CHAPTER - II : Meaning of Words.

SECTION - I : Nature of a Word-Different Views.

We propose to discuss meanings of words. But as meanings are conveyed by words, so we have to discuss, at the very outset, the nature of a word. What is a word? The question at first seems nonsense to a common man as everyone knows what it is. But a person with some sense of philosophy understands that it is a very difficult question to which no short-cutt easy answer is possible. Any literate person, who has read any grammar, knows that a word is a letter or a group of letters that conveys a concept. Words consisting of only one letter are very rare. The overwhelming majority of words are made up of more than one letter. The problem that confronts us is whether a significant word is different from or identical with the sounds or letters that constitute or reveal it. Different philosophical schools of India answered the question in different ways. Let us discuss their views.

As far as we know, the question was first posed by Patanjali in the very beginning of his Mahabhasya. Grammar deals with words and so Patanjali puts the question at the very outset: 'We utter the word: 'gauh' (cow); but, in this case, what is the word in reality'? (atha gaur-ityatra kah sábdah. MB, Lp.7). Then he himself defines 'word' as that entity which, when uttered (revealed, according to Kaiyata. Vide: uccāritena prakāśitenatyarthah. MBP, Lp.7), leads to the cognition of a concept. The word 'gauh' is actually that entity which brings out the idea of an animal with a dewlap, a tail, a hump, hoofs and horns. (yenoccā-ritena sāsnā-lāṅgula-kakuda-khura-visānīnam sampratyayo bhavati sah sábdah. K.B., L. p.7) He also admits that people with superficial outlook take the uttered sounds or letters for a word conveying a meaning. (athavā pratīta-padārthako loke dvaniḥ sābdas ityucyate. MB, Lp.12) His definition spots out a word by its act of signification from a complex setting of associations, viz., the objective substance, e.g., the animal, its qualities, movements and the class elements. The constituent
letters, too, cannot be regarded as the word as they cannot signify any meaning. Patanjali did not clarify the nature of a word any further. Later on, another grammarian-philosopher, Bhartrihari, made it clear in his Vākyapadīya through his famous theory of 'sphota'.

Indian logicians (the Naiyāyikas) believe in the existence of God (personal) and they try to prove his existence as the Creator of the universe and the Vedas. Hence they maintain that letters and, hence, words are transitory in character. They admit of their production by our vocal organs and of their destruction also just after their production. They think that a word is not different from the articulate sounds or letters that constitute it. But individual letters cannot be considered as significant for, in that case, letters other than the first one become redundant. A group of letters, too, cannot be regarded as significant of meaning because no such group is possible. The letters being transitory in character the preceding letter ceases to exist when the succeeding one is heard. So they cannot form a group since only co-existing entities can assemble together to form a group. In reply to these objections the logicians put forward the argument that, even though no assemblage of transitory letters is possible, yet a word comprised of them may be perceived in any one of the following three ways: (1) A letter is, no doubt, destroyed at the next moment of its utterance; but at the very moment of its destruction it leaves behind an impression of its own in our minds. The succeeding letter is uttered at the moment of the production of this impression and so it becomes united with the previous letter through the medium of this impression due to their simultaneity of production. This process goes on till the cognition of the last letter. Thus all the letters of a word unite through the impressions and the word is perceived as a whole comprised of letters as its parts. Hence the word becomes competent in the signification of sense. (2) The sound produced by the utterance of a letter gives rise to a new but similar sound which again gives rise to another similar sound and this process goes on. These new-born similar sounds exist till the cog-
nition of the last letter of a word. Thus, all the sounds produced by the component letters of a word being co-existent, nothing stands in the way of the comprehension of the whole word-unit by our auditory organ. (3) The component letters of a word, except the last one, leave behind abiding impressions; then the cognition of the last letter become united with these impressions and this united whole, as a word, goes to convey the particular meaning. In other words, the comprehension of the last letter of a word, being reinforced by the simultaneous recollection of the preceding ones, goes to signify the corresponding particular concept. (yattu tārlikāḥ - varṇāṇāṃ anityatve'pi uttarottara-varṇa pūrva-pūrva-varṇavattvam avyavahitottaratava-sambandhena saṃskāra-vasād gṛhyata iti padasya pratyakṣatvācchābdabodhaḥ. yadvā pūrva-pūrva-varṇājñāḥ sābdāḥ sābdajya-sābdajyānyāyena carama-varṇa-pratyakṣa-pāryantāṃ jāyamāṇā eva santīṇi na pada-pratyakṣapupapattih. yadvā pūrva-pūrva-varṇa-janyasaṃskāra-sadhricinā-carama-varṇa-nubhavataḥ sābdabodha ityāḥ. PLM, p.25. Vide also : pūrva-varṇesu saṃskāreṇa smaranam antyavarṇe srotrendriyād anubhava ityevam smaryamānāṁubhyāmāṇa-vārṇa-karanako'rtha-pratyayāḥ syāt. ....NM, p.347).

Nāgāsa, the great grammarian-philosopher of the 17th Century, A.D., trenchantly criticised the view of the logicians in his Paramalāghumāṇūḍa. He contends that, none of the above mentioned explanations concerning the comprehension of the whole word-unit as also the cognition of the meaning conveyed by it is acceptable. The first explanation is not : tenable because an existing letter cannot unite with an extinct one. Only co-existing entities can unite with one another and form an assemblage. Moreover, the question of sequence does not arise in respect of the momentary sounds. The second explanation, which takes resort to sābdajya-sābdanyaya, is also equally unhelpful. Of course, it explains the cognition of a sound unit. But it cannot establish the existence of a significant
word as comprised of constituent letters. If a non-existent word is taken to be endowed with expressiveness then it can also be said that a non-existent jar contains water. But this is absurd on the face of it. The third explanation, too, is not acceptable. It takes resort to abiding impressions. But there is no hard and fast rule about the existence of impressions of letters in the same order in which they are realised. Therefore, the sequence of letters, which is very important, cannot be regarded as well-mentained. Thus the difference in meanings between such pairs of words as 'sarah' (lake) and 'rasah' (flavour), 'nadi' (river) and 'dina' (poor), jara (old age) and raja (king), etc., become unaccountable since the constituent letters are the same in these pairs. According to the logicians, a word is nothing but a multitude of letters and the difference in the order of arrangement makes no difference to the multitude. (tanna. ādye'yam pūrvo'yam para ityabhilapaśambhavem-āvyavahitottaratva-sambandhāyogat. naṣṭe-vidyamānyor-āvyavahitottaratva-sambandhasya vaktum as'akyātvacca. dvitiya sābdaja-sābdanāyēna pada-pratyakṣopādāndane'pi padasyāvidyamānatavena tatā saktyasrayatvasya grāhānupatatē. avidyamāne āśrayatvāṅkāre naṣṭo ghaṭo jalavān ityādyaḥ patteṣa. tritiya yena kramaghānubhavastenaiva kramena tat-saṃskāra-sthitir-ityatra vinigamanabhāvāt sarorasa nadī dīna ityādaṃ viparīta-saṃskārodbhodhena pratyekam anyārtha-pratyayāpatteṣa. H.K.,p.25).

The Mimansists are the upholders of the supreme authority of the Vedas. They believe that the Vedas are eternal and not composed by any person, not even by God (personal). These eternal Vedas are comprised of words having some meanings. Therefore, they believe in the eternity and omnipresence of words. (nityas tu syād-darsānasya parārthatvat. M.S.,I.1.18). The words are constituted by letters. Hence they believe in the eternity and omnipresence of letters and do not consider a letter as a momentary phenomenon as the logicians think. Of course, they also, like the logicians, maintain that a word is really a group of letters sounds which are the content of a single cognition. A word is not unitary but multiple
in character. The sense of the unity of a word is nothing but an illusion. The unity of cognition is superimposed upon the content of cognition and thus arises this illusion. As the letters are eternal and omnipresent so nothing stands in the way of their forming into an assemblage.

But one may raise objection to this view. All the sound-units, conveyed by individual letters, are equally permanent and omnipresent. Therefore, it is difficult to determine which of them would form a particular group to convey a particular meaning and, hence, verbal cognition becomes impossible. (athaṁ mimamsaka-matena nityah sābda igrate tatāpi sattaya yaugapadyaya sakala-varpa-śādāraṇatvāt kena varpa-samudāyena ko’rthaḥ prayāy Yeteti nāvadhāryate. NM, p.337).

Another objection may be raised against the Mimansist view. The sequence of letter-sounds is very important in a word. A change of sequence results in a change of meaning. Each of the words ‘sarah’ and ‘rasah’ contains the same letters, but while the former means a lake, the latter means flavour. But, the letters being present for ever and everywhere, no permanent sequence is possible. (atascaivam yadi te vācaka bhaveyur-viparita-krama-prayuktā apyarthah gamaye yu. NM, p.338).

To these objections the Mimansists reply that, in order to convey a definite concept, the eternal and omnipresent sounds stand in need of manifestation by our speech-organs. Unuttered sounds cannot form into a particular word to signify a particular meaning. Thus it is possible to determine which of the manifested letter-sounds would form a word. It is also quite possible to attribute sequence to the manifestations of the sounds. Still one may raise an objection that, manifestations of sounds being momentary actions, it is not possible for the manifested sounds to form a group and signify a particular concept. To this the Mimansists reply that the manifested sounds, apprehended in succession, leave behind abiding impressions and the last manifested sound is aided by them. Moreover, recollection of all the sound-units occurs at a time and in the same order in which they were manifested. In this
way a particular meaning is comprehended. In fine, the sounds, manifested by
our utterance of letters apprehended in succession, leave behind abiding
impressions which, together with the comprehension of the final sound, conveys
a particular concept. (yāvanto yādyṣā ye ca yad-artha-pratipādane, varṇāḥ
prajñāta-sāmarthyās-te tathaivaavabodhaḥāḥ. ŚV, p.527).

Here we see that the Māmanskists attribute to memory-impressions an
unbelievable capacity of signifying meaning. This view is also opposed to our
experience of the unity of a word as it renders it a combination of manifested
sounds. The Māmanskist view is very much similar to the third explanation
given by the logicians. Though the Māmanskists believe in the eternity and
omnipresence of sounds, yet they have to maintain that the letters manifested
by our speech-organs assemble together to form a word. But it must be admi-
tted that manifestation of sounds is momentary. Thus the Māmanskist viewpoint
is not basically different from the third explanation furnished by the logicians
and, therefore, is equally untenable. (utpattat-abhivyaktār vā kṣana-sthāyitvat.
VŚLM, p.161).

The Buddhists try to explain the order and adjustment of letters as the
occurrence of the different ideas in the mind of the speaker. According to them,
a letter is nothing but an idea produced by an antecedent idea. The different
ideas are produced by different causes. Therefore, the pairs of words like
'sarah' and 'rasah' are different from one another. Though the letters of such
pairs may be regarded as similar or identical, yet these combinations cannot be
considered as identical because their causes are different owing to their dif-
ference in the time-order. But this view is not acceptable. "Apart from the
objections against the possibility of combination of evanescent entities, the
hypothesis is open to grave objections. The difference of words is sought to
be explained by the difference of the cause or by their temporal difference. If
it be so, the difference of the words can be felt only if the difference of the
causes can be apprehended. If, again, the difference of the causes be the condition of the understanding of the different meanings, this difference must be apprehended before, which is impossible. The difference of the mental status of another person is not susceptible of being directly cognized. It can be inferred by the realization of the unity of the speaker. It has been shown before how there can be no realization of unity of the speaker when hidden by a screen or when he is a member of a crowd shouting slogans together. All these considerations compel the recognition of a single word entity as the vehicle of meaning" (PWM, p.134).

The grammarians observe that, as the momentary sounds, pronounced by the operation of our vocal organs, cannot combine to form a word, so they cannot signify the meanings. What they do is that they reveal the eternal sound unit called 'sphoṭa' or logos which alone is capable of conveying a meaning. The function of sphoṭa is two-fold in nature: on the one hand it is manifested by letters and, on the other, it is an entity from which alone the sense emanates. (sta eva sphuṭyate vyājayate varṇārītī sphoṭo varṇābhivyayāgyah. sphuṭatī sphuṭibhavatyasmād-artha iti sphoṭo 'ṛtha-pratyāyaka iti sphoṭa-sābdārtham ubhayathā nirāhuḥ. SDS, p.300). Bhartṛhari scrupulously makes a distinction between momentary and isolated sound on the one hand and the eternal and indivisible word-essence on the other. The former reveals the latter which alone signifies the meaning. (dvāv-upādāna-sābdeṣu sābdam sābdā-vido viduh,

eko nimmattām sābdānām aparō 'ṛtheprayujyate. V.P.I.44) The former is termed as 'nāda' and the latter is called 'sphoṭa'. This doctrine proves the unity of word in spite of plurality of letters. This unity of word is directly perceived by all and, therefore, cannot be repudiated.

Taking the second function, i.e., signification of meaning, into account the grammarians enumerate eight varieties of sphoṭa: (1) varṇa-sphoṭa,
(2) pada-sphota, (3) vākya-sphota, (4) varṇa-jätī-sphota, (5) pada-jāti-sphota, (6) vākya-jāti-sphota, (7) akhaṅda-pada-sphota and (8) akhaṅda-vākya-sphota. (tatra varṇa-pada-vākya-bhedena sphotaḥ-tridhā. tatrāpi jāti-vaṭyakti-bhedena punah gṛṇā. akhaṅda-pada-sphoṭo'khaṅda-vākya-sphoṭasaceti sāṃkalanaṣṭau sphoṭāḥ. PLM, p.2). When the grammarian speaks of varṇa-sphota, which is conceived in order to explain grammatical derivation of terms, he does not mean that each and every letter is significant of meaning; what he actually means is that, individually and separately stems and suffixes express ideas. (tatra sāstra-prakṛtya-nirvāhako varṇa-sphoṭaḥ. prakṛtya-pratyayās-tat-tadārthavācakā eveti tād-arthaḥ. PLM, p.3). A word, however, is not regarded as a combination of a stem and a suffix at the time of comprehension of its meaning; rather it conveys the meaning in its entirety. Therefore, the grammarians have to posit the existence of padasphota as something distinct from varṇa-sphota. In a similar manner, he finds a strong justification for admitting vākyasphota. A child is ignorant of the technicalities and principles of grammar and consequently of the analysis of a sentence into component terms. Yet he understands the import of a sentence as a whole when, between two persons in its presence, it observes one person performing a certain activity (e.g., bringing of a cow) after he is asked by the other to do so. There are other reasons for accepting vākyasphota. We use such sentences as 'gabhīrāyaṁ nadyāṁ ghoṣaḥ' ("There is a hamlet of cowherds on the deep river"). In such cases we cannot grasp the idea unless we believe that it is the sentence which is endowed with the power of conveying an import. Of course, the logicians argue that the term 'nadyāṁ' means the river-side through the function of indication (lakṣaṇa). But difficulty crops up when they are asked to construe the meaning of the term 'gabhīrāyaṁ' with it. In their eagerness to avoid this difficulty, they put forward another explanation. They maintain that the term nadyāṁ means, through lakṣaṇa, the bank of a deep river and the term
'gabhīrayām' is necessary to help us understand the nature of the meaning of the term 'nadyām'. In other words, the term 'gabhīrayām' is 'tātparyagrāhaka.' (......nadi-padasya gabhīra-nadiśre laksanā, gabhīra-padā tātparya-grāhakam. SN, pp.370-71). But this argument carries little weight as we do not come across such tātparya-grāhaka terms in all cases of indication. Besides, there is no definite pointer to point out which of the terms should act as a 'tātparya-grāhaka'. Therefore, not only stems, suffixes and terms are endowed with the power of conveying concepts, this power belongs to sentences as well. (viniga-
manā-virahāt ....ataḥ samudāye sāṅgīkāryā. VSLM, p.130).

The grammarian who extends recognition to 'jātisphoṭa' argues that, when the denoted meaning is the universal, it is perfectly reasonable to maintain that, what denotes the sense is also of the nature of universal. Thus, he points out, the individual word 'ghaṭa' (the jar), uttered by a certain person, does not express the desired meaning. What actually signifies the sense is the universal that finds its expression through the different use of the same word. The grammarian emphasises on the point that, this sphoṭa is completely devoid of all ideas of sequence and the question of priority and posteriority does not arise in respect of it. Still he speaks of an entity as 'ākhaṇḍa-pada-
sphoṭa' implying thereby that there is another entity known as 'sakhaṇḍa-pada-
sphoṭa' which admits of classification into component parts. This does not, however, represent his true stand since it goes to annul the transcendental character of sphoṭa. By 'ākhaṇḍa-pada-sphoṭa' the grammarian means one indivisible word, which is but an aspect of 'Śabda-brahman' or 'Eternal Verbum' and which manifests itself through different words in the line of word as the cosmic process starts. The conception of 'sakhaṇḍa-pada-sphoṭa' which is referred to simply as 'padasphoṭa', as opposed to it, means numerous indivisible words each of which is significant of a meaning. Thus while an advocate of ākhaṇḍa-pada-
sphoṭa believes in the unitary character of sphoṭa, an advocate of sakhaṇḍa-pada
sphota thinks that it is multiple in number. Same is the case with 'vākya-
sphota'. An akhandā-vākyasphota is one indivisible sentence which assumes a
plurality of forms by undergoing formal transformations and this one indivisi-
ble sentence expresses all the imports. The conception of sakhandā-vākyasphota,
which is referred to merely by the term 'vākyasphota', is that there are nume-
rous indivisible sentences each of which is possessed of the power of signifi-
cation. With all emphasis at his command, Nāgāsa asserts that, the akhandā-
vākyasphota or the akhandā-pada-sphota alone is the real entity since it alone
is significant of complete ideas. (Mukhyam vācakatwaṅgu kalpanayā bodhita-
samudāya-rūpe pada vākye va, lokānām tata evārtha-bodhāt. PLH, p.30). This
assertion shows that, by 'pada-sphota' Nāgāsa does not refer to the fact that
the words used in a sentence are expressive of ideas themselves, but he refers
to such a word that is used as a sentence itself. As for example, a person is
asked, 'kutas-tvam āgacchasi' ('where are you from?'). Here the single term
'nadyāḥ' acts as a complete sentence. In reality, a sentence does not admit
of division into component words which also cannot be divided into constituting
letters.

(pade na varṇā vidyante varṇegavayavā na ca,
vakṣāt padānām atyantam praviveko na kasāna. VR,1.73).

In fact, in order to facilitate the smooth understanding of our linguistic
behaviour, the grammarians take resort to dissection of a sentence into compo-
nent terms which again are divided into stems, roots, suffixes, etc. But all
these divisions are purely imaginary in character. (....kalpanayā padāni
pravibhajya kalpitābhāyam anvaya-vyātirekābhyām tat-tad-artha-vibhāgām sāstra-
mātra-viṣayām parikalpayanti smācāryāh. PLH, p.2).

Truly speaking, these different forms of sphota, which is unitary in
character, are asserted only in relation to the momentary sounds that go to
reveal it. A parallel is found in a crystal which, though one and the same,
appears as red or yellow when it is placed upon a red or a yellow object. The same sphota is called vargasphota, padasphota or vakyasphota as it is revealed by sounds taking the shapes of stems (or suffixes), terms or sentences respectively. (sa ca yadyapye khaṇḍas-ca tathāpi padam vākyam japā-kusumbi-lauhit-
yya-pitātādi-vyaṁjaka-para-vasāū lohitah pītah sphalika iti bhaṅavad vargādi-vyanāgyah varṇa-rūpah pada-rūpo vākyarūpasā. PLū, p.28). The orb of the moon, though fixed, appears as quivering when it is reflected on the ripples of a river. Here the motion of the ripples is superimposed on the orb of the moon. Similar is the case with sphota. It is, in reality, devoid of physical structure and sequence, which actually belong to 'nāda' that manifests it, and which are attributed to sphota. As a result, sphota appears to be something endowed with form and sequence. (nādasya krama-janyatvāt na pūrvo nāparaścā saha, akramah krama rūpeṇa bhedavān iva jāyate.
pratibimbam yathāyatra sthitah toya-kriyāvasāt,

According to Bhartṛhari, the subtlest form of speech, i.e., sphota, is identical with 'śabdatattva' (Word-essence) or 'śabda-brahman' (the Eternal Verb) which is the Supreme Reality. It is termed as 'śabdatattva' because it is what assumes all verbal forms as well as all the objects signified by them.

(anādi-nidhanam brahma śabdatattvam yad aksaram,

evartate'ṛtha-bhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ. VP.I.1.)

It is a highly subtle and metempirical principle that transcends all the objects of human experience or all that possesses a pragmatic significance. Even no moral or religious values can be predicated of it. The Eternal Verbum lies beyond time and space and it is devoid of any attribute, eluding thereby all descriptions by means of positive and negative predicates. It can be grasped only by direct realisation following in the wake of the attainment of discrimina-
ting knowledge dispelling nescience and not by any amount of human reason. Still some characteristics are mentioned of it as aids and stimulants to the human intellect in order to prepare for the subsequent realisation. Thus some powers or aspects termed as 'kalas', of which 'kala' (time) is regarded as the greatest, are predicated of it. These are also real and absolute for they have got no independent being apart from the Eternal Verbum and each of them partakes the character of the Absolute Word as they are inherent in and identical with the Absolute.

\[
\text{(ekameva yad amnataṃ bhinnam sakti-vyapārayat,)} \\
\text{apṛthaktve'pi saktibhyāḥ prthaktveneśa vartate.} \\
\text{adhyāhita-kalāṃ yasya kāla-sāktim upāsritaḥ,} \\
\text{jāmādayo vikārāḥ sad bhāva-bhedasya yonayah. VP.1.2-3).}
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This marks the difference of Bhaṭṭarṇhari’s philosophy from Śaṅkara’s philosophy in which the unity of Brahma is absolute and unqualified and the plurality of powers is a mere appearance having no ultimacy at all. But the Absolute of Bhaṭṭarṇhari is, as if, a dynamic principle which produces the universe out of itself. As the cosmic process starts, the powers, which remained one with it, in the transcendental plane, are sundered from the Eternal Verbum which manifests itself in the forms of both words and meanings. It appears to be the material and efficient cause of all that exist while in Śaṅkara’s philosophy the Brahma only appears to be the cause, but it is not the real cause (in absolute reality), of the world. However, the process of evolution, that proceeds from the Eternal Verbum and occurs in it, does not involve any change of being in the Absolute which, though identical with the plurality, does not forfeit its simple unity at any stage. “The ultimate reality is the Absolute Consciousness, and consciousness and word being identical, it is the Absolute Word. In the system of Bhāṭṭarṇhari consciousness and word are interchangeable.
terms. This makes for his difference from the Vedānta, though both of them are at one with regard to the unitary character of the Absolute". (PWM, p.24). It is an undeniable fact of our common experience that whatever passes current in our thought is determined by an articulate verbal form and without access to our thought, an existent thing is as good as non-existent having no proof of its existence.

(tasmād artha-vidhās-sarvā-sābda-mātrās-suniscitaḥ. VP.1.120)

On the other hand, a pure fiction like a rabbi's horn, when conjured up by a verbal expression, appears to be an existent entity and becomes amenable to logical predication.


Bhartrhari's philosophy is in strict conformity with a very important Vedic tradition that makes 'brahman' and 'vāk'(speech) conterminous. (yā vad brahma viṣṭhitam tāvat vāk. RV.1. 114.8).

Kumārila, however, opposes this view that knowledge without language is impossible. He points out that, just before a determinate perception (savikalpaka prayaksā) there is an indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) stage which may be likened to the experience of an infant or that of a deaf and dumb person having no linguistic predisposition.

(asti hyālocana-jūnām prathamān nirvikalpakam,
vāla-mūkadi-jhāna-sādṛśam sūdhā-vastujam. Śv, Pratya.v.112).

Bhartrhari anticipates this and answers that in such cases the linguistic predispositions of the previous birth silently work in the mind and, hence, language may be in an indistinct form, precedes and makes knowledge possible.

(iti-kartavyatā loke sarvā sābda-vyapāsrayā,
yām pūrvāhita-samskāro bālo'pi pratipadyate. VP.1.20).
"Such an assumption may appear to a modern mind as too bold to be rational. But an Indian philosopher believing in the cycle of births should be the last person to raise an objection". (PLC, p.44). However, it is a scientific fact that the faculty of articulation or that of articulated thought comes down to us through the 'gean' of our ancestors through ages. This fact may act as a substitute of Bhartrhari's argument of linguistic predispositions coming down to a child from its previous birth. The philosophy of Bhartrhari does not form an actual content of our subject matter. But this brief discussion will facilitate our understanding of the sphaṭa-theory.

Nāgeseśa asserts that an articulate sound has got four stages of evolution - (1) 'Para'; (2) Pasyanti, (3) 'Madhyama' and (4)'Vaikhari'. He believes that, in some part of the human body there is a reservoir of air and this air plays a prominent part in the evolution of sound. Para is the subtlest form of speech. It is air in the state of equilibrium. It remains in the Mulādhāra, the seat of eternal consciousness from which come out all our impulses. It is nothing other than Ṣabdabrahman. The first gross manifestation of this air, the Para form of speech, is 'Pasyanti'. It is manifested by the same air reaching up to our navel region. This form of speech can be grasped only by our mind and not by the auditory organ. These two subtle forms of speech are respectively the contents of indeterminate and determinate cognitions of a Yogin who gets a glimpse of Ṣabdabrahman at the time of highly deep meditation. (caturvidhā hi vāg-asti - para pasyanti madhyama vaikhari ca. tatra muladhārastha-pavana-saṣṭakā-ribhūtā muladhārastha-ṣabdabrahmarūpā spanda-sūnyā vindu-rūpinī para vāg ucyate. nābhi-paryantar āgacchatā tena vāyunābhīvyaktā manogocariḥbūtā paṣyanti vāg-ucyate. etad-dvayaḥ vāg-brahma-yogināḥ samādhau nirvikalpaka-savikalpaka-jñāna-viṣaya itucyate. PLM, p.26). The next gross manifestation of this air, when it reaches the region of our heart, is called 'Madhyama'. It is mental in consti-
tution. It may be regarded as 'sūkṣmā' (subtle) as it cannot be cognised by our auditory organs. It can be comprehended only by our intellect as in the case when we shut up our ears and go on contemplating on mantras (incantations) (tato hydaya-parānychā āgacchati tena vāyunābhivyaktā tat-tat-artha-... vācaka-sphoṭa-rūpā śrotra-grahanāyogyatvena sūkṣmā japaṇau buddhi-nirgrāhyā madhyeśa vāg-ucyate. PLM, p.26). Ultimately this air comes up to the cavity of our mouth, strikes the palate, turns back and touches the various places of articulation. This is the grossest manifestation of speech. This is endowed with form and is comprehended even by the external auditory organs of others. This is called 'Vaikhāri' speech. (tata āśya-parānychā āgacchati tena vāyunordhvan ākrāmata ca mūrdhānam abhayā parāvyttya ca tat-tat sātānegabhavyaktā para-srotenāpi grāhyā vaikhāri vāg-ucyate. PLM, pp.26-27)

It is very interesting to note in this connection that Bhartṛhari did not mention 'Parā'. He regarded 'Pasāyantī' as identical with Śabdabrahman itself and not as its first manifestation in the direction of word. (vaikhāryā madhyanāyācabā pasāyantīcaitad-adbhutam,
aneka-tīrthha-bhedāyāstrayyā vācaḥ param padam. VP, I.143).

But his commentator, Puṇyaṛāja, described 'Parā' as identical with Śabdabrahman and 'Pasāyantī' as its first manifestation in the line of word and Rāgasa follows him in this regard.

The 'nādas' or the momentary articulate sounds comprehended by our auditory organs are produced simultaneously by the Madhyā and Vaikhāri forms of speech. Of these two forms the latter, i.e., Vaikhāri, is as non-sensical as a sound emanating from drums and other instruments. But Madhyā, which is manifested by a subtler form of air, reveals the sphoṭa which is the only conveyer of meaning and which is identical with Śabdabrahman. This unitary indivisible and eternal sphoṭa is the real significant 'word'. The audible articulate sounds convey meanings only because they possess both the elements of Madhyā and Vaikhāri, the former being the revealer of sphoṭa. (yugapad-eva nyāra-vaihāri-

As regards the process of comprehension of sphoṭa, the grammarian maintains that, different sounds of a simple word reveals the same sphoṭa and not different ones, in as much as, sphoṭa is unitary in character. The last sound of a word is the final revealer; the previous ones help us grasp the real character of the 'sphoṭa', the 'Word'. The simple word 'gauḥ' (cow) consists of the three audible articulate sounds 'g', 'au' and 'h'. Each of these sounds possesses the element of Madhyamā form of speech, the revealer of sphoṭa. For this reason, each of the three sounds manifests the same sphoṭa. (pada-vākyayos-sakharatva-pakse tvantimavarna-vyañgyaḥ sphoṭa eka eva. pūrva-pūrva-varṇastu tātparyagrāhakaḥ. PL 3, p. 30).

The opponents may raise an objection that, each sound being the manifestor of the same sphoṭa or word-unit, the sounds succeeding the first one become superfluous. In reply, Bhartrhari argues that, though each of the sounds reveals the same sphoṭa, there is a qualitative difference in each act of revelation - the first one is indistinct and, therefore, the subsequent acts of revelation are necessary in order to make the comprehension of sphoṭa distinct and clear. Successive rubbings and polishings are required to enable our mental apparatus grasp the sphoṭa. Bhartrhari presents an analogy to make this point clear. Each time we recite a particular section of the Vedas or a verse, we do not cognise that we are reading new-sections or verses conveying different meanings; rather we feel that we are reciting the same verse. But with each successive recitation the meaning becomes clearer and clearer to our mind. Similarly,
as each sound of a word reveals the same sphaṭa and leaves behind an impression of it on our mind, our mental apparatus becomes more and more apt to grasp the sphaṭa and, as the last act of revelation is performed by the last sound, the word-essence is cognised in its undimmed glory.

(yathānvākaḥ śloko vā sojhatvam upagacchatī, āvṛttaṇā na tu sa granthaḥ prattyāvṛttaṇā nirūpyate. pratyayair-anupākhyaṇair-grahaṇānugunaḥ-tathā, dhvani-prakāśite sābde svarūpam avadhāryate. VP.I. 84-85).

It is true that with the perception of the first sound sphaṭa appears as nothing other than a letter; but the knowledge of a letter, though really an appearance, serves as a medium of ascertainment of sphaṭa. This is analogical to the comprehension of a higher number depending upon the knowledge of the preceding number.

(yathādya-saṅkhya-grahaṇam upāyaḥ pratipattaye, saṅkhyaṃtarāṇam bheis'pi tathā sābdiṃtara-arutiḥ. VP.I. 88).

The knowledge of the number 'one' is indispensable for the knowledge of 'two'. Now, the knowledge of the latter being completely different from the former, it cannot be said to be present at the time of the comprehension of 'two'; yet it appears to be present and helps us grasp 'two'. "And, it is a matter of common knowledge that even appearance is capable of giving rise to real consequences. A man may die of heart failure from the false knowledge that the rope is a snake". (ES, p.10).

The gradual clearer manifestation of sphaṭa with the perception of each one of the succeeding letters is analogical to that of a gem through successive perceptions. But Jayanta, in his Nyāyamaṇjarī, criticises this view. He opines that, in the case of a piece of gem, there is every chance that some of its parts escape our notice at the first or the second observation and, hence, some more
observations may be necessary for having the perfect knowledge of it. But, sphoṭa being posited by the grammarians as having no part, it is certainly wrong to maintain that it is gradually manifested. (yat punar-avādi prathama-varṇa-buddhi-velāyam iva vyaktam sphoṭa-tattvam uttarottara-buddhibhir-atisāyatatara-paratrayātaṃ niyate ratna-tattvād-iti, sa eva viṣama upānyāsaḥ ratnasya hi sāvayavatvāt prathama-pratyayaviṣayākṛta-sūkṣmatarā'vaya-visēṣa-grāhīṣām uttarottara-pratyayānām asti tatrāvaktāsāḥ, sphoṭastu varṇa-svarūpa-vad-anassā iti tat-svarūpa-sarvasvam ādyenaiva varṣena vyaktam kīm idānim anye varṣā kariṣyanti ekadesāvyaktistu niravayavasya varṣasyeva na sambhavati, ....NM, pp.347-48).

This objection seems to be unanswerable. It was not anticipated and hence, not answered by the previous writers. "But we meet the difficulty exactly along the lines that have been followed by the Vedāntists. The Brahman is the only reality according to Vedānta and the Brahman which is absolute consciousness, is self-revealing and does not require the help of a medium to reveal itself. The medium, on the other hand, covers and veils its existence and the help of the cognitive instruments is required to remove this veil of matter or ignorance". (DS, P.54). Sphoṭa, too, is described as Śabdabrahman which has no part. But in the empirical plane it appears as having parts owing to our ignorance or nescience (Āvidyā). "Our experience is, however, subject to the limitations imposed by Āvidyā and it is owing to these limitations that sphoṭa is revealed to us only in small doses and never in its plenary form, in its real essence and magnitude. The difficulties of the physical apparatus should not be transferred to the Ultimate Reality". (DS, p.55). In the transcendental plane the parts are simply non-existent. But, as Śaṅkara maintains, in the empirical plane the Absolute indivisible whole is perforce manifested only in a piecemeal fashion and its manifestation is partial owing to the distorting medium through which the infinite is perpetually presented to human being labouring under the veil of nescience. (tathāpi anyanyasminanyakūtmakatām anyonya-dharmāṣcādhyāya
This process of gradual revelation of sphaṭa by the succeeding syllables may also be explained by our common experience. When a person is about to speak something to me, I am totally ignorant of what he will say, but I have a blank expectancy. When he utters the first syllable 'u', my imagination is set to work and it defines my expectation by ruling out of possibility of all the words not beginning with 'u'. The next syllable 'ni' further limits my expectancy to words having 'u' and 'ni' as their first two syllables. The utterance of the final syllable 'ty' solves all the unknowns and the result is completely defined to my consciousness as the meaning is comprehended fully. "Each of these stages of the knowledge of meaning is presented by the corresponding stage of the knowledge of the symbol or sphaṭa of the heard word, which being gradually perceived defines the sphaṭa from the mere vagueness of the initial stage to the complete certainty of the last stage; so the grammarians speak of the gradual revelation of sphaṭa through the gradual perception of the word-symbol". (SWM, p.257). Sphaṭa, the subtlest form of speech, is called śabda-tattva or Sabdabrahman and this concept is the greatest contribution of Bhartṛhari to the field of Indian Philosophy of grammar. "The merit of the sphaṭa theory lies in the fact that it does not seek to twist the verdict of commonsense". (PWM, p.135). It may still be argued that Bhartṛhari's theory of revelation of sphaṭa is unjustified. The manifestor and the manifested must co-exist in the same locus. The rays of light that reveal an object must be present where that thing lies. But the sphaṭa resides in the mind whereas the sounds are produced in the cavity of the mouth. Bhartṛhari answers that this condition holds good only in respect of concrete objects; but neither sphaṭa nor sound has any concrete existence and, hence, the condition does not apply to them.
The famous Mimansist, Kumārila, was the most formidable critique of this grammian theory of sphota. But it is very interesting to note that his disciple, Nāṇḍana Misra, put forward an apt reply to the criticisms of his preceptor and placed this theory on a sound logical basis. The matter is elaborately discussed in "The Philosophy of Word and Meaning" and also in "A study in the Dialectics of Sphota" of Dr. Gaurinātha Sastrī and here we propose to discuss only the more important points. Kumārila’s most formidable attack is that the advocate of sphota is guilty of assuming two metempirical facts, viz., (1) the impression left behind by the component letters of a word as a leaven and (2) the indivisible sphota. Moreover, he has to postulate the three things: (1) that there is a logos or simple word, (2) that it is different from the experienced plurality of the letters and (3) that the letters are not cognised as constituent elements of the word or that such cognition is false.

But this attack is based on an erroneous identification of the unseen impressions as postulated by the Mimansists with those as adumbrated by the advocates of sphota. The sphota theory admits of the unseen impression left behind by the perceived letters as a memory-impression which is admitted by all the philosophical schools of thinkers as an inescapable logical necessity; otherwise there would be no point in talking of memory. The Mimansists, on the other hand, take the impression as analogous to religious merit and make it capable of expressing the meaning. This assumption is unprecedented and unjustified. This postulation is a must to the Mimansists in order to maintain the validity of the moral law and also of religious practices. But no such necessity arises in the case of the comprehension of word and meaning. The sphota-theory does not deny the plurality of letters which are essential conditions for the revelation of the
'word'. This theory postulates only the simple 'word' which again, is not a mere postulate but a universally perceived fact. So the contention of the assumption of unperceivable facts is only a make-believe. On the other hand, the Mimamsaist theory is untenable. "The so-called impression which is supposed to deliver the meaning is not a word; the final letter has no meaning; the group, if possible, is not a word nor has it the capacity to convey a sense, as we have shown that the difference of order of the letters or the simultaneous utterance of the letters by different persons do not make any difference to the numerical identity of the letters". (PaI, p.114).

Kumarila attacks the assertion of the advocates of sphaṭa that the word-essence is apprehended indistinctly in the initial stage and is cognised fully after the cognition of the final letter. In fact, what is apprehended are the letters which are different from the simple indivisible word-essence. Actually the simple word is not cognised distinctly or indistinctly. Secondly, it is illogical to say that the sphaṭa veils its identity and appears as letters. The possibility of one thing being presented and a different thing being cognised would lead to scepticism because there would be no guarantee for the validity of cognitions as evidence of reality. Therefore, the memory-impressions left by the perception of letters can revive only the knowledge of those very letters and, hence, the impressions cannot be instrumental to the realisation of sphaṭa. (nanu sābdāntarāṇyeva vartāḥ prāk prakāśānte, na pada-rūpam avyaktam vyaktaṁ vā. na ca tadeva tirohitāt-mārūpaṁ sābdāntarātmanaḥ prakāśati iti śāmpratam; katham anyapraṇāśeṇaḥ prakāśeta, atiprasaṅgat. anyākāra-prakāśopanītaṁ ca bhāvanāviṣeṣaḥ katham anyākāra-prakāśā-prādurbhāva-nimittaṁ syat. SS, p.134-35).

The advocates of sphaṭa-theory posit that the appearance of the indivisible word entity as letters is an illusion. But Kumarila contends that error as misperception is possible, no doubt, but it is always conditioned by some defects. The sounds cannot be regarded as the condition of error as they are
posed as the condition of the perception of word. The condition of perception of an entity cannot be regarded as the condition of its misperception. And if it were the condition of its misperception, it would never be the condition of its valid cognition. Hence, the sounds would not, as assumed by the advocates of the sphोṭa-theory, reveal a word and there being no other conditions it would remain unrevealed. (viparyāśa-prakūṣanam ca nimiṃṭāpekaḥ, na ca tad ānāsti. na nādāḥ, teṣāṁ tattva-paricchedha-hetutvāt; na hi yadevāśyopalabdhi-nimittaṁ tadeva viparyāśa-nimittaṁ bhavitūm arhati; viparyāśa-nimittatvā vā na tatas-tadrūpopalabdhir-ityanabhivyaktiprasaṅgah. SS.pp.135-36)

Again, if the sounds are taken for the cause of the illusion, there is no reason why the illusion should necessarily have the same contents with unvarying uniformity. It is also not a fact that all persons have the same illusion regarding a particular datum and that emergence of illusion occurs in an irreversible determinate order. (iha tu niyataḥbhavi niyatakramo niyatarūpasā vai viparyāśa iti kim atra kāraṇam. SS, p.138). If the universally apprehended letters be held as an illusion, the identity of the contents cognised by all persons, the necessity of uniformity and the irreversibility of the order are facts that go against the hypothesis. These are the characteristics of a valid cognition, not of an illusion.

The charges seem formidable but are not irrefutable. They are based upon imperfect knowledge of the cases of illusion. It is a common experience that a cluster of trees observed from afar is taken for an elephant or the like; a piece of rope is mistaken for a snake by one who enters into a dark room from lighted outside. In such cases the cause of misperception is that the actual data are not perceived in their full perspective. It cannot be said that the data are not perceived because sense-object-contact is there. Had there been no contact, the data would not be the cause of the misperception. (na ca teṣāṁ na pratīkṣanam
Thus it is proved that, one thing being presented another thing can be apprehended. Again, a man, who at first mistakes a cluster of trees for an elephant, cognises the reality on a closer and careful observation at subsequent moments. Here each succeeding observation in the series helps clarify the cognition of the real data and it is possible only because each succeeding observation is strengthened and reinforced by the impressions left behind by the preceding ones. This is exactly the case with the comprehension of the word entity. (tasmāt pūrva-darśanā-nyeva yathottartarokṣaṁa saṃskāram ādāhāti vyakta-vaikādi-pratipatti-nimittā bhavati. SS, p.140). It cannot be said that the impressions of the preceding perceptions have no contribution in the eventual cognition. Were it so, the first observation would enable us to have the full glimpse of the thing. (anyathā prathama-darsāne 'pi syāt. SS, p.141). The distance cannot be held responsible for the indistinct perception because the same person standing on the same spot can have the full perception after a number of careful observations. (tad-desāvasthitānām eva ca prapidānābhyāsa-kramaṁ bhavan na dūrātvaḥ alaṅkāra-janām saṁpyād-udētī ti yuktam. SS, pp.141-42). Nor can it be argued that the initial imperfect perception is due to a defect in the sense-organ because the person concerned has normal vision and perceives other things correctly and distinctly. (prakṛtya-thendriyā api vahir-vaṣṭvantara-darsānād-anyathā pratipadya yathāvād-upalabhante. SS, p.142). Therefore, it must be admitted that the memory-impressions, though they are plural in number and different from the simple indivisible word entity, can contribute in the comprehension of sphoṭa and there is no inherent impossibility of the word-entity being felt as a plurality of letters. The third charge of Kumārila that, the condition of the cognition of a thing cannot be the condition of its misperception, is based upon inadequate study of the reality. The cause of the cognition of a tree is sense-organ-object contact and the same is also the
cause of its misperception as an elephant from a distance. Wrong cognition is also a kind of cognition and, therefore, quite naturally, the conditions of valid cognition should play the same part in both the cases, though there may be some additional factors to hinder the correct perception. (upalabdhi-nibanda eva ca viparyasaasya nimittam hetvantara navasandhaneo viparyasaasyapupalabdhirupatvam-anupalabdhyupayogi katha tatropayujyate. yathä viduha-varti-vanaspatarv-indriya-sannikartha eva viparyasaasya nimittam; upalabdherapi sa eva pratidhanah-bhyasa-prasuta-vasana-krumena.... SS, pp. 147-49). Again, different words actually revealed by different sets of sounds, may sometimes overlap and appear to be similar and cause wrong cognition.

(dhvanayas-sadrasatmao viparyasaasya hetavah,
upalambhakam evastam viparyasaasya karanaa. SS. v.20).

"For example, 'horsemen' is a different word with a meaning different from that of 'horse' or 'man'. But the similarity of sounds may induce one to regard the component parts as different words. It is the realization of syntactical incongruity that leads one to correct the mistake". (PrKH, p.125). The next contention of Kumārila is that the identity of contents, the necessity of uniformity and irreversibility of the order of letters go against illusory cognition. This charge can be refuted by establishing the fact that simple word-entities are the real conveyers of meanings and that the felt unity cannot be accounted for by the plurality of letters. It is a psychological fact that sometimes we have a faint intuition and sometimes, again, we have a clear intuition of a word. This is a definite pointer to the existence of an entity as the object of perception, in as much as, only perception can present its content as faint or clear. (pratyaksa-maya-niyata vyaktavyaktivabhatisa. SS, p.169). "If sounds or letters were alone sufficient for the communication of the meaning, there would be no qualitative variation as distinct or indistinct regarding the content. It is this fact which compels the recognition of a simple word-entity as a condition of the under-
standing of the meaning". (FMN, p.129).

But, Kumārila objects, what is felt are the letters and not apoha independently of them; the cognition of the manifold letters is a single fact and the singularity of the cognition is the cause of illusory cognition of the unity of content or it is imposed upon the manifold content. (jñeyē tu tadhāya-kārthā-kārītayā vaikatvahramaj, ekatvopacāro vā vanādivat. SS.p.175).

In answer it may be pointed that only due to the drawback of finite intelligence the indivisible word cannot be cognised independently of the letters. Thus the universal can never be cognised as separate from the individual; no object can be visualised without the perception of light. Moreover, the words like 'kumāra' (a young unmarried boy) show that there can be no cognition of a meaning unless a word is first cognised. This word may be divided into 'ku' (bad) and 'māra' (Cupid); but the word conveys a completely different meaning. Therefore, the cognition of meaning depends upon the fixity of the word; multiplicity of letters by themselves cannot have any relation with the meaning. The view that the unity of meaning determines the unity of the word, involves circular argument. The meaning is conceived to be conveyed by the unitary word. The word, again, is taken to be ascertained by the meaning. Obviously, this leads to a complete deadlock.

(arthasyādhigamma narte pada-rūpavadhāraṇat,
tad-artha-bodhāt yadi ca vyaktam anyonya-saṃśayāh. SS.v.26).

If there be no real unity of word, but only a multitude of letters, then the difference of words with the same constituent letters, e.g., 'nādi' (river) and 'dīna' (poor), could not be explained. (bhinnaka-śtri viśākhe saṃśīgna na bhedavān, saṃśīha pada-rūpam tu spaṣṭa-bhedam pratyayate. SS.v.27).

Thus the unity of the word is an inispensable datum. As unity and plurality cannot both be predicated of a fact, it must be admitted that, the appearance of the word entity as plurality of letters is an illusion. The uniformity of the contents of illusion is only due to the fact that the condition of the
intuition of simple word is supplied by this plurality and, therefore, its apprehension is a necessary antecedent. (ata eva ca tulyārūpas-sarva-pratipatnāṃ viparyāsaḥ, tannimittasya samānātvat. SS, pp.151-52) The regularity of the order of letters is also only due to the fact that it is the condition of the revelation of the word entity. (krama-miyamasā cā niyata-kramatvāt. SS, p.152).

An analogy may be found in the cognition of numbers. Each of the numbers from "one" to "n" is distinct and different from each other. Each number measures out a definite quantum; yet the higher number is known through the lower one and particularly the big numbers are spelled out by and through smaller units. It is an illusion, no doubt, that smaller numbers form the parts of a bigger number; yet it is this illusion that makes for the comprehension of higher numbers. (yathā cāvidya-mānātmabhūta-saṁkhyaṁtara-jñānam saṁkhyaṁtara-pratipattau nimittāni tad-upāyatvāt, tathāpi sābdaṁtara-paricchedā. SS, p.152). In conclusion we can quote: "All these considerations compel the recognition of a simple word entity as the vehicle of meaning. The fact that it is eternal follows from the consideration that it delivers the meaning in all cases irrespective of the difference of time or place or speaker" (PWV, p.134).

The Vedantins contend that the sphota-theory is unsatisfactory because the problem of the knowledge of a series is not unique in the cases of words alone. There are many other cases like the knowledge of a line of ants or a collection of trees where the sphota-theory is not at all applicable. Without a general explanation the fundamental problem remains unsolved and, if a general explanation can be furnished, the special hypothesis of sphota becomes redundant. The knowledge of wholes in all cases of temporal and spatial series, is an universal experience and, hence we have to admit that the intellect possesses the power of synthesising elements which were originally cognised at different points of time or place. Śaṅkara calls this function of intellect 'samasta-pratyavamsūnī buddhi' or 'intellect looking back on past experiences as a whole'. 
(satyapi samasta-varṇa-pratyavanarsé yathá kramānurodhiná eva pipālikáh paṅkti-
buddhim ārohantyevañ kramānurodhina eva varṇáh padabuddhim āroksyañti. tatra
varṇánám avisege'ti krama-viségaक्तá pada-pratipattirna virudhyate, bhddha-
vyayahàre ceme varṇáh kramādyanughíta grhítärtha-viséga-sanbandháh sántaḥ svá-
vyayahàre'pyekaikà-varṇa-grahañañantaram samasta-pratyavanarsinyáh buddhau
tádá eva pratyavabhásamánás-tám tám artham avyabhicáreñpa pratyáyayigyantíti
varṇa-vádino laghíyasi kalpaná. Sí, p.442). Thus the sphota theory becomes
unnecessary as the cognition of verbal series also can be explained by the same
faculty of intellect. But Saññkara did not explain how simultaneity and succes-
sion are compatible in the same act of intellect. Moreover, he did not deal with
the question how even in memory we can avoid recollecting the syllables in their
order and, thereby grasp them as a whole. "His theory can be compared to Kant's
theory of the synthetic unity of appreciation and is, therefore, subject to many
of the criticisms that his critics have hurled against the theory of Kant."
(SWK, p.261). But the findings of the Gestalt school of psychologists would
support Saññkara regarding the possibility of perception of wholes.

'To the Gestalt psychologist sensory elements appear only after careful
and somewhat "unnatural" introspection. The real data of experience are orga-
nised and extended wholes, never mosaics; we do not encounter specific elements
either in consciousness or in behaviour. ..........These Gestalten or configura-
tions, as the word has been translated, are the true "mental elements". For
this reason, Gestalt psychology studies the organization of these unitary
experiences; ' (GEP, pp.63-64). This school of thinkers have shown through
numerous experiments that we overlook or cannot cognise small spatial or temporal
gaps between a series of entities. We take ' M ' for ' H ' by overlooking the
spatial gaps between the different straight lines. We cannot cognise the temporal
gaps between the still pictures of a cinema show projected on the screen in
quick succession and perceive that one picture is moving. "One of the fundamental
principles which the Gestalt school emphasises as operating not only in the
process of perception but also in all psychological phenomena is the principle of closure. (GP, p.229). In fact, the cognition of words, too, is an instance of
gestalt. We ignore the temporal gaps between the letter-sounds of a word and take
it to be an organised whole. "At present, the Gestalt position is more generally
accepted because (a) the facts known about the perceptual process are better
explained by this theory and (b) the neurological evidence about cerebral mechani-
sms and functioning corroborates such a view more than any other view we now
have". (GP, p.244).

The acceptance of the Gestalt theory, which is akin to Śaṅkara's
'samasta-pratyavamarsini buddhi', having a much wider scope, results in the
rejection of the sphota-theory. Moreover, the sūtra theory cannot satisfactorily
explain why a particular number of particular letters arranged in a particular
order is required for the revelation of a particular word-unit. The necessity of
successive rubbings and polishings does not imply a particular type for each
word-unit. What more, new words are coined by men every now and then in order to
signify various man-made objects and these words gradually come in vogue. This
process can safely be assumed to be true for all words. So, the Mīmāṃsakist and
the grammarian theory of the eternity of word, meaning and their mutual relation
is not acceptable. Moreover, no word is seen to reveal itself by itself. We
first come to know a word as a word only from such sources as the usage of the
elderly people, dictionaries, etc. We cannot cognise a word as such if it is not
priorly known to us as a word. Of course, we sometimes come across some unknown
words in some sentences and know them as words; but this cognition is only due to
our assumption based on our experience that sentences are made up of words, not
unmeaning groups of sounds. Science has proved that a sound, articulate or
inarticulate, is produced by the vibration of an object like larynx, wire, etc;
this vibration generates similar vibrations in the media like air, water, etc.
which create further similar vibrations in succession in the successive molecules of the media and thus the sound-vibrations move like ripples of water. This corroborates the 'sābdaja-sābda' and vīcī-taraṅga-nyāya doctrines of the logicians. The famous logician, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, has based his arguments on universal and uncontradicted experience to prove the correctness of the logician theory that momentary articulate sounds in succession give rise to the cognition of a unitary word which conveys a concept. Several pieces of stone are used to make one unit of object. Several gulps of a delicious food in succession create one satisfaction. There are directions in the Vedas for the joint performance of Dārśa and Pūrpa-māsa sacrifices in order to achieve one goal, the heaven, though these two sacrifices cannot be performed simultaneously. Such examples from popular and scriptural activities can easily be multiplied. These instances clearly point out that, in spite of succession, the comprehension of a unitary whole is quite possible. The cognition of a unitary word (in spite of the plurality of articulate momentary sounds in succession) is a similar one. (yathā yugapad-bhāvināḥ samāstrayo grāvā-ṇaḥ ekāmukhāḥ dhārayantō dṛṣṭante tathā krama-bhāvino pi samastā grāsā ekaṁ trśtaṁ utpādayanto dṛṣṭante ............. na ca samastā api te grāsā yugapat prayoktaṁ sākyāḥ. .......vede'pi dārśa-pūrpa-māsābhyām itaretara-yoga-sāmsīnā dvandvena samarpita-saṁityānām āgneyādi yāghanām pakṣadvaye prayojayatvena cāpārya-kramaṁ ēkāṅkśa-sampāda-katvām dṛṣṭam ........,evam krama-vartino pi varṇā evārthābhhi- dhāyino bhaviyanti. NM, pp.344-45).
CHAPTER - II.

SECTION - II : The Grammarian Theories of Word-meaning.

A word is actually a symbol of an idea and so it has to fuse its other two aspects, viz., its existence and content, into this aspect of meaning which is the most important aspect. "Words, spoken, heard or written, differ from other classes of bodily movements, noises, or shapes, by having meaning". (I.K.T, p.23).

In the previous section we have seen that there are different views regarding the nature of a word. Similarly, different schools of thinkers mutually differ in their opinions concerning the nature of the meaning of a word. In his Tantra-vartika, Kumārila informs us that there are innumerable theories of the denotation of word. (vicāryate kim ākṛtiḥ saṁartho'tha vyaktiriti. dvau ca pakṣāv-upanyastau bhāṣyakāreṇa yadyapi, vyākhyātāras-tathāpyatra kuryuh pakṣāntarāṇyapi. TV, p.293)

Dhartpirit has recorded a dozen theories on the meaning of words.

(aṁhyāta-sābdah saṁghāto jātiḥ saṁghāta-vartini, eko'navayavaḥ sābdah kramo buddhyānusāphrtiḥ.
padam ādyam prthak sarva-padaṁ sākāñkṣam ityapi, vākyam prati matir-bhinna bahudhā nyāyāvādinām. Vf.II.1-2)

Among these theories we propose to discuss only the important ones of which first come the gramarian theories.

Patañjali informs us that his predecessor, Vājapāyana, believed that 'ākṛti' (configuration or universal) is one and that it is is expressed by the denotative power of a word. (ekā ākṛtiḥ, sa cābhīdhiyate. MB. II, p.90). When the word 'gauḥ' is uttered, what is understood is not any particular cow-individual but any individual cow. This shows that there is one common nature in all the individuals belonging to a group and this common element is called 'universal'. (gaur ityetaṁ sābdenokte pratyayite sāmāyana-lakṣaṇe'rhthe visēṣānavahāraṇaikyam sāmānyasya-viśyate. MBf. 11, pp.90-91). It proves the one-ness of universal, no doubt, but it cannot show that the meaning is nothing but universal. In this connection we should note that the similar configuration of a group of individuals
leads to the cognition of similarity among them and this cognition leads to the
conception of the universal. Patañjali has used the word 'ākṛti' in the sense
of 'jāti' or universal. But it is not clear to us what Vājapeyāyana has meant by
'ākṛti'. However, the ākṛtvāda is almost identical with 'Jātivāda' and, as such,
got no prominence. According to ākṛtvāda, it is the configuration which is the
import of a word. This view is not at all acceptable because it is not applica-
tble to the words which signify such concepts that have no figure or form or no
definite structure, e.g., dayā (kindness), etc.

It may be argued against Jātivāda that, in fact, the case-relation
(kārakatva) can be syntactically related only with the individual, not with the
universal. (bhavatu sāmānyam ekaṃ tasya tu váha-dohādikāyām arthakriyāyām ayogya-
tvād dravyasyaiva yogyatvād abhidhānaṃ nyāyam. MBP II, p.91). To this it is
replied that the individual cannot be denoted by a word. Firstly, the number of
individuals being practically infinite, it is not possible for a word to denote
all of them. Moreover, the individuals have got specialities or particularities
of their own which cannot be denoted by a single word. (vyaktinām ānanātyāt teṣu
na saktigrahah, nāpiśuddhānaṁ tāsāṁ bodhas-tāsāṁ viseṣa-rūpaṭvena viseṣāvagati-
prasaṅgat. MBP, II, p.91). Secondly, if a word denotes one particular indivi-
dual, it cannot denote any other individual and, hence, this will compel us to
postulate an infinite number of words as per individual. This is quite absurd.
(jātyupalakṣitasya dravyasya sābdenābhidhāne saty-abhidheyānekatvenā-neka-sābdatva-
prasaṅgat. MBP, II, p.93). Our experience also supports the universalist theory.
When a boy is taught that an animal standing in front of him is called 'cow', he
easily designates by the same term another cow at another place and time, though
the second animal may be much different in age, colour, height, etc. from the
previous one. It would be impossible if the particular cow shown to him were the
denotation of the term 'cow'. (gaurasya kadācid-upadiśto bhavati. sa tasmānjasmin
desānyasmin kale'nyasyām ca vayovasthāyām drṣṭvā jāniti ayaṃ gauriti. MB II, p.91).
It may be argued that the universal being one, it cannot simultaneously reside in more than one individual. In reply, Patañjali at first gives an analogy of the sun which is perceived simultaneously at different places. But, in this case, the perceivers are different whereas in the case of the universal the cogniser is one and the same. Therefore, the analogy is not appropriate. For this reason Patañjali presents another analogy. Indra, king of gods, is invoked in different sacrifices at one and the same time and he attends all of them simultaneously.

(tad yathā eka ādityo 'nekādhikeṣaṇaḥ yugapad-upalabhya'te. tad yathā eka indro 'nekasain kratusāte śhuto yugapat sarvatra bhavati. evam ākṛtir-yugapat sarvatra bhaviyanti. MB. II, P.92). Again, in Ekaṣeṣa, one word is left over and it denotes a number of individuals. For example, 'pitā ca mātā ca pitaraś' (father and mother —'parents'). Here, between the two words 'pitrī' (father) and 'mātī', only one word 'pitrī' is left in Ekaṣeṣa and it is used in the dual number. This single term is competent enough to denote both father and mother. This shows that the relation of one entity with a number of individuals should not be deemed impossible. (yo hi manyate — 'nākam anekādhikaraṇaḥ yugapad upalabhya'ti. ekṣeṣa tasya doṣaṁ-syāt. MB, II. p.92).

Patañjali further points out that, if a particular individual be the denotation of a word, then it would be difficult to account for the unrestricted reference of words. The scriptural injunctions, e.g., "A brahmin must not be killed" or "Liquour must not be taken", would mean that a particular brahmin must not be killed or a particular peg of wine should not be taken, while all other brahmīs may be killed or there is no other restriction in drinking. But anybody understands that the cases are not at all like that and all brahmīs and all liquor are denoted by the respective terms. (evaṁ ca kṛtva dharmaśāstraḥ pravṛttam 'brāhmaṇo na hantavyah' 'suraṁ na peṣṭi yadi dravyam padārthas syāt, evaṁ brāhmaṇam ahatvā ekāṁ ca surāṁ apiтвор'nyatra kāma-cāras syāt. MB, II, p.92). The opponent may argue that, as the universal resides in each of the individuals fall-
ing within its sweep, it cannot be fully comprehended without the apprehension of all those individuals. But this argument is based on a wrong conception of the universal. In fact, a universal is neither the sum total of the individuals nor is it collectively inherent in the latter. Though the universal is related to each and every individual in which it resides, the relation subsisting between the universal on the one hand and a particular individual on the other is the same as in other individuals. Therefore, if the relationship between any particular individual and the universal underlying it is precisely determined, there remains no difficulty in understanding, in all its bearings, the relationship subsisting between the universal and the different individuals included therein. Thus the meaning of a word is a universal as related to any individual coming within its perview. The universal, as a meaning, includes an individual as its substratum. In each individual the universal is independent and self-contained. Hence in order to understand the incidence of the universal we are not required to know all the individuals. Therefore, one need not bring all the cows when asked to bring a cow. (sarvabhūṃ vyaktibhīṣ-sambandhasya tulyatvāt sarvatraivābhīṃna-buddhyut-pādanāt pratyekaḥ parisamāptatvādeksāmnāpī dravya tat karma kṛyamāṇam jātau kṛtameva bhavati. MBP, II, p.93).

But another ancient grammarian named Vyādi was the prince of the Individualists and Patañjali clearly explained his viewpoint. The position of Vyādi may be justified on various grounds. Firstly, the ideas of gender and number can be associated only with the individual which, therefore, should be regarded as the meaning of a word. (evaṃ ca kṛtva līṅgavacaḥāṃśiddhāṃ bhavanti. MB, II, pp.94-95). Secondly, actions are invariably connected only with the individual. Thirdly, there is no entity which is simultaneously perceived in different media. Moreover, according to the Universalist, 'A dog is dead' would mean that all dogs are dead, which is not a fact. Similarly, 'A cow is born' would signify that all cows are born. But the fact is that while a cow is born, others exist as some
others die. Such sentences become intelligible only if we accept the view point of the Individualist. (codañṣu ca tasyārāmbhaṁ manyāsahē dravyam abhidhīyata iti. ...... na khalvayekam anekā-dhikaraṇasthaṁ yugapad upalabhyaṁ. na hye ko devadatto yugapat arughne bhavati mathurāyaṁ ca. ......'svāḥ mṛtaḥ' iti svā nama loke na prarcet. 'gaurjāta' iti sarvaṁ gobhūtam anavalkaśyām syāt. MB, II, pp.94-95).

The logical basis of the theory of Vyādi has been pointed out by Nāgasaṁ-abhaṭṭa. The crux of the problem lies in the relation of the universal with the individuals in each of which the universal is supposed to inhere. Now, it may inhere in an individual in its entirely; but in that case it will not inhere in others. This would lead to extreme individualism as then none but a single individual could be taken for the meaning of a word. The second alternative is that the universal inhere collectively in all the individuals taken together. But in that case the universal could be known only if all the individuals embodying it were known beforehand. But our actual knowledge is entirely different. Again, the perception of two-ness, which inhere collectively in two individuals, presupposes the perception of the two individuals and the destruction of one individual would lead to the destruction of the number 'two'. Similarly, the perception of the universal would presuppose the perception of the infinite number of individuals. The destruction of one individual would also involve the destruction of the universal itself or, at least, the lapse of it in case it is supposed to be eternal. (jātir na tāvad dravyaṁ vyāsajyāvīśāḥ, ekāśāya-nāśe pypaṛṭītyaṁpatteḥ. kīca gaṁabhete ṭyādinodānāhu sarvadravyālambhāpattiḥ. pratyekasamāptau tu dravyān-tare tadanāpattistatāpi sattve ekāṛtirīti pratiyābāhānirvārthāḥ. MBPU, II.p.94).

Again, it is a fact that there is diversity between two individuals belonging to the same class. Moreover, the relation of the universal to the individuals cannot be other than identity with its different loci. Therefore, if one universal be taken for the meaning and if it is supposed to cover all the individuals, then it must be conceded that the universal in one individual, being
simultaneously inherent in another, would be identical to and different from itself at the same time. But this is absurd on the face of it. (na hyekasya bhedabhedaeha viruddhau upadayate. MBP, II. p.96).

Furthermore, one point in favour of the universalist is that the Pāṇiniian rule, "jātyākhyāyām-ekaśin vahucanam-anayatarasyām" (Pāṇ.1.2.58), for the elimination of a number of self-same words could be disposed of. But this position may have some plausibility in those cases where the number of individuals (denoted) fall under one class. But it breaks down in those cases where one word denotes a number of heterogenous individuals. As for instance, the word 'akṣa' denotes dice, sense-organ, axle and so on. To suppose one universal in these diverse entities is nothing but an absurdity. But the position of Vyādi is immune from all these difficulties. (yadartha ākṣaipaśaparigrahastadēva na sidhyati, na hi sākaṭākṣadevanākṣādiṣvekākṛtisadbhāvah. MBP, II. p.96). "The elimination of the repetition of phonetically similar words even when the meaning is a plurality of (individuals), is not sanctioned by logic but by convention. And so Pāṇini formulates a rule to make this usage immune from the charge of absurdity." (PWEM, p.150).

We have elucidated the viewpoints of Vyādi and his objections against Vājapāyayāna's view as found in Mahābhāṣya. But Patañjali also discusses the replies of the universalists to these objections. To the first objection that difference of number and gender is incompatible with the universal, the reply is that this objection is based on a misconception of the relation of the universal with the individual. Actually, the universal being manifested in individuals, which vary in number and gender, the various numbers and genders are predicated of the universal because of association due to co-existence in one substratum. (guna castra dvitva-strītvadāyō vivaśṣutāh. taisākāṛterkarhasamavāyalakṣana-sambandha ityākṛtāvapi padarthe lingasamkhyādisiddhirthyarthāh. MBP, II p.96).

But it may be contended that this explanation may hold good regarding
gender only but not in the case of number. The predication of dual and plural numbers regarding the universal is contrary to its unitary self-same character postulated by the universalists. Moreover, the supposed elimination of repetition without resorting to 'Ekäséga'-rule transpires to be illusory. (bhavell- ingaparihāra upapannah, vacanaparihārastu no 'papadyate. yadi hi kadācidākṣṭirekatvena yujyate kadācid dvitvena kadācid wahunvena, eka ākṣṭiriti ca pratijñā hiyeta. yaccāya pākṣasyo 'pādāne prayojanam uttam 'ekāsāgo na vaktavya' iti, ca ca idānāṃ vaktavyo bhavati. MB, II, p.97). On closer examination it is found that the difference of sex and sexual determination is constant and not variable. "So the association of the self-same universal with different genders in different verbal forms, though the objective reality meant by them is one self-identical thing, becomes absolutely unaccountable". (PWM, p.151).

In reply to this objection regarding the variation of gender, the universalists maintain that the difference of gender in words is not based upon the objective difference of sex. The spirit has no sexual difference which actually belongs to physical organism. In fact, feminine gender is used when the speaker wants to emphasise the element of diminution of sensible qualities like sound, touch etc., of an entity, while the masculine is used to emphasise the aspect of growth and development of the same, and the neuter is used when there is no emphasis on either. (sāmūyaṇavivakṣāyāṁ stri, prasāvavivakṣāyāṁ pumān, ubhayorapyavivakṣāyāṁ napuṇasakam. MB.II, p.98).

The objection regarding the variation of number proceeds from a misconception of the position of the universalists. In fact, the universalists, while maintaining the universal as the meaning, does not imply that the individual is entirely left out of cognizance. Similarly, the individualists, too, cannot fail to take cognizance of the universal while they maintain that a word denotes an individual. The meaning of a word is a complex one and the difference between the two schools lies only in emphasis. The universalists make the universal the prin-
cipal meaning and the individual the adjectival appendage, while according to the individualists the individual is the principal meaning and the universal is its adjectival adjunct. (na hyākṛtipadārtha-kasya-gravyam na padārthaḥ, dravya-padārtha-kasya vā kṛtirna padārthaḥ. ubhayorubhayam padārthaḥ. kasyacit kīcīt pradhānībhūtaṃ kīcīt guṇabhūtam. ākṛtī-padārtha-kasya ākṛtīḥ pādhanabhūtaḥ, dravya-guṇabhūtam. dravyapadārtha-kasya dravyam pradhānabhūtam ākṛtir-guṇabhūtaḥ. MB.II, pp.98-99).

The universalists offer an alternative solution also. In Sanskrit, the number and gender of words denoting qualities follow those of the substances which they qualify. This is logically explained by the postulation of the relation of inseparability or apparent identity between a substance and a quality. Likewise, the relation between the universal and the individual also can be logically regarded as one of apparent identity and, hence, the universal can similarly take on the number and gender of the individual substance in which it inheres. (yadasau dravyam sṛīto bhavati guṇastasya yallīṅgaṃ vacanaq ca tad guṇasyāpi bhavati. evam ihāpi yad asan dravyam sṛītā ākṛtistasya yallīṅgaṃ vacanaq ca tad ākṛterapi bhāviṣyaṭi. MB.II, p.99).

In reply to the objection that actions are incompatible with universals, the universalists maintain that, when an action is enjoined regarding an universal, it must have a reference to the individual also with which it is associated by force of logical implication alone, just as a person, being asked to fetch fire, fetches it in a vessel. (yathāṅgrānīyatām ityukte kevalasyāṅgernāyanāsanabhavān-nāntarĪyakatvād acoditamsapi pūtram āṁyate, etad evāṅgernāyanānāṃ ynt pātraśthasya, tathā ākṛtavigāmbhāvānādīnī codyamānānī sāmerthyāt sāhacaryād dravyam abhinivisante. MBP; II, p.99).

As regards the objection that one entity (the universal) cannot exist in more than one substratum (individuals) at the same time, it may be replied that there are things which have got unfathomable powers, e.g., the sun. Though a
universal has no spatial and temporal limitations, yet that does not give rise to confusion of concepts. For instance, it is the horse-universal, and not any other universal, which is effectively related to the individual horse. Again, the individual horse can manifest the universal 'horse-hood' and not others. (sarvakatatve'pi padarthananyān vicitrasāktyogat kascit padarthah kaucidevā'kṛtīm abhivyanakti na tu sarvam sarvah. MBp.II, p.96).

The charge of diversity and the like accruing to the universal also does not hold good, because the diversity actually belongs to the individuals and the universal appears to put on the vesture of diversity because the relation of the universal with the individual is one of apparent identity.

In reply to the last charge of Vyādī that there can be no universal in a number of heterogenous individuals, Patañjali says that, in the case of polynyms the different senses have got a common derivative meaning and so there is no necessity of repetition of more than one such word to denote the various meanings. For example, the word 'akṣa' is derived from the root 'as', meaning the act of pervasion which is the common element in all the various meanings of the said word. (vibhinnārthesu ca sāmānyat siddham sarvatra anśoter akṣaḥ, padyateḥ padāḥ, mūteḥ māśaḥ. tatraśāmānyat siddham. MB.II, p.101).

"It is worthy of notice that according to orthodox traditions Patañjali is supposed to believe that not only universal and individual but gender, number and case-relation as well form the constituents of the denoted sense of a word. Nāgāsāhāṭṭa goes so far as to suggest that the view of Patañjali is decidedly the best of all the current theories on the subject". (PWH, pp.155-56).

Bhāṭṭaṭī Diṅgāta, in his Saḍbakaustubha points out that the two theories, though opposed in principle, have been accepted by the grammarians as both of them are means that enable us to understand and explain our usages and so their pragmatic utility can hardly be denied. (yadyapi jātivyaktipakṣayoryanatarasya nyāyena vādha āvasyakastathāpi sāstre samjñā-paribhāṣādival-lakṣyasyāddhyupāyatyā ubhayā-
śrayaṁ kimapi badhakṣaṁ nāsti. Sk., p.28). He supports this statement by pointing out that, if the universal alone were the meaning then Pāṇini's rule 'jātyākhyaṁ-mekasmin vahuvacanam anyatarasyaṁ' (Pāṇ. 1.2.58) would not have been enunciated, and that, the rule 'sarūpāṁm-ekasēṣa ekavibhaktau' (Pāṇ.1.2.64) would have been totally meaningless if the individual were the only content of the denoted meaning. (yadiṁ vyaktireva ..... tārī jātyākhyaṁmiti sūtraṁ nā'rabheta. yadi ca jātireva ..... tārī sarūpasūtraṁ nā'rabheta. Sk., p.29).

In his Vaiyākaranabhūsanāśa, Kondabhatta has made a contribution of outstanding merit. Drawing his inspirations from Bṛhathari's Vākyapadīya, he has fully developed the theses of his previous masters and pointed out that the formulative elements of the denotative meaning are not only five, but one more, viz., the word-element. When we say: 'Viṣṇum uccāraya'(pronounce Viṣṇu), we cognize the word-element as the meaning. Therefore, the denoted meaning of a word consists of two elements, viz., the word-element and the sense-element which is five-fold, viz., universal, individual, gender, number and case-relation. (sabdastavacchābdabodhe bhāsate. ..... viṣṇum uccārayetvāśāvarthoccāraṇāsam-bhavana vinā sābdaviṣṇayanā śābdabodhāsaṅgatisāeti so'pi prātipadikārthaḥ. VB, p.222).

Bṛhathari has recorded a dozen theories on the import of words and has pointed out that, as the meaning of a word is largely determined by our subjective attitude and culture, so the denotation of a word is held to be different in different schools of thought.

(asamākhyayatattvānāṁ arthānāṁ laukikair yathā, vyavahāre samākhyānaṁ tat prājñō na vikalpayet. VP,II.144)

"In his system, however, the import of a word is a fiction, in as much as, he believes in the reality of a sentence and also of its meaning as an indivisible unit. Hence word and its meaning have no more objective value to him than that of an instrument enabling us to visualize and reach the ultimate goal". (PwM,p.171).

"Of course, contribution of words to the formation of propositions is not disregarded or denied even by the grammarians. But, it should always be carefully remembered
that the grammarians have denied the transcendental validity of parts of speech as they are always parts and never wholes". (DS, p. 22).
CHAPTER II.

SECTION III : The Mimansist Theory of Word-meaning.

In consistency with their thesis that objects are eternally related with eternal words, the Mimansists hold that, all words, without fail, denote 'ākṛti' (the universal or class-element). Otherwise the Vedic injunctions, which give directions for some ritual actions, become meaningless. (ākṛtistu kriyārthatvāt - MS. 1.3.33). Here it should be noted that, by 'ākṛti', the Mimansists mean the universal or class-element and not a configuration as the logicians do. The universal determines the individual and so it is called 'ākṛti'. (jātimsvākṛtīṁ pṛāhurvaktirākriyāte yayā. Śv. Ākṛtivāda, V.3, p.546). There are Vedic injunctions like 'ṣyenacitam cinvita'. (Tait, 3.5.4.11), which directs to construct a brick-built sacrificial fire-place that must resemble a falcon. If the word 'ṣyena' is taken to denote an individual falcon, then the similarity must be either to all the individual falcons or to a particular falcon. To put the similarity of all the falcons in one place is impossible. So the first alternative is to be given up. If the second alternative is accepted, then the death of the particular falcon taken for determining similarity would make the work impossible because, no other particular falcon could be taken for the purpose as that is not the denotation of the term. But if the universal be taken for the denotation of the term, then no such difficulty crops up at all. For, in that case, the similarity can be determined by any falcon, which is the substratum of the universal falconhood. The individualists may raise the objection that syntactical construction of cases with verbs is intelligible only with reference to individuals. The Mimansists do not deny it. But they maintain that the individual is the substratum of the universal and both of them are inseparable from each other. So, the universal being denoted, the individual also cannot but be cognised and, hence, there is no such difficulty in the practical field of work through linguistic behaviour as is pointed out by the individualists. (tadarthatvāt
Thus the word 'go' (cow) denotes the universal cowhood. Of course, an individual cow is, no doubt, understood from the word 'go' in such expressions as 'gaur-anubandhya' ('a cow is to be slaughtered'). But in such cases the Mimansists rely on 'lakṣaṇa', i.e. the function of indication. The universal is the primary denoted meaning while the individual, which forms the substratum of the universal, is the secondary indicated meaning and gender, number, etc., pertain to this individual only.

\[(\text{āter-astitva-nāstitve na hi kaścidvivakṣati,} \]
\[\text{nityatvālakaśaṇāyā vyakteste hi visēṣaṇe. Śū, v.311).} \]

It should be noted in this connection that, according to Prabhākara school of the Mimansists, a word denotes a universal which by its inherent capacity automatically makes the individual known because the universal is neither ontologically possible nor psychologically realisable without the individual as its concrete substratum. Thus the individual, too, is the meaning of the word though no separate capacity is to be postulated for this purpose. (atha na vyaktau sāktī kīrtu jātāveva. sā tu sābdenaiva pratiyamāṇā vastu-avabhāvād vyaktyā saha pratiyate. NR, p.121). But Prabhākara, like the logicians, regards the relation between the universal and the individual as inherence of one ontologically different principle in another. Hence it is nothing but a confusion to hold that the individual is the denoted meaning which is tantamount to the assertion that the word has a denotative capacity regarding the individual.

\[(\text{yādi tasyārtha-dvaye 'pi sāktidvayaṃ kalpitam tataḥ kena pramāṇenāṃ avāntara-} \]
\[\text{vibhāgo vagamyate svābhāvikyākṛtau sāktir-vyaktau tu tannibandhanetī. Mi, p.121).} \]

Moreover, if the universal cannot be understood without reference to an individual, the former cannot be the condition of the latter. Now, the word has got no power of denoting the individual and so it cannot denote it. Again, the universal minus an individual being unintelligible, simple universal, too, cannot be the meaning of a word. Thus the view of Prabhākara tantamounts to saying that a word
can denote no meaning at all, neither universal nor individual. (nanvasau na kevala pratyetum sakya-te. evam tarhyasya apratiti praasajyeta. vyaktistavat
pratyayaka-tvabhavana pratiyate. tasya c'apratiyamahayam na taya saha jati
pratyetum sakya-te. NR., p.121). Therefore, this position of Prabhakara is not
acceptable to Kumaila Bhata and his followers. They contend that the
universal, denoted by a word, is incapable of being associated with
the rest of the sentence and, as it is immanent in the individual, so the latter
is conveyed through 'Lakshana'. The relation between the individual and the
universal, according to Kumaila, is one of identity-cum-difference.

However, the individualists may contend that, according to their theory
also, the universal is comprehended with the cognition of the denoted individual;
because the universal is an 'upalakshana' to the individual. An 'upalakshana' is
determining mark of a substance and, as such, is an adjective; but it is not
related with the noun it qualifies. But the Mimansist cannot accept this theory.
If a word is taken to denote an individual, then the individual being infinite in
number, innumerable denotative powers for a single word is to be postulated.
This would lead to the fallacy of endlessness (anantya). If a particular white
cow be the denotation of the word 'cow', then another black cow cannot be denoted
by the same term. Thus the individualist theory goes against the law of parsimony
while the Mimansist theory is in accordance with it.

The universalists maintain that qualities, actions and substances are
actually of diverse types and the identical cognition of all of them is a definite
pointer to the inherence of universals in them. Thus, though the attribute of
whiteness is different in different individuals (varying in shades), yet due to
the presence of universal 'whiteness' in the different patches of the same colour,
we use the word 'white' to denote all of them. Therefore, the word 'white'
definitely denotes whiteness. The same is the case with the words signifying
actions, viz., cooking, etc. The Mimansists go so far as to declare that even
a proper name, e.g., 'dittha' denotes the universal pertaining either to the sound or to the sense. Because, the word, though differently uttered by different persons, parrots, etc., is cognized as the same word. The substance conveyed by the word, too, though constantly changes its form, colour, etc., is always ascertained from the same word. This clearly indicates that the universal is denoted by the proper names even. (sarveṣṇaṁ sābdānāṁ jātirevārthaḥ. yaṁ-gocchā-
śābdānāṁ ca vālavyuddhasūkhādyuḍīrītattvācchabī-vṛttastattatsamayābhinārthavṛtte-
rvā jātirevābhidheyatāsambhavāt. RG.II, p.184).

It is interesting to note that the world-famous western philosopher, Bertrand Russell, also holds almost the same view. He says: "The spoken word 'dog' is not a single entity: it is a class of similar movements of the tongue, throat and larynx. Just as jumping is one class of bodily movements, and walking another, so the word 'dog' is a third class of bodily movements. The word 'dog' is a universal, just as dog is universal. We say loosely, that we can utter the same word 'dog' on two occasions, but in fact we utter two examples of the same species. Thus there is no difference of logical status between dog and the word 'dog': each is general, and exists only in instances. The word 'dog' is a certain class of verbal utterances, just as dog is a certain class of quadrupeds. Exactly the similar remarks apply to the heard word and to the written word". (IMT., p.22).

The objections against the universalist Vājapāyayana and also the answers have been elaborately discussed in the previous section. These equally hold good with regard to the Mimansist theory also. Hence we need not go into further details in this section.
CHAPTER - II.

SECTION - IV : The Logician Theory of Word-meaning.

Gautama, the founder of Indian logic, contends that none of the previously discussed theories gives the whole truth. The individual itself cannot be the meaning of a word, because individuals are many in number and vary amongst one another and there is no knowing which particular individual is denoted by a word to the exclusion of others. (na, tadanavasthānāt. NS., p.170 - NS.2.2.63)

Configuration, also, cannot by itself be the meaning of a word. Had it been so, a clay model of a cow also would be denoted by the word 'cow'. But we know that in the pragmatic world the word 'cow', used in such sentences as 'bring the cow', etc., does not mean any clay model though it has the same configuration. (vyaktākṛtiyukte'pi mṛdgavake prakṣapādinām aprasāngādīti. gāṃ prakṣaya, gāṃ ānaya, gāṃ dehitī naitāni mṛdgavake prayujyante. Nb. on NS.2.2.66, pp.172-73).

The universal also, by itself, cannot be the meaning of a word, because the absolute universal can never be cognised without reference to the individual and configuration. (na, ākṛtiyaktyapekṣatvājjātyā-bhivyakteḥ, NS.2.2.67).

In these circumstances, Gautama concludes, the denotation of a term consists in the universal, the individual and the configuration taken together. In other words, a word denotes an individual as having a physical arrangement and as characterised by the universal. (vyaktyākṛtiJayastu padārthaḥ. NS.2.2.68). On hearing the word 'cow', any person, who is aware of its denotative power, understands an individual cow, the cowhood and the configuration of the animal simultaneously.

The logician maintains that, though the denotation of a term is thus cumulative in character, yet the emphasis is placed on one of the three elements and it varies from instance to instance. Thus in the sentence : 'A cow should not be touched by feet', the emphasis is on the universal, but in the sentence: 'Tether the cow', it is on the individual; while in the sentence, 'Draw the picture
of a cow', the emphasis lies on the configuration. (sthita'pi tadvato vācyatvān
kvacit prayoge jāteḥ prādhānaye vyakteraṅgabhāvah-yathā gaur na pada sprastavyeti
sarvagaviṣu pratiṣedho ganyate, kvacid vyakteḥ prādhānaye jāteḥ aṅgabhāvah
yathā gām muñca gām vadhāneti niyataḥ kaṃcid vyakim uddisaḥ prayujyate, kvacid-
ākṛteḥ prādhānaye vyakteraṅgabhāvo jātirnāstyeva yathā piṣṭakamayyo gāvah kriyat
ātāmāti. NM, p.297).

The universal being one of the constituent factors of denotation, this
doctrine, though it includes the individual within the meaning of a word, is
not vitiated by the fallacies of endlessness (ānantya) and violation (vyabhicāra).
According to this thesis the individual is comprehended through the function
of denotation. Hence the logician does not feel any necessity for having
recourse to the function of indication (lakṣaṇa) in order to account for its
cognition. "It enjoys another advantage over the doctrine of the Māṃsaka,
in as much as, it renders construction of gender and number with the connota-
tion of a term possible, because though the universal is amorphous, the indi-
dual is not so" (LC, p.120).

The neo-logicians, however, maintain that the individual-as-determined
by the universal constitutes the meaning of a word. (tasmāt tadvānāvad padārthaḥ,
nam ko'yaḥ tadvān nāma tad asyāstī tadvān iti viśeṣa eva sāmānyavān ucye.
NM, p.295). In short, the neo-logicians modify the concept of meaning as pro-
pounded by Gautama. They take into account both universal and individual ele-
ments of the import of a word. Ākṛti or abiding component structure (niyatāvaya-
vavyūha) is dropped, though there are some cases like geometrical figures where
the ground for the application of a name, e.g., 'triangle', is the form. Actually,
configuration is an aid to the comprehension of the universal and so if the
universal is taken into account, 'ākṛti' or configuration becomes superfluous.
In the cases of geometrical figures also, the universality of forms being accep-
ted the configuration need not be taken separately into account. The conception
of form is included in the conception of 'jāti' or the essential generic character. "It is altogether unnecessary therefore to say that in certain cases the 'form' alone is meant by the word. It should rather be said that in certain cases the form is the most prominent (or even the sole) factor that constitutes the generic properties expressed by a word. When one hypothesis can cover all cases it is illogical to advance another hypothesis to explain a part of such cases." (SWK, p.268-69). A term (part of speech) consists of two parts, viz., a base (prakṛti), nominal or verbal, and a suffix. According to the logicians, the suffix signifies case, gender and number. If only the universal be regarded as the meaning of the base, it would be impossible to construe this meaning with that of the suffix, in as much as, a universal can never be conceived to be functioning as a case or as related to gender and number. But an individual can be so conceived. "It is, therefore, quite in the fitness of things to hold that the individual is the import of a word. But as there is no limit to the number of individuals, it is required that the particular individuals that would be denoted by a word should be restricted or determined and the restriction of determination can only be achieved through a reference to the universal which underlies all these individuals". (PVM, p.142).

The view of the neo-logician, however, is rejected by the Advaitins who hold that the meaning symbolized by a word is the universal alone and not the universalized particular. If it is said that the word 'cow' means an individual possessed of cowness (gotvavīśīṣṭavyākta), the knowledge of the universal cowness is already assumed. The individual is the substantive (vīśīṣṭa) which is qualified by the universal as its adjective, and it is a well-known dictum that the cognition of adjective precedes that of the substantive qualified by it. Hence, logically the primary meaning of a word is nothing but the universal pure and simple. The inclusion of the particular in the primary meaning brings another difficulty. It is impossible to cognize all the particulars. Hence they cannot form the content of meaning. Only one particular, too, cannot be
regarded as a part of meaning, in as much as, the knowledge of one particular implied by the meaning cannot help us in determining other particulars which are also actually meant by the same word. "On knowing that a certain word is applicable to a certain universalised particular, what enables us to apply it to a fresh universalized particular is not the particularity of either of them, which is unique, but the universal element which is common to both. And the primary and explicit meaning of a word is that by knowing which we are able to apply the word to different objects. Hence the meaning consists of the universal essential character alone and not any other particularizing element". (SNK, p.271).

But 'Jati' or the universal being regarded as real and eternal, the passage from universal to particular becomes very difficult. However, the Vedántins, who are empirical in these matters, find no such difficulty as they regard a universal as consisted of the common essential characteristics actually existing in a group of particulars (dravya-guṇa-karmavṛttiḥ samānyadharmaḥ).
CHAPTER - II.

SECTION I - The Buddhist Theory of Meaning.

The Buddhist fails to accept any one of the orthodox views, as discussed before, regarding the import of words. This is due to the difference between the orthodox and the Buddhistic view-points concerning the ontological categories. Therefore, in order to understand the Buddhistic theory of concepts we must, first of all, acquaint ourselves with the Buddhist position regarding universals vis-a-vis the orthodox view, which constitutes its foundation and, therefore, is intimately interlinked. The Buddhist regards the universe as an intellectual fiction having no objective reality. Like the famous Western Philosopher, Hume, the Buddhist contends that there is nothing permanent and constant in the universe; whatever we see is nothing but a continuous flux of changes. Nothing remains identical at two successive moments even. The cognition of identity is illusory to the very core of it. The apparent temporal continuity of an entity is made up of several successive moments. This is analogical to the temporal continuity of a cinema picture composed of swiftly moving successive snap spots. Modern science also maintains that the whole universe is made up of atoms which go through constant evolution or change. Thus, to a modern mind, the Buddhist view may impress itself as a scientifically correct one. But there is a basic difference between the scientific and the Buddhistic tenets. While modern science regards the world as objectively real, the Buddhist denies its objective reality altogether and regards the universe as purely subjective which is nothing but a mental construction hypostatized as an objective reality. The logical outcome of his metaphysical doctrine is that the individual entity is a momentary self-contained one which has nothing to do with any other individual, similar or dissimilar, and consequently, it cannot be the object of verbal convention.
The orthodox philosophers (particularly the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa) regard the universal as a positive ubiquitous and immutable entity that serves to synthesise mutually different individuals into a particular class. The universal cow-hood is an immutable positive entity present in all the mutually different individual entities known as cows. They maintain that it is this universal or class-element which accounts for the use of the same term 'cow' to denote all these mutually different individuals. But as regards the universal, the Buddhist repudiates its objectivity as an independent category and regards it as a fiction having no objective counter-part; it cannot be an eternal entity subsisting in individuals and the individuals, too, on their part, cannot share it in common as all reals are discrete and, therefore, that would strike at the very root of this self-containedness of the reals, which is the key-stone of the Buddhistic metaphysics. The individual or substance is regarded by the orthodox philosophers as the substratum of qualities, actions and universals. But the Buddhist repudiates this view and regards it as nothing but a collocation of attributes apart from which it has no existence at all. This is analogical to a forest that has no existence apart from the trees constituting it. Needless to say that these qualities, on their part, are nothing but subjective and everchanging entities having no extramental reality.

(nanu dharmātireṇa dharmino 'nupalambhanāt, tattvamātra evayam gavādiṣyād vanādivat. Śū, v.151,p.264).

The polemics of Dhammakirti, the eminent Buddhist philosopher, against the orthodox theory of universals are well-known to the students of philosophy and we need not go into it here, in as much as, it does not form the subject matter of our treatise. The Buddhist, however, admits the fact of universal experience that whenever a word is heard, we cognise a concept; but he denies the objective reality of that concept. According to him, the concept is as much unreal as the cognition of two moons by a person having defective eyesight.
(na hi sarvathā sābdārthāpāvādō' smābhīḥ kriyate,
tasyāgopālam api pratītatvāt. kintu tāttvikatvām.
dharmo yaḥ paris-tatrāropyate tasya nīṣedhāḥ kriyate,
na tu dharmināḥ. TSP, p.341).

But, nevertheless, whenever we hear the word 'cow', we comprehend all
cow-individuals and many of our pragmatic activities are based upon such cogni-
tions. Now, if a term signifies only a concept which is nothing but a subject-
ive ideal, how are we to explain the objective reference associated with it?
Moreover, admitting that there is no such objective element as a universal
inherent in all the individuals belonging to a particular class, what leads to
the similar, rather identical, cognition and verbal usage? To be more clear,
why should the same term 'cow' be used to designate all the cow-individuals that
are mutually different and, if such usage can be granted, what is the bar in
using the same term to signify other individuals like horses which are similar
in respect of mutual difference and, therefore, have equal claim with the cow
individuals?

In reply, the Buddhist points out that, the denotation of a term consists
in the negation of the contradictory (anyāpoha or 'apoha'). Thus the term 'cow'
conveys the concept of 'being not-not-cow'. It is true that one cow is as much
different from another cow as it is different from all other individuals like
horses and dogs; yet all the cow-individuals have one property in common - when-
ever we perceive a cow, be it black or white, with horns or without horns, we
cognise it as something different from not-cow. This property of being different
from not-cow is equally shared by all the individuals we call cows. Therefore,
it is quite logical to use the term 'cow' to signify this property of not-not-cow
and this is wrongly interpreted and hypostatised by the orthodox philosophers
as the so-called positive entity, the universal called cow-hood. But this assump-
tion of them has no ontological basis and the said property of 'not-not-cow' is
as much an effective a synthesising factor as the so-called universal. In fact,
Dīnāga, the propounder of 'apoha', describes it as qualified by all the attributes which are shown by the orthodox philosophers as attributes qualifying the universal. This 'apoha' which is the import of a word is neither a subjective idea nor an objective reality but only a fiction. When a word is uttered, the speaker erroneously thinks that he is presenting an objective fact to the listener while the hearer, on his part, wrongly thinks that the import is something objectively real, though in fact, it has no objective reality and is not positive either; it is at bottom a negation of negation and negation is only an ideational abstraction. (vikalpa-viṣaye viṣaye iṣṭā sābdānāmānayoḥ, avastu-viṣayāścāte vikalpā iti varṇitam. yā ca bhūmīr vikalpānāṃ sā eva viṣayogirām, ata eva hi sābdānāṃ anyāpohaṃ pracakṣate. NM p.27)

This wrong notion is due to a transcendental illusion which is unavoidable.

This doctrine helps the Buddhist to establish the falseness of verbal cognition. This doctrine has been criticised seriously by the realists, especially by Bhāma in his Kāvyālaṃkāra, by Kumārila in his Ślokavārttika and by Uddvyotakara in his Nyāyavārttika.

The first known critic to criticise the Buddhist view on denotation of words is Bhāma, one of the oldest, if not the oldest, author of poetics whose work is still extant. In the sixth chapter of his work, Kāvyālaṃkāra he passigly criticises the doctrine of 'apoha' in three illuminating kārikās (verses). He first asks the Buddhist: Well, you contend that the import of the word "cow" is the negation of not-cow and this is purely a negative concept; then how can you account for the cognition of the positive concept of a cow? Such cognition is universal and uncontradicted and, therefore, cannot be repudiated. You cannot say that the self-same term 'cow' signifies two concepts simultaneously - one, the positive concept of a cow-individual and the other, the negation of not-cow; one word cannot express an affirmative and a negative idea in one sweep.
Again, you say that the term "cow" denotes the negation of not-cow. But it is a fact admitted on all hands that the cognition of negation presupposes the knowledge of the negatum since the latter is the determinant of the former. Therefore, you have to admit that the term "cow" at first signifies not-cow which is the negatum and, hence, the determinant in this case. Thus, in order to meet logical necessity, you have to admit that the term 'cow' at first signifies 'not-cow' directly by its denotative capacity. It is quite natural and logical to maintain that what is directly comprehended from a word without any intervention is the denotation of the same. Thus you have to admit that the denotation of the term 'cow' is 'not-cow' rather than 'not-not-cow' which is in agreement with your doctrine. Hence, is not your conclusion quite fantastic and is not your doctrine involved in a moras of contradiction? Thus your hypothesis propounding the negation of the contradictory (anyāpoha) to be the denotation of a word is absurd on the face of it.

(yadi gaur ityayaḥ sābdah kṛṭarthaḥ nya-nirakṛtau, janako gavi go-buddher-mṛgyatām aparā dhvamiḥ, artha-jñāna-phalāḥ sābdā na caikasya phala-dvayaḥ, apavāda-vidhi-jñāne phale caikasya vah katham. purā'gaur iti vijñānam go-sābdā-sravaṇād bhavet, yenāgo-pratiṣedhāya pravṛttto gaur iti dhvaniḥ. KL.VI.17-19 pp.42-3)

The Mīmāṃsikā is the guardian of the uncontested authority of the Vedas and it is therefore their solemn duty to repudiate the Buddhist doctrine of 'apoha' which helps them (the Buddhists) prove the falsity of verbal cognition and thereby verbal testimony and ultimately the authority of the Vedas. Hence Kumārila Bhaṭṭa severely criticised the Buddhist doctrine. His critique is much more elaborate and penetrating than that of Bhāma and, indeed, he has devoted a whole section named 'Apohavāda' to dissect the doctrine with a view to proving its hollowness. In his Nyāyamaṇḍarī, Jayanta has remarked that Kumārila has
chopped the doctrine of apoha into pieces with the sword of his polemics.

(nanvapoha-sābdārtha-pakṣe mahātīm kṛpaṇa-वष्टिम utsasarja bhaṭṭah. NM. p.277)

Kumārila at first asks the Buddhist: what ultimately is the negation of not-cows like horses, etc.? In reality, all negative concepts are ultimately reduced to some positive concepts.

(bhāvāntaraṁakomābhāvapurastāṭpratipāditāḥ
  tatrāsvādī-viṣṇ yabābhāh ka iti kathyaṁ. SV v.2)

Let us clarify the point. The Mīmāṃsik maintains that there are four accepted types of negation each of which, if properly analysed, is proved to be some positive entity. Thus the pre-non-existence (prāgabhāva) of curd in milk is nothing but milk itself, which is a positive entity. Similarly, the post-non-existence (dhvapaśabhāva) of milk in curd is nothing else than curd which is undoubtedly positive in nature. The mutual negation or difference (anyāyabhāva) and the absolute negation, too, in the long run, can be proved to be positive in essence through the same line of arguments. Thus the mutual differences of a cow in a not-cow like horse and that of the horse in a cow are nothing but the positive entities of a cow and a horse respectively and nothing else. Hence it is quite logical to maintain that the negation of the contradictory (anyāpoha or apoha), e.g., not-not-cow is, in the ultimate analysis, reduced to a positive entity, be it an objective category or a subjective concept. Thus the Buddhist doctrine is nothing but the universal of the orthodox philosophers presented in the guise of apoha. In order to steer clear of this charge, the Buddhist may argue that the import of the word 'cow' is nothing but the real, momentary and self-contained cow-individual and it is regarded as a positive entity by the Mīmāṃsik though, in reality, it is not so. But this reply does not tally with the fundamental position of the Buddhist who maintains that the individuals are discrete and can never be connected by verbal description which, on its part, is illusory and ideal and hence cannot be a description of the real momentary individual. Thus thwarted, the Buddhist might explain 'apoha' e.g. not-not-cow, as an absolute
negation (prasajya pratiṣedha) like the negation of sky-flower which has no reference to a positive entity. Hence the above charge does not hold good. But the Mimansist here retorts that this position of the Buddhist cuts at the very root of human language the main function of which is to help us in our pragmatic activities. But if 'apoha' he regarded as absolute negation of the contradictory, it would lead to absolute negativism. As a result, the concept cognized from words should be cast off as illusory because the words would not signify any positive entity in that case. Consequently, a proposition composed of different words would become a sum total of different concepts in the forms of absolute negations that have no extra-mental reference. Thus a sentence would generate only an illusory and ideal judgemental cognition having nothing parallel in the outer world. Thus the Buddhist hypothesis utterly frustrates the pragmatic value of language, which is an undeniable fact. Now, verbal cognition of positive concepts, which is an universal and uncontradicted experience, cannot be denied in any way. Hence the Buddhist might recognise the origin of positive concepts though he might consider them as ideal fictions residing in the mind alone. But then what can be the logical necessity of postulating the entity of absolute negation? What harm can there be if the ideal positive fiction alone be regarded as the denotation of words? What more, the Buddhist denies any objective status to the category of 'Negation' (abhāva) but, strange enough, he posits the illusory entity of absolute negation as being real denotation of words. Thus his position is all the more inconsistent. To remove this inconsistency, the Buddhist may accept the ontological reality of negation. But then it will be nothing but accepting the orthodox Naiyāyikā position even the idea of which is repulsive to any true Buddhist.

(niṣedha-mātra-rūpasā sābdārtho yadi kalpyate,
abhāva-sābdā-vācyā syāc-chūnyatānya-prakārikā,
tasyām cāsvādi-buddhinām ātmāsa-grhaṇāṃ bhavet,
tatrānāpoha-vācyatvam mudhaivābhyupaganyate. TS.918-19 p.362)
The Mimansist again puts the Buddhist between the two horns of a dilemma: if the Buddhist accepts the negatum of the final negation (e.g. not cow) in its universal aspect, it would lead to regressus-ad-infinitum and if he accept it in its particular aspect then his position leads to absurdity; let us clarify the point. The final negation in the form of not-not-cow, which is the denotation of the term 'cow', has for its negatum 'not-cow'. The negatum signifies everything outside the species cow, e.g. dogs, horses, etc., which are the objects of negation. Now, the concept of dogs, horses, etc., may stand for the classes 'dog', 'horse' etc. which are generic concepts; but according to the Buddhist, all generic concepts are nothing but negation of the contradictory and hence, dog, horse, etc., must be reducible to the corresponding negation of their opposites, and so on. Thus this position leads to the fallacy of regressus-ad-infinitum. Again, if the concepts of horse, dog, etc. are regarded as signifying individual horses and dogs, etc., then this position will be simply an absurd one since, according to the Buddhist himself, particulars are absolutely inexpressible. What more, it is a common dictum that double negatives make a strong affirmative and, hence, the concept of 'apoha' appears to be nothing but a positive one in spite of his strong protestations to the contrary. The Mimansist puts the Buddhist into another dilemma: The negation of the negata, not-cows, viz. horses, dogs etc., may either be distinct from the negata themselves or be identical with them. If the first alternative be taken, the final negation must be considered as a positive entity, because only a positive entity can constitute the negatum of negation; but this is contrary to the Buddhist position and, therefore, he cannot accept this alternative. If, however, he accepts the second alternative, the concept of apoha, viz., not-not-cow, will be identical with the concept of not-cow like horses, dogs, etc. and this is purely a fantastic view. (api cāśvādayāḥ sāmānya-rūpeṇa vai poheyana visēgātmāṇa va, na visēgātmāṇā tadd-amāṅgatvād-asākla-vacatvācca, sāmānyātmāṇā tu teṣaṁ apyapoha-rūpa-γvād-abhāvatvām, kathā cābhāva-syaiśvabhavah kriyate karaṇe va pratīṣedhādvaya-yogād-vidhīr-aviṣeṣhate iti vidhi-
The Mimansist again puts a query to the Buddhist: What would be the denotations of the terms 'existent' and 'knowable'? According to the Buddhist, these must be negation of non-existent and not-knowable respectively. But a non-existent and not-knowable entity being only a fancy, the concepts constituting their negation will also be nothing but a figment of imagination. Now, if anything be existent it must be knowable and all knowable entities must be existent, though it may not have any extramental reference. Hence the concept of non-existence is not cognizable and, therefore, the question of the cognizability of its negation cannot arise at all. Thus there can arise no cognition of non-existent from the term 'existent' and hence the doctrine of apoha is not acceptable. Moreover, we cannot negate anything about which we know nothing at all or which is not knowable; we must at least know its existence. Thus the objects of negation, viz., the concepts of non-existent and not-knowable, must existent and knowable, too. Thus the Buddhist doctrine leads to the absurd position that the concept of 'non-existent' is 'existent' and that of 'not-knowable' is 'knowable' and, hence these terms become self-negatory in import. This position cannot be justified by any amount of logic. (ajñeyādī-sabdānām-apohā-nirūpaṇā' sambhavān-nāpohavācitvān, na hyasad ajñeyam vā kuncid-avagatan vād vyāvacchidyate jñātaṁ cet sad-eva taj-ajñeyam cetyataḥ kathāḥ sacchadbena sad- eva ajñeya-sabdāna ca ajñeyam evāpohyate, ajanātaṁ tu nitarāṁ anāpohyam, kalpitam tu tad vaktum asakhyaṁ kalpanayaiva sattvājñeyatvāccha, NH, p.279)

The mimansist presents another puzzle before the Buddhist for solution: What is the denotation of the term 'apoha' itself? The Buddhist may answer that it is 'not-not-apoha'? But what is the nature of this not-apoha? The Buddhist
doctrine also utterly fails to explain the denotation of negative particles like 'na' (not), etc., of prepositions and also of verbal forms signifying actions, in as much as, his doctrine is a challenge to the orthodox theory of universals alone and is not extensive enough to explain the terms signifying actions, etc., that are different from universals. (apoha-sabdasya ca kim vacyam iti cintyam, anapohino bhavati-upapahas ca kasacyam anapohah kathah vasau na bhavati abhavan va kim avasesyate iti sarvam avacakam, pratishedha-vacinah ca naaddi-sabdana ca kavarta, atre na bhaviti neti ko'rthah upasargah-nipatanam ca kathah apoha-vigayatvam akhyata-sabdana ca pacaticdinyam apohd durupadah namn na va jatisabdana apoha-vigayatvam igyate yega bhavanto jaticcitvam tad-vacitvam va pratipadyante iti cet tato 'nyesan tarhi kavarta, NM, p.279).

These arguments lead to the conclusion that the Buddhist doctrine of 'apoha' cannot be universally valid. It may somehow hold good in cases of the words prefixed by a negative particle, e.g., 'abrahmana' (non-brahmin) where a negative concept is cognized. But in all other cases it fails to explain verbal cognition which is definitely positive in character.

The next eminent critique of the doctrine of apoha is Uddyotakara. In his Nyavyavartika, he has pointed out several other inconsistencies in the Buddhist thesis, in addition to those already discussed. The Buddhist doctrine is that a term denotes the negation of the contradictory. It may hold good in the cases of those concepts which have some contradictory concepts. But what can be contradictory to 'all' which is comprehensive of anything and everything and nothing is left out of its scope? The Buddhist, however, may contend that, 'one', 'two' etc., are contradictory to 'all'. But this course of defence shatters down before his own doctrine that repudiates the objectivity of a whole (samudaya) apart from its parts constituting it. Now the concept of 'all' is the sum-total of the concepts of 'one', 'two', etc. and, therefore, one, two etc. are its component parts. Hence 'all' has no existence apart from one, two, etc.
Consequently, negation of one, two etc., will be negation of 'all' itself. Thus the denotation of the term 'all' becomes self-negatory in character. The same line of arguments proves similar inconsistencies in respect of the denotation of every collective term such as 'two', 'three' etc. and all terms expressive of wholes as opposed to their component parts. (anyāpohasaḥ saṁdārtha ityayuktam avyāpakatvāḥ-yatra dvairasyaṁ bhavati tatra itara-pratīṣṭhāt tad-itoraḥ pratīyate. yathā gauriti pade gauḥ pratīṣṭhānaṁ agauḥ prati-gidhyāmaṇaḥ, na punah sarva-pada etad-asti, naḥyasarvaṁ nāma kiścid asti yat sarva-padena nivartyeta. ekādy-vyudāsat vyūpakam iti cet? atha manyase ekādy- śarvaṁ tat sarva-sābdena nivartyeta? - tamma, svārthāpavāda-doṣa-prasaṅgat. evaṁ satye-kādi-vyudāsenā pravarta-maṇaḥ sarva-sābdah aṅgasya pratīṣṭhād-āṅga-vyatirikta-sāya cāṅgino 'nathyupagamasat anarthakahḥ syat. evaṁ sarve samudāya-sābdā ekadesa-pratīṣṭhāda-rūpeṇa pravarta-maṇaḥ samudāyi-vyatirikta-samudāyābhūyupagamasat anarthakahḥ prāpnuvantīti. dvyādi-sābdānāṁ ca samuccaya-viśayatvaḥ-ekādi-pratīṣṭhedhe pratīṣṭhidhyāmaṇanāṁ-amuccayaḥ dvyādi-sābdānāṁ anarthakatvam. NV, p.329).

Uddyotakara asks the Buddhist to clarify another point. Is 'apoha' (e.g., not-not-cow) a positive or a negative entity? According to the Buddhist, 'apoha' is pure negation and, therefore, he cannot accept the first alternative. The second alternative also cannot be logically accepted. To be more precise, the Buddhist has to face a dilemma by accepting this alternative. The concept, 'not-not-cow' which is the import of the term 'cow' may either mean not-cow which is self-contradictory or it may be regarded as purely negative in character in which case all our pragmatic activities will become impossible since there will be no reference to any positive entity. This point has been elaborately discussed before. What more, introspection reveals that the denotation of the term 'cow' is some positive entity and no negative concept flashes forth in our mind. Thus introspection, the ultimate arbiter as to the real character of all sorts of experience, conceptual or not, proves the hollowness of the Buddhist theory. (yasāyaṁ anyāpohah - agaur na bhavatī go-sābdasyārthah sa kim bhāvo 'thābhāva
iti? yadibhāvah kim gaur-agaur iti? yadi gaur-nāsti vivādah, athāgaur-go-sābdasya-
ṛthaḥ? aho sābdartha-kausālam. abhāvastu na yuktāḥ praiga-sampratipattyor-
avisayattvāt, na hi go-sābda-sāvagād abhāve praiga na vā sampratipattīḥ,
sābdarthaścā pratipattyā pratiyate. na ca go-sābdad-abhavaḥ kascī pratipadyata
iti. NV, p.329).

Udyotakara attacks the Buddhist with another formidable dilemma: The
color of apoha may either be discrete and variable and vary in the case of each
individual intended to be signified, or it may be an unvariant concept. If the
first alternative be accepted, the concept of not-not-cow would be as much discrete
and variable and, consequently, inexpressible as the cow individuals themselves
are. If, on the other hand, the second alternative be accepted, apoha would be
of the same nature as the unvariant universal of the orthodox philosophers and
what would the Buddhist gain by reinstating the concept of apoha in place of that
of the universal? (ayam cāpohah prativastveko 'neka iti vā vaktavyah. yadyeko'
-neka-go-sambandhī tadā gotvām tad iti. athāneka stataḥ pīndavād ānanta yād ākhyānānu-
papatter-arthā-pratyayo na yuktāḥ. NV, p.330) It seems very strange, however,
that the eminent Buddhist philosopher, Dīnāga, the originator of the doctrine
of 'apoha', has predicated of the concept of apoha all those attributes that are
attached to the concept of universal propounded by the orthodox philosophers.
However, Udyotakara hurles another sharp weapon. He asks: IF apoha (e.g.,
not-not-cow) itself a self-sufficient concept or is its import its negation (e.g.,
not-not-not-cow)? If the first alternative be accepted, the doctrine loses
universal application, in as much as, the import of this term at least becomes
positive in character. The acceptance of the second alternative leads to the
logical fallacy of regressus-ad-infinītum. Thus the doctrine of apoha is quite
unsatisfactory and, therefore, should be rejected outright. (idam ca tāvat
prāṣṭavyo jāyate bhavān kim ayam apoho vācayo 'thāvācya iti. yadi vācayo 'naikāntikaḥ
sābdarthaḥ anyāpohah sābdartha iti. anavasthā vā athānāpohā-vyudāsa-rūpenābhi-
dhīyate apohas-tasyāpyanya ityanavasthā. athāvācayo 'nya-sābdartha-pohah karotīti
vyāhatam. yadi cāsābdasyāpohoh nābhidheyārthaḥ? abhidheyārtha-vyatirekeṣa
svārtho vaktavyah. atha sa evāsa svārthah? tathāpi vyāhatam — anya-sābdārthā-
pothag svārthe kurvati srutir abhidhatta ityucyate iti tasya vākyasyāyam arthah
tadānih bhavatyanyad-anabhidadhāno bhidhatta iti. NV, pp. 330-31).

The later Buddhists, however, tried their best to steer clear of all
the sharp criticisms directed against their doctrine of apoha (negation of the
contradictory) by the eminent orthodox theorists. They maintain that all the
adverse criticisms originate from the want of appreciation, on the part of the
orthodox philosophers, of the fundamentals of their doctrine. So their first
duty is to explain clearly the doctrine. Apoha, they assert, is of three kinds :
(1) in the form of an ideal image, (2) an objective entity and (3) an absolute
negation (prasaJayapratīgedha). Of these, the first two types may be regarded
positive entities (paryudāsa). Let us explain the nature of these three types
of apoha from the standpoint of the Buddhist.

All cow-individuals are discrete, self-contained and distinct from each
other; in spite of that, they are cognized as similar to one another. This
cognition, being universal and uncontradicted, cannot be repudiated as a false one.
But how can this similarity be accounted for? In reply it is maintained that
each of the individual cows performs the self-same activities of yielding milk
carrying burdens etc., and satisfies the self-same need. The perception of this
identity of functions gives rise to an ideal image in our minds. This conceptual
image is purely ideal in character and has no extramental reality at all. It is
unvariant in nature unaffected by the variability of the individual cows. This
idea has a negative implication because it is cognized as different from all other
ideal images of horses, dogs, etc. It functions as a differentiating factor of
the particular individuals under perception as well by marking it off from all
other individuals. Therefore, it is called apoha. Whenever we perceive a cow-
individual, an identical image flashes forth in our minds and this apoha accounts
for the similarity or rather identity of cognition and expression with reference
to different individual cows.

(anyāpoha-parijñānād evam ete kudṛṣṭayaḥ,
svayām duṣṭa durātmāno nāsāyanti parān api.
tathāḥi dvividho 'pohāḥ paryudāsa-nigedhataḥ,
dvividho paryudāsopī buddhyātmārthāma-bhedataḥ.
eka-pratyavamarsāya ya uktā hetavaḥ purā,
abhayādi-samā arthāḥ praṃtayaivānya-bhedinaḥ.
tān upārītya yajñāne bhātyartha-pratibimbakaṁ,
kalpake'rthātmatābhāve'pyarthā ityeva mīcitam,
pratibhāsāntaraḥ bhedādi anya-vyāvrūta-vastunāḥ,

The other type of positive apoha is the objective apoha which is identical with the particular instance in question, e.g., the particular cow-entity intended to be expressed by the term 'cow'. This also is termed as 'apoha' or the negation of the contradictory for the simple reason that it is cognised as a discrete entity different from all other entities whether of the same species or not. This objective apoha is the cause of the ideal apoha which is the ideal cow image. (svalakṣāne 'pi taddhetāv-anya-visēgā-bhāvataḥ. TS.1002 p.391).

Again, it is an undeniable universal experience that after we perceive a particular cow, i.e., the objective apoha or cognize the ideal cow-image, i.e., the subjective or ideal apoha, the experience takes the form: 'this particular entity is not-not-cow'.

(prasajya-pratigedhāsca gaur-āgaur na bhavatyam,
atī-vispaṣṭa evāyam anyāpoho'vagamyate. TS.1009, p.392).

Thus the existence of this variety of apoha as absolute negation in nature is also corroborated by introspection. Thus all these three types of apoha are to be admitted as they are attested by universal and uncontradicted experience.
Of these three types the first one (i.e., the ideal image, e.g., the ideal cow-image) is the invariable concomitant of the knowledge of the word (e.g., 'cow'). Therefore, it is the primary verbal cognition and the cognition of other two types of apoha follows suit. Thus when we hear the word 'cow' we first cognize the ideal cow-image, then the cow-individual and next we cognize that it is not-not-cow. This is, according to the Buddhist, the process of verbal cognition. (tatrāyam prathamaḥ sābdair apohaḥ pratipadyate, vāhyārthādhyā-vasāyinyā buddheḥ sābdāt sadubbhavāt. Ts.1010, p.392).

Thus the primary denotation of the term 'cow' is the ideal cow-image and the concept of not-not-cow is only necessarily and invariably derived from it. Hence, the latter, which is a derivative concept, should not be given precedence over the former which is the primary denotation of the term 'cow'. Again, the objective individual cow is the cause giving rise to the utterance of the word 'cow', which in its turn gives rise to the ideal cow-image. Thus the individual cow-entity is the remote cause of the ideal cow-image and hence the latter is necessarily implied by the former and thus it is only a by-product of the primary denotation, in-as much as, it is conveyed by suggestion through the mechanism of the causal relation. Thus the objective individual and the concept of absolute negation are not actually the denotation of a word; but they are described to be so only secondarily as they are cognized through the instrumentality of the denotation of the word.

Indeed, the cow-individual, being momentary, cannot be related with the word 'cow' and therefore, cannot be directly conveyed by it because the relation between the two is the essential pre-requisite of any verbal cognition.

The above discussion shows, contends the Buddhist, that Bhāmaḥa's charge that the word 'cow' denoting only the concept of absolute negation of not-cow, another term should be requisitioned to convey the sense of the cow-individual which alone can ensure our pragmatic activities, is groundless because primary denotation is the positive ideal cow-image and not the absolute negation of not-cow alone as falsely assumed by him. The same discussion also controverts the other charge of incompatibility in the Buddhist doctrine on account of the self-same term 'cow' generating two mutually contradictory ideas of absolute negation of not-cow and affirmation of cow-individual, in as much as, the former is implied while the latter is denoted. Denotation and implication cannot be held mutually exclusive and incompatible even by the orthodox philosophers. According to them, the self-same proposition 'that Deva-datta does not take any meals by daytime' denotes negation and implies affirmation of eating by night and yet there is no logical incompatibility. So the assertion of the same dual function in respect of the word, on this analogy, cannot be charged as logically incompatible.

(divā-bhojanā-vākyāder-īvāśayāpi phaladvayam,
sākṣāt sāmarthyato yasmān-nānvayo'vyatirekavān.
nābhimukhyena kurute yasmācchadbha idam dhyayam,

Now, the Buddhist maintains, the ideal cow-image is constant and inheres in all the varying cow-individuals and thus is illusorily cognized as the universal cow-hood. But the opponents may here argue that the basis of illusion is the cognition of similarity which is not possible in the present case where one of the two entities, the universal, is practically a chimera according to the
Buddhist; otherwise a bull’s horn could be illusorily cognized as a rabbit’s horn. In reply, it is said by the Buddhist that, here the basis of illusion is a sort of psychological aberration (antar-upaplava) arising from the unavoidable primal and perennial nescience. The incident is analogical to the illusory perception of two moons in the lunar orb by an ophthalmic patient due to some sensory deficiency. This illusion is in no way based on similarity as there is no duality in the moon. (namu yadi kadacin-mukhya-vastu-bhutaṃ sāmānyaḥ vāhya-vastvāsātam upalabiḥaṃ bhavet, tadā sādharmya-darsanāt tatra sāmānyaḥ bhāntir-bhavet, yāvatā mukhyārtha-sambhave saiva bhavatāṃ sāmānya-bhāntir-upapannetāyāksāyāḥ-jhāntīyeva hītyādi. Jhānti-sāmānya-darsanādyanaspekyā dvicandrādi-jañāṇādivad-antar upaplavād-etaj-jhāntaṃ jhānam. na hi sarvā bhāntayaḥ sādharmya-darsanād-eva bhavanti. kim tarhi-antar-upaplavād-apītyadosaḥ. TSP, on T.1021-22, p.396).

Thus, though the doctrine of apoha might well serve the functions of the orthodox theory of so-called objective universal being the denotation of a word, yet the former is not the latter presented in a different garb as charged by the orthodox theorists, there being a gulf of difference between the two. Moreover, the ideal image, though purely mental in character, is perceived as the objective individual entity capable of pragmatic activities, owing to the hypostatization caused by inherent nescience, (athava vikalpa-pratibimbakam jañānakāra-mātrakam eva tad-svāhāyām api vicitra-vāsanā-bhedopahita-rūpabhedaṃ vāhyavād-avabhā-samānaḥ lokayātrāṃ vibharti, vyāvṛtti-echāya-yogācata-d-apoha iti vyavahriyate, seyam ātmakhyātīgārthāḥ saraṇīḥ. NM.p.281).

Now, the opponents may argue that the functions of different cows being as variant and mutually distinct as they themselves are, the cognition of the identity of function is a myth. Therefore, the ideal cow-image based upon it as well as the use of the same term ‘cow’ to
denote all cow-individuals consequent upon it is not logically possible.

To repudiate this cogent charge the Buddhist replies that the determinant knowledge (pratya-vamāsā-pratyaya) in the form of the ideal image is a non-variable entity; its causes, the cognitions of function-entities, though as variant as their causes, the function-entities, are regarded as identical. Bhāmaha and Kumārila criticised the Buddhist hypothesis as absurd in view of the fact that, according to it, absolute negation is cognized immediately from a word without the intervention of the respective negatum in its positive aspect. But the previous discussion clearly shows that this criticism has no legs to stand upon as it is based upon an erroneous representation of the implication of the Buddhist thesis.

According to the doctrine of apoha, a word primarily denotes an ideal image, which is a positive entity, however fictional it might be in essence, and the negation of the contradictory is only implied, of necessity, by the former.

Here the opponents might point out that this implication of the doctrine of apoha is an altogether new one which does not logically follow from the statements of the originator of the thesis, Dharmāja. In his Hetumukha, Dharmāja categorically maintains that pure and simple absolute negation of the contradictory is the denotation of a word and this denotation is not vested with the least positivity in it. How can, therefore, the above interpretation of the later Buddhists be reconciled with this statement? (syādetat yadi vidhirūpaḥ saḍdiḥarlo’bhupagamyate, kathā tarhi hetumukhe lakṣaṇa-kāreṇa ‘asambhavo vidheḥ’ ityuktam? TSP, p.417).

The Buddhist maintains in reply that the master, Dharmāja, expressed his view from the transcendentnal standpoint of ultimate truth according to which there can be no such positive synthesizing element as the ideal image. But the new interpretation is from the empirical standpoint and it
satisfactorily explains our conceptual cognition. Thus the contradiction is only apparent and not real, the angles of vision being different in the two interpretations.

(asambhavo vidher-uktah sāmānyāder asambhavat,
sābdānām ca vikalpānām vastuno viṣayatvataḥ. T5.1096.
Vide also :- sāmānya-lakṣaṇāder-vācyasya vācakasya ca paramārthato'sambhavācchabdānām vikalpānām ca vastutaḥ paramārthato viṣayāsambhavat paramārtham āritya vidher-asambhava ukta ācāryaṃṣtyavirodhaḥ. TSP, p.417).

The opponents might again raise an objection that the Buddhist doctrine fails to justify logically the addition of suffixes, expressive of gender and number, to words. Apoha, a conglomerate of positive-cum-negative implications, being absolutely a numberless and genderless entity, is incapable of being sexo-numerically determined. It cannot also be secondarily justified by saying that the sexo-numerical characteristics of the cause, the individual, are transferred to the effect, apoha, because the particulars are totally inexpressible, according to the Buddhist, and, hence, not fit for such determination.

(liṅga-saṃkhyādi-sambandho na cāpohasya vidyate,
vyaktēśāvayapadesyatvāt tād-dvārenāpi nāstyasau. ŚV. Apoha-135).

The Buddhists repudiate this charge by pointing out that the conceptions of number and gender are not grounded on facts; on the other hand, sexo-numerical determination of stems is purely an arbitrary convention having no empirical foundation. Otherwise, how the stem 'taṭa', meaning bank, can be used in all the three genders and how the stem 'dāra', meaning wife, can be used in the masculine gender? Again, the stem 'dāra' is always used in the plural number even though there be no plurality in fact and the stem 'vipina', meaning forest, always takes the singular suffix though it refers to a plurality of individual trees.
Orthodox philosophers raised another objection by pointing out that this doctrine cannot claim universal application because in the case of verbal forms like 'pacati' (cooks), etc., no negative sense is cognized. But the Buddhist here retorts that it is a universally admitted fact that a word is used only to convey the object intended to be communicated for the time being and from this logically follows the fact that a word has a restrictive implication of excluding what is not intended to be communicated. This fact holds good in respect of each and every word irrespective of whether it be a verb or a noun or an adjective. Thus the word 'pacati' implies the exclusion of all other action-entities like eating, playing, running and so on for the time being. Thus the charge of lack of universal application does not hold good.

(abhiprete nivesārthaḥ buddheḥ sābdaḥ prayujyate,
anabhīṣṭa-vyūdāso taḥ sāmartyenaiva sidhyati. T5.v.1143.
tathā hi pacatītyukte nodāśino 'vatiṣṭhate,
 bhunikte dīvyati vā neti gamyate'nya-nivartanam.T5.v.1145,p.431).

But the opponents might still stick to their objection by pointing out that, as explained before, the doctrine fails in the cases of the words 'existent' and 'knowable' which can have no negative significance in view of the fact that their contradictories, viz., not knowable and non-existent, being fictional, cannot be fit objects of negation, i.e., apoha. But the Buddhist contends that the objection is baseless and it becomes clear by
explaining the characteristics of these two terms. Used in isolation these
terms have no significance at all. They convey some senses only when they
are used along with some other terms, e.g., 'this book is existent and
knowable'. In this sentence the terms are significant as they are predi-
cated of some definite object. But if one simply utters the term 'existent'
or 'knowable', nothing is cognized. In order to be expressive, these
terms stand in need of syntactical relatedness lacking which they have no
denotative capacity at all. But the opponents' objection comes from their
ignorance of this fact.

(prameya-jaśeṣa-gabādeḥ kasyāpohyaḥ na vidyate,
nāgyasau kevalo kānde prakāśvadbhiḥ prayujyate. TS.v.1165 p.436).

Thus in the proposition : 'Colour is knowable by means of visual perception',
the term 'knowable' implies the negation of the doubt as to whether colour
is the object of visual perception, or the negation of the perverse belief
that colour is the object of auditory perception. Similarly, in the propo-
sition : 'Momentaliness of sound is existent', the negative implication of
the term 'existent' is the denial of the existence of eternity of sound as
is maintained by the Mīmansāist. Thus these two terms also have some obvious
negative implication which no sane man can deny.

(cakṣur-jaśeṣa-vimśeṣaḥ rūpaditī yad ucyate,
tenāropitam etaddhi kenacit pratiṣeṣṭhyate.
na cakṣur-āśrītenaiva rūpaḥ nīlādi vedyate,

The charge of Śūkyottakara that, the adoption of the doctrine of
apoha turns the denotation of the term 'all' to be self-contradictory, has
also its root in the same ignorance. This term, too, by itself, is not
significant but stands in need of syntactical relation with other words
denoting some definite objects constituting the universe of discourse, so
that it can become significant. Thus, in the proposition, 'all men are mortal; the term 'all' has an obvious negative implication, viz., 'not-some' and the negative sense of the proposition would take the form of the judgement:

'Not-some men are mortal'. This negative significance of the term 'all' dispels the possible incorrect notion that, 'some men only are mortal' and thus totality is a negation of partiality. Thus it is seen that the opponents have taken these terms out of their propositional settings and this logical isolation in stead of syntactical relation is against the Buddhistic viewpoint. This misinterpretation lies at the root of the objections directed against the Buddhistic doctrine of apoha and, consequently, the objections have no legs to stand upon.

(vyavahāropanāte ca sarva-sūde'pi vidyate,
vyudāsyam tasya cārtho 'yam anyāpoho bhidhisitaḥ.
sarve dharmā nirātmānaḥ sarve vā puruṣā gatāḥ,
sāmāstyām gamyate tatra kaścid-āsāstavaphyate.
kecideva nirātmāno vāhyā 1śā ghaśādayaḥ,
gamanām kasyacicecaivaḥ bhrāntis-tad-vinivartate.
sarvāṅga-pratiśedhaśca naiva tasmin vivakṣiśaḥ,
svārthāpoha-prasāndo 'yam tasmād aśātayocayate TS.1184-87 pp.441-42)

The opponents might still stick to their objection raised against the universality of the doctrine by pointing out its failure in explaining the 'apoha' per excellence conveyed by such terms as, 'the barren woman's son', that have no objective counterpart and, consequently, no negatum of the absolute negation. Yet the later Buddhists would not acknowledge their defeat. They remind the opponent that this charge would be somewhat cogent against the theory propounded by Dīnāga; but it has been interpreted in a modified way to suit the empirical experience of the laymen and in order to avert the changes directed against it by the opponents.
In the light of this exposition it is clear that the ideal image, that flashes forth in our mind when we hear such a term, is the denotation of the term, no matter if the concept of absolute negation, which has been given a secondary position, follows in its wake or not. Thus the doctrine of apoha stands unassailed.

(yasya tarhi na vāhyo 'rtho 'pyanyathā-vṛttā isyaye, bandhyāsutādī-śabdasya tena kvāpohā ucyate. TS.1201.


But at this point the opponents might raise a vital objection against modern interpretation of the theory by showing that it fails to impose a relation between a word and its meaning. The point deserves clarification. The speaker utters a word with a view to transmitting his own idea to the hearer and if both of them do not cognize the same thing from the same term, there would be an end to all linguistic usage. So there must subsist some definite relation between a term and its corresponding concept. This relation is the convention prevalent in a society. But it is an undeniable fact that the cow-image as cognized by one person is different from that formed in the mind of another man since the two consciousness-streams are different. Consequently, the acceptance of the Buddhist doctrine turns down the validity of the maxim that there must be absolute identity between the concepts cognized by both the speaker and the hearer; the images being variable, no definite conventional relation, the key-stone of all verbal knowledge, can be established between a word and its meaning. Thus the new interpretation also has no legs to stand upon and, therefore, should be rejected outright.
But, even to such a serious charge, the modern Buddhists do not yield. They contend that the ideal images caused by a term are different in different persons, no doubt; but still, as all of us are covered by the same prime nescience, we erroneously think that our cognitions are identical and thus our pragmatic activities are served. This wrong cognition of identity is analogical to the illusory cognition of duality in the unitary lunar orb by two ophthalmic patients. Both of them say, due to the same disease, 'I see two moons' and understand each other. This illustrates the nature of our linguistic usage in general. The ideal images, though different in different persons, lead to the attainment of an identical objective particular and this identical fulfilment of our purposes lies at the root of this illusory identity of ideal images. In fact, the ideal image, hitherto referred to as the primary denotation of a word, is only to serve a make-believe in order to explain our empirical experience. In reality, however, a word causes, and does not express, the ideal image.

(svasya svasyāvabhāsasya vedane'pi sa vartate,
vāhyārthādhyavasāye yad dvayorapi samā yataḥ.
timīropahatākṣo hi yathā prāha sāsidvayam,

Here the opponents might argue that ideal concepts being unreal and non-objective in reality, there is no logic in talking of truth and falsehood with reference to propositions. Hence, it would not be possible to discriminate between a valid or true proposition and a false one, in
as much as, the ideal images caused by the component terms in both the cases are similar. The issue, maintain the Buddhists, is intricate, but not insoluble. It is accepted on all hands that the propositions give rise to pragmatic activities evoked by a perceived object with reference to which we are willing to act. Thus on seeing water a thirsty man says, 'give me a glass of water' in order to quench his thirst. Simultaneously, the ideal images of water are generated in the minds of the hearers and they fail to cognize the difference between the ideal water-image and the glass of water in the outer world. This non-perception of the difference lies at the root of all our activities, physical or verbal. Now, if a proposition leads to some pragmatic activities that satisfy our need of the moment by helping us attain some real objects, the proposition is regarded as true; otherwise it is false. Thus the test of truth or falsity of a proposition lies in its capacity or incapacity to serve some pragmatic purposes. The idea may be clarified by an analogy. A man perceives the rays of a gem, mistakes it for the gem itself, goes to it and really gets the gem. In another instance, perceiving the rays of a lamp he mistakes them for those of a gem and goes to the lamp only to be frustrated. Both of the cognitions are unqualified illusion and, as such, false. Yet the former leads to the attainment of the gem, while the latter does not. Such are the cases with the so-called true and false propositions. (yatā hi pāramāryaṣa vastuṇa pratibandhoṣti tasya bhṛantasāyapi sato vikalpasya maṇipra bhāyām maṇibuddhivat na vāhyārthāna pakeṣatvam asti. TSP, p.323).
"In Ratnakirti's ApohaSiddhi, we find a third view which advocates that words mean something unique which is at the same time different from others. Negation and affirmation are simultaneous...... The knowledge of a unique particular as something different from what it is not is one whole, it does not admit of parts." (PM., p. 219).

The doctrine of Apoha was still severely criticised by the later orthodox thinkers; but there was no Buddhist stalwart to refute the charges. The Buddhist centres of learning were ruined on account of historical reasons. However, it appears in ultimate psychological analysis that the universal is also nothing but a mental image. It is seen that the later Buddhists also described Apoha in the form of an ideal image as the primary denotation of a word. Hence, to an impartial reader, the difference between the two schools of thought transpires to be a difference of emphasis. The Universalists emphasise upon the positive aspect of the image which causes cognition of different individuals belonging to the same class as similar to one another. But the Buddhists lay emphasis upon the negative aspect of the ideal image which, they think, is cognised as different from all other images. In fact, it cannot be denied that the ideal image has got both the aspects. Of course, the universal is not categorically described by the Universalists as an ideal image. But we will presently see (in the next section) that Nagesa, who is also really a universalist, has propounded the conceptuality of meaning.

"The merit of apoha theory lies in this that it has opened our eyes to the fact that objective universals are not possible and at the same time universals are necessary for our knowledge" (PM, p.219),
Language is a medium of communication of ideas. In the previous sections we have seen that the different schools of Indian thinkers maintain that meaning is something external in character, though there are differences of opinion as to what exactly forms the meaning entity—an individual, a class-element or an individual—as determined by class-element and a particular form. Of course, the later Buddhists have opined that a conceptual image is signified by a word.

But Nāgēsā is the first thinker to propound in clear-cut terms the theory that, meanings are not external but conceptual in character. (....sākyo 'rtha' pi buddhisattāsamāvīṣṭa eva na tu bāhyasattāvīṣṭaḥ. VSM, p.239).

After bringing out a detailed discussion of the concept of sphoṭa and establishing its consciousness character, Nāgēsā introduces the problem of the nature of meaning. The grammarian denies the existence of this mundane universe. To him the external universe is conspicuous by its absence and is nothing but the projection of our internal experience. This idealistic position of the grammarian has an impact on his concept of meaning which, according to the realist consists in the external objects denoted by the words. As is usual with the Indian theorists, Nāgēsā at first refutes the viewpoints of his opponents, real or imaginary, and then establishes his theory by forwarding various arguments to show the hollowness of the viewpoint of the opponents and the soundness of his own view.

It is a fact of our experience that we use such a sentence as, 'the jar exists' which signifies that existence is ascribed to the particular substance, 'jar'. If the meanings were self-evident principles occurring by themselves without depending on our mental apparatus, the term 'jar' would alone suffice to indicate its existence. But in that
case the verb 'to be' would be a meaningless apposition. 'The jar' would mean, 'the jar exists' and, as further ascription of its existence is predicated by the term 'is', it is obvious that the meaning does not exist on its own account but requires, for its existence, the assistance of the cognitive function of the knower. Moreover, while denying the existence of 'jar', such expression as 'the jar does not exist' also presupposes that the jar is not a self-evident principle. Otherwise, such expressions become self-contradictory, in as much as, 'the jar' conveys the very existence of the corresponding object. But innumerable sentences like these are quite usual in human speech and, therefore, cannot be thrown away outright. It must be accepted, therefore, that the meaning of a word is absolutely conceptual in character the very existence of which depends on our cognitive function and such assertion of existence and non-existence through the verb 'to be' would indicate its extramental existence or its corresponding absence. (ghaṭa ityata eva sattāvagamena ghaṭo 'stīti prayoga gatārthatvād astīti pravogānāpatteḥ. sattāyā virodhāt ghaṭo nastityanāpatteśa. mama tu buddhisato bāyhasattā tadabha-vodbhāvanā 'asti' 'nasti' iti prayogāḥ. VSIL, pp. 239-40).

It is an established dictum that the cognition of absence is determined by the knowledge of its counter-positive (pratīyogin). In case of such an expression as, 'the hare's horn does not exist', what is recognised as a counter positive is the rabbit's horn which is conspicuous by its permanent absence in the outer world. Hence such expressions as above, in order to be compatible with the principle just laid down, point to some conceptual counter-positive. Otherwise, such sentences become meaningless altogether. This finds support in the Līlāvatīśiromāṇī where the same view is expressed (ata eva 'atra bhāvajñāne āhāryameva prati-yogi-jñānam kāraṇam' iti līlāvatīśiromāṇau spaṭām. KuT, p.240). What
more, the negation of a non-entity is superfluous and irrational. Similarly, such expressions as 'the sprout grows' also points to the conceptual character of meaning; otherwise the sentence becomes meaningless. The term 'sprout' means a seed that has already sprouted and the term 'grows' means its sprouting. Thus the expression, being a sheer tautology, carries no sense at all. But Nāgēsa's viewpoint is not confronted with any such difficulty. According to him, the first sentence means that the conceptual image conveyed by the term 'hare's horn' cannot be found anywhere in the external world. The second sentence means that the sprout-entity remaining in our intellect is found to come into existence in the outer world. (kiśa 'sāsāṣrāgaṃ nāsti' 'aṅkuro jāyate' ityato bodhānāpattih. mana tu buddhisannāṅkuro jāyata ityarthaḥ. sā sattāpi sābdavācyeti bhūvah. VSiM, p.240). Moreover, acceptance of externality of meaning makes such words as 'sāsāṣrāga' meaningless and thus robs it of the character of a 'pratipadika' and hence of grammatical inflections or case-terminations (vibhakti) because the case-endings are added only to a pratipadika (ñyāpratipadikāt. Pāñ.4.11.). A pratipadika is a meaning-conveying letter or group of letters other than a root or a suffix; a group of letters ending in a qū or a taddhita suffix or a compound word also is termed as pratipadika. (arthavād adhāturapratyayā pratipadikam. kṛttadddhitasamāsāca. Pāñ.1.2.45-46). Only the conceptuality of meaning can make such words as 'Sāsāṣrāga' meaningful; and, hence, a pratipadika.

Nāgēsa further retorts that all our mental functions, such as, thinking, willing, volitional activity, etc., refer to some objects which stand as the contents of all these mental functions. Objectless cognition is an impossibility and a causal nexus subsists between cognition, will, etc., on the one hand, and the object on the other. It is an admitted fact that the entities which are causally related must share the
(samānādhikarana). Let us take the case of will. No one intends to have anything which is already attained. Will universally refers to an object not yet attained. For example, when the act of cooking is already performed, will to cook is not generated. Hence, will to cook refers to that act of cooking which is not yet performed. This act of cooking referring to a future point of time is the determining cause of the emergence of will to cook. The two entities belonging to two different points of time cannot coalesce in the same locus unless it is admitted that the future act of cooking, standing as the object of will, is by its nature inherent in our concept. In this way alone the causal relation between the two can be determined. If order is placed to a potter: 'make a jar for me', he desires to make it. Here the meaning of the term 'jar' is the cause of the said desire. Therefore, in conformity with the above-mentioned principle, this meaning and the said desire must remain in the same substratum. Now, it is universally accepted that desire is a mental function. Therefore, it is quite rational to maintain that the meaning of the term 'jar' also exists in the same region. By generalising such instances, it is quite logical to hold that meaning of a term is mental or conceptual in character. (kiṃca, icchādīnām antahkarana-nīṣṭhatayā tatra viṣayasya sāmānādhikaraṇyenaiva kāraṇatvauṣcyena buddhapadārtha-sattā'vasyākī. VāLM, p.240).

The Vaisēpikas, and others following them, try to explain causality in a different way in order to do away with this difficulty of sharing the same loci (sāmānādhikaraṇya). They contend that an object becomes the cause of the knowledge of itself through the relations of objectivity (viṣayatā) and identity (tādātmya). The point needs clarification. We see a jar and have visual cognition of it. Here eye-jar contact is a cause of the particular cognition. But as objects of cognition are infinite in number, so the entry of the object in causality leads to the fallacy of endlessness.
(ānantya). In order to avoid this fallacy, the neo-logicians and others maintain that eye-contact, and not eye-jar contact, is to be regarded as the cause in such cases. But if this position be accepted, another difficulty crops up. Eye-contact being the singular determinant, why does not the visual knowledge of several other objects arise at the same time? What is it then that relates knowledge to a particular object? With a view to overcoming this difficulty, they have accepted another determinant. They maintain that the object itself is a cause of its knowledge through the relation of identity. The relation is taken to be one of identity, because the knowledge cannot be separated from its object. Now, as the relation of identity subsists between an object and its knowledge, no difficulty can stand in the way of their being co-existent in the same substratum.

This explanation bears an appearance of plausibility. But a deeper thought reveals that there is a subtle technical difficulty that goes against it. Let the point be clarified. Relation can broadly be divided into two categories — vṛttiyāṃaka (occurrence-exacting) and vṛttyanivyāṃaka (non-occurrence-exacting). Relations that determine the very existence of the relata belong to the first category and those which do not come under the second one. In the present case, relation of identity belonging to the object is a vṛttyaniyāṃaka one because the existence of the object (e.g., jar) is independent of this relation. Such a relation cannot prove that the relata are co-existent in the same substratum. The point becomes crystal-clear when we explain the particular case in hand. The relation of identity subsisting between the jar and its visual knowledge is vṛttyaniyāṃaka and it is clear that the jar can exist separately from its visual knowledge. Then how can it be logical to maintain that both these relata must co-exist in the same substratum? Thus the expla-
nation furnished by the opponent is not at all convincing. Moreover, a past or a future object also, when spoken of or thought of, can arouse knowledge or desire in our minds. For instance, I go to a potter for a jar and he says, 'Alas! I made a jar for you but it has broken into pieces'. or 'Well, I'll make a jar for you'. In both these cases I have some knowledge about the jar. Here the meaning of the term 'jar' is the cause of my knowledge of the same. But if this meaning be regarded as something external, then there can be no sāmanādhikarāṇya and hence no causality between the two, in as much as, the jar itself is not present. A relation is possible only between two objects that co-exist. Hence the relation of causality demands that the meaning of a word must be conceived as something intellectual and not external. (yattu vaisē-ākādyasūrīṇa viṣayatāsambandhena jñānaṃ prati tādātmyena viṣayaḥ kāraṇam iti vadanti. tanna. tadiya-tādātmyasya vṛttyaniyāmakatayaḥ sāmanādhikarāṇyānirvāhakatvāt. atitānāgatasthāle satorāva sambandhenaivaḥ sambandhasya vaktum asākyatvācca. VSūH, pp.240-41).

The opponent may try to explain the sāmanādhikarāṇya by adopting a subtler argument. Let us clarify the standpoint. If somebody says that, 'there is a pen on the table', the substratum table determines both the pen and its knowledge. Therefore, the relation between the determinant and the object determined (avacchedya-avacchedakabhāvah sambandhah) subsists in the table. Again, the table is the spatial attribute (daisīka visēgaṇa) that qualifies both the pen and its knowledge. So the attribute in the form of spatial adjective also subsists in the table. Thus both avacchedya-avacchedakabhāva and daisīka-visēgaṇataḥ are co-existent in the same substratum (sāmanādhikarāṇa). Now, as a relation subsists in both the relata, the relation in the form of spatial adjective, which is co-existent with the relation between the determinant and the determined, resides both in the pen and its knowledge on the one hand and in the
table, on the other. Hence, through this common attribute, both the pen and its knowledge co-exist in the same substratum, the table. Thus the requisite condition of sāmānādhikaraṇa is fulfilled and, hence, there remains no difficulty in explaining the causal relation between an object and its knowledge. But, Nāgeseśa contends, we use such expressions as, 'there is a headache in my head'. Here headache is the determinant of the attribute of container-hood (ādhāratāṇḍyāma) subsisting in the head. But the determining relation cannot be the determinant of the relation of containerhood. It cannot be said that the locative suffix (seventh case-ending) expresses the determinanthood (avacchedakatva), because there is no such grammatical rule. Lakṣaṇa or the power of indication or secondary denotation also cannot come in rescue; because, this power is not sanctioned to the sup-suffixes or case-endings by the opponents themselves. Thus colour and other attributes belonging to a particular entity can have the same substratum with the entity. Another point endorses the viewpoint of Nāgeseśa. In the case of illusory cognition the substratum of illusion is intellectual and not external. I see a mother-o-pearl from afar and mistake it for a piece of silver. Here the substratum of illusion cannot be any external entity, but it is purely conceptual. (ghatādisāmagrāyā apyavacchedyāvaccēchedaka-bhāvasāmānādhikaraṇa-daisīka-viśeṣaṇatāyā
desavisaṣe saṃānādhikaraṇaṃ draṣṭavyam. 'śirasi me vedana' 'atra ghaṭaḥ' ityādvivahārād ādhāratāniyāmakatvam. avacchedakatvam saptanyarthā iti tu cintyam, anusāsanābhāvāt. subvibhaktau lakṣaṇa-bhāvasya bhavādiyasama-
tavitacca. dravyarūpādānāmapi dravya-desā eva desā iti bodhyam. bhramādhi-
śthānatvamapi buddhasaiva na vāhyaṣetyi sarvaṃ saṃāṇjasam. ŚiM,pp.241-42).

There must be some real entity (e.g., the mother-o-pearl) upon which the cognition of another entity (e.g., a piece of silver) is superimposed; because a superimposition without a substratum is absurd. But we
must admit that, though the substratum of superimposition is something having extramental reality, yet the object (i.e. the substratum) of illusory cognition (e.g., the piece of silver) has no such extra-mental reality. It is purely conceptual in character.

Nāgęśā quotes a portion of Mahābhāṣya on the Pāṇiniian rule 'upadesē'janunāsika it' (Pāṇ. 1.3.2) in support of his thesis. There Patańjali gives the description of one Debadatta as: 'the one wearing bangles, earrings and a head-gear (kīrīṭa), with a broad chest, rounded arms, red-eyes, sharp nose and with various ornaments on, such is Debadatta'. (.....āṅgadī kaṇḍāli kīrīṭi vyuḥhorasko vṛttavāhurlohitākṣa-stuṅga-

nāso vicitrābharaṇa īḍrāḥ debadatta iti. MB, ep.574). Now, all these attributes refer to the same person. There can be no difference of Devadatta with himself. So the use of 'such is' (īḍrāḥ) in the description expressing similarity becomes incompatible as similarity presupposes difference between the two similar entities. (sāḍrāyāḥ nāma tadbhinnavat sati tadga-

tabhūyodharmavattvam. EP, p.26-27). But, if the thesis of Nāgęśā be accepted, no such incompatibility arises at all. In fact, the great commentator takes the meaning of the term 'devadattah' as an intellectual image and, therefore, uses the term 'īḍrāḥ' to convey the sense that this image tallies with an external person bearing that name. (īḍrāḥ iti. stāh

sābdaiḥ īḍrāḥ buddhāvarthanāḥ pratibhāsate tādṛśo grāhya ityarthāḥ.

MBF, ep.574).

This thesis is further corroborated by the commentaries and sub-

commentaries respectively of Patańjali and Kāiyatā on the Pāṇiniian rules -

'hetumati ca' (Pāṇ.3.1.26), 'paṅktiviniśatitriṃśāccha'. (Pāṇ.5.1.59) and 'tadayaśatyamīnmiti matup' (Pāṇ.5.2.94). In course of commenting on the rule 'hetumati ca', Patańjali gives the illustrations, viz., 'kaṃsaṃ ghata-

yati', (Lord Kṛṣṇa kills Kaṃsa), and 'valin bandhayati' (He binds Valin).
Then he raises the question regarding the aptness of using verbs in the present tense as those incidents took place in the hoary past. Then he himself presents different solutions and by the way he says that the incidents are present in the intellectual region of the authors and so they convey them through such expressions in the present tense. (iha tu katha\vartamanakalata kam\sa\p\ghatayati va\li\m\ bandh\m\yatiti cirahate ca kamse cirabaddhe ca vala\? ....granthike\a\n katham? ......sato buddhivigayan prak\ase\yanit\a. MB:III, pp.68-69). Bhartrhari also expresses the same opinion in this regard and says that the authors, as if, perceive these incidents, which are present in their conceptual region. (sabdop\shatarup\g\setu buddhivigayatan gatan, pratyak\sam\iva kam\sa\d\in s\dhanatvena manyate. VP,III.5, p.177). Similarly, in course of explaining the commentary on the P\pm\ni\nian rule, 'tadasya parim\a\n' (P\p.5.1.57), Kaiya\a\ maintains that, though there is no real difference between multiples of ten things and groups of ten things in the outer world, yet, as actually the meaning is conceptual, due to the difference of conceptual images of tens and groups of ten in the intellectual region, such difference is maintained in our language. (iha dravya\p\n dravyasanghasya dasat\mp dasat-sanghasya ca p\p\ar\thik\bo tho\d\e kevala\mp buddhy\p\ pari\k\lpyate. buddhivayas-thapitarthanibandhanas\ca sad\b\\a buddhiv evarth\k\r\am upajanayanto\p\satyapi \v\as\tave bhede bhedam avagamayanti. MBP, V. p.35).

It is all the more interesting that N\g\esa\ finds support of his thesis even in various other schools of Indian philosophy. Thus he finds support in the \Nyaya S\utra, 'buddhisiddha\p\ tu tadasat (NS.4.1.50). Let us clarify the point. The view of the opponent is expressed in the aphorism, 'nasanna sanna sadasat' (NS.4.1.48). The opponent here presents a dilemma: Before its creation an entity must be either non-existent or existent. Commonsense-view is that, before its creation, a thing was non-
existent. But had it been so, why do not horns come out of a rabbit's head or why do we not find oil in sand-grains? Thus it is a fact that a thing cannot be created out of nothing, or in other words, nothing can come into existence out of pure non-existence. Again, if it be said that before its creation a thing was existent, then how can creation be predicated of it? Our common experience reveals that, before it was made, a particular jar did not exist. Moreover, if we accept that an existent entity is created again, then we cannot deny its recreation and further creations and thus regressus-ad-infinitem becomes unavoidable. (idam asyotpattaye samartham na sarvamiti prāgutpattiyatākāraṇaṃ kāryaṃ buddhyā siddham, utpattinyamadarsānāt, tasmādupādāna-niyamsyotpattihā,

sati tu kārya prāgutpatterutpattireva nāstiti. NB.p.301). By the aphorism 'buddhisiddhayu tadasat', Gautama manages to escape between the two horns of the dilemma. He contends that before its creation, an entity exists in the intellect of the creator, and creation means its coming into existence in the outer world. Thus the first horn of the dilemma becomes ineffective. Again, as the particular thing with its external form did not exist before its creation, so the second horn, the charge of recreation, becomes blunt. Thus, as there is pre-conception of the weaver that cloth can be made of fibres and not of sands, so he works with fibres in order to weave a cloth. When I ask a potter, 'Make a jar for me', what he understands by the term 'jar' is a particular intellectual image to which he tries to give an external shape. Hence the intellectual or conceptual existence of things, i.e., meanings of terms, is to be accepted by Gautama also.

Nāgeseā quotes a passage from the Bhāmatī commentary of Vācāspati Miśra on the Brahmāsūtra, 'jannādyāya yataḥ (Bś.1.1.2) and thus shows that his thesis finds support in the Vedantic theory of creation, sustenance
According to this theory, (from the pragmatic viewpoint) the cause of creation, sustenance and dissolution of the universe is Brahman. In course of commenting upon the aphorism stated above, Vācaspati maintains: An animate (rational) being first forms an image of a name and then the corresponding form of a jar and then he makes the corresponding external entity bearing that name and form. Thus the jar being already created and existent in the intellect, there is no incongruity in making the jar the object of the verb 'to make' (kr̥t) in the sentence, 'He makes the jar' (ghatasya karoti). Here the external jar is only in the making and so, being non-existent, cannot be regarded as an object (karma) which is the substratum of the result accruing from the respective act. Therefore, its previous existence in the intellectual region is essential. Here Vācaspati also quotes the Nyāya aphorism, 'buddhisiddham tu tadasat', in support of his own view. The intention behind this illustration is to show that, likewise, this external world being determined by name and form, an animate being must be inferred as its creator and it is called Brahman. (cetano hi buddhavālikhyā nāmarūpe, ghaṭa iti namnā, rūpeṇa ca kambugrivaśinā, vāhyān ghaṭaṁ niśpādayati. ata eva ghaṭasya nīrṛtyasyāpi antaḥsaṅkalpatmanā siddhasya karma-kāraṇabhāvah—ghaṭaṁ karotīti. yathāḥuḥ-'buddhisiddham tu tadasat' iti. Brāha, VD, I.p.56).

The Vedantic theory of the process of acquiring knowledge of external objects also corroborates Nāgasaṅk's thesis. Water, coming out of a well through a hole, takes different shapes according to the difference of shape of its containers. Likewise, according to the Vedānta philosophy, one's mind (antahkarana) also comes out through one's eyes, etc., goes to jars, clothes, etc., and takes their respective shapes. Thus we have the knowledge of those objects. This shape-taking of our internal sense-organ is technically called 'vṛtti'. Hence, when I visualize a jar, what
happens is that my internal sense-organ comes out through my eyes, goes to the jar before me and, due to impressions subsisting in a subtle form in my mind, takes its particular shape. Thus my mind and the jar remains in the same substratum and I have the visual knowledge of the particular jar. (cittasya drabyarūpo vṛttyākhyāḥ pariṇāma indriyapraṇālā nirgatya viśayagacā sāpyujya sūkṣmavasthārūpaviṣayavāsanāvāsam tatadviṣayākāraṃ pariṇāmat. VSIM, pp. 248-49). According to Sāṅkhya philosophy, of course, what happens is that the internal sense-organ reaches the object through an external sense organ and takes the impression thereof and becomes modulated accordingly. This is called 'Vytti' and this is what is called direct cognition. (yatsambaddhām sat tadābhāvatiḥ viṣayām tat pratyakṣam. S.Sū.1.89). But the Vedantins retort that, in that case our visual knowledge in a state of dream (which is a valid cognition according to them) cannot be explained. There is no object outside the impression of which the internal sense-organ can take and be modulated accordingly. (na tu tasyām saṃyuktavāhyaviṣayapraṇābimbaḥ. svapnādau vāhya-vigayāsam-yogena tatpratibimbāsamabhavāt. VSIM, p.249). Thus our direct cognitions like perceptual knowledge also being mental in character, the conceptuality of verbal cognition, or, in other words of the meanings of words comprehended by us, is all the more evident.

The same idea is expressed more clearly in a verse in the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha where lord Viṣṇu tells Gādhi that the earth and the like actually remain in the intellectual region and are never external in character and this is felt by everyone in a state of dream, false cognition or infatuation. (vipra, prthvīdī cittaśthām na vahisthaṃ kādācana, svapnabhramāmadādyēṣu sarvaiṃvānubhyāte. YVY;53).

In a state of dream, everybody admits, whatever may we visualize, is nothing external but something conceptual. All our dream-of-objects are mere reflections of our minds. Similar is the case in a false cognition and
cognition in a state of infatuation. When I mistake a mother-o'-pearl for a piece of silver, what happens is that my mind comes out through my eyes, goes to the necre and, with the impression of a piece of silver due to distance and glitteringness, my mind takes the shape of a piece of silver and hence I see a piece of silver instead of a necre. Thus what we see are not the objects remaining outside, but our own mental organs taking different shapes. This being a simpler explanation of false appearance, the logicians and others are wrong in introducing jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikāraṇa in order to explain such cases. In the case of false cognition of a piece of necre as a piece of silver, the logicians maintain, what I really see is a mother-o'-pearl and through the memory impression of my previous knowledge of silver, which is equally glittering, I know it to be a piece of silver through jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikāraṇa. But adherence to the law of parsimony (lāghava) compels us to reject this explanation and accept the simpler explanation of the process of cognition forwarded by the Vedantins; because that same process is competent enough to explain all types of knowledge. Thus, according to Vedānta philosophy, whatever we know is intellectual in character. In other words all entities referred to by the terms (padārthas) are 'bauddha' or conceptual in character. (etena jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikāraṇa haṭṭe 'mabhūta-rajātprakārika suktraprati- tītīryapāśtam. anyathopapatteḥ. VSLM, pp. 252-53).

By the way, Nāgésa proves that jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikāraṇa cannot be a type of sannikāraṇa at all, because no relation of contact or inherence can be established with a thing which is non-existent. It is clear from the above-mentioned illustration. (vastuto jñānalakṣaṇa pratyāsattireva na. avidyamānasya pratyāsattitvāyogāt. VSLM, p.254). It may be argued that, in such a case of erroneous cognition, there are two cognitions. firstly, there is perceptual cognition of the object present, vis. the
necre. Secondly, due to some impediment it is not known as a necre and the memory impression of a piece of silver being revived through similarity, we have the memory-knowledge of a piece of silver. The objects of the two types of knowledge are different from each other. But due to some defects like distance, etc., the difference is not cognised and the two different types of knowledge appear as one and so the perceiver goes to collect it as he would have done on seeing a piece of silver. This knowledge is inherent in the necre, which is its object. Thus, 'being an object of knowledge' may be taken as the prattyāsatti or relation in the form of knowledge. But it is not accepted because it violates the law of parsimony and entails unnecessary complexity. According to this view, the cause of the person's moving towards the object is the knowledge of the object before the eyes, the knowledge which is not generated through the contact with the object really existing but which is determined by a memory-impression and also determined by the capacity to fulfil a desire. This is very much complex. Moreover, if it is said that viṣayatā or objecthood is of the nature of both the knowledge and the object, then the viṣayatā should disappear with the disappearance of knowledge. Thus it must be stated that the relation is of the nature of impression. This relation is similar to that in the case of a memory knowledge and this also ultimately leads to the acceptance of the thesis of conceptuality of meaning-entities. (na ca jñānaviṣayatvam pratyāsattīḥ jñānaviṣayobhaya-svarūpa-viṣayateti mate jñānānāsā tasyā vaktum asākyatvat. tasmāt smṛtviva saṃskāra eva pratyāsattīḥ. evaṃ ca madukta eva paryavasānem. VSLM, pp. 252-52). The visual knowledge of a sweet-smelling piece of sandalwood should be regarded as a special type of knowledge caused by both memory and eye-object contact and not as an admixture of memory and perceptual knowledge (‘ surabhi candanam’ 'so'yaṃ' ityādi ca saṃskāra-
Patañjali in his commentary on the Pāṇinian rule 'strīyam' (Pāṇi 4.1.3) corroborates the view that in the case of false cognition we
cognise something which does not exist in the outer world. He says that
even though there is no water, a thirsty animal visualizes water in a
mirrage. **(tad yathā mṛgāśeṣita apām dhārāḥ pasyanti na ca taḥ santi....**
**MB., IV p.16).** Hence it is clear that what we cognise in a false appre-
hension must be intellectual, and not external, in character. This is a
clear support to Nāgeseśā's thesis of conceptuality of meaning.

The Sāṅkhya aphorism, 'sadasatkhyātirbādhābhādhāt' (S.Śū.5.56)
also expresses the same idea. It needs clarification. No non-existent
entity, e.g. man's horns, can be cognised. **(nāsataḥ jñānaṁ mṛgagavat.**
S.Śū.5.52). On the other hand, an existant entity also is not cognised
sometimes due to some hurdles like its dissolution, etc. (na sato
bādha-darsanāt. S.Śū.5.53). There can be no cognition of such imaginary
entities also, of which neither existence nor non-existence can be
predicated. For there can be no such entity that is neither existent nor
non-existent. An entity, real or imaginary must be either of the two.
(nānirvacanīyasasya tadabhāvāt. S.Śū.5.54). It cannot be maintained that
one entity appears as something else, in as much as, that something else,
being non-existent like a man's horns, is incapable of being cognized.
(nānyathākhyātiḥ svavacovyāghātāt. S.Śū.5.55 vide also : anyadvastva-
nyadrūpeṇa bhāṣata ityapi na yuktaṁ svavaco vyāghātāt. anyatrānārūpasya
mṛgagatulyatvam anyathā sādencedyate, atha tasya bhānam ucyata iti
svavaca eva vyāhatam. **SPB, p.459**). A wrong cognition should be treated
as the cognition of some entity which is existent-cum-nonexistent. A piece of
silver seen in a jeweller's shop is existent. But when it is superimposed on a necre, it is non-existent. Therefore, as explained before, the cognition of a piece of silver duly occurs when it is seen in a jeweller's shop. But there can be no cognition of a piece of silver when actually a necre is seen, though silver-hood is superimposed on it, because no piece of silver is there. In the first instance, the cognition is not thwarted by any obstacle whereas in the second instance, the cognition is impeded owing to its factual non-existence. According to Sāṅkhya philosophy, the whole world is of the same status. The universe is really existent and hence its cognition, as it is, can arise. But there can be no cognition of it when it is superimposed on consciousness. (sadasatkhyā-tir-bādhābādhāt. S.Śu.5.56. vide also: yathā vā rajataq vanigvīthiśtharūpega sat, sūkyādhyastarūpeṇa cāsat tathaiva sarvam jagat swarūpataḥ sat caitanyādāvadhyaśtarūpeṇa cāsaditi. ......evam āvasthābhedenaśi sadasat-tvām aviruddham. SPB, p.460). Thus it is clear that there can be no cognition of a piece of silver in a necre, due to its non-existence. So, what we cognise is, in fact, a mental image of a piece of silver previously cognised somewhere else.

This entire universe, which we see around us, with all its flora and fauna, is described in different scriptures and philosophic texts as a false appearance bearing similarity to a mother-o'-pearl appearing as a piece of silver. The only difference between the two is that, while the latter erroneous cognition lasts only for a short period, the former one lasts till the dawn of the knowledge of reality, i.e., of Brahman, in our mind. (prāg brahmātmadaramānōd viyadāiprāpance vyavasthitā pra-vāsthitā evam oṣṭiśthītyār āvasthitā vāsthitā.) The Paramārthasāra says that the cognition of the world is as false as that of water in a mirrage, a piece of silver in a necre, a snake in a piece of rope or two moons in one.
The same idea is expressed in the two Brahmasūtras of Vyāsa: "māyāmā-
tranā tu kārtyanamabhivyakteḥ" (B.S. 2.2.3.) and "tadanyanyatvamārambhāna-
sabdādibhyah" (B.S. 2.1.14.). The second aphorism refers to the Vedic
text, 'vacārambhanaṃ vikāro nāmadheyam' (UV. 6:4:6:12) which means that the
universe exists not in reality but in name only. There are various other
passages that convey the same idea. This view renders a clear support to
Nāgāsā's thesis that the concepts conveyed by human speech are only
conceptual in nature and do not have any external existence in reality.
It is interesting to note in this connection that the Vedantins regard
'adhyāsa', i.e., appearance of Brahman as the world, as existent-common
non-existent which, therefore, cannot be described in clear-cut terms.
The world is a non-entity and hence, cannot be termed as existent. The
existence of brahman is superimposed on it and we perceive it as real
and, hence, it cannot be termed as non-existent altogether. So it,
in fact, beggars description (anirvacanīya). (evam adhyāsa'pyanirvācyya eva.
VSLM, p.280). The Vedantins admit of the appearance-reality of the world
in the pragmatic sphere. This view is different from that of a school
of Buddhists who do not admit of even the superimposed reality of the
universe and the eternity of the self even. (etenaśato-bhāne buddhama-
tapravesā ityapāstam. tena tahrāropitasattvasyāpyanāṅgikārāt. ātmanas-
tenānityatyavāṅgikāracc. VSLM, p.282).

However, mind takes the form of the objects of cognition through
the medium of our external sense organs and, therefore, a white conch
appears to be yellow to a man with jaundiced eyes. Hence, 'vṛtti' may
be correct in some cases and incorrect in others. But whatever may it
be, vṛtti comes in contact with the self and thus the self (puruṣa) cognises external objects. The self-vṛtti contact is, in reality, the 'paripāma' or transformation of intellect (buddhi) and it is technically called reflection of vṛtti on the self. But this reflection is not like that of an object on a mirror, as the Sankhyayists think; because both the vṛtti and the self are formless. However, the self, through its imposition of identity (abhedādhyāsa) with vṛtti, takes the form of its object of knowledge. Vṛtti, on its part, reveals the nature of the object as puruṣa (the self) of the revealing nature (caitanyaasvarūpa) is superimposed on it. A close analogy may be found in the case of a red-hot iron rod. Here there is a superimposition of identity of fire on the rod and, therefore, we say that the iron rod burns. (cittasya viṣa-yākāraparipāmarūpā vṛttisa indriyena sahāva, at eva ...... nayana-tapittānyayena ca 'saṅkaṇha pīṭha' ityādyupapadayate. saṣa bhramapramohayarūpā puruṣe pratibimbate iti pūṣaṇa vidyāmānavṛttigrāhakatvam. pratibimbo'tra buddheḥ pariṇāmaviseṣa eva na tvādarsādīvat pratibimbah, ubhayorapi nīrūpatvād...... puruṣopī vṛttisambandhāktad-gataviṣayākāra-bhāk svabhāvāt. VŚLM, pp.322-25). Patañjali in his Yogasūtra says that, in deep meditation (samaṇḍhi) there can be no vṛtti and, therefore, the self remains in its pure nature; but otherwise it becomes identical with vṛtti through superimposition of its identity. ('yogascittavṛttinorodhaḥ', 'tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe'vasthānma, 'vṛttisārūpyamitaratra'. Yo.1.2.4. vide also : vyuthāne yāscittavṛttiyastadāvidiṣṭavṛttiḥ puruṣaḥ. com.on YS.1, PD, p.20). Here vṛtti of the self is, in reality, nothing but the self as determined by vṛtti and the self (puruṣa) is called vṛtti due to identical form. (puruṣasya vṛttisa vṛttysvacchinnaḥ puruṣa eva. sārūpyāttra vṛttitvavayavahāraḥ. VŚLM, p.326).
The effect of \( \text{vṛtti} \) is the reflection of the object on the pure self and this is technically called prakāṭatā. \( \text{vṛtti}-\text{janyaphala} \text{ ca} \ \text{vṛttidvāra} \ \text{sūdhhacetane tasya pratibimbanam, etadeva prakāṭatā. VSLM, p.328} \). The self may be reflected on itself through the medium of \( \text{vṛtti} \). Thus the knowledge of self-arises and here the reflection and the original being identical, the self is self-manifesting in nature (svapraķāśāsvarūpa). It cannot be manifested by any other external entity. A lamp reveals some external objects and at the same time reveals itself. Knowledge also acts likewise. Similarly, a term (sādā) also conveys its meaning and at the same time reveals its self. Hence, if I know something I do not doubt it or do not feel that I do not know it. Introspection (anuvyāṣāya) cannot be the manifestor of knowledge, for in that case the fallacy of regressus-ad-infinitum will step in (as it would need another manifestor, which would need another and so on). Moreover, we have no such introspection as 'I know the knowledge'. (evam puruṣo'pi vṛttidarūṇghap purugo pratibimbata iti 'aham' iti jñānotpattih. tumbapratibimbayorvāstavaḥ bhāvāḥvāt.........svapraķāśātvāg puarpasyopapānnaṁ ...........jñānasābdiradipānāṃ trayānāmapi svapraķāśātvāt. anuvyāṣāyasya jñāpañāhakatve tvanavasthā. .....'jñānam jñāmi' ityanubhavābhāvācc. VSLM, pp.331-35).

Like perceptual knowledge, inferential knowledge and verbal cognition \( \text{vṛtti} \) also arise through \( \text{vṛtti} \). \( \text{vṛtti} \) taking the form of the probes (hetu) is reflected on the self and is cognised. Then it gives rise to the conceptual knowledge of the \( \text{vṛtti} \) in the form of the probans (sādhya) the cognition of which is called inferential knowledge. (anumiti). In the case of a verbal cognition what happens is this: at first, \( \text{vṛtti} \), taking the form of a particular term, reflects upon the self and hence the term is cognised; then follows the \( \text{vṛtti} \) taking the form of the respective entity denoted by the term and this \( \text{vṛtti} \) also reflects upon the self.
Thus arises the knowledge of the meaning and this is called verbal cognition. Therefore it is purely intellectual in character. (evaṃ vyāyā-
kārayātpratibimbabarūpavyāpyāyānottaram, sābdākārayātpratibimbabarū-
-pasābdaśīnottaram jāyamabauddhavyāpakaśābdārtha-rapatattadartha-kāra-
vīttipratibimbamvañnumitiḥ sābdabodhasca. VSāM,p.p.34,2-43).

Bhatṭhari also expresses the same view as he says:

(vyapadesē padārthānaṃ vāhyasattaupacārikaḥ,

sarvāvasthaḥ sau sarveśāṃ atmarūpasya darśikaḥ. VP.III,39,p.115).

The intention of the verse is that, the external existence of the mean-
ings of words are only superimposed ones; their real existence is merely
intellectual. Otherwise, how can we use such terms as 'sāsāśṛṅgaḥ'
(rabbit's horn) meaning something non-existent? Or, how can we express
past or future entities by means of terms? Such terms are wide in use
and this proves that word and meaning are related with each other for
ever and this relation subsists actually between a word and its meaning,
both of which are present in our intellectual region. Nāgēsā takes so
much pains to establish 'vṛtti' only with a view to placing his thesis of
conceptuality of meaning on a sound footing and hence he goes into a
very much detailed discussion regarding vṛtti.

The theory of the conceptuality of meaning gives rise to some
pertinent questions which require a fitting reply. If all meanings are
intellectual in character, then how do pragmatic activities with exter-
nal entities go on through the medium of language? Why is a verbal cog-
nition regarded as a valid one or otherwise? In reply, Nāgēsā quotes a
verse from Vākyapadiya which means that a meaning, which is intellectual,
is taken for an external entity due to the deficiencies of mind like
attachment, etc., and thus is known as an external entity.

(yo vārtho buddhīvīśayo vāhyavastumibandhanaḥ,

sa vāhya vastvīti jñātaḥ sābdārthāḥ kaiscidigyate. VP.II.134).
Let us clarify the point. Father asks his son, 'Bring the cow' and the son really brings an animal which is an external entity. Hence it is clear that the term 'cow' in this case conveys an external object. All our pragmatic activities, like this one, through the medium of language, likewise prove that words sometimes convey or refer to external objects. But how is it possible if meanings are intellectual in character? The explanation is that, due to our mental deficiencies like attachment, etc., we impose an external form upon the actual conceptual form of the meaning. (avaḥr̥upopī vaḥr̥upatayēdhyasto ...PR, on VP.11.134,p.137). This imposed form is erroneously taken for the meaning of a term like 'cow' etc. Our pragmatic activities through the medium of language is dependent on this fact. When an intellectual image tallies with its corresponding external form, then the word is taken to be authentic and the corresponding verbal cognition is regarded as a valid one; if it does not, it is considered as a false cognition. (adhyāṣe vijāma cāntah-karāṇasya rāgādidosā eva. ata eva vāhyapadarthānāyanam upapamam yatra cābhyaantarārthasya vāhyārthena saṃvadāh sa sābdhā pramanam, visāvāde tvapramāṇam ity vyavasthā. VSIL, pp.344-45).

Those, who do not accept Nāgasaṅga’s thesis, are confronted with difficulties in explaining the cognition of denotation (sāktigraha) of those terms which express past, future or remote objects. Such objects being absent before the listener, there cannot arise the cognition of their denotation. Without the pre-cognition of the power of denotation no meaning can be cognised from a word. But it is an undeniable fact that such terms really signify some concepts. Therefore, there must be pre-cognition of denotation. Logicians of the older school try to steer clear of this difficulty by maintaining that such a term primarily expresses an object—as—determined by the general attribute of knowability and then the
cognition of the object—as-determined by a particular attribute (having the necessary stimulant) arises. The neo-logicians fail to see eye to eye with them because there is no determinant that can determine which particular stimulant would act in a particular case. They, on the other hand, imagine a current of impressions which has no beginning and which has come down to us through the usage of our forefathers. A particular word makes us recollect a particular impression and thus arises the cognition of denotation and, hence, verbal cognition.

This explanation, though seemingly plausible, proves to be unsatisfactory in the ultimate analysis. Firstly, the condition of the cause of verbal cognition in the form of a particular cognition is not fulfilled. If somebody utters the term 'nala' referring to the famous character in the Mahābhārata, what I should understand, according to the logicians, is a person—as-determined by nala—hood and a particular form. But how is it possible for me to cognise nala—hood and the particular appearance of that pre-historic personality? What I can do at best is that, I can imagine something like that. I have no previous knowledge of the person. So how can I recollect the impression when I first hear the term 'nala'? Secondly, when I see an object, e.g., a jar, I at once recollect the word signifying it, e.g., 'jar'. Similarly, if the view of the neo-logicians be accepted, then on seeing an unknown object also we should recollect the term signifying it, because the required current of impression is still present there. But this is impossible on the face of it. Thirdly, according to the logicians, the particular current of impression remaining there, the cognition of a term should at once lead to the cognition of its respective concept and, hence, there is no scope of any doubt. But, in fact, a person first reading the term 'nala' in the ābhārata, simply understands that there was a person—as-determined by
the name and enquires about who and how he was. Unless this scope of doubt and enquiry is there, analogy and dictionary become needless. These points show the hollowness of the views maintained by both the schools of logicians. Hence, our practical linguistic behaviour also demands the acceptance of Nāgasaṃ's thesis. (nalādi-padebhyopāpi bauddhakāra-viṣayaka eva bodhayā. na sa bauddha ākāra sāmānyata eva, avayavasaṃsthāna-gatavisēgārahāt. VŚM, p.345, Vide also : etenātatalādi bhāvicaitrādivartanāna-prasiddhāsannikṣetā-vastugocarāh saṃskāra anādayo dhārārūpena viśiṣṭa bodhānupapatyā kalpyante, taṁ smṛteśvartheśu sāktigrahō bodhasceti naiyāyikanavoyoktam apāstām. Viśiṣṭa bodhāraṇahetvasiddheh. viśiṣṭa grāhāsāṅgatikānāṁiva taddarsāne padasmarāṇapattesā. padaprakāra-kabodhasaivañubhavācā. VŚM, pp.348-49).

Nāgasaṃ raises another important point. A meaning remaining in the intellectual plane is identified by superimposition with the conveying word which also subsists in the same region. Thus the form of the word also becomes a part of the meaning. Thus a word possesses two powers of signifying 'grahatva) and 'being signified' (grahiyatva) at the same time. Due to the variation in the intention of the speakers, words can convey different meanings. But all the different meanings qualify the expressive word and hence in all the cases we cognise the term as qualified by the meanings. Again, there are cases where we fail to understand what the speaker means to say and we request him to repeat what he said; after repetition we become able to comprehend the sense. (bauddhārthasya bauddhana sābdanāvibhāgāt tanmūlabhedādhvyavasāyena sābdadartha-kārayyatau jáyamānayaḥ svākāra-vāyapi samaranāṃsāti sādasyāpi viṣayata. ato eva śābe grāhītvagrahākatva-rūpasāktidvayasyākāśaḥ. tatra tātparyavasād vahudhā sābdaprakāraḥkato bodhayā. VŚM, p.352).

Bhaṭṭṭhārī also clearly expresses the same view as he says that
there can be no cognition devoid of the cognition of any word; in fact, all cognitions are intermingled with the cognition of a word.

(na sāsti pratyayo lāke yah sābdānugamārte, anubiddhamiva jñānaḥ sarvaṁ sābdena bhāsate. VP.1.124).

Patañjali makes this point all the more clear in his simple and lucid style as he comments on the Pāṇini rule, 'svaṁ rūpam sābdasyāsābda-saṃjñāḥ' (Pāṇ.1.1.69). He maintains that knowledge of a concept arises only after the cognition of the respective conveying word itself. This becomes clear through our experience. If a person be called by a name but cannot understand it, he asks: 'What do you say, Sir?' Thus, knowledge of a word is a cause of the respective verbal cognition. But the word is not only the cause but also a determinant of verbal cognition. Hence, as a grammatical action cannot be applied to the meaning of a term, it should be applied to the term itself. (sābdapūrvako hyartho sampratyayah. ātascā sābdapūrvah. yo'pi hyasāvāhuyate nāmā nāma ca yadānena no'palabdhaḥ bhavati tadā prēchātī'kim bhavānāhā; iti. .....sābdapūrvakasācaya sampratyayah. iha ca vyākaraṇe sābde kāryasambhavah, arthe'sambhavah. MB,3p.518). The definition of perceptual knowledge as furnished by Gautama also corroborates this view. According to him, perceptual knowledge is that kind of knowledge which arises through sense-organ-object contact, which is not false and which has no word as its object. (indriyārthasaṃmuktarotpannam jñānam avapadesyām avyabhicāri vyavasaṃśtamaṁ pratyaksam. MB.1.1.14).

The clause that, perceptual knowledge must not have a word as its object, differentiates perceptual knowledge from verbal cognition. There is no such object which is not intermingled with a word as its name or a conveying agent. Human behaviour proceeds from the comprehension of meanings. Hence arises the necessity of this differentiating clause. (yāvadarthanā vai nāmadheyasābdāstair-arthasaṃpratyayah, arthasaṃpratyayaśca vyavahārāḥ.
Thus it is clear that Gautama also holds that verbal cognition has word as its object; or in other words, meaning includes the form of the conveying word. This fact that the meaning of a word includes the form of the word itself, proves that meaning must be conceptual in character, in as much as, an external object and the form of the word can never remain intermingled.

Again, in a case of 'vikalpa', there arises nothing but a conceptual knowledge. Patanjali defines 'vikalpa' as a kind of knowledge which is caused by the cognition of a word, but which has no objective counterpart in the outer world (sābda-jñānānupātī vastustūno vikalpa). It itself is again a cause of its utterance by the speaker. For without precognition of such an image, how can one utter such a word? It cannot be regarded as a false cognition because it fits in our usage and creates no difficulty at all.

That more, different figurative expressions in poetry would have failed to give us delight had meaning not been conceptual in character. Word and meaning remain mutually superimposed and, therefore, inseparable in the intellectual plane. Hence such figurative expressions as: 'The bi-syllabic name, Hāma, is the cause of the frustration of the pride of the archers' become possible. The same fact, again, saves tautologous expressions in some cases from becoming poetic blemishes; e.g., in the expression: "The sun rises purple and purple does it set in. Great men remain unchanged both in wealth and in danger." Hence Mambatā remarks in his Kāvyaprakāsa that, without the repetition of the same word 'purple' (Tāmra), the required cognition of "unchanged character" would not arise, in as much as, verbal cognition is qualified by the expressive word. (rāmeti dvayakṣaraṃ nāma mānabhaṅgah pinākinah, 'udeti savitā tāmratāmrav evāstameti ca, sampattau ca vipattau ca mahaṭā-mekarūpatā. ityatra 'tāmrapadaṃ vinā na tādṛśo bodhaḥ, padaprakāraṇaka
Expanding this cue given by Nāgasā, we may quite logically maintain that, without accepting his thesis of conceptuality of meaning, we cannot satisfactorily explain aesthetic delight arising from poetry. We know that poetry is not a carbon-copy of external objects and incidents. On the other hand, it is created by the imaginative muse of the poets. Therefore, whatever is delineated in a poetic creation is not something external, but it is something conceptual. Again, the process of generalisation, which is an essential factor in aesthetic realisation or the experience of 'rasa' (sentiment), cannot be satisfactorily explained without the help of the thesis of Nāgesā Bhaṭṭa.

Thus we see that Nāgesā has quite successfully refuted the viewpoints of his opponents by astounding logical arguments and has shown that his thesis finds support even in the viewpoints of the stalwarts affiliated to different schools of thinking. After a very elaborate discussion, he concludes that, it is the conceptual meaning which is the object of a verbal cognition as well as of the cognition of denotation. The knowledge of meaning is, on its part, of the nature of vṛtti, which is but a function of our intellect. Thus, both of them subsisting in the same plane, they are mutually superimposed on one another. (arthaśāca buddha eva jñānaviśayāḥ sāktigrahaṇaviśayayāścā. jñānaṃ ca vṛttirūpam buddhidharma eveti ekadesāsthavat teṣaṁitaretarādhyāsah. VSLM, pp.384-85).

This fact proves the reasonability of the Yogasūtra which expresses the view, that the cognitions of words and meanings being mixed up owing to mental superimposition, all utterances of all creatures can be comprehended only if the word and meaning can be properly demarcated from each other. (sābdārtha-pratyayaṁ-itaretarādhyāsāt saṃkarastat-pravītāga- saṃyamāt sarvabhūtaruta-jñānam. YS. 3.17).
The grammarian philosophers deny the existence of this mundane universe, which is, to them, conspicuous by its absence and is nothing but the projection of our internal experience. This idealistic position had such an impact on the concept of meaning that led to the 'Buddhā-rthavāda' of Nāgasa Bhaṭṭa.