CHAPTER 6

STRAWSON ON SUBJECT - PREDICATE DISTINCTION (7)
CHAPTER - 6

STRAWSON ON SUBJECT-PREDICATE DISTINCTION(I)

In the preceding Chapter we have discussed about Geach's exposition of subject-predicate distinction. For him, as we have seen, the distinction between subject and predicate is neither a distinction concerning our mode of apprehending the object, nor the distinction between objective entities. It is the distinction between signs or expressions.

The definition of subject and predicate, as offered by Geach, rests on two crucial expressions - 'about' and 'stands for'. Strawson tries to show that these two expressions have no explanatory value which they are supposed to have. Let us consider the assertion 'Raleigh smokes'. Here 'Raleigh may be classified as the subject and 'smokes' as the predicate. Now when someone uses this assertion we can often say that he is talking about Raleigh and what he asserts about Raleigh is that he smokes. So far the name 'Raleigh' seems to qualify the definition of subject and 'smokes' of predicate. But someone may use the same sentence while he is talking about smoking and what he asserts about smoking is that Raleigh is a smoker. Here the name 'Raleigh' seems to qualify, according as the definition stated, as a predicate, thus destroying the fundamental distinction between names and predicables. According to Strawson, the word 'about' itself requires explanation and hence

46. 'Individuals', p. 145.
can not be used to explain the notion of subject and predicate.

Strawson, moreover, tries to find out whether the another crucial phrase 'stands for', as it occurs there, implies that the name 'Raleigh' can never be a predicate. According to Strawson, it would have done so if it could be maintained that the word 'smoke' never stand for smoking. But, in fact, there is no such rule which prevents us from saying that 'smokes' stands for smoking or habit of smoking. Moreover, there is no such rule which makes senseless to say that an assertion made in the words 'Raleigh smokes' is an assertion about smoking. There is indeed a certain link between the word 'about' and the phrase 'stands for'. In an assertion about a thing we expect to find an expression which stands for that thing. If we insist on the link then the insufficiency of 'about' for the purpose of definition itself proves the insufficiency of 'stands for'. And if we break the link, the phrase 'stand for' alone becomes useless, for it itself requires explanation. Hence, according to Strawson, the pair of words 'about' and 'stands for' do not carry the explanatory weight which Geach's definition requires them to carry. It suggests that Geach's definition rests on no concrete grounds, so far it is based on the distinguishing power of the words 'about' and 'stands for'.

According to Strawson, though anything whatever can be introduced into discussion by means of a singular, definitely identifying substantival expression, nevertheless particulars have traditionally been held to occupy a special position among
objects of reference. Since anything can be a possible object of identifying reference, we can not distinguish one type of objects from another in this respect. Yet being an object of reference marks some distinction. It does not distinguish one type of object from another, but it distinguishes one way of appearing in discourse from another. It distinguishes appearing as a subject from appearing as a predicate 47.

According to the traditional view particulars can appear in discourse as subjects only, whereas universals or non-particulars in general can appear either as subjects or as predicates. This means that both particulars and non-particulars can be predicated by means of predicative expressions. Particulars like 'John' and universals like marriage and what may be said to be universal-cum-particular, namely, being married to John, can all be referred to by the use of referring expressions; but only universals or universal-cum-particulars can be predicated by means of predicative expressions. But, as we have already seen, Ramsey denies that there can be any complex predicate like 'being married to John'.

According to the traditional view there is an asymmetry between particulars and universals regarding their relations to subject-predicate distinction. This asymmetry has also been denied by Ramsey who denies the subject-predicate distinction altogether. For him, there is no essential distinction between the subject of a proposition and its predicate. Let us now discuss the alleged asymmetry as explained by Strawson 48.

According to Strawson a special kind of combination i.e. predication has got a vital importance in our current logic. In logic, we use the schemata \('Fx', 'Eyx', 'Eyz' etc.\) and they represent the general forms of unquantified and uncompounded propositions. Those schemata, as we find, consist of two different kinds of symbols, individual variables on the one hand and predicate letters on the other. In using these schemata which represent the general form of complete sentences, we seem to unify either two different sorts of expressions or terms; or expressions or terms with two different kinds of role. Strawson tries to explain the general nature of this duality, i.e. the general nature of the terms unified in the basic combination of predication. To explain the distinction between subject-terms and predicate-terms Strawson begins with some formal differences.

The first formal difference, as pointed out by Strawson, is that predicate-terms are formally restricted in a way in which subject-terms are not. This can be obviously shown by the schemata we have mentioned earlier. Sentences exemplifying those schemata may contain more than one subject-terms, but only one predicate-term. A predicate-term can appear either in a form with just one-place for a subject-term, or in a form with just two-place, or in a form with just three-place and so on. But one and the same subject-term may appear in a form with any number of subject places. This formal distinction presents merely a grammatical or syntactical distinction between subject-terms and predicate-terms.
Russell held that the certain sentences of those forms which express atomic propositions consist of terms reflecting extra-linguistic items of two different kinds, say, individuals and universals. He maintained that individuals could occur in atomic propositions with any number of constituent elements, but universal could occur only in a proposition with an appropriate fixed number of constituent elements. This view, somehow, corresponds to the formal distinction just discussed. But unless we know the character of these extra-linguistic items, it can not be accepted as explaining the subject-predicate distinction.

Strawson now comes to consider another formal distinction which is not purely syntactical. For its exposition, he introduces propositional connectives and term-connectives. This distinction consists in the fact that we may construct negative and compound predicate-terms in logic, but no negative or compound subject-term. Suppose, we have a simple subject-predicate sentence 'Fa'. Its negation is '-'(Fa)'. Now we may negate the predicate term 'F' and thus get the negative term ¬F and it can be combined with 'a' to yield the sentence '¬Fa'. Here 'a' is the subject and '¬F' is a negative predicate. Then '¬(Fa)' is logically equivalent to '¬Fa'. Similarly, suppose, we have a conjunction of two simple subject-predicate sentences with the same subject and different predicates, e.g.'(Fa) and (Ga)'. We can construct a conjunctive predicate out of those two predicates, thus obtain a sentence '(F and G)a' which is logically equivalent to '(Fa) and (Ga)'. In this sentence the compound term 'F and G)' enters into the predicative combination with 'a'. 
Again, in the same way, we can acquire the uncompounded sentence \((F \text{ or } G)a\)', which includes a disjunctive predicate, as equivalent to the compound, disjunctive sentence \((Fa) \text{ or } (Ga)'\). Thus we can have negative and compound predicate in the way we form negative and compound proposition. The two propositions \(-(p \& q)'\) and \(-pvq'\) are logically equivalent. So the two predicates \(F\text{ and } G'\) and \(\overline{F} \text{ or } \overline{G}\) are equivalents. Hence the propositions of the form \((F\text{ and } G)a\)' are equivalent to the propositions of the form \((\overline{F} \text{ or } \overline{G})a\).

But there is no parallel way to construct compound and negative subjects. Let us take for example a disjunction of conjunctions, viz. \((1) (Fa \text{ and } Ga) \text{ or } (Fb \text{ and } Gb)\). Then as we can frame compound predicate, \((1)\) is equivalent to \((2) (F\text{ and } G)a\) or \((F \text{ and } G)b\). If we could have compound names as well, \((2)\) would be equivalent to \((3) (F \text{ and } G)(a \text{ or } b)\); and \((3)\) can be expanded into \((4) F(a \text{ or } b) \text{ and } G(a \text{ or } b)\), which may be further expanded into \((5) (Fa \text{ or } Fb) \text{ and } (Ga \text{ or } Gb)\). But \((5)\) is not obviously equivalent to \((1)\), since \((6) \bigwedge(P \& q) v (r \& s) \bigwedge = \bigwedge(p\vee q) \& (q \vee s) \bigwedge\) is not a valid formula. So disjunctive names are not possible and same is the case with conjunctive names.

The possibility of negative names can also be ruled out. Suppose, we have the following conjunctive sentence \((1) Fa \text{ and } Ga\). It is equivalent, by double negation, to \((2) -(Fa \text{ and } Ga)\), which is equivalent to \((3) -(-(F \text{ and } G)a)\).

If we could introduce negative names \((3)\) would be equivalent to \((4) -(F \text{ and } G) \overline{a}\) and it can be expanded into \((5) -(Fa \text{ and } Ga)\) which is equivalent to \((6) -((Fa) \text{ and } -(Ga))\);
and it is in its turn equivalent to (7) Fa or Ga. But evidently (1) and (7) are not equivalents.

Strawson thinks that these formal arguments merely show that there can not be both negative and compound subjects, and negative and compound predicates. They neither explain nor confirm, by themselves, the doctrine that we can introduce negative and compound predicates, but not negative and compound subjects like wise.

The third formal difference, as held by Strawson, finds its expression in the statement 'The predicate is "true of" (or "false of ") what the subject stands for'. The idea roughly says that the truth or falsity of a subject-predicate proposition is determined by the truth or falsity of the predicate. If the predicate is true (or false) of what the subject stands for, the proposition is true (or false), but not conversely. But this is merely a rough expression of the idea. 'Socrates swims' is a subject-predicate proposition, where 'Socrates' is the subject and 'swims' is the predicate. We can not say 'swims' is true of Socrates. Rather we would say, 'It is true of Socrates that he swims, and also 'It is true of Socrates that Socrates Swims'.

Likewise, 'John beats Marry' allows the following paraphrases:

It is true of (the couple), John and Marry, that John beats Marry.

49. Ibid, p. 9
It is true of (the couple) John and Marry, that former beats the latter.

We can also say:

It is true of John that John (or he) beats Marry.

It is true of Marry that John beats Marry (or her).

So according to the doctrine we can get those paraphrases for subject-predicate sentences so far as subjects and predicates preserve the position just illustrated.

But it can be equally claimed that the following sentences are also allowable as permitted paraphrases:

It is true of swimming that Socrates swims.

It is true of swimming that Socrates does it, and also,

It is true of beating that John beats Marry.

It is true of beating that John does it to Marry.

So the phrase 'true of' can not be a clue for the subject-predicate distinction.

In order to rule out the possibility of those paraphrases Strawson imposes a restriction on the procedure. The restriction says that in the permitted paraphrases the grammatical form or the category of the expression which figure in the original sentence can not be changed. They must always be in the form— it is true of X that \[ \frac{xy}{yx} \] as they occur.

Now from the grammatical standpoint, the phrase 'is true of' is to be followed by a noun or noun-phrase and it again requires to be followed by a verb or verb-phrase to
form a clause. So the doctrine, along with the restriction imposed, preaches a purely grammatical distinction to the effect that in a subject-predicate sentence in English the subject is always a noun or noun-phrase and the predicate a verb or verb-phrase.

Nevertheless we may admit the idea that it is a peculiarity of the predicate expressions that they yield truth or falsity when attached to subject expressions. And there is a connection between this idea and the fact that predicate is, in English, always a verb or verb-phrase; and also with the fact that we can get the negation of a subject-predicate sentence by negating its predicate-term whereas we can do no such thing with the subject-term.

The fourth formal distinction lies in the fact that subject-terms, but no predicate-terms, are admissible in places where variables of quantification are admissible. The chief advocate of this alleged difference is W.V. Quine, who held it to be the only difference between subject-terms and predicate-terms. According to Quine a name is marked by its admissibility in positions of variables. Predicates are not names. They are other parts in predication-combination. In 'Existence and Quantification' he says that when we schematize a sentence in the predicative way 'Fa' or 'a is an F', our recognitions of an 'a' part and a 'F' part depend on our use of variables of quantification. According to him, 'a' stands for the part of the sentence which is replaceable by a quantifiable variable and 'F' represents the rest of the sentence. So in a complete

50. Ontological Relativity and other Essays, p. 95
(Referred to by Strawson)
unquantified sentence there are two parts - the subject-part and the predicate-part. A subject-part occupies the position which is accessible to variables of quantification and a predicate-part does not.

In order to find out the reason behind the claim made by Quine that his alleged distinction makes up the sole ground for subject-predicate distinction, Strawson proceeds to consider the nature of that ideally austere language of his logic. In such a language subject-terms have no place at all. Their place is occupied by a certain combination of existential quantifier, variables and predicate. In Quine's nameless language, the sentence 'Fa' is transformed into '(\exists x)(\text{Uniquely-Socratic } \land x \land Fx)'. Instead of 'Socrates swims', we have 'Something which is uniquely Socratic and swims', in which the place of the name 'Socrates' is occupied by the construction 'Something which is uniquely Socratic'. As far as this language is concerned, names or subject-terms in general are to be regarded merely as abbreviations for such constructions. And in such a language a complete sentence is a combination of an existential quantifier and bound variables with a predicate. A name is an expression which can stand in the position of a bound variable, as it simply abbreviates such a construction.

So, according to Quine, existential quantification and predicates lie in the root of language. Predicates are defined as those items which are combined with quantifiers to form a sentence. Names or subject-terms in general are
Inessential abbreviations, as illustrated. Thus Quine holds that subject-predicate distinction lies strictly on our use of the variables of quantification.

In his earlier book 'Individuals', Strawson discussed a supposed distinction between two kinds of elements which may be combined to formulate a singular proposition of a fundamental kind. He distinguishes between two complementary functions which a person performs in the complex activity of making a statement. Strawson lists as follows some of the phrases which have been used to express this functional distinction by the philosophers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A1</th>
<th>B1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>referring to something and</td>
<td>describing it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>naming something</td>
<td>characterizing it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indicating something</td>
<td>ascribing something to it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>designating something</td>
<td>predicking something to it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mentioning something</td>
<td>saying something about it</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While asserting a statement the speaker performs those two sorts of activities as listed above.

The functional distinction in list I can be ascribed to distinguishable linguistic parts of the sentence which are used in making a statement. In the second list elements distinguished are linguistic parts of a statement as follows:

---

51. P. 139.
The list II describes merely a linguistic distinction which can be applied to the various parts of a sentence.

Strawson holds that the elements distinguished in the list I suggests that we connect in some way two different non-linguistic items or terms in producing the unified thing, the proposition. These non-linguistic items are called constituents of the proposition. So Strawson makes a third list which distinguishes between propositional constituents or terms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A3</th>
<th>B3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Predicate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject-term</td>
<td>Predicate-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term referred to</td>
<td>Term ascribed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distinction of list III are relative to a given proposition. In this list Strawson distinguishes the term which is infact the subject of a given proposition from the term which is infact predicated of that subject. There remains the possibility that one and the same term may appear in different roles in the different propositions. But the
distinction of list I and II are not relative to a given proposition. The items of these two lists are mutually exclusive and their position can not be interchanged. Strawson thinks that we may now assume the possibility of a further distinction which preserves the exclusiveness of first two lists, while being, not a distinction of linguistic parts or speech functions, but a distinction of non-linguistic elements. This distinction was used by a philosopher, viz. by Frege, whose view is very important on this matter. By borrowing his terminology Strawson records the distinction between

IV

\[ A_4 \quad B_4 \]

Object Concept

The distinction of list IV is a non-linguistic counterpart of the distinction of list II. Just as no referring expressions can be used alone to predicate, so no object can ever be predicated. Again, as no predicate-expression can be used alone as a referring expression, so no concept can ever be an object.

Now within an assertion Strawson has listed the distinction between two sorts of expressions, as held by different philosophers, and in terms of his list he calls one sort 'A-expressions' and the other 'B-expressions'. According to him given an expression of either sort, we may get an assertion by attaching it to a suitable expression of other sorts.
In the assertions 'Socrates is wise', 'Raleigh smokes', 'Socrates' and 'Raleigh' belong to sort A and 'smokes' and 'is wise' to sort B. And an expression of sort A can not be an expression of sort B, though it might be part of such an expression.

Strawson says that anything which is or can be introduced into an assertion by an expression is a term. Strawson points out a common feature of two sorts of expressions, that both A-expressions and B-expressions serve to introduce terms, though they introduce them in different ways. Thus the two expressions 'Socrates' and 'is wise' have in common the fact that both serve to introduce terms in the assertion 'Socrates is wise', but there is a difference in the way of introduction.

Strawson suggests that we can try to grasp this distinction in ways of introduction through a grammatical distinction between the substantival or noun-like mode of introduction and the verbal or verb-like mode of introduction. It may be said that an A-expression is a singular grammatically substantival expression, while a B-expression contains at least one finite form of a verb in the indicative mood which does not itself form a part of a complete sentence or a clause. Both A-expressions and B-expressions are capable of formulating an assertive sentence when combined with some suitable expression of the other sort. We have already acknowledged this grammatical distinction while discussing that one of the formal distinctions between subject and predicate consists in the fact that in ordinary subject-predicate sentence, in English, the subject is always a noun or noun-phrase and the predicate is always a verb or verb phrase.
So far we have discussed the subject-predicate distinction in formal terms, belonging to formal logic itself or to Grammar. Strawson thinks that the duality of subject and predicate represents some fundamental features of our thought. He holds that our thought at a certain level contains the duality of spatio-temporal particulars and general concepts and this may throw light on the duality of subject and predicate.

It has been commonly admitted by most philosophers that our thought about the world involves general concepts, though they differed regarding the account of general concepts. Now a general concept is that which can be exemplified in any number of different particular cases. The notion of general concept itself includes this possibility, otherwise it can not be said to be general at all. Thus we have general concepts on the one hand and particular instances on the other. While we are using any general concept, we will be able to encounter in experience different particular cases and distinguish them as different while recognizing them as examples of the same concept. This has a peculiarly intimate connection with the notions of Space and Time. For instances, when we see at once two sheeps in a field, we observe the simultaneous presence of two spatially distinct, particular instances of the same concept. We can also recognize the temporal distinction while experiencing a succession, say, of high-pitched siren blasts from a police man's whistle. In some other cases we mix the both distinction together. Particulars can be distinguished or

52. 'Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar', p. 14
identified not by themselves but under the concepts of kinds of particulars. There may be two or more particulars of the same kind in respect of the general concept they exemplify. But what distinguishes one particular of a given kind from another particular of that kind is that they can not share just the same track of space-time. When one particular is a physical part of another the former one may occupy the part of the space, for a certain period, occupied by the latter one at that time. And obviously this relation is more commonly found between the particulars of different kinds. Thus particulars are ultimately differentiated by spaito-temporal difference.

It has been aforesaid that a general concept can be specified by any number of different particular instances and so far concepts are principles of collection. They are also principles of distinction among particulars. Those concepts come in a range, i.e., the concept of yellow, red, blue belong to one range, of colour, the concept of buying, sitting, standing, that of physical attitude and so on. This range can be called logical space metaphorically and it is shared by the concepts which constitute the range. Two concepts of the same range are ultimately distinguished by the difference in the space they occupy in the range. What is meant by the metaphor is that the concepts of a range are principles of distinction among the particulars that come within the range and are in logical competition with other members of the range regarding their application to particulars. If any particular specifies one member
of the concept-range, it is logically impossible for that particular to specify some other members of the range at the same time.

Strawson points out an asymmetry between spatio-temporal particulars and the general concepts they exemplify. We have on the one hand a set of concepts belonging to a certain range and the entire field of particulars which come within that range on the other. For any concept of the range, there must be other concepts which are in logical competition with it throughout the field. But there is no such competitive range of particulars. Strawson holds that for any concept of the range, no particular which exemplifies it can at the same-time exemplify its competitor. But there are no two particulars such that from the fact that one exemplifies a concept, it follows that other does not exemplify it.

Let us turn to another point of asymmetry between particulars and general concepts. One concept may be contained in a part of the region of logical space occupied by another, viz. the region of the logical space occupied by concept coloured includes as a part that occupied by the concept red; or may contain another within a part of its logical space, viz. the logical space occupied by the concept red contains within itself the part occupied by the concept scarlet. For any particular, if it exemplifies the concept red it is a necessary condition for its exemplifying the concept scarlet, but not conversely. Again, for any given particular, its exemplifying the concept red supplies the sufficient condition for its
exemplifying the concept coloured, though not conversely. But we can find no such parallel relation among particulars so that, for any given concept, the fact that one of those particulars exemplifies that concept will be either a necessary or a sufficient condition of the others doing so too. Strawson tries to express these asymmetries when he says. "General characters come in exclusiveness/involvement groups vis-a-vis individual particulars; individual particulars do not come in exclusiveness/involvement groups vis-a-vis general characters." He has explained this point in detail in his earlier book 'Individual'.

According to Strawson any term, whether particular or universal, to yield a proposition must be assertively tied to some other term or terms. A term, in this sense, may be regarded as a principle of collection of other terms. Any term collects just those terms, such as when it is assertively tied to any one of them, the resulting proposition must be a true and significant one. There are several kinds of assertive tying, distinguished partly by the difference in the types of terms and partly by the differences in the purpose or content of assertion. It is important to note here that such assertive links between terms can not be regarded as ordinary relations. They are, Strawson says, non-relational ties.

The non-relational ties may exist between a particular and a universal, or between two universals, or between two

particulars. Strawson distinguishes between two sorts of universals which collect particulars, hence also between two kinds of non-relational ties which bind particulars to universals. This is the distinction between sortal and characterizing universals, and hence also between the sortal tie and the characterizing tie. A sortal universal itself provides a principle for grouping and counting individual particulars which it collects. It presupposes no antecedent principle of individuating particulars. But the characterizing universals, though they too supply principle of distinguishing and counting particulars, provide such principles only for those particulars already distinguishable according to some antecedent principle. Roughly certain common names for particulars can be regarded as sortal universals, while verbs and adjectives applicable to particulars can be regarded as characterizing universals. The characterizing universals share their power to supply principles for grouping already distinguishable particulars with the particulars themselves. Thus just as among particulars already distinguished as historical utterances we may further group together those which are wise utterances, so among them we may further collect those which are Socrates' utterances. Socrates, like wisdom, may serve as a principle for grouping particulars already distinguishable by some other principle. So we can speak of non-relational ties between particulars and following Cook Wilson Strawson calls them 'the attributive tie'. Obviously the particulars tied by the attributive tie must be of different categories.
In general, wherever a particular is bound to a universal by a characterising tie, there are another particular bound to the first by the attributive tie. Thus corresponding to the characterizing tie between Socrates and the universal dying, there is an attributive tie between Socrates and the particular, his death.

Strawson elucidates the diverse ways in which terms may collect each other by those ties: (1) One and the same individual may be instantially tied to a number of sortal universal, viz. Fido is a dog, an animal, a terier. The universals to which one and the same particular is sortally tied have a characteristic relation to each other which is sometimes described as that of sub or super-ordination. Again, one and the same universal may be sortally tied to different particulars, viz. Fido, Tom, Rover are all dogs. Such particulars will sortally resemble each other. So one particular may collect by the instantial tie various universals, as well as one universal may collect various particulars. But the principle of collection in each case is different. This difference may be marked by the use of the asymmetrical form 'x is an instance of y' where x must be a particular and y a universal in addition to the symmetrical form 'x is instantially tied by y', where x or y can be either a particular or a universal.

2) One and the same particular may be tied by a characterizing tie to different characterizing universals, e.g.
Socrates is wise, talks, dies. Again, one and the same universal may be tied by a characterizing tie to different particulars, e.g. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle are all wise. So by the characterizing tie too, one particular collects at different times a number of universals, and one universal, at different times, a number of particulars. Here also the principle of collection is different. The principle of collection in the case of the particular is based on the continuing identity of the given particular, supplied by the spatio-temporal continuity. On the other hand, the principle in the case of a universal involves a certain characteristic resemblance among those particulars, collected by the universal at different times. This difference may also be marked by the asymmetrical phrase 'x is characterized by y', where x is necessarily a particular and y a universal.

3) The situation is different in the case of attributive tie. A given particular, namely, Socrates may collect by the characterizing tie a number of characterizing universals, viz. smiling and dying. Correspondingly, it may collect by the attributive tie a number of particulars, e.g. a particular smile and a particular death. But whereas the universals smiling and dying can collect by the characterizing tie any number of particulars of the same kind as Socrates, the particular smile and the particular death can not collect by the attributive tie any other particulars of the same kind as Socrates. Strawson explains this peculiarity of the attributive tie with reference to the dependent member and independent
member of any such tie. The independent member may collect any other particulars similar to the dependent member, but the dependent member can not. This asymmetry can be brought out by the form 'y is attributed to x' where y must be the dependent member.

From the above discussion we find that there is an obvious similarity between the ways in which sortal and characterizing universals respectively collect the particulars. But this similarity can be extended neither to the ways in which particulars collect universals by the characterizing or the instantial tie, nor to the ways in which particulars collect other particulars by the attributive tie. Now Strawson holds that the primary sense of 'y is predicated of x' is 'x is asserted to be non-relationally tied to y' either as an instance of y or as characterized by y'. In accordance with the sense, discussed previously, of 'is an instance of' and 'is characterized by', we can say that universals can be predicated of particulars, but not vice versa. Strawson extends the sense of 'y is predicated of x' beyond this primary one. Thus to admit that universals may be predicated of universals, we have to show that there are non-relational ties between two universals analogous to the characterizing or sortal tie between universals and particulars. The tie between different species to their genus is analogous to the sortal tie between a particular and a universal. Again, thinking of different colours as bright or sombre is analogous to the characterizing tie between a particular and a universal. In all these cases the universals
collect other universals in the same way as the universals collect those particulars which are instances of them or characterized by them. But we can not think of particulars collecting either universals or other particulars in the similar way. Strawson next extends the sense of 'y is predicated of x' to explain the doctrine that particulars, though can not be predicated by themselves, may be parts of what is predicated. We can possibly secure this result by slight modification of the rules for 'is an instance of' and 'is characterized by'. These two phrases are properly followed by the designation of a sortal universal and the designation of a characterizing universal respectively. The principle of grouping which they introduce may be further modified. Thus one particular may be an instance not only of a smile but of a smile of Socrates, and another may be characterized, not only by being married, but by being married to John. So Socrates and John may be part of what is being predicated.

Thus, by taking as the fundamental case of y being predicated to x, in which x is asserted either to be an instance of or characterized by y and thereby, proceeding to other cases by analogy or extension, Strawson establishes a sense of 'to predicate'. Thus, we have seen, universals can both be simply predicated and be subjects, while particulars can never be simply predicated though they can be subjects and parts of what is predicated.

Now, according to Strawson, the basic classes of
subject predicate sentences are those which express any judgment to the effect that a certain spatio-temporal particular exemplifies a certain general concept. In such a sentence two expressions are combined, one specifying the particular in question and one specifying the concept in question in a way that the resulting combination is true, if the particular exemplifies the concept or the concept applies to the particulars, and is false if it does not. Thus in any sentence of our fundamental type we find three different functions, that of specifying the general concept in question and that of specifying the particular in question and that of combining the two in such a way that the resulting combination is either true or false in the way just described. This truth or falsity yielding combination is called the propositional combination.

According to Strawson, the sentence-part specifying the particular in question is the subject term and the sentence-part specifying the concept in question is the predicate term. Now Strawson tries to explain the formal differences of subject and predicate, as mentioned earlier, with reference to the asymmetries of individual particulars and general concepts.

According to Strawson as far as the basic class of subject-predicate propositions is concerned, the first formal distinction of subject and predicate-terms raises no problem of explanation at all. It has been aforesaid that general concepts may be divided in different ways in different sorts. Regarding their status as principles of collection, they may

be divided into those which collect single particulars, those which collect pairs, those which trios etc. But any particular can be collected both under singletone-collecting principles and under pair-collecting and trio-collecting principles as well. This corresponds to the requirement that in any complete sentence of the basic sort there should be just one predicate-term, complemented by a fixed number of subject-terms. But the occurrence of subject-term is not restricted thus.

Strawson urges that so far the basic class of subject predicate propositions is concerned the second formal distinction can also be explained on account of the asymmetry between concept and spatio-temporal particulars as regards the possession of incompatibility and involvement ranges.

Since the relations of incompatibility and involvement hold between concepts, we can accordingly construe new concepts in terms of those relations. So we can define, for any concept, its complementary concept as one that covers the entire logical space unoccupied by the concept of which it is the complement. If we can introduce such a concept, it should be represented linguistically in a way which reveals its logical character, i.e. by attaching a negation sign to the expression specifying the original concept. Thus we get complex expressions and when they are propositionally combined with a particular specifying expression, they should be treated as predicates. The propositional combination of such a predicate with a certain subject is equivalent to the negation of the propositional combination
of the predicate which specifies the original concept with the same subject. For instance, 'Fa' is a proposition of our basic class, where 'F' specifying a general concept and 'a' an individual are propositionally combined. We can have the complementary of 'F' by attaching negation sign to 'F' and thus have 'F'. When this new concept is propositionally combined with 'a', the resulting combination 'Fa' would be equivalent to '-(Fa)'. It matters a little whether such a procedure is followed actually in all cases. As the procedure is open to us, the option of following such a procedure is also open to us. But there is no such parallel method of introducing negative subjects, since there is no such relations among particulars.

To consider the predicate composition Strawson introduces a simple symbolism. Suppose the three functions of particular specification, concept specification and propositional combination are represented by the form 'ass (ic)', where 'i' represents particular specification, 'c' concept specification, and 'ass (' )' propositional combination. The propositional negation of such a combination may be represented by 'ass(ic)'. With the help of this symbolism, we can present the case of negative predicates in the following way. The complementary concept $C_2$ of a given concept $C_1$ can be defined as $\overline{\text{ass}(iC_1)} \leftrightarrow \text{ass}(iC_2)$. We may represent the complement of a given concept by attaching a negation sign to the expression specifying the given concept and thus get the general form of equivalence: $\overline{\text{ass}(iC_1)} \leftrightarrow \text{ass}(\overline{iC_1})$. 
As concepts stand in one-way involvement relations with other concepts, we can consistently define concepts related in more complex ways to other concepts. For any two concepts \( c_1 \) and \( c_2 \) which are not incompatible with each other and which are such that the propositional combination of either with a particular specifying expression is well-formed, we can define the concept \( c_3 \) as that which is involved by \( c_1 \) and \( c_2 \) jointly and which involves each of them separately. Thus \( c_3 \) is defined as:

\[
\text{ass}(iC_1) \& \text{ass}(iC_2) \rightarrow \text{ass}(iC_3) \\
\text{ass}(iC_3) \rightarrow \text{ass}(iC_1) \\
\text{ass}(iC_3) \rightarrow \text{ass}(iC_2),
\]

which, taken together, amounts to:

\[
(\text{ass}(iC_1) \& \text{ass}(iC_2)) \leftrightarrow \text{ass}(iC_3). \quad \text{So } c_3 \text{ is the conjunctive concept of } c_1 \text{ and } c_2. \quad \text{We can use the conjunction sign of propositional logic in forming a single compound concept specifying expression. Thus we are able to introduce conjunctive predicates as follows:}
\]

\[
(\text{ass}(iC_1) \& \text{ass}(iC_2)) \leftrightarrow \text{ass}(i(C_1 \& C_2)).
\]

Similarly, we can introduce a form of compound, disjunctive concept specifying expression, hence a disjunctive predicate.

Therefore we find that so far the terms of basic subject-predicate propositions are concerned, we can proceed to introduce compound predicate terms but no compound subject-term. Because predicate terms specify concepts while subject-terms specify particulars. And, we have seen, concepts stand
in the relation of incompatibility and involvement with other concepts in respect of their application to particulars, whereas no particulars enter in such relations with any other particulars in respect of their exemplification of concepts.

The third formal difference between subject and predicate seems to point out merely a formal grammatical distinction. It points out that in an ordinary subject-predicate sentence in English, the subject is a noun or noun-phrase, while the predicate is a verb or verb-phrase. So the two sentences 'Socrates swims' and 'Socrates is brave' are to be distinguished into two parts—in each case 'Socrates' as subject and 'swims' or 'is brave' as predicate.

Now in our basic subject-predicate sentences we have find tripartition of functions (1) particular-specification, (2) concept-specification and (3) indicating propositional combination. Among them, only the first two have been allotted to the part of the sentences. The noun 'Socrates' specifies the particular man and thus is functionally subject, and the verb-phrase 'swims' and 'is brave' specifies the concept of swimming and bravery respectively and hence performs the function of a predicate. Now where the third function is to be allotted? Either it is to be associated with one of the two parts of a sentence; or it may be held that the third function is performed simply by the manner of their being brought together. We usually associate this function to the predicate part, viz., 'swims' or 'is brave' as they have the form of the
verb or verb-phrase, though this association is not absolutely necessary. We have already noticed that in the symbolic-form ‘ass(iC)’ the three functions are separately represented. Nevertheless as we do this association Strawson seeks for the explanation of the fact that the function of indicating propositional combination is usually ascribed to the concept-specifying expression.

Strawson urges that the explanation is intelligible through the notion of negation. We know, on our hypothesis, that we can have no negative subjects, but negative predicates. So in forming the formal contradictory of a proposition of our basic kind, we can negate the sentence as a whole which expresses the proposition or we may negate the predicate. Now in the aforesaid symbolism we indicate negation of the whole sentence by attaching a negation sign with the symbol of propositional combination ‘ass (iC)’. The symbol of propositional combination serves to indicate that the two expressions with different functions, as said before, are combined in such a way that the resulting combination is true under one set of conditions and false under another. By negating the proposition we simply reverse the connection between these truth-values and these conditions. Naturally we indicate this effect by changing the sign of the propositional indication. So we find that the negation and the symbolism of propositional combination have a natural affinity for each other. We have also find the affinity of concept specification and negation for each other. So in respect of our basic class of subject -
predicate sentences we arrive at a mediating affinity between the function of indicating propositional combination and that of concept specification. In short, 'ass' function and negation are apt for each other. If negation can be allotted to the predicate, the 'ass' function can also be allotted to it.

Strawson proceeds to explain the fourth difference between subject-terms and predicate-terms. This difference is based on the doctrine, advocated by Quine, that the position of subject-term is accessible to the variables of quantification, but the position of predicate-term is not.

The two simple sentences: (a) 'Socrates swims' and (b) 'Socrates is brave' may be taken for illustration. They have the corresponding general sentences 'Someone swims' and 'Someone is brave'. Here the general expression 'someone' occupy the position of particular-specifying expression 'Socrates'. According to the doctrine (a) and (b) cannot, by generalization, reproduce the sentences 'Socrates does something' and 'Socrates is something'. However, Strawson thinks, we may look at the matter in a different way. Instead of verbs or verb-phrases we may specify our concepts by nouns or noun-phrases and also introduce some suitable two-place predicates. Thus we can have another pair of sentences and can proceed to generalize coherently. Such sentences are —
Here we have attribute-specifying noun 'swimming' and 'bravery' in subject-positions linked by a new two place predicate with the name 'Socrates' also in subject-place. The position of these names are accessible to non-specific 'something'. Strawson urges that 'Socrates does something' is as much an adequate generalization of 'Socrates swims' as 'Some one swims' is. The both phrases 'does something' and 'some one' remove specificity with non-specificity. Strawson thinks that as Quine fails to see or refuse to acknowledge the double function of ordinary predicate expression that it combines the function of concept-specification with that of propositional indication, he imposes the restriction on quantification.

Strawson points out a certain absurd consequence of the doctrine. The under-lying idea behind this alleged difference is supposed to be that (A) or (B) commit us regarding swimming and bravery in a way in which (a) or (b) does not. But this is absurd. The theory of commitment by noun but not by verbs, is an impossible idea. (a) and (b) equally commit us as (A) and (B) do. One may say that 'Socrates exemplifies bravery' brings in the attribute or concept bravery. But this is also done by 'Socrates is brave'. The reason behind this absurd view, as pointed out by Strawson, is that the fact that the predicate always admits of the propositional symbolism of
verb tempts to over look the fact that it also specifies a concept as a noun does. And, according to Strawson, this failure to acknowledge the latter fact lies in the root of the restriction imposed on quantification.

It was held traditionally, in logic, that in a proposition there is a fundamental distinction between subject and predicate. In this Chapter we have discussed how Strawson has explicited this distinction. Strawson begins with bringing out some formal distinctions between two sorts of expressions. According to him, in a proposition, two sorts of terms are combined and he calls one sort 'subject-term' and the other 'predicate-term'. He points out some formal asymmetries between the two sorts of expression as following - 1) a predicate-term can appear in a proposition with a fixed number of terms. But a subject-term can appear in any form. (2) We can have negative and compound predicate-terms, but no negative and compound subject-terms. (3) The truth or falsity of a subject-predicate proposition is determined by the truth or falsity of the predicate, not by that of the subject. This formal distinction renders to be a grammatical distinction to the effect that in a subject-predicate sentence in English the subject is always a noun or noun-phrase and the predicate a verb or verb-phrase. (4) The fourth one was held by Quine. It lies in the fact that subject-terms but not predicate-terms, are admissible in places where variables of quantification are admissible.
Next we have discussed some functional distinctions, as pointed out by Strawson, which is involved in an act of assertion. Corresponding to this functional distinction he distinguishes two sorts of linguistic and accordingly two sorts of non-linguistic items. Finally he points out the distinction between two sorts of elements, originally held by Frege, i.e. the distinction between objects and concepts.

Strawson further holds that the duality of subject and predicate represents duality in our elements of thought. He says that our thought involves on the one hand spatio-temporal particulars and on the other general concepts. General concepts can be divided in different ways in different sorts. Particulars can be distinguished only under concepts and ultimately with reference to space and time. Strawson brings out an important point of asymmetry between general concepts and particulars. General concepts come in exclusiveness/involvement groups in relation to particulars. But particulars do not come in exclusiveness/involvement groups in relation to general concepts. Strawson also speaks of three sorts of non-relational ties which can be found when particulars and universals are combined to yield a proposition. He speaks of sortal tie, characterizing tie, and attributive tie. These assertive ties may exist between a particular and a universal or between two universals or between two particulars. According to Strawson the primary sense of 'y is predicated of x' is 'x is either an instance of y or characterized by y' and so universals can be predicated of particulars, though not conversely. And beginning
from this case Strawson arrives at other cases by analogy and extension; and holds that universals can appear either as subjects or as predicates, but particulars only as subjects or as parts of the predicate.

According to Strawson, a basis sort of subject-predicate propositions consists of those in which a particular-introducing expression is propositionally combined with a concept-introducing expression. Particular-introducing expressions serve as subject-terms and concept-introducing expressions as predicate-terms. He tries to explicate the formal distinctions between subject and predicate through the asymmetries between particulars and general concepts. The first formal distinction he explains with reference to the status of general concepts as principles of collection which can be discriminated into those which collect single particulars, those which collect pair of particulars, those which collect three and so on. But particulars can not be distinguished thus. The second formal distinction is explicable through the possession of incompatibility and involvement ranges by concepts in relation to particulars. It also shows that we can get the negation of a proposition by attaching the subject-term to the contradictory of the original predicate. The third formal distinction consists in the fact that in an ordinary subject-predicate sentence in English, subject is usually a noun or noun-phrase and predicate a verb or verb-phrase. In a basic combination Strawson mentions of trepartition of functions - (1) particular specification, (2) concept specification,
(3) indicating propositional combination. The first two have been allocated to subject-terms and predicate-terms respectively. We usually associate the third function with the predicate part which adopts the form of a verb or a verb-phrase. Strawson explains the reason of this association through the notion of negation. According to him, negation and the symbolism of propositional combination have a natural affinity for each other and this affinity is also found between negation and concept specification. Thus he arrives at a mediating affinity between the function of indicating propositional combination and that of concept specification. Strawson does not accept the fourth formal distinction. He holds that Quine failed to acknowledge that the predicate part, though usually admits of propositional symbolism of verbs, also introduces a concept. Concepts can be introduced into a propositional combination also by substantival expressions and we can also introduce some suitable two-place predicates. Thus, 'Socrates is brave' can be transformed into 'Socrates has bravery'. We can generalize 'Socrates has something' as equally well as 'Some one has bravery' from 'Socrates is brave'. Strawson thinks that the restriction imposed by Quine on quantification results from his failure to recognize the double function of the predicate-expression-of concept specification and of indicating propositional combination.

Now we have seen beginning from certain formal distinctions between subject and predicate Strawson proceeds to find out its root in the general nature of our thought and tries to explicate it with reference to certain duality between types of categories of terms.