Whenever a particular word is uttered, a particular individual concept flashes forth in our minds. Therefore, a relation between the two relata, word and meaning, is necessary and this is called the power or function of signification. This may be of three types — Sakti or denotation, Laksanam or indication and Vyamanam or suggestion. But different schools of Indian Philosophy differ widely in their opinions on them. For this reason, different schools of philosophical thought uphold different theses about the exact nature of the function of signification.

The Kumanasa, eager to maintain the unquestionable trustworthiness or authority of the Vedas, maintains that the expressive capacity is eternally inherent in a word a parallel to which is found in the burning capacity of fire. (avyuktaḥ sādārthayorbhāvāḥ sambandhāḥ, notpavatam pācät sambandhāḥ sābdasyārthena sambandhāḥ. MS. 1.1.6).

Here a question may be put: 'Why are the meanings of all words not cognised by all persons?' In reply, the Kumanasa points out that, though words are in possession of eternal and natural denotative capacity, yet, in order to generate verbal cognition, the function of this capacity depends upon the knowledge of the conventional relation prevalent in a particular community. This is analogical to the eternal power of comprehending the respective objects belonging to our sense-organs that stand in need of establishing contact with the objects in order to reveal them.

(nanu sati svābhāvike sambandhe vyutpavavad avyutpannavyāpi bodhaḥ syāt, na hyagnir aviditasāktir na dahati — ityatra pratyakṣādeḥ svābhāvike'rtha-pratyāyakatve satyāpi yathā indriyasannikargāpekaḥ tathā trāpi saṁketagra-hasācivasyāiva bodhakatvam ityāha. VB, p.189). But the opponents may argue that, if words possess eternal inherent expressive power, then how is it that some words are found to convey different ideas in different
countries and communities? In reply, the Mīmāṃsaka says that this power, though natural and unchangeable, depends for its operation on conventional relation which varies from country to country and from community to community. This variation of conventional relation accounts for the variation of meaning. Thus with all emphasis at his command, the Mīmāṃsaka upholds the thesis of eternal and inherent expressive power belonging to words and maintains that Sākti or the power of denotation depends on Śāṅketa or conventional relation for its effective operation and this differentiates Sākti from Śāṅketa.

The Mīmāṃsaka is of the opinion that in all cases Sākti or Abhidhā, the function of denotation, denotes the universal and thereafter ceases to function. But it is an undeniable fact that words convey individuals also in our pragmatic activities. For this reason, the Mīmāṃsaka grants recognition to another function named Lakṣaṇā or the function of indication or secondary denotation. According to him, this function brings out the idea of individuals. He also thinks that this function belongs to the primary or denoted meaning. "In his eagerness to establish the correctness of Arthavāda, which merely extols the Vidhi and, thereby, indicates in round-about manner the advisability of following the injunction, the Mīmāṃsaka feels the necessity of describing Lakṣaṇā as a function pertaining, as well, to the import of a proposition, and accordingly explains it as a power, competent to bring into comprehension an idea, related in some form or other to a complete thought-unit presented by a significant entity." (LC., p.130). Kumārila Bhāṭa makes it abundantly clear in the following verse:

(jāterastitvanāṣṭitve na ca kaścid vivakṣati,
nityatvāllakṣyamāṇāya vyakteste hi visēṣāca Śv, VII. V.311).
Following this, Mukalabhaṇṭa cites the expression, 'gaur-anubandhyah' (a cow is to be immolated) as an illustration of Lakṣaṇa. Here the term 'gaur' denotes the universal cow-hood. But, the universal is an eternal entity and, hence, establishment of logical connection between immolation and this universal is an absurdity. What the proposition actually signifies is that a cow-individual is to be sacrificed. This concept of the individual is signified through Lakṣaṇa. Again, in the proposition, 'gabhīrāyāṁ nadyāṁ ghosah' (There is a herd-station on the deep river), the idea of the bank of the fathomless river is conveyed through indication, neither by the term 'gabhīrā' alone, nor by the term 'nadyāṁ' singly, nor by both the words severally. This, according to the Māṁśaka, is signified by Lakṣaṇa by both the terms conjointly. Therefore, Lakṣaṇa is a function belonging to a primary meaning of either a word or a sentence the impression of whose denotation is excited through the relation of conveyance. (jñāpyasambandhodbudhaḥsāskārato bodhe lakṣaṇa. ......'gabhīrāyāṁ nadyāṁ ghosah' ityādyanurodhat. VSāM, p.129). The word 'Gabhīrā' cannot signify the concept of the bank, as in that case its connection with the meaning of the term 'nadyāṁ' becomes absolutely difficult because the bank is not identical with the river itself. (na tāvagyabhīrapadāṁ tīralakṣaṇaṁ nadyāṁ ityānvyāpateḥ. na hi tīrāṁ nadī. VSāM, p.130). Similarly, the word 'Nadī' also cannot convey the concept of the bank, in as much as, establishment of connection of bank with depth is equally difficult, since the bank itself is not fathomless. (ata eva na nadipade'pi, gabhīrapadārthānvyāyat. nahi tīrāṁ gabhīram. VSāM, p.130). Again, it is not possible for both the terms to signify their respective secondary senses separately -- the former signifying the 'deep bank' and the latter, 'the bank of the river' -- since the sum-total of these two meanings does not amount to the actual
meaning, i.e. 'the bank of the fathomless river'. (na ca padadvaye
pratyekag visistanaditirajpreatiprasaṅgat. VSLM, p.130). It is also
not logical to argue that either the word Gabhīra alone conveys the actual
sense and the word 'nadi' helps us ascertain the intention of the speaker
in order to fix up the exact secondary meaning; or the word 'nadi' alone
signifies the exact secondary sense, the word 'gabhīra' only helping us
in making out the said intention, in as much as, it is very difficult to
choose between the two alternatives as there is no decisive evident for
any one of them. (na ca nadipeḍena gabhīranaditirajanakṣyate gabhīra-
padaṇa tātparyagrāhaskam iti vācyam. vinigamanā-virahat. VSLM, p.130).

Of course, it may be argued that the word 'nadi' denotes a tangible object,
whose connection with the bank is more intimate and real and, therefore,
the second alternative should be accepted. But it may be pointed out
that, the word 'gabhīra' denotes a quality which cannot reside without
a substratum and so its connection with the bank is more intimate and,
hence, the first alternative is better than the second one. (na ca
nadīpadasya dravyavācakataya saṅkṣatambandhaurodhena tatraiva seti
vācyam. gabhīra-padasyāpi nityagunaṅvācakataya tenāpi saṅkṣatambandha-
syaiva sattvā. VSLM, p.130). Thus, the Mīmāṃsaka concludes, the
intended idea is signified through the function of indication by both
the mutually related terms, 'gabhīrayam' and 'nadyām' conjointly.
(ataḥ samudāye saṅgīkaryā. VSLM, p.130).

According to the Mīmāṃsaka, the function of indication depends,
for its operation, upon two preconditions. This function is resorted to
only when the comprehension of primary meaning of a term or terms is
debared owing to its contradiction to or incompatibility with any other
valid source of knowledge. This incompatibility is the first pre-condition.
The second condition is that it must convey only such a concept which is intimately related with the denoted primary meaning, i.e. the universal. It is not competent to signify any such concept as is not intimately connected with the primary concept of the word or words.

(Māṇḍaraviruddhe tu mukhyārthasya parigrahe, abhidheyyāvinābhūtapratītirlakṣaṇocyate. T.V. 1.4.).

In the sentence, : 'A cow is to be immolated in a sacrifice', the term 'cow' means 'cow-hood'. But this universal, being an eternal entity, cannot be immolated. Hence the primary meaning is incompatible with immolation and so it becomes unacceptable and we cannot be satisfied with the comprehension of this primary meaning. The function of denotation cannot work any further to solve this problem, but ceases immediately after its duty, i.e. signification of the universal, is performed. There is a well-established dictum that restricts a word to become active again in the same way after it ceases functioning. (sābdabuddhikarmāṇena viramayāyāpārābhūvah. oft quoted.). Therefore, the second function, viz. 'Lakṣaṇa' of the power of indication, steps in to remove the hurdles and it conveys the concept of an individual cow which is intimately connected with universal cowhood, owing to their mutual inseparability.

However, we should note in this connection that, the famous Māṁśaka, Prabhākara, maintains that the cognition of the individual arises automatically, and simultaneously with the cognition of the universal through denotation, because the universal can never exist without an individual as its substratum and, therefore, cannot be comprehended without the cognition of the individual. So, he does not accept 'Lakṣaṇa' for the comprehension of the individual, though Kumārila and his followers find it necessary.
The Mīmāṃsaka extends recognition to a third function, viz. 'gaṇa' as a separate one. The function of indication conveys only such a concept as is intimately related with the primary meaning and ceases thereafter not to be revived again. But if an object, associated with some attributes (guṇas) which are indicated through Lakṣaṇa, be cognised from any linguistic expression, then another function must be recognised and it is termed 'Gaṇa', due to its association with 'guṇa' (attribute). The conditions of its operation are the same as those of Lakṣaṇa. (abhidheyaṁvinśbhute pravṛttir lakṣaṇasyate, lakṣaṇamāṇapagunair yogād vṛttteśviṣṭa tu gaṇataḥ, TV, on K.S. 1.4.22, p.354). As an illustration, Kumārila quotes the expression : 'vahini-māṇavakah', i.e., the boy is fire. Here the term 'vahini' signifies the universal 'firehood' through the function of denotation and conveys the concept of individual fire through the function of indication. Similarly, the term 'māṇavakah' denotes the universal boy-class and indicates an individual boy. Then, there being a similarity between the colour and splendour of fire and those qualities of the boy, the sense of the boy resembling fire in respect of colour and splendour is brought out through "Gaṇa Vṛtti". Thus it is seen that, a similarity between the attributes of two individuals lies at the root of 'Gaṇa Vṛtti'.

(vahnitvā-lakṣitādārthāt yat paṁgalyādī gāmyate,
tena māṇavake buddhiḥ sādṛśyādūpajāyate. TV, on 1.4.22 p.354).

Thus Kumārila shows that there is a difference between Lakṣaṇa and Gaṇa-Vṛtti in point of time of cognition, because the latter conveys an object that is similar to a thing, signified by the former function (Lakṣaṇa).

It should be noted in this connection that, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, Lakṣaṇa and Gaṇa Vṛtti actually belong to meanings and not
to the words. Still they are regarded as the functions of a word or of a sentence in accordance with the well-established dictum: - 'yatparah sabdah sa sabdarthah', i.e. the intended meaning for the signification of which a word is used, is the actual meaning of that word.

It is interesting to note that those thinkers, who do not recognise the necessity of Lakṣaṇā for the signification of the individual, do not regard 'Gauni' as a separate function. Hence the logicians and the rhetoricians accept Gauni only as a type of Lakṣaṇā. Here connection or relation between two objects is established through their qualities. Moreover, the root of this type of function is similarity which, too, is a quality. This is why the Lakṣaṇā based on similarity is called 'gauni'.

But Nagesā extends his tacit concept to the difference between Lakṣaṇā and Gauni as maintained by the Mīmāṃsaka. He says that the indicated meaning is directly connected with the primary meaning whereas the concept conveyed by 'Gauni Vytti' is connected with the primary one only indirectly through the attributes of the denoted entities and, hence, 'Gauni' is inferior to 'Suddha' (pure) type of Lakṣaṇā, which in its turn, is inferior to 'Abhidha' (the power of denotation). (mukhyārtha-sambandha-mūla-ropān mukhyārtha-vṛttiguna-samāna-gunavattvarūpā-paramparāsambandha-mūlāropo jaghāya iti gaunyā stijaghanyātvam bodhyam. VSIM, p.146).
CHAPTER - II.

SECTION - II - THE VIEWS OF THE LOGICIANS.

The logicians cannot agree with the Maññásaka thesis of eternal expressive power belonging to words. This power, according to them, cannot be parallel to the eternal burning capacity belonging to fire. The reason is that, while for its operation, the burning capacity does not depend upon its knowledge, the expressive power is absolutely dependent for its operation on the knowledge of conventional relation existing between a word and its primary meaning. Thus the Maññásaka thesis entails a violation of the law of parsimony (Laghava), as, according to this thesis, conventional relation is an imperative necessity in addition to the eternally inherent expressive power. Therefore, this doctrine should be controverted. The logicians maintain that their doctrine that, Sakti or the power of denotation is nothing different from Sañkata or the 'Will of God', is in conformity with the law of parsimony. The logicians join-hand with the Vaisēvikas in order to controvert the Maññásaka-doctrine of eternal and natural relation subsisting between a term and its concept. They deny the existence of any such eternal relation, in as much as, there is no perceptual or inferential evidence to support it. Moreover, according to them, a word is not eternal and, hence, the question of the eternity of relation subsisting in a word does not arise at all. There can be no relation of conjunction (Sañyoga) or inherence (Sañavāya) subsisting between a word and its meaning as these two do not share the same locus; the former originates in the vocal apparatus whereas the latter remains outside. Still there must be some relation between the two and this relation is nothing else than the 'Will of God' which expresses itself either in the form: 'Let this meaning be cognised from this word' or in the form: 'Let this word convey this particular meaning'. This 'Will of God' is the relation that connects words with their respective
meanings and this is identical with the real denotative capacity or Sakti belonging to words. (atra tarkikah — 'asmacchatadaya artho boddhavyah' ityakara 'ida' padam imam artha' boddhayatu' ityakara vesevarecchah saktih laghavat. saiva sakketah sambandhah. PLM, p.6).

The opponents may object that, as word, meaning, signifying capacity and cognizance — all these four factors are the objects of expression of the Divine Volition and are, therefore, related to it with the same relation, so how can a term and its respective concept be differentiated from each other as the denoter (vācaka) and the denoted (vācyā) respectively? In reply, the logicians maintain that the word alone is regarded as the denoter because it is the agent that causes the cognition of meaning, and the meaning alone is taken to be the denoted entity as it is the content of such cognition. Cause and effect relation is the determinant factor in this case. Hereby it is also clear that there is no possibility of the cognition itself being regarded either as the denoter or as the denoted (saktivyavatvalaksanah sambandhah pade 'the bodhe ca tathā'pi bodhansirṣṭha-janyatānirūpita-janakatāvatvena saktivāsāy vācaka, padajanya-bodhavisayatvena saktivāsāy vācya iti nātiprasāṅgap. PLM, pp. 6-7).

According to the logicians, a sentence is the only significant unit of speech, or in other words, primary denotation (of a complete idea) subsists actually in a sentence. Then by concomitance in presence and in absence or by insertion and extraction (āvāpa and udvāpa), the parts of a sentence (i.e. the parts of speech) are imagined to be endowed with the power of denotation.

(vākyabhāvan avāpta'ya sarthakasyāvabodhatah, sampādyate sabdatodho na tanmātrasya bodhatah. ŚŚEv.12, p.63).
In this connection one point demands due consideration. The 'will of God', His Knowledge and Action - all these three may be termed as Sakti as there is no definite pointer (vinigamaka) in favour of any one of them. In order to avoid this difficulty, some logicians define Sakti as God's Knowledge having verbal cognition for its object. The verbal cognition (Sabdabodha) has for its primary cause the knowledge of words, the function (vyapara) of which is constituted of the recollection of meanings caused by such words; the knowledge concerning Sakti, these logicians add, is auxiliary to verbal cognition, because without this knowledge it is not possible for a person to recollect objects even when words are comprehended by him.

\[
\text{(padajnanam tu karanam dvaram tatra padarthadhu,)}
\]
\[
sabdabodhaphalam tatra saktidhah sahakarin. \text{ BP.v.81).}
\]

According to the Naiyaika (logician) thesis, hearing of a particular word causes recollection of its particular concept with which it is connected by conventional relation superimposed by Divine Volition. This recollection is possible due to the 'Laws of Association' according to which the cognition of one of the two mutually related entities invariably leads to the recollection of the other related object.

To sum up: the Naiyaika identifies Sakti with Samketa which is wholly artificial, in as much as, it is improvised by Divine Volition. His thesis differs from that of the Mimamsaka in so far as while the Mimamsaka differentiates Sakti from Samketa, the Naiyaika equates the former with the latter and concludes that conventional relation superimposed by Divine Volition alone constitutes the sole cause of verbal cognition. However, the ancient and the new schools of the logicians differ among themselves regarding the exact interpretation of 'Samketa'. According to the ancient school, Samketa is Divine Volition, but the neo-logicians
maintain that any will, be it Divine or human, that expresses itself in the form, 'Let this meaning be comprehended from this word' constitutes Śāṅketa. (adhumikasāṅkete tu na sāktirīti sampradāyah. nayyāstu īśvarecchā na sāktip, kintu icchaiva. tena adhumikasāṅkete'pi sāktirastyeva ityāhuh, SM on BP, 61).

The conceptual cognition from the technical terms of grammar as 'ti', 'shu' etc., cannot be said to be caused by Divine will but it is caused by the will of the grammarian, who is a human being. When father gives a name to his son for the first time, the will of the father is the determinant factor and Divine Will seems to be unnecessary. But, according to the ancient school, whenever there is a will of a human speaker (i.e. individual will), Divine Will is also there, for it is eternal and all-pervading as god is conceived as eternal and omnipresent. Therefore, in order to abide by the law of parsimony, only Divine Will should be taken for Śāṅketa.

The problem under consideration is whether denotation subsists at all in a modern term which is used in our day-to-day usage. The older school of the logicians denies this capacity to a modern term. The new school, however, is not arrogant in granting denotative capacity to it. According to some, those words, of which denotation has been granted by such authorities as Pāṇini, etc., cannot be properly regarded as denotative of meaning since they lack the nature of possessing Divine Volition. To this Nāgesda points out that, in the case of the denotation of modern terms as in the case of giving a name to a new-born baby, one should have recourse to Lakṣaṇa or secondary denotation; but the secondary denotation in this particular case is of the nature of ascription or super-imposition. For example, the term 'gobinda' signifies the 'Lord' as its primary meaning and we superimpose the qualities of the Lord on the child who is
signified by the same term. But it is a fact of our common experience that super-imposition is possible only in that case where a relation subsists between that which is being superimposed and that on which something is superimposed. For example, the character of silver is superimposed on the mother-of-pearl only when there is some sort of relation between the two. The grammarian, therefore, characterises this relation as of the nature of object-hood which unifies the denotation of the primary meaning, on the one hand, and the secondary (indicated) meaning on the other.

In consistency with his doctrine that, Sakti is identical with the relation subsisting between a word and its corresponding meaning, as is fixed by Divine Volition, the Naiyayika defines Lakṣaṇā also in terms of a relation that links a secondary sense with a primary one and which emanates from the incompatibility of the primary meaning with the intention of the speaker. (lakṣaṇā sākyasambhastātparyānupattitasa, BP.v.82). Here also he depends upon the laws of association and maintains that, just as in the case of comprehending the meaning through Sakti, the cognition of the word unit gives rise to the recollection of its conventional meaning, similarly in the case of cognition through Lakṣaṇā also the knowledge of the conventional meaning leads to the recollection of the secondary meaning which, in its turn, gives rise to conceptual cognition. For example, when the sentence: 'gaṅgāyāṁghoṣah' (there is a hamlet on the Ganges), is heard, then owing to the incompatibility of the primary meaning of the term 'gaṅgāyāṁ' (on the Ganges) with the intention of the speaker, the conventional meaning (the water-flow) leads to the recollection of the secondary meaning, the bank of the river, due to its relation (of association) with the primary meaning and then
there arises the verbal cognition, 'The hamlet is on the bank (of the river Ganges)' (pravāhṛupa-sākyarthasaṃbandhasya tīrte gṛhitatvāt tīrasya smaraṇam. tataḥ bodhaḥ. SM on BP v.82) p.364). The relation subsisting between the primary and the secondary meanings, the logicians maintain, may present itself in any of the following five forms:

1. in the form of a connection existing between a container and the thing contained, e.g., 'The cradles are laughing';
2. in the form of a connection between an imitator and the imitated, e.g., 'The boy is a lion';
3. in the form of proximity, e.g., 'The hamlet is on the Ganges';
4. in the form of association, e.g., 'Admit the sticks' and
5. in the form of relation subsisting between a benefactor and the beneficiary, e.g., 'The stakes are Indra'.

(tātsthvyātathāiva tāddharmyāt tāstāmpyāttathāiva ca, tātsthacaryāt tādarthyaḥ jñeyaḥ vai laksāṇa-buddhayā. PLM, p.17).

The logicians controvert the Mīmāṃsaka view-point that, incompatibility of the primary meaning of a term with the concepts conveyed by other terms paves the path for the operation of Laksāṇa because, in that case, such expressions as, 'admit the sticks', 'protect the curd from crows', etc., would be left out of the scope of indication, as there is no such incompatibility.

(yadya-vayānupapattirlakṣāṇāvījaya syāt, tataḥ yaśṭih pravesāya-tyādau lakṣāṇa na syāt, yaśṭisu pravesānvyāsya-ānupapatter-abhāvāt. SM on BP, v.82, p.364).

Moreover, as the said incompatibility can be removed in different ways, the same sentence is likely to convey different ideas through Lakṣāṇa.

Thus according to the Mīmāṃsaka, in the example, 'gāṅgāyaḥ ghoṣah' (There is a hamlet of cowherds on the Ganges). The primary meaning of the term 'gāṅgāyaḥ' (on the stream) being incompatible with that of the
term 'ghoṣah' (a hamlet), the former term conveys through Lakṣaṇā the concept of the bank in order to remove the incompatibility. But equally forceful is the counter argument that, as logical connection of a row of fish can be established with the flowing stream, so the term 'ghoṣah' conveys, through indication, a row of fish. Thus it is extremely difficult to ascertain the meaning of such sentences. (yadi cāṇayānu-papattir-lakṣāṇāvījaṃ syāt, tādā kvācid gaṅgāpadasya tīre kvācid ghoṣapadasya matsyādau lakṣaṇetī niyamo na syāt. SM on BP v. 82, p.365). Hence, in order to do away with this difficulty, the logicians accept the incompatibility to convey the intention of the speaker (tātparyānmopapatā) as the primary precondition for the operation of Lakṣaṇā in stead of the inconsistency of the primary meaning (mukhyārthaḥādha). (vastutastu tātparyānmopapathip-atisandhiḥcānameva tad-vijam. PLM, p.17). Thus in the sentence, 'Admit the sticks', the intention of the speaker is to allow the holders of sticks to enter. But, as this idea is incapable of being conveyed through the primary meaning, the term 'sticks' conveys the concept of 'the holders of sticks' through its power of indication. Moreover, this standpoint of the logicians explains the comprehension of a definite meaning from a single proposition, because the intention of the speaker is always the same in a particular proposition. It cannot be argued that in some cases the inconsistency of primary meaning paves the path for the operation of Lakṣaṇā and in some other cases the job is done by the incapability of bringing out the intention of the speaker, because, this leads to unnecessary complexity. Thus the first factor for the operation of Lakṣaṇā, the logicians hold, is the inability of the primary meaning to bring out the intention of the speaker (tātparya-vādha).

The second factor is the existence of a relation between an entity primarily denoted by a term and the secondary meaning indicated by it. The third
factor is usually held as usage or motive by some schools of thinkers (mainly by the rhetoricians). But the logicians reject usage, since the so-called indication based on usage is but another name of Sakti or denotation.

The logicians do not see eye to eye with the Mīmāṃsaka also in respect of asserting the function of indication to a sentence or a collection of words. "In conformity to his thesis that Lākṣaṇa is comprised of a relation which the secondary idea bears to the primary one and that the recollection of the conventional meaning is caused by comprehension of the word, with which alone its relation is fixed by the Will of God, the Naiyāyika maintains that, a sentence or a collection of words mutually related to one another does not constitute the field of its operation. And this is so because no idea is assigned to a sentence as a whole by Divine Volition and consequently, the question of existence of a type of connexion of the secondary concept with the idea does not arise." (LC, pp. 133-34). Thus in the proposition, 'gabhūrayām nadyām ghosah' (There is a hamlet of cowherds on the deep river), the logicians contend, the terms 'gabhūrayām' and 'nadyām' cannot conjointly signify the secondary sense through Lākṣaṇa, as is maintained by the Mīmāṃsaka. On the other hand, the word 'nadi' conveys through Lākṣaṇa the concept of the bank of the river and the idea signified by the term 'gabhūrayām' becomes connected with the river through the relation of identity. The objection that, a concept cannot be connected with only a part of a concept or sense unit, does not hold good because there are many such linguistic usages, e.g. 'sahā satitapraha' (chopped-winged by arrows) etc. The logicians advanced another solution also. In the present illustration (of Lākṣaṇa) the word 'nadi' (river) alone conveys the concept of 'the bank of the deep
river' through Laksana while the term 'gabhiraayam' helps us merely in ascertaining the intention of the speaker and thus act as an aid to the determination of the exact nature of the indicated meaning. (vakiye tu sakterabhavat sakyasambandhara Laksana nasti. yatra tu gabhiraayam nadya ghojta ityuktam, tatra nadipadasya naditre Laksana. gabhiraapadasya nadya sahabhadenavaya, kvacidekadesanvayasyapi svikratvat. yadi tatraikadesanvayo ma svikriyate, tada nadipadasya gabhiranaditre Laksana, gabhiraapadam taptaparyagrahanam. SM on BP v.82, pp.369-71).

The same line of argument explains the comprehension of idea from a compound word which, as a whole, possesses neither Sakti nor Laksana, since no conventional meaning is assigned to it as a whole by Divine Volition. In all such cases one member of the compound word is regarded as competent enough to signify the whole idea through Laksana while the other member (or members) merely helps us in the ascertainment of the intention of the speaker. In 'itaretaradvandva' and 'karmadharya' types of compound words, however, Laksana does not operate because, in these cases, the component members are competent enough to bring their respective meanings into light through their power of denotation. (dvandve tu dhavakahidirau chindhityadau dhava khadiraasca vibhaktarthadvaprapkara santa budhyate, tatra na Laksana.......karmadharyasthaalas tu nilotpalam ityadau abhedasambandhena milapadartha utpalapadarthe prakara). tatra ca na Laksana. SM. on BP, v.82, pp.373-77.). "Thus unlike the Kinasaka, the Naiyayika denies both Sakti and Laksana to a collection of words, mutually related to one another : and this he does in conformity to his metaphysical scheme, which is essentially theistic". (LC, p.135).
CHAPTER - III.

SECTION-III - THE VIEWS OF THE GRAMMARIANS.

The grammarians fail to see eye to eye with the logicians in respect of the function of words. They challenge the Naiyāyika thesis and maintain that Divine Volition cannot serve as the relation connecting terms with the respective concepts. Any relation must fulfil three pre-requisites - (1) there must be two relata, (2) the relation must subsist in both the relata, and (3) the relata must be related as the container and the thing contained. These three pre-requisites cannot be fulfilled if Divine Will be considered as the relation subsisting between a word and its meaning. It is obvious that Divine Will cannot be thought of as contained in a word or in its meaning. (tanna. icchāyāḥ sambandhino-r-āsrayatānīyāmakatvābhāvena sambandhatvāsambhavāt. 'sambandho hi sambandhīdvaya-bhinnatve sati dvīṣṭhatve ca sati āsrayatāyā visiṣṭabuddhi-nīyāmakaḥ' ityabhiyuktavyavahārāt. PLM, p.7). According to the grammarians, a relation must always lead to a qualified cognition and so they absolutely deny any relation that does not give rise to a qualified cognition. This type of relation is technically known as vṛttiniyāmaka and the second type is called vṛtttyaniyāmaka. The logicians, however, grant recognition to both these types of relation and this difference in their epistemological scheme is the main factor that determines their difference of opinion concerning the role of Divine Will.

When a superior person orders a junior one to bring a cow, a boy standing nearby observes the junior person bringing an animal and infers that the junior one must have understood something and that his cognition must have been caused by the words uttered by the superior one, as there is no other cause in view. Then he thinks that there must be some relation between the sentence and its meaning; because, without any
relation the sentence cannot cause cognition of its meaning. This rule does not hold good by itself and hence the relation of causality cannot be recognised. The reason behind this is that, this relation is imagined after the cognition of the relation of causality and so the causal nexus cannot by itself explain the phenomenon of verbal cognition. For this reason also, the Naiyāyika viewpoint cannot be accepted. (tanna. prayojapravojaka-vṛddha-vyavahāran paśyata vālēna prayojyasya pravṛttyā tasya jñānam anumāya jñānasya copasthitatvāccha-ḥdameva kāraṇatvena gṛhitvā asambaddhasya kāraṇatvānupapatti-jñānapūrvvakaṃ kalpyamānasya sambandhasya svayam anupapadyamānātvena gṛhitā-janakatva-ghājitasya grahītabhām asākyatvāt. VSLH, p.21). The same arguments go to refute the doctrine that causation of cognition is the relation of a term and its corresponding concept. (etena bodhajanakatvam eva padapadārthhayoh sambandha ityapātastam. VSLH, p.21). Moreover, there is no conclusive pointer to determine whether will or cognition is to be regarded as Śakti and, therefore, this doctrine violates the law of parsimony. (vinigamanā-virahapācchāḥbodhinoḥ ubhayoh sakti-tvākālpāne gauravācca. VSLH, p.21). Again, it may be argued that, the subject matter of will in the form: 'Let this be given rise to by this', may be taken as the cause. Another important point also goes to turn down the doctrine. The sources of knowledge (Pramāṇas) cause cognition of knowable entities through a relation which must be different from the relation of cause and effect or the relations proceeding from the causal nexus. Otherwise, the subject of the will of a person in the form:

"Let the cognition of fire be given rise to from the knowledge of smoke" would be taken as the relation between the probans and the probandum and thus the relation of universal concomitance (vyāpti) would be thrown into ground. (anyathā 'dhūmād vahni-jñānān janyatam' iti, icchāvighatvamva vā hetuśāńhyayah sambandhā syāditi vyāştyucchedaḥ. VSLH, p.21). All these
arguments clearly prove that conventional relation or causal nexus cannot be considered as the relation subsisting between a term and its corresponding concept.

Hence Nāgėśābhaṭṭa finally abhers that, the relation is neither of the form of Divine will, as asserted by the logicians, nor any other accepted relation, but that it is of the form of 'the denoter and the denoted' (tasmāt padapārthayoḥ sambandhāntaram eva sāktih. vācyavācaka-bhāvaparaparyāya. VSALM, p.26). This is 'denotation' by virtue of which a word denotes its corresponding meaning. It is interesting to note in this connection that the grammarians look at this relation as a form of identity, although this identity is not one that is accepted in common parlance; this is identity-in-difference. (tadgrāha-kaṇcetaretarādhyāsa-mūlakaś tādātmyam. tacc saṃketaḥ. VSALM p.26).

Although there is mutual difference between a word and its meaning, still by superimposition this difference is completely overlooked. (tādātmyaṁ ca tadbhinnaṁvate sati tadbhedena pratīyamāṇatvam. abhedāvyādhyāstata-vācca na tayorvirodhāḥ. VSALM, p.38). This is supported by our day-to-day experience also. Whenever we say: 'He is Devadatta', the name is the signifier while a particular person is the signified object. Now, the particular usage provides us with a sense of identity or, in other words, the name and the person are treated as identical in a sense. This relation of identity brings a word and its meaning into one single unity rendering impossible thereby the ascertainment of the difference of a particular meaning from a particular word irrespective of time and space. This relation of identity helps in the ascertainment of denotation inherent in a word and, as such, is used in a secondary sense as a synonym of denotation. Now, the difference between a word and its meaning is real and their identity is only a product of illusory superimposition. This explanation of the grammarians is competent enough to
refute the counter-argument of the logicians and the Kāśyapakas that, had the words and their meanings been identical, one would feel burning sensation at the time of uttering the word 'fire'.

This theory of 'superimposed identity of a word with its meaning' (sābdādhyāsāsavāda) of the grammarians faces other serious objections. This doctrine is likely to render identical all the different objects signified by a homonymous word, since things that are equal to the same thing are also equal to each other. Conversely again, this grammarian doctrine converts synonymous words into words signifying different ideas, since such words mutually differ in respect of their constituent letters. (yadi ca sābdah svarūpe gārtham pratipādayati tadā kṣaśabdasayaikyād devana-bhūtaka-rathākṣegu tulyā pratītī syat.... apica paryāyegu hastah karaḥ pānirityādīgu sābda-rūpabhādhyāsa-pakṣe rathabuddhi-bhedah prápnoti na cāsāvastīti nādhyāsah. NM,II, p.101).

It is also pointed out that the basis of super-imposition is either similarity or spatio-temporal association by which the quality of one entity is capable of being transferred to the other. But there is no such similarity or spatio-temporal association between a word and its meaning. (ātmadhyāsascā sādṛṣṭyād-unapāgacca jāyate. Sū, v.209).

But these arguments seem to be based upon an insufficient or distorted knowledge of the logical character of the word-meaning relation. The grammarians maintain that, according to the logic of language, meaning as an epistemic relation should primarily belong to the conceptual plane. Even the opponents should admit that, logically the cognition of a meaning should move hand-in-hand with the universalisation of the meaning and its corresponding word. Physically a word differs from speaker-to-speaker and from utterance-to-utterance. Similarly, the meaning-impression also varies from person-to-person. But our linguistic communication
demands our participation in a common fund of word and meaning ami, hence, words and meanings must transcend their particularity and be sublimated to universals in the realm of conceptual understanding where a word and its meaning coalesce into such a single and monolithic existence that they cannot be separated from each other. "The meaning is so much interpenetrated by the word that the referential function is also an act of self-reference at the same time. This is the famous doctrine of Svarūpavācyatā or Grāhyāsākti of a word, as it has been propounded by Bhartṛhari and interpreted by Pugyanāja and Heḷārāja." (LC, pp.102-3). Now, if the fundamental position of the Śāraṇāvatī philosophy of the grammarians be accepted, then it should be admitted that a word, (viz., 'ghaṭa', the jar) passing into its meaning is nothing but a word appearing as its meaning. Therefore, the meaning is a superimposition on the word as its sustaining substratum. The appearance of the word as the meaning in the realm of consciousness is the reflection of the metaphysical process of the Īśvar Varṣam appearing as the phenomenal world. The word passes into the meaning-consciousness which in its turn passes into the objective world and thus the word is the final substratum which sustains consciousness and the object. At last these three unite in one. (evaṁ ca kṛtvā sarvagha-
ṭasābda-sādhāraṇyaṁ sāmānyarūpaṁ arthapakṣanikṣiptam arthasamāñādhikaraṇaṁ svarūpaṁ asya vācyam arthavat-tat-sāmāñādhikaraṇyāt. tatrāpi tathā pra-
līteḥ, sāmānyarūpe eva saṅketopatateḥ tenaivarthasya sāmāñādhikaraṇyāt, 

In order to fortify this thesis of the grammarian, Nāgāsā advances his 'Buddhārthavāda' which has already been dealt with in all its elaborations (ch.II., Sec.VI). With irrefutable logic, Nāgāsā establishes his own thesis that word and meaning remain identical in the realm of our intellect prior to outward manifestation and this indicates him to be a monist out and out.
"This is an extension of Bhartrhari's doctrine that, the Eternal Verb is the only Absolute reality, which manifests itself in the line of name as also of form, as the process of creation goes on". (LC, p.107).

The net result of this discussion is that neither the difference itself nor the non-difference can account for the relation of a word with its meaning. Hence the grammarian propounds the theory of identity-in-difference which alone can serve as the denotation of a word. This superimposition of a word on its corresponding meaning is first done by God Himself and conventional relation merely reveals this existent fact.

(ayamadhyāsa ādiyavahārakṛdīśvarakṛta eva ......saṃkṣetastūktarūpa īśvarasya sthitam evārtham abhinayati. VŚIM, p.38). A close parallel is to be found in the case of father-and-son relation which is revealed by such sentences as: 'He is his son'. Denotation is absolutely internal in character and it is nothing, but remembrance. To be more explicit, in the process of verbal cognition the knowledge of denotation is of prime importance and whenever a particular word is uttered, a person standing nearby understands the meaning of that word only when he remembers the priorly known denotation of that word. If the denotation is not known previously, it does not help in the least in the ascertainment of the meaning of a word. Nāgasaṇḍhī supports this character of remembrance of denotation on the authority of Patañjali who, in course of determining the nature of Saṃketa, uses the same terminology and brings out the same idea. (taduktam patañjalamahāya-saṃkṣetastu padasadārthayorya-taretarādhyāsārūpah smṛtyātmako yo'yaṣ sābdah so'ṛthaḥ, yo'ṛthaḥ sa sābdah, VŚIM, p.27)

The relation of identity-cum-difference of the word with its meaning is supported by Bhartrhari also who asserts that whenever a word is uttered, the meaning, the nature of the word as well as the will of the speaker are also known.
A causal nexus subsists between the will of the speaker and the relation under consideration, i.e., the relation between the denoter (word) and the denoted (meaning). It should, however, be understood that this relation is in no way temporal. It is not a fact that this relation has been imposed due to some external factor, but that it is a natural relation, which continues from time immemorial and will till continue to exist - a relation which is inherited by a modern man.

Thus, following the footsteps of the Mīmāṃsaka, the Vaiyākaraṇa also describes the word-meaning relation as natural and eternal. The relation is analogous to the relation that subsists between the sense-organs and the objective world; both are without beginning and end. The Vaiyākaraṇa maintains that, if terms were naturally unconnected with their corresponding ideas, none n could have associated them by any external force in any way. For this reason Patañjali also emphatically declares that a word, its corresponding idea and the relation linking the two- all are eternal entities. (siddhe sābdārthasambandhe. MB.I, p.38).

The above discussion clearly shows that the Vaiyākaraṇa agrees with the Mīmāṃsaka also in differentiating Sakti or denotative capacity from Sambandha or the relation subsisting between word and meaning. He declares that this relation is auxiliary to comprehension of the eternal denotative power pertaining to words, which stand in need of ascertainment of relation existing between a word and its corresponding meaning for its effective operation. It has a close parallel in the illuminating power of a lamp, which, though inherent in a lamp, cannot operate and illuminate objects till its connection with them is established. Likewise, Sakti, though inherent in a word, operates and produces verbal cognition only when
the relation of the word with its corresponding meaning is ascertained. This clearly refutes the viewpoint of the author of Sābdakaustubha that, the capacity, subsisting in a word, to signify an idea is Sākti and that is Sambandha, because, Sākti also requires a relation for its operation. (yatū padapatārthaśayor bodhagārthakabhadhāvanīyāmiśaśaktireva sambandha iti, tanna, saktērapi kāryajankatve sambandhaśayaiva niyāmakatvāt. VSIL, p.34). The dependence of Sākti on some relation is also supported by Bhartṛhari in his Vākyapadiya.

(ūpākāraḥ sa yatrāsti dharmaśatārṇugamyate,
śaktinām api sa śaktirgūṇānāṁ apiyasaśa guṇah. VP.III.5, p.100).

This conventional relation resides in words as well as in sentences. This grammarian viewpoint is supported by the commentator of Nyāyaśūtra also, who asserts that, grammatical texts have been composed in order to preserve correctly this conventional relation, which, though resides in the terms, yet belongs to the sentences as well and brings out the meanings. (samaya-
pālanārtham cedam padalakṣaṇāyā vāco 'nvākhyānaṃ vyākaranam. vākyalakṣaṇāyā vāco 'rtho lakṣānam. Nb, on VS.1.1.56), Nj, p.125). Of course, the triple conditions of expectancy, compatibility and proximity (discussed in Ch.V Sec.-I) help us in ascertaining the conventional relation in case of a sentence. Thus the Vaiyākaraṇa scrupulously distinguishes Sākti from Saṃketa or Sambandha and in support of his view cites such expressions as: 'This sense constitutes the conventional meaning of the word', 'This idea is signified by the denotative capacity of this term', etc. Such linguistic behaviours clearly distinguish Sākti from Saṃketa. (anena hi padeśyiva vākyāvāpi aśivarāḥ saṃketa iti sāpāṭam evoktam. vākyāvāye samayagrāhi-
kākāṅkṣādyapi. VSIL, p.34).

It is interesting to note that, though the Vaiyākaraṇa agrees with the Naiyāyika in respect of regarding a sentence as the only significant unit of speech, yet he completely repudiates the standpoint of the Naiyāyika
recognising the reality of word-units isolated from a sentence. Bhartrhari asserts that, just as letters can never be split into component parts, so words also cannot be divided into constituent parts and words, too, have no existence of their own if they are separated from the sentence.

(pade na varṇā vidyante varṇasyavā īva,
vākyāt padānām atyantām praviveko na kascāna. VP-I.73).

Punyaraja also describes the non-existence of words apart from a sentence. He says that Pāṇini and Patañjali looked to the grammatical analysis of a sentence into component words and of words into constituent units and sub-units as an artificial method which helps the understanding of unintelligent people and they resorted to this necessary evil only because it helps one arrive at the Supreme Truth. (tasmaṁ manyāmahe padānyasatyāni. ekam abhinnavbhāvakaṁ vākyam. tadavavodhanāya padavibhāgaḥ kalpitaḥ.
PR, on VP,II.57). The Vaiyākaraṇa maintains that, like a sentence, its meaning is also indivisible. In illustration he shows that just as the meaning of the word 'brāhmaṇa' (brāhmin) in the expression, 'brāhmaṇakaṇ-balam' (a blanket for a brāhmin) has got no separate existence apart from the meaning of the whole expression, similarly, the constituent terms of a sentence have got no meaning of their own separate from the complete idea conveyed by the whole sentence.

(brāhmaṇārtho yathā nāsti kāṣeṣid brāhmaṇakaṁbale,
devadattaḥdayo vākye tathāvai saurāṇaṁtathākaṁ. VP,II.14).

But the Naiyāyika challenges this doctrine and says that, the very fact that, a change of a word in a sentence amounts to a resultant change in the meaning of the sentence, clearly establishes the separate existence of individual words and their capacity to signify meanings of their own. Similar is the case with the parts of a word also. (ataścā
sāvayavau vākyavākyārthau padopa-janamāpyābhhyām tadarthopa janamāpya-
darsanad anayaiva yuktay padabhaga api prakrtipratyayadayah tattvikata ityavam:
gantavyam na kalpana-matrapratigdhah,... yo'thoh yan sadam anugacchati
sa tasyarthaha ityavasthitate tat katham asatyadhagah. NH, pp.353-54).

The Naiyayika describes the cognition of words as the primary
cause of verbal testimony and comprehension of the denotative power as
auxiliary to it. Thus, he mentions the cognition of a word and its power
separately as the causes of verbal cognition. But the Vaiyakara/ga
opines that, cognition of words, as endowed with the power of signification, is
the primary cause of verbal cognition. With a view to ensuring that his
view does not lead to complexity, he maintains that verbal cognition of
a particular entity is caused by a knowledge, qualified by the power of
signification (vrtti) ascertained with reference to that particular
entity. (taddharmava-chinna-vigayaaska/a/satvatvavacchinam prati taddharmava-
vacchinna-nirupita-vrtti-visista-jyotinam hetah. VSL, p.12). Here the concept
of word is automatically understood through 'samsarga' or association. This
knowledge qualified by the power of signification co-inheres in the same
substratum with the excited impression of the power of signification and
word, which is the resort of the power, is included in it as its content.
(sane vrttivaisistya ca svavigayakodbudhha-sa/pikarasamanadhihkaraya-
svasarayapadavigayakatvobhaya-sambandhena bodhyam. VSL, pp.15-16). For
this reason verbal cognition does not accrue to one, who has no knowledge
of the power of denotation, or to one who has forgotten the same, or to
one who does not know the particular word itself. (ato naghita-vrttikasya
bodha<n, napi vismitavrttikasya, napi tadvacakapada/janavatitah. VSL, p.16).

The grammarian (Vaiyakara/ga) maintains that, vrtti or the power
of signification appears either in the aspect of Sakti (denotation) or in
that of Laksana (indication) or in that of Vya<njan a (suggestion). (sae ca
vrttistridha, saktir-laksana vyana<nana ca. VSL, p.19). We have already
seen that Sakti is the function of denotation which, according to the
grammarians, consists in a relation between a word and its meaning and
this relation is not of the nature of Divine Volition, but is of the form
of the denoter and the denoted. This relation is cognised through the
relation of identity-cum-difference subsisting between a word and its
meaning, which is called 'Sagketa'. This relation is also called 'Sakti',
because it helps the cognition of 'Sakti' residing in a word. (tasmāt
padārthayoh sambandhāntaram eva saktiḥ vācyavācakāḥbhāvaparāpayā. tā
tadgrāhakaṁcetetarādhyāsaṃulakaṁ tādātmyam. taccā sagketaḥ. tasyāpi
cadaniṣṭhasāktyupakārakatvācchaktiriti vyavahāraḥ. VS.L, p.26).

The grammarian subdivides Sakti into Rūḍhi, yoga and yogaruḍhi.
(saktistridhā rūḍhiryogo yogaruḍhisca. VS.L, p.106). Sakti residing in a
word taken as a whole, irrespective of its component parts, is called
'Rūḍhisakti'. The words 'maṇi' (jewel), 'nūpura' (an ornament of feet),
etc. possess this type of Sakti. Here the meanings of the component parts
are not cognised. (sāstrakṛtakalpitāvavārthāpratītāu yadarthanirūpitaḥ
prakṛtiprātysamudāyamātre bodhakatvān tatpade sā tadarthanirūpitaḥ
rūḍhiḥ, yathā maṇinūpurādau. VS.L, pp.106-7).

On the other hand, when merely the sum total of the senses of
the component parts, imagined by the grammarians, is cognised from a
word, then that word is said to be endowed with 'yogasakti'. The word 'pācakād
(cook) is such a word. Here the components are the verbal root 'pāc' and
the suffix 'ṇvul' and they respectively signify the act of cooking and an
agent. The word expresses the sum-total of these two ideas, viz., 'one who
cooks', i.e., a cook. (sāstrakṛtakalpitāvavārtha-mātrabodhe yogasaktih,
yathā pācakādau. VS.L, p.107).

Again, when a word as a whole conveys a sense that is determined
by the ideas conveyed by its component parts, the word is known as endowed
with 'yogarūḍhisākti'. Paṅkaja is such a word; which means a lotus. The component parts of the word are the stem 'paṅka' (mud), the root 'jan' (to grow) and the suffix 'da' (an agent). The parts jointly mean 'a thing that grows in mud'. But, due to popular usage, the word 'paṅkaja' means a lotus only, in exclusion of other things growing in mud. Thus, in this case, the meaning based on usage is conveyed by the word as a whole; but at the same time this meaning is determined by the combined senses of the component parts. (yatra sāstrakalpitāvavārthān-vita-visēgyabhūtārtha-nirūpitaḥ samudāyabodhakatvaḥ sā yogarūḍhiḥ, yatha paṅkajādipade. VŚLM, p.107). Here there is no scope for lakṣaṇā, because the conditions for its operation are absent. There is no incompatibility of the primary meanings conveyed by the component parts with the sense cognised from the word as a whole. We also need not look for the relation for these two types of meaning in order to comprehend the sense of the term. (padmasyānupapatti-pratisandhānaṁ sambandhapratisandhānaṁ ca vinā bodhāṇna tatra lakṣaṇāvasaraḥ. VŚLM, p.107).

Thus we see that Rūḍhisākti resides in the word as a whole; yogasākti resides in the component parts of a term and yogarūḍhisākti resides simultaneously both in the component parts and in the word as a whole.

According to some thinkers, there is yet a fourth type of Śakti, known as 'yaugikarūḍhi', by which a word conveys in one context the sum-total of the senses conveyed by its component parts and, in another context, it conveys another meaning revealed by the term taken as a whole. For example, the word 'udbhid' in one context means 'plants which come up by penetrating the earth' which is the sum-total of the meanings cognised from the component parts (the prefix 'ut', the root 'bhid' and the suffix 'kvip'). But in another context it means a special type of sacrifice. Thus this sākti is a combination of both 'Rūḍhi' and 'yoga' types of Śakti;
in one case the yogasakti predominates while in another instance the hudi-sakti plays the dominant role. (yatra tu yaugikartha-rudhyarthayoh svasttryena bodhas-tad yaugikarudham. yathodhidadi-padam. tatra hi utbhedana-kartā tarugulmādir-budhyate. yāga visēgo'piti. SM. on BP, 81,p.362).

Unlike the Māmāṣaka and the Naiyāyika, the Vaiyākaraṇa does not regard lakṣaṇa as a power absolutely distinct from sakti. He asserts that when Sakti, belonging to a word, conveys as the primary meaning an unfamiliar object, with the nature of the familiar object superimposed on it, it is called Lakṣaṇa. (āropitasākyatāvacchedakarūpeṇa sāktyaiva tatpadavācyatvena prasiddhanyayaktibodhe vyaktivisēgabodhe vā lakṣaṇeta vyavahāraḥ. VSLM, p.133, based on:- arthamātram viparyastoshādādha svārthe vyavasthitah. VP.II.257). Thus, unlike the Māmāṣaka and the Naiyāyika, the Vaiyākaraṇa accepts no difference between the primary meaning and the secondary meaning in the realm of our intellect. In the stock example: 'There is a hamlet of cowherds on the ganges', the grammarian maintains, Lakṣaṇa indicates the idea of the bank with the state of flowing stream attributed to it and not the mere bank as the logicians think. Thus in the expression, 'Protect the curd from crows', the word 'crow' indicates through Lakṣaṇa 'any being that may spoil the curd, which 'being' is regarded as identical with the crow. ('kākebhyo dadi' ityā-dāvapi dadhyupaghāta-mātre kākatvāropah. VSLM, p.133). This discussion shows that, while the logicians maintain a difference between the determinants of the denoted and the indicated meanings, the grammarians regard them as identical.

Now the opponents may object that, the cognition of the bank as identical with the flowing stream being a false one, it is not likely to lead to the cognition of coolness and purity, the attributes which actually belong to the stream alone. In reply, the grammarians maintain
that, the identity of the bank with the stream is comprehended through Vyanjanā or the function of suggestion, which follows no path of reason and therefore, the soundness of the cognition cannot be challenged or rejected. (na ca 'gangāyam ghoṣah' ityādāvāropitagangātvenā bodhe'pi
tasya jñānasya bhramatvācchāstra jñānavatam sarvathā bhramatvena grahācca
taduttaran gangāgataśāitya-pāvanatvādipatirūpaḥ phalam na sidhyet......
iti vācyaṁ. madhye vyanjanayā mukhyagangāpadārtha-bhedasyāpi prātiṣṭhē.

Patanjali in his commentary on the Pāññin rule 'puyogadākhyānayeṁ' (Pāñ.4.1.48) points out that, the superimposition of one on another
takes place due to any one of the following relations subsisting between
the two: (1) that of the container and the thing contained, (2) that of
the imitator and the imitated, (3) that of proximity and (4) that of
association. The illustrations by order are: (1) 'The cradles laugh',
(2) 'The boy is a lion', (3) 'A herd station is on the Ganges' and (4)
'Admit the sticks'. (caturbhiḥ prakārāir-etasmin sa ityād-bhavatītā-
tathāyāt, taddharmyāt, tattāmipyāt, tattāhacaryād iti. tattāhīyāt tāvat
mañcā hasanti, taddharmyāt yātaṁ yātaṁ brahmadattā ityāha, tattām-
pyād gangāyām ghoṣah, tat-sāhacaryāt yastiḥ pravesāya. ABK. IV, pp.54-55).
Kaiyāṭa, commenting on this, remarks that, the use of the term 'laugh' in
the proposition, 'the cradles laugh', shows that the identity of cradles
is superimposed upon the children reclining on them. (āropate tādṛūpyam,
na tu mukhyam ityārthaḥ. mañcā hasantī. atra vaiśāma mañcatvāropān
mañcasābda-pravṛttir hasantī padāntara-pravogāt viśāyate. ABK. IV, p.54). 

The grammarian doctrine of superimposition finds support in the
Nyāya Sūtra; 'saḥacaraṇaṇaḥ tādārthaḥyāttaṁāna-dhāraṇa-sāmipyayoga-
sādhanādhipatyebhṛyo brāhmaṇa-maṇica-kaṭa-raja-saktu-candana-gangā-sētākānna-
puruṣagvatadbhāve'pi tadupecarāḥ. NS. 2.2.64). Here Gautama also takes
note of this factor of super-imposition, which consists in the attribution of the state of one to another and which is caused by various types of relation subsisting between the thing superimposed and the substratum of superimposition. In commenting on this, the author of the Nyāyaśāstra remarks that the universal 'stick-ness', primarily residing in the stick associated with the Brahmin and causing the application of the word 'stick' to it in exclusion of any other word, is subsequently transferred to the Brahmin himself and, as a result, the Brahmin is called 'stick'. (yaṣṭi-śānt-web tāvadayAmb yaṣṭikāśābdo yaṣṭikāva-jātinīmtakah, tatra saṃyukta-saṃavetāṃ jātin śrāmake samavāyenādhyāropya śrāmake yaṣṭikātyāha.

The grammarian doctrine enjoys another advantage over the logician thesis. The logician finds it very difficult to explain such expressions as: 'There are both fish and a herd-station in the Ganges' because Lakṣaṇā, according to him, conveys the bank, but fish cannot live there. But the grammarian faces no such difficulty as, according to him, Lakṣaṇā simultaneously, conveys the Śrī flowing water and the bank as identical with it. Thus nothing stands in the way of forming 'Dvandva' compound in such a case. (asa eva 'gaṅgāyāṃ mīnaghoṇau stāṇa ityādyupapadyate. VSIV, p.138).

Nāgasa, in his Paramalaghumaṇḍiṇīa, denies in unambiguous language the status of a separate vyātī (function) to Lakṣaṇā. This is in line with the principle enunciated by Patañjali that, each and every word is competent enough to convey any and every meaning, if there be the intention of the speaker for signifying that particular sense by that particular word. This intention, Nāgasa says, pertains actually to God and is handed over to us through tradition. This doctrine is more in conformity with the law of parsimony than that of the Naiyāyika or of the Mīmāṃsaka; they admit of two separate functions whereas the grammarian recognises only one and main-
tains that the so-called Laksanā conveys only an unfamiliar object—determined by the attribute of the object primarily denoted by a word and thus speaks of one determinant only. Moreover, the attribute 'jagha-
nyā' is given to Laksanā by the logicians and the rhetoricians as it functions only after the function of denotation in order to remove the inconsistencies. This fact suggests that they treat it with contempt. It is better to reject it than to despise and yet accept the same, particularly when an unfamiliar power of denotation itself is competent enough to remove all the inconsistencies and bring the intention of the speaker into light. (sati tātparye 'sarve sarvartha vacakaś' iti bhāgyāllakṣaṇāyā abhāvat. vṛttidvāyāvacchedaka-dvayakalpane gauravat. jaghanyāvṛttikal-
panāyā anyāyatvācca. PLM, p.20). Nāgaseśa opines that, actually there are two types of vṛtti or power of expressiveness pertaining to words, one familiar and the other unfamiliar. The first is ascertained by the dullards even, while the second one can be comprehended only by men of mature intellect. (tathā-hi sāktirdvidhā - prasiddhā'prasiddhā ca. āmandatu-
ddhevedyātvam prasiddhātvam. sahṛdayahṛdayamātravedyātvam aprasiddhātvam. PLM, p.21). Thus the word 'ganga' denotes the flowing stream through its familiar function of denotation and the bank by the unfamiliar one and thus the 'Laksanā' of others can easily be equated with this unfamiliar denotation. (tatra gangādipadānāg pravahādau prasiddhā sākthiḥ, tīrādau cāprasiddhēti kim anupapannam. PLM, p.21).

In support of his viewpoint, Nāgaseśa quotes the observations of Bhartṛhari that, a word is competent enough to convey both the primary and the secondary meanings but, both the meanings are not cognised simultaneously owing to the difference of the factors like context, etc., which are auxiliary to the comprehension of meanings. As for example, the word 'go' can convey both the senses of a cow and a carrier. But the concept of cow is conveyed
through the familiar power of denotation, whereas the secondary sense of the carrier is signified through the unfamiliar power due to difference of factors in the sentence 'gaurvāhīkah', meaning, 'the carrier is a cow'.

(ekam āhur anekārthāṃ sābdāṃ anye parikṣakāḥ,
nimittabhedādeksasya sārvārthyaṃ tasya bhidyate. II.252)
sarvasāktestu tasyaiva sābdasyānekadharmāṇaḥ,
prasiddhibhedād gauṇatvāṃ mukhyatvāṃ copacaryate. II.255.
gotvānuṣaṅgo vāhike nimittat kaiścidigyate,
arthamātre viparyastāṃ sābdāḥ svārthe vyavasthitaḥ. VP.II.257/.

Thus Bhartṛhari ascribes unrestricted power to words and this is quite in conformity with his metaphysical scheme that, words and meanings are nothing but evolutions of the same Sādabrahman or the Eternal Verba.

It may, however, be objected that, as the same word 'cow' denotes both the cow-individual and the dull carrier, so the grammarian doctrine of natural and eternal relation between a word and its corresponding meaning is violated. In reply, Nāgėsā points out that, the word 'cow' actually denotes the universal cow-hood and as this universal resides primarily in the cow-individual and secondarily in the carrier through superimposition, the objection has no solid ground. The problem may be solved in another way. According to some thinkers the form of the word itself constitutes its denotation, because each and every knowledge is associated with a verbal expression and we cannot cognise anything which has no corresponding linguistic expression to denote it. The true denotation of the term 'cow' is its self and as it is associated primarily with the cow-individual and secondarily with the carrier so the eternity of the word-meaning relation is not invalidated. (sābdastu gotvam evābhidhatte gaurityatāṃ mukhyāṃ gotvam, vāhike tūpačaritam. Sāda eva pravṛttinimittam iti pakṣe sa kadācit gojātāvanuṣaṅjayate kadācīd vāhike iti. VSāM,p.146).
The grammarian does not accept the view point of the logicians who deny any expressive power to a compound-word as a whole because, in that case, such words would not be regarded as 'prātipadikas', which must be expressive units, and as such no suffixes would be attached to them. It is no argument that the parts being significant, the whole compound word is also to be regarded as such, for there are many instances furnished by Patañjali which go against it. (sāmāse sāktyasvīkāre visiṣṭasyārthavattvābhāvena prātipadikatvā na syāt. ata evārthavatsūtre bhāṣyena 'arthavadītī kim, arthavatān sanudāyo 'narthakaḥ—dasadājimāni sadapupah kundam ajājinam' iti pratyudāhṛtam. PL, p.115). Hence, Nāgara concludes, a compound-word as a whole is endowed with the expressive power through which it denotes a unified meaning, which is different from the individual meanings of the component members, as also from a collection of them.

The grammarians primarily deal with the formation of words and analysis of sentences. It seems, therefore, that they need not recognise vyañjana or suggestion as a separate function of conveying meanings. But, as according to their doctrine of Spōta, the Eternal Word-essence is revealed by the transitory letters or articulate sounds, so they have to grant recognition to this function. The grammarian like Bhartṛhari also mentioned the suggestiveness of 'nipātas' (some indeclinables). The roots or verbs may denote various meanings. The prefixes are used in order to suggest which particular meaning is to be cognised from a verb in a particular case. Thus in the term 'prajapati' (performs an excellent penance), the prefix 'pra' itself means nothing but it only suggests what particular meaning among the various meanings of the root 'jap', is to be cognised in this particular case. It is the verb 'japati' itself which conveys the idea of an excellent penance. The prefix 'pra', having no primary meaning, cannot convey any indicated meaning (lakṣyārtha) which is merely
an extension of the primary concept. Thus Bhārtṛhari regards a nipāta as a dyotaka (suggestive unit) and thereby draws a line of demarcation between 'vāccana' (denoter) and 'dyotaka' units. This is another reason for recognising 'Vyañjana' as a separate Vṛtti. (nipātānāṃ dyotatvam sphoṭasya vyañjana ca haryādibhiruktā. dyotatvam ca vvacit samabhivyāhrtapadiya-sāktivyāñjakatvam iti vaiyākarāṇanāṃ apyetat svīkārāvas-yakaḥ. VSLM, P.156).

Thus in the grammarian scheme Vyañjana exists in mere name. This function of suggestion, he says, does not depend upon the inapplicability of the primary meaning in the context and it may cause cognition of such an idea as may have no connection with the primary meaning. This fact differentiates Vyañjana from Lakṣaṇa. Vyañjana is actually an impression (saṃskāra) excited by the knowledge of the peculiarity of the speakers, etc., or by the poet’s muse. (mukhyārtha-bādhagraha-nirapekṣa-bodhañjano mukhyārtha-samboddhasamboddha-sādharāṇa-prasiddhā-prasiddhārtha-viṣayako vaktrādi-vaisīṣṭya-jñāna-pratibhādyuvuddhasaṃskāra-viṣeṣo vyañjana. VSLM, p.156). This function belongs not only to words but also to the primary or secondary meanings, to a part of a word (like a stem or a suffix), to a whole passage or even to physical efforts and the like. (eṣa ca sādā-tedartha-pada-padaikadesa-varṇa-racana-ceṣṭādiṣṇ sarvatra tathaivānubhāvāt. VSLM, p.156). Thus we see that the grammarian emphasises the importance of pre-disposition (Vāsanā or Saṃskāra) as a force, the resurgence of which he has equated with Vyañjana. This is in conformity with his metaphysical position according to which the SādBrahman reveals itself as the phenomenal world. This inverted revelation of the empirical world as a reality over and above the consciousness is Vyañjana or appearance and this is the play of 'Avidyāsākti' which instils such an inverted pre-disposition in the common man. In the conceptual plane of
meaning-relation, too, the word as the substratum and sustainer reveals itself as the meaning and, in this fundamental sense, each and every meaning is 'vyañgya' or revealed, in as much as, it is superimposed on the word: that means. "But on the purely empirical plane, as a mark of concession to logico-epistemic analysis, the Vaiyākaraṇa, too, has distinguished among different dimensions of meaning and accepted Vyañjanā as the tertiary dimension". (H.C., pp. 165-66).
CHAPTER - III.

SECTION-IV - THE VIEWS OF THE RHETORICIANS.

The rhetorician follows the grammarian on major points. Accepting the grammarian's distinction between denotation and conventional relation, the rhetorician defines 'Abhidhā' (the function of denotation) as the primary function capable of bringing the conventional sense into expression. (tatra samketitārthasya bodhanādagrimābhidhā. Sād.II.12, p.34).

Of course, the rhetorician maintains that the function of expression belonging to a word is of three types - Abhidhā, Lākṣaṇā and Vyāñjana and these are separate functions, not aspects of the same function as the grammarian thinks. He defines Lākṣaṇā as a function that brings into comprehension a meaning, connected with the primary one, and this is a function the operation of which is based upon either popular usage or some motive when the primary denoted meaning becomes incompatible with that of the rest of the sentence.

(mukhyārthabādehe tadyoge rūghito'tha proyojanāt, anyo'rtho lākṣyate yat sā lākṣaṇāropitākriyā. KP.II.4) p.5).

Thus there are three conditions required for the operation of Lākṣaṇā:

(1) inapplicability of the primary meaning of a term in a given context;
(2) subsistence of a definite relation between the primary and the secondary meanings and (3) usage or a special motive. Of these three pre-requisites, the first condition supplies the reason for taking resort to Lākṣaṇā, because this shows that the help of this function is taken only when it becomes impossible to establish logical connection of the denoted meaning of a term with that of any other term or terms used in the same sentence.

The second condition serves as a clue as to why a particular meaning, other than the conventional one, is accepted in exclusion of other ideas; because
it points out that lakṣaṇa conveys only that sense which has a definite relation with the denoted primary meaning. The last condition presents the justification for having recourse to this round-about process by showing that it serves a definite purpose. Thus unlike the logician, the rhetorician does not equate Lakṣaṇa with the relation subsisting between the primary and the secondary meanings. In stead, he mentions this relation as a necessary condition for the operation of Lakṣaṇa and thus draws a line of demarcation between the two.

Mammanja cites the expression, 'karmaṇi kusālah' meaning 'an expert in work' as an illustration of Lakṣaṇa based on usage. Here the denoted sense of the term 'kusāla' is 'a cutter of Kusā-grass'. This meaning is inconsistent in the present context. So the term signifies through Lakṣaṇa the idea of 'an expert' who is similar to the cutter of Kusā-grass in respect of discrimination. The term indicates this particular meaning as it has gained currency to convey this idea. (karmaṇi kusālah' ityādau darbha-grahaṇādyayogat....mukhyārthasya bādehe, viveçakatvādau....sambandhe, rūdhitaḥ prasiddhāḥ....KP, p.5). It is interesting to note that another famous rhetorician, Vīśvanātha, criticises this on the ground that, actually the conventional meaning of the word 'kusāla' is 'an expert' and, therefore there is no scope for Lakṣaṇa in the example cited above. The meaning 'a cutter of Kusā-grass', is an etymological one and etymological meanings are not in all cases identical with the conventional ones. Otherwise operation of Lakṣaṇa should be admitted in such sentences as 'gauḥ sēte' (The cow is lying) and the like. The word 'gau' etymologically means 'one who goes' which is inconsistent with lying. (anyaddhi sābdānāṃ vyutpattinimittān anyacca pravṛttinimittān. vyutpattilabhyaṣaya mukhyār-thatve 'gauḥ sēte' ityātrūpi lakṣaṇa syāt, Sāl, com.on.II.14, p.40).

He cites the expression 'kaliṅgaḥ sāhasikaḥ' meaning, 'the inhabitant of
Kalinya is brave, as an illustration of Lakṣapā based on usage. The primary meaning of the word 'Kalinya' is a land bearing that name, which cannot be brave. So the word indicates an inhabitant of that land through Lakṣapā, as it is the usual practice of men to use this word in this particular sense. The relation between the two types of meaning is that of the container and the thing contained. But it is amazing to note that Visvanātha himself, inconsistently enough, recognises Lakṣapā in such a case as 'etani tailāni hemante sukhaṇi' meaning, 'all these types of oil are pleasant in the Hemanta season'. Here the derivative or etymological meaning of the word 'taila' is 'oil extracted from tila or spinseed' which is inconsistent in the given expression and hence it conveys through Lakṣapā any type of oil. But it is quite obvious that both the words 'Kusāla' and 'taila' are on the same footing and are illustrations of generalisation of the etymological or derivative meaning. Hence, if the derivative meaning of 'Kusāla' is not accepted as the primary one, how can that of 'taila' be accepted as such? In fact, both Lakṣapā (indication) based on usage and Abhidhā (denotation) convey such ideas as are handed over to us by tradition and, as such, both of them stand on the same footing. Hence Kumārila-bhaṭṭa opines that, indication based on usage (Niruddhā Lakṣapā) is identical with the function of denotation. (Niruddhā lakṣapā kācit sāmarthyādabhidhānavat. TV1. III.1. p. 700).

The rhetorician maintains that Lakṣapā actually belongs to the primary meaning and it is by courtesy that the word is said to possess it through tranference of epithet. (sa āropitaḥ sābdavyāpāraḥ sāntārūṭhanistho lakṣapā. KP, p.5). When the primary meaning of a term becomes incompatible with the meanings of any other term or terms used in a sentence, the primary meaning itself conveys the secondary sense.
According to the rhetorician, this function belongs not only to the primary meaning of a term, but also to the import of a whole sentence. Nammata cites the example: "Oh friend, you have done great good to me and have highly established your goodness; behaving in such a fashion may you live a hundred autumns" as an illustration of 'Dhvani' (suggestion) based on Lakṣaṇa. Here he comments that, in this sentence the import of the whole expression conveys, through Lakṣaṇa, the sense that great harm has been done to the speaker by the person spoken to.

(upakṛtaḥ vahu tatra kimucyate sujanatā prathitā bhavatā param, vidadhādiśāmeva sādā sakhe sukhitamāssavatataḥ sāradāj sātām, -- etadapakāriṇaḥ prati viparītalakṣaṇayā kaścid vakti. Vṛtti on K.P.IV.1, p.13).

As an illustration of Lakṣaṇa based on motive, the rhetorician cites the stock example: 'A herd-station is on the Ganges'. Being incompatible with the meaning of the word 'ghoṣa' (herd-station) the primary meaning of the word 'gaṅga' (the Ganges), conveys, through Lakṣaṇa, the bank (of the Ganges) which is related with the primary meaning with the relation of proximity and the motive is to signify excess of coolness and purity, which cannot be denoted by the simple expression: 'A herd-station is on the bank of the Ganges'. (gaṅga'yām ghoṣah ityādav gaṅgādīnām ghoṣadyadhikarāṇatvāsambhāvāt mukhyārthaḥ sādhe, ......sāmīpyo ca sambandhe; ......'gaṅgātāte ghoṣah' iti prayogat yeṣām na tathā pratipatiḥ teṣām sātiya-pāvanatvādīnām dharmānāṁ tathā-pratipādanātmanāḥ prayojanaḥ ca. .....K.P. p.5).

It is interesting to note that Jagannātha, a later rhetorician, closely follows the logician stand and defines both Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇa in terms of relation. He defines 'Abhidhā' as a relation which a word bears to its meaning and vice versa. (sākyākhyorthasya sābdagatāḥ, sabḍsyārthagato va sambandhavisēgo 'bhidḥā. RG.II, p.15). His La...
consists in a relation which the secondary idea bears to the primary meaning. (śākyasambandho lakṣaṇā. RG.II, p.184). “These descriptions are not in consistency with the tradition of an Ālayānārika and point out to the great influence exercised by Navyanyāya on scholarly world at the time of Jagannātha”. (LC, p.135).

The rhetoricians maintain that the motive, for the suggestion of which Ālayānā based on motive is taken resort to, is conveyed neither through the function of denotation nor through that of indication but through that of suggestion (Vyāñjanā) and suggestion alone.

(yasya prātiṣṭhānā dhiṭu laukaṇā samuṣpāyate,
phale sādākagane' tra vyāñjanānāṃparā kriyā. KP.II 9-10, p.6).

In the previous example, the function of denotation is incompetent to convey the idea of excess of coolness and purity since this idea does not constitute the conventional meaning of the term 'gāṅgā'. Nor is the function of indication competent enough to do so. We take the help of this inferior function, which is a necessary evil, only to remove the obstacle standing in the way of establishment of logical connection among the concepts conveyed by different terms of a sentence. This is done only when denotation fails to bring out such concepts among which logical connection can be established. Thus this function indicates only that sense which is absolutely necessary in order to remove the inconsistency and does nothing else. Moreover, it is unable to convey the motive as the factors necessary for its operation are absent. Firstly, the idea of the bank being indicated, there remains no inconsistency in the meaning of the sentence. Secondly, there is no relation of the motive with the primary meaning; because it is related with the idea of the bank which is a secondary sense. Thirdly, there can be no other motive for the indication of the said motive.
If for argument's sake, another motive is posited, then another *lakṣaṇa* and one more motive are to be admitted and, this being a never-ending process, the fallacy of regressus-ad-infinitum crops in and lands even the basic *lakṣaṇa* in jeopardy; in such a case, the minds of the hearers or readers are likely to remain absorbed in search for a never-ending series of motives and thus it is not possible for them to comprehend even the first indicated meaning. (*...prayojaṇaḥ cellakṣayate, tat prayojaṇaṁ antareṇaḥ, tadapi prayojaṇaṁ antaḥ, iti praktāpratītiḥ anavasthā bhavet. KP, p.8*).

Thus, the rhetorician maintains, another *function*, viz., *vyānā* (suggestion) must be admitted on all hands. This is defined by Visvanātha as a function which conveys the implicit idea when the three well-known functions of denotation, indication and implication (*tātparya*) cease to operate after conveying their respective concepts. This function of suggestion belongs not only to words but also to meanings, roots, suffixes and the like.

*(virātaṁvabhidādyāsū yāyārtho bodhyate parah, sā vṛttirvyānānā naṁ sādasyārthaṁ dikasya ca. SāD, II.19).*

Some opponent critics contend that the motive of indication has no separate existence from that of the indicated meaning. In reality, what is comprehended is not the so-called secondary sense only, but it is the sense endowed with a particular motive. Thus, as indication conveys a meaning qualified by a motive, there is no necessity of the postulation of a separate function for the signification of this motive. But Vāmāta contends that this opponent view is not at all tenable, in as much as, it leads to the violation of the well-known axiom :- 'Viśaya viṣaya ṣaṁvāh phalam anyadudāhṛtam'. (*KP,II.13, p.9*). According to the
commentary of Māmaṭa, the meaning of the axiom is this: Just as the content of knowledge is different from the knowledge itself, similarly, the fruit accruing from it is also different from it. Thus knowledge, content of knowledge and its fruit—all these three are mutually exclusive. As for example, in the case of perception of a blue object, the content of knowledge is the blue object itself while the fruit is either (according to the Māmāṣa) prakāṭatā (the attribute of knowledge belonging to the object) or (according to the Naiyāyika) saṃvitti (the subjective cognition pertaining to the perceiver that he cognizes the object). (pratyākṣadāniśādir-viśayā. phalaṣ tu prakāṭatā saṃvittirvā. Kp, p.9). Now, in the previous example, according to the advocate of the doctrine of qualified cognition, the content of cognition caused by indication is the bank of the river endowed with coolness and purity while the fruit is comprehension of an additional meaning which is nothing other than an excess of the same attributes. Thus, fruit of knowledge being identified with the knowledge itself, the said axiom is thrown into winds and, therefore, this doctrine becomes untenable. The commentator, Vāmanācārya Jñāndikā, in his Bāla-Bodhini commentary puts forward another explanation:— The content of knowledge is entirely different from the fruit of such knowledge, as there is temporal sequence between them since the content is cognised first and the fruit next. (phalaphalinoḥ sama-samaya-samutpādāsamabhādziḥ sūtrarthaḥ. Bū, p.61). In fact, the content of knowledge is the cause of knowledge and, therefore, they must be different from each other. Similarly, the fruit being the effect of knowledge, they are also mutually different. As there must be a difference in point of time between a cause and its effect, so both the explanation of the said axiom are quite logical. In the example in view, the sense of the bank is comprehended first and the attributes next. Thus,
as there is difference in point of time of cognition of the unqualified secondary sense and that of motive, which is said to qualify it, the same function cannot convey both the ideas simultaneously. Therefore, the doctrine of qualified indication is an absurd one.

Again, the inferior function of indication is resorted to only with a view to establishing logical connection among the concepts denoted by the terms used in a proposition. Therefore, it brings out only that idea which is absolutely necessary for the establishment of logical connection. In the example under consideration, the idea of the bank is competent enough to solve the difficulty. Hence it is not at all meet to maintain that indication conveys the idea of the said attributes also. Moreover, it is accepted on all hands that, in order to have the knowledge of a qualified object, the qualifications are to be known beforehand. But the doctrine of qualified indication (Visista-lakshana-vada) denies this fact. What more, coolness and purity being attributes of the stream alone, and not of the bank, no valid source of knowledge (pramana) can convey the concept of the bank as endowed with the said attributes. Indication cannot be supposed to generate a false cognition, because in that case the very purpose of indication, viz. removal of the erroneous cognition caused by denotation, is defeated. Hence, the rhetorician concludes, indication can never convey a concept accompanied with a motive. The function of indication actually signifies an unqualified object, the qualities belonging to which are conveyed through the function of suggestion alone, which is different from the functions of denotation, indication and even from tatparya or implication which, according to the Naiyayika is actually the intention of the speaker that acts behind the utterance or writing of a particular sentence. Hence the postulation of
this function of suggestion, which is also designated as 'reverberation', 'illumination', etc., is an imperative necessity. (viśeṣa lakṣaṇā naivam, ....viśeṣāḥ syustu lakṣite. taṭādau ye viśeṣāḥ pāvanatvādasya cābhidhātātparya-lakṣaṇābhya vyāpārāntareṇa ganyāḥ. tacca vyaṇjana-dhvananādyotanādisābdavācyam avasyam eṣitavyam. KP.p.9).

Ānandabardhana, the propounder and propagator of Dvani theory, introduces the question of difference between guṇavyṛtti (the function of Lakṣaṇa including the 'gauq' of the Nyāsa (Nāsa)) and Vyaṇjana (the function of suggestion) in points of form and content. As is evident from its nomenclature, guṇavyṛtti refers to a function the operation of which depends upon such qualities as proximity and the like or on such attributes as sharpness and others. One of the preconditions of its operation is incompatibility of the primary meaning of a term with the rest of a sentence. For this reason it is regarded as a secondary function and this factor accounts for its inability to convey the secondary sense straightway. Suggestion, on the other hand, is a primary function, in as much as, in no stage is its operation put to a halt by obstructing factors and it reveals the meaning straightway. Secondly, guṇavyṛtti is an extended denotation but Vyaṇjana is completely different from denotation. Again, the meaning revealed by suggestion presents itself in the form of a fact (vastu) or of a figure of speech (alaṁkāra) or of an emotional mood (rasa), while the sense signified by guṇavyṛtti always presents itself only in the form of a dry fact. Even when a fact is revealed through suggestion, it excels much the one conveyed through guṇavyṛtti in charm. Suggestion is actually a transcendental function and such is its greatness that its slightest touch even is sufficient to invest an idea with exquisite charm. Indication, however, lacks this greatness.

(uktyaṃtareṇāsakṣayam yat taccarūtvaṃ prakāsayaḥ, sābdo vyaṇjakātaḥ vithrād dhvanyukterviṣayasya bhavet. DA. p.53).
Anandabardhana forwards other arguments also to show the difference between these two functions. The circumstances under which guṇavṛtti operates are, in their turn, different from those under which suggestion functions. While guṇavṛtti is regarded as a function belonging to a word (or to a group of words) whose ability to signify an idea is impeded by obstructing factors, the case is otherwise with suggestion. Secondly, inability on the part of the conventional meaning of a term to establish logical connection with the rest of a proposition being a precondition for the operation of guṇavṛtti, this function is to depend, though not directly, but indirectly, upon Divine Volition; but suggestion is independent of it, because even unmeaning letters and gestures are endowed with it. Thirdly, the factors for the operation of these two functions are different; guṇavṛtti depends upon the absurdity of establishment of logical connection of the conventional meaning of a term with the rest of a proposition, whereas suggestion takes the help of speciality of speakers, persons spoken to and such other factors. Fourthly, in the case of guṇavṛtti, only the secondary sense is comprehended while in the case of suggestion both the explicit and the implicit ideas are distinctly cognised and this cognition is parallel to that of a lamp and a jar. (na ca padārthavākyārtha-nyāyo vucyavyānīgyayoḥ. .... tasmāt āhātpradīpayāyayāyas-tayoḥ. DĀ,III, p.200). Thus as suggestion is completely different from indication in points of form, content and conditions of operation, its existence as separate from indication must be admitted on all hands.

The function of suggestion is also completely different from denotation. The sense conveyed by denotation is an expressed or explicit one, while the idea revealed through suggestion is an unexpressed or implicit one. There are seven points of difference between an unexpressed
content and the expressed one: (1) form, (2) time of cognition, (3) conveying agent, (4) cause of comprehension, (5) effect of cognition, (6) number and (7) substratum of cognition. An analysis of some poetic stanzas shows that the unexpressed contents cognised from them are quite contrary to the expressed ones. In the verse:

(bhama dhammia visattho so sugao ajja mario dena,
golapaikanca-kugangaasina daria sīhena. Dā, p.16).

meaning: "O you religious-minded man! now you can freely roam about here; because that dog has been killed today by the mighty lion that resides in the groves situated on the bank of the river Godāvari". Here the expressed meaning is injunction while the suggested sense is prohibition - not to move about freely on the bank of the river infested with a powerful dangerous lion. Similarly, in the illustrations of the figure of speech named 'Vyājastuti', the explicit idea is praise, but the implicit assumes the form of censure. Secondly, it is clear from the given illustration that, the expressed is comprehended first and after that the unexpressed idea is cognised and, therefore, there is a difference between the two in point of time of cognition. Thirdly, the conveying agent of the expressed content is always a word-unit while that of the unexpressed one may be a word, a letter, the explicit idea itself, a compound, a composition and even movements and gestures. Fourthly, the expressed is cognised through a sheer knowledge of the rules of grammar and lexicons, while the unexpressed idea is comprehended through this knowledge along with the trained intellectual powers of a connoisseur of poetic art.

(sabdārtha-sasanaajāna-mātaregāva na vedyate,
vedyate sa tu kāvyārtha-tattvajñāireva kevalam. Dā.1/7.p.28).

According to Rājasēkhara, a noted critic, the appreciative genius belonging
to a connoisseur of poetic art prompts in to catch the implicit idea presented in poetry and thereafter to enjoy aesthetic relish. (bхагасы-пакурао bhवयति. सा हि कवि अरमाम अभिप्रायं का bhवयति. तया khalu phalitं kaverryāparataruh. anyathā so 'vakesī syāt. KM, p.48).

Thus the causes of comprehension of the two types of meanings are different. Fiftly, the person, who understands the explicit idea of a composition, is regarded as an intelligent person, while one, who catches the implicit, is recognised as a refined appreciator, a true connoisseur; moreover, the explicit meaning causes simple understanding, but the implicit generates highest delight. Thus the two also differ in the effects of their understanding; Sixthly, the expressed sense is always one and the same; the unexpressed, on the other hand, assumes a number of forms according to the difference in the nature of the speakers and the persons spoken to. For example, the simple sentence, 'astam gacchati dinakaraḥ' expresses the idea; 'the sun is setting'. But, being spoken by a burgler to his fellow, it implies that soon it will be dark and it is time to be ready for starting (for) burglary. The same expression, when used by a heroine to her friend, means that the friend should now give up gossip and help her in her dressing and make her ready for going to the engagement place. The expression may imply many other ideas.

Seventhly, the substrata of cognition of the expressed and the unexpressed ideas are different. The expressed primary meaning is comprehended by one, a particular unexpressed by another and a completely different implicit idea by a refined connoisseur or by a neutral person. This point may be illustrated by the following Prākṛta verse:

(kassa vा na hoi rosо daṭṭhaṇa pīśe savvāṇa saharaṃ, sabhamara-vaṃagghāṇśa vāraṇāme sahassa enhim. DA, p.22).

The expressed meaning is:— "who indeed does not become enraged to see the lower lip of his beloved bearing scar-marks thereon! O lady! you
did not pay any heed to our prohibition and took the fragrance of lotuses with bees hovering over them. Now you have got to stand the admonition of your husband." Abhinivagupta, the noted commentator of Dhvanyāloka, comments that, this verse is addressed by a lady to her friend, on whose lips were manifested the signs of dalliance with her paramour, in presence of her husband. Here the expressed sense is meant for the friend spoken to. But different suggested ideas are comprehended by different listeners. The husband understands that his wife is not at fault; the next-door neighbour knows that she has done no wrong; the co-wife realises that the heroine is very much loved by her husband; the paramour understands that clear signs of dalliance should no more be affixed to the limbs of the girl, and the refined reader is charmed as he grasps the sharpness of intellect of the speaker by which she manages the awkward situation and saves her friend. (stryaṃ bhūvaḥ - kacidvinītā ...vācyam avinayavati-vigayam. bhartṛvigayantu aparāhi nāstityāvedyamānam vyāgyam.... prativesikalokavīgyam cāvinayaprachchādānena pratyāyanaṃ vyāgyam. tātṣapattyāṅ ca.... saubhāgyātisaya-khyāpanaṃ....vyāgyam. ....punah prakāṣṭradana-daṅgāna-vidhirna vidheyā iti taccayakāmuka-vigaya-sambodhanam... vyāgyam.... evaiva daṅghya-khyāpanaṃ tātṣaṭha-vidagdhalokaviγayam vyāgyamiti. DL,pp.22-23). These differences conclusively go to establish the absolute distinction of the suggested sense from the expressed meaning and necessarily of suggestion from denotation. (sa hyartho vācyasāmarthyakṣiptaṃ vastumā-trāṃ-alamkāra-rasāsācetāvanka-prabheda-prabhinnā darsāvyayate. sarveṣu ca teṣu prakāreṇu. tasya vācyādanyatvam. DA, pp.15-16).

The Māmāsaka contends that the function of suggestion is identical with the function of denotation. In support of his contention he quotes the well-known dictum - "yatparaḥ śābdah sa śādārthaḥ", which is interpreted to mean that, 'a meaning, to signify which a sense is used,
forms the primary meaning of that sentence'. Thus an unexpressed meaning, for the signification of which all poetic elements are used in such a way that they become subservient to it, becomes nothing else than an expressed one conveyed through the function of denotation, which, according to them, is competent enough to convey both the expressed and the so-called unexpressed ideas. The cognition of the former idea leads to that of the latter in the same manner as the cognition of the meaning of a term leads to the understanding of the import of a whole sentence.

But the rhetoricians cannot agree with this view, because the meanings conveyed by the two functions as well as their nature are essentially different. The function of denotation conveys a meaning that is directly and eternally related with a word and hence it is known as the primary meaning. But the function of suggestion signifies a sense which is related with a word in an indirect way, in as much as, it is suggested by the primary meaning of the word. "The very fact that musical notes and gestures that are never endowed with the function of denotation, not being word-entities, bring into comprehension certain Rasis through suggestion proves beyond doubt the absolute distinction of Vyanjanā from Abhidhā." (LC, p. 361). The said dictum, the rhetoricians maintain, relates only to the Vedic injunctions and it should be interpreted in a different way. A Vedic sentence is used to signify something which is not known from any other source. What a Vedic sentence enjoins is a meaning which is yet to be accomplished. Hence the dictum means that, 'the drift of a sentence lies in what is actually laid down in it and this constitutes the actual meaning of the sentence because, to signify this, which is not known from any other source, a sentence is used.' For example, the Vedic injunction, 'agnihotraḥ juhoti' enjoins the performance of Agnihotra-sacrifice and so the subsequent injunction, 'dadhā juhoti' meaning, 'he makes an oblation of curd' does not enjoin the performance
of the sacrifice, which is already enjoined, but it only lays down the instrumentality of curd in oblation and this is the actual meaning of the proposition. Thus the spirit of a sentence lies only in meanings, expressed through words actually used; because, actions, presented directly through words alone, are enjoined. The suggested meaning is neither conveyed through words denotative of them, nor in all cases does it form an enjoined meaning. Therefore, it cannot be regarded as the primary meaning of a proposition, conveyed through the function of denotation. Anandavardhana points out that the speculations of the Mīmāṃsaka themselves that, the relation between words and their meanings is natural and eternal, go to establish the existence of the function of suggestion as different from that of denotation. In order to establish the unquestionable trustworthiness of the Vedas, the Mīmāṃsaka is compelled to ascribe eternity to both the words and their relation with meanings. Now, the word-meaning relation being eternal, what differentiates a Vedic expression from an expression composed by a human being is nothing but the intention of the speaker of the latter expression brought into light through the function of suggestion. This intention is an accidental attribute (aupādhikī dharma) which is transmitted to words and expressed meanings by such factors as the speciality of the speaker, person spoken to, time, place, context and the like. A human expression, no doubt, conveys its eternal meaning through the function of denotation, but, at the same time, it signifies the intention of the speaker, who being a human being is likely to err, and accordingly such an expression may present incorrect meanings. But a Vedic expression always conveys a correct and trustworthy fact because it never conveys through suggestion the intention of a human being. This difference between a Vedic expression and a human expression in point of
correctness or trustworthiness as maintained by the Mīmāṃsaka compels him to accept the existence of an unnatural function pertaining to a word and this function is nothing else but suggestion. (as ca tathāvidha aupaśhiko dharmāṅg sābdārthā-sambandhāvadīnāvākyatattva-vidā pauruṣeyāpauruṣeyayorvākyayor-visēṣam abhidhātā niyamāṇaḥbhupagantavyaḥ, tadanabhupagame hi tasya sābdārthasambandhā-nityatve satyapapauruṣeyā- pauruṣeyayor-vākyayor-artha-pratipādāne nirvisēṣatvāya śūt. tadabhupagame tu pauruṣeyāṅgam vākyāṅgam puruṣecchānavvidhāna-samūropita-apāḍikā-vyāpāraṁta rānan satyapi svābhidheya-sambandha-parityāge mithyārthatāpi bhavet. DA, pp.209-10).

Taking clue from Ānandavardhana, Mammaṭa shows that neither of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrines of Abhihitān/ayāvāda nor Anvitābhidhānāvāda is competent enough to equate the function of suggestion with that of denotation. Of course, the rhetoricians, down from Abhinavagupta, including Mammatā, committed a great blunder in representing Abhihitānayayavāda as they placed a function known as purport (tātparya-maintained acutely by the logicians) in lieu of the function of indication. But it does not in any way stand in the way of the arguments put forward by Mammatā.

Abhihitānayayavāda as propounded by Kumārila-bhaṭṭa states that, the function of denotation ceases after conveying the primary meanings of the component words of a sentence, which are universal. Then the required concepts of individuals are conveyed through indication belonging to the primary meaning. After that the function of indication (purport, as represented by Mammatā) pertaining to the meanings start functioning and brings into light the sense of association amongst the different individual concepts. The suggested concept does neither constitute the conventional meaning nor does it enter into association with other concepts and its comprehension occurs after the cognition of association. Hence it is
capable of being conveyed neither through the function of denotation nor through that of indication. Thus the possibility of its comprehension through the function of denotation is completely ruled out. Anvītābhidhānavāda, as adumbrated by Prabhākara, states that the function of denotation itself conveys the idea of correlation amongst concepts aided by expectancy, compatibility and proximity. Here also, the potency of denotation is exhausted after signifying the sense of the said association and, hence, this function cannot convey the suggested sense which does not enter into this association and sometimes is completely opposed to the expressed meaning. (ākāṅka-yogatāsannidhivasād-vakṣyamāṇa-svarūpaṇaṇa padārthānām samanvaye tātpar Yaṁ vīśeṣavāpur-āpadaṁ paṁ vākyārthaḥ samullasati-
tyabhihitānvaṇādīnām jñāmatam, vācya eva vākyārtha ityanvitābhābhihā-
avaṇādīnāh. saṛveṣām prayaṁ rthaṁ yuṇjakatam apīgyate. KP, p.3).

It may be argued by the opponent that a cause is inferred from the effect. Therefore, cognition of all meanings appearing in chain, on hearing a particular word, being caused by that very word, a single function is competent enough to bring out the different types of meanings. But this argument is not tenable as it is based upon some misconceptions. The Māṁsāsaka himself holds that words are not generators (kārakahetu) of meanings which, being eternal entities, do not admit of production; the eternally existing meanings are merely made known by the words, which are to be regarded, hence, as indicators (jñāpakahetu) of meanings. But unless and until the relation of a particular word with a particular meaning is cognised, that word does not convey the particular meaning which is brought into light solasly through a function. The same line of argument is applicable in case of a suggested sense also, which is conveyed through the function of suggestion by its corresponding suggestive word-unit. This unit can never be regarded as a cause unless the function of suggestion is taken into account. It may be contended that, it is possible for a word
to signify a sense even without the help of a function. But this argument roots out the function of denotation also. Some Mīmāṃsakas argue in favour of granting an extended power to denotation by virtue of which this function itself can convey all types of meanings. But then the feelings of joy and sorrow arising in individuals on hearing some pieces of good and bad news, that are known through inference, also should be regarded as primary meanings conveyed through the function of denotation. Thus this function not only comes in clash with inference but also does away with the function of indication and this is against the Mīmāṃsaka position itself. Moreover, the extended power of denotation goes against an axiom of Jaimini, the propounder of the Mīmāṃsā philosophy, according to which, in case of conflict arising between Śruti (a word independent of any other evidence), Liṅga (the potential power of a word), Vākya (words signifying one unified sense through mutual expectancy), Prakāraṇa (mutual expectancy), Sthāna (mention in some place) and Samākhyā (a word whose derivative meaning is taken into account), the former prevails over the latter. This aphorism admits of the concept of gradual and delayed cognition while according to the hypothesis of extended power the function of denotation conveys all meanings simultaneously like the same arrow destroying the armour, piercing the heart and killing the enemy by a single stroke.

(......kasmaça lakṣaṇa laksanaye'pyarthe dīrghadīrghatarābhidhā-vyāpāre-ṇaiva pratītiṣiddheḥ kimiti ca śrutī-liṅga-vākya-prakāraṇa-sthāna-samākhyā-nāṅ pūrvapūrṇavāyalīyastvam ityantarībhidhānavāde'pi vidherapi siddham vyākgyatvam. KP, V, p.42.) Again, it is admitted almost on all hands that, in a great poetry no word, actually used by a great poet, can be replaced, by synonyms, because in that case all that is intended to be signified by the terms will not be cognised. This is also a definite pointer to the existence of the function of suggestion.
The Naiyāyika equates the function of suggestion with that of indication. Jagadīśa, the famous neo-logician, in his Sākṣāktipratīsāka, cites the expression, 'mukham vikasītasmitam' (SSP, p. 144) (the face displays smiles in full blossom) in support of his contention. Here the word 'vikasīta', according to the rhetoricians, signifies through suggestion the ideas of fragrance and attractiveness of the face. As these ideas do not constitute the conventional meaning of the term, so the function of denotation is incompetent to convey these ideas. The function of indication also cannot operate here, because inability to establish logical connection with the primary meanings of other terms, which is one of the three pre-conditions for the operation of this function, is absent. But Jagadīśa contends that the function of indication is competent enough to bring these ideas into light. This function is defined in terms of a relation which a secondary sense bears to the primary meaning. Inability to establish connection of the primary meaning of a term with that of another term in a proposition is not actually a pre-requisite for its operation. In the expression, 'yaṣṭih pravesāya' (admit the sticks), the sense of allowing the holders of sticks to enter is understood through indication even though there is no inability to establish connection between the primary meanings of the two terms, hence the viewpoint of the rhetoricians that, the function of indication cannot start operating in the absence of this condition, and hence, cannot convey the sense of fragrance and attractiveness, is not at all tenable. The actual pre-requisite is incompatibility of the primary meaning of a term with the intention of the speaker (tātparya-vādha). This pre-condition being present in the case under consideration, the function of indication is competent enough to bring out the said ideas and, therefore, there is no necessity of postulating a separate function called suggestion.
The rhetoricians put forward another proof of the existence of the function of suggestion. They say that, in the example, 'ayam gauravito mahān', the contextual meaning, 'this great man is venerable', is the primary meaning conveyed through the function of denotation. However, a non-contextual meaning, 'this cow is better than that sheep', is also cognised from the expression. Now, the function of denotation, being restricted to the contextual meaning, cannot convey the non-contextual idea. The necessary pre-requisites being absent, the function of indication also cannot be said to operate here. Therefore, it must be admitted that, this non-contextual sense is conveyed through the function of suggestion and, hence, the postulation of this function is an imperative necessity.

But Jagadīśa challenges this proposition and asserts that, in such cases the so-called non-contextual idea is not cognised at all. However, if for argument's sake it is agreed that such an idea is cognised, then this cognition is not at all verbal, but mental, effected somehow. The rhetoricians may argue that, verbal cognition, effected through the function of suggestion alone can produce transcendental bliss. But it carries no weight; a knowledge that flashes in mind automatically without the help of any other factor of cognition, too, produces supreme bliss. The comprehension of 'Rasa' (poetic sentiment) leading to supreme delight, too, can be explained as one effected in mind automatically without the help of any contact of organ and object (viśayendriya-sannikarṣa) or 'parāmārṣa' (consideration of logical datum or logical antecedent of a judgement) or 'sāktijñāna' (knowledge of the power of conveying a meaning). Hence the postulation of the function of suggestion in order to account for this element is quite unnecessary. (na caivam, tattadarthakāśādā-sāmānyāyā pratyaya tattadarśanistatparyakatvadhiyāḥ pratibandhakatvāt, tattadarśanām yathākathathācidupanayavasāna manasaiva visīṣṭadhīsamabhavāt pāramārṣthikā-
sukha-prabheda-pariyavasitam camatkaram pratyapi sadasyeva manasasya
dodhasya visisya hetutayah suvacatvat, atiriktasya vyavajananakhyapadarthankarasya

But the rhetoricians stand firm on their position that, the
necessary pre-conditions being absent, the function of indication cannot
operate in the case of the expression, 'the face bears smiles in blossom'.
The argument that, the non-contextual meaning is not conveyed at all,
falls flat on the ground that the very use of multimeaninged words by
the poets to the exclusion of others is a definite pointer to the inten-
tion of conveying the non-contextual ideas. The argument that the cogni-
tion of the non-contextual meaning is not verbal but mental is also con-
tradictory to the position of the logicians themselves who recognise
the function of indication as a function different from that of denotation.
If the cognition of the indicated sense be taken as verbal, then there
 can be no ground for denying the same status to the suggested meaning
which, too, follows from cognition of words. "The point that although
this cognition follows from comprehension of word, yet it is regarded
as mental in character, because mind thinks out the idea under considera-
tion is dangerous, because its application is likely to withdraw the
status of separate sources of knowledge to perception and inference,
in as much as, these being types of cognition are caused by common cause,
the mind." (LC, p.164). In these circumstances, the postulation of a
separate function, viz., suggestion, is an imperative necessity and it
can never be equated with either the function of denotation or that of
indication.

There are other critics like Mahimabhatta who want to compre-
hend the function of suggestion under the process of inference. These
critics contend that a suggestive unit is merely an indicative one and the relation subsisting between a suggestive unit and a suggested sense is exactly that which connects an indicator and an indicated. In the stock illustration of inference, 'parvato vahnimān dhūmāt' ('the hill possesses fire as it possesses smoke'), the relation of indicator and indicated exists between the probans and the probandum, in as much as, smoke indicates the existence of fire on the hill. Therefore, they argue, the relation linking a suggestor and a suggested is that which connects a probans and a probandum. In other words, the function of suggestion is identical with inference. According to them the remarks of Ānandavardhana himself that, the intention of the speaker is brought into light solely through the function of suggestion, supports their view because the intentions of others are capable of being apprehended by the process of inference alone. Thus the proposition established by Ānandavardhana against the viewpoint of the Mīmāṃsaka itself goes to equate the function of suggestion with the process of inference (Anumāna).

We have seen that in the case of the verse 'bhama dhamma' etc., the rhetoricians point out that the expressed meaning is injunction or affirmation while the suggested sense is prohibition or negation. Mahimabhaṭṭa points out that the so-called suggested sense is capable of being known through inference in the form: 'idam godāvarīrasthatanikūṭāṃ śvabhīru-bhramapāyogyam simha-rūpa-bhayakāraṇa-sattvāt'.

"When arranged in the form of an Aristotelian syllogism, it takes the following shape:

No place that is inhabited by a lion is a proper place for free movement of a man afraid of dog.

The grove situated on the bank of the river Godāvari is inhabited by a lion.

The grove is not a proper place for free movement of a man, afraid of dog?" (LA, 1480).
But Mamāśa shows that this position cannot be accepted at all as this is vitiated by the logical fallacies of inconclusive, contradicted and unestablished probans. Firstly, order of the preceptor or an earnest request of the lover may prompt even a coward to go to a place, knowing fully well that it is infested with a cause of great fear. So the major premise is proved false and, consequently, the probans becomes inconclusive. Secondly, the pious man may be afraid of dog in his eagerness to avoid its impure touch, but he may be a very courageous man otherwise and not at all afraid of the lion. Thus the probans becomes a contradicted one. Thirdly, the presence of the lion, being known only from the world of an unreliable lady of easy virtues and not from any authentic source of knowledge, the probans is unestablished also. Hence, Mamāśa concludes, such a probans can never lead to a valid inferential cognition of the probandum and thus Vyāhjana is incapable of being replaced by Anumāna (inference). (atrocyate. bhūturāpi gurū prabhorrāpyā midesāna priyānurāgena anyena caivamabhūtena hetunā satyāpya bhayakāraṇa bhramatīyansikāntiko hetuḥ. śūno bhītyadapi viratvena adghānāna bibhetiti viroddho'pi. godāvaritīre sīghasadbhāvaḥ pratyakṣād-anumānaḥ vā na niścitaḥ api tu vacanāt, na ca vacanasya prāmāṇyam asti arthenapratibandhādityasiddhēṣaḥ tat katham evamvidhādhetoh śādhyasiddhiḥ. KP, v., p.45). Visvanātha points out that, in the case of a figure bringing out a fact or another figure in comprehension, the fallacy of unestablished probans invariably vitiates the syllogisms, in as much as, a poetic figure resides only in the realm of a poet's imagination. (kiṁcā, evamvidhānāṁ kāvyānāṁ kāvaprātibhāṣāṭra-jāmanāṁ prāmāṇyānāva-syakatvāna sandigdhasiddhatvam hetoḥ. SaD, p.258, vṛtti on V.4).

Mahimabhāṭṭa maintains that, Rasa (aesthetic relish of sentiments) is an inferred entity. Here the probans is comprised of Vibhāvas (excitants), Anubhāvas (ensuents) and Vyabhicāribhāvas (accessories).
He thinks that Vibhāvas, etc., presented on stage are in no way related to the original personage imitated by the actors and, hence artificial. The feelings, too, are unreal and artificial for the same reason. The feelings presented on stage are only a semblance of mental condition of the original personage and the inference of the semblance of mental condition invariably causes pleasure, though the inference or real mental conditions may sometimes produce pleasure, pain, hatred, anger, etc., according to varying situations. "Thus it is clear that the view of Mahimabhaṭṭa on the problem of aesthetic realisation is very much similar to that of Śaṅkuka on the same issue. Like Śaṅkuka he thinks that Rasa belonging to the original personage is superimposed on the actor, and this artificial mood is known through inference from unreal Vibhāvas, Amubbāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas, and this inference invariably causes delight". (LC, p.474). But the rhetoricians belonging to the Dhāvani school regard Rasa as manifestation of the bliss-portion of one's own consciousness, the veil of ignorance of which is removed temporarily by the function of suggestion alone. It is Vyanjana which is competent to raise Rasa into consciousness and, hence, Rasa is rightly called 'Vyaṇgya' (suggested). (tasmāt vidyāmāna eva vāsanātmā ratyādīh sthāyī­bhāvo vibhāvādibhiḥ sambandha­smaraṇādyavadhānām­antareṇa vyakta iti sthitau mukhyam eva vyaṇgyayatvā rasasya naupacārikam naṇyanumeyṣmi ti tāvat. VVV, l. p.59).

The same arguments go to repudiate the attempt of some thinkers to comprehend Vyanjana under Arthāpatti, through which an unknown cause is comprehended from a known effect. (etena arthāpattivedyatvamapi vyan­gyānāmāpātaṁ. arthāpattarapi pūrvasiddha­vyāptichehāyaṁ­upaśajivaiva pravṛttāṁ. Saṅ, p.258, Vṛtti on V.4).
To sum up: The Mimansists maintain that the powers or functions of signification are of three kinds - Sakti, Lakṣaṇa and Gauni. Sakti depends on Samketa for its effective operation. Thus they differentiate Sakti from Samketa. Lakṣaṇa, they think, actually pertains to the meaning of a word or a group of words conjointly. It depends, for its operation, upon the incompatibility of the meaning of a term or terms with any other valid source of knowledge and it can convey only such a concept which is intimately related with the primary meaning. But gauni conveys such a concept which is associated with some attributes brought out through Lakṣaṇa. Of course, others regard it only as a type of Lakṣaṇa.

The logicians equate Sakti with Samketa and Sambandha which, they think, is Divine Volition. Of course, the neo-logicians accept human will also as Samketa or Sakti and it is attested by our common experience. Divine Volition acting behind all human will may humbly be discarded as the existence of God (personal) is highly disputed. It may humbly be suggested that a particular word conveys a particular concept only because a particular human being willed so and others accepted it and this will is Sakti; thus the viewpoint of the neo-logicians may be accepted. The logicians maintain that Lakṣaṇa belongs only to a single word and it is nothing but a relationship subsisting between the primary meaning and the secondary meaning; it operates when the primary meaning of a term becomes incompatible with the intention of the speaker. But it appears that this intention is the real meaning of a word or of a sentence. Hence the said incompatibility cannot be cognised before the sentential meaning is comprehended. Of course, they have correctly shown that mukhyārthabādha cannot be the precondition. Therefore, it may humbly be suggested that incompatibility with the given context (prakaraṇabādha) may be regarded as the first precondition.

The grammarians accept only one power of signification and maintain that it has got three aspects - Sakti, Lakṣaṇa, and Vyañjanā. The rhetoricians of the Dhvani school, however, assert that these three are separate functions and they have taken much pains to establish the separate existence of Vyañjanā.