CHAPTER IV - DENOTATION OF APABHRAŞA WORDS.

SECTION I - AN APABHRAŞA WORD - WHAT IT IS.

In the previous chapters we have discussed different views regarding the meaning of a word and its different functions or capacities which empower it to convey its meaning. Now, an interesting study centres round the question whether the Apabhraśa (non-Sanskrit) words are endowed with denotive capacity or not. Before entering into the problem we must clarify what is meant by the term 'apabhraśa' because various views are met with regarding the meaning of the very term also.

Indian languages have broadly been divided into three classes, viz., Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhraśa. "The essential fact regarding Apabhraśa is that it is the collective term employed to denote literary languages not-Sanskrit or Prākrit." (HSL, p.32). This is testified by Rājaśekhara as he remarks that the body of the Kāvyapurusa (poetry personified) is made up of words and meanings; Sanskrit is his face, Prakrit his arms and Apabhraśa is his loins. (sabdārthau te sārīram, saṃskṛtaṁ mukham, prākṛtaṁ vahuh, jaghanam apabhraśaṁ...KN, p.26). Anandavardhana also remarks that poetry is composed in three languages - Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhraśa. (yatāḥ kāvyasya prabheda muktakasya saṃskṛtaprākṛtā' pabhraśa-nibaddham. DA, p.144). Daṇḍin specifically tells us that Apabhraśa is the literary language of the Ābhira tribe. (ābhiraśigraṣṭ kāvye apabhraśā- satayoditam. KD, VI.36, p.33). The Ābhiras were the inhabitants of Sindhudesā (Peshwar). In the specimens of Apabhraśa-poetry it is seen that both 'ṛ' and 'r' are preserved. "By preserving ṛ and r it is clear that these verses belong to the species of Prākrit styled by the eastern school of grammarians (Kramadīśvara, Mārkandeya, Rāma Tarkavāgīśa) Vṛcāṭa, which also is styled the speech of the Ābhiras. ....Both Ābhiras and Gurjaras were probably of the Dardic branch of the Indian race, to judge
at least from the strong Dardic element in Lāhūd, the speech of the Western Panjāb. As they grew in civilization, they must have sought to create a literature; whether they attempted it in their own dialect at first and later produced apabhraṣṭā must remain uncertain; what is clear is that Apabhraṣṭā originally was an effort to infuse into Prakrit a measure of their vernacular .......The Prakrit used as the base of early Apabhraṣṭā seems to have been often Kāhārāṣṭrī, but sometimes also Sauraseni". (HSL, pp. 33-34). In later periods, Apabhraṣṭā gradually spread over many parts of India and assumed different forms which varied from province to province. The famous rhetorician Rudrāja, has remarked that Apabhraṣṭās are local dialects varying from region to region. (prā-kṛta-saṃkṛta-māgadhā-piśāca-bhāgāśā suraseni ca gaśṭho 'tra bhūrībheda desāvisēpād apabhraṣṭāḥ. kl, II. 12, p.33). Some scholars tried to establish Apabhraṣṭā as a connecting link between Prakrits and modern Indian vernaculars. But this theory has no cogency as in some areas like Mahārāṣṭra and Kashmir, Apabhraṣṭā appears to have been unknown.

"Pischel and sir. G.Grierson have given currency to the view that the term Apabhraṣṭā denotes the true vernaculars as opposed to literary Prakrits, and the latter has constructed a scheme for the derivation of modern vernaculars from the various local Apabhraṣṭās. ....Unfortunately this theoretical scheme will not stand investigation for the evidence of texts and even of the literature proves clearly that Apabhraṣṭā had a different signification". (HSL, p.32).

According to the orthodox schools of thought Prakrit and Apabhraṣṭā languages bear blood-relation with Sanskrit. The term "apabhraṣṭā"literally means 'distortion of or deviation from the original'. Applied to language it means a distorted form of speech presenting a corruption of Sanskrit. Patañjali has used the term 'apāsābda' (unchaste
word) in this sense. So, to him 'apasa\bda' is a synonym of 'apabhra\p\spa'. He has particularly shown in his preamble to Kah\bh\ha\ya how one chaste Sanskrit word may give rise to many apasa\bdas. For example, the Sanskrit word "gau\p (cow) gives rise to the apasa\bdas - "g\p\vi", "gon\p", "got\p", "gopatilika", etc. (sakaikasya hi sabdaslya vahavopahbra\p\sp\h. tad yatha - gaurityasya s\bd\dbya g\p\vi gop\p gopatalikatyasam\d\d\d\d\dyo pahbra\p\sp\h. MB,Ip.54). Thus it is clear that, according to Patan\j\li, the Prakrit words, too, fall under the category of apabhra\p\spa words; because they are nothing but corrupt or distorted forms of Sanskrit words. Bhart\\h\hari also speaks in the same tune as he remarks that when a person, who is bereft of the knowledge of Sanskrit words and, as such, is not acquainted with their correct pronunciation, fails to pronounce the Sanskrit words like "gau\p" in a correct manner. Such utterings are called apabhra\p\sp\as. (s\bd\d\dh sam\k\r\ha\ha\hno yo gauriti prayuyuk\tite, tam apahbra\p\sp\s\i icchanti vise\garthanives\inam. VP.I.14\f). Punyar\a, in his commentary on V\k\y\yad\i\ya, refers to the viewpoint of Vy\\d\i, the famous ancient grammarian philosopher, that the apabhra\p\s\a words originate form Sanskrit words and, as such, are distortions of the same. (Sabadprak\r\trinapahbra\p\s\a iti sa\pgra\vak\\aro\k\rt\e\h. PR, p.59). Bhart\\h\hari merely echoed the opinion of Vy\\d\i in this respect. Thus it is significant that, according to the grammarians, the outstanding feature of Apabhra\p\s\a speech is that it represents only the perverted or distorted form of Sanskrit. It does not, therefore, constitute a language of independent growth but represents the refined tongue (Sam\k\r\t\a) only in a perverted form. (apabhra\p\sp\n\ma na sva\t\n\tr\a ka\\c\c\cana vidya. sarvasya hyapahbra\p\s\asya s\dhureva prak\r\r\t\i\h. PR, p.59). These mutilations and corruptions of Sanskrit words were owing to both natural unfitness and wrong imitations on the part of ordinary people. Thus, while the word
"gauḥ" is to be uttered, ordinary people, sometimes due to incapacity and sometimes due to inadvertence, pronounce it as "gaṇi", "goṇī" and the like. Hence these wrong pronunciations, called the apabhramśa-words, have their roots in chaste words only. (gauriti prayoktavye asākyā pramā- đūdbhirvā gogyādayastat-prakṛtayo 'pabhrāmsāḥ. Pr, p.59). Such distortions due to incapacity has also been noted by Kātyāyana (the author of Vārtikas, i.e. modificatory and supplementary rules on Pañinī's Aṣṭādhyāyīn) in a Vārtika where he states that the use of the vowel "i", which is seen only in the root "klp" is found here and there only due to incapacity of correct imitation. (ākāropadeso yadṛccchā sāktijānukaraṇa-plutyādyarthaḥ. vār on Śivāṣṭra "rāk", MB, p.85). Patañjali explained it with the help of an example. The uneducated wife of a banmin tried to utter the name "rtakah". But due to her incapacity for the pronunciation of the letter "i", she pronounced the term as "itakah". Such examples are innumerable and are found everywhere. (asākyā kayācid brāhmaṇā ṛtaka iti prayok- tavye ṛtaka iti prayuktam. MB, p.86).

Here we should draw a line of demarkation between sādhutva (chastness) and Sāktatva (expressiveness). The corrupt words are endowed with expressiveness, no doubt, but what they lack is chastness. In this connection the meaning of the term 'sādhutva' should be clarified as this is the characteristic which demarcates chaste words from corrupt ones. There are as many as six different views regarding the exact meaning of the term. The neo-logicians uphold the view that sādhutva or chastness is nothing but conformity with grammatical rules, i.e., a grammatically correct word is to be regarded as a chaste one. But this does not hold good as it does away with the very distinction between chaste words and corrupt ones, because all words, used as imitated words, conform to grammatical rules. If one imitates the word "goṇī" uttered by a layman
in the place of the term 'gauñ', then it conforms to grammatical rules and hence, it is to be treated as a chaste word. (na ca vyākaraṇaviṇaptīdvavatvā vā navyanaiyikoktaḥ tat. anukaraṇa sādhatrasya vyākaraṇa-nigpādyādītvena sarvatra sādhutvāpattau sādhvasādhuvibhāgocchedāpatteḥ. KT, pp. 78-79). With a view to avoiding this difficulty the upholders of this view may add a clause that, in order to be regarded as a chaste one, a word must also be used to denote the same sense as is denoted by it in grammar. But this cannot take them out of the woods because all the chaste words cannot be found in the grammar books and in order to ascertain the grammatical meanings of a great many chaste words, we have to take resort to inference from dictionaries, the uses of authorities (śītas), etc. (na ca yaḥ sādāḥ yatārthe vyākaraṇa-vyutpannah sa tatra sādhuh, tadvyutpammatvagrahasca kvacit spaṭpalabhyamāna-vyākaranat kvaciciṣṭha-prayogakosādībhir-amunanat tasya ca bāhulakādinā sankrahaḥ. KT, p. 79). Moreover, words used to indicate secondary meanings cannot be regarded as chaste ones according to this view, because, words are not used in grammar to convey secondary ideas. (lāṅgaṇikānaḥ tattadartha-vyutpādanavirahena teṣah tatra sādhutvāmātpatteḥ. KT, p.79).

The second view about chastness is that, expressiveness is chasteness. But this view also is equally untenable as it bestows chasteness upon corrupt words also, cutting thereby the very root of demarcation between the two types of words. It is an undeniable fact that the corrupt words also convey some concepts and hence, they must be regarded as endowed with the power of expressiveness. (etena sāktatvam eva sādhutvam ityāpāstam. KT, VŚLM, p. 79). What more, acceptance of this view leads us to another difficulty. It is regarded that expressiveness belongs to the component terms of a compound word and also to roots and suffixes separately, and not conjointly. Thus according to this view, compound words and the
resulting forms of roots and suffixes become unexpressive and, hence, un-chaste words. (paramate samāsādau prakṣ¯tiprathyayasyasamudaye ca sāktyabhāvena tasyāsādhutvāpatteścā. KT, p.79).

The same line of arguments go to show the unacceptability of the third view, according to which, a word endowed with vyātti or the capacity of signifying a meaning is a chaste one. (etena vyāttimattvam tadityapi parāstam. KT,p.79).

The fourth school upholds the view that a word endowed with the capacity to produce religious merit is to be considered as a chaste one.

A fifth school maintains that a term that can be grammatically analysed is to be taken as a chaste one. But both these views, upheld by some ancient grammarians, are only partially correct and are vitiated by the fallacy of too wide definition. (etena bhāvyadaya yogyatvam vyākriyā-janatvam iti lakṣāṇadvayam iti pācīnoktam apāstam. KT, pp.79-80).

Nāgāsa synthesises the last two views and presents a sixth one. He maintains that a chaste word is one which conveys a meaning enjoined by grammar and which is at the same time endowed with the capacity to produce religious merit. (sādhutvam ca vyākaraṇavyāadyo'rtha-viśiṣṭa-sādbaniśthah puṇyajanatacavacchedako jātivisēgah. VS LM, p.76). He quotes a comment made by Patañjali that corroborates his view. In his commentary on the Pāñjīnian rule 'ekah pūrvaparayoh' (Pāñg.6.1.94), he says that one word which is known in its chaste nature, which adheres to the rules of grammar in respect of its formation and which is pronounced properly according to the rules and regulations of Śikṣā (the science of pronunciation or Semantics), becomes desire-yielding both in heaven and on the earth. (taduktam-ekah pūrvaparayanah iti sūtra bhūyā - 'ekah sābdah samyak āṣṭaḥ sāstrānvitaḥ suprayuktah svargē loke ca kāmadhug bhavati'. VS LM, p.76).

Thus we see that 'apabhraṣṭā' words as opposed to chaste words are those which are not enjoined by Sanskrit grammar and which are not
endowed with the capacity to produce religious merit. Dājin has observed that, in the interpretation of the orthodox Hindu scholars, i.e. Indian philosophers, dialects other than Sanskrit are called 'apabhrāṣṭa'. (śāstresu saṃskṛtādanyad apabhrāṣṭatayoditam. KD, 1.36, p.33). In the present discussion this term may be taken to signify all the words that are not enjoined by Sanskrit grammar. In this sense all the terms belonging to the languages other than Sanskrit (and the Vedic) are to be treated as apabhrāṣṭas.

It should be noted in this connection that the corrupt words like 'asvah', 'gāvi', 'goni', etc., are regarded as chaste ones when they are used to signify such concepts as are different from the meanings denoted by the terms 'asvah', 'gauni', etc., of which these words are regarded as the distorted forms.

(asvagopūdayāh sābdāh sādhava viṣayāntare, nimittabhedāt sarvatra sādhutvaḥ ca vyavasthitam. Vī.1.150).

Thus the word 'goni', is to be regarded as a chaste one when it does not signify a cow but conveys the idea of āvapana (sowing seeds). Similarly, the term 'asvah', denoting 'a person having no wealth' (ani not 'a horse') must be taken to a chaste one. In this way, the word 'gāvi', too, should be considered a chaste word when it means 'a devotee of the god Gaṇapati' (and not 'a cow'). (āvapane goṇi śvavīyogābhidhāne ca asva iti sādhureva. Pṛ, p.59. Vide also: - gāvisābdo'pi kayācid vyutpattāḥ kvacit sādhuriti. TC, p.646 and 'evam gām gānapatim avitum prīṇayitum śīlam asyeti gāvisābde'pi sādhutaḥ kvacit. TCA, p.646). Thus it is seen that the meanings signified by the terms also play a very important role in determining the chasteness of words. It may be argued in this connection that, if it be so, the terms indicating secondary meanings should be regarded as unchaste ones; because the chasteness of words are pre-determined with relation to their well-known denoted meanings. The term 'asvah' denoting a penile
person becomes unchaste when it means a horse. Similarly, the word 'gaṅgā', which denotes the current of the Ganges, should be regarded as an apabhraṣṭā or unchaste word when it indicates 'the bank' in the expression, 'gaṅgāyām ghōṣaḥ' through the function of indication. (nanu āsvasādō vējini sādhurītyevam sādhutāyā arthavisēṣanīyantritavāt tīrādau gaṅgādipadasya sādhutvānāpattiriti.....Kt, p.80).

But this apprehension has no sufficient ground behind it. In the case of an indication (lakṣaṇā) the indicated secondary meaning is related with the denoted primary one which acts as a via media resulting to the ascertainment of the indicated meaning. The word 'gaṅgā' at first denotes its primary meaning and this meaning being incompatible with that of the other term, it indicates the secondary sense in the next stage. The chastness of the term is determined at the very first stage of its primary denotation and this chastness does not leave it after that. Any attribute or qualification accruing from the primary meaning is a permanent one. This becomes evidently clear when we examine the Pāṇinian rule, 'puṣyogadākhyāyām'. The word 'gopa' denotes a cowherd and after that the feminine suffix pīp' is added to it and we get the word 'gopī'. This word conveys the idea of 'the wife of a cowherd' who may not herself tend the cattle. (lakṣaṇi-keśvapi sākyārtham ādāyaiva padasya sādhutvam, padāntara-sambandhe'nvayānu-papattyā sākyatāvacchedakāropeṇaiva lakṣyārthabodhāt. 'gopī' ityādau prakriyādāsāyām 'gopa' iti prātipadikasya gopatvāropeṇa tat- stri-bodhatvānumāṇam 'puṣyogadākhyāyām' iti śastrataḥ. VolH, p.80).
CHAPTER IV.

SECTION II: The Views of the Mimansists Regarding Denotation of Apabhraṃśa Words.

In the previous section we have dealt with the significance of the term "apabhraṃśa". We have accepted it as signifying any non-Sanskrit (also non-Vedic) word. The Mimansists also use it in the same sense. This is evident in their discussions. Now we come to the question whether 'apabhraṃśa' terms have the power of denotation or not.

The Mimansists hold that words, specially scriptural words, are a kind of divinity as imposing and as sacred as a corporeal one. Therefore, with supreme seriousness, they have dealt with the problem of the introduction of foreign words into Sanskrit and also with the question of religious merit involved in the use of such words. The observations of Sābara and Kumārila throw significant light on the naturalization of foreign words in Sanskrit. There are a good many words each of which denotes one thing among the Indian Aryans and a different concept among the non-Aryans (Kleecchas). An ordinary man is at a loss in deciding which one of them is to be preferred to the other. The word 'yava' denotes barley-corn among the Indian Aryans while it conveys the concept of 'priyaṅgu' or long-pepper among the non-Aryans. Similar is the case with 'varāha' which denotes 'a boar' to the Aryans while a non-āryan understands 'a crow' from the same word. Likewise, the term 'vetasa' conveys 'a cane-creeper' to an Aryan while it signifies 'a black-berry' to a non-Āryan. Thus the words like these convey two different sets of meanings of which any one may be understood by anybody and this puts us in a great difficulty in respect of our comprehension of meanings. (tatra kecid dirghasūkeṣu yava-sabdāṃ prayañjate kecit priyaṅgusu. Ṛ varāhasabdāṃ kecit sūkare kecit kṛṣṇasākunyau. vetasa-sabdāṃ kecid vañjulake keci jambvām. tatrobbhayathā padarthavyagamād vikalpaḥ. Sā on MS: 'teṣvadāsāṇād virodhasya samā vipratipattiḥ'. MD, p.216). In such cases we are confronted with the question as to which of
these two sets of meanings is authoritative or acceptable from the orthodox point of view.

The answer, according to the Himansists, is that the meanings enjoined by the scriptures (the Vedas and the Smritis) should be regarded as more authoritative than those current among the non-Aryans. The meanings of such words, which are current in the areas beyond the bounds of Aryavarta (the land of the Aryans - northern India), are only similar to those in vogue among the Aryans. For example, the word 'yava' means barley among the Aryans. Barley grows when the previous main crop decays out. Similarly, the case with long-pepper which is understood by the non-Aryans from the same word. Thus there is a similarity between the two different concepts conveyed by the same term in two different communities. (Pūrva-sasya keśiṃ bhavanti dīrghasūkhāḥ priyāṅgavaścaittat-tayopād cārayaḥ. SB, M, p.217).

This similarity tends to make those meanings, current among the non-Aryans, indirect in comparison to those in vogue among the Aryans. This is all the more justified, maintain the Himansists, because the meanings, enjoined by the scriptures, are supported by the sīstas or Āptas who are held to be the unquestionable authorities so far as the determination of meaning is concerned. (Śāstrastraḥ vā tannimittvāt. MS.1.3.9. Vide also: ke śastrastraḥān. sīstān. tēgām avicchinnāṃ smṛtiḥ sāstreṇu vedēgu ca. tena sīstāh nimittaḥ śrutimṛtyavadhāraṇe. SB. on MS.1.3.9, M, pp.217-18).

But we have to face an embarrassing difficulty in determining the denotation of the words like pika (cuckoo), nema (half), sāta (wooden vessels) and tāmarasa (lotus) which, though occasionally used by the Aryans, are undoubtedly of foreign origin. (atha yān sābdān āryā na kasmīṃścīdayat-ācarante, mlecchāsca kasmīṃścit prayunējante, yathā pika-nema-sāta-tāmarasādisābdāsteṣu sandehaḥ. SB, M, p.224), Vide also:

ye sābdā na prasiddhāḥ syuṛyāvartanīvāsinām,
tēgāṃ mleccha-prasiddho'rbho grahano neti vicintyate. TV, M, p.224).
The difficulty may be solved in two alternative ways: (1) either we may derive the words according to the principles laid down in Sanskrit grammar and etymology and thereby get at their derivative meanings, or (2) we may unhesitatingly accept those meanings for the denotation of which these words are used by the non-Áryans. (kíma-nigama-nirukta-vaikaranë-vasëna dhätuto'rtah kalpasitavya uta yatra mlecchë ácaranti sa sádártha iti. Sú, MD, p.224). Between these two alternatives, it needs hardly be said that the first one is quite in tune with the orthodox standpoint and, therefore, obtained the support of the Áimansists.

(niruktavyakriyadváraya yastvarthah pariganyate,
pikanemádi-sábdänam sa evárho bhavayati. TV, MD, p.226).

Kumárilá solved this problem in a slightly different way. He maintains that, as the words like 'pika', 'nema', etc. signify the same concepts in Sanskrit as well as in Mleccha-languages (non-Sanskrit languages) so there should be no objection in accepting the meanings which are popular with the non-Áryans. But utmost care should be taken in respect of the fact that these meanings are in no way incongruous with the Vedas. The Vedic injunctive, 'niśádasthatapi yájayet' ('the sacrifice is to be performed with the help of an architect of the non-Áryan Niśáda-tribe'), clearly shows that, in the Vedic age, people belonging to the lower rank of the society were sometimes allowed to take part in religious matters. There are certain Vedic injunctions, the implications of which cannot be ascertained without accepting the authority of the non-Áryan people. Kumárilá explicitly states that the denotations of some words like 'kloma' (right liver), 'kúta' (heap of paddy or deception of false number), etc., should be learnt from low-class people like butchers and dealers in coins. (yathaiva klomádayaś pasvavayavah vede coditaḥ santo'dhvaryaśibhi śvayam a-jñayamanúrthathvatád ye nityám práñibhadháhbiyuktastebhyā evávadhárya viniṣyujante. yatha

- 198
Moreover, popular usage is stronger than etymological interpretations which are often more than one for a single word and thus incapable of leading us to the comprehension of a definite meaning.

Kumarila does not see eye to eye with the view that the acceptability of anything and everything depends upon whether it is enjoined by the scriptures or not. He does not find any solid ground behind such highly orthodox view. Of course, he does not disagree with the point that in case any difference is found between two viewpoints regarding one and the same thing, we should accept that one which is in accordance with the scriptures, which, according to the Mimansists, are the strongest basis of any argument. But where there is no antinomy with the scriptures, a less strong argument has got every right to be acceptable on all hands. Barring those arguments which, like a mirrage, has only an appearance of logic, any logical argument, however weak it may be in comparison with the scriptures, should be accepted without any hesitation if only there be no contradiction with a stronger argument. Hence, regarding the meanings of the Vedic words we must, no doubt, accept those which are current among the Aryans; but regarding the significance of those words which are not generally used in the scriptures or in Sanskrit language but are in vogue among the non-Aryans, we should not be the least hesitant in accepting the meanings which are current among the non-Aryans. (yat tu sāstra-vālīyastvād etad-grahaṇam iti. tamma. avirodhe durvalasyāpi grāhyatvād yadevātyantaḥ pramāṇābāhāsm eva mṛgaṭṛśavād bhavati tat sarvadāiva pariḥartavāya, yat punar-valavad-virodhā'peksam apramāṇaḥ bhavati tad virodhābhāvāt pramāṇam evetyava-
The learned Mimansist has frankly admitted that the Aryans used to pick up words from foreign languages and changed them into Sanskrit words with necessary alterations.

(aryasteca mlecchabhasabhyah kalpayantah svakam padam, padantaraksaropetam kalpayanti kadacana. TV, MD, p.225).

It is very much interesting to note that he has given some examples of this fact of Sanskritisation of words belonging to different languages like Dravidian and others. The Dravidian words 'cor' (rice), 'atar' (road), 'pap' (snake), 'mal' (truth), 'vaira' (belly or stomach), etc., are still used in these senses. These words ending in consonants had been naturalised in Sanskrit in ancient times by adding some vowels at the ends. Thus the words 'cora', 'ataras', 'papas', 'malas', 'vairas', etc. are used in Sanskrit in order to convey the same concepts as are denoted by their corresponding original Dravidian words. (tad yatha dravida-bhasayam eva tavad vyadinananta-bhasapadesu svaranta-vibhakti-stripratyayadi-kalpanabhip svabhagra-nuruparthah pratipadyamah drayante. tad yathau dana cor-ityukte corapada-vacyag kalpayanti panthanam atar-ityukte'tara iti kalpayitvahuh. TV, MD, p.226). Of course, the Aryans have tried to explain the meanings of these words in their own etymological way and have added Sanskrit inflections and suffixes to give them a 'sanskrit look. Thus they have explained the word 'ataras' as 'which is difficult to cross' (from the root 'tā' to cross) and have said that, it is very difficult to reach the end of a road and so it is rightly termed 'ataras'. (satyaṃ dusraratvād atara eva panthā iti. TV, MD, p.226). But these explanations are based on far-fetched
imagination and the foreign origin becomes clear. If this be the case with the Dravidian words which are of Indian origin, how much far-fetched will it be with regard to those words which are taken from languages like Persian, Roman or Greek? (tad yathā dravidādibhaṣāgāyām īdṛṣī svacchanda-kalpaṇā tadā pāraśī-varvara-yavna-raumākāṇi-bhaṣāsu kim pratipatsyanta iti na vidmaḥ. TV, M. p.226). It is admitted that the Vedic usage is more authoritative than the non-āryan usage. But no reason can be adduced to in favour of rejecting the non-āryan usages altogether, particularly when they happen to be entirely absent in the Vedas.

The above discussion clearly proves that, according to the Mīmāṃsikās, both Sanskrit and apabhraṃśa words are equally potential in denoting the intended sense. Jaimini unambiguously admits that there are many words which have no origin in the scriptures and, therefore, they cannot enjoy the authority of the same. But these words of foreign or non-āryan origin should not be denied the capacity of denotation for that reason. (prayogotpattya-śāstratvācchabdeṣu na vyavasthā syat. M.1.3.24). The question of religious merit accruing from the use of correct Sanskrit (including the Vedic) words, as raised by the Mīmāṃsikās and the grammarians, is a different thing altogether.

The Āryamlecchādhiṣṭhāna (regarding the denotation of Āryan and non-Āryan words) of the Mīmāṃsikās, as discussed at the outset, shows that the expressiveness of the apabhraṃśa words is supported by them. The gist of the chapter may be reviewed thus: The Āryans understand barley by the word 'yava' which signifies long-pepper in non-Āryan communities. Still the Āryan usage pre-dominates over the non-Āryan usage and, therefore, barley should be cognised from this term when it is used in any scriptural instruction. Here the purport remains not in the fact that
the meaning comprehended by a non-Aryan is not a denoted one and their
cognition is erroneous; on the other hand, both the meanings are denoted
ones.

But it is to be noted in this connection that the Kimansists are
reluctant to award direct denotative capacity to the corrupt words or
distortions of Sanskrit words like 'gāvī', 'goṇī', etc. They opine that
the term 'gauḥ' and not its corruptions in Prākṛta or in vernaculars,
should be regarded as correct and denotive of meaning. A question may
arise in this connection: 'what should be the criterion for regarding
one word as a chaste one and for assuming others as corrupt ones?'
Beginninglessness cannot be the criterion. There is no record of the
particular moment when a word, be it a chaste one or a so-called corrupt
one, was first coined and came to be used to mean something. We may
go hundreds of years back but still we see the use of the term 'gāvī'
in the sense of a cow and nobody knows who coined it. Therefore, both
the chaste words like 'gauḥ' and the corrupt words like 'gāvī' stand on
the same footing of being devoid of any appreciable beginning. Both
the classes of words are also equally expressive of meaning. Hence there
should be no distinction between words as chaste or unchaste. Moreover,
there is no scriptural text enjoining the use of chaste words alone and
barring the use of corrupt ones. There is no proof that the utterance
of the chaste words like 'gauḥ' gives rise to religious merit. In fact,
such words too, like the unchaste words like gāvī, are used only for the
communication of some concepts. (kim atraiṣaḥ bādho 'vicchhaṇa-pārmparyo'
ṛthābhidhāyā, itare 'pabhraṃsāh, uta sarve 'nādayāḥ. sarva iti brūmāḥ.
kutāḥ. pratyaṣayat. pratīyate hi gāvyādhīhyāḥ sāmānām arthaḥ. tasmād-ito
vargasāte 'pyasyārthaḥ sambandha āśīdeva, tataḥ paraṇa, tatasā ca
pratyaṃśanādita. kartā ca 'sāya sambandhasya nāṣṭīti vyavasthitam eva........
The argument, that the chasteness of words may be determined according to their conformity with grammar, is untenable, because grammar is not based upon the Vedas. Moreover, difference of opinion is found even among the stalwarts of the same school of grammar. For example, Pāṇini, the author of the aphorisms, regards the correct derivation of words as the effect or aim of the study of grammar. But Kātyāyana, the author of the Vārtikas (supplementary and modificatory rules), opines that the goal of grammar is the performance of sacrifices after acquiring the correct knowledge of words. Patañjali, the great commentator, however, propagates the view that heaven is achieved by the correct knowledge of words with the help of grammar. For these reasons, grammar cannot be regarded as an authority in pointing to the chasteness of words.

In reply, the Mimansists contend that the opponents have placed the two types of words on the same footing by assumption (arthāpatti) which pushes itself back whenever the problem under consideration can be solved in any other way. It is found that the chaste words require a good deal of concentrated vocal exercise and training and their correctness of pronunciation is maintained with utmost care through ages. On the other hand, it is also found that a correct word becomes corrupt owing to wrong pronunciation by an untrained person and he, and from him others also, put it into linguistic usage. So it is quite logical to maintain that the correctly preserved words like 'gauḍ', etc. are chaste, while the words & like 'gāvi' are unchaste. (sābe prayatnaniṣpattā-aparādhasya bhūgitvaṁ. MS.1.3.25). In fact, the correct and chaste words alone have no appreciable beginning while many corruptions of them take place even these days.
It may be argued that, in spite of this difference, both the classes of words should be regarded as possessing denotative capacity. But the Himansists maintain, this argument cannot be accepted as this does away with the authority of words or of verbal testimony (sābdapramāṇa). By watching the linguistic behaviour and the corresponding actions of other people, a layman cognises the meaning of a term as a particular entity belonging to a class which is different from all other entities belonging to all other classes. Thus he understands that the meaning of the term 'gauḥ' is 'a cow' which is different from anything else like horse, etc. In this way, he cognises that the word 'gauḥ' has got some capacity to denote 'cow'. This becomes seated in his mind as a rule. But if he subsequently finds that several other words like 'gāvī', 'gopī', etc., express the same concept, his previous notion of denotation is thrown into winds and he becomes sceptical about the very denotative capacity and, hence, the authority of words and of verbal testimony is jeopardised. Therefore, in order to avoid this untoward situation, denotative capacity should be assigned only to one correctly preserved word for the expression of one concept. Of course, the opposition may point out that even the so-called chaste words like 'hasta', 'kara', 'pāpi', etc. though expressive of the same meaning, are regarded as having denotative capacity by the Himansists themselves. But this is done, the Himansists reply, as there is no other means to avoid it since each of these words is equally preserved and used by the Āptas and, hence, though not pleasant, denotative capacity has to be assigned to all of them. 'Necessity knows no law'. The case is not the same with the corrupt words as the difficulty may be solved by regarding them as a separate class, as corrupt but similar pronunciations of chaste words which alone possess the capacity of denotation. (anyāyasyānekasābdatvam. 93.1.3.26, Vide also : na ca āga nyāyo yat sadṛśāḥ sābdā ekam artham abhinivasāmānvāḥ, sarve'vicchinna-pārmparyā
eveti. pratyaya-matra-darsanad-abhyupagamyate; sadgeyat sadhusabde-
vagate pratyayo vikalpyate. tasmad amigam eko'nadir anye'pabhramyaha.
hastah karaah panyirityevam adigu tvabhivyaktesasah anadiramugam arthe na sambandha iti. SB, MD, pp.277-78).

It is difficult, no doubt, to ascertain which words are chaste and which are otherwise. But the study of grammar helps us in this matter with (the help of) some general rules and some rules of exceptions where-ever necessary. It has been argued that grammar has no authority. But this argument is not valid. Grammar has got the authority of the Vedas behind it. The Vedas enjoin that a brahmin should not use corrupt words (particularly at the time of sacrifice) and point out as an illustration that the Asuras were defeated at the hands of the gods due to their corrupt pronunciation of the words 'he'rayah' as 'he'layah'(0, you enemies')$\text{\textasciitilde}he'sura he'layo he'laya iti kurvanta\text{\textasciitilde}paravabhuvuh. tasmad brahma\text{\textasciitilde}na mlecchitavai nappabha\text{\textasciitilde}sitavai, mleccho ha va esa apasa\text{\textasciitilde}dah\text{\textasciitilde}. mlecch\text{\textasciitilde}ma bhumi\text{\textasciitilde}yadhyeya\text{\textasciitilde}vyakaranam. MH, pp.137. The Taittiriya Saghita of the Yajurveda also enjoins that one should utter only those terms which are derivable, i.e., correctly formed with stems or roots and suffixes. (tasmad iyam vyaktra wagi udiate. Tai.S.-6/4/7/3). This clearly proves the authority of grammar, because the correct derivation of words is the business of grammar and, as such, it can be regarded as a 'Smrita' having its basis in the Vedas. There is no hard and fast rule that all the Smritis should be connected with religious matters like sacrifices. (tatra tattvam abhiyogavisya syat. MS.1.3.27). Highly efficient grammarians are found engaged in maintaining the correctness of Sanskrit words through ages with utmost care. So the words which the grammarians and the persons who are well-versed in grammar earmark as chaste ones, arc to be ungrudgingly, accepted as such. (drisyate cahiyyuktana\text{\textasciitilde}gunyatam avismaranam
But, in spite of all these arguments, it cannot be denied that meanings are cognised from the corrupt words. The Kimasists do not deny it. They only maintain that, the corrupt forms of Sanskrit words, significant though they are in ordinary parlance, express their meanings only indirectly by virtue of their resemblance to the corresponding correct forms. (tadasaktiscānurūpatvāt. MS.1.3.28). They opine that the origin of the corrupt words lies in the inability to pronounce the words correctly on the part of uneducated people. Such a person intends to pronounce the term 'gauḥ' but, owing to his incapacity, he pronounces it as 'gāvī', which is as similar to the original in sound. An educated person, to whom it is said, understanding the intention, remembers the correct word and acts accordingly. Another person, who is ignorant of the correct word, watches it and thinks that the term 'gāvī' itself denotes 'a cow' and subsequently uses the term to signify the same. Gradually others also learn this from him. Thus the process goes on and the term gets currency.

Similar is the case with other corrupt words. (gosābdam uccārayitukāmena ke-nacid asāktyā gāvityuccāritam. apareṇa jñātāṃ sāsnādimān asya vivakṣitastaddhārthāḥ gaurityuccārayitukāmo gāvityuccārayati. tataḥ sīkṣitvāpare'pi sāsnā-dimati vivakṣite gāvityuccārayanti. tena gāvyaḍibhyo sāsnādimān avagamyate. anurūpo hi gāvyaḍir-gosābdasya. Sū, Mā, p.289). It is often found that even if a word is not used with correct case-endings, yet the cognition of meaning takes place due to similarity of the term with the correct one. Thus if a man is asked: 'where are you coming from?' and he answers 'amasākaḥ' in lieu of the correct answer 'asāmakabhyaḥ' (from Asāma) with the fifth case-ending, still no difficulty of cognition crops up in this case. Thus, on hearing the
term 'gāvī', one actually remembers the correct term 'gauḥ' due to similarity in sound and it is this recollected word which denotes the sense of the cow, not the corrupt term 'gāvī'. This view can be supported by the reference to the indistinct utterings of children, which also give rise to the cognition of concepts due to their similarity of sound with the corresponding words actually used by the elderly people. (āta eva hi vibhakti-vyataye'pi pratyayo bhavati. asākairāgacchāmiṭyasānakasā-bdaikadesā upalabdhe, asāmakebhya ityeva sābdhaṃ smaryate. tato'sāmakebhya ityeṣo'ṛtha upalabhyata iti. evaṃ gāvyādi-darsānād gocābdha-samāpam, tataḥ sāsnādimān avagamyate. SB, MD, p.289).

This may be true in respect of the cognition of those persons who are conversant with the correct and chaste Sanskrit words. But the vast ignorant mass, who never even heard of the chaste Sanskrit terms, cannot by any means remember them. Hence it must be accepted that they comprehend the meanings directly from the corrupt terms or apahṛtaśūnas and, therefore, these terms cannot be deprived of their denotive capacity.
CHAPTER - IV.

SECTION - III : The Views of the Logicians.

Gāggesā, in the Śabdakhaṇḍa of his Tattvacintāmaṇi, has discussed the questions as to how the corrupt words, not sanctioned by the Sūtras (the Āptas or the authorities), have come to be significant like correct ones in ordinary usages. He raises the fundamental question whether their power of denotation is innate or purely conventional and he supports the latter view. According to him, corruption is not simply due to mistaken notions or want of adequate knowledge. For, in that case, the utterance of a man not conversant with grammar would be treated as anything but intelligible. (asādhutvaṃ ca na bhramādzi-janyatvam anāptokte asādhutvāpateḥ sūkādyudīrite grāma-gānādau bhramādyajanyatvācca. TC, p.626-27-27). In his opinion an apabhraṃśa is that form of speech which cannot be supported by the rules of grammar recognised by the Sūtras. (kim tu maṇājana-parighīta vyākaranaṃ-smṛti-nisiddhatvam tad-aparighītatvam veti. TC, p.627). But chasteness, on the other hand, is a kind of vṛtti or relation which subsists between a term and its corresponding concept. This is necessary for presenting the image of the thing before the mind of the listener. (padasya sādhutvaḥ vṛtti-reva, vṛttīścā sādabodha-hetu-padrarthopasthityanukūla-pada-padrarthayoh sambandhaḥ. ...TC, p.627).

Quite in conformity with the usual method followed by the Hindu philosophers, Gāggesā has at first advanced a series of arguments in favour of the opponents' view supporting the denotative character of the apabhraṃśa terms and refuted it afterwards. The first argument in favour of the opponent is that, apabhraṃśas possess the power of denotation because meanings are as regularly conveyed by them as by the chaste Sanskrit words like 'pañkājā' (lotus), etc. Moreover, these corrupt words can be derived on the basis of popular usage which is also the basis of derivation regarding
mapy chaṭte words. (nanyeṣaṃ ṭaṅkaja-pādasyeṣaṃ-paḥṛṣaṇcāṅgam api sāktistato
niyamenārtha-pratipatteḥ vyavahārādhaṇa-vyutpattā aviseśat. TC, p.638). It is an undeniable fact that both 'gauḥ' and 'gāvī' signify the same concept. The corrupt words cannot be regarded as indicative (as opposed to denotive) of meaning either, since their primary meanings are not found inconsistent with the sense of any other term. (na ca laṅkāpaḥ mukhyārthabādhat. TC, p.639). It is also not at all logical to maintain that corrupt words appear to be significant only by recalling the corresponding correct words which alone are regarded as naturally endowed with sense. The reason is not far to seek. Uneducated people, devoid of any knowledge of Sanskrit, are found to understand the usual meanings from corrupt terms. (na ca paḥṛṣaṇcāṅgam smērita-sādhu-sābdhā-anvayabodhah, sādhu-sābdhā-ajānatāmapi pāmāraṇām tato'rtha-pratītih. TC, p.639). Lastly, it cannot be assumed that their signification is consequent upon their imposed power of denotation, because there is no logical proof behind such an assumption. (sāktyāropat tato'rthapratyaya iti cet, na, māṁbhūvat. TC, p.639). Hence we cannot deny denotive capacity to the apabhṛṣṭaś and, therefore, no line of demarcation can be drawn between a correct and the corresponding corrupt word so far as the power of denotation is concerned.

But their equality in this respect tends to invalidate the division of words into correct and corrupt ones. At the same time it reduces the force of the Vedic injunction that forbids one to speak corrupt speech, particularly at the time of sacrifice, at the risk of committing a sin. (naṁbhayoh sāktatve sādhasādu-vibhāgābhūvat tad-vyavahāra-virodhaḥ sādhubhir-bhūgaṇṭaṃ nāpabhṛṣṭaṃ na mlecchaṇa ityādi vaidikāvidhi-nigedḥānumapattisectet. TC, p.640-41).

Gaṅgāśa then tries to refute these points. But it is not an easy task for him. He at first advances the argument that, though correct and
corrupt words are found to be equally expressive of meanings in ordinary parlance, yet it is more logical to assign the power of denotation only to the correct ones because only the correct terms are related with their corresponding concept by Sāṃkṣeta or Divine Willition in the form: 'Let this word be denotative of this sense'. Moreover, great authorities like the grammarian Pāṇini and others have studiously maintained the correctness of Sanskrit words but they did not deal with the corrupt forms in the same way. (saktavāyīṣṇa'pi tad-abhiyuktendra-pāṇinyādi-pranīta-vyākaranopagrhītatām eva sāṃskṛtānām sādhutvam astu na hyapabhṛgaśe taś sādhutvaṁ amaryate. TC, p.641). Again, if we assign the power of denotation to both the correct and the corrupt words, we violate the law of parsimony and involve ourselves in redundancy. Therefore, Gāṅgāsalā maintain, it is much more reasonable to take correct Sanskrit words to be the only significant forms of speech. He further contends that the apparent denotative capacity of the corrupt words is the result of imposition or false attribution. (ekatra sāktayāpyanyatra tadāropāt tadartha-pratītyupapattāv-ekatraiva sāktir-lāghavāt. TC, p.641). He strongly insists that the assumption of Sākti (power of denotation) in respect of more than one word denoting the same sense has no logical justification. Moreover, a Sanskrit word has the same form in all parts of the country whereas apabhṛṣṭas have got variant forms in different areas. Therefore, the power of denotation pertains to the Sanskrit words alone. (sā ca sāktiḥ sāṃskṛta eva sarvadesā tasyaikatvāt nāpabhṛṣṭasqu teṣāḥ pratidesāṁ ekatraṁ the bhīmna-bhīmna-rūpāṇām tāvacchaktikalpanā-gaurāvāt. TC, p.641). In order to fortify his standpoint he refers to the Hīmaṭaśa aphorism: 'anyāyasāneka-sābhatvam'. (MS. 1.3.26).

Jayanta Bhāṭṭa laid very much emphasis upon the almost beginningless tradition of preceptors and disciples in favour of the argument that, denota-
tive capacity should be restricted to correct words alone and it should not be extended to their corruptions also. The logicians think that denotative capacity is nothing but God's Volition in the form: 'Let this particular meaning be cogniscd from this particular word'. (asmät paddāi-sāmy-arthe bodähavya itīśvara-saketo sākthi. Ts, p.50). From time immemorial learned and honourable preceptors are traditionally putting their utmost effort to maintain the correctness of pronunciation of the Vedic and Sanskrit words through their able disciples. The preceptor does not alaken his effort till the disciple becomes fully capable of correct pronunciation. If the corrupt words enjoy the same status regarding careful effort, then and then only they can be regarded as endowed with the same status in respect of denotation. (......ittham eva yadi gāvyaśīnām gavādīvāt pramādattaḥ supariraksitaḥ prayagastathaiva tebhyo'rtha-pratipatti-pūrvako vyavahāras-tadā'nādi-gavādi-sābdha-samāna-vigāya eva gāvyaśaya iti .....NH, p.386). But the case is entirely contradictory in respect of the corrupt words. There is no such tradition of scientific or careful effort to maintain the forms of the corrupt words. On the other hand, the pronunciation of the words like 'gāvī' always goes through various transformations due to inadvertence, laziness, incapacity, etc., among laymen. Such corrupt words are particullarly used by uneducated lower-class people, children, women and the old folk who, in spite of their best efforts, are quite unable to reproduce with perfect correctness the words heard by them. (......asti tvatrānyaḥ prakāre na hyskāntena yādīgeva vaktrā sābdhā prayujyate tālgeva sōtrā pratyuccaryate kīṁ tu pramādālayādi-vividhāparādā-vigūna-karāngocā-ryaṁāṇo'pabhramśatām sprṣān dṛṣyate ityasti saṁśayāvāsaraḥ .....NH, p.386).

It is quite obvious, therefore, that in the case of doubt as to which class of words the denotative capacity should belong, any rational being would logically side with the correct or chaste words and not with the corrupt words which attain variety due to inadvertence and incapacity and thus
various corrupt words like 'gāvī', 'gonī', etc., are used to convey the same concept. (....tasmād-avasāyam tāvad-adhyatve paridrṣyamānūpaithraṃdā -dēsā durvala-vālovaleśi-sābdānaṃ na gavādīsābdān spardhitum arhanti, te cenna spardhante tadādhunā gāvyādayo'pi prakārāntaropapatti-sambhūvanākura-prabhavāḥ santo ma gavādī-sābdā-samāna-vidhitvam adhyavasātum sākunyuritī tarkayāmaḥ ....NM, p.387). The corrupt words have no definite or standardized form due to their ever-changing character as shown before. Hence they cannot be regarded as possessed of the capacity of denotation which is natural and ever existent. (tat-ṣarūpasyāvyavasthitā-tvena nisarga-siddhi-ka-sāktipātraṭā'rupattheḥ. ....NM, p.388).

It may be argued that the logicians do not consider the words eternal. The eternity of words is maintained by the īmānsīsts. Hence, according to the logicians, the chaste words cannot enjoy eternal and natural power of denotation. But this argument does not hold good. The logicians hold that denotative capacity is nothing but the volition of God who imposed this power upon the words at the time of very first creation of the world. Thus this power is well-established and it is as good as eternal and natural.

On the other hand, the corrupt words signify some ideas due to the imposition of signification upon them by ordinary human beings and convey only conventional concepts. Hence the two classes of words can never enjoy equal status. (......pratipattistu svakṛtā-samaya-mātra-nibandhanā tebhyaḥ, naiyāyikāṇām kva vē na samayaḥ pratipattyupāyaḥ, satyaḥ sā tvēvāra-pratītaḥ prathama-sargāth prabhṛtī pravṛttō māṃsaśakēbhupagata-naisargika-sākti-sodaraṇa eva na maḍrāsa-racita-parimita-viṣaya-samaya-samānaḥ. sa ca gavādi-sābdagevva prūpta-pratigṛho na gāvyādiṣu ....NH, p.388).

So the corrupt words cannot be assumed to have denotative capacity. But it is an undeniable fact that these words also convey some concepts. The logicians opine that the corresponding correct forms are remembered consciously or unconsciously due to the similarity of the letters of the
corrupt forms like 'gāvī' with the correct ones like 'gauḥ' which actually denote the meanings and thus the corrupt terms only appear to be significant. (te tu varṇa-sārūpyācchāyā gavaḍi-sāmbda-smṛtim ādadhānāstäd-
artha-pratipatti-hetutām upagacchantīti. NM, p.388),
CHAPTER - IV.

SECTION - IV: The Views of the Grammarians.

The grammarians do not agree with either the Himmansists or the logicians in respect of the denotation of apabhrạṣṭa words. The opponents maintain that the apabhrạṣṭa words cause remembrance of the corresponding chaste words and thus become expressive of meanings, only indirectly, through the medium of the correct words, which actually possess the power of denotation. It is, no doubt, an experienced fact that on hearing the indistinct utterings of children we remember the corresponding words in their correct and distinct nature and then realise the corresponding concepts. Similarly, in various cases a person, well-versed in the chaste forms of words, infer the correct forms from the corrupt ones uttered by uneducated people and those inferred correct terms denote the corresponding concepts to him and he acts accordingly. The cause of this inference lies in the similarity between the sound forms of the corrupt words and the corresponding correct ones. Other uneducated people watch the activity of the educated person and think that the corrupt words themselves denoted the meanings to the latter. Hence they unknowingly identify the corrupt terms with the correct ones and through this identification the corrupt forms of words become expressive of meanings to them.

(te sādhuṣvanumānena pratyayotpatti-hetavah,
tādātmyam upagamyeva sābdārthasya prakāśākāh. VP.I, 15).

But the grammarians find fault with this view. (na hi sādhusmaraṁ-
tato bodhaḥ. VSIL, p.63). The reasons are not far to seek. Most people using corrupt terms are not at all in the know of the chaste words and, hence, they cognise meanings directly from the corrupt words without any intermediate recollection of the corresponding correct ones. Had their been no denotive capacity of the corrupt words, there would be no verbal cognition of the people blissfully ignorant of Sanskrit. (....sādhusmara-
nam vināpi bodhānubhavat. tadvacaka-sādhu-sābdam-ajñatam bodhānupatte-
ścā. VSLM, p.64). There is a well-established dictum that words are used
only to express some meanings. Hence, there being no difference between a
corrupt word and the corresponding correct word in respect of generating
verbal cognition, the corrupt words must be regarded as equally related
with the concepts conveyed by them as the correct ones are. (ayam bhāvaḥ,
'arthagatyarthathā sādya-prayahā'. arthāvagatesāpasādebhyaopyavisistatvāt
tēṣām apyarthena sambandha iti. Ku T, p.65).

The opponent may, however, argue that the corrupt words give rise
to such inference as 'there must be some correct word corresponding to it'
and, as such, this inference leads to the cognition of the concepts from
the corrupt forms of speech. But this view cannot be agreed to. The power
of denotation is regarded as seated in a particular word in respect of a
particular meaning only if there be an invariable antecedence of the word
to the meaning. But it is not the case with this view, because there is
no reference to a particular word but to any corresponding word. When
a person hears the term 'gagari' (a pitcher) he may infer the term 'ghaṭa'
as the corresponding chaste word while another person may infer the term
'kalaśa' from the same. Thus, the antecedence becomes variable. What is
more important, it is only an uttered word which can be regarded as deno-
tative of meaning. Denotative capacity cannot be assigned to any recollec-
ted or inferred in term. (tadarthā-jñāpaśa-tvena smarāṇyā tu nārthopa-
sthāpakaṃ śaktatvāvacchedakaṁpūrvyagrahāt, tadvacaka-sarvanāma-smarāṇ-
umbhavācca, uccāritisayiva bodhakatvena smṛtasādhuto bodhāsambhāvācca.
VSLM, p.64).

It has been argued by Śabara that, a Sanskrit-knowing person hears
a corrupt word, but and then he remembers the corresponding correct word.
This word denotes the meaning to him. But an uneducated third person,
quite unaware of this fact, thinks that the corrupt term itself denotes
the meaning and thus he comprehends the concept from the corrupt term due to wrong cognition of the power of denotation in that term. But the same line of argument may be directed against the correct words also. It may be argued that, on hearing a correct Sanskrit word an uneducated person remembers the corresponding corrupt word which, in its turn, denotes the meaning to him. Practically it often happens that a layman, ignorant of Sanskrit, does not understand the meaning of a Sanskrit term and when somebody translates it into the corresponding corrupt word, he comprehends the sense. It may be contended that the chaste words are preferable due to the cognition or of the same meaning from the same term by the Sistas everywhere. But the same is the case with an apabhraṣṭa word, e.g., with a term of Māhārāṣṭrī Prākṛta, also. Difference in the cognition of meaning from the same term by the Sistas inhabiting different countries is seen equally in respect of both the types of words. So the criterion of the identity of verbal cognition of the Sistas everywhere cannot be regarded as a definite pointer (vinigamaka) in favour of the chaste ones. Patañjali has remarked that the root 'śāv' is used to denote the action of 'going' in Cambodia while the Indian Aryans understand 'transformation' (vikāra) from the same. Thus we see that the Sistas (authorities) belonging to different countries comprehend different concepts from the same chaste Sanskrit term. (tadbhāṣyakṛtā ca tatroktarītyā sāktibhramā upapādita ityucyate tadā pratya- kaś tat-tat-saṁskṛtasya tattad-apabhraṣṭena vinigamanā—virahāt teṣu sāk- tih, na ca sakaladesā-siṣṭa-parighnītatvas vā śāvār-gatikāraṁ—śāvatir-gatikārā- kambojēṣu, vikāre evainam ārya bhāṣante ityādi-bhāṣya-rītyā tattad- desāniyato-saṁskṛteṣu sāktisiddhyānāpatteṣu "...VSIM, p.68). Here we should remember that there is no bar for a non-Aryan being regarded as an Āpta or a Sīṣṭa only if he possesses the requisite qualifications.

There are other points also that go to vitiate and invalidate the view of the opponents. Sīṣṭas, belonging to different countries and speaking different non-Sanskrit languages including the speeches which are re-
garded as corrupt forms of Sanskrit, are never in a doubt about the denotative capacity of the terms, used by them. Their cognition of the denotative capacity as belonging to these terms cannot be considered as false cognition because it is not contradicted by any stronger subsequent cognition. Moreover, we often find that an uneducated person fails to comprehend any sense from a chaste Sanskrit word and becomes able to grasp the idea when the corresponding corrupt word is referred to him. This very fact conclusively proves that corrupt words, too, are endowed with denotative capacity. (tat-tad-desīya-sīgṭānāgā tat-tad-bhāṣāju jāyamaṇasya nirvicikītā-sāktva-pratyayasya bādhakām vinā bhratavāyogāca. ata eva stri-sūdra-vālaṇāg prayukte sādhau arthasaṃsāye tad-apabhraṃsāne nirṇayāḥ. VSūM, p.66). The poetic blemish known as 'cyutasaṃskṛtidoṇa', which arises owing to the corrupt terms used among chaste ones, may be regarded as a pointer to the non-denotativeness of corrupt words. But it is no proof of lack of denotative capacity on the part of the apabhraṃśa words. It is regarded only as a case of impropriety like the presence of caṇḍāla (a low-caste person) in a gathering of brahmīns which is repulsive to some persons due to its impropriety. (kāye cyutasaṃskṛti-doṇasya duṣṇaktyavijñā tu sādhu-pada-samudāyamadhye'sādhu-pada-darsanena vipra-sabhāyāno caṇḍāla-darsāṇeneva sahaḍdayodvega eveti bodhyam. VSūM, p.76).

This discussion clearly proves that both the chaste Sanskrit words and the non-Sanskrit words (including corruptions of Sanskrit terms) are equally denotative of meaning. The only difference between the two classes of words lies in the fact that the use of grammatically correct Sanskrit terms gives rise to religious merit while others have got no such capacity. (saṁñāṇāyam arthaśāṅgatau sābdaisaśāpasābdaisa sāstrēṇa dharmā-niyamān kriyate. MB,Ip.48).

The Mimansist view that, a corrupt word signifies a sense only due to its similarity with the original correct term, is not acceptable. There are
many words which are similar in sound to some other words, but they do not convey the concepts actually denoted by their similar ones. For example, the word 'ghaṭa' (a pitcher) is similar in sound to the word 'paṭa' (a cloth). But 'ghaṭa' does never denote a cloth. On the other hand, Śigśas are found using both correct and corrupt words. Hence both the types of terms are equally denotive of meaning.

It has been argued that an ignorant person erroneously takes a corrupt word as denotive of meaning when he watches the action of an educated person on hearing that word, though, in fact, the latter comprehended the meaning from the corresponding correct word inferred by him. Thus his cognition of the power of denotation as belonging to a corrupt word is false.

(ubhayesām avicchedād-ānasābda-vivakṣayaḥ, yo'nyaḥ prayujyate sābdo na so'ṛthaśyābhidhāyakah. VP.I.19).

But this view is not based on logic. An erroneous cognition is that which is subsequently contradicted by a right notion. But such is not the case with the cognition of denotation of corrupt words. No person using corrupt terms subsequently experiences any such contradiction. (kiṃca apabhraṃgā sāktasyād kādāpi kasyāpi vyavahartur-bādhādarsānaṇa na tatra sāktigrasayaḥ bhramatvam. asati bādhake pramātvasayaiva nāyāvatvāt. VSLS, p.83).

To sum up: There are two classes of words — sabda or chaste Sanskrit words, ... and apabhraṃgā or unchaste or non-Sanskrit words. Sabdas are those Vedic and Sanskrit words that conform to the grammatical rules (mainly Pāṇini) and the use of which gives rise to religious merit. All other words including corrupt forms of Sanskrit words, are termed as 'apabhraṃgās'. The Mimansists hold that the apabhraṃgās, excepting the corrupt or distorted forms of Sanskrit words, have got denotive capacity of their own; but the
corrupt forms of Sanskrit words have no such capacity; they are expressive of sense, no doubt, but they signify senses only through the medium of the corresponding correct Sanskrit forms which are remembered, consciously or unconsciously, owing to the similarity between the correct and the corrupt words. Similar is the view of the logicians. But the grammarians contend with solid arguments that the denotative capacity of all apabhraṃśa words is an undeniable fact, in as much as, the overwhelming majority of the humanity, who are completely ignorant of the correct and chaste Sanskrit words, comprehend concepts from apabhraṃśa words and face no difficulty in their linguistic behaviour due to such ignorance.