to a nature is of thirty two varieties; Utpekšās pertaining to a cause and a result are of twelve varieties each. Thus, the Expressed Utpekšā is of fifty six varieties. The same counting is applied to the Suggested Utpekšā also. But the distinction is this: there, even in Utpekšā pertaining to a nature, non-mention of the cause is not possible. Thus, sixteen varieties are there with regard to Utpekšā pertaining to a nature. Utpekšās pertaining to a cause and a result are of, as mentioned earlier, twelve varieties each. Thus, the Suggested
Utpreksā is of forty varieties. Thus, in total, there are ninety six varieties of Utpreksā.

Again, having admitted the conjecture pertaining to a cause and a result, relating to a thing also, Vidyānātha, with the contention that in the group of (Utpreksās) where the source is not mentioned, admittance of (another) variety (of Utpreksā) relating to a quality and an action, where the source is suggested, is like naming a son who has not taken birth at all and does not cause delight, has shown (its) varieties in another way. In the Expressed, Utpreksā pertaining to a nature, is of twenty four varieties, since eight varieties would be decreased, because, in (Utpreksā), where the source is not mentioned, there cannot be any consideration of the varieties pertaining to a quality or an action. Utpreksās, pertaining to a cause and a result, are of sixteen varieties each; since, there are four varieties more which are found in the Utpreksā pertaining to a thing, on the basis of a quality or an action as the source along with (their) positive and negative occurrence. Thus, the Expressed Utpreksā consists of fifty-six varieties. In the Suggested Utpreksā again, even the Utpreksā pertaining to a nature consists of sixteen varieties. Since non-mention of the source is not possible there it would be decreased by eight varieties which are based on that. Thus, the Suggested Utpreksā consists of forty eight varieties. Thus, in total, Utpreksā is of a hundred and four varieties.

Now, examples with mere indication only, are being shown. An example of Utpreksā, where the quality,
source, genus, positiveness and nature are mentioned, is the following one —

May that moon save you; (the moon), of which the ends are curved like a newly grown lotus-stalk; which rests on the head of Śiva (lit. the enemy of Cupid), which is ruddy on account of blazing (and) which looks like a sprout unfolded by crystal-white forehead, sprinkled everyday by the water of the river Mandākinī flowing there.

Here, a genus is conjectured as the word 'aṅkura' denotes a genus. The quality, namely, the curvedness, which has been mentioned, is the source. Similarly,

Utpreksā involving a genus, positiveness (and) nature, where the action has been mentioned as the source, also, has to be exemplified. An example of Utpreksā involving a quality, positiveness (and) nature, where the action has been mentioned as the source, is the following one —

The wax, applied to her lips for brightening the lustre of their red lac, shone forth, clinging to the border of her nether lip, eager to live on the nectar-like lip, having forsaken honey.

Here, inquisitiveness as a quality is being conjectured. The action, namely, the connection, which has been mentioned, is the source. Similarly, Utpreksā, involving a quality, positiveness (and) nature, where the quality has been mentioned as the source, has to be exemplified.
An example of Utprekṣā involving an action, positiveness (and) nature, where the quality has been mentioned as the source, is the following one —

Then the pair of Cakravāka birds flew away separately with their bodies reddened by the thick rays of the evening twilight as if they were smeared with the blood flowing from their hearts broken by the grief of separation.

Here, the action, namely, smearing with blood, is being conjectured. The quality, namely, the redness, which has been mentioned, is the source. Similarly, Utprekṣā involving an action, positiveness and nature, where an action has been mentioned as the source, has to be exemplified. An example of Utprekṣā involving a thing, positiveness and nature, where the action has been mentioned as the source, is the following one —

As she thus, leaving one (king) and approaching another, was (again) forsaking the latter, — each with virtues noticed and free from blemishes — she, whose lotus-feet are worshipped by the world, spoke to her who was Lākṣmī as it were, separated from the bosom of Viṣṇu.

Here the thing is conjectured, as Pādā has to be taken as a thing on account of her oneness. The action, viz. rejection after having approached, which has been mentioned, is the source. Similarly, Utprekṣā involving a thing, positiveness and nature, where a quality has been
mentioned as the source, may be exemplified. Thus, eight varieties (of Utprekṣā) with the source mentioned, on the basis of positiveness and pertaining to the genus etc., have been established. An example of Utprekṣā involving the genus positiveness and nature, where the source has not been mentioned, is the following one:

I know the moon to be glittering in the fresh mushroom-like stars; the mushroom, that have grown on a heap of wood having no protection from the rain and sun for long.

Here, the genus, viz. the mushroom, is being conjectured. The qualities, namely, whiteness, roundness etc., which are not mentioned, are the sources. An example of Utprekṣā involving a quality, positiveness and nature, where the source is not mentioned, is the following one:

Here shines like a grace incarnate to

[85]

...to his servants, the foremost of kings, who has defeated all the enemies.

Here, the grace as a quality is being conjectured. The state of giving plenty and that of being easy to serve etc., which has not been mentioned, is the source. An example of Utprekṣā involving an action and positiveness, where the source is not mentioned, is the following one:

The darkness spreads over (my) limbs as it were; the sky rains collyrium as it were; the vision has become useless, like service to a wicked person.
Here, the action is conjectured. The source, namely, besmearing etc., is not mentioned. An example of Utprekṣa involving a thing and positiveness, where the source is not mentioned, is the following one —

(Siva), residing in whose person, Umā looks on the mirror at the image — as if it was another 'ardhanārīśvara' (Lord with half-female) — as if produced from the other halves.

Here, the thing, namely, another 'ardhanārīśvara' (Lord with half-female), produced from the other halves, is conjectured. The source, namely, the state of possession of a form of a male and a female in the other parts in the form of a reflection, has not been mentioned. The conjecture of Utprekṣa involving a thing remains uncontradicted even in the conjecture of another 'ardhanārīśvara' (i.e. Lord with half-female), since 'ardhanārīśvara' (i.e. Lord with half-female) in reality is one. Or for example —

(The city) which appeared beautifully to be as though heaven reflected in the middle of a lake not possessed of water at a place (i.e. in the middle) owing to the reflection clearly appearing under the pretext of the moat.

Here, the thing, namely, the city of gods, is being conjectured. Excellence of beauty belonging to the city of Kuṇḍina, which has not been mentioned, is the source. Thus, the four kinds (of Utprekṣa) pertaining to the non-mention of source, have been exemplified. Eight
varieties of this (i.e. Utpreksa), having taken into consideration the difference in the form of a quality and an action, belonging to the source, are to be understood. Similarly, Utpreksa pertaining to the genus etc., on the basis of positiveness, is of sixteen varieties.

Or, the variety with quality and action as the source not mentioned, following the line of Vidyarntha, should not be considered. Since, such a provision, with the source not mentioned, is not applicable. For example, in the example 'vilalasa jalasayoda' etc., this also can be said that, here, the quality, namely, the possession of unsurpassed riches, is the source. (Or), this also (can be maintained that,) the state of possessing unsurpassed riches, is the source of the action. Thus, twelve only are the varieties. Now, Utpreksa pertaining to nature involving negation, are being exemplified.

Thus an example of Utpreksa involving negation of genus, quality and action, where a quality as the source has been mentioned, is the following one —

It is only by your natural qualities that this body of yours appears as smeared with saffron, although not applied; the lower lip as possessing redness without the application of lac (and) the couple of eyes as possessing collyrium although not applied.

Here, the negation of genus, quality and action, namely, the powder of saffron, lac-dye and mark of collyrium, are being conjectured. The natural colours, namely, white, red and black, which are mentioned
are the sources. In these, action as the source also, may be exemplified. An example of Utprekṣā involving the negation of a thing, where action as the source has been mentioned, is the following one —

Having seen your face as the full moon risen on earth, I see the sky as if bereft of the moon because of the loss of beauty.

Here, the negation of a thing, viz., the moon, has been conjectured. The action of giving up, which has been mentioned, is the source. Similarly, Utprekṣā involving the negation of a thing, where the quality has been mentioned as the source, may be exemplified. These two very verses would be the examples of Utprekṣā involving the negation of genus etc., with no mention of the source, if the fourth lines are read as 'idāṃ visālākṣi vibhāvayāmi' ("I think, O dame with large eyes") and 'paḍavām amṛṭāndhasām' ("..... has attained this position on account of the loss of nectar") (respectively). Thus, in the (same) manner as said before, there are sixteen or twelve varieties of Utprekṣā pertaining to nature involving negation. Thus, thirty two or twenty-four varieties of Utprekṣā pertaining to nature, have been exemplified mostly.

In these (varieties), sometimes the superimposed is introsuscepted identically. For example, 'sa vaḥ pāyād induḥ' etc. Somewhere, it i.e., the introsusception, is in the form of a relation. For example, in the verse beginning with "hīvaśitaṃ yāvakarāgadīptaye", the 'eagerness' (may be cited). This difference also has to be understood.
Now, Utpreṣa pertaining to a cause (is being exemplified). An example of Utpreṣa pertaining to a cause relating to genus, with the mention of quality as the source, is the following one —

The slender body of the fawn-eyed turned pale like the stalk of a reed by the rays slowly emitting from the (conch) Pāñca-janya in the hand of Hari who is staying in the womb.

Here, the genus, viz., the ray, has been conjectured as the cause of paleness. That paleness itself stands as the source. Similarly, Utpreṣa pertaining to a cause and a genus with an action as the source also, has to be understood. An example of Utpreṣa pertaining to a cause and a quality with action as the source is the following one —

The bird again approached the hand, possessing bee-like rudrākṣas of Nala who was possessed of many marks of Śiva, mistaking it for a red lotus having rudrākṣa-like bees on it from a lake having a big mossy surface.

Here, the illusion of a red-lotus with regard to the action of approaching the hands of Nala, has been conjectured as the cause. That action of approaching itself is the source. In subsequent cases also, everywhere in Utpreṣa pertaining to a cause, the very fruit is the source. Similarly, Utpreṣa pertaining to a cause, relating to a quality with a quality as the source also has to
be understood. An example of Utpreksā pertaining to a cause and an action with a quality as the source, is the following one --

The sun has taken away, as it were, with its own thousand rays, the rays of the people, the other name of which is the eyes and this blindness is caused by that and not by darkness.

Here, to the quality, viz., the blindness, the action of taking away, is conjectured as the cause.

Similarly, Utpreksā pertaining to a cause and an action, with an action as the source also, may be exemplified. An example of Utpreksā pertaining to a cause and a thing with an action as the source, is the following one --

The heart of that wise, who practises sacred deeds, is made holy all the time by the heavenly river flowing from the lotus-feet of Viṣṇu (lit. one who possesses infinite shapes and figures) residing in him.

Here, the thing, viz., the Ganges, is conjectured as the cause to the action of sanctification. Similarly, Utpreksā pertaining to a cause, with quality as the source, may be exemplified. Thus, (examples of) Utpreksā pertaining to a cause on the basis of positiveness have been exemplified.

Now follow the examples (of Utpreksā) on the basis of negation --
That Lord, having noticed the absence of the sun at night and the moon at day-time, created the prowess and fame (of this king) which are manifested all the time in the world.

If the sun sets, how much is the moon in that position? — Definitely with this idea (in mind), the lotus-bed with lotuses closes out of disrespect.

When the playing on lute started, the right breast of hers trembled as if out of failing to see the other (breast) which was covered by the expanse of the body (of the lute).

Here, in the first verse, the absence of the genus and thing relating to the sun and the moon, is being conjectured. In the second and third verses, absence of a quality and an action relating to the respect and seeing (respectively) are being conjectured. The actions of creating, closing and trembling are the sources. Similarly, Utprekṣā pertaining to a cause, on the basis of negation, where quality stands as the source, may be exemplified. Thus, Utprekṣā pertaining to a cause, comprising sixteen varieties, has been shown.

Now follow the examples of Utprekṣā pertaining to a fruit —

Where in palaces, the beauty of faces of the fawn-eyed women, which are expert in laughing at the moon-beams, are spreading
about, the moon, as if for them, spreading forth its rays through windows, is moving again and again at nights.

Having gone away from your treasury, evidently, gold is staying at holy places; since, having noticed your colour, it has assumed a colour like that.

The sun proceeded towards northern direction, the land of origin of the best of steeds, as if to change the old horses yoked with (his) chariot.

Evidently with a view to making a thousand milky ocean and a crore of Kailāsa mountains, Pratāparudra spread forth (his) fame to (all the) directions.

In these verses, genus, quality, action and thing in the form of lustre of face, white complexion, changing, the milky ocean and the Kailāsa mountain respectively have been conjectured as the fruit. Actions of moving about, staying at shrine, proceeding and spreading forth are the sources. Similarly, (Utpreksā) with quality as the source also, may be exemplified.

Examples of Utpreksā pertaining to a fruit on the basis of negation, are the following --

Desirous of achieving similarity with your face, the moon dance in the ocean, definitely with a view to washing off the mud in the form of its stains.
The shelterless women of the enemies of the king of Kalinga became averse to casting amorous glances towards the female deer with whom they earned friendship during their stay in the forests, as if for showing lack of enmity.

The female Siddhas, roaming in the grove of the Himalaya, are, as if not to touch darkness, proclaiming the spread of fame of Śrīvirarudra, (comparable to) moon-beams.

The globe covered with dust, caused by the march of victory of King Virarudra, appeared as if without the sky.

In these verses, lack of mud, enmity, touch and the sky are conjectured as the fruit. Of them, the state of averseness only is a quality. Others are actions. In this way varieties (of Utprekṣā) on the basis of pertaining to quality and action, have to be exemplified. Thus, Utprekṣās, comprising sixteen varieties, pertaining to a result, have been exemplified. Here ends the group of Expressed Utprekṣās.

Now, example of suggested Utprekṣā is being hinted at —

Concluding from the hoverings in yonder sky of those hawks, the rays of the sun, killing the crows of darkness, that the sun is going ahunting, the moon betook himself to the west for fear of his hare being killed; while those pigeons, the stars, flew away on receiving the news.
Here, the action of going ahunting on the part of the sun, like the swoop of a falcon, is conjectured on the basis of movements of rays, spread forth by the sun, in the form of a falcon killing the crow of darkness. Thus, this is the case of Utprēkṣā pertaining to the nature and action. This is one. The fear of the moon from that (i.e. the sun), is conjectured as the source to its movement to another direction. This is another Utprēkṣā pertaining to a cause. It is again a case of another type of Utprēkṣā pertaining to a cause, since, knowing of that (news), identified with the bewilderment on the part of the pigeon in the form of stars, has been conjectured as the cause to the lack of gleaming (of the stars) in various places. All these are suggested owing to the absence of words like 'iva'. Others too may be similarly understood by one's own self. Since, without the use of words like 'nūnam', the varieties as mentioned before, can be understood. Varieties of suggested Utprēkṣā have not been exemplified in full separately, since, the verses exemplified before may turn to be the examples of suggested Utprēkṣā without the use of words like 'nūnam'.

Here, this is being considered — whether in suggested Utprēkṣās, Utprēkṣā pertaining to a nature involving a genus and a thing, are possible or not? If it be maintained that possible (are those varieties), then those are to be exemplified with verses like the following ones —

Where the lines of stalls of Kashmira saffron in the cosmetic boutique, in every evening appeared like the lustres
of the setting sun as though, falling there and having no support.

Which city, which was not possible to be conquered by others and which was as inaccessible as the Phakkikā (i.e. the statement of problem of grammar) of the Commentary, composed by Phañī, was as if put in a circular mark round in the guise of the circular moat.

And such is the opinion of some. But the author of Alāṃkārasarvasva holds that (such varieties) are not possible. With this intention in view, this has been said by him while dividing the suggested Utpreksā — "Generally, Utpreksā pertaining to a nature is not possible here."

Then what is the figure in these two cases according to him? Rūpaka — is the answer.

To a person, who has offended his beloved, this is something a excellent thread of hope in the form of the body of the moon that rises at the first day of a lunar fortnight. Is this a flow of fresh nectar, or, the sickle for dispelling (lit. cutting) the darkness, or, the lotus-stalk, dropped down from the beak of an absent-minded Cakravāka bird of the heavenly Ganges, or, the duality of the arrow of Cupid.

This is why, while exemplifying Mālārūpaka by the above mentioned verse, he has admitted the figure Rūpaka even in the expression 'Śvargaṅgā vimanaska' etc. Hence,
the group of suggested Utprekṣā has to be counted leaving aside the Utprekṣā pertaining to a genus and a thing.

Another thing has to be understood. In Utprekṣā pertaining to a 'dharma', the property conforming to the 'viśayin' and the 'viśaya' is the source, whereas in Utprekṣā pertaining to a 'dharma', the property conforming to the 'viśaya' relating to the 'viśayin' is the source. Hence, the opinion, namely, clearness is the source in the example beginning with 'uvāha yā tanulatam', is not correct; since, that property of the body as the cause of reflection, (which is) capable of drawing a probability of identity, cannot be the property of the subject of superimposition and since the very property of the subject of superimposition has been treated as the source by all who define it with the expression 'yatrānyadharma-sambandhāt'. No need of further elaboration. Here we say —

The way of division of the superimposed as genus, quality etc., in Utprekṣā, as shown, does not lead to charm like the (division of) the object of comparison in Upamā.

In its absence (i.e. the absence of charm), figures of speech do not deserve division on the mere ground of possibility. Otherwise, its (i.e. Utprekṣā's) subject of superimposition also should be similarly divided.

The division of property also, namely, a quality or an action, does not produce charm. Since the absence of those two,
has not been taken into account, that also, as in Upamā, would suffer from deficiency.

Her eyes, as if gone within in their eagerness to see her beloved residing in her mind, could not grasp even objects resting in front of them.

Did even the ears of the fawn-eyed women who were absorbed in looking at (him), turn absent-minded, gazing with their eyes in the form of the blue lotus buds, used as ear-ornaments? Was that the reason why their ears did not hear?

In these examples we clearly notice the state of a source in Utprapṣa, relating to the absence of a quality or an action, based on the presentation of a bright idea.

Here, in the first example, in the conjecture of being entered into the heart by the eyes for beholding the beloved residing in the heart, the lack of power to grasp external things, is the source. In the second, in the conjecture of absorption in beholding, pertaining to the organ of hearing, the absence of the action of hearing, is the source. Similarly, on the basis of absence, numerous are the examples like the following one —

Even these trees in the middle of the altars of the sages, who devote themselves to meditation in the Vīrāsana posture, appear, absorbed in (yoga)
meditation, as if were, on account of the stillness caused by the absence of breeze.

Moreover, in the sources, another variety (on the basis) of combination has to be taken into account, since, (a couple of) positiveness and the positiveness and the negation being combined attain the state of a source.

I know the white rows of swans are but the moving grains of fame of your beauty, which flying and falling, as is proper, float in all directions on the waters of rivers and pools.

Is it not right for the assembly of stars, nor proper for the night that they now refrain from looking at their consort, the moon, whose rays are on the wane? But the moon's heart is clearly made of stone, which is clearly visible as pale and petrified. For, alas, the heart was not quickly melted even when they were separated from them.

Who can ignore the combination as the source which is noticed in these numerous examples and the like.

In the first example, in the conjecture of grains of fame, relating to the rows of swans, both the quality, viz. whiteness and the action viz. floating on water are the sources. In the second, in the conjecture of being made of stone, relating to the heart of the lord of stars,
both the positiveness, viz. appearance like stone and the
negation, viz. the non-occurrence of melting are the sources.
Moreover,

This counting of sources, we consider, to
be defective for the fact that even genus
and thing can become a source in Utprekšā.

There the mountain Droṇa which looks like
the lamp of that island owing to the lustre
of its medicinal herbs, and is worth-seeing
with the sootlike clouds resting on its
summit, will give you a magic gift of herbs,
affording prosperity, as obtainable by luck.

Here in the conjecture of mountain Droṇa as being
a lamp, the sootlike cloud, resting on the lamp in the form
of medicinal herbs grown there, is the source and thus,
genus as the source is noticed (there).

The palace whereof shines with the shining
moon on the top, appears as Lord Śiva as if
in proximity for protecting the devotee.

Here, in the conjecture of the palace of the demon
Bāṇa as being Śiva, the moon shinning on the top, is the
source. Similarly, in the following extract, in the con-
jecture of Vāsavadattā as made of all the planets, the
ornaments etc. assuming the form of various planets by
virtue of pun are the sources.

(She appears) as made of planets by virtue
of glowing ornaments (also, the sun in the
form of ornaments), brilliant smile (also,
the white-rayed moon in the form of smile), crimson lip (also, Mars in the form of the lip), handsome appearance (also, Mercury in the form of appearance), heavy hips (also, Jupiter in the form of hips), white necklace (also, Venus in the form of necklace), feet with slow movement (also, Saturn in the form of her feet), bloomed lotus-like eyes (also, Ketu, in the form of her lotus-like eyes) and beauty acting as the flag of conquering the three worlds.

And thus, the genus, action and quality combined as the source, is noticed.

It would be unjustified to say that in the afore-said examples, the connection with shining etc., is the source and all those are nothing but qualities; since, in that case, the question of (admitting) action itself as the source with regard to the expression like 'I'dhrśān kṣāmatām gatau' (i.e. "the two have attained such a state of emaciation") would arise, taking the very connection with action viz. movement etc., as the source. It would be unjustified to say that still in the expression beginning with 'bhāsvatālamkārena', ornaments etc., having assumed the state of the sun etc., through pun, are the sources and not the unqualified genus or a thing; because, in that case, the question of inconsistency in the division of the superimposed as the source of genus etc., also, as noticed in 'Kapālenomuktā sphatikadhavalenāmkur iva' and the like, would arise, taking that the subject of conjecture is only that which is qualified by the state of a sprout, opened by forehead and not unqualified genus etc. Hence, the
four-fold division of the source also, like the superimposed, as genus etc., and again eight-fold, each being divided by positiveness and negation has to be made and thus deficient is the division in question. Moreover, what has been maintained, namely, in Utprekaṃ pertaining to a cause, non-mention of the source is nowhere possible, is also not convincing.

Was his eye immersed in the nectar of her moon-like face? Did it remain fixed between her breasts? Did it delay in leaving her too slender waist for fear of tumbling down?

Here, in the subject of conjecture, viz., the cause, the sources, viz., immersion and fixing, of the result, namely, leaving the face and the breast on the part of the eyes after a long time, are not mentioned.

Had it been so one may ask — here, in the conjecture of immersion and fixing, the sources, namely, leaving the face and the breast after a long time, are not mentioned and the immersion and fixing have no eligibility to be the sources to those two. True, still, here the figure is Utprekaṃ pertaining to a cause. It is not so that Utprekaṃ pertaining to a cause consists only in the conjecture of that which has eligibility to be a cause. But the mere conjecture as a cause (is desired here). For example, in the verse 'Sailā sthānil yatra vicinvatā tvam' etc. Here the fifth case-ending establishes the state of the cause. Similarly, in the following example, in the conjecture of not-seeing each other as the
cause of reducing to thinness, the suffix 'satr' denotes the state of a cause.

Alas, it is a pity that the cheeks of hers, so fair, are reduced to this thinness as if not seeing each other.

The obstructing pressure of the heavy breasts, closely set, was guilty as the heart of Damayanti could not fly away bursting under the excessive affliction of love.

Here, in the conjecture of the state of a cause of the oppression of the couple of breasts, relating to refraining from flying away of the heart by bursting under the excessive affliction of love, the term 'pratibadhnati' ('preventing'), denoting prevention, ultimately becomes the establishing factor of the state of a cause to the abstinence from flying away. In examples like this, mention of the source of the result is essential. Otherwise, syntactical relation with the fifth case-ending etc., would be impossible. Where there is no word denoting the state of a cause with regard to even that which has the eligibility to be a cause, it is a case of an Utpreksā pertaining to the nature.

This is why, the author of Alamkārasarvasva has exemplified in the following verse, the Utpreksā pertaining to a nature even in the case of the state of being overwhelmed, the subject of conjecture, which is eligible to be a cause of trembling although there is no word for denoting the state of a cause.

While this king after coronation, intended
to be firmly established, the kingdoms of 
the enemy, with their wealth looked at (by 
the king in question), trembled as if being 
overwhelmed with fear.

If so argued, the answer is no; —

Because, if this be admitted, Utpreksā pertaining to a cause cannot be exemplified with the following verse. Since, no word denoting the state of a cause relating to recalling is found (there).

Do you remember that I tied you at the wrong utterance of (my) name, or that I threw (at you) the lotus that I had worn on my ears, so that the dropping pollen injured your eye?

Nor such an object is desirable.

You never did an act displeasing to me; nor did I ever act against your wish; why then do you withhold your sight without a cause, to Rati, thus bewailing for you?

(Here), the verse in question has its congruity only as a case of Utpreksā pertaining to a cause, namely, "Is it so that you withhold your sight remembering my past misdemeanours", coming as it does after the speech just quoted (i.e. "kṛtavān asi" etc.). If an Utpreksā pertaining to a cause is admitted on the basis of consistency of context, even in the absence of words denoting the state of a cause, then, here also, (i.e. the verse beginning with 'magnā sudhāyām'), conjecture of immersion and fixing as the cause relating to the leaving of the face and the
breast after a long time, which has been suggested, would be justified, since, it is the fear for falling that stands as the source in the first two conjectures also by virtue of the association of the conjecture connected with the third case-ending while leaving the waist after a long time has been mentioned by word in that (conjecture). This is seen that even where the word denoting the state of a result is noticed as relating to a result, Utpreksā pertaining to a cause has to be admitted ignoring the Utpreksā pertaining to a result on the ground of prosperity. For example —

That what his heart counselled surreptitiously to you is expressed by the face, that clearly is an act quite appropriate for the friendship of the face with the moon, the friend of (flower-arrowed) Cupid, who is an enemy of him.

Here the act of friendship with the moon, a friend of Cupid, who is an enemy of the heart on the part of the face, namely, the disclosure of secret, is expressed by words, because, the word 'ṣaḥyamcitā' which has the suffix 'ṣyaṁ' denoting an act, is appositional with the word 'tat' which indicates the disclosure of secret counselled by the heart. Still, here the conjecture of friendship is as a cause to the disclosure of secret counsel and not as a result of friendship relating to the disclosure of secret counsel. Since, conjecture like this, namely, friendship was established with a view to the result, namely, the disclosure of secret counsel, is inconsistent. Since, unlike the Utpreksā pertaining to a cause, on the basis of a mere state of cause, Utpreksā, pertaining to a result cannot be
executed on the basis of a mere state of an action and without any desired (end). Similarly, Utpreksā, pertaining to a result has to be admitted ignoring the Utpreksā pertaining to a cause, out of propriety even where words denoting the state of a cause are found in the cause. For example —

As flowers perturbed the heart of the fair-browed girl of Vidarbha (i.e. Damayanti) by becoming Cupid's arrows, a maiden there who was making a garland, took vengeance upon them by thursting into them the point of her needle.

Here, in (the action of) thursting, although there exists the suffix 'ktvā' denoting the state of a cause by virtue of (its) precedence, it is not the subject-conjecture as a cause to the revenge on enemy, but the very revenge on enemy is the subject of conjecture as a result, taking that thursting is meant for the revenge on enemy. Since, it is the 'asiddha' i.e. unestablished, that becomes the subject of conjecture out of an established and unestablished matter and since, here, the conjecture of that (desired) end is to be noticed. Or for example —

"The making of lotus blossoms is my sketching practice for making this hand of yours" — did the Creator announce this to the deer-eyed damsel by that sketching (of lotus-blossoms) on her hand?

Here, although there exists the instrumental case-ending, namely, by the creation of lotuses and sketches on
hands, that is not conjectured as a cause to the revealing of the sketching with hands relating to the creation of lotuses by the Creator, but the very revealing, as the result, is the subject of conjecture, taking that the creation of lotuses is the sketching practice for the revelation of that. What to speak of more, out of propriety, even where there is a word denoting a cause, the state of being a result with regard to that word itself sometimes becomes admissible. For example —

Having seen the couple of breasts of the slim girl, the young nodded (his) head as if to extirpate (his) sight, immersed in between the two.

Though the suffix 'saty' is prescribed in the sense of a cause, here, Utpreksa pertaining to a result has to be admitted having somehow established even result as the cause, since that is the desired sense. Thus, since Utpreksa pertaining to a cause etc., has to be admitted even ignoring the establishment of the state of a result etc. Under the circumstances, does it require any mention that propriety should be followed in the absence of a word standing against. Similarly, in this way, non-mention of the source in other cases also, has to be understood as possible. Moreover,

As the mention as well as non-mention of the source exists separately, similarly, both combined are also found.

For example,

The Agastya tree in buds with its dark
hue, in the forest, was thought by him to be as if Rāhu (the son of Simhikā) vomiting the host of lunar digits which was drunk by it in the guise of the waning in the dark fortnight.

Here, in the conjecture of the Agastya tree, marked by the blooming of buds, as Rāhu, marked by the vomiting of the host of lunar digits, the source relating to noun, namely, the state of dark colour, has been mentioned whereas the source of conjecture relating to the adjunct, namely, the commonness in property between the bud and the lunar digit or the like has not been mentioned. Or for example,

O the beautiful lord Pāṇḍya! the fettered elephants in your courtyard look like the mountain in the horizon as if with offence on account of giving shelter to the enemy kings.

Here, the state of being fettered, the source of conjecture of the state of being with offence, which is an adjunct, has been mentioned. The state of highness etc., as the source of conjecture of the state of a mountain, which is a noun, has not been mentioned. Or for example,

(The horse) had the dust particles raised on account of the continuous pounding of earth clinging to its feet; particles, which were as though the atomic minds of people and which came to learn the great speed.
Here, in the conjecture of the state of having the form of mind, which appear as the noun, the source has been mentioned by the expression 'animāṇkitaḥ'. In the conjecture of the adjunct to that also, contained in the expression 'adhyanārthaṁ āgataḥ', the source, namely, attending at the feet, has been mentioned. In the adjunct to learning, contained in the expression 'rayaprakārādhya-yana', the source, namely, inferiority of the speed of mind to that of the horse, the subject of description, has not been mentioned. Similarly, elsewhere too, examples of the combination of the mention and non-mention of the source, has to be given. Hence, this division is deficient and unreasonable. This is why, those divisions only are charming, which, leaving aside the eight-fold division pertaining to genus etc., relating to the superimposed and the division pertaining to quality and action relating to the property, are accepted from other divisions.

In Utpreksa pertaining to nature, cause and result, sub-divisions by other means also can be admitted. Thus, Utpreksa pertaining to nature is of two varieties, namely, Utpreksa without pertaining to adjunct and Utpreksa pertaining to adjunct. Where the adjunct to the superimposed, though mentioned, does not appear as the subject of conjecture since there is no adjunct to the object of superimposition or in the form of a source to that, but that adjunct is connected with the superimposed by another way, that is known as Utpreksa without pertaining to an adjunct. But that is Utpreksa pertaining to an adjunct where the adjunct relating to the superimposed also appears as an object of conjecture on account of the mention of the adjunct of the object of superimposition either in the form of the object of that or in the form of the source of that.
An example of the first variety is the following one:

The minds of the princes looking at the descendant of Kakutstha, who resembled the god of love, whose body was given back to him by Śiva, who had as it were, accepted the importunities of Rati, became hopeless of (obtaining) the princess Indumati.

Here in the conjecture of the state of the form of Cupid, there is the source, namely, possession of the figure of Cupid. Hence is known the subject of conjecture. But the portion of the adjunct, viz., the restoration of that (body), done by the lord, pleased by the importunities of Rati, hence by the lord, pleased by the importunities of Rati, does not appear as the object of conjecture; because, in that portion, either the subject of superimposition or the source-expressed or suggested, cannot be found. But the adjunct to that (i.e. restoration) can be justified as the factor responsible for giving back, relating to the superimposed, (on the basis of the idea), namely, no other person like Sukra, who (returned) the body of Kaca, scorchéd by demon, can return the body of Cupid, scorchéd by the lord, and hence the Utpreksā does not pertain to an adjunct.

In Utpreksā pertaining to adjunct, as in the examples like "munidrumah korakito'sitadyutih", "tvat-prāṅgane sundara pāṇḍyadeva" etc., the adjunct to the superimposed appears as object of conjecture because of the mention of the object of superimposition. In the second example, it appears through the mention of the
source. Utprekṣās pertaining to cause and result are each of the two varieties by virtue of being the object of conjecture consisting in a cause and a result relating to non-established or established (objects). In examples like "Saiśa sthalī yatra vicinvata tvām", "Cholasya yad bhītipalāyitasya", the non-establisheds, viz., pangs of separation, reading the decree of fate etc., have become the objects of conjecture in the form of cause and result with regard to anklet and thorny tree etc.

How should I describe the couple of sprout-like tender feet of the slender-bodied girl, with (their) soles reddened on account of stepping on earth.

In order to increase the tide of the ocean, how much water does the moon, I wonder, extract from moonstones, and how much from the eyes of Cakravāka maids mourning their separation from their mates!

In these examples and the like, the stepping, increase of the water etc., which are established in their own self, have become the object of conjecture in the form of cause and result. We shall show a few other varieties of this (Utprekṣā) following another means, in the section on Samāsokti.

Another variety of this (i.e., Utprekṣā) as shown by the author of Sarvasva (is this): Somewhere it possesses pun on (the word) denoting the property, somewhere it is with a denial by virtue of the word like 'chala' ('pretext') and somewhere it possesses an approach to Upamā at the time of syntactical relation with the meaning
(of the words). The reason is this: It culminates in (the figure) Utprekṣā through the order of propriety of function on the part of the critic by virtue of implication of the meaning of the sentence involving comparison through it is touched by the figure Upamā through the mention of similarity. Now, what does the state of pun relating to the property, that has been mentioned, mean? Does it mean that Utprekṣā is accomplished also by pun as by the property being in conformity, or it is seen also as being embellished by pun just like purity in point of properties? In the first alternative, the division would be deficient since, the same number of division, namely, the state of being in conformity with the common property etc., that establish commonness, are possible in Utprekṣā as establishing the property as the source. Thus in "Mālenduvakṛtyayikāśabhvāt" etc., the state of being in conformity is clear. For example,

O friend, the face of the slender-bodied

97

girl, with the neck turned round,

shone as it were, the lotus with

its stalk turned round in water in the

form of the heaps of beauty.

Here, there is a relation of a prototype and its copy. The relation like an original and its image have already been exemplified. In the second alternative, the division would be deficient, since, embellishment is seen by other figures too like the pun as by the portion relating to source. Thus, in "āṅgullbhir iva keśasaṅcayam" etc., figure Upamā in the portion relating to the source, is clear.
Was it someone curious, who as though measured the belly of Damayantī by his fist, in as much as it appears as though held by his four fingers in the form of the three lines and the golden girdle (a fourth).

Here the figure (mixed) is Utprekṣā. Here, in the conjecture of the belly of Damayantī as being measured by a curious one, holding of the belly by his four fingers, which is ascertained from the conjecture of the state of his fingers, is the source (of the conjecture) of the lines (of belly) along with a girdle.

Continuously you ascend the extremely long flight of stairs in the form of high-soaring desires of his; and the fact that he heaves heavy and profuse sighs is due to the fact of his having become identical with you through (continuous) meditation.

Here the figure (mixed) is Asaṅgati (Inconsistency). Because, here, in the conjecture of attainment of the form of Damayantī by Nāla ascending by steps by Damayantī is considered as the source of heaving of sighs by Nāla.

Was it that opposing qualities gave up their contradictory nature through his fear, like enemy kings (who also gave up their dissensive activities through his fear)? For, he who excelled the sun in lusture (oajasā mitrajit), also conquered his enemies by his power (oajasā amitrajit);
and though he saw the things through spies (cāraṇḍk), he also saw them with discernment (vicāraṇḍk).

Here the figure (mixed) is Viroḍhābhāsa (Apparent Contradiction). Here, in the conjecture of giving up of the contradictory substratum relating to the opposite properties living together, namely, in Nala, by the properties which appear as mutually contradictory, is the source.

Definitely did the slender-waisted (lit. having waist measuring a couple of atoms) maiden learn her impatience, contrary as it was to sobriety, from the flying speed of the messenger of her beloved; for that which appears immediately after something originates from it.

Here the figure (mixed) is Arthāntaranyāsa. Here, although the speed of the wings of the swan, the messenger sent by Nala, is conjectured as the cause of the impatience pertaining to Damayantī, still there the source is not the mere result of learning, but the same embellished by the figure Arthāntaranyāsa, contained in the expressions — "that which appears immediately after something, originates from it", — which is used to avert the doubt, namely, why impatience arising out of the speed of something rests somewhere else.

Round her waist, the Creator put a blue-string in the shape of a row of hair, as if thinking, lucky like Pārvatī through
her husband, she too, would one day present the half of her body for completion.

Here, in the portion of source, the figure is Rūpakā. These and the like are to be understood. Thus, in both the ways, mention of being panned only is deficient and has to be understood as implying the other figures in addition.

What has been given as an example of Utprekṣā pertaining to nature with the state of a denial, is this:

(The river) Sīprā shines as if with loud laughter in the guise of multitudes of swelling foams while the playful maidens of the city have gone to the bank, which, (as if) laid afraid, through the encounter among the whales.

That also should be understood as implying Utprekṣā pertaining to a cause or a result with denial. An example of Utprekṣā with denial, pertaining to cause, is the following one —

Cupid is called 'Mugdha' ('beautiful', also 'foolish'), because of his foolishness, not because of his beautiful form; for having given his bow for the making of your eye-brows, he became conquerable by you at any moment with this beauty of yours by a mere wrinkling of them.

Here in the expressed meaning of the word 'mugdha' relating to Cupid, with the denial of the state of a cause
relating to beauty, which, in fact, is the cause, the state of cause relating to foolishness, caused through giving his own bow for creating the eye-brow of Nala, is conjectured. An example of Utpreka with denial, pertaining to a result, is the following one —

The elephant, heated by the sun, enters into the pond, definitely to oppress its friends, the lotuses and not to bathe; since, a bath of the elephant is useless.

Here, in the description of entering into the pond by the elephant, with the denial of the state of a result relating to bath, which in fact, is the result, oppression of the lotuses is conjectured here to be a result. It is unjustified to say that in Utpreka pertaining to nature, the denial of nature of the matter in hand, is the particular charm, and not the denial of the well-known cause and result, relating to Utpreka involving the cause and result. Since on the contrary, the denial of the established cause and result in the cases of Utpreka relating to cause and result that have been exemplified, has a reason behind it and not without reason as in the case of the denial of nature, the scope of which has been exemplified and thus herein only lies the excessive charm. Therefore, these two also are cases of Utpreka involving denial and thus justified is the implication. The rest deserving discussion would be discussed in the section on Samasokti.

What has been stated, namely, in "kastūrītīlakaṁti bhāla-phalaka" etc., the figure Upamā, which has been approached, culminates in Utpreka out of propriety, there,
if the propriety is in the mere identification of relation to particular places like forehead with the Tilaka-mark of musk etc., then it would have culminated in Rūpaka and thus its culmination in Utpreksā has to be admitted by admitting the propriety in the possibility of identification. Thus in the following examples and the like, even in the appearance of Rūpaka, Utpreksā has to be understood.

May the glances of the cowherd-women protect you; [the glances] which are the offering of blue-lotuses at the foot, fishes in the pond in the form of the navel, known as Kaustubha gem on the bosom of Murāri, necklaces of sapphire on the neck, bees over the lotus-like face (and) the plumes of peacock of the mass of hair.

Similarly, in the following examples and the like, in the appearances of the figure Upamā, culmination is in Utpreksā.

The group of swans, the nature of which was to produce inarticulate sweet sounds, cackled on the banks, resembling the (ringing of) anklets moving the lotus like feet of Lax̄mi who was going away leaving that lake which was bereft of that beautiful bird.

The vault of the Universe gleams, a primeval pavilion, serving as the abode of the worlds. The stars are like incisions made by insects on timber and emitting heaps of dust in the form of their own beams.
Then there entered in that hermitage, a person wearing matted locks, holding a Palāśa staff and clad in skin, of a loquacious tongue, blazing with the holy light as it were, looking as an impersonation of the first stage of life.

Similarly the following examples and the like, even in the knowledge of the figure Rūpaka, culmination in that (i.e. Utpreksā) has to be understood, since there exists the same principle of mentioning the adjuncts, adequate for the possibility of identification.

Encircling which city, there remained a golden wall, as if the Meru mountain with its wings constituted of the thick-jewelled door-pannels, as if entreating with an embrace a sensitive lady, as it were, who had fled from his lap.

The water, mixed with sesamum seeds and purified by faith, which offered by sons to their Manes, reached the moon being its nectar itself mingled with the hue of lunar spots; for it is the abode of the Manes.

Similarly in the following example of Apahnuti also, the same is to be found.

This atmosphere has not originated from the sky, enlightened by expanding rays of the full moon, but this is the umbrella
of Cupid, at present, unfolded by the charm of the pale twilight; -- Cupid, who has taken earnest steps in pacifying the haughtiness of the puffed up persons.

More would be considered in the section on the figure Atidayokti.

Now the question arises: the inclusion of the suggested Utpreksā as a figure of speech is unjustified, since, that is the suggestion of a figure. The answer is this: where figure Utpreksā is ascertained with the mere non-mention of expressives like 'iva' with the mention of the object of superimposition, the superimposed and the source, there, as it is very clear so as to appear like an expressed one, it attains the mere state of a figure of speech. Examples have been shown. Where even the superimposed, which is the subject to be conjectured, is not mentioned and figure Utpreksā is suggested either by the expressed matter or a figure of speech and hence concealed, there only it is a case of the suggestion of Utpreksā. For example —

Having seen in battle the warriors of Virarudra, guarded by the fortune of victory, the thorny trees in forest are dragging the hairs of the enemy women.

Here, a conjecture, viz., (thorny trees) have their passion excited by the sight of the warrior, embraced by the fortune of victory, is suggested by the matter, namely, dragging by the lock of hairs.

It was on her high breasts that Nala's
large eyes took refuge when the ocean of his passion swelled up, overflowing its shore of patience, with water in the form of the nectar-flow of her vision in the moon-like face.

Here, in (the example of) Rüpaka, involving a part, the conjecture, namely, 'as if out of fear of drowning', is suggested. Examples may be given in a similar way in other cases also.

Here ends the section on Utpreksā.

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Now begins Atisayokti (Hyperbole).

That is Atisayokti with poetic fancy as its soul, where without the mention of the object of superimposition, the superimposed is established.

Having given its definition thus they maintain its four varieties — no difference where there is difference (in reality), difference where there is no difference, no relation where there is relation (and) relation where there is no relation. Examples of these are the following —

A lotus, (but) not in water, and on (that) lotus a blue-lotus; all these lotuses on a creeper of gold, delicate and lovely; — thus what a series of calamities is this!
Different is this wealth of beauty, and different is the uninterrupted continuity of skill (possessed by her); this girl with her eyes like lotus-petals is not an ordinary creation of the Creator.

In the creation of this woman, was the position of the creator occupied by the moon, the source of effulgence? Or was it the love-god himself abounding in the erotic passion? Or was it the season of spring? How else could the ancient sage, whose sensibility had been deadened by Vedic study and whose interest had been withdrawn from all objects, be able to create such a heart-ravishing body?

(Her) affliction produces flow of tears; ever increasing tears are sufficient for a channel; sighs are like the oscillating flames of a kindled lamp; the body, as if, is plunged in paleness. What to speak of more, — she passes the whole night by the side of the window facing the path of yours, barring the moon-beams from entering (in the room) by her palm acting as the umbrella.

There is a denial of difference here, although there exists difference of the lotus etc., from the face etc. Difference is admitted although there exists no difference of beauty etc., (described in the verse), from the beauty etc., noticed in the world. There is a denial
of relation although there is the same in the creation of beauty by the ancient Brahmā. Again, a relation has been admitted although there is no relation of separation etc., with the production of flow of water. These are exemplified in order. Here this is being considered — does the 'non-mention' in the expression 'viṣayasyāṃupādānāt' mean the absence of words establishing the object of superimposition by all means or the absence of words expressive of that?

In the first case, the definition would not suit even to the example like 'kamalavanam anambhasi'; since, the words 'kamala' etc., convey by indication the face etc., which happen to be the object of superimposition. In the second case, it would be too-narrow to cover the expression "The moon as if kisses the face of night" etc., which is a case of Atiśayokti, based on pun of the word 'mukha'. If it be maintained that the absence of words conveying the object of superimposition, which are different from the words expressive of the superimposed, is desired (here), then too it would be too-narrow to cover the case of Atiśayokti as in "The lotus-like eyes are opened while the sun has risen" etc., where there is an introsusception of the indicated meaning with the expressed meaning of the word 'unmīlīta'; since, as the word 'unmīlīta' is indicative of blossoming, which happens to be the object of superimposition, a word verily different from the expressive of that (i.e. the superimposed), denote the object of superimposition. Even if it be maintained that the absence of words establishing the object of superimposition which are different from the words establishing the superimposed, is desired (here), (then also) in the following verse it would be too-narrow to cover the case of Atiśayokti, based on the pun of the word 'karna'.
O the hero, the distinction of your hand
from the young sprouts of the wish-yielding
tree is this — the one ornaments the ears,
the other censures Karpa (, the king).

If it be maintained that here the absence of
words establishing the object of superimposition which is
different from the word establishing the superimposed, is
desired (here) because of the mention of the word 'karpa'
differently, even then, in the following verse it would be
too-narrow to cover the case of the figure Atisayokti in
the form of introsusception of identity of the couple of
pitchers with the couple of breasts:

Did a pair of pitchers appearing on her
chest manifest itself as a fresh present
rendered by her (young) age, so that she,
the slender one, having crossed the diffi-
cult river of bashfulness, entered the
heart of Nala.

Since, there exists the word establishing the
object of superimposition, which is different from the
word establishing the superimposed, by means of the
102
description of being produced from the breast.
(Now), if it be argued that the absence of
words establishing the object of superimposition which
is different from the words establishing the superimposed,
is desired as possessing the determinant property of the
object of superimposition and the state of being produced
from the breasts does not possess the determinant property
of the object of superimposition relating to the couple
of breasts for its commonness in many, then also (it would
be noticed faulty).
O you with beautiful thighs, in the quest of the nature of darkness, the Vaisesika doctrine seems to me to be sound. Verily it is said this system of philosophy was propounded by an owl and hence it is able to determine the essence of darkness.

In the above verse and the like, fallacy of being too narrow would be irresistible to cover the case of Atisayokti in the form of introsusception of identity of the sight of a particular bird with the view of the Vaisesikas (which is mentioned, in the following manner), — this is what is noticed in the philosophy of Uluka. Since there exists the word establishing the object of super-imposition by way of mentioning the opinion of the Vaisesikas in the form of the possession of the determinant property of the object of superimposition. Moreover, it would be similarly too-wide with regard to the figure Ananvaya as exemplified in the verse beginning with "rāmarāṇayor yuddham". Since there is the absence of the word establishing the object of superimposition which is different from the word establishing the superimposed. If it be argued that the state of an object of superimposition and the superimposed is desired here as the following— that is the object of superimposition where something is being introsuspected as identified but that is the super-imposed which is introsuspected in that manner and thus it would not involve the said fallacy of being too-wide (a definition), then also it would be difficult to avert the fallacy of being too-wide with regard to the figure Rūpaka with pun, exemplified in the verse "Vidvanmānasahāmaa" etc. The idea, namely, in Rūpaka only the superimposition of
Identity is there and in Atiśayokti there is the introduction of identity, has been discarded while considering the definition of Rūpaka. Also it would be too wide with regard to the examples of the figure Samāsokti based on similarity.

To whom the thoughtful Citramāṁśā though half-finished like Aruṇa to the sun (or) the half-moon to (the lord) Siva, does not bring delight?

And here ends this text (of the Citramāṁśā) as available.