CHAPTER - IV

TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVE OF POST_COLONIAL AGRARIAN REFORMS IN INDIA : A BRIEF REVIEW

The Indian state after independence assumed an interventionist role for itself to reconstruct the post-colonial society. For an effective intervention in the agrarian structure, the post-colonial state had to work out its own perspective and strategy. The primary objective was to bring about a desired pattern of change in the agrarian structure of the country as a whole. Therefore, the fundamental issues related to the agrarian reforms in Assam, or any other part of the Indian federal structure can not be addressed in isolation, it must be understood in the context of the all-India perspective. In this chapter, we have therefore made an attempt to understand the perspective of the post_colonial state in India which sought to transform the rural agrarian structure through various reform programmes. In the first part of our discussion, we have also made an attempt to trace out the genesis of the perspective in the course of India's anti-colonial freedom struggle.
The agrarian structure of colonial India witnessed two major systems of land revenue: (a) Zamidari system; and the Ryotwari system. In 1842-43, the Zamidari system areas which constituted British India covered about 72 percent of the privately owned agricultural land while the rest was covered by the Ryotwari system. These two systems of land revenue had generated a parasitic class of landholders who had to pay an annual land revenue to the state. As a result, the agrarian structure which emerged before India's independence remained powerfully dominated by big feudal and semi-feudal interests. The hitherto landlord-tenant relations, and the stranglehold of usury with its resultant semi-feudal bondage of various types condemned the agrarian society to a state of stagnation. In a situation, where both the forces of production and productivity remained unchanged, extraction of surplus was maximized by the landlords by frequently rising rental.

The overall situation in Assam also, as we have already noted, was not qualitatively different from the rest of India. The degree of land concentration in Assam was perhaps not as high as it was in the case of the Zamidari areas of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and some other parts of Ryotwari areas. Yet, this phenomenon can not be overlooked. A sample survey of the districts of Darrang, Sibsagar and Lakhimpur conducted in 1950-54 revealed that holding of 50
bighas (about 38 acres) or more constituted from 3.6 percent (Lakhimpur) to 4.2 percent (in Darrang and Sibsagar) of the total households, but held 22.4 percent (in Darrang), 39.1 percent (in Sibsagar) and 16.9 percent (in Lakhimpur) of the total land in those districts.

The exorbitant land rent and rental imposed by the colonial state and the landlords everywhere in India generated parasitism on one hand, and growth of landlessness and land hunger of the peasants on the other. Specifically speaking, evictions and growing insecurity of tenancy, rack renting and increasing burden on the small peasants were some of the fundamental problems created by colonialism along with their local agents, i.e. the landlords. The oppressed peasants of different parts of the country under such circumstances sought to resolve their contradiction with the feudal landlords even by adopting violent means at different times.

At such a crucial juncture, the political leadership of the Indian National Movement (INM), to be more specific, the Indian National Congress (INC) had to respond in favour of the oppressed peasants to bring them to the fold of anti-colonial freedom struggle in order to give it a mass character. Moreover, cognizance had also to be taken of raising consciousness of the peasants against both colonialism and feudalism which had manifested itself in a number of peasant struggles in different parts of India. The
INC, nevertheless, had played a dubious role in articulating the basic issues of the oppressed peasants vis-a-vis the landed interests to keep intact its support base. To address this aspect more objectively, it is an imperative here to go in for a brief analysis of the ideological and class essence of the INC; both, as an anti-colonial nationalist platform as well as the largest political party of colonial India.

The ideology of the INC and the relationship of the roles it played in course of the INM had been studied by historians of different schools. In a recent analysis, Bipan Chandra tried to establish that, the INM essentially was an outcome of the 'central or primary contradiction' of colonial India -- the contradiction between colonialism and the people of India. In his premise, "inner class contradictions had to be seen as secondary and therefore was subordinate to the primary contradictions, they had to be seen as contradictions within the camp of the people and class struggles based on them had to wage in a non-antagonistic fashion". Bipan Chandra further argues that Congress, and in particular Gandhi practised the strategy of class adjustment and the INC had no "class essence."

One can not deny the primacy of the central or primary contradiction in the specific context of colonial India where the INM was not against any feudal state per se, but was essentially against a mighty colonial force.
However, it would be a complete denial of the concrete realities to say that the INC had no class essence. There are now enough evidence to prove that the INC had a clear class perspective and its leadership basically represented the aspirations of that section which was keen to transform India to a modern capitalist society and to capture power after independence.

The leadership of the INC while fighting colonialism, however, sought support from the influential class of the landlords, and compromised with this class in the name of national unity. This compromise between the leadership of the INC and the feudal class decidedly influenced the strategy of the INM. And consequently, the peasant movements led by the INC in different parts of the country prevented the potential revolutionary activities at the grass root level. A large number of studies have already established these facts and now it is needless to repeat the same exercise here.

On the basis of the existing studies, we may, however, conclude that, the fundamental issues of the oppressed peasants such as abolition of intermediaries and landlordism, distribution of land to the tiller etc. were excluded from the agrarian programmes of the INC. Moreover, the alliance between the leadership of the INC and the feudal forces had been largely responsible for breaking the link of the INM with struggles in different parts of India.
and the big landlords. The primary objective of the ruling interests had obviously been the maintenance and consolidation of class rule, which, however, could not be carried out with only coercion as earlier. The post-colonial state, in its new parliamentary democratic set up, had to derive its legitimacy from the mass support. Accordingly, the new state had also to base its rule logically, and for that it had to take up partial agrarian reform programmes as a part of its economic populism. Thus, the perspective of agrarian reforms in post-colonial India must be analysed in the context of the realigned interests of capitalism and landlordism.

To frame a detailed perspective of agrarian reforms in India, the newly formed Congress Government constituted the Congress Agrarian Reform Committee (CARC) under the chairmanship of J.C. Kumarappa, which submitted its report in the middle of 1949. As the CARC suggested, the basic principles which should govern the agrarian reforms in India are, first of all, eradication of the hitherto class exploitation, and maximisation of production efficiency. With these two basic principles in mind, the CARC recommended that all intermediaries between the state and the tiller should be eliminated, and land must go to the tiller. Subletting of land should be prohibited except in case of widows, minors and other disable persons.

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To work out a modality of land distribution, the CARC evolved a concept of three types of holding, viz. (a) economic holding, (b) basic holding, and (c) optimum holding. An optimum holding, as the CARC defined it, would be a holding which could afford a reasonable standard of living to the cultivator and provide full employment to a family of normal size and at least a pair of bullocks. A basic holding, as the CARC perceived it, is smaller than the economic holding but larger than those holdings which are palpably uneconomic from the point of efficiency of agricultural operations. Such holdings, though unable to provide a reasonable standard of living to a cultivator’s family, may not be inefficient for the purpose of agricultural operations. Thus, the CARC recommended to rehabilitate such holdings. Considering the factors of technique of cultivation, managerial capacity and financial resource of an average cultivator in India, the CARC recommended that the size of an optimum holding should be three times the size of an economic holding.
Further, the LARC was in the opinion that individual peasant farming should constitute the general pattern of socio-economic structure of Indian agrarian society. However, for the holdings smaller than the basic holding, the LARC suggested, should be brought under cooperative farming in course of time as an alternative to the existing peasant farming.

In its essence, the First Five Year Plan attempted to concretise agrarian reforms in the light of the recommendations made by the LARC. It attached significantly high priority to production efficiency. It emphasised on diversification of the agricultural economy in order to develop the level of efficiency. The planners also emphasised on adoption of a land policy by the government to reduce disparities in wealth and income, and to provide security for the tenants. In addition to all such laudable propositions, the First Five Year Plan was also of the opinion that only the fairly large farms could be efficient for higher production. Therefore, the plan suggested that the small and middle farmers should be encouraged to group themselves into co-operative farming societies.

On the question of upper limit of ceiling, the Plan, took an ambiguous position. However, it reluctantly suggested that an upper limit might be imposed on the amount of land
that might be held by an individual. It seems, the First Five Year Plan was heavily influenced by the assumption that agricultural production could be increased only by large farms capable of using modern agricultural inputs, and that the small size of farming was the major cause of agricultural backwardness in India. Simply speaking, the post colonial state wanted to bring in capitalism in the agrarian sector.

In response to the ongoing debate on the question of ceiling on landholding, in the early 1950s, the Planning Commission had constituted the First Panel on Land Reforms in the middle of 1955. The major recommendations made by the Panel in its report provided a clear direction to the land reform policies to be followed by the government in the subsequent period. The Panel also recommended that in fixing of the ceiling, the aggregate area held by all the members of a family should be taken into account. So far as the level of ceiling is concerned, the Panel recommended that three times of the "family holding" should be the limit for an average family. The Panel defined a "family holding" or an "economic holding" as a holding which ensures the minimum income necessary for supporting a family. In terms of income, the Panel suggested that a farm which yielded average income of Rs. 1,600 or net income including remuneration for family labour of Rs. 1,200 per annum might be considered as a "family holding".
The Panel, however, suggested certain categories of land to be exempted from ceiling. These categories are: (a) sugarcane farms; (b) orchards; (c) plantations (tea, coffee and rubber); (d) special farms such as cattle breeding, diary etc.; (e) farms in compact block; and (f) mechanised farms and farms with heavy investment.

Further, to provide security of tenure, the major recommendations of the Panel are: (a) a tenant, who has held any land continuously for 12 years, or is in possession of land which has not been cultivated by the land owner personally at any time during a period of 12 years, should have permanent and heritable rights on land and should not be liable to ejectment on any ground whatsoever, (b) all other tenants should have security of tenure subject to the landlord's right to resume land bona fide for personal cultivation. The Panel recommended three major criteria of personal cultivation: (1) risk of cultivation; (2) personal supervision; and (3) personal labour. It was expected that in addition to providing security to the tenants, the conditions specified for personal cultivation would at least restrict the practice of absentee landlordism. However, the Panel was also in the opinion that while these three conditions represented the goal which should gradually be achieved, it was not necessary at that stage to insist upon performance of personal labour, provided the owners met the entire risk of cultivation and personally supervise the agricultural operation. The Panel was also not in favour of prohibition of leasing.
In the light of the experiences gathered during the period of the First Plan and the recommendations, which we have pointed out, the Second Five year Plan re-emphasised on confirmation of ownership rights to the tenants, and imposition of ceiling on land holding. The Plan asked the state governments to decide whether ceiling should be applied to the holding of an individual or holding of a family.

The third Five year Plan reiterated the policy accepted by the previous two plans. It, re-emphasised on the necessity of quick completion of land reform programmes while the foundation of agricultural growth.

The Fourth Five year Plan reviewed the ongoing land reform programmes and pointed out the gap between the stated objectives and implementation of the land reform legislations. This indirectly implies the confession of failure of land reform policy in India. The plan observed that ownership conferred by that time included only a small percentage of the tenants. Further, the plan noted that despite of all the efforts of making the tenural institution secure, 82 percent of the total tenants were uncovered by security provisions.

To discuss the problems regarding land reforms, the Minister of Food and Agriculture convened a conference on the Chief Ministers in November, 1969. The conference emphasised on the need for a Central Body for monitoring the
progress of land reforms and providing guidance to the state
governments. Another conference of the Chief Ministers held
in November, 1970 also re-emphasised on the need of a
centralised body. Accordingly the Central Land Reform Committee
(CLRC) was constituted to maintain continuous monitoring of
the problems related to land reforms and to assist the state
government in implementing the programmes effectively.

The CLRC also recommended that ceiling should be
applicable to the family as a whole. It was in the opinion
that ceiling for a family of five members may be fixed
within the range of 10 to 15 acres, and even in case of dry
land, it should not go beyond 5 acres. However, when the
number of family member exceeds five, additional land may be
allowed for such members subject to the total area
admissible does not exceed twice the ceiling limit for an
average family.

A high-powered committee of nine members was also
appointed by the Congress President to review the question of
ceiling and other allied matters related to land reforms.
All major issues referred to it were discussed by the
Committee in its meeting in June 1972, and agreed with most
of the recommendations made by the CLRC.

Another conference of the Chief Ministers was held in
July 1972, and that conference considered the
recommendations made by the CLRC and the high-powered
committee. This conference had also worked out the "National
guidelines" to be followed by the state governments on the matter of ceiling on landholdings. These guidelines were formulated mainly on the basis of the recommendations made by the ULK.

The Fifth Five Year Plan emphasised on speedy and effective implementations of the land reform measures within a time bound programme. High priority was given by the Plan in preparation and maintenance of land records, and cadastral surveys. Land Tribunals and Civil Courts were given power to handle the implementation problems. The Plan was also of the opinion that lower level committees at the village and block levels would help in effective implementation of the reform programmes.

The Sixth Five Year Plan critically evaluated the achievements of various land reform measures. It noted that inspite of the efforts being made to plug the loopholes and ensure proper implementations, there were several problems related to ceiling limits, and a gap persisted between the objectives of reform and effect of implementation of the land reform programmes.

The Seventh Five Year Plan emphasised removal of the inadequacies of tenancy laws. It insisted on recording the informal tenants, and advocated in favour of involvement of local 'personal, and peoples' institutions in the sphere of land reforms.
The Eight Five Year Plan also emphasised on effective implementation of the land reform programmes. The Plan suggested to initiate steps to review and formulate the land legislations. The Plan further suggested that the land distributed to the poor must be developed to make it fit for cultivation on a group basis, and proper maintenance and improvement of land records should be given priority.

LEGISLATIONS FOR REFORM:

Since land reform is a subject of the State List of our Constitution, the actual enactments of legislation are marked by certain degree of variations from state to state. Yet, the salient features of most of the enactments aimed at land reforms are common and embodied mainly in the programmes for: (a) abolition of the intermediaries; (b) tenancy rights inclusive of protection against arbitrary ejection of tenants; and (c) fixation of ceiling on land holding. A detailed analysis of all the enactments in all the states is certainly not our immediate purpose, but a synoptic review of the common features of the enactments, and their application would help us to understand the logic of agrarian reforms in the country as a whole.

The apparent concern of the ruling Congress to abolish the intermediaries encouraged a spate of legislative enactments almost in every state. To understand the content and impacts of such enactments on the hitherto agrarian structure, we may consider a couple of the most significant legislations.
The zamidari system in Uttar Pradesh was attempted to be abolished by implementing the Uttar Pradesh zamidari abolition act, which was passed in 1951 but implemented in 1954. It must also be noticed that this particular act was based on the recommendations made by the United Provinces zamidari abolition committee which was constituted in 1946. The long gap of eight years between appointment of the committee and the actual implementation of the legislation was itself enough to defeat the stated objective of zamidari abolition. Further, the Act was not applied to Sir land owned by the zamidars which covered almost seven million acres in Uttar Pradesh. As a consequence of this Act, the tenants were evicted and their lands were resumed by the zamidars for personal cultivation. Here, the concept of 'cultivator' included even those, who cultivated land by employing hired labour and the crop-sharers. In addition to that, the Act also provided many other provisions for legal eviction of the tenants. Fundamentally, the Act increased the legal security of the already entrenched big landlords vis-a-vis the tenants while the actual tillers experienced both eviction and reduction of their rights on land.

However, in Andhra Pradesh, the Telengana Peasants' Movements compelled the ruling class to speed up their efforts. The process started with promulgation of the Hyderabad Abolition of Jagirdars Regulation of 1949, and several other Acts which were introduced to abolish jagirdari system. No doubt, under the compelling...
circumstances, a good number of Jagirs were abolished in Andhra Pradesh. But, in addition to a sizeable amount of compensation, some of the bigger Jagirdars were also given cash grants of a hereditary nature. Besides, pensions were also given by the government to the retired officials of the Jagirdars.

Needless to explain that, almost in every state the legislation enacted for abolition of the intermediaries were full of loopholes and the big landlords were given sufficient scope — both legal and illegal to retain their ownership over land. For instance, the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, though came into effect from September 1950, was implemented gradually following government notification in the case of each estate. The Orissa Estate Abolition Act, 1951, also followed the same way of prior notification for each estate, and several such other loopholes can also be pointed out.

Without going into further details, it can be said that the legislations enacted for abolition of intermediaries had at least two major impacts on the agrarian structure of this country. First of all, it resulted in consolidation and extension of control of the big landlords, and secondly, it resulted in eviction of the tenants "on a scale unheard of before in the agricultural history of India." Further, it had also resulted, as we have seen in case of Andhra Pradesh, in accumulation of capital
to an extent in the hands of the big landlords which they could effectively utilise for hiring in labour and to raise efficiency of production as desired by the landlords.

The stated objectives of the land reform programmes related to tenancy right were mainly to regulate rent, grant security of tenure, and ownership rights to the tenants. Almost every state enacted several legislations for tenancy reform depending upon the nature of tenancy system that prevailed in the states, and other specific conditions such as availability of irrigation facility, soil fertility etc. In order to provide security of tenure, most of the tenancy laws specified the land rent, and the period of continuous cultivation by a tenant required for establishing his permanent right over the land he had been tilling. To prevent the tenants from haphazard ejectment by the landlords, the enactments along with several provisions also specified the conditions under which, a landlord could go for resumption of his land. The common conditions were: (a) by terminating the tenancy for failure of rent payment; (b) for self-cultivation or personal cultivation by the landlords, which of course allowed engagement of hired labour; and (c) if the tenant voluntarily surrendered the land.

The tenancy legislations, with their built-in loopholes provided a legal sanction for a large scale eviction of the tenants mainly in the pretext of voluntary surrender, and personal cultivation in most of the states.
For instance, till March 31, 1973, about 144 thousand hactres of land were resumed for personal cultivation affecting about 78000 tenants; and about 41,100 cases were recorded relating to surrenders involving about 62 thousand hactres of land in the state of Haryana alone. In Maharashtra, an area of about 187.3 thousand hactres of land was resumed for personal cultivation which affected almost 85,000 tenants, and 1,21,711 cases were recorded where lands were surrendered by the tenants. Needless to say that the tenants were forced to surrender the land they were tilling. Thus, in the process legislations had actually weakened very seriously the position of the tenants vis-a-vis the landlords.

The third major programme of land reform, i.e., fixation of ceiling on landholding is remarkably different from the other two programmes which we have already indicated. The programme for abolition of intermediaries and the legislations enacted for this purpose had the specific target, that was the class of Zamidars. The programme of tenancy reform with its several legislations had essentially been an effort to restructure the relationship between the landlords and the tenants. The third type of programme which involved fixation of ceiling, however, was an attempt to restrict the holdings of all the members of the propertied class. The question regarding framing the legislation and its effective implementation had therefore been most controversial and we have already noted it.
The ceiling laws were enacted and implemented by different state governments in broadly two phases. The first phase covered the period before the National guidelines were laid down in the chief Ministers' conference held in 1974, and the second phase, thus started after adoption of the guidelines. Most of the legislations enacted during the first phase fixed the ceiling limits so high that concentration of land in the hands of the big landlords remained intact. Moreover, many of the state governments applied ceiling on individual as the unit.

Further, several categories of land were exempted from the operation of ceiling laws by every state government. During the second phase, the state governments amended or modified their ceiling laws in accordance with the National Guidelines. The ceiling limits in most of the states were reduced, but again several categories of land were exempted from ceiling laws. The unit of application of ceiling laws in the second phase has become a family of five members, but in most of the cases, the major sons are allowed a separate ceiling unit. Further, different states defined the category of land which was to be exempted from the ceiling laws in different ways, but the common practice has been the granting of large number of exemptions, particularly those relating to orchards, plantations, efficient farms, mechanised farms, and co-operative farms etc. Therefore, the ceiling laws also have largely failed to
achieve its stated objectives. However, it can be said that these laws have at least resulted in redistribution of land among the big landholders themselves.

SUMMING UP:

It was projected by the government that Zamidar, Jagirs, Inams and such other intermediaries were practically abolished long back and millions of tenants were brought into direct relationship with the state. Laws imposing ceiling on agricultural holdings were also enacted in almost every state, and several million acres of land declared as surplus land had also been distributed among the landless peasants during the first two decades after independence.

A section of scholars are convinced with the achievements made by the government in the front of land reforms, and they believe that agrarian structure has become now more "rational" and "equitable". Consequently, they have claimed that the considerable progress made by the land reform programmes has resulted in a gradual and almost imperceptible transformation of the semi-feudal agrarian structure of pre-independent India into largely a peasant economy.

However, we have sufficient reasons to believe that such theoretical formulations are misleading. We accept that land reform programmes have been successful to shed away
some of the feudal characteristics which were quite influential during the colonial era. Some of the feudal landlords had to give away a certain portion of their land and for that they were given adequate compensation of some cash grants of heritable nature which could have been re-invested in promoting agriculture. Nevertheless, in most of the cases, as we have seen in our brief discussion, the big landlords have retained their land either by legal method, or by using the in-built loopholes of the legislations. A large number of absentee landlords were also brought back to their villages, and they resumed their land for self or personal cultivation with the help of hired labour, but only by ejecting their earlier tenants.

Any perceptive observer would find at least the minor impacts of the land reform programmes. First, the big landholders to a certain extent had to change their feudal practices of domination and surplus extraction to retain their land, as they had to show more interest in cultivation, and secondly, in order to prove their interest in cultivation, the big landlords ejected a large number of tenants and reoccupied their land. Thus, in the process emerged a large number of landless peasants who could be engaged by the big landholders as hired labourers in their personal farms. Such changes in the production relations were definitely not some accidental or unexpected results of the undesired loopholes of the land reform programmes. But,
as we have seen, these are the logical outcome of the reform strategy which is based upon the assumption that agricultural production could be increased only with the help of large farms.

We can, therefore now come to the conclusion that the ruling Congress government which represented the interests of the Indian capitalist class, had superimposed the capitalist relations of production in the agrarian structure of post-colonial India, but simultaneously helped the big landlords to retain their property and semi-feudal interests. It is true that "the history of land reforms in India is replete with examples of hypocrisy and treachery practised by the ruling party - the Congress". And finally, the stated objectives of the reform programmes, as well as the myth of peasant economy, must be seen as a part of the ruling class ideology to maintain legitimacy of their class-rule in a parliamentary democratic set-up.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. A third type of land tenure system called, Mahalwari system was initially introduced in the United Provinces, and later extended to Punjab. However, in course of time, this system became indistinguishable from the Ryotwari system. See, Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Report of the National Commission on Agriculture, New Delhi, 1976. PP 5-6

2. In 1947-48, the Zamidari system covered completely the states of Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, and Bihar. In Orissa, 81 percent of privately owned land was under this system, in Assam 9 percent, in Bombay 7 percent, and Madras 27 percent. The Ryotwari system covered 93 percent of the privately owned land in Bombay 73 percent in Madras, 91 percent in Assam, 59 percent in Madhya Pradesh. See, ibid P.6

3. It is evident from the degree of land concentration in hands of the landlords. For instance, in the early 1950s, in Uttar Pradesh, about 800 of the biggest land owners of the state held 45 percent of the total land, and the bigger Zamidars, who paid more than Rs. 250 as land revenue constituted 1.5 percent of the Zamidars in the state but they held 58 percent of the total land. On the contrary to that, in 1951, holdings upto 5 acres constituted 67 percent of the total holdings and covered 26 percent of the total area. In Bihar, such holdings constituted 77 percent of the total holdings and covered by 31.99 percent of the total area. In West Bengal, these constituted 66 percent of the total holdings and covered 31.60 percent of the total land. These indicate a very high degree of land concentration in the areas covered by Zamidari system. Similarly, the Ryotwari areas also witnessed a considerable degree of land concentration. This is evident from the following facts. In the former Bombay state, in the year 1952-53, land holders having land upto 5 acres constituted 53 percent of the all land holders, and covered only 14 percent of the total land. In Assam, they constituted 61.88 percent and covered only 31.48 percent of the total land, and in Madras, they represented 74.45 percent of the total holdings with only 30.46 of the total land. For all these figures, see ibid, PP. 8-10

4. In early 1950s, the ratio of land revenue to the total rental was 39 in Uttar Pradesh, 25 in Madras and 14 in West Bengal. In all the Zamidari areas, the rental
demands of the Zamidar continued to grow over the years during the colonial period, while the land revenue demands of the Government did not register a corresponding increase. In United Provinces, for example, between 1893-94 and 1944-45, the rental demand increased by 42 percent, while the land revenue increased by 15 percent, and the margin profit of the intermediaries rose by 69 percent. See, ibid, P.11


10. On the basis of his study on the state in Pakistan and Bangladesh, Hamza Alvi arrives at the conclusion that the state in Post-colonial Society is not the instrument of a single class, it is relatively autonomous and it mediates the competing interests of the three propertied classes; the metaboloplitant bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie, and the landed classes while at the same time acting on behalf of all of them in order to preserve the social order in which their interests are embodied, namely, the institution of private property and the capitalist mode as the domenent mode of production. See, Hamza Alavi, "The state in Post-colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh" New Left Review, Vol. 74, July-August, 1972. We may accept the relatively autonomous character of the state, through the nature of class alignment in India is different from Pakistan and Bangladesh. For a detailed analysis of the nature of Indian state, see, K. Mathew Kurian, "Class Character of the Ruling class in India" in K. Mathew Kurian (ed.), India: State and Society, Madras, 1975.


22. See, Daniel Thorner, The Agrarian Prospect in India, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, 1956.; Ritu Dewan, op.cit.

23. A.M. Khusro, Economic and Social Effects of Jagirdari Abolition and Land Reforms in Hyderabad, Osmania University, Hyderabad, 1958, PP. 20-23


27. ibid.

28. Fourth Five Year Plan, op.cit.

