INTRODUCTION
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The distinction between subject and predicate has been playing an important role in grammar as well as in logic for ages. This distinction is supposed to be a distinction within a thought or a judgement. Hence we would proceed with a survey of the fundamental ways in which human thought operates.

According to some thinkers, the most fundamental way of our thought consists in knowing something about something else. In other words, our knowledge of object involves two parts viz., what is being known and about which it is known. At this level we can discriminate two elements of thought and it warrants another distinction, that between subject and predicate of a thought, corresponding to the differing elements of the thought. This notion of knowing something about something has been adopted by traditional logicians to formulate the distinction between subject and predicate as the two elements of a proposition. Propositions are expressions of judgements. Traditional logic claims that every proposition has a subject and a predicate. They define the subject as that about which something is asserted or said in a proposition and the predicate as that what is being asserted or said about the subject. For instance, in the proposition 'Socrates is wise', 'Socrates' stands for the subject as something is being asserted about him in the proposition, whereas what is being asserted is expressed by the adjective 'wise', so it is the predicate.
Among modern logicians P.T. Geach also seeks to explicate the distinction between subject and predicate of a proposition by means of the notion of 'about'. He defines predicate to be an expression that gives us a proposition about something if we attach it to another expression that stands for what we are forming the proposition about. And the subject is an expression standing for something that the proposition is about. Geach differs from traditional logicians in holding that subjects and predicates are always linguistic expressions. For him, a man is never a logical subject of a proposition, but the name of a man, say, "Peter" is, as in "Peter was an Apostle". Likewise, not the property of being an Apostle is the predicate, but its verbal expression "was an Apostle" is.

Strawson approaches the subject predicate distinction from a different stand point. For he denies that the word 'about' has any explanatory value. For him, our fundamental thought about the world involves general concepts as well as spatio-temporal particulars. According to Strawson the distinction between subject and predicate in a sentence corresponds to the distinction between particulars and general concepts in thought. He points out certain formal asymmetries between subject expressions and predicate expressions and holds that these formal asymmetries originate from the asymmetries between particulars and general concepts. According to him, in a subject predicate proposition of a basic kind a particular introducing expression is propositionally combined with a

1. 'Individuals' (p.145)
concept-introducing expression. The particular introducing expression plays the role of the subject and the concept introducing expression that of the predicate. He distinguishes between subject-expressions and predicate-expressions with reference to their distinct modes of introducing terms. Subject-expressions which are usually names can be used in any manner, but predicate-expressions which take the form of verbs or verb-phrases always introduce their terms in a propositional style. Strawson urges that, though both sorts of expressions are incomplete as introducing constituents of a larger fact, subject expressions are in a sense complete. Subject-expressions which introduce particulars are complete in the sense of presenting a fact in their own right. On the other hand, predicate expressions, which serve to introduce universals, are incomplete as they can not express any fact in isolation. They always require to be completed in a specific manner. Thus the predicate expressions, though they share the incompleteness of subject-expressions, lack their completeness.

This notion of peculiar incompleteness as possessed by predicate-expressions has been severely attacked by F.P. Ramsey who has denied the subject-predicate distinction altogether. Ramsey holds that no compound propositions are of the subject-predicate form. He enquires whether we can trace out this distinction in an atomic proposition and subsequently he enquires into the nature of the elements of an atomic fact. According to Russell, one of the constituents of an atomic fact is incomplete and connective and holds other constituents
together. This incomplete constituent is the universal and is predicative in character. And the other constituents are particulars. Ramsey holds that any object whatever is incomplete, since it can occur in a fact only in conjunction with another object of a suitable type. We can at best say that an atomic fact consists of two different types of objects, but we can not distinguish them in the way of particulars and universals. Likewise, an atomic proposition consists of two types of expressions and we can not say of one type that they can occur only as subjects and of the other that they can occur only as predicates. According to him, either type of expressions can appear in either role as the context demands.

According to Frege, the fundamental way of thought consists in knowing something through something. Here the distinction we can make is the distinction between the object of knowledge and the mode of knowledge. Whenever we know an individual object presented to us by an expression we know it in and through a certain aspect, for example, when we know a planet as the evening star. Accordingly Frege draws an important distinction between sense and reference of an expression or sign. By reference of an expression he means the object designated by the expression in question, and by sense he means the mode of presentation of the object. As one and the same object can be known through different modes so also expressions having the same reference can differ in senses. For example, the pair of expressions 'The morning star' and 'The evening star' have the same planet as their reference, nevertheless their senses are
different so far as they represent two different modes of knowing the same object. Frege speaks of also the sense and the reference of a declarative sentence. The reference of a sentence is its truth-value, i.e. either the True or the False; and the sense of a sentence is the thought expressed by it. A mere thought is not a knowledge. We acquire knowledge when a particular thought is ascertained either to be true or to be false. So, on Frege's view, in making a judgement we pass from a thought to its truth-value. Frege says that subjects and predicates are elements of thought and the subject-predicate distinction is a distinction within a thought. Therefore, in a judgement we do not have subject-predicate distinction, we merely pass from the sense of a sentence to its reference.

According to Frege, when we merely understand the meaning of a sentence (its sense) we have a thought. To know whether what the sentence means is true or false requires an additional element which is not present in the thought, i.e. in merely understanding the sense of the sentence. So the question is what exactly is the nature of this additional element in judgement?

Hegelian logicians like F.H. Bradley distinguishes between two elements in a judgement, (i) an ideal content (ii) an act of reference of the ideal content to reality\(^2\). In this act of referring, according to Bradley, the whole ideal content becomes a predicate of reality which is the ultimate subject of every judgement.

2. 'The Principles of Logic', vol. 1 p. 10.
Bernard Bosanquet, however, goes further than Bradley and asserts that the distinction of subject and predicate within the content is necessary for referring the ideal content to the reality. Only by asserting the predicate within the ideal content of the subject within the ideal content in the most basic form of judgement, namely, perceptual judgement, the whole ideal content is referred to reality. In this form of judgement, the whole ideal content can be referred to reality only by means of the presentation of reality in perception. Otherwise, the act of referring the whole ideal content to the reality must remain mysterious, for reality which falls outside the ideal content is not available to the judging subject. Reality becomes available only through its presentation, i.e., only as the subject within the ideal content. If reality is merely transcendent, the ideal content can not be referred to it by the judging subject. Thus, according to Bosanquet, there are two aspects of the act of predicating. There is a predication within the ideal content and it is only by means of this predication within the ideal content that the whole ideal content is predicated of the reality beyond the ideal content. Thus reality must be both immanent and transcendent and by predicating a part of the ideal content to the immanent reality that the whole ideal content is referred to reality beyond the act.

W.E. Johnson, however, makes a distinction between two aspects of predication in a judgement. He distinguishes be-

3. 'Logic or The Morphology of Knowledge' p. 76-78
4. 'Logic', Part-I, p. 10-13
-tween what he calls a characterizing tie and an assertive tie. It is only when the characterizing tie has done its work that the assertive tie can function. Yet these two ties are not related in the way in which the two aspects of predication are related in Bosanquet's theory. Still Johnson by using the same generic word 'tie' seems to suggest that the characterizing tie and the assertive tie are different species of the same genus.

Frege, however, differs from all these theories. According to him, the distinction between the subject and the predicate is restricted to a thought, i.e. to the ideal content. The act of passing from thought to the True is not analogous to the act of predicating. It is passing from the sense to the reference of the sentence. Thus, according to Frege, there are two altogether different types of acts involved in judging --- one is the act of predication involved in thought and the other act is the act of passing from thought to the True or the False.

Thus we get the following types of theories about the fundamental acts involved in thinking and judging: 1) the act of predicating which involves the distinction between the subject and the predicate defined by means of the word 'about'. 2) the distinction between subject and predicate explained by means of the concepts of 'completeness' and 'incompleteness'. 3) The sceptical theories which deny the importance of this distinction altogether. 4) The act of passing from the ideal content or thought to the reality or the True or the False is just another aspect of the act of predication. 5) This act is
completely different from the act of predication.

In this work we shall first of all explain those theories in classical philosophy which use the word 'about' as the basic explanatory device. Then we shall explain some sceptical theories. Then we shall explain some theories of contemporary philosophers, and the theories which use the concept of completeness and incompleteness as the means of clarification of the distinction between subject and predicate. We shall then pass on to the distinction between sense and reference of expressions and show how this distinction is related to the distinction between subject and predicate, explaining and supporting the theory of Navya-Nyāya in the concluding chapter.