CHAPTER - V

THEISM IN VEDANTA SYSTEM

In sharp contrast to the Mīmāṃsā system, the Vedānta system recognises the necessity and importance of God and different schools of this system describe the entity known as God in different ways. Both the monist and the dualist in this system recognise the Absolute Reality as God, but the monist is of opinion that only the eternal Brahman is the real entity, and all entities including this qualified and embodied God is an illusion. From the stand-point of Absolute Reality, thus God is incapable of being recognised as a real entity, but from the empirical point of view, the monist Vedāntin argues, the existence of God is incapable of being denied. The monist feels that in order to explain the creation, sustenance and annihilation of the universe as also to maintain the diversity of results accruing from performance of actions it is necessary to recognise God or the Consciousness limited by ignorance. Bādarāyana, the great exponent of this system, has in three aphorisms of his magnum opus entitled Brahmasūtra tried to expound the nature of God with the help of strong arguments as also by making reference to the Vedic texts.¹

¹. phalam ata upatthe - Brahma sūtra 3.2.38; 
    srutavac ca - Ibid 3. 2. 39; pūrvantu bādarāyaṇo hetuvyapadesāt - Ibid 3. 2. 41.
One of the schools subscribing to the monistic theory is of opinion that God is nothing by Consciousness reflected in ignorance. Just as the face is reflected in the mirror, similarly pure Consciousness is reflected in beginningless ignorance. This reflection of ignorance is nothing other than God. As the reflection of a Conscious entity is naturally conscious, God is conscious. As this reflection has no beginning, so God also has no beginning. So long as the face stands reflected in the mirror a distinction is capable of being drawn between the original face and its imitation in the reflected mirror. When the adjunct in the shape of the mirror is removed, the original face remains alone and in the absence of the imitation it is neither qualified as original, nor as an imitation thereto. In a similar manner when the adjunct in the shape of the ignorance or ajñāna is removed, pure Consciousness manifests itself in its full splendour. According to this school of monists, while Consciousness reflected in the nescience constitutes the concept of God, Consciousness reflected in the mind constitutes the concept
of the individual soul. Thus God is Consciousness limited by ignorance and the individual soul is the Consciousness limited by mind. The reflection of the sun caught by the lake and water placed in a small pot is essentially one and the same, but still a line of demarcation is drawn between the two images through differences of the adjuncts reflecting those images. In a similar manner the reflection of pure Consciousness in ignorance and mental apparatus is same: still a distinction is drawn between the two on account of difference between the nature of the two reflecting media. As the image of Consciousness reflected in ignorance or ajñāna is all-pervading, God is described as omnipresent. As pure Consciousness is continuing to be reflected in nescience since time immemorial, God is conceived of as one having no beginning. This school,

2. bimbe tamonipatite pratibimbake vā deśādvavyāvaṇa-varjitaitsvarūpe // -- Saṃkṣepasārīraka, 2. 176; atra ca' jñānamāträpratibimbatvam īśvaratvaṁ vivaksitam. ahamkaratādātmyāpannajñānapratibimbhitavatvam ca jīvatām iti draśtavyam. - Ibid, Sārasaṅgraha, pages 107-108, Kashi Sanskrit Series, no. 18, Vedānta Section no. 4, Benares, 1924.
therefore, regards God as omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent. It asserts that in sharp contradiction to the God the individual soul is limited, does not possess all-embracing knowledge and is both the agent and the experiencer of the fruit of actions.3

The author of the noted text Pañcadasī holds a similar view that there is a subtle distinction between his doctrine and the doctrine recorded earlier. The earlier theory considers māyā and avidyā as the different names of the same entity4 and maintains that pure Consciousness reflected in māyā or avidyā constitutes the God. The author of the Pañcadasī recognises a fine distinction between māyā and avidyā5, and in continuing

3. ajñānavarjitatatāyā paramesvāro'sau sarvajñā eva yad ahamkṛtibandhahānāḥ / jñānāṁ nirāvaraṇam'istam amūsyā yasmaj jīvasya sāvaraṇam eva yato' nabhijah //
   - Saṃkṣepaśārāpraka 2.183.

4. prakṛtibhūtayor māyā'vidyayoh tadvikārayos ca adhyāsāmayayoh lakṣanābhedēekatvam avagamyate.
   .......... na ca śāstravyavahārāt māyā'vidyābhedaḥ.
   -- Pañcapadikāvivarana, pages 171-172,

5. sattvasuddhyavisuddhībhyaṁ māyā'vidye ca te mate /
   -- Pañcadasī 1.16.a. 
his observations in regard to God he says that while pure Consciousness reflected in māyā constitutes the concept of God,\(^6\) this Consciousness reflected in avidyā or ignorance represents the individual soul.\(^7\) This author thinks that the quality of goodness or sattva resides in a prominent scale and the matter in this situation is regarded as māyā. While on the other hand, the distracting factors of the mind technically known as the tāmas and the rajas acquire prominence of subordinating the fine quality of goodness, the matter is regarded as avidyā or ignorance.\(^8\) In the view of this noted thinker the image of pure Consciousness reflected in māyā, which has for its chief component the quality of pure goodness is the God and the image of pure Consciousness reflected in avidyā or ignorance in which the quality of goodness is subordinated represents the individual soul. This explains the omniscience and the omnipotence of the God as also the limited knowledge and power of the individual soul.

\(^6\) māyāṁ bimbo vaśekṛtya tāṁ syāt sarvajña Īsvarah // -- Pañcadasī 1.16.

\(^7\) avidyāvasāgas tvanyas tad vaicitryād anekadā // -- Pañcadasī 1.17\(^a\); see also Pañcadasī 6.23.

According to one section of thinkers who subscribe to the view propounded by this group of monists the essential matter has two powers, - the power to cover the real nature of things and the power to cause distraction. When the essential matter has for its prominent constituent the quality of distracting the mind the matter gets the designation of mayā and the reflection of pure Consciousness in this mayā is regarded as God. When the essential matter, on the other hand, has for its prominent constituent the quality of covering the realities, the matter gets the designation of avidyā or ignorance and the reflection of pure Consciousness in this mirror of ignorance is regarded as the individual soul. Therefore, avidyā or ignorance constitutes adjunct of the individual, not of the God. This analysis of the theory propounded by a section of absolute monist makes it clear that according to this section both God and the individual are nothing other than the pure Consciousness reflected in different reflecting media. Though different thinkers belonging to this

9. vikṣepavṛtiḥ-pābhyaṁ dvidha' vidyā vyavasthitā /
   -- Pañcadasaṅ 6.26a

10. advitiyabhramatattve svapno'yam akhilaṁ jagat /
    Ṛṣṭivādirūpena cetanācetanātmakam //
    -- Ibid, 6. 211.
section hold divergent views on the nature of mayā as also on the point on which the concept of mayā differs from the concept of avidyā, each one of them holds the view that God is the reflection of Consciousness in eternal mayā.

It is interesting to note that the profound author of the Pañcapādikāvivarāpa is preferred to differ from this common view. He is of opinion that God is not the reflection of Consciousness, but Consciousness itself. It is the real Consciousness which constitutes the concept of God, and not its imitation reflected in mayā. This thinker is of the opinion that if reflection of Consciousness is considered as to constitute God then God is likely to be shifted by the shortcomings and the deficiencies belonging to the individual. The common experience shows that even the beautiful face reflected in a mirror having stains loses its beauty and appears as a dark one. In a similar manner, the defects of ajñāna are likely to vitiate the image of Pure Consciousness reflected in it. These considerations have prompted this thinker to differ from his predecessor and to assert that God is not the reflected Consciousness, but Pure Consciousness itself. He is of opinion that when Pure
Consciousness gets reflected in ājnāna or ignorance, it assumes the shape of the individual, and consequently the distinction between God and the individual is exactly the same as the distinction between the original and its imitation. 11 To this an objection may be raised. If the God is comprised of Pure Consciousness then how is it possible for the God to reside within all beings and to constitute the material cause of all entities? The original does not reside in the place where the imitation resides, just as the original face and face reflected in the mirror, both do not reside in the same substratum. This objection is replied to by the argument that though the limited original does not reside in the same substratum with the reflection, the unlimited Pure Consciousness is in a position to cohere with the reflection in the same substratum, as otherwise, the all-pervading character of Pure Consciousness is likely to be endangered. 12

11. tattvam iti bimbasthānīyatrahmasvarūptā pratibimba- 

12. tataś ca sarvagatacaitanyabimbavatvam api caitanyāma. 
travṛttiḥ bimbatvaviśistaṁ brhme sarvagatam eva. 
-- Bhāvaprakāsikā, page 291, ibid.
Another objection is raised against this doctrine. It is pointed out that an entity having no colour is not reflected in any medium. The stock illustration that is put forward to explain this proposition is the reflection of the red flower in the pure diamond placed near it. The objectors point out that as Consciousness has no form or colour its reflection is incapable of being displayed in any reflecting medium. The champions of the Imitation Theory assert in reply to this animadversion that the proposition put forward by the opponent has no legs to stand upon. It is not a fact that only entities having forms and colours are reflected in a medium. As things possessed of forms and colours are perceived with the help of visual organ, their images also are experienced through ocular perception. An entity having no form is not perceived with the visual organ and so its image also remains inexperienced. Consequently, nothing stands in the way of the pure Consciousness being reflected in a reflecting medium.13

13. śrutismṛtisūtraṁ jīvasya pratibimbabhaūvasya
darśitavat, amūrtasya ca' kāśasya sābhāranakṣatrasya
jale pratibimbavat amūrtasya brahma'pi
pratibimbasyaśambhavat. — Pāñcapādikāvivaraṇa,
page 289, Madras Government Oriental Series,
No. CLV, Madras 1958.
In this connection it seems necessary to introduce an analysis of the theory relating to the distinction and identity between the original and its reflection. In the view of the monists the distinction between the original and its reflection is not real: it is an illusory concept constructed by figments of imagination.\(^{14}\) The proposition of absolute distinction between the original and its reflection is likely to change entire concept regarding the relation between the original and its imitation. An entity absolutely distinct from another entity cannot be deemed to constitute the reflection of that entity. Nor is the reflection capable of being explained as an unreal entity or as a product of erroneous knowledge. In case of error the knowledge of the real thing dispels the former knowledge relating to unreal entity. The real knowledge relating to the nature of the rope dispels the false notion relating to the snake in case of mistaken identity between the rope and the snake. In the case of the relation between the original and its imitation, however, this does not hold good. Or in other words, the knowledge

\(^{14}\) na vayaṁ vicchedāvabhesaṁ pāramārthikāṁ brūmaḥ. kintu ekatvam. vicchedaṁ tu māyāvijrmbhitāṁ. — Pañcapādikā, page 109, ibid.
of the original does not yield place to the knowledge of the reflection, when the actual image is reflected in the reflecting media.¹⁵ The objection that the image reflected in the reflecting media is separate from the original entity does not equally hold good, since the genesis of an entity depends on existence and conglomeration of certain causal factors, and causal factors whatsoever can be traced to explain the genesis of the image caught in the reflected medium. The proposition that when the face is reflected in the mirror, a face different from the original one is brought into being does not hold good, primarily because it is controverted by our actual experience. The experience of the common man reveals that in such cases what actually happens is that the image of the original, similar to it, is caught in the reflecting media. All this goes to show that the proposition of absolute distinction between the original and the

¹⁵. bāḍhadarsanāt mithyābhāvaḥ. neś ha sa bāḍho drṣyate. yaḥ punaḥ darpaṇapagame tadapagamah, na sa bāḍhaḥ. -- Paṅgaṇapādikā, page 107, ibid.
imitation has slender legs to stand upon. The relation between the original and the imitation is neither the relation of identity, nor that of absolute distinction: it is something akin to that of similarity. As a matter of fact, this situation has lead some renowned Indian Aesthetics to posit the existence of a new relation and a new type of comprehension technically known as the knowledge which the connoisseur has of a horse in respect of the painting of a horse (citra-turaga-pratīti).

It may not be out of place to mention here that in view of the author of the noted work Advaitavidyā the original is absolutely distinct from its imitation or reflection. The original is the real, the imitation is a false entity. This thinker is of opinion that the face reflected in the mirror is not the actual face, but simply an appearance on it. The face is not perceived through the visual organ by the man concerned, but the image of the face caught in the reflecting medium is actually perceived by him. Had the original face been identical

16. सास्त्रीयो' पिययावहाराः प्रतिबिंबस्या
परमार्थिकम् एवा बिम्बाकरुपात्वम् दर्शयति.
-- पञ्चपदिका, page 108, ibid.
with the reflected one, then the reflection also would have remained unperceived by the person. With this argument the author of the Advaita-vidya has tried to establish his own theory that the reflection is a false entity distinct from the original. This theory, however, lands the monist thinkers into further troubles, because its acceptance leads to the falsehood of the God, - the falsehood of the individual soul, - the unreality of the mundane existence and the falsehood of liberation. This of course, does not take us far from the gateway of the Truth, because the monist asserts that it is the falsehood of these entities that is intended to be established in his doctrine. One section of the monist thinkers, thus, conceive of God as Consciousness reflected in maya, and try to draw the line of demarcation between the God and the individual soul by pointing out that while Pure Consciousness reflected in maya assumes the form of God, this Pure Consciousness reflected in ignorance or ajñāna

17. na nirodho na co' tpattir na baddho na ca sādhakah / na mumukṣur na vai mukta ity' eṣa paramarthatā //
   -- Māṇḍūkyakārīkā 2.32; Ātmopaniṣād 31 ; Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, Sloka 576.
takes the form of the individual. This explains the omniscience, omnipresence and omnipotence of the God and at the same time indicates the reason as to why the individual soul is so dependent on the Absolute Reality for its sustenance. In sharp contradiction to this theory propounded by one section of the monist, which is technically regarded as the group of upholders of the Doctrine of Reflection, other section puts forward the doctrine known as the Doctrine of Limitation and regards the God as Consciousness limited by ignorance of profound magnitude. A third section conceives of God as semblance of Pure Consciousness implying thereby that the God is simply an appearance. A close analysis of these three theories forms an interesting issue, and is essential for a student of the evaluation of theism in the realm of six systems of Indian philosophy.

It is interesting to have a detailed discussion of the nature of God in accordance with the Doctrine of Limitation. In his monumental work Brahmasiddhi Maṇḍana Miśra perhaps is the first author to give an indication to this doctrine, but in the commentary called Bhāmatī of the philosophical monster Vacāspati Miśra this theory gets a detailed analysis. It is not without reason,
therefore, that the great Vācaspati Miśra is regarded as the propounder of the Doctrine of Limitation. According to these theoreticians if the structure of a particular object is extremely pure and transparent then the object becomes able to catch the reflection of another thing having colour and appearance provided it is placed near the earlier thing. 18 As air has no form it cannot get itself reflected on anything. Similarly, as the supreme soul Brahman has got no form it is incapable of being reflected in nescience or mental apparatus. It is our common experience that when the orb of the sun gets itself reflected on a lake, it is erroneously said that the form of the lake has got itself reflected. But this experience is a result of an error, and consequently this cannot be put forward as a supporting evidence. It is unnecessary to admit the proposition of reflection of such sounds as 'a' 'ā' etc. on the eternal verbum having no form, because as the sounds competent to effect

18. rūpavad dhi dravyaṁ atisvacchatayaṁ rūpavato
dravyāntarasya tadvivekena gṛhyāmaṇasyaṁ pi chayāṁ
gṛñīyat ; cidāṁ tvaṁupo visayo na visayacchāyaṁ
udgrāhayitum arhati.

revelation of the eternal verbum is near the verbum itself
the qualities of the eternal verbum are superimposed on
the transient sound. In a similar manner, the echo is
incapable of being regarded as the reflection of the
original sound. The echo represents in reality a different
sound. It represents also the quality of the space. The
material cause of the echo is furnished by the space and
the original sound both. In this manner the propounders of
the Limitation theory point out that Consciousness as
limited by the mental apparatus constitutes the individual
soul and when this Consciousness does not get itself
limited by the mental apparatus or in other words, becomes
limited by nescience it represents the God. In the Vedic
text as also in the Brahma-sūtra, this Limitation Theory
has been acknowledged.\textsuperscript{19} It is not without reason, therefore, that though in one of the aphorisms of Brahma-sūtra,
the great Bādarāyana has presented the Reflection Theory.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{19} ghaṭasaṁvṛtam ākāsāṁ niyamāhe ghaṭe yathā /
- Brahmavindu Upaniṣad 3.13; aṁśo naṁavyapadesād
anyathā ca' pi dāśakitavāditvam adhiyata eke.
- Brahma-sūtra 2.3.43.

\textsuperscript{20} ata eva co'pama sūryakādivat. - Brahma-sūtra 3.2.18.
in the subsequent aphorism he has shown the unacceptability
of the first theory 21 and in the following aphorism has
clearly pointed out that it is the Doctrine of Limitation
which is in a position to stand the test of criticism. 22
Consequently the consistence with the texts of the Vedas,
the aphorism presented by the great Bādarāyana as also with
the postulates of logic it is capable of being asserted
that Consciousness as limited by the mental apparatus
constitutes the individual soul and when it does not get
itself limited in the manner prescribed before it blossoms
forth into the nature of the God.

The propounders of Monism like Suresvarācārya
and others have found favour with the Doctrine of
Appearance. According to them the individual soul does
not represent the reflection, nor it is limited by any-
thing. In reality it constitutes the shadow of Conscious-
ness. When the unchangeable Brahman appears as a different
thing through the influence of nescience, it is regarded
as the individual soul. In one of the commentaries of

21. ambuvad agrahanāt tu na tathātvam. - Brahmaśūtra
2.2.19.
22. vṛddhihrāsabhāktam antarbhāvādubhayasāmahājasyād
evam. - Brahmaśūtra 3.2.20.
the Brhadāraṇyaka the illustration of a prince brought up in the house of a fowler has been put forward in this regard. Just as a prince brought up in the house of a fowler regards himself as the son of the fowler, similarly the supreme Brahman when confined within the frame-work of the ordinary rules of existence through the influence of nescience regards itself as the individual soul. This theory is regarded as the Theory of Appearance. A man who is conscious of the pedigree of the prince may say that he is actually a prince and thus, may try to generate consciousness about his own self in him, and when he becomes successful in his attempt, the prince regards himself as the real prince. In a similar manner through cultivation of constant practice of the Upanisadic sayings which assert the identity of the individual soul and the Supreme Spirit, the nescience which keeps the bright self covered disappears and the Supreme Spirit reveals itself in its brilliant splendour. According to this theory like the horse realised in a dream the God also is an imaginary entity.\textsuperscript{23} The individual soul and the God both represent different appearances of the same Consciousness. While individual appearance is regarded as the individual soul,

\textsuperscript{23} See Brhadāraṇyaka Upanisad 1.3.3, 1.7.1, 2.6.4.
the collective appearance is regarded as the God. Appearance in this context refers to the shadow. In the famous work Pañchadāsī composed by the great philosopher Vidyārāṇya the Doctrine of Appearance gets attention due to it. According to the Doctrine of Appearance to which a new turn is given by these theoreticians the individual soul and the God do not represent the appearances of Consciousness alone. Just as the snake superimposed on the rope does not appear as different, similarly the individual soul or the semblance of Consciousness in ignorance and the God or the semblance of Consciousness in māyā or nescience do not appear as different from Pure Consciousness which represents the substratum of all these experiences. The semblance of Consciousness superimposed on mental apparatus and nescience both are identical with Pure Consciousness, but still the nature of Pure Consciousness reveals themselves as independent entities. So the great Brahmendra Sarasvatī says Consciousness representing the substratum of nescience, nescience and appearance of Consciousness on that—these three conjointly constitute the concept of God, while Consciousness representing the substratum of mental apparatus, mental apparatus and the appearance of
Consciousness on mental apparatus - these three conjoinly constitute the concept of individual soul.\textsuperscript{24}

Now that much has been said on the Theory of Reflection and the Theory of Appearance, it may not be difficult to comprehend the points of distinction between the two. Appearance or shadow is an unreal thing, but the reflection of Consciousness on nescience or mental apparatus is not an unreal entity. In the view of the Vivaraṇa School also the reflected soul is not an unreal thing. The reflection and the shadow, these two are incapable of being described as one and the same thing. The reflection of the face on the mirror is not really the shadow of the face, because while the shadow does not maintain any distinction with the original one, so far as its direction and the total contour are concerned the reflection maintains a difference, in as much as the left side of the thing reflected appears as the right side of the image and so on. Thus, the distinction between the reflection and shadow

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{jīveśvara na kevalābhāsarūpaṁ kintu mâyādhiśthāna-caitanyaṁ, māyā, tatra caitanyābhasa ity etat trayāṁ militvā Īśvarah. avidyāṁsādhiśthāna-caitanyam, avidyāṁsaḥ, tatra caitanyābhasa ity etat trayāṁ nilitvā jīvah.} - \textit{Vicārasāgaram, page 307, The Vasudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal Library Committee, Madras 1964.}
is to be maintained and while shadow is capable of being explained away as an unreal entity, reflection has got some sort of real existence. It may be profitable in this context to discuss the nature of the individual soul and the God as presented in the famous Māṇḍukya Upanisad. This Upanisad par excellence describes four different stages of the Supreme Spirit. Of these four different stages three are appended with adjunct and the fourth one is devoid of any adjunct or external appendage.

Of the three theories enunciated above, the Theory of Reflection appears to be more acceptable than the Theory of Limitation. The propounders of the latter Theory assert that since only an entity having form and complexion gets reflected in a thing having form and since the Brahman has no form of its own, the proposition of this Supreme Entity being reflected in nescience does not appear sound and acceptable. This assertion, however, has no legs to stand upon; and the reasons are simple. The statement that only an entity having a form is capable of being reflected in a thing having form, is itself open to objection. Moreover, the Theory of Reflection is quite in conformity to the Vedic Postulation that the God has got independence and free volition,
while the Individual is completely subordinated to Him.
Thirdly, the Theory of Limitation itself suffers from many
deficiencies. The concept that Consciousness as limited
by the mental apparatus represents the Individual Soul,
makes the proposition of the Yogins taking resort to a
number of bodies simultaneously difficult and rather
absurd. Limited Consciousness, as a matter of fact,
resides in a particular place, and consequently, is
incapable of being present in a series of bodies created
through the influence of Yoga simultaneously. The
Reflection Theory does not pose this problem since
Consciousness as reflected in nescience is in a position
to reside in many places at one and the same time. More­
over, acceptance of the Limitation Theory renders the
common experience of the Individual Soul enjoying the
fruits of deeds done in previous births untenable. And
the reason is not far to seek. The Consciousness as
limited by the mental apparatus in this world of
mundane existence is certainly different from Consciousness
as limited by the mental apparatus in the world of
heavenly existence, and consequently the Individual as
residing in the Heavenly world is not the same as that
obtaining diverse experience in the ordinary world.
This position makes the concept of the Jīva enjoying
the fruits of actions done in previous births untenable. The Reflection Theory, on the other hand, does not suffer from this weakness. The limited entity certainly differs as the adjunct that limits the earlier changes position, but the reflection does not differ with the situation of the entity in which it gets itself embedded: it always remains one and the same, and shines in its full splendour.

It is not without reason, therefore, that though the Great Bādarāyaṇa in his earlier aphorisms of the Brahma-sūtra has presented in details the Theory of Limitation, in conclusion he has postulated the Theory of Reflection, and has indicated his acquiescence with this doctrine. This explains the endeavour exhibited by some of the Great exponents of the Vedānta System of Philosophy like Vidyāraṇya and others to demolish the Doctrine of Limitation and to establish the Theory of Reflection on a solid foundation. The Pañcadasī of Vidyāraṇya states that if Consciousness, as limited by mental

25. aṁsva nānāvyapadesād anyathā cā' pi dāśakitavādi-tvam adhīyata eva. - Brahma-sūtra 2.3.43.

26. abhāsa eva ca - Brahma-sūtra 2.3.50.

27. samprati evakāreṇa' vacchedapakṣārucirnā
sucayan rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo babhuvē ' ty ādisrutisi-
ddhāṅ pragribimbapakśam upanyasyati bhagavān
apparatus is regarded as the knower then Consciousness as limited by the jar also is capable of being described as the knower, since the jar is much a limiting and differentiating entity as the mind. The Reflection Theory, however, does not present these insurmountable difficulties. The mind being an effect of Sattva is clear and consequently is able to catch reflection of Consciousness: the jar, on the other hand, being an effect of Tamas is hard and devoid of the power of holding an image. The nature of the two adjuncts being different genesis of diverse results from them is natural and not unexpected. All this explains further, the attempt made by the literary monster Sañkaracārya to support the Doctrine of Reflection and to establish it on a solid foundation. The argument that as in the Theory of Reflection it becomes necessary to imagine the nature of the reflection itself in addition to other factors, it is vitiated by the defect of complexity does not cut much ice, since this Doctrine is more easily comprehensible to the ordinary reader, and thereby is more

in conformity to the tents of simplicity. More postulation of a third category represented by reflection does not make a procedure complex; and more so, when this postulation makes the Theory more clear and enables the ordinary reader to comprehend it fully.

The champions of Monistic Vedānta consider the Individual Soul as a fraction of the Supreme Soul - the Īśvara. This concept seems at the first sight to favour the Theory of Limitation, because Consciousness, as limited by the mental apparatus is surely a fraction of the supreme Sumum Consciousness, but a deeper analysis shows that the concept is not totally anagonistic to the Theory of Reflection. The Consciousness as reflected in the mental apparatus, also is capable of being regarded as a fragment of supreme Consciousness. Moreover, the concept, that the Jīva is a fragment of Īśvara, itself, is open to serious objection. This postulation makes Īśvara a victim to sufferings as much as the Jīva and the liberated soul a

victim to collective sufferings, in as much as he is required
to experience all accumulated miseries of all Jīvas. This
position takes away all enchantment from the state of libera­
tion, and renders the state of bondage more charming and
attractive than the state of emancipation. To obviate all
these difficulties the Great Bādarāyaṇa has taken pains to
establish the fact that the relation as existing between
the Īśvara and the Jīva is one of part-cum-whole or one of
identity-cum-difference. An ultimate analysis of the entire
position, however, shows that neither the relation of
difference, nor that of identity-cum-difference is capable
of being predicated of the linkage existing between the
Jīva and the Īśvara. When Vacaspati Miśra asserts that the
Jīva is not the fraction or portion of the Īśvara, but is
like a portion of the latter, he, therefore, gives expre­
ssion to a profound truth.

In sharp contrast to the Nyāya System of Philosophy
that the God constitutes the efficient cause of the creation,
the Vedānta system holds that He is both the efficient and
the material cause. This Vedānta view is substantiated by

30. evam avidyopadhānavigame jīve brahmabhāva iti
siddhaṁ jīvo brahmāmsa iva tattāntratayā na tva 'nā
dāsā iti tātparyārthah. - Brahma-sūtra 2.3.43,
Bhamati, page 623, Nirmaya Sagar Press edition,
Bombay 1938.
the linguistic form of the famous aphorism 'Janmādyasya yataḥ'\(^{31}\) employed by the Great Bādarāyaṇa, where the fifth case ending refers to both the efficient and the material Cause\(^{32}\). A number of teachers of the Vedānta system have indicated their agreement with this theory, and have shown that the God is the material as well as the efficient cause of Creation. When God is described as the material Cause, what is intended is that He transforms Himself into a new entity without rejecting the original form. The possible objection that can be raised against this is that the material Cause of the Creation is furnished by Māyā, and not by Brahman or the God. This is capable of being substantiated by Vedic expressions which assert that in the process of creation of

\[ \text{31. Brahma-sūtra 1.1.2.} \]

the universe the matter is represented by Maya. In
controverting this objection it is possible to point out
that while Maya or nescience furnishes the material cause i
in its Parinami phase, the Brahman furnishes the material
cause in its Vivarta Phase and that both Maya and Brahman
conjointly constitute the material cause of creation. This
epitomises the view points of the author of the work entitled
'Padarthatattvanirnaya' and these are shared with minor
modifications by the successors in the field of the Vedanta
system. Prakasananda, the author of Siddhantamuktaval
says that though Maya alone constitutes the material cause
of creation, Brahman is mentioned secondarily as the
material factor, because it represents the substratum of
nescience. The teachers affiliated to Vivarana school

33. māyān tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt māyinantu mahesvaram/
   - Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad 4. 10 .

34. atrā' huppadarthatattvanirnaya kārah . brahma māyā
ce'ty ubhayam upādānam ity ubhayaśrutypapttiḥ .
sattājādyarūpoubhayadharmanugatyupapattisch ca . tatra
brahma vivartamānatayo' pādānam avidyā parinamamāna-
taya. - Siddhāntalesaṁgraha, Chapter I, page 12.

35. brahmajñānaṁ jagajjanma brahmaṇo kāraṇatvataḥ .
adhiṣṭhānatvamātreṇa kāraṇaṁ brahma gīyate //
   - Vedāntasiddhāntamuktavalī, Sloka 38.
maintain that Brahman in the shape of original God and characterised by the adjunct of Māyā constitutes the material cause of creation. In support of this contention they point out that this is the real import of the Vedic expression 'yah sarvajñah sarvavit,' and proceed to affirm that in the aphorism 'janmādyasya yataḥ'—what has been intended is that Brahman represents both the efficient and material cause of the creation. This intention of the great Bādarāyaṇa has been clarified to a great extent by Śaṅkara in his Commentary to the Brahmasūtra, and the Sūtra and the Commentary taken together have been successful in building up the Theory that the Brahman represents very much the material cause of creation.

36. vivaraṇānapratijaśāriṇas tu..............
sarvajñatvādiviṣṭam māyāśavalam īśvaram eva brahmopā


37. Mundaka Upanisad 1.1.9.

38. Brahma sutra 1.1.2.

39. prakṛtis ca upādānakārṇaṁ ca brahmābhypagantavyaṁ

nimittakāraṇaṁ ca; na nimittakāraṇam eva. kasmāt

pratijñādrśtāntānurodhāt. evaṁ hi pratijñādrśtāntau

śrāutau noparudhyete. Brahma- sūtra 1.4.23, Śaṅkara-
It is interesting to note that the champions of both the Doctrines of Appearance and Reflection have referred to Brahman as the material cause of creation. The author of Bhāmatī and other exponents of the Doctrine of Limitation, however, hold that the object of nescience is furnished by Brahman, while its substratum is represented by the Individual or Jīva, and consequently consciousness constituting the content of ignorance is the Grand God or Īśvara, while Consciousness forming the substratum of this ignorance is the Individual or the Jīva. They are of opinion that the content of ignorance can never constitute the material cause of the creation which itself is a product of Ignorance, just as the Mother - O! Pearl can never produce the shining piece of silver. On the other hand, it is the ignorant individual who takes to a flight of imagination and conceives of the shining piece of silver. According to the propounders of the Theory of Limitation the form of creation differs according to difference in the nature of the perceives. The creation as imagined through ignorance by one can never constitute the content of perception of another. Thus the individual, the ignorance and the creation ushered in through ignorance, - all these are characterised by multiplicity. This Individual, his ignorance and the creation superimposed through ignorance, - all these again, they say, rest on the God or the supreme Īśvara. Consequently, it is asserted that the
character of material cause, as predicated of the Isvara is only a superimposed entity^{40}.

The propounders of the Monistic Vedânta consider the God as the agency that controls the experience of the fruits of past deeds by the Individual. They say that dead and dull action independent of God can never constitute the cause of this experience: the real agency in this case is represented by the God^{41}. This theory is in sharp contradiction to that adumbrated by the Mîmâmsâ system of Philosophy, which states that religious merit accrued through performance of action is the only agency responsible for this experience. The aphorisms of the Great Bādarāyana as also the commentaries of Saṅkara thereon expend their energies in establishing this Doctrine of Causality of Isvara^{42}. It is asserted that recognition extended to action or merit alone as the causal factor of fruits of deeds done by an individual is controverted by our own experience. The Sacrifices performed to propitiate the anthropomorphic deities please them and

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^{40} jîvasyaî vai jînãnopahitatatvaî jagadupadãnatvat
pratyabhijnâ ca' tisadâryat. Isvarasya ca saprapãcajî
vâvidyadhísthânatvena kápañtvopacârâd iti.

^{41} tatra tâvat pratiparyate - phalam atah - Isvarâd bhavitum
arhati. kuta? upapatteh. sa hi sarvâdyahaksâh ârstishtih-
tisãmahrâvârâ vinictrân vidadhâd desâkâlavisesâbhijnâtvat karmiñau
karmânurupaî phalam sampâdayatî' ty' upapadyate. - Brahma
-sûtra 3.2.38, Saṅkarabhâṣya, Nîrâya Sagar Press edition,

^{42} See Brahma-sûtra 3.2.41 and Saṅkarabhâṣya thereon.
this favourable attitude leads to genesis of these fruits. In a similar manner performance of acts opposed to Vedic scriptures dissatisfies the Gods, as a result of which the performer gets himself subjected to sufferings and miseries. It is not without reason, therefore, that the Bhagavadgītā sings the glories of the Lord, and implorès upon the man to surrender every possession and action to Him, so that the Lord can come forward to dispel his gloom of nescience in order to enable him to have a glimpse of his expanded ego. All this shows that the philosophers affiliated to the Vedānta system of philosophy have approved of the proposition of the existence of the God, — the omniscient and the omnipotent one, as the Controller and Casual factor of all entities. Though the Vedānta system like the Mīmāṃsā system accepts the Vedas as an eternal and unwritten collection, it puts forward a new proposition and says that in the beginning of each cycle the Vedas emanate and reemanate from the lips of the Great superhuman agency — the God. It is further said that the

43. tathāca devaḥprasadād eva sthāyinaḥ phalotpatter upadatēḥ kṛtam apūrvena. — Brahma-sūtra 3.2.41.
44. na hi rāja sādhukāriṇam anugṛhṇam nigrhaṇam vā pāpakarīnaḥ bhavati dviṣto rakto vā tad vad alaukiko' pī' śvarah. — Ibid.
trustworthiness of the Vedic expressions follow from the fact that they have their origin in the speech-organs of the Īśvara. In one of the aphorisms Badarāyaṇa has made it perfectly clear that Īśvara represents, the casual factor of all scriptures. The followers of Saṅkara are of opinion that a devotee who serves the God after observing all injunctions and prescriptions enunciated in the Vedas and Smṛti literature ultimately acquires the supreme knowledge relating to non-duality and consequently liberation through His grace. As a matter of fact, it is asserted, even the urge to obtain emancipation is not generated in the man without this grace. All this shows that in the Monistic Philosophy of Saṅkara the God or Īśvara has been able to retain a special prestigious position.

45. asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitam etad yad ṛgvedah. - Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.10.
46. īśvarayonitvāt. - Brahma-sūtra 1.1.3.
47. īśvarānugrahād eṣa puṃṣām advaitavāsanaḥ / mahābhāyatatrāṇā dvitrāṇāṁ yadi jāyate // - Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakāhādyā, Chapter I, page 224, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 126, Fasciculus III, June 1908.
A status higher than this is enjoyed by Isvara in the scheme of Qualified Monism, propounded by the eminent Ramanuja, the author of Sribhasya. Ramanuja considers the God or Isvara, consciousness and matter as three real entities and proceeds to say that the individual, who constitutes a portion of the God is controlled and regulated by Him, - the complete entity - the Controller of all agencies. 49 The individual or the jīva is completely dependent on Divine Volition for all changes and transformations, but at the same time it is as much an eternal entity and a profound verity as the unchangable Brahman. While Brahman as conceived of by Śaṅkara partakes of the nature of knowledge, this knowledge constitutes one of the chief qualities of Brahman in the scheme of Ramanuja. The God, Ramanuja says, is endlessly benign: he is omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent, and at the same time full of compassion for all beings. 50 This God resides in all


animate and inanimate beings and regulates the actions of all entities being present in the inner self of each. As a matter of fact, He is the foremost of all seers and listeners, thinkers and knowers: He sees, himself remaining unseen, - listens, himself remaining unheard, - thinks, himself remaining uncomprehended and knows being present in the intellect of every being, himself remaining untraced and unknown to the ordinary untrained mind. The adherents of the Philosophy of Qualified Monism asserts that at the time of dissolution of the universe the distinctive factors of name or species do not reside in the God: all matter remains unmanifested and all knowledge contracted in a nebulous state. Brahman then is indeed not absolutely one, for it contains within itself both spirit and matter in a germinal state. These thinkers affirm that at the time of creation of the universe there is gross manifestation of consciousness and matter, and knowledge reveals itself in its full glory. Thus, the Ṣiva in the aspect of cause

51. See Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.7.37.

52. 'Brahman then is indeed not absolutely one, for it contains within itself matter and souls in a germinal condition'. - Sacred Books of East Series, Vol.XXXIV, Part I, Introduction, page XXIX, Oxford edition, 1890.
becomes qualified by subtle spirit and matter, while in the aspect of effect, He remains qualified by gross spirit and matter, and consequently, is regarded as the Great Qualified, characterised by qualifications. All these considerations prompt the school of Qualified Monism to declare that the relation of Identity-Cum-Difference exists between the God and the Individual, - the Īśvara and the Jīva. The Īśvara is one and at the same time many: His forms and powers are endless and diverse, and are incapable of remaining confined within the narrow limitations imposed by ordinary intellect and imagination. The profoundly surprising experience which Akrūra had on his union with Lord Kṛṣṇa, - the experience that this union with the supreme and surprising is really a meeting with the wonderful world, as recorded in the Viṣṇupurāṇa, thus, is backed by deep and significant Philosophical truth 53.

The followers of Rāmānuja solemnly affirm that the God is complete and perfect: He creates the universe comprised of matter and spirit in a sportive mood without any ulterior motive of gaining anything. Though the God

53. jagad etanmaḥścaryām rūpaḥ yasya mahatmanah /
tenaḥ scaryavarena'ham bhavatā kṛṣṇa saṅgataḥ //
- Viṣṇupurāṇa 5.19.7.
is full of compassion to all beings and is prone to take an impartial attitude, difference in status occurs between all created beings: and this difference owes its genesis to difference in deeds done by these beings. In the view of these theoreticians the God is the Absolute Reality: He is absolutely independent and extremely powerful. All Individuals are under His control: they obtain emancipation through knowledge that dawns through Grace of God showered as a result of devotion. And when this state of liberation is obtained the Jīva is delighted to savour bliss that constitutes the part and parcel of Īśvara. Theory of God, thus, is inseparably associated with the philosophical doctrines of the Monistic Vaishnava School.

It will not be out of place to mention here the position of the God in that Monistic Philosophy, which considers Śiva as the Absolute Reality. In his Śrīkaṇṭḥabhāṣya, the noted philosopher Śrīkaṇṭṭhācārya mentions Śiva as the greatest Reality54 and asserts that through

54. yat sarvajñatvāvīśiṣṭam āstābhidhānādhikaraṇaṁ śiva-
tattvam tad eva jagatkarana brahme ty' ucyate. —
the Grace of this supreme God the devotee attains that state, which is regarded as the be all and end all of human existence. The Śivadvaitavāda of Śrīkanṭhācārya is in essence qualified monism and the similarity of this theory with Qualified Monistic Theory of Rāmānuja is striking, - the main difference between the two being while Śrīkanṭha's Theory regards Śiva as the supreme Reality, the God of all Gods, - the Para Brahma, Rāmānuja's Theory mentions Viṣṇu as the Great God, the Absolute Reality, - the Para Brahma. Śrīkanṭha thinks that the Great Śiva reveals himself to the devotee who surrenders all his possessions and passions, actions and attitudes to the service of Śiva like the father to the son - the employer to the employee, the teacher to the taught. Rāmānuja, however, feels that the supreme deity Viṣṇu reveals himself to the devotee who places all his actions and emotions, sacrifices and gifts at the altar of the Lord like the affectionate friend to his friend and the affectionate lover to his darling.

55. Śivasya parabrahmaṁaḥ prasādatisayenā' syā' dhikārintaḥ pradhvastapaśāpaṭala pratyaksibhūtaniratisayajñānānanandasvarūpā kaivalyālakṣmīṁ prajojanam ca bhavati. - Brahma-sūtra 1.1.1, Śrībhāṣya, pages 12 - 15, ibid.
In his magnum opus Sarvadarśanasamgraha Madhvacārya makes mention of four sects of Philosophers who regard Śiva as the only Reality and describe the individual as bearing close similarity to the animal in view of his deficiency in point of knowledge. Of these four the first is the Śaṇḍupata, the second the Śaiva, the third the Partyabhijñāvādin and the fourth the Rasesvaravādin. The Śaṇḍupata is of opinion that the individual transcends above the cycle of miseries through the grace of the Absolute Reality — the great Śaṇḍupatī, which dawns when he performs right actions and follows the injunctions of the Śastra. This Philosophy asserts that the great function or power, technically known as Parāsakti always accompanies the Reality and Śiva carves out the creation with the help of this power. Like the Nyāya System it considers the God as the efficient cause of the creation and says that the omnipotent Lord unfolds the creation at his own sweet will without giving any consideration whatsoever to the actions performed by the individuals. The very fact that sometimes actions bear fruit and

56. kṛyasaktir eva' pi trividho' pacaryate. manojavitvaṁ kamarūpitaṁ vikaraṇapadharmitvaṁ ce' te. . . . karmadinirapekṣasya svecchayai' va' nantasalakṣaṇa — vilakṣaṇasvarūpasvarūpādhiṣṭhā — tṛtvāṁ kamarūpitaṁ

— Sarvadarśanasamgraha, Chapter 6, page 73, Ānanda Āśram Sanskrit Series, no. 51, Poona 1966.
sometimes prove themselves abortive goes to show that the action has no utility whatsoever so far as the attainment of the goal of human existence is concerned. This does not, however, mean that virtue or vice residing in the individual is fruitless. As a matter of fact, virtue and vice follow inasmuch as from Divine volition, it is the plain will of the God that engages one in a righteous deed and the other in a sinful one: these, in their turn again, grant pleasure or pain to the individual.\footnote{Iśvarecchā' nugrhitasya karmaṇaḥ saphalatvopapatteḥ. tadanamugrhitasya yayātiprabhṛtikarmavād kadacin nisphalatvasambhavāc ca. - Ibid, page 76.} With these arguments the Pasupata establishes the absolute independence of the God who represents the efficient cause of the creation and firmly affirms that the God is omniscient and omnipotent.

The Saiva Philosophy, which is posterior to the Pasupata one says that the knowledge of the highest God or Śiva, individual or the animal, technically known as Paśu and bondage or action, technically known as Paśy leads to liberation. This is rendered possible by the grace of Śiva, and consequently the Absolute Reality represented by Śiva is completely independent of all agencies, – all bonded and liberated individuals remaining subservient to him.

\footnote{Iśvarecchā' nugrhitasya karmaṇaḥ saphalatvopapatteḥ. tadanamugrhitasya yayātiprabhṛtikarmavād kadacin nisphalatvasambhavāc ca. - Ibid, page 76.}
attainment of knowledge par excellence the liberated individual attains the state of Śiva and experiences his identity with the Absolute, but such an individual is not completely independent and omnipotent. This Philosophy is of opinion that though the supreme God carves out the creation without taking into consideration the actions of the individuals, still He grants pleasure or pain, gain or loss, victory or defeat according to virtue or vice acquired by the individual through performance of righteous or sinful acts. The system, thus, gives the actions performed by individuals their dues, but at the same time takes care to see that the complete independence of the supreme God, the Paramājīva is not endangered. Like the Pasūpana the Śaiva also asserts that the Absolute Reality represented by Paramājīva is completely independent and omnipotent and that it controls the animate and the inanimate in the world of existence.

In sharp contrast to these two sects, the sect commonly known as the Pratyabhijñā sect propounds a Philosophy

58. ājnāmy jantrānīśo' yam ātmanah sukhadhukkhayoh / 
īśvaraprerito gacchet svargam vā svabhram eva vā // 
itī yāyena prānikṛtakarmāpeksayā parameśvarasya kartā- 
vopapatteh . - Ibid, Chapter 7, page 78.

59. ihā'pi prasiddhapūrānasiddhāgamānūmanādiḥātaparipūrṇa- 
saktike paramesvare sati svātmāny abhimukhībhūte tac 
chakṣupratisandhānena jhāṇam udeti nūnaṁ sa eva' śvaro' 
ham iti. tām etām pratyabhijñām upapādayāmi . 
- Ibid, Chapter 8, page 88.
of Qualified Monism and asserts that the entire creation consisting of the animate and the inanimate constitutes the physical frame of the supreme Mahēśvara, whose power or function is not different from the great Śiva. As this Theory regards the great Śiva, endowed with his function as the supreme Reality, it is technically known as Qualified Monism relating to Śiva. The Theory of Pratyabhijñā finds a beautiful expression in the noted work Ṣāṃvardana and Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya of Kaśñarāja, and states that Mahēśvara carves out the entire creation at his sweet will without depending in any way on the actions of individuals. The proposition that the God is required to take the help of actions of individuals endangers complete independence of the God and as such is unacceptable. According to the Pratyabhijñā Theory the supreme Mahēśvara manifests or seemingly reflects in the soul the existent entities, and consequently this creation comprised of the animate and the inanimate is not different from the God endowed with knowledge and action. It further states that just as in the one and the same tree diverse branches retain distinction among themselves, similarly the reflected components of the knower, the known etc. display difference among themselves even though they reside in the same God. The
Theory the omnipotent Maheśvara endowed with knowledge and action reveals the entire creation comprising of the animate and the inanimate through his profound power of knowledge, technically known as 'Jñānaśakti', and creates the universe at his sweet will through the supreme power of action, technically called 'Kriyaśakti' in the language of the Saiva Texts. The will of God, which manifests itself in the form of 'I shall be many', as a matter of fact, forms the material cause of the creation, and this will carves out the universe without depending whatsoever on other tangible things. The capacity to create something out of nothing is seen even in the Yogin who is in a position to create a jar without taking the help of other external agencies like the earth and the weel: when this is possible for a trained human being, then it can be easily expected of the supreme Maheśvara, who is omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent, and endowed with tremendous powers.

60. tatra jñānam svatahsiddham kṛyākayāśritā
dsati /
parair śph upalaksyeta tayā'nyajñānam ucyate //
-Iśvarapratyabhijñā, 1.1.5, Kashmira Series of Texts and Studies, no. XXII, Nirmaya Sagar Press edition, Bombay, 1918.
A close analysis of the fundamental doctrines of the Pratyabhijña Philosophy reveals that at least on some basic factors it meets on a common platform with the Monistic Philosophy of Śaṅkara. Though the Pratyabhijña system supports the Thesis of Qualified Monism while the Śaṅkara Doctrine establishes the Thesis of Unqualified Absolute Monism, the Pratyabhijña system regards the Grand Mahēśvara as the only real entity, others having appearance only just as the Śaṅkara Doctrine considers the Brahman as the Absolute Reality and emphasises that the entire creation exists only in appearance having no substance of its own. The champions of Unqualified field Monism are of opinion that nescience forms the Parināmī material cause of the creation, whose Vivarta material cause is furnished by the great Brahman: the adumbrators of the Pratyabhijña Philosophy similarly indicate that the will of the supreme Mahēśvara constitutes the Parināmi material cause while the Vivarta material cause is furnished by Mahēśvara himself. This deduction becomes possible when one takes note of the Pratyabhijña Thesis that the power is not different from the agency that is endowed with the power and that the power and the powerful are identical in essence. In explaining the concept of 'Pratyabhijña' this Philosophy says that this is
represented by the realisation that the devotee is identi-
cal with and not different from the supreme God Siva. The
devotee through the process of verbal testimony first
obtains the knowledge that he is identical with the God
and then proceeds to comprehend the Greatness of the
supreme Deity along with his powers and functions. When
this comprehension is complete the realisation that he is
identical with the God and consequently as powerful as He
is dawn in him as a result of which he experiences a taste
of liberation. All this shows that like the scheme of the
Vaiṣṇavas, the system enunciated by the Saivas also gives
the God its due share and recognises Him as a completely
independent entity creating the universe at his sweet will
and regulating the course of events therein.