CHAPTER 3

SUBJECT AND PREDICATE IN GRAMMAR: JESPERSON'S THEORY
In this Chapter, we shall discuss the distinction of subject and predicate as held in grammar. The distinction of subject and predicate plays an important role in the grammatical discussion. We are here mainly concerned with the view of Otto Jesperson as found in his 'The Philosophy of Grammar.'

Jespersen's approach to the problem is not direct. At first, he considers the distinction between certain grammatical elements. Then he proceeds to find out the underlying reasons behind those alleged grammatical distinctions and thereby arrives at the notion of subject and predicate. He, further, distinguishes between the psychological subject and the grammatical subject of a sentence and considers various views, propounded by different philosophers, which we shall come to discuss lately.

Jespersen first proceeds to consider the distinction between substantives and adjectives. He states that to designate the same individual we sometime use the words which contain two elements that stand in the same relation to each other viz. 'little man', 'old doctor'. Here the words 'little', 'old' etc. are called adjectives and 'man', 'doctor' etc. are

called substantives. For him, it is sometime very difficult to determine whether a word belongs to one or the other class.

In some languages like Finish, there are hardly any criterions in flexion that distinguish substantives from adjectives. In the older languages like Greek, Latin etc., the chief formal difference between the two classes has reference to gender. While every substantive is of one definite gender, the adjective varies. In English language, we find, substantives have s-endings, while adjectives have not. Thus in 'the old boy's', we see that 'old' is an adjective from its having no ending and that 'boys' is a substantive as it possesses s-ending. For example, 'the heathens' is a substantive, while 'the heathen' is an adjective.

From the above discussion, it is clear that every language distinguishes between substantives and adjectives, though the formal distinction between the two is not marked with equal vividness in all languages. The words denoting such ideas as stone, tree, women, etc. are everywhere substantives and words like 'big', 'old', 'bright' etc. are everywhere adjectives. So Jesperson assumes that the distinction between the two classes of words can not be purely accidental. There must be some logical or psychological foundation for this distinction.

It is often said that substantives denote substances, i.e. persons and things, and adjectives denote qualities of the things. But, according to Jesperson, this definition is
not completely satisfactory. The names of many substances are derived from some one or other quality. So, two ideas can not always be separated. For instances, 'the blacks', 'eatable', 'a plain' etc. are treated as substantives in the language. There are many other substantives which were at first the names of quality, singled out among others by the speaker. So, for him, the distinction between substances and qualities can not have any great value in language. Moreover, from a philosophical point of view it may be said that we know substances only through their qualities and essence of any substances is the sum of all those qualities. Besides, Jesperson points out, the old definition given above can not solve the problem of so called abstracts viz., 'wisdom', 'kindness' etc., for though these words are treated as substantives in all languages, they denote the same qualities as the adjectives 'wise' and 'kind' and there is nothing substantival about them.

According to Jesperson, it can be stated generally that substantives are more special than adjectives i.e. their applicability is confined to fewer objects, whereas adjectives have greater applicability. The extension of a substantive is less, but its intention is greater than that of an adjective. The adjective indicates one quality, but each substantive suggests many distinguishing features, by which the corresponding person or thing is recognized. He states that all these features are not indicated in the name itself. Only one or two of them are selected and the others are understood. A botanist can easily recognize a blue bell even at a season when it has no blue flowers.
Jesperton maintains that the difference between the two classes can be accounted for clearly if we consider the examples of the same word as belonging to both classes. There are many substantivized adjectives, but their meanings are more special than the meanings of the corresponding adjectives, e.g. 'the blacks', 'sweets' etc. On the contrary, when a substantive is turned into an adjective its meaning becomes less special. The words like 'rose', 'mauve' etc. become more general when they stand as colour indicating adjectives than when they appear as substantives. They can be applied to a various number of things, as they connote only one of the distinguishing marks which make up the thing they originally stand for.

Jesperton makes us notice the fact that the most special of substantives, i.e. proper names can not be turned into adjectives without really losing their character of proper name and becoming more general. We find this point in such a combination as 'the Gladstone ministry', which means the ministry headed by Gladstone and stands in the same relation to the real proper name 'Gladstone' as English to England.

Jesperton next turns to the cases in which an adjectival and a substantival element of the same group can naturally exchange places. He compares the two expressions 'a poor Russian' and 'a Russian pauper', and holds that the substantive 'Russian' is more special than the adjective in that it implies the idea of man or woman. On the other hand, the substantive 'pauper' is more special than the adjective 'poor'. since 'poor'
may be applied to many things beside human beings. The substantive 'pauper' is even more specialized than 'a poor person', since it definitely implies the one who receives public charity.

Thus it is evident that where we are able to compare directly two words of closely similar signification, the rule that the words belonging to class of substantives obtain greater complexity and specialization than the words belonging to the class of adjectives is easily proved. Now the question is whether this rule has a general application or not. According to Jesperson in many cases we can apply this criterion by counting the number of individuals which each word may be applied to. For example, 'a new book' - in this case we can find that there are more new things than books in existence. Some critics may argue that when we say 'rich widow', it is very doubtful whether there are more rich persons in existence than widows. They seem to overlook the fact that 'rich' can be said of many other things beside persons. Yet Jesperson holds that the numerical test can not be always applied. When we speak of grey stone, it is very difficult to enumerate which of the words 'grey' and 'stone' is applicable to the greater number of objects. But applicability to greater or lesser number is only one side of the criterion. Jesperson emphasises on the greater complexity of qualities denoted by substantives as against the singling out of one quality in the case of an adjective.

Jesperson likes to indicate that in our language there are certain substantives which have a very general signification,
such as, 'things', 'body', 'being'. But their general signification is different from that of an adjective. Generally, they are used as comprehensive terms for a number of substantive ideas. We often say 'all these things', instead of listing book, papers etc. He says that this use is often found in philosophic and abstract scientific thinking. On the other hand, he points out, there are certain highly specialized adjectives, viz., 'a pink-eyed cat', 'a ten-roomed house'. There are certainly more cats than pink-eyed beings. But, for Jesperson, here we must mind that the real adjectival parts of such combinations are 'pink' and 'ten' respectively.

According to Jesperson, it can be understood from the above account that the degrees of comparison are found only with adjectives, since such comparisons are necessarily concerned with one quality at a time and it is the adjective which designates one single quality. In case of a very specialized idea, there will be no use for degrees of comparison. Substantives as specifying such specialized idea and as involving the complexity of qualities are of no importance as regards the degree of comparison.

Finally, it can be said that we can not make the complexities of qualities or specialisation of signification a criterion, by which we can decide whether a word is a substantive or an adjective. The formal criterion varies from language to language. So far Jesperson has attempted to justify the ground of classification and to find out whether there is
any logical or psychological foundation for the distinction of substantives and adjectives. He maintains that substantives are broadly distinguished as having a more special signification, and adjectives as having a more general signification, because the former indicates the possession of a complexity of qualities and the latter the possession of one single quality.

Next Jesperson comes to consider another grammatical distinction, i.e. the distinction between a junction and a nexus. A junction consists of two parts: one is the primary word and other is the adjunct attached in a special way to the primary. He first tends to enquire into the function of adjuncts. There are various classes of adjuncts. The most important of them are called restrictive or qualifying adjuncts. Their function is to restrict the primary word, in other words to specialise or to define it. Thus, for example 'poor' in 'a poor widow' restricts the applicability of the word 'widow' to one particular sub-class of the general class of widows. In other words, it specialises or defines the word 'widow' by excluding rich widows from its range.

Here it may be reminded that we took the same example formerly to support the thesis that substantives are more special than adjectives. So it seems to be contradictory. But Jesperson says that on further observation we will find that it is more natural that a less special term may be used to specialize what is already to some extent special. To explain this point he takes the help of a metaphor. He states that the method of specialisation is same as that of reaching the roof
of a building by means of ladders. We first take the tallest ladder and tie the second tallest to the top of it and if it is not enough to reach, we tie on the next length. In the same manner, if 'widow' is not special enough we add 'poor' which is less special and even if it is not special enough we add 'very' which is more general than 'poor'. Though proper names are highly specialized, we still try to specialize them more by adjuncts. When we speak of Young Burns, 'young' is used either to mean a different person from Old Burns, or to state the fact that the person whom we are speaking of is still young.

There are some restrictive adjuncts of a prenominal character, such as 'this', 'that' in 'this rose', 'that boy'. They differ from other adjuncts as they are not descriptive. They simply specify the primary words. The same is true of definite article 'the'. 'The' is most general of adjuncts yet specializes more than most of other adjuncts. In 'the rose', 'rose' is restricted to that one definite rose which is at this very moment present in the speaker's thought as well as in hearer's, because everything in the situation points towards that particular rose.

Jesperson points out that this is not the only function of the definite article. In cases like 'the king of England', 'the eldest boy', the adjuncts are by themselves quite sufficient to individualize and the article may be said so far to be logically redundant. For him, we may rather call this the article of supplementary determination. The relation between
'the king' and 'the English King' is same as that between 'he', standing alone as sufficient to denote the person pointed out by the situation as in 'he can afford it', and the same pronoun as determined by an adjunct relative clause, viz., 'he that is rich can afford it'.

An adjunct which consists of a genitive or possessive pronoun is restrictive, though not always to the same extent as the definite article. 'My father', 'John's head', are as definite as possible since a man can have atmost one father and one head. But the situation is different with 'my brother' and 'John's hat' because I may have several brothers and John may have more than one hat. But in most situations these expressions are perfectly definite. For instance, 'My brother arrived monday' -- here the situation and the context will show which of my brothers is meant. But, according to Jesperson, when these expressions are used in the predicative, they lack the definiteness. when we say 'this is my brother' or 'that is not John's hat', these words may mean one of my brothers and one of John's hat.

According to Jesperson there are another class of adjuncts, that are non-restrictive, viz. 'my dear little Ann'. Here the adjuncts does not specify which among several Ann's is being talked about. As these sort of adjuncts are used only to characterize the primary, Jesperson calls them ornamental. He maintains that their use is generally of an emotional character, while restrictive adjuncts are purely intellectual. They are very often added to proper names, for instance, 'Beautiful Evelynhope', 'Rare Ben Jonson' etc.
Jesperson urges that it may sometimes be very difficult to determine whether an adjunct is of one or the other kind. 'His first important poem' generally means the first among his important poems, but it may as well mean the first poem he ever wrote and add the information that it was important.

Jesperson now turns to discuss about nexus. He suggests that if we compare the two expressions 'a barking dog' and 'the dog barks', we find a fundamental difference between the two. Though 'barks' and 'barking' may be called the different forms of the same words we find that the latter combination represents a complete sentence, while the former lacks this completeness. The former, as we have seen earlier, is called junction and the latter nexus. The relation between 'the dog barks' and 'a barking dog' is same as that between 'a red rose' and 'the rose is red'. In 'the dog barks' and 'the rose is red' we get complete sentences where 'the dog' and 'the rose' are treated as subjects and 'barks' and 'is red' are treated as predicates. Thus nexus is a combination, elements of which are distinguished into the subject and the predicate, whereas in a junction elements can not be distinguished in this way.

Jesperson presents us views of some philosophers regarding the respective nature of a junction and a nexus. According to Paul, an adjunct is a weakened predicate. Sheffield says that an adjunct involves a latent copula. This means that 'a red rose' is equivalent to 'a rose which is red' and, therefore, 'red' is always a kind of predicative. Jesperson
comments that it should not be overlooked that the relative pronoun is here smuggled into the combination. But the function of the relative pronoun is precisely that of making the whole thing into an adjunct. Paul says that junction has developed from a predicate and, therefore, ultimately from a sentence. But Sweet does not say anything about the relative priority of the two. He holds that 'assumption', his name for junction, is a latent predication and that predication is a kind of strengthened assumption. Wundt distinguishes the two as the open and the closed combination.

It may be said that one is unfinished and makes one expect a continuation, while the other is rounded off so as to form a connected whole. The former is a lifeless combination and the other has life in it. It is generally held that the latter combination has got life, since there is always the presence of a finite verb in it. But there are combinations without any finite verb, which may be ranked with the combination like 'the rose is red' or 'the dog barks'. The relation between the last two words in 'He painted the door red' is evidently parallel to that in 'the door is red'. Moreover, the same relation between a primary and a secondary word that is found in such complete sentences like 'the rose is red' or 'the dog barks' is also found in many other combinations which are not so complete in themselves to stand as a real sentence viz. 'that the rose is red', 'when the dog barks'. Thus Jespersen points out that we should keep in mind that on the one hand the presence of a finite verb is not required in a nexus and that on the other hand, a nexus may, but does not always form a complete sentence.
In a junction a secondary element is joined to a primary word as a distinguishing mark, e.g. a rose is characterized by being mentioned as 'a red rose'. In a junction, adjunct and primary together form one denomination, a composite name, for which we may use a single name instead. As a matter of fact, instead of 'a new born dog' we usually like to say 'puppy', instead of 'silly person' we say 'fool'. Therefore, a junction is a unit or single idea expressed more or less accidentally by means of two elements.

On the contrary, a nexus always contains two ideas which must remain separate. The secondary term adds something new to what has already been named. For Jesperson, whereas the junction is more stiff, the nexus is more pliable. He compares a junction with a picture and a nexus with a process or a drama. Jesperson holds that the distinction between a composite name for one idea and the connection between the two concepts, i.e. between a junction and a nexus can be easily seen by means of comparing two such sentences as 'the blue dress is the oldest' and 'the oldest dress is blue'. In the first sentence the fresh information given about the dress is that it is the oldest and in the second sentence, the fresh information is that it is blue. There are instances of nexus in which we have either a primary alone or a secondary alone. But Jesperson maintains that by accurate analysis it can be shown that the usual two members are everywhere present to the mind and that it is only in the linguistic expression one or the other may be present.

30. Ibid. p. 141-42.
After considering the distinction between substantives and adjectives and that between a junction and a nexus, Jesperson proceeds to consider the relation of subject and predicate in grammar. The discussion of the two members of a nexus has to some extent anticipated the question of the relation of subject and predicate, for in those nexuses which constitute the complete sentences the primary word is identical with the subject and the adnex with the predicate.

Jesperson tries to consider various definitions of subject and predicate given by different writers. According to some, the subject is relatively familiar element to which the predicate is attached as something new. The speaker throws into the subject all that he knows the receiver is already willing to grant him and to this he adds in the predicate what constitutes the new information, which is to be conveyed by the sentence. But this may not be true of all sentences. For example, when in answer to the question 'who said it?' we say 'Peter said it', 'Peter' is the new element but it is the subject. So we find that the new information is not always contained in the predicate. For Jesperson, it is inherent in the connection of two elements, i.e. in the nexus.

Some other says that the predicate specifies or determines what was formerly indefinite and indeterminate, that is, the subject is a determinandum which only by means of the predicate becomes a determinatum. But this description suits more to an adjunct as 'blushing' in 'the blushing girl' than to 'blushes' in 'the girl blushes'.

Another definition which is most popular is that the subject is what is talked about, the predicate is what is said about the subject. Jesperson remarks that this is true of many sentences, but not of all. For instance, in such a sentence viz. 'John promises Mary a gold ring', there are four things of which something is said, therefore, all of them may be counted as subjects, namely 1) John, 2) a promise, 3) Mary and 4) a ring. This definition according to which the subject is identified with the subject matter of the topic is unsatisfactory and leads to a point which is very far from the grammarian's conception of subject and predicate.

According to Stout, the predicate of a sentence is the determination of what was previously indeterminate. The subject is that product of previous thinking which forms the immediate basis and the starting point of further development. The further development is the predicate. Sentences are in the process of thinking parallel to the steps in the process of walking. The foot on which the weight of the body rests corresponds to the subject. The foot which is moved forward corresponds to the predicate. According to him, all answers to questions are as such predicates. If the statement 'John is a good swimmer' is an answer to the question 'what can John do well ?', 'swimmer' is the predicate. If it be an answer to the question, 'who is a good swimmer ?' then 'John' is the predicate. Again, if the same sentence is an answer to the question 'Is John a good swimmer ?', then 'is' is the predicate. So the subject is the formulation of the question, the predication is the answer.
Jesperson urges that if this is the logical consequence of the popular definition of 'subject' then grammarians have nothing to do with it, for it does not assist them in the least. But this is unfortunate that the grammarians have to use the word 'subject' which in ordinary language means, among other things, also topic or subject matter.

Jesperson distinguishes between the psychological and the logical subject on the one hand and the grammatical subject on the other. According to him, the word 'subject' is very ambiguous and this ambiguity is also responsible for much of what logicians and linguists have written on the psychological and the logical subject and predicate. These terms have been used variantly by different writers. Jesperson offers a brief survey of those views as follows:

The subject and the predicate has been distinguished sometimes by sequence in time. According to Babelentz the hearer first apprehends a word A and asks 'what about this A?'. Then he receives the next word or idea B and adding these two together asks, 'what about this (A+B)?'. Then he gets the next word C, and so on. Each successive word is the predicate of the subject contained in what is already heard. The speaker knows both before hand. He evidently places first what makes him think, i.e. his psychological subject and next what he thinks about it, i.e. his psychological predicate. After that both together may as well be the subject of further thinking. But, Jesperson points out, the word-order in actual language is not exclusively determined by psychological reasons, rather it is
often conventional and determined by the idiomatic rules peculiar to the language in question. It is independent of the will of the individual speaker.

According to some the predicate is marked by novelty and importance. Paul seems to agree with Gabelentz in defining the psychological subject as the idea or group of ideas which is first present in the mind of the speaker and the psychological predicate as that what is then joined to it. But he differs from Gabelentz when he adds that even if the subject idea is first present in the mind of the speaker, it is sometimes placed later. Because in the moment of speaking, the predicate idea presses on utterance as the new and more important one. Paul says that the psychological predicate is the most important element. It is the aim of the sentence to communicate and, therefore, it carries the strongest tone. According to Jesperson, the terms 'subject' and 'predicate' may be avoided in this sense. We may simply say that what is new to the hearer in any case of communication may be found in any part of a sentence according to the circumstances.

The distinction between the subject and the predicate is sometimes based on stress accent. Hoffding says that the logical predicate is often the grammatical subject or an adjective belonging to it. In the sentence, 'you are the man', 'you' is the predicate. It is indicated by stress accent. In sentences of descriptive contents nearly every word may stand as a logical predicate, for as containing new information it may receive stress. In this sense the logical predicate is almost identical
with the psychological predicate of Paul. But Jesperson points out that Hoffding in his text book of formal logic has continually used the terms 'subject' and 'predicate' not in their logical, but in their grammatical signification without any regard to stress.

Some writers have tried to avoid the term 'subject' altogether. Schuehardt substitutes the word 'agens'. But this is not appropriate in 'he suffers', 'he broke his leg' etc. According to Jesperson, it is much better to retain the traditional terms and restrict their use exclusively in the sense of the grammatical subject and predicate, by avoiding the adjuncts 'logical' and 'psychological'.

Now Jesperson turns up to the notion of the grammatical subject and predicate. According to him, in every sentence there are some elements which are comparatively fluid and others which are more firmly fixed. The former elements are called secondary words and the latter primary words. He says that the subject of a sentence is always a primary, though not necessarily the only primary in the sentence. The subject is comparatively definite and special, the predicate is less definite and so applicable to a greater number of things. The doubt may arise regarding which word is the subject in a sentence where the verb 'be' is followed by a predicative. Jesperson points out that we shall keep here in mind the difference between a predicate and a predicative. In the sentence 'the man is a painter', 'is a painter' is the predicate but the predicative is a 'a painter'. He maintains that we can overcome this difficulty if we acknowledge the specialized nature of a subject as opposed to a predicate.
According to Jesperson, adjectives are often found as predicatives, for they are less special than substantives and applicable to a greater number of things. Thus in 'my father is old', 'the dress is blue', 'my father' and 'the dress' are the subjects and the two adjectives are the predicatives. Where two substantives are connected by means of 'is', the one of the substantives is perfectly definite and the other is not so definite. So, for Jesperson, the former is the subject. This is the case with a proper name, viz. 'Tom is a genius'. Thus also if one substantive is made definite by the definite article or a possessive pronoun, it is the subject e.g. 'the thief was a coward', 'my father is a professor'.

Jespersion states that the word-order is not always decisive, though in many languages there is a strong tendency to place the subject first. We find exceptions when adjectives are placed first, though used as predicatives.

He further maintains that if the two substantives connected by 'is' are equally indefinite, the subject is determined by the extension of two substantives. The substantive which has lesser extension appears as the subject. For example, in 'a cat is a mammal', 'a cat' is the subject as it has lesser extension than 'a mammal'. Again in 'a mammal is an animal', 'a mammal' is obviously the subject, as it is more special than 'an animal'. Jesperson points out that though the subject and the predicative seem to be equally indefinite, nevertheless there is a difference. Because the subject is taken in the generic sense, while the predicative in an individual
sense. Thus the sentence 'a thief is coward' means any thief is coward, i.e. some of the coward in existence, not a particular thief is coward.

According to Jesperson, it is also worth noticing that how the value of the indefinite article changes. In the sentence 'a cat is a mammal', 'a mammal' refers to one individual of that species. But in 'a mammal is an animal', the same word denotes all of that species. So the predicatives are often used either without any article or with the indefinite article, though the rule varies in different languages. In English, one says 'John is a tailor' and 'John is a liar', whereas in German and Danish, the indefinite article is not used in the former one where the predicative designates a profession. In English, predicative is used without an article if its sense is limited e.g. 'Mr. X is Bishop of Durham'. But it requires an article where its sense is not limited, e.g. 'he is a bishop'. Jesperson holds that by comparing the two sentences 'my brother was the captain of the ship' and 'the captain of the ship was my brother', we find that 'my brother' is more definite in the first sentence where it appears as the subject than in the second where it appears as the predicative.

Jesperson urges that it is sometime difficult to determine which is the subject and which is the predicative in the sentences in which it is possible to transpose the two members, e.g. 'Miss castlewood was the prettiest girl at the ball', 'the prettiest girl at the ball was Miss castlewood'. Here the both term is equally special. Yet in such cases, according to
Jesperson, the proper name is more special and, therefore, should be taken as the subject.

Jesperson states that if the two terms connected by 'is' are perfectly identical, they may change places as the subject and the predicative, e.g. 'Beauty is truth'. But perfect identity is rare. Moreover, he says that the copula 'is' does not imply identity, but subsumption in the sense of the old Aristotelian logic. In some idiomatic uses the word 'is' implies identity, e.g. 'seeing is believing'. But the identity is more apparent than real. The two terms are not invertable. The logical purport of the sentence is merely that seeing immediately leads to belief.

As it has been aforesaid that the subject of a sentence is more special and definite than the predicative, according to Jesperson a word with the indefinite article is not used as a subject except when this is meant as the generic article designating a whole species. In beginning, a story we generally say 'Once upon a time there was a tailor' instead of 'a tailor once lived in a small house'. The weak 'there' is introduced in the place of the subject and reduce it to an inferior position as it is indefinite. The weak 'there', though spelt in the same way, is different from local 'there', since the latter is definite. It is usually followed by an indefinite subject, viz. 'there was a time when .....', 'there came a begger' etc. The weak 'there' is also used as the subject in a combination like 'Let there be light'. The indefiniteness is not formally indicated. Thus also 'those' is notionally indefinite in
'there are those who believe it' and different from the definite 'those' in 'those who believe it are very stupid'.

The sentence containing 'there is' or 'there are' in which existence of something is asserted or denied may be called existential sentences. They, Jesperson says, present some striking peculiarities in many languages. Whether or not a word like 'there' is used to introduce them, the verb precedes the subject and grammatically it is hardly treated as a real subject.

Thus from the above discussion we have seen that Jesperson has first drawn a distinction between substantives and adjectives. According to him, in general, substantives have a more special signification while adjectives have more general signification. The adjective indicates one quality, but each substantive suggests many distinguishing features which apply to a certain person or thing. So a substantive possesses a lesser extension but greater intention than an adjective. Next he tries to consider another grammatical distinction i.e. between a junction and a nexus. In a junction an adjunct is attached to a primary word. Some adjuncts may be of restrictive nature which restrict the primary or specialize or define it, e.g. in 'poor widow', 'poor' is a restrictive adjunct as it specializes the word 'widow'. The non-restrictive adjuncts do not restrict the applicability of primary words. They only characterize the primary words, viz., 'my dear little Ann'. The nexus is a combination in which two separate ideas are linked, viz. 'The rose is red', 'the dog barks'.
The secondary term adds something new to what has already been named. But in a junction a single idea is expressed by means of two elements. Then Jesperson arrives at the relation between the subject and the predicate through the discussion of the relation between the two members of a nexus. According to him, in those nexuses which represent the complete sentences, the primary word is identical with the subject and the adnex with the predicate. Next he considers various definitions given by different writers. He has distinguished between the logical and the psychological subject on the one hand and the grammatical subject on the other. After considering the different views concerning the logical and the psychological subject and predicate, he says that these two terms should better be used in the grammatical sense. Finally, he defines the grammatical subject as that which is comparatively definite and special and the predicate as that which is less definite and has greater extension. Jesperson, moreover, discriminates between the predicate and the predicative. For him, in the sentence 'The rose is red', 'is red' is the predicate, but 'red' is the predicative. According to Jesperson, adjectives are often found as predicatives, as they are less special than substantives. Thus, for Jesperson, the grammatical subject of a sentence is marked by definiteness and speciality.