CHAPTER - IV

THEISM IN MIMĀMSĀ SYSTEM

Indian tradition has given the designation "Mimamsā Philosophy" to the system which has engaged itself in providing an exposition to the content of the Vedas. This system of philosophy is classified into two types, according to the different phases in the line of its development, - the first phase being known as the system of Pūrva Mimamsā propounded by the great Jaimini and the second as the Uttara Mimamsā of which the chief protagonist is the great Badarāyaṇa. The content of discussion of this chapter centres round the attitude of Pūrva Mimamsā as adumbrated by Jaimini and his successors.

The Mimamsā system of Philosophy has for its chief objective an analysis of critical appraisal of religion, as propounded in the Vedas, and the aphorisms of Jaimini composed in this regard have been commented upon by the profound commentator Śabarasaṃvid, who with his astounding logic has tried to establish fully the view point of the Mimamsā system. This commentary in its turn has been commented upon by different exponents, as a result of which we come across two distinct sections among the exponents of the Mimamsā system, - the first established by the great Kumarila Bhaṭṭa and the second established by Prabhākara Miśra.
The Māṃśā system of philosophy extends recognition to a number of categories in the manner recognised in the Vaiśeṣika. But while the Vaiśeṣika acknowledges the distinction between the individual soul and the Supreme Spirit, the Māṃśā extends recognition only to the individual soul as representing the substratum of all knowledge. In this system there is no place for Supreme Spirit or God. This attitude of the Māṃśā system is responsible for the common belief that the Māṃśā is atheistic in its approach and the fact that though recognising the character of the Vedas as eternal, this system does not recognise the existence of God established in the Vedas, is really astounding. The theistic system of philosophy admits the existence of God mainly for two reasons, - the first being the justification for explaining the genesis and the annihilation of the universe, and the second being that for establishing the authoritative character of the Vedas. The Māṃśā system does not recognise total annihilation or creation from the very beginning, and

1. tasmād adyavade 'vā'atra sargapralayakalpamā/ na sidhyatya pramāṇika samastakṣayajamabhyaṁ/ / S.V. on M.S.I.I.5, Chapter Sambandhākṣepaparīhāra, verse 113; See also Ibid., verses 67-73; ekādā krūtaṃśrṣṭipralayau māṇaśūnyau' -- Bhavanātha’s Nayaviveka on M.S. 1.1.5, page 187, Mad.Univ.edn., 1937; 'atra jaiminīyāḥ uktānumāṇena dhāta yathāpūrvam akalpayad ityā'dimantraliṁ genā vanatarapralayasiddhā' vapi mahāpralaye nāsti pramāṇam-Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇī on M.S.1.1.2, page 47, chow.Skt. Series, 1900.
consequently does not feel the necessity of recognising God to explain this great creation or great annihilation. Secondly, as this system recognises the Vedas as knowledge for excellence, not emanating from the pen of a creative agent, as also as a means of valid knowledge which is resplendent in its own splendour and does not stand in need of any other means to explain its genesis, it does not feel the necessity of admitting the existence of God.

It is interesting to note that though Jaimini, the author of the Mīmāṃsā Aphorisms of Śabarasvāmin, the great commentator does not put forward arguments to indicate the proposition relating to the existence of God, the germs of atheistic philosophy are present in the compositions of both. In his attempt to enunciate a definition of "Dharma" Jaimini says that Dharma is one whose authority is established by the injunctions of the Vedas and Dharma is capable of being known only with the help of the injunctions of the Vedas. An analysis of this definition reveals the stand of Jaimini that the Vedas are absolutely reliable means of knowledge and that the concept of Dharma is capable

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2. M.S. 1.1.4.
3. Ibid, 1.1.5.
of being arrived at only through the injunctions of the Veda.\textsuperscript{4}

Secondly, in his attempt to indicate the relation existing between the word and its corresponding concept Sabarasvāmin has maintained that this relation is eternal and is not a created entity, brought into being by the machinations of a divine agent.\textsuperscript{5} The Mīmāṁsā does not feel the necessity of admitting God on this account. Thirdly, the Mīmāṁsā does not consider it necessary to admit God as the creator of the Veda,\textsuperscript{6} or as the donor of fruits of rituals and other actions, because as it says, God is not in a position to grant any gift of fruit, which is granted only by religious merit accrued through performance of sacrifices enjoined in the Vedas\textsuperscript{7}. All these go to establish the proposition that the germs of atheistic philosophy are traceable in the speculations of the Mīmāṁsā system.

\textsuperscript{4} Ṛṣya dharmas tatra codanai' va pramāṇam ity ekaḥ pratya-
ksanumānabuddhāvākyādivyavrāttiyarthah. yo dharmas tatra
codanā pramāṇam evēty aparo nāstikābhimatavedāprāmāṇya-
series, Benares 1902.

\textsuperscript{5} tasmāt kāraṇād avagacchāmo na, kṛttvā sambandhaṁ vyava-
hārārthaṁ kenacid vedāḥ pranītā iti. -- Sābara Bhāṣya
on M.S. 1.1. 5., page 12, lines 21-22, Beneras end.

\textsuperscript{6} M.S. 1.1.27-31.

\textsuperscript{7} apūrvam punar asti, yata ārambhaḥ śiṣyate, svargākamo
yajeta. -- Sābara Bhāṣya on M.S. 2.1.5, page 77, lines 5-6, Benares end.
That this proposition is not a figment of imagination is evident from the observations of the profound philosopher Bādarāyaṇa, who has taken great pains to demolish the viewpoint of Jaimini and his successors in the field of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. In giving a citation of this favourite theory of Mīmāṃsā system Śaṅkara says that, according to this system, religious merit represents the direct donor of fruits, and not God. This citation itself goes to show that at the time of Bādarāyaṇa also the Mīmāṃsā system had been accepted as an atheistic system, particularly in the matter of recognising the existence of divine agent.

The assertions of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa on this point are more interesting. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has taken great pains to demolish the theory of the Nyāya system that the existence of God is capable of being comprehended through the process of inference since an active agent lies behind the creation of the entire universe. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa raises certain important issues. Where does God exist before the creation of the universe? Is it possible for the first

8. B.S. 3.2.41.
9. jaiminis tvā' cāryo dharmam phalasya dātāram manyate . . . .
   Ishvaras(tū phalam dadātī 'tya' nupapannam. - Śaṅkara
   Bhāṣya on B.S. 3.2.40.
creator to know anything before the creation of the universe, since there was no knowable before the universe came into being? How can God feel prompted to create the universe, because God is not supposed to possess any frame and desire or propensity to create is traceable only in such beings that have bodies and mental apparatus? How can God experience the sorrow of the beings before the genesis of the universe? As none of these problems are solvable in the scheme of the Nyāya system, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa asserts that the universe is eternal, — that it is changeless, — and that it has not been created by an intelligent conscious agent indicated as "God" in the system. Continuing his animadversion of the Nyāya thesis Kumārila says that God has no role whatsoever in the genesis of the world. The bodyless is like the liberated soul and is incapable of experiencing any feeling whatsoever. Nor is creation capable of being described as a frolic of God, because the bodyless God is incapable of demonstrating His dexterity in plays and games. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has proceeded further to point

10. See S.V. on M.S. 1.1.5, chapter Sambandhākṣepapariparīhāra, verse 46.
11. kiṇca, duḥkhaprayaṁ jagat dṛṣyate, na ca i' vaṁ praṇa-duḥkhā pi siṣṭkhāḥ hitakāmasya sambhavati, tasmād īśrām eva' daṁ sarvaṁ sarvadā jagat, na tu kenacid buddhipūrvakāriṇā nirmitam. — Pārthasārathi's Nyāyaratna on S.V., 5. 49, page 651, Chow Skt. series 1899.
12. See S.V. on M.S. 1.1.5, Chapter Sambandhākṣepapariparīhāra, verse 56.
out the defects in the arguments advanced by the Nyāya system to recognise the existence of God. The logic adopted by the Nyāya system is this, as the famous entities like the jar, the house, the garment are produced by a conscious, active and intelligent agent, similarly the oceans and the mountains, the trees and the bodies also are produced by an active, intelligent and conscious agent. This conscious agent is necessarily of bigger stature and possesses omniscience and omnipotence. This omniscient and omnipotent being is no other than God. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is of the opinion that the chain of argument adopted in the Nyāya system of philosophy is vitiated by the defect of "establishment of the already established". He further points out that all the fallacies of argument, as recognised in Indian logic, go to vitiate the chain of argument adopted in the Nyāya system. Firstly, the Nyāya proposition makes God a super human agent possessed of body, because otherwise such an entity is capable of being described as an intelligent and conscious being. But as there is no conscious

13. कषयाचिद dhetumātratvaṁ yadya' dhiṣṭhāṛte' syate / karmabhiḥ sarvajīvānāṁ tat siddheḥ siddhāsādhanam // S.V. on M.S. 1.1.5, Chapter Sambandhākṣeṇaparībāra, verse 75.
bodyless agent other than God, this proposition has no legs to stand upon. God is incapable of being described as an embodied agent. Nor he is bodyless. Because bodyless God is like a liberated soul and consequently is incapable of creating the world, which is capable of being brought into being only by an agent experiencing desire and capable of giving expression to them. With the help of these arguments Kumārila has demolished the Nyāya thesis, showing thereby that the atheistic attitude is traceable in the entire Mīmāṁsā system of philosophy, which takes a start from the speculations of Jaimini and winding its course through the commentaries of Śabaravāmin receives ultimately a full form in the observations of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

Another noted exponent of the Mīmāṁsā system Parthasārathi Miśra has introduced certain other arguments in his work entitled Śastrādīpikā to controvert the existence of God. The Vaiśeṣika system holds that by the desire of God to create the universe a spasm is generated in the motionless atom and the atom subsequently
gives rise to different entities. Parthasarathi maintains that no spasm or fluctuation can be generated in the motionless atom by the desire of God who is regarded as a bodyless and mindless agent. The desire to do something and the effort necessary for creation of a particular object, both these are traceable only in an agent provided with a body. Similarly God is incapable of knowing anything, because the dawning of knowledge presupposes the conjunction between the mind and the soul. As God does not have soul or mind, the question of His knowing anything does not arise. If to obviate these defects God is conceived as an embodied agent of supernormal stature and superhuman powers, then other difficulties crop in to vitiate the entire proposition. Since God is an eternal entity His body also is an eternal entity, implying thereby that it is to continue at the

14. sarvātmagatāḥ ca vṛttālabdhaḥ ca' drṣṭāḥ ca tān apekṣyante ye tattvaṁyogātātmānusaṁyogātebhyāḥ pavanaparamānuṣu karmāṇy utpadyante . . . . Śrīdhara's Nyāyakandalī, page 52, lines 11-13, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series no. 6, 1895, See also Chandrakānta Tarkātankāra's commentary on V.S. 5.2.13".....paramāṇunāṁ khalv apyā' dyāṁ karma, yato dvaṇukādikrameṇai' te lokā bahāvus taccā drṣṭena sraṣṭā kāritaṁ iti".

15. katham aśāriṁ prayaṭeta. na ca'śāriṁsaye coha' pi sambhavati muktamaṇāṁ īva. nā pi jñānaṁ sambhavati indriyā-der abbhāvāt. -- Sastrādipikā on M.S. 1.1.5, page 115, Nirnaya Sagar Press edn.
time of the annihilation of the universe. The concept of Pralaya or annihilation of the universe, however, is based on the idea that the destruction is total and that there is no being or matter left at this state. The postulation of the theory that God is possessed of a body thus cuts at the root of the concept of annihilation and subsequent production of the universe.

Another exponent of Mīmāṃsā system the great scholar Nārāyaṇa in his famous work Mānameyodaya has joined hands with other scholars in his attempt to wipe away the proposition of the existence of God. Nārāyaṇa points out that God cannot be established by the observations of the Vedas. The existence of God depends on the unquestionable authority of the Vedas, and the trustworthiness of the Vedas in its turn depends on the authority of the God. The proposition relating to the existence of God, therefore, Nārāyaṇa points out, is vitiated by the fallacies of "mutual dependence" and "vicious circle".\(^{16}\) Nārāyaṇa raises the same points raised by his predecessors.

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\(^{16}\) vedānām api śvarakartṛtvam sādhayatām tārākānām
vedaprāmāṇyād īśvarasiddhiḥ, īśvarapramāṇāyāc ca
vedasiddhir itaretarāśrayacakrayoh prasaṅgāt. --
Mānameyodaya 2.3.13, vivṛti, page 70, lines 18-20,
Trivandrum edn. 1912.
and says that the concept of God as a being possessed of body is incapable of being postulated, since as all the bodies perish at the time of annihilation the body of God also is likely to meet with an end at the time of destruction. This leads us to the concept of bodyless God but this concept also does not come to one's advantage, since a bodyless agent is not in a position to effect genesis of the world. 17 Continuing his criticism of the theory propounded in the Nyāya system Nārāyaṇa has taken care to show that the syllogism advanced in the Nyāya system are vitiated by all the defects of valid argument propounded in logic. 18

The commentators belonging to the sections affiliated to Prabhākara in their turn do not lack behind the philosophers affiliated to other sections in their attempt to deny the existence of God. In his exposition on the relation linking the word with the corresponding concept the great Prabhākara has maintained ominous silence on the theory


18. itthāṁ nirāste paramate svapakṣasthāpanārtham anumānam ucyate, kaṭityādayah karttṛṣūnyāḥ śāriṣijanyatvā'bhāvāt, ātmavād iti. -- Manameyodaya 2.14, vivṛti, page 71, lines 10-12, Trivandrum edn., 1912.
of divinity and concept of God throughout the discourse. But his commentator Śalikanātha has taken great pains to controvert the thesis that the world has been brought into being by the divine agent known as God. The arguments advanced by Śalikanātha are more or less the same. The proposition of the world being created by a superhuman agency possessed of desire and knowledge naturally leads to the concept that God is possessed of body, mental apparatus and sense organs, because desire and knowledge dawn only in beings possessed of bodies, sense organs and minds. Secondly, as Śalikanātha points out, the causes leading to genesis of knowledge are absent in the case of God, and consequently God is being incapable of posited as the substratum of knowledge par excellence or the supreme knower. Thirdly, the syllogism put forward by the Nyāya system, Śalikanātha thinks, is incapable of being regarded as a valid chain of argument, since it runs counter to the principle that an inference

relating to a specific entity is stronger than the inference relating to generality.20

An analysis of the viewpoints recorded in the Aphorisms of Jaimini, the commentaries of Sabaradvāmin and the subsequent works of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhakara shows that all the representative works of the Mīmāṃsā system of Philosophy have denied the existence of God as an agent necessary for creation of the world. In spite of this it is wrong to assume the Mīmāṃsā system as an out and out atheistic system, since a number of other observations contained in the extant works of this system, go to show that this system is in agreement with the proposition that God as recognised in the Vedas does exist. The chief objective of the Mīmāṃsā system is to make a critical appraisal of the propositions presented in the Vedas, and not to substantiate or deny the existence of God. The Mīmāṃsā system throughout its career has tried to explain the significance of Vedic injunctions and justify the performance of actions prescribed in the Vedas, and for this it

may occur to some that the God has remained subservient in it. As the doctrine of divine existence lies outside the area of the operation of the Mīmāṃsā system, God has not received prominence from the hands of the exponents of this system. It is interesting to note that a number of the Vedic hymns describe deities as anthropomorphic beings, and the Vedic seers expend their energies in giving detailed descriptions of different limbs of diverse Vedic deities. In explaining this queer attitude of the Vedic deities Šabarasa-vāmin has asserted that these bodies do not refer to gross bodies as are commonly traceable in human beings: these bodies are ethereal structures, which assume the form of expression, in as much as the expression significant of a divine agency is identical with the divine agent itself. It is not without reason, therefore, that the Vaiṣṇava theologians speak of identification between the name and the deity, and tender advice to posterity to sing the name of the supreme lord in ecstasy and spiritual madness.

21. nanu dravyadevatakriyaṁ yajatyarthah. satyam evam. kintu guptave devatāsrutih dravyadevataṁ hi bhūtam, bhāvayitavyo yajatyarthah. bhūtabhavyasamuccaraṇe ca bhūtasya bhavyayo' padisyate, tasmaṁ na devatā prayogikā. Šabara Bhāṣya on M.S. 9.1.9, page 98.

22. See R.V. 10.47.1a, 8.17.8a; Sa.V.1. 137a; Mai. S.4.14.5a
A further analysis of the texts of the *Mīmāṃsā* system of philosophy reveals that this system does not demolish totally the proposition of an embodied deity. The *Mīmāṃsā* system recognises the existence of a proposition known as "laudatory expression presenting the reality", and says that a statement which is established on its own and is not controverted by another means of knowledge, constitutes an example of this proposition. As the statement that the Gods are possessed of bodies is not controverted by another statement occurring in the Vedas or by another means of knowledge, there is no reason to discard it. If cogency among different observations of *Ṣāvarasvāmin*²³ is to be maintained then one is to assert that the exponents of the *Mīmāṃsā* system do not really want to deny the concept of embodied God²⁴. The reason as to why the *Mīmāṃsā* system takes this

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type of lukewarm attitude is possibly this that it tries

to keep the devotee away from the path of dedicated devo-
tion which prompts a devotee to surrender all his actions
to the embodied God with unflinching faith and steadfast
devotion. Such an attitude in the devotee is likely to
endanger the performance of sacrifices, and consequently
the authoritative character of the Vedas. It is to be
noted that the Mimamsa system has all along tried to
establish the supremacy of the sacrifices enjoined in the
Vedas and to assert the doctrine that liberation is
effected through performance of sacrifices alone.

The conjecture that the Mimamsa system is not an
out and out atheistic system of philosophy, is substantiated
all the more by the fact that most of the exponents of

25. ahamkaramamakarav anatmany atmabhimanau iti, mrdayita
-kaayagam eva'tat kathanityam, na karmasaahgingam ity
uparamyate. aha ca bhagavan dwaipayaanaah -- "na
buddhibhedam janayed ajnanaam karmasaahgingam" iti
rahasyangikare. Brhati on M. S. 1.1.5, Chapter
Atmasadhanopaya, page 187, Chow. Skt. Series No. 406,
1932, Vide also Nyayaratnavale, Advaitamanjari, page 60

26. api va sabdapurvavatvd yajnakarma pradhanaah syat
gunatve devatasrutih. -- M. S. 9.1.9.
this system start their works by offering salutation to one or other deity, who is accepted as an anthropomorphic being delivering welfare to the bonded soul. The great Bhavanātha Miśra, also identified with Bhavadeva Miśra²⁷ in his famous treatise entitled "Nayaviveka" offers obeisance to Lord Śiva, Umā and Viṣṇu.²⁸ In a similar manner the noted treatise "Arthasaṁgraha" opens with the obeisance to Lord Vasudeva²⁹ and closes the entire discussion with the statement that performance of sacrifices through a feeling of surrender to the Supreme Lord constitutes the chief means of attainment of liberation.³⁰

27. Vide Varadarāja's commentary on Nayaviveka, benedictory verse 10.

28. gaṇadhīpam grahan vande
   harim haram umām gurūn /
   vāgdevīṁ svardhūnīṁ viprān
   kartuṁ gurunaye kṛtīṁ //
   - Nayaviveka, benedictory verse 1.

29. vāsudevaṁ ramākrāntam natvā laugākṣibhāskaraṁ.
   - Arthasaṁgraha, page 1.

30. Īśvarāpaṇabuddhyā tu kriyamaṇāḥ niḥśreyasahetuḥ.
   - Arthasaṁgraha, page 109, Vālmīki Press, 1899; also Āpadeva's Mīmāṁsānāyā prakāśa, benedictory verses 1–2, page 1, Benares edn.
It is really strange that great Kumārila Bhaṭṭa who has advanced plethora of arguments to demolish the existence of God, has started his work ślokavāruttika by offering salutation to Lord Śiva\(^{31}\) and Pārthasārathi Misra also has preferred to adore Lord Śiva at the beginning of his work.\(^{32}\) All this shows that the intention of the Mīmāṃsā system is to demolish the viewpoint of the Nyāya philosophy that the existence of God is capable of being established through the process of inference and not to declare God as an unreal entity, living in the figment of imagination of devotees surcharged with divine madness alone.

A close analysis of the theories adumbrated by the advocates of the Mīmāṃsā system of philosophy goes to indicate that these theoreticians have tried to controvert the stand taken by the Nyāya system of philosophy that the existence of God is capable of being comprehended through the process of inference. The main target of this attack

31. viśuddhajhānadehāya trivedīdivyācakṣuṣe /
śreyahprāptinimmityāya namaḥ somārdhadhāriṇe //
-- S.V. benedictory verse 1.

32. ślokavāruttikam āripsus tasyā' vighnasamāptaye /
viśveśvaramahādevāṁ stutipūrvaṁ namasyati //
Pārthasārathi's Nyāyaratna, benedictory verse 1.
of these thinkers is represented by the syllogism advanced by the Nyāya system, and not God Himself. The Nyāya contention that the existence of God is capable of being known through inference from the effects represented by the movables and immovables of the ordinary world of experience, the Mīmāṃsakas point out, is not in a position to stand on a solid foundation. The Nyāya theory feels the necessity of establishing the trustworthiness of the Vedas which are supposed by the system as created by superhuman divine agency. The philosophers affiliated to the Mīmāṃsā system beginning with Kumārila Bhaṭṭa have taken pains to controvert the syllogism advanced by the Nyāya system in order to show that the Vedas are not created by external agencies. The postulation of God as established in Vedic injunctions and scriptures, further, does not run counter to the doctrine of the Mīmāṃsā system of philosophy. The Mīmāṃsā system does not recognise the concept of great destruction, but nevertheless it admits the proposition of "small deluge" as also that of the "cycle". The Mīmāṃsā theory indicates that the eternal Veda is remembered at the beginning of the new cycle by God, who is an eternal entity.33 What holds good of

doctrine adumbrated by Kumārila is equally applicable to the theory adumbrated by Prabhākara. The great philosopher Bhavanātha, an exponent affiliated to the School of Prabhākara has maintained that though the Māmāsakas have demolished the inference of God, they have not denied the existence of God altogether. As a matter of fact, Bhavanātha says, if God known through the Vedic injunctions and scriptures, is regarded as the creator of the universe, no conflict occurs with the established view of Prabhākara School. Another philosopher Nandīśvara attached to the Prabhākara School has concluded his dissertation on the score by saying that the entire process is intended to demolish the contention that the God is comprehensible through the process of inference and not God Himself. So it is wrong to assume that the

34. eva'nce' svare paroktam eva'numānām nirastam. ne'svaro' pi nirastah. Bhavanātha's Nyāyaviveka, page 199, Mad. Univ. edn. 1937; see also Prabhākara's Brhatī —" yadi param brahmavidām esa nis'cayaḥ — yad upalabh'īyate tad asat, yan no' palabh'īyate, tat tattvam iti, namas tebhyo, viduśi, nottaram vācyam." page 176, Chow Skt. Series, no. 406, 1932.

35. jagatiś'varakartṛke' pi na gurunayavirodha iti prāguktam, tad abhyupetyi' va parokta'numānikesvaranirāsapravatnah. - Ravideva's commentary on Nyāyaviveka, page 188, Mad. Univ. edn. 1937.

36. eva'hcā' numānikatvam eve'śvarasya nirākṛtam, ne' śvaro!pi nirākṛtaḥ. - Prabhākaravijaya, page 82, Sanskrita Sāhitya Pariśat edn, 1926.
school of Prabhakara is atheistic in spirit. The School affiliated to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has also extended recognition to God established by the trustworthy vedic injunctions and other scriptures. A noted work affiliated to the school of Kumārila, named Śaṅkaradigvijaya, specifically mentions that the great Kumārila was not a heretic and that he himself admitted in his speculations that the entire process have been started by him in order to establish the proposition that the Vedic injunctions are extremely trustworthy in character and that their credibility does not stand in need of being established separately. 37 All this shows that the objective of Kumārila was to controvert the Nyāya theory that the Vedas emanated from the mental apparatus of a superhuman external divine agency. Kumārila is of opinion that just as the omniscience of Lord Buddha cannot be established through the process of inference because such a proposition is exposed to the fallacy of mutual dependence, similarly the existence of God also is incapable of being established through the

37. nirāsyamīśaṁ śrutilokasiddham śruteḥ svato māttvam udāharisyaḥ -- Śaṅkaradigvijaya 7.8.
process of inference. A similar stand has been taken by the great Nārāyaṇa. While finding fault with the syllogism advanced by the Nyāya school to establish the supreme importance of God, he has asserted that God as established through the validity of Vedic injunctions is a profound verity. Exactly this stand has been taken by the author of the noted work Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi. The author says, God is capable of being comprehended through the valid means of knowledge represented by the scriptures including Vedic injunctions, and not by any other means of valid knowledge. Thus though the Mīmāṁsā system has taken great pains to demolish God as comprehended through the process of inference, it has admitted the existence of God, as comprehensible through the valid instrument of

38. sarvajñāvan niśedhyā ca sraṣṭuḥ sadbhāvakalpanā / na ca dharmād ṛte tasya bhavel lokādviśiṣṭatā // - S.V. Chapter Sambandhākṣepaparītāra verse 114.


40. ato veda eva Īśvarasiddhau pramāṇam nā' nyad iti dik. -- Gāgānātha's Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi Tarkapāda, Īśvaravāda, page 43, Chow Skt. Series no.6, 1900.
Vedic injunctions. It may not be wrong to assume that as the objective of the Mīmāṃsā system was to expound the character of religion and analyse the rituals connected with different sacrifices, they did not dilate upon the topic relating to the existence of God established by Vedic injunctions and other scriptures. The author of the famous epic Naiśadha, as a matter of fact, introduces the parallelism of the silence adopted by the adherents of the Mīmāṃsā system of philosophy in explaining the nature of God in his attempt to explain the silence of the heroine Damayantī after listening to the merits of a particular prince in the assembly organised by her father to choose a bridegroom for her.⁴¹ The employment of the peculiar simile by the famous poet shows that even in the time of the poet it was an established fact that the Mīmāṃsā system of philosophy did extend recognition to God.

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⁴¹ vedair vacobhir akhilaih krtakīrttiratne hetum vinai'va dhṛtanyaparārthayatne / mīmāṁsaye'va bhagavaty amṛtāṁsumaulau tasmin mahībhujī taya' numītir na bheje //
Naiśadhacarita, Canto 11, verse 64.
In spite of all this it is a fact that God does not receive His due share from the hands of the exponents of the Mīmāṃsā system, and most of the exponents of this system expend their energy in demolishing the viewpoint of the Nyāya doctrine that God is comprehended through the process of inference. This deficiency in the Mīmāṃsā system has been tried to be compensated to a great extent by the stand taken by the Vedānta system which is regarded as Uttara Mīmāṃsā, particularly because of its similar approach to the problems and riddles of the universe, and because of its posterity to the earlier Mīmāṃsā doctrine. The later Mīmāṃsā works, therefore, introduce the concept of God to a great extent in their speculations, and proclaim that a sacrifice performed with the feeling that the fruit is being dedicated to the God leads to liberation. Exactly this is the proclamation made by such noted theoreticians as Āpadeva, the author of the Arthasaṃgraha. 42

The attitude revealed in the works of these philosophers is exactly the same attitude as reflected in the treatises of Vaiṣṇava theologicians, who propounded the philosophy of surrender, and tender advice to the posterity

42. īśvarārpaṇabuddhayā tu kriyamāṇāḥ niḥśreyasahetuḥ.
to perform duties through a spirit of dedication and complete surrender to the Supreme Lord. When one hears of these observations, he is reminded of the proclamation made by Śrīmadbhagavadgītā to the fact that, even these small daily duties are to be performed with a feeling that the benefits of all these are to be surrendered to the Supreme Lord. Constant cultivation of this feeling of surrender leads to a complete metamorphosis in the personality of the man, as a result of which humanity is changed into divinity, narrow individuality blossoms into the flower of universality, as a result of which Emancipation is obtained. The Mīmāṃśā system of philosophy thus sings: hallelujah to the immense powers of God and proclaims the utility of surrendering all actions to God, established by the valid and trustworthy Vedas. What it wants to reject is the proposition that God is comprehended through the process of inference in the manner fire is comprehended through inference from smoke, implying thereby that the ordinary cause and effect theory is incapable of being predicated in respect of the relation between God and the universe or God and the devotee.

43. yat karosi yad aśnāsi yaj juhosi dadāsi yat / 
yat tapasyasi kaunteya tat kuruṣva madarpanam // 
Śrīmadbhagavadgītā, Chapter 9, verse 27.