CHAPTER VI

THE GOD IN THE NYĀYA VAIŚEŠIKA SYSTEM

Like the Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta systems, the Nyāya and Vaiśešika systems also are regarded as theistic ones, admitting the existence of God and resting their theories on the proposition that the benign Divine Agency carves out the entire creation and regulates the activities of all its inmates, - the animate and the inanimate. The first propounder of the Vaiśešika system, the Great Kapāda does not make mention of the God, - the Īśvara: in a similar manner the first adumbrator of the Philosophy of Nyāya, - the scholastic Gotama does not make it clear as to whether the God mentioned by him is admitted in the systems opposed to the Nyāya school or in his own system. It is only in the hands of the commentators of Kapāda and Gotama that the Theory of God gets a full-bodied form and constitutes the corner-stone of all subsequent discussions. Ultimately emerges the Nyāya-Vaiśešika Thesis that the existence of the God is to be admitted in order to explain the creation and annihilation of the universe as also to defend the trustworthiness of the Vedas.

Though in his aphorisms the Great Kapāda does not make express mention of the God, - the supreme controlling Divine Agency Īśvara, he betrays throughout his work his
awareness of the existence of a great power, - a divine agency, whose volition lies behind the genesis of many things, including the state of liberation. In explaining the intention of Kanāda, the Great commentator Praśastapāda says that religion alone is not in a position to effect emancipation: when Divine Volition inspires religion to work it ushers in that covetable state of liberation, implying thereby that the God is a profound verity in the scheme of Kanāda itself.¹ In a similar manner in expounding one of the famous aphorisms that tries to establish the reasons of the trustworthiness of the Vedas, Udayana says that the Vedas do have unquestionable authority, because they represent the Words of the God.² Saṅkaramiśra, author of Upaskāra follows suit and furnishes two alternative explanations - one in which the Vedas are described as the Words of the God and the other in which they are referred to as emanating from the lips of the anthropomorphic

1. tac ce ' śvaracodanābhivyaktād dharmād eva. - Praśastapādabhāṣya, Chapter on dravya, page 7, Vizianagam Sanskrit Series, no. 6, Benares 1895; dharmopī kevalam tāvan na niḥśreyasam krati yāvad Ṛgvere'ochaya na ' nugṛhyate tene' dam uktam śvaracodanābhivyaktād dharmād eveti. - Nyāyakandali, page 7, ibid.

2. See Udayana's Kirāṇāvalī on V.S. 1.1.3.
deity of Religion. Jayanarayana, the author of Vivṛti thinks that the Vedas owe their trustworthiness to the fact that they have emanated from the lips of the God, and proceeds to establish his proposition by making references to the Gītā.

The Vaiśeṣika considers the sound as transient and explains the important role played by sequence, that is produced through conscious effort in the genesis of the word that delivers the meaning. Like the word the sentence also is produced through conscious effort, and this holds good of the entire structure, like the Vedas and other specimens of Poetic Art. This argument enables the Vaiśeṣika to arrive at the existence of the God, - the supreme soul, endowed with motion, action and effort, as something distinct from the ordinary individual, - the Jīva.

3. tad vacanād teneśvareṇa pranayanād āmnasyasya vedasya prāmāṇyaṃ. ātma vā tad iti sannihitam dharmam eva paraṁśati tathāca vacanāt pratipādanāt āmnasyasya vedasya prāmāṇyaṃ. - V.S. 1.1.3, Upaskāra.

4. īśvaravacakam eva' tra tatpadam, om tat sad iti nirdeśo' brahmānas trividhah smṛtaḥ. - V.S. 1.1.3, Vivṛti

5. V.S. 2.2.28-32.
Though not making express mention of the God, Kañada puts forward such syllogistic reasonings that are in a position to point out the existence of a supremely powerful Divine Agency. It is said that the designations and expressions employed throughout as also the effects comprising such entities as the earth and the sprout all depend for their genesis on a supremely powerful agency, and this agency is nothing other than the God. Since words are in a position to deliver meanings only with the help of convention to which a start is given by volition, it becomes necessary to postulate the existence of God, the most powerful agency, whose Will enables expressions to signify meanings and the entire creation to flash forth in its profoundly rich charmingness. Both Sañkaramisra and Jayanārāyana agree with this view and refer to both nomenclatures and effects as the Probans that goes to establish the Probandum represented by the existence of God. The authors of the commentaries of Vivṛti and Upaskāra, however, go a step further and posit the theory that these causal factors prove the existence

6. saṅgā karma tv' asmad visiṣṭaṁ māṁ liṅgam. - V.S. 2.1.18.
7. tathācā cāddhā saṅgāya iśvaraliṅgatvam. evaṁ karmā' pi kāryam apiśvare liṅgam. tathāhi kṣītyādikāṁ sakṣarttrkāṁ kāryatvāt ghaṭavad iti. - V.S. 2.1.19, Upaskāra.
not only of the God, but also of the Great sages. By taking this advance step these commentators land themselves into fresh troubles, because the seers are regarded as the persons to whom the Vedas had been revealed in the dawn of the human society, and not as the composers of the Hymns and scriptures. Parāśarasamhitā says that the God first created the supreme creator, Brahmā and imparted to him for the first time instructions relating to the Vedas. Subsequently the seers acquainted themselves with the Vedas and through practice of Vedic sacrifices and incantations, attained the covetable state of the 'Seer', in which new truths were revealed to them. The proposition that the seers created the Vedic expressions cuts at the roots of the Theory of God, because in case of creation of expressions by the sages, the scope for admission of the superhuman agency of God does not arise.

When we move from Kanada to Gotama we breathe in a separate atmosphere where the supreme God-Īsvara makes his presence felt at every step. In a number of

8. saṅgā nāma karma kāryam ksityādi, tad ubhayam asmad visiṣṭānām īśvaramahārśīnām sattve 'pi liṅgam.
   - V.S. 2.1.18, Upaskāra
9. na kaś cīd vedakarttā ca vedasmarttā caturmukhaḥ /
   - Parāśarasamhitā 1. 20.
aphorisms Gotama makes mention of the God and refers to it as belonging to the species of the soul, - a view which is shared by Kaṇḍāda as well. That this soul is represented by both the individual soul and the supreme spirit has been made abundantly clear by Śaṅkaramiśra in his 'Kaṇḍārahasya'; as also by Prasastapāda in his commentary on Vaiśeṣika sūtras. The question as to why the supreme spirit also is regarded as the soul or the Ātman constitutes the subject matter of an animated controversy, and this takes us to an equally animated discussion on the justification of postulating the category of Ātman. The Vaiśeṣika contends that the generality of soulness is to be recognised in order to determine the state of the knower or in other words, as the determinant of the state of one is endowed with knowledge: as the individual soul and the supreme spirit both are endowed with knowledge, both are capable of being regarded as

10. N.S. 4.1.19, 20, 21; 1.1.7.
11. so' yaṁ dvividhāḥ kṣetrajñāḥ sarvajñā ce' ti. - Kanādārahasya, page 39, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, no. 231.
12. ātmatva' bhisambandhād ātma. - Prasastapādabhāṣya, page 69, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, no. 6, Benares 1895.
belonging to the species of the soul. In his endeavour to keep the definition of 'soul' and 'soulness' free from the fallacy of too wide definition Jagadisa in his commentary entitled 'Sukti' modifies the definition and asserts that soulness determines the state of the knower not through any and every relation but through the relation of inherence. This modification is definitely an improvement on the earlier one, since it precludes the possibility of time and space being included in the category of 'soul'. Śrīdhara, the author of Nyāyakandalī, therefore, gives expression to the total Vaiśeṣika doctrine when he says, — The God is soul itself because of his quality of being endowed with intellect.

Following his close associate the Vaiśeṣika, the Naiyāyika also extends recognition to the category of soul and describes the God as a soul characterised by the absence of vice, nescience and error as also by the presence of virtue, knowledge, contemplation and fullness.


14. Īśvoro' pi buddhigunatvad ātmai'va. — Nyāyakandalī, page 10, line 8, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, no. 6, Benares 1895.
Vātsyāyana in his famous commentary on the Nyāyasūtra asserts this and says that since intellect constitutes the chief salient trait of the God like that of the individual soul, and since the substratum of intellect is represented by the soul, the God or the Īśvara falls under the category of the soul. The chief argument in this syllogistic reasoning is this:

All possessed of knowledge, desire, intellect etc. are souls.
The God is possessed of knowledge, desire and intellect.

Therefore, the God is of the category of the soul.

The great Neo-logician Viśvanātha in his Muktāvalī subscribes to this view, but he takes recourse to a different chain of argument. Viśvanātha justifies the existence of the separate category of the soul by saying that the generality of soulness is to be admitted as the determinant of the material cause of pleasure and pain: Since this determinant exists in the God also, He belongs to the

category of the Soul. This does not, however, mean that
the God is subjected to pleasure and pain like the ordinary
being. And the reason is simple. Experience of pleasure
or pain, as the case may be, is regulated by destiny or
religious merit accrued in previous birth. As God has no
such destiny or religious merit the possibility of his
experiencing pleasure or pain does not arise. 16

In sharp contradiction to this view, the neolo-

gician Raghunātha does not accept the proposition that
the God belongs to the species of the soul. He, however,
endorses the employment of the expression 'Soul' to God,
simply because, as he says, the God forms the substratum
of knowledge through inherence. 17 The great Gadādhara
follows suit, and says that the expression 'Soul' or
'Atman' refers to a being that is possessed of knowledge. 18

16. ātmatvajātīs tu sukhadūḥkhaḥdisamavāyikāraṇatā' vacchedakatayā sidhyati. Īsvare' pi sā jātir
astye' va, adṛṣṭādikāraṇābhāvān na sukhadūḥkhā' dy utpattiḥ. - Bhāṣāpariccheda 47, Muktāvalī

17. sukhādisamavāyikāraṇatā vacchedakatvena siddham
ātmatvam jātir ne' śvare. - Padārthatattvavirūpāna,

18. ātmapadam jhānāvacchinnasya vācakam. -
Anumitīgadādhārī, page 4, Chowkhamba Sanskrit
Series, Benares.
As God or Isvara is endowed with knowledge, He is referred to as 'Soul'. This indicates that in the view of Gadadhara the God is not characterised by the Generality of Soulness. He further says that if the generality of soulness is supposed to reside in God, who does not experience pleasure and pain, it cannot be described as determining the material cause of pleasure and pain, or in other words, it becomes a too wide generality, embracing for its content both the species and the non-species. All this shows that the concept of 'soulness' as the determinant of the material cause of pleasure and pain does not stand the test of logic. The Vaisesika, therefore, extends recognition to the generality of soulness as the factor that determines the state of a being burning with knowledge. This generality is perceived through a process of mental perception by the Yogin engaged in deep contemplation. The Vaisesika argument is surcharged with significant substance, and it is possibly because of this that the Naiyayikas like Annambhatta and others of a much later date demonstrate a shift in their earlier stand and recognise both the individual soul and God as constituting the substratum of knowledge.  

The Nyāya system does not recognise God as independent of action. Gotama asserts that God alone cannot create the universe without the help of action perpetrated by beings, because no result is expected to accrue in case all beings take recourse to inaction.20 This Thesis is likely to encourage inaction, and at the same time fails to explain experience of pleasure and pain by the bonded self, which enjoys the fruits of actions and savours joy or sorrow as the case may be according to difference in the nature of the action perpetrated earlier. The Naiyāyika anticipates a possible objection to this and raises the issue that the concept of the God functioning with the help of action performed by ordinary beings is likely to run counter to the proposition of sovereignty, omniscience and omnipotence of God. To combat this objection Uddyotakara says that the God favours the action of the bonded self, inasmuch as, it allows the action to bear the deared fruit at the material hour21 and consequently He is to be regarded as the agent of the action depending

20. na, puruṣakarmābhāve phalā' niṣpatteḥ. - N.S. 4.1.20.
21. api tu puruṣakarma īśvaro ' nugarhṇāti. ko' nugarhā' rthaḥ ? yad yathābhūtam yasya ca yadāvipākakālaḥ tat tathā tadāvinīyukta iti. - N.S. 4.1.21,
on which He is required to usher in the genesis of the universe.

In his commentary on the Nyāyasūtra Vātsyāyana refers to the God as a distinct soul possessed of a number of qualities like intellect and the like.22 In the Vedas also the God is described as the Knower of all general and particular entities23 implying, thereby, that He is possessed of all the equipments necessary to comprehend categories. The concept of 'Qualitiless God' finds favour with the Naiyāyika, because as he says, a God having no quality is incapable of being cognised through the process of Perception or Inference. The Vedic expressions also indicate the existence of the God as endowed with quality24, effecting his comprehension thus through the process of verbal testimony. The Great Rāmānuja of Vaiṣṇava school finds fault with the Doctrine of 'Qualitiless Absolute' and affirms that the theory gives an ethereal shape to the Ultimate Reality and makes it an uncomprehensible unit.


23. yaḥ sarvajñāḥ sarvavit. - Mundāka Upaniṣad 1.1.9; sa vetti vedyam. - Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 3.19.

24. jñāḥ kāḻkāro guṇi sarvavit yah. - Ibid, 6.16.
To obviate these difficulties Gotama postulates the concept of a God having qualities and actions and possessing thus a close similarity to the individual soul characterised by diverse attributes.

It is interesting to note that though the Nyāya system conceives of the existence of a God having qualities and the Vedānta system envisages the concept of the Ultimate Reality having no attribute whatsoever, both draw their inspiration from the Vedic literature and quote copiously from Vedic texts in their endeavour to establish their respective doctrines. The Vedas, as a matter of fact, represent a great compendium of opposite thoughts and conflicting ideas, and it is not difficult for any Philosopher to find out excerpts from the Vedas in support of his thesis. The profound Śaṅkara considers the import of the Vedic expressions presenting the qualitiless Absolute as the real spirit of the Vedas and proceeds to affirm that the expressions which give an idea of the God characterised by attributes and actions are to be interpreted in a different way. The champions of the qualified God however, depend on Vedic expressions giving rise to the idea of the qualified God and say that the concept of the qualitiless Absolute is introduced only to advice the being desirous of savouring the delight
of emancipation to contemplate on the qualitiless Brahman. They also point out to the dangers of concentrating on the qualified god competent to fulfil the desires of the devotee. This concentration, it is asserted, is likely to infuse in the devotee an urge to enjoy the objects of enjoyment, putting an end thereby to his craving for savouring the delight of liberation. In Reality the Absolute does possess qualities and actions. This view of the Nyāya system finds a beautiful expression in the third chapter of the magnum opus Nyāyakusumāñjali, in which Udayana categorically asserts that the Vedas affirm the existence of the qualified God, and the concept of qualitiless Absolute is ushered in only to show that beings who concentrate on the Supreme having no quality and action are in a position to get out of the riddle of the mundane existence and savour the delight of emancipation.25 He asserts further that when thinkers describe the God as devoid of all quality what they mean is: that qualities common to ordinary mortals are not tracable in the God, and not that the God cannot constitute the substratum of any quality, whatsoever.26 This theory

25. nīrāṇjanaḥ vabodbhārtho na ca san napi tatparah //
   - Nyāyakusumāñjali 3. 17b

26. na ca nirguna-vākyavirodhā prākṛtaheyagyūnā-
   viṣayatvat teṣām. - Brahma-sūtra 1.1.1 Sribhaṣya.
finds a fuller expression in the Sarvasaṃvādī of Jīva- Gosvāmin who concludes his dissertation by saying that though vice, sorrow, limitation and such other earthly qualities do not exist in the God, He constitutes very much the receptacle of loftiest attributes through which He delivers good to the creation.

The exact number and nature of qualities pertaining to the God constitute the subject matter of an animated controversy in the system of Nyāya Philosophy itself, in as much as different theoreticians put forward divergent views on the issue. Vātsyāyana feels that as the God is required to exercise control over the individual soul and to engage the unconscious atom in the act of creation of the universe, He is possessed of knowledge, desire and activity. Uddyotakara, the author of Nyāyavarttika, however, is of opinion that as in the case of the God knowledge produces the results of desire and activity, postulation of these two qualities become redundant. According to him, the God has the general qualities of number, measure, distinction, conjunction and disjunction, in addition to the special quality of knowledge.27

Some of the old Vaiśeṣika schools display their acquiescence with this view. This is faithfully recorded in the work entitled 'Nyāyakandali' of Śrīdhara. Uddystakara, a predecessor of Śrīdhara, however, thinks that the God has eternal desire just as he has perpetual knowledge. Vācaspāti, Udayana and Jayantabhaṭṭa go a step further and postulate the existence of eternal effort in addition to the other two eternal qualities of knowledge and desire in the God. The proposition of the God endowed with eternal desire and eternal motion is open to serious objection, since in case the God has perpetual desire to create, a number of creations would usher in and the process of annihilation would never start:—

28. anye tu buddhir eva tasyā' vyāhata kriyāsaktir ity evam vadanta icchāprāyatnāv apy anahākurvānāh sadgūṇa'dhikaraṇo' yam ity āhuḥ. - Nyāyakandali, page 57, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, no. 6, Benares 1895.


other hand, the God displays eternal desire to destroy the process of annihilation would never come to an end. To obviate these difficulties it is asserted that though the desire of the God is eternal it is dependent for its exact manifestation on the extremely important factor of time: when the Divine Agency desires to create, the process of creation starts and when the time for dissolution appears, the process of annihilation sets on.31

In his attempt to enumerate the qualities of the God, Jayantabhaṭṭa arrives at five such attributes, knowledge, desire, effort, virtue and happiness; and all these, he says, are eternal in nature. Happiness is predicated of the God, through the consideration that an unhappy being cannot engage itself to the task of creation.32 The commentator Vātsyāyana, however, says that as there can be no joy without sorrow, none of these two is capable of being predicated of the God. Uddyotakara acquieses with this view and solemnly affirms that

31. anātmanamānāḥsaṁyogajatvād icchā svarūpamātrena nityā'pi kadācita sargeṇa kadācita samhāreṇa vā viṣayeṇā' nurajyate. - Ibid.
32. sukhāḥ tv asya nityam eva nityānandatvenā' gamāt pratīteḥ, asukhitasya caī'vamvidhakārīyārāmbhayo-gyatā' bhavāt. - Ibid.
the God has neither joy nor sorrow. Like the ancients the neo-logicarians Udayana and Gaṅgesā also assert that the God does not possess eternal joy. Of the neo-logicarians Viśvanātha, however, displays his agreement with the thesis that the God has eternal joy though produced pleasures which visit the ordinary mortals are incapable of being predicated of Him. Nilakanṭha in his commentary on Tarkasamgrahadīpikā states that the Navya Nyāya system regards the God as one endowed with eternal bliss, and hastens to say that when this is asserted what is meant is that the God constitutes the substratum of eternal bliss and not that He partakes of the nature of the bliss. It is equally interesting that though the traditional Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems extend recognition to the existence of the quality of measure

33. See Bhaṣya, Vārttika and Tatparyatīka on N.S. 1.1.2.
34. prīteṣu sukhasvarūpataḥ viṣṭ劫rīty ādau tātā asambhavat. - Bhaṣapariccheda 162, Muktāvalī.
like greatness in relation to the God, the neo-logician Raghunātha does not see any reason for its admission because, as he says, there is no evidence of its existence. In a similar manner, Raghunātha denies the existence of the attribute of distinction in regard to the God, and maintains that, the God is neither great nor distinct.

In his attempt to draw the line of demarcation between the individual soul and the supreme spirit the commentator Vātsyāyana says, while the individual has vice, false notion and error, the God has virtue, right notion, contemplation and all types of prosperity. The eight manifestations of prosperity of the God, it is asserted are due to His virtue and contemplation, implying thereby that these are not eternal attributes. Vac̄aspati Miśra differs from his predecessor on this issue, and he is of opinion that a distinction should be drawn between knowledge and action of the God, and His other attributes like the capacity to assume tremendous magnitude and such other well-known manifestation of prosperity, and while the first two continue for all time to come, the others appear

and disappear according to the needs of the Universe and the merits or demerits as the case may be, of diverse beings. Uddyotakara feels that the proposition of the God having eternal attributes makes it difficult to predicate virtue in relation to Him and prefers to acquiesce with the views expressed by Vācaspati Miśra. All this indicates the extensive controversy that raged over the exact number of attributes belonging to the God, and this makes the task of determining the attributes of the divine agency a difficult rather impossible one.

The Nyāya system poses the question as to whether the God is a bonded being or a liberated one, and in its attempt to solve the problem it postulates a separate category known as the 'perpetually emancipated being' as distinct from the bonded or liberated one, under which the God is capable of being comprehended. Since God does not have false notion, he is not a bonded being, and since he possesses virtue springing from action and prosperity springing from virtue, he is not a liberated one. Hence arises the necessity of postulating a distinct category known as the 'perpetually emancipated being'.

37. tasya hi jñānakriyasaktī nitye iti aisvaryaṁ nityam.
apimādikāṁ tv anityaṁ tad abhiprayyaṁ ca bhāgyakārasya dharmaphalatvābhidhānam. - N.S.4.1.21, Tatparyatikā, page 420, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, no. 15, Benares 1898.
emancipated being'. This view finds expression in the doctrines adumbrated by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, both of whom affirm that the God is not an ordinary liberated being, because He is not subjected to any bondage, whatsoever at any given time. It is curious to note that by positing the distinct category of 'perpetually liberated one', the Yoga system also refutes the contention of the Sāmkhya system that as the God is neither bonded nor liberated, He does not exist. The Nyāya system thus asserts that though the God is akin to the individual soul in many respects, it is a 'perpetually liberated being', in sharp contradistinction to the ordinary soul, which is subjected to the miseries of bondage, and subsequently savours the delight of liberation.

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems affirm that the God constitutes the efficient cause of creation of the world. While the atoms of earth, water, air and fire represent the material cause, and the collocation of atoms the non-material cause, the efficient cause in the process of creation is represented by the God. When the God desires to carve out the creation a tremour is generated in the airy

39. sa tu sadai' va muktāḥ sadai' ve' śvaraḥ - Y.S. 1.24, Vyāsabhāṣya.
atoms, and through an elaborate process of permutation and combination of diverse atoms the creation ultimately ushers in. Since no action can be generated in the atoms without a conscious agent, and since the individual soul though possessed of consciousness does not have knowledge of atoms constituting the material cause, the existence of God as distinct from the individual soul is to be postulated. It is not without reason, therefore, that most of the Philosophers affiliated to the Nyāya system recognise the God, his knowledge, desire and action along with the other factors of space, time, fortune and non-existence prior to genesis as the eight general efficient causes of all produced entities.

Most of the authors belonging to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems hold the opinion that no purpose of the God is served by his commissioning different agencies to usher in the creation of the universe. He simply engages himself in the task of creating the world through compassion to ordinary beings. In reply to the question as to why then the supreme creator allows the beings a taste of both pleasure and pain, it is asserted that as

40. āptakalpaś cā ' yam. yathā pitā patyānām tathā pitṛbhūta īśvaro bhūtānām. - N.S. 4.1.21, Vātsyāyanabhaṣya.
experience of pain causes aversion to worldly objects to which emancipation is obtained, the God takes care to see that his creation can infuse a sting of pain in the individuals. The noted logician Uddyotakara makes mention of other two theories which seek to explain the reason behind the creation of the world by the God. One such theory states that the God creates the world in a sportive mood and the other theory attributes the reason for carving out the world to the desire of the creator to give expression to his greatness and tremendous prosperity. Neither of these two theories, however, seems to be acceptable. The first theory is not, because only an unhappy being takes recourse to sports to forget his miseries and to have a taste of magnificent bliss: as the God experiences bliss for all time to come and is never subjected to miseries, the question of his engaging himself in sports and plays does not arise. The second theory also fails to establish itself on a solid foundation, because, it demonstrates its inability to explain the considerations that impel the God to give expression to his greatness and super-normal prosperity or skill. It is not without reason, therefore, that Uddyotakara has failed to acquiesce with either of the two theories and has advanced the new view that as the desire to create
constitutes a part and parcel of the nature of the God, He engages himself in the difficult task of unfolding the creation.\(^{41}\) This does not, however, mean that the creation of all effects takes place simultaneously, because the genesis of entities depends to a considerable extent on the existence of a set of causes: when the causes favourable to creation of one thing are there, the God effects creation of that thing; when the causes favourable to creation of another entity are there, the God effects genesis of that another entity, and so on. This consideration prompts another noted logician Jayanta Bhatta to affirm that the God sometimes engages himself in the absorbing task of ushering in the magnificent creation and sometimes expends his energies in the work of effecting dissolution of his created universe of profound enchantment.\(^{42}\)

All this discussion relating to the creation of the world takes us to a more vital issue relating to the

\(^{41}\) tat\(\text{svabhāvyat pravarttata ity aduino.}\) - N.S. 4.1.21, Nyāyavarttika, page 463, Vidya Vilas Press edition, Benares 1915.

\(^{42}\) svabhāva evai' sa bhagavato yat kadācit sṛjati kadācit saṁharati visvam iti. - Nyāyamahājāri, Part I, page 186, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares.
bodily frame of the Divine Agency, the questions raised being - Has the God a corporal frame? Is this body eternal? Or is it transient, like the bodies of other beings? The thesis that the God possesses an eternal body is vitiated by the defect of absurdity, since it runs counter to experience of all men as also to the axiomatic truth that all bodies are perishable entities. The proposition that the God is in possession of a transient body is equally vitiated by the fallacy of Regressus ad infinitum, because a produced body will require another God for its creation, - the body of that God will require another God, and this process of postulating unending series of Gods will continue ad infinitum, endangering the postulation of the basic proposition itself. To obviate all these difficulties most of the Philosophers affiliated to the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika systems assert that the God does not have any frame or any limb whatsoever. They challenge the basic proposition that only beings having corporal frames are in a position to create, and affirm that the possession of body has no bearing on the production of an event.

This, they say, is strengthened by the simple fact that the dead body does not have the competence to produce an event. The God, they assert, does not possess body, but at the same time, He has the full competence to usher in the creation of the universe. The same thought is expressed in the Isopanisad which denies the existence of both gross and subtle bodies in relation to the God as also in the Svetāsvataropanisad, which declares the God as seeing without the visual organs and as listening without the help of auditory organs.

It is to be noted in this connection that though the God is not required to assume a body in order to bring into being the genesis of the entire creation, it becomes necessary for him to take recourse to diverse forms with the ultimate objective of instructing the world. It is for this reason that the great Udayana admits the proposition that the God unfolds the creation without assuming a form, but at the same breath says that the God manifests himself through different forms in order to give expression to his magnificent grandeur.

44. sa paryagācchukram akāyam asnāviram / - Isopanisad 8.
45. apānipādo javano grahīta paśyaty acakṣuḥ sa śrṇoty akarpnaḥ // - Svetāsvatara Upanisad 3.19.
46. grhnāti hi āśvaro' pi kāryavaśāc charīram antara'ntarā, darṣṣyati ca vibhūtim iti. - Nyāyakusumārjali 5.5 vivṛti, page 508, Kashi Sanskrit Series, no. 30, Benares 1957.
Vardhamāṇa also asserts that though the God has neither virtue nor vice, still he possesses a body and proceeds to justify his thesis by making references to Śrutī and Smṛti texts. The famous commentator Vyomasiva in his work entitled Vyomavatī expresses the opinion that for all practical purposes the atoms constitute the body of the God, and hastens to observe that the first action generated in the atom does not depend on any other action, and consequently a definite status is to be assigned to the atom. In his endeavour to find out this enhanced status of atom, the Naiyāyika draws his inspiration from the axiom that the medium through which the soul can generate an action or cause a tremour independent of other actions should be regarded as the body of that soul, and asserts that as in the atom an action is generated by the God without depending on any other actions it constitutes the body of the God. In his great work

47. इवरास्या द्रष्टाभावे पि तच चारिरासाध्यपतुका- समादनिधोगसामपादकार्दश्ते दे इवरास्या शरीरपर्ष्ठेः. - Ibid, Prakāśa.

48. See Vajasaneyīsāmhitā 16.27; Taittirīyasāmhitā 4.5.9.1; Maitrāyanīsāmhitā 2.9.5 : 124.6; Kaṭhakasāmhitā 17.7; Gītā 4.7.

49. अचार्यसमानुवाचयनस तु आस्तु चेतात्वेशा तत्र जगतुवम, अस्तु च तद अनुरोधेने इवरास्या नित्याः शरीरम, ततो धपी ने इवरास्यातिरिक्तस्ारिसाद्धि, परमानुस्मानं एव तच चारिरात्वो पागमत. - Bhāṣāpariccheda, Sloka 1, Dinakarī.
"Iśvarapratipattiprakāśa", Madhusūdana Sarasvatī expresses the same opinion and affirms that the body of the God is really represented by the collection of atoms. This affirmation makes the frame of the God eternal, because the atoms are indestructible entities. The argument that the proposition of the God having one eternal body is marked by simplicity and consequently is to be preferred to the proposition of the frame of the God being represented by a conglomeration of atoms, which is vitiated by the defect of complexity does not lead us to the gateway of truth. Rather it complicates the problem and makes many situations and effects inexplicable. To obviate all these difficulties, the Nyāya system considers the innumerable atoms as the body of the God and tries to reconcile the divergent views expressed by Vedic texts in regard to the bodily frame of the omniscient, omnipresent and omnipotent God.

50. sākṣāt prayatnādhiśthayam śārīram ucyate, paramesvārasya ca sākṣāt prayatnādhiśthayam paramānavaḥ. atah paramānuṣārīram Iśvarasya yuktam. - Iśvarapratipattiprakāśa, page 5, Trivandrum edition 1921; see also Tātparyaparipariśuddhi, page 5, Asiatic Society of Bengal, New Series no. 1302.
All this indicates the attitude adopted by the Nyāya system of Philosophy in solving the riddle of the universe and in approaching the problem of existence of the God. The Nyāya system accepts the position that the creation has a beginning and an end, and in its endeavour to arrive at the efficient cause that puts the atoms in a compendium and ushers in the world, it points out to the supernormal agency of God. Secondly, it thinks that postulation of God is necessary in order to present introduction of created entities and to introduce these to the first group of comprehenders. Thirdly, the Vedas are created entities and as these cannot emanate from an ordinary individual, the existence of an extranormal divine agency is felt, and consequently the postulation of God is an essentiality. Fourthly, as there must be an animate being to apportion fruits of good or bad deeds amongst individuals, the admission of the God as distinct from the inanimate fate becomes necessary. With these arguments the Nyāya system of Philosophy, thus, establishes its theory of God, and it is in this system that Indian Theism reaches spectacular heights absorbing the attention of all scholars, - both oriental and occidental.