Chapter - III
Russell summarized the difference between the new and the traditional conception of philosophy as the difference between the 'old logic' and the 'new logic'. 'The old logic put thought in fetters, while the new logic gives it wings'. In the struggle between darkness and light, the champion of Light is logical 'pluralism'.

What Russell urged was the transfer not of result, but of methods, from the sphere of the special sciences to that of philosophy. The aim is the dispassionate pursuit of philosophical truth. The results achieved by philosophers should be impersonal and objective. Much of traditional philosophy fails to meet this standard: it is merely grounded in intuition, and it is distorted by the hopes, fears and values of the investigators. It is important to recognize that 'insight, untested and unsupported, is an insufficient guarantee of truth.'

The appropriateness of scientific method for philosophy reflects the fact that philosophy really is a form of science. The construction of philosophical theories is subject to the same intellectual constrains as the construction of scientific ones. Both aim at the development of theories with the maximum explanatory power using the minimum of assumptions and theoretical concepts. But philosophy is distinct from the special sciences. Because of:
(1) Generality— philosophy is the science of the general. It enquires in to such question as "what is a number? or 'Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?"

(2) Necessity— all philosophical propositions are necessary and a priori belonging to 'the science of the possible' (M.L. III).

(3) Abstraction— philosophy abstracts from all particular qualities and relations of particular things in the pursuit of maximum generality.

(4) Form— philosophy is primarily concerned with formal questions; in aiming at generality by abstracting from all particularity. Here form means the logical form of the facts concerned.

Thus philosophy consists of propositions that are distinguished from these of the special sciences by their generality. It is governed by the ideal of axiomatic systematization. The ultimate achievement would be an arrangement of propositions 'in to deductive chain in which a certain number of initial propositions from a logical guarantee for all the rest'.

For Russell the centre of gravity of philosophy lies within epistemology. The problem of philosophy is discovering and formulating the foundations of knowledge, i.e., the presentation of an axiomatic systematization of what can be known with certainty and a calculation of the degree of probability to be attached to propositions that can not be supported by conclusive evidence. This primacy of epistemology is easily overlooked, particularly because of Russell's insistence on the importance of logic to philosophy. In his view, however logic is important as a means not as an end in itself. The correct account of the logical forms of propositions is necessary for identifying errors in traditional metaphysics and epistemology. They are indispensable as tools in the search for the foundations of knowledge. For Russell, the objects of
acquittance are the foundation of knowledge, the thrust of this principle is to
guarantee that the analysis of a sentence is directly relevant to establishing its
epistemological status. The principle of acquaintance makes the theory of
meaning logically subordinate to epistemology.

The empiricists neglect of judgement had always been the main target
of idealist criticism. Russell absorbed this part of the idealist tradition; and
put it at the service of empiricism. For the new philosophy is really an
empiricism based on judgements or propositions instead of based on ideas.

The basic premises of Russell's theory of knowledge depends upon
two kinds of analysis.

(1) There is an analysis which attempts to strip off the layers of
habit, expectation, and inference from the immediate perceptive experience
to arrive at the sensory care of the perceptive experience which may be called
behavioural analysis and

(2) Secondly, there is the necessity of analysing the connection
between the having of perceptive experience and the occurrence of
propositions which are derived from it. It is a kind of behavioural analysis.
Russell's philosophy exemplifies and pioneered modern analytic philosophy.
Russell describes that analysis starts with the beliefs which are hazy or
ambiguous, which are complex and which are felt to be certain about without
knowing what it is that one is certain about. In 'The Philosophy of Logical
Atomism', he uses the example of believing that there are people in the room
were the lecture is being given:

'It is a rather curious fact in philosophy that the data which are undeniable
to start with are always rather vague and ambiguous. You can, for instance, say,
'There are a number of people in this room at this moment.' That is obviously in
some sense undeniable but when you come to try and define what this room is what it is for a person to be in a room and how you are going to distinguish one person from another and so forth, you find that what you have said is most fearfully vague and that you really do not know what you meant. The process of sound philosophizing to my mind, consists mainly in passing from those obvious, vague, ambiguous things, what we feel quite sure of to something precise, clear, definite, which by reflection and analysis we find is involved in the vague thing that we start from.

In addition, consideration must be given to the nature of symbols, sentences, and propositions and various kinds or levels of meaning involved. It may be called linguistic analysis.

The linguistic analysis is a major theme of 'The philosophy of Logical Atomism'. The name 'Logical Atomism' was invented by Russell. The word 'atomism' is of course, a metaphor: just as the scientist was supposed to go on dividing object until he reached their ultimate, indivisible parts, so the philosopher's task was conceive as a kind of analysis of thought in to its ultimate simple elements and Russell maintained that the analysis should deal with propositions, he qualified this as logical atomism.

The word 'atom means 'invisible particle, and it remains to be shown how Russell and Wittgenstein came to believe that there must be indivisible logical particle. Logical atomism begin with statements, subject them to analysis and find that they are built up out of parts. Some parts of these parts name objects in the world. But the copula does not name in object, but many other words do. Objects are of two kinds: (i) Particular things (ii) Qualities and relations which are general objects. So, we are to picture the world as an aggregate of separable things qualities and relations which are particles.
In the "Inquiry" Russell made the distinction between propositions of atomic form and molecular propositions. However since the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description has been dropped a difficulty develops in linguistic analysis in distinguishing between words as names of simple and propositions as referring to facts. For this reason, and because of the addition of more behavioral analysis, a somewhat different analysis of language is given in the later book. Russell begins by distinguishing levels of language in terms of levels of meaning. The object, language is defined by Russell as a first level of language in which words refer directly to elements of experience which may be denoted ostensively and a word, by itself, could have meaning or be used as a significant sentence.

A second level of language is the level of logical words, here logical consecutive such as 'and' 'or' are introduced and terms like 'true' and 'false' are appropriate. A sentence on the primary level is judged from the standpoint of the secondary level to be 'true' or 'false'. The 'or' or the and refer to an alternation or conjunction of meanings given, on the primary level; there are no 'or's in nature, Russell thinks. Similarly, negative facts are not considered part of nature, but 'not' express an attitude of disappointed expectation on the part of the utterer of the sentence in which it occurs. 'Some' and 'all' also belong to this second, logical level of language.

One of the important problems discussed by in the 'Inquiry' was—what is meant by "empirical evidence for the truth of a proposition"?

A proposition is something which may be said in language; "Socrates is mortal" and "Socrates est mortal" express the same proposition. In a given language it may be said in various ways: the difference between "Caesar was killed on the 2des of March" and "it was on the 2des of March that Caesar was"
"killed" is merely rhetorical. Therefore it is possible for two forms of words to "have the same meaning". We may, at least for the moment, define a "proposition" as "all the sentences which have the same meaning as some given sentence".

But what is a sentence? It may be a single word, or more usually, a number of words put together according to the laws of syntax; but what distinguishes it is that it expresses something of the nature of an assertion a denial, an imperative, a desire, or a question. What is more remarkable about a sentence, from our point of view, is what we can understand what it expresses if we know the meaning of its several words and the rules of syntax. Therefore we must examine first words, and then syntax.

Russell holds that the subject of language is one which has not been studied with sufficient care in traditional philosophy. It was taken for granted that words exist to express "thought" and generally also that "thought" have "objects" which are what the words "mean". It was thought that by means of language, we could deal directly with what it "means" and that we need not analyse with any care either of the two supposed properties of words,— (i) "expressing" of words (2) "meaning" of things. Often when philosophers intended to be considering the objects meant by words they were in fact considering only the words, and when they were considering words they made the mistake of supposing more or less unconsciously, that a word is a single entity but actually a word is not a single entity, it is set of more or less similar events. For Russell, "meaning" can only be understood if we treat language as a bodily habit, which is learnt just as we learn football and bicycling. The only satisfactory way to treat language, is to treat it in this way, as Dr. Watson does.
There are three matters to be considered in beginning the study of language. First: what words are, regarded as physical occurrences; secondly, what are the circumstances that lead us to use a given word; thirdly. What are the effects of our hearing or seeing a given word. But as regards the second and third of these questions, we shall find ourselves led on from words to sentences and thus confronted with fresh problems perhaps demanding the methods of Gestalt psychology.

We can understand a language when we know the meaning of words. Ordinary words are of four kinds: spoken, heard, written, and read. A given word, say "dog", may be uttered, heard, written, or read by many people on many occasions. Words spoken, heard, or written differ from other classes of bodily movement, noises, or shapes, by having a meaning. A noise may have meaning subject to ascertainable limitations, but within its limits it supplies what is wanted to explain the understanding of words. The child becomes excited when he sees the bottle; this is already a conditioned reflex, due to experience that this sight precedes a meal. And this conditioning makes the child on a lower stage to become excited when he hears the word bottle. He is then said to "understand" the word.

Therefore it can be said that a person understands a word which he hears if the law of conditioned reflexes is applicable, the effects of the word are the same as those of what it is said to "mean". This of course only applies to words like "bottle", which denote same concrete object or same class of concrete object.

We may sum up this theory of meaning in a simple formula. When through the law of conditioned reflexes, A has some to be a cause of C, we will call A an "associative" cause of C, and C an "associative" effect of A.
shall say that to a given person, the word A, when he hears it "meaning" C, if the associative effects of A are closely similar to those of C, if the entrance of A is an associative effect of C, or something previously associated with C. To put it more correctly, the word "peter" means a certain person if the associated effects of hearing the word "peter" are closely similar to those of seeing peter, and the associative causes of uttering the word "peter" are occurrences previously associated with peter.

From behaviorist's point of view, there is no important difference between proper names and what are called "abstract" or "generic" to the hearer, but not to the utterer; in that case it is a heard word but not a spoken word. E.g., Friday's footprint had "meaning" for Robinson Crusoe but not for Friday. Many words only have meaning in a suitable verbal context—such words as "than" "or", "however" connect stand alone. We can not begin the explanation of meaning with such words, since they presuppose other words. There are words however including all those that a child learns first that can be caused in isolation: proper names, class names of familiar kinds of animals, names of colours and so on.

A child learns to understand words exactly as he learns any other process of bodily association. If one always says "bottle" when he or she gives a child his "bottle", he presently reacts to the "bottle" within limits, as he formerly reacted to the bottle. This is merely an example of the law of association. When the association has been established, parents say that the child "understand" the word "bottle", or knows what the word "means". Of course the word does not have all the effects that the actual bottle has. It does not exert gravitation, it does not nourish, it cannot bump on to the child's head. The effects which are shared by the word and the thing are those which
depend upon the law of association or "conditional reflexes" or learned reflexes. These may be called "associative" effects or "mnemic" effects. Mnemonic effects belong only to events in living tissue; therefore only those effects of the bottle which happen either inside John Smith's body, or as a result of his reaction to the bottle, can become associated with his hearing the word "bottle". And even then only certain events can be associated. Nourishment happens in the body, yet the word "bottle" can not nourish. The law of conditioned reflexes in. A child learns to use the word "cat", which is general, just as he learns to use the word "peter" which is a proper name. But in actual fact "peter" really covers a number of different occurrences and is in a sense general. Peter may be near or far walking or standing or sitting loughing or frowning. All these produce different stimuli, but the stimuli have enough in common to produce the reaction consisting of the word "peter". Thus there is no essential difference, from a behaviorists point of view, between "peter" and "man". There are more resemblances between the various stimuli to the word "peter" than between those to the word "man", but this is only a difference of degree.

Russell calls this "object-words", and they compose the "object language". These words have various peculiarities— First their meaning is learnt (or can be learnt) by confrontation is the objects which are what they mean, or in distances of what they mean. Secondly— they do not presupposes other words. Thirdly each of them, by itself, can express a whole proposition; we can explain "fire !". It is obviously with such words that any explanation of "meaning" like "truth" and "falsehood", has a hierarchy of languages.

Words are used in many ways; in narrative, in request, in command.
in imaginative fiction, and so on. But the most elementary use of object words in the demonstrative use, such as the exclamation "fox" when a fox is visible. The use of proper name to indicate desire for the presence of the person named but this is not quite so primitive, since the meaning of an object word must be learnt in the presence of the object.

In addition to 'object-words' and logical words' there are words which are called by Russell 'egocentric particulars'. E.g. 'I', 'now' and 'this'. The words are very important because they carry the denotative function of pointing to specific aspects of the immediate situation and differ from object-words which always carry some generality of meaning, although in a given context they may refer to specific aspects of the immediate situation and differ from object-words which always carry some generality of meaning, although in a given context they may refer to specific referents. The egocentric particulars refer to different particulars in each sentence. The 'this' referred to in a sentence will change from moment to moment. The 'now' always refers to the time of utterance of the sentence and changes from sentence to sentence. The words function as names, and that function of a logically proper name (of Russell) is important to Russell's theory of meaning and theory of knowledge, because the present perceptive experience is directly referred to in this naming relation.

The concept of a logically proper name in Russell's theory of language belongs to the purified Augustinian picture that was made possible his repudiation of the concept of denoting. Russell's theory of descriptions was developed by him to solve a problem in logical theory, related to the formal system of Principia Mathematica. He presented this theory to analyse the meaning of certain kinds of puzzling symbols and statements. In 'Mind' of
1905, in the article 'On Denoting', Russell pointed out that symbols like 'unicorn' 'round square', and 'golden mountain present a problem in the analysis of meaning. These symbols seem to perform the same role in sentences as the symbols such as 'horse' 'isosceles triangle', 'Matterhorn'. But in the case of these peculiar symbols one can not trace their meaning by pointing to their denotation the objects to which they refer. Yet the puzzling symbols are not meaningless, nor the propositions in which they occur nonsensical.

Russell proposed a new analysis of such 'denoting phrases', this analysis would show how words like 'unicorn' have meaning, it would show how some statements the present king of France is bald' and 'Scott is the author of Waverley' can be analysed. It is assumed that in the analysis of the meaning of a proposition one seeks to connect each component of the proposition with a constituent of experience, either directly or indirecly in the analysis of a proposition. Some where one must come to something with which he is acquainted, for which the components of a proposition is a name. But the problem arises because these symbols in question do not refer to such components of experience. Russell says that 'denoting phrases' are 'incomplete symbols' which appear to be names but they are actually symbols which have meaning only in the context of the proposition in which each occurs. He goes on to show how these apparent names can be replaced in their propositions so that the meaning is revealed, but the seeming name symbol drops out.

He applies this theory of description to the puzzle of "the present king of France is bald" This proposition seems to have meaning and to be false, yet it is not false in the sense that the king of France has hair. This puzzle can be solved when we replace the present king of France is bald' with 'one and only one person
is the present king of France, and that person is bald. We see that it is the first part of this conjunction which is false, but here does not exist a person who is the present king of France and this makes the whole proposition false.

Russell presents his theory as a more satisfactory analysis of the meaning of these troublesome symbols and propositions than the analysis he had yet been put forth. He intended the analysis to apply to all phrases of the form 'the so and so' which are definite descriptions for him, and the phrases of the form a such and such' which are indefinite descriptions. These descriptive phrases, on analysis, could be shown not to name or to refer directly, but to have meaning only in the context of the proposition in which they occur and to be amenable to a restatement in which the original symbols drop out.

In Russell's theory of knowledge, there was a continuing search to find the components of propositions which directly refer to experience, that is, logically proper names, and then to show how other symbols can be analysed as descriptions in terms of these names with direct denotations\(^9\). The theory of descriptions removed the necessity of distinguishing meaning from denoting. Therefore all expressions that survived analysis as names have meaning consisted simply in the object named.

The main features of logically proper names according to Russell are:

(1) Logically proper names have meaning in isolation, they contrast with incomplete symbols, definite descriptions and class names for these have no meaning until they are supplied with appropriate contexts.

Russell also holds that it is not true that incomplete symbols can be defined only in use, not in isolation from a context. Because genuine proper names are indefinable, and also because incomplete symbols may well have
inexplicit definition. Such symbols (the indefinables) can be understood only by acquaintance with what they stand for and this gives them meaning in isolation from any context.

Russell's contrast between incomplete symbols and symbols with meaning in isolation from any context (proper names) has nothing to do with the valency of an expression. Any symbol that is not incomplete has a meaning by itself in particular, simple (unanalysable) predicates have such meaning.

In addition to the use of the method of the analysis of incomplete symbols and the analysis of descriptions, the analytic method had an important application it 'the method of construction'.

Russell presented the method of construction as the new scientific method of philosophizing in 'Our knowledge of the External World'. In this work the units of sense-data are used as the basis of the constructions by which bridge is built between perception and the entities of physical science. 'Matter', 'Cause', and other concepts of physics are to be resolved by analysis in the constructions from sense data. This eliminates the need to postulate a world of space, time, matter as real in order for the conclusions of science to be meaningful.

After the adoption of neutral monism a further development of the method of construction, Russell resolved the supposed difference between mind and matter in the method of constructing causal laws of physics and of psychology. The law of physics & of psychology result from the grouping of 'appearances' at succeeding times from given spatial perspective. The method of construction is applied to number of construction of physics and of psychology in the two books, 'The Analysis of Matter' and 'The Analysis of mind'.

The meaning of a logically proper name is the object named which is its bearer. A logically proper name directly represents some object. It is a

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word whose meaning is a particular and it depends upon direct acquaintance with object. [Wittgenstion and understanding meaning – p-229]. Therefore Russell accordingly develops a way of referring to the present experience which will be equivalent in meaning to the use of 'ego-centric particulars' but at the same time will be descriptive of the present experience.

In discussing the problem of 'ego-centric particulars' we have been led in to discussion which is properly concerned with the meaning of sentences and propositions, rather than of universal words. In some cases rudimentary meaning may be carried by a single object-word used alone as in the cry of 'fire', in most cases meaning is carried in a sentence through the unity of the sentence not through the separate words1.

For Russell there are different types of sentences viz interrogative, optative, exclamatory or imperative; they may also be indicative. Indicative sentences are alone true or false. Besides being true or false, indicative sentences have two other properties which are of interest to us, and which they share with other sentences. The first of these is that they are composed of words, and have a meaning derive live from that they are a certain kind of unity, in virtue of which they are capable of properties not possessed by their constituent words. In the sentence 'x precedes y', for instance, the unity of meaning is clean in that the order of the words impart of the meaning itself. Again we may consider a sentence e.g., "I should be sorry if you fall ill". This can not be divided into "I shall be sorry" and "you will fall ill", it has kind of unity that we are demanding of a sentence. But it has a complexity which some sentences do not have. Without concerning tense, it only states a relation between "I am sorry" and "you are ill". At any time when the second of these sentence is true, the first is also true. Such sentences may be called

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"molecular" in relation to their constituent sentences, which in the same
relation, may be called "atomic". Whether any sentences are "atomic" in a
non-relative sense may be left an open question; but whenever we find a
sentence to be molecular, and considering what makes the unity of sentences,
we shall transfer our attention, in the first place to its atoms.12

An atomic sentence could be described as containing single subject
and predicate. But this description is superficial when we discuss the
'proposition of atomic form' in which we deal with the basic unity of meaning.
The proposition of atomic form' is defined by Russell as one composed of a
finite number of proper names and another world, usually a relation words,
e.g. 'A gave the book to B or X precedes Y'. Such propositions will exclude
all object-words which are not logically proper names (since these involve
generality and hence do not refer directly to a specific portion of space-time).
All logical e.g. conjunctions, negative terms, and words of 'quantity' refer to a
second level of meaning and are properly to be expressed in a molecular
proposition. Propositions of atomic form refer to an unanalysable complex of
the given compresent complex of qualities and there is a fact which verifies
them and renders them true or false.

Russell defines a basic propositions as true by definition when the
sentence in which it is symbolised 'spontaneously', expresses and indicates
the same fact. 'The sentence expresses the utterer's immediate experience
and it indicates that is, refers to the fact. Which is what the utterer is
experiencing, and that is the same experience, or the same fact. There is a
direct causal connection between the experience and the uttering of the
sentence.13

A basic proposition has several characteristics. It must known
independently of inferences from other propositions, but not independently of evidence, since there must a perceptive occurrence which gives the cause and this perceptive occurrence is considered give the reason for believing the basic proposition. And from a logical point of view, it should be possible to analyse our empirical knowledge and its primitive propositions (apart from logic and generalities) should all have been at the moment when they were first believed, as basic propositions.

Therefore in short, a basic proposition must be caused by some sensible occurrence; and it must be of such a form that no other basic proposition can contradict it. E.g. "I am not", that is red", "what a foul snail". All basic propositions in the above sense are personal, since no one else can share my percepts, and transitory, for after a moment they are replaced by memories.

Objects words, in their most primitive use, they are perceptive judgments. E.g. the word "hot". What are express by at first sight by the word "hot" is what we afterwards express by "this is hot" or "I am hot", Every object in its primitive use, has an implicit egocentricity, which the subsequent development of speech renders explicit.

But when we have advance to the point at which we can explicitly consider the meanings of words, we see that this egocentricity is no part of the meaning of the word "hot" as it exists in a developed language. The word "hot" means only that quality in occurrences which if the occurrences are suitably related to one, will make them causes of his or her utterance of the word "hot". In passing from "hot" to "this is hot", we effect an analysis; the quality "hot" is freed from egocentricity, and the formerly implicit egocentric element is rendered explicit. Implicit egocentric element is rendered explicit.
by the "this is . All knowledge stated by means of egocentric particulars can be stated without employing them$^{15}$.

The implications of this linguistic analysis of propositions of atomic form are connected with derivative meanings and truth values, because in logical atomism, molecular propositions are built up out of atomic propositions. They are analysable in to their component atomic propositions, and it is through such analysis that they are testable. But there are important differences between the linguistic analysis developed in the Inquiry and the earlier analysis of 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', in spite of the similarity of the method and of terminology. The original programme of logical atomism at least suggested the possibility that all molecular propositions could be reduced to the appropriate atomic propositions and hence verified. But in the Inquiry' there is a long argument against the verifiability theory of meaning and the verifiability theory of truth of logical positivism. In this argument Russell maintains that there are meaningful propositions which are not capable of verification, and the true propositions which can not ever be known to be true. Russell argues there will always be at least one more relation in the proposition than in the fact. Even logically perfect language cannot be expected to mirror perfectly the structure of the complex of compresence$^{16}$.

Russell categorically says that for a sentence to be claimed as significant, the sentence need not satisfy the condition laid down in the above criterion, i.e. a sentence can be claimed to be significant, even if it does not refer to any situation. He has made this provision in his criterion of meaning in order to account for the meaning claim of abstract propositions such as propositions about what he calls universals. On this connection Russell rejects

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Schlick's theory of meaning. According to Schlick, "stating the meaning of a sentence amounts to stating the rules according to which the sentence is to be used, and this is the something as asking the way in which it can be verified (or falsified). The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification. There is no way of understanding any meaning without ultimate reference to ostensive definitions, and this means, in an obvious sense, reference to experience or possibility of verification".

For Russell, here Schlick falls into a fallacy from failure to distinguish between words and sentences. All necessary words, as we have been seen, and are thus dependent on experience for their meaning. But it is of the essence of the use of language that we can understand a sentence correctly compounded out of words that we understand, inspite of having no experience corresponding to the sentence as a whole. Fiction, history, and all giving of information depend upon this property of language.

Russell in his first point of criticism admits his agreement with Schlick in respect of the concept of the meaning of sentences, on the ground that it can not account for the universally recognised meaningfulness of historical propositions, other information giving sentences and fictions, propositions used in fiction. For Schlick, all necessary words have ostensive definition and are thus dependent on experience for their meaning.

Russell agrees with Schlick in view that the constituent words of a significant sentence can be understood only in terms of our experience. But he rejects Schlick's view that it is not possible to understand a sentence unless what the sentence indicates is for an object or experience.

Secondly, for Russell, "again when it is said that the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification", this omits the propositions that
are most nearly certain, viz - judgments of perception. For these there is no method of verification, since it is they that constitute the verification of all other empirical propositions that can be in any degree known". That is Schlick's theory of meaning does not account for the meaningfulness of judgments of perception, as they are unverifiable in the sense that they do not need to be verified because they constitute the verification of all the verifiable propositions17. Schlick were right, we should be committed to an endless regress, for propositions are verified by means of other propositions which, in turn, must derive their meaning from the way in which they are verified by yet other propositions, and so on ad infinitum. All those who make "verification" fundamental overlook the real problem,, which is the relation between words non-verbal occurrences in judgements of perception.

The process of verification is never sufficiently examined by those who make it fundamental. In its simplest form, it occurs when we first expect an event and then perceive it. But if an event occurs though we donot expect it ; we are just as capable of perceiving it and forming a judgement of perception about it ; yet in this case there is no process verification. Verification confirms the more doubtful by means of the less doubtful, and is therefore essentially inapplicable to the least doubtful, viz judgments of perception18. while others signify what is false. We must therefore find some way of defining the difference between string of words that are nonsense and string of words that signify something ..... "In the case of a sentence that signify something, we have to inquire whether the something must be different from the sentence, or whether significance can be merely adjectival. He says that the rules of syntax in ordinary language are obviously intended to prevent nonsense ; but they fail to achieve their purpose completely. By following the
rules of syntax a sentence does not necessarily become significant. The example given by him is "quadruplicity drinks procrastination". Wisdom's well known examples of such sentences are, 'Time and Space take tea without sugar'. Algebraic equations do not attend race meetings, Arithmetical fractions attacked me in the bathroom' etc.

For Russell an assertion has two sides, subjective and objective and the distinction between subjective and objective assertion leads Russell to explain the criterion of meaning. Subjectively an assertion expresses a state of the speaker, which may be called a belief, which may exist without words and even in animals and infants who do not possess language. Objectively if the assertion is true it indicates a fact, if false, it intends to indicate a fact, but fails to do so. There are some assertions, viz - those which assert present states of the speaker in which what is 'expressed' what is 'indicated' are identical. E.g. psychological propositions. But in general Russell points out that these two viz what is expressed and what is 'indicated' by an assertion are different. After pointing the marks of distinction between subjective and objective sides of an assertion, he formulates his criterion of meaning in the following words. "The significance of a sentence is what it expresses. Thus true and false sentence are equally significant ; but a string of words which can not express any state of the speaker is non-sensical".

Evidently, Russell's criterion of meaning (the significance of a sentence is what it expresses) pertains more to the meaning of sentences comprehend by the hearer, than to the meaning sought to be communicated by the speaker. According to Russell "the question of significance may be brought in to connection with sentences heard rather than spoken. The hearing of a significant statement has effects dependent upon the nature of the statement
but not upon its truth or false has no such effects. It is true that what is in fact nonsense, may have effects such as only a significant statement should have but in that case the hearer usually imagines a signification of which the words are not strictly susceptible ...... a heard statement interpreted by the hearer as significant is capable of which obvious nonsense in incapable”20. This is one of the points to be borne in mind in seeking a definition of significance.

Therefore generally two questions arises (1) What is meant by the “significance” and form of words? (2) What syntactical rules can be given as to when a form of words is significant?

What is meant by the significance of a form of words? Russell used the word “significance” in a restricted sense here, in which significance is propositional E.g. “the king of England” is a phrase which has meaning in one sense, but does not have “significance with which one is concerned. For our present purpose, what the phrase signifies must be something true or false. Russell calls this significance “propositional significance” to distinguish it from other kinds.

A sufficient but not necessary criterion of significance is that to use a phrase as an assertion perceptual experiences can be imagined, or actually occur. E.g. in certain circumstances we may say that we perceive, “snow is white”, therefore the phrase “snow is white is significant. In certain perceptive circumstances we may say “snow is not black” is significant21;

According to Russell a spoken sentence can be characterised as meaningful if it produces in the hearer’s mind a thought content, but the thought content should be an integrated thought pattern and not merely some stray mental pictures, for even a non-sensical sentence does evoke stray mental pictures in the hearer’s mind.

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Three factors seem to be involved when we make on hear meaningful utterances through words and sentences. (1) Words or patterns of words, (2) thought patterns, (3) things or situations (composed of things and their interrelations)

In Russell’s Theory of Meaning, meaning is defined in terms of the relation between words and thoughts and not in terms of the relation between words and things. In this statement, he means to point out that if there is at the moment an actual perceptual situation in our empirical experience, or if we can conceive (by way of recollection or imagination) a situation in reference to which the given word or sentence is used, then that word or sentence would be considered to be significant. Therefore, meaning giving situation of a sentence should fall, either within the field of our perceptual experience or within the field of recollection or imagination.

Russell holds that, what makes a statement true is one thing and that one expresses is another. A fact of physics makes a statement true when one says about snow: “snow is white”. But here there is an expression of a state of mind, viz a certain belief means object of belief). Certain experiences cause us to believe that snow is white ; if this belief has an object, we may say there is an expression of the fact of believing something (viz - snow is white) by the assertion of this object. According to Russell if someone does not assert that he believe the object ; that would be a different assertion, which might be true even if snow is black. Our problem is : is there something, and if so that, what one believes when he believes that snow is white? It is obvious that if beliefs have objects, what one believes in the same whether he believes that snow is white or doubt that snow white? If the significance of the sentence is true, occurrences are neither words nor images, if it is known to
be true, these occurrences must be or have been percepts. If we can decide what is meant by the "significance that is to be called a "proposition", and that is either true or false. A sentence may signify a truth or, a falsehood or nothing; but if a sentence signifies anything, then what it signifies must be true or false.

In the case of a sentence of atomic form, the significance is a state of the believer, or rather a set of such states having certain similarities. A possible form of such a state is a complex image, or rather a whole set of similar complex images. Images form a language, but the language differs from that of words in the fact that it does not contain any non-sense. Russell holds that, in order to understand the meaning of a proposition as a form of words, we must understand what constitutes the meaning of single words.

If we confine ourselves to spoken words in one language, a word is a class of closely similar noises produced by breath combined with movements of the throat and tongue and lips. This is not a definition of 'words' since some noises are meaningless, and meaning is part of the definition of 'words'. What we call one word is not a single entity, but a class of entities; there are instances of the word 'dog' just as there are instances of dogs. And when we hear a noise, we may be doubtful whether it is the word 'dog' badly pronounced or not.

If we take some words such as 'Socrates' or 'dog', the meaning of the word consists in some relation to an object or set of objects - the first question to be asked is; can the relation called 'meaning' be a direct relation between the word as physical occurrence and the object itself, or must the relation pass through a 'mental' intermediary which could be called 'the 'idea' of an object ?
If we think that no ‘mental’ intermediary is required, we shall have to regard the ‘meaning’ of a word as consisting in what James call ‘processes of leading’. That is to say, the causes and effects of the occurrences of a word will be connected, in some way to be further defined, with the object which is its meaning. When we say of a dog that he ‘knows’ his name, only causal correlation are indubitable, but we can not be sure that there any ‘mental’ occurrence in the dog when we call him and he comes. Is it possible that all use and understanding of language consists merely on the fact that certain events cause it, and it, in turn, cause certain events?

This view of language has been advocated, more or less tentatively, by professor Watson in his book on Behaviour. For him since language is a observable phenomenon, and since language has a property which we call ‘meaning’, it is essential to behaviourism to give an account of ‘meaning’, which introduces nothing known only through introspection. Watson recognises this obligation and sets to work to fulfil it. But Russell believes that a theory of language which takes no account of images is incomplete in a vital point.

Watson denies altogether the occurrence of images, which he replaces by faint kinaesthetic. Sensation Kinaesthetic images can be explained as being really small sensations of the same kind as those that would belong to actual movements. Inner speech, in so far as it is not accompanied by auditory images, really consists of such small sensations and be accompanied by small movements of the tongue or throat as behaviourism requires. Tactile images might possibly be similarly explained. But visual and auditory images cannot be so explained, because, if taken as sensations, they actually contradict the laws of physics.
Watson denies imagery altogether in order to show that practically all natural thoughts goes on in terms of sensory motor processes in the larynx. Russell thinks that he (Watson) is mistaking a personal peculiarity for a universal human characteristics.

The essential characteristics of introspective data is concerned with localization; either they are not localized at all, or they are localized in a place already physically occupied by something which would be inconsistent with them if they were regarded as part of the physical world. In either case, introspective data have to be regarded as not obeying the laws of physics, and this is, the fundamental reason why an attempt is made to reject them.

When we consider the localization of images, we find a difference according to the nature of the images, of private sensations can be localized where the private sensations would be, without causing any gross or obvious violation of physical laws. Images of words in mouth can be, located in the mouth. Therefore the objection regarding 'images as small sensations' may or may not be true, but it is not capable of being rejected without more difficulty. In regard to all private sensations, the distinction between image and sensation is not sharp and definite. But visual and auditory images are in quite a different position, since the physical event to which they would point, if they were sensations, is not taking place.

Introspection are images of public sensations, i.e. especially visual and auditory images. On grounds of observation, inspite of Watson, it seems impossible to deny that such images occur. But they are not public, and if taken as sensations, contradict the laws of physics. Thus it seems that the physical world does not include all that we are aware of, and that introspection must be admitted as a source of knowledge distinct from sensation. It is
impossible to escape the admission of images as something radically distinct from sensations, particularly as being not amenable to the laws of physics.

Sensations are both physical and mental. The use of words actually pronounced or written is part of the physical world, but in so far as words obtain their meaning through images, it is impossible to deal adequately with words without introducing psychology and taking account of data obtained by introspection. In considering the meaning of either a word or an image we have to distinguish:

(1) The causes of the word or image.
(2) Its effects.
(3) What is the relation that constitutes meaning. Therefore it is clear that meaning is a relation which involves causal law, but it involves also something else when is less easy to define.

The meaning of words differs as a rule from that of images by depending upon association not upon similarity.

To 'think' of the meaning of a word is to know the meaning the images of the word. Normally, grown up people speaking their own language use words without thinking of their meaning. A person 'understands' a word when (a) suitable circumstances make him use it, (b) the hearing of it causes suitable behaviour in him. We may call these two, active and passive understanding respectively. E.g. Dogs have often passive understanding of some words but not active understanding respectively.

A word has a meaning, more or less vague, but the meaning is only to be discovered by observing its use; the use comes first, and the meaning is distilled out of it. The relation of a word to its meaning is, in fact, of the nature of a causal law. To understand what is meant by 'understanding words
and sentences we may suppose that some body is walking in London with an absent mended friend - “Look out, there's a motor coming. He will glance round and jump aside without the need of any 'mental' intermediary. There needs no ‘ideas’, but only a stiffening of the muscles, followed quickly by action. He understands’ the words, because he does the right thing such ‘understanding’ may be regarded as belonging to the nerves and brain. Thus understanding in this sense may be reduced to mere physiological causal laws.

For Russell there are four distinct ways of understanding words:

1. On suitable occasions one uses the word properly.
2. When the word is heard by one he acts appropriately.
3. One associates the word with another word (in a different language) which has the appropriate effect on behaviour.
4. When the word is being first learnt, one associates it with object, which is what it ‘means’, thus the word acquires some of the same causal efficacy as the object. The word ‘motor!’ can make one leap aside, just as the motor can, but it can not break his bones.

So far as the four ways of understanding are concerned everything can be accounted for by behaviour and we are concerned with only the demonstrative use of language to point out a feature in the present environment, but not with its ‘narrative’ use of which we may take as an instance telling of some remembered event.

A child when hears the word ‘motor’ for the first time, the child remembers the incident and relates it to someone else. In this case, both the active and passive understanding of words are different from what they are when words are used demonstratively. The child is not seeing a motor; but
only remembering one; the hearer does not look round in expectation of seeing a motor coming, but 'understands' that a motor came at some earlier time. The child may not genuinely remember the incident, but only have the habit of appropriate words as in the case of a poem which we know by heart we can not remember learning it. And the hearer also may only pay attention to the words, and not call up any corresponding picture. But there is however the possibility of a memory image in the hearer that makes the essence of the meaning of the words. We may say that while words used demonstratively describe and are intendant to cause images.

Therefore we have other two ways of understanding words viz - the way of memory and the way of imagination.

5. The words which are already exist or the words which exist as a habit and which are known to be descriptive of some past experience are used to describe or recall a memory image.

6. The words used by a poet or novelist, or to create it in the ordinary case of giving information may be used to describe or create an imagination image, though in the ordinary case of giving information, it is intended that the imagination image when created, shall be accompanied by belief that something has occurred.

These two ways of using words may be spoken of together as the use of words in thinking. Since the way of using words depends upon images, can not be fully dealt with on behaviourist lines. This is the most essential function of words and it is through their connection with the idea of 'time' or 'space' Thus the problem of the meaning or words is reduced to the problem of the meaning of images.

The 'meaning' of images is the simplest kind of meaning, because

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images resemble what they mean, where as words, as a rule do not. Images are said to be 'copies' of sensations. The question what a given image 'means' is partly within the control of our will. The image of a printed word may mean, not the word, but what the word means. The image of a triangle may mean one particular triangle, or triangles in general. In thinking of dogs in general, we may use a vague image of a dog, which means the species, not any individual.

Some images mean particulars and others mean universals. Images are particulars, when their meaning depends upon the nature of their causal efficacy. An image means a universal if its effects depend only upon its prototype being an instance of that universal. If we call up an image in order to make a statement about dogs, we apply to that image the characteristics of all images of dogs. In using words, we always ignore all that is peculiar to the instance of the word except elocution and calligraphy. Two instances of the word 'dog' are more like than two dogs. Therefore through words we can easily deal with universals.

That of which an image is a copy is called its 'prototype' and this is or its parts is always an indispensable part of the cause either of the image, or of its constituents.

The effects of an image tend to resemble those of its prototype or to produce desire or aversion for it. This is one link between an image and its meaning. The thought of a drink has effects on a thirsty man which are similar to those of a sight of the foaming glass. This similarity belongs also to words, primarily, thought their power of calling up images, but afterwards directly. Images are of various degrees of vagueness, and the vaguer they are the more different objects can be accepted as their prototypes. If an object 'O' is
the prototype of an image, then, in the presence of 'O', we can recognise it as what we had an image 'of'. We may then say that 'O' is the meaning of the image. But meaning is to some extent subject to the will e.g., a generic image is simply one intended to be generic.

It has already been stated that an assertion has two sides objective and subjective and when either a belief or a proposition is interpreted, there are two aspects to the meaning of it; one is what it expresses, and the other is what it indicates. Although in a sense the sentence or proposition may be said to 'express' an organic state. E.g. if one says 'I am hot', the meaning of this sentence or proposition, assuming that one is telling the truth, is a certain organic state expresses. Therefore one aspect of any belief or proposition or sentence is the expression of the organic state which is the underlying pre-verbal belief.

The other aspect of the meaning of belief or sentence or proposition is what it indicates. E.g. the statement about Christopher Columbus expresses a 'yes feeling' concerning the assertion of certain sentence; it also refers to a person and an event which happened in the fifteenth century. The facts to which this historical proposition refers are what it indicates.

Russell's theory of knowledge requires a rigorous relation of belief, symbol and fact which is possible only if one limits one's consideration to the kind of language and language use which is truly indicative. In The Analysis of Mind Russell is interested primarily in psychological analysis and he drops the reference to the knowing mind or subject as part of that analysis, having adopted the position of neutral monism. A belief is analysed in to three elements viz –

(1) the content which is believed.
(2) the relation of the content to its 'objective', i.e. to the fact which makes it true or false.

(3) the element which is believed, as opposed to consideration of the same content, or doubt concerning it, or desire for it etc.

The believing is the individual's possession of the conviction of a certain meaning, either in words or in images; the content of the belief is the meaning, e.g. that Caesar conquered Gaul; the reference of the belief is the event or fact to which the belief, if it is true, refers the historical event of the conquering of Gaul. The 'objective reference' of the belief, may be derived from the meaning of the individual words, if one is trying to understand a given proposition. Russell says that what is expressed and what is referred to are the same. Hence the proposition 'I am hot', can not be false. In most propositions there is a gape between the organic state of belief which the proposition expresses and the fact which it indicates that the possibility of its being true or false arises. There may be a considerable gape between the belief and the content which is remote in space and time and which may not itself be the cause of the occurrence of the belief. E.g. if one say it is raining, the objective reference of his belief is the water streaming from his face from the clouds, and his belief is caused by the same fact which is the objective referent of the belief. However, this is not the case with respect to 'Caesar conquered gaul. In this case, the causal connection between the event referred to one's belief is remote and indirect.

Truth and falsehood depend upon a relation between the significance of the sentence and something which is neither words nor images. It is not easy to define what is significance. If we can desire what is meant by the 'significance' of a sentence, the significance is to be called a "proposition"
and that is either true or false. A sentence may signify a truth, or signify a falsehood, or signify nothing; but if a sentence signifies anything, then what it signifies must be true or false.

Russell distinguishes a proposition expressed in words as a ‘word propositions’ and one consisting of images as an ‘image-proposition’. As a general rule a word proposition ‘means’ an image proposition; this is the case with false propositions as well as with true ones, since image propositions are capable of falsehood as word propositions. It is not the fact which makes a proposition true or false as its ‘meaning’, because this usage would be confusing in the case of falsehood. But it is the relation of the proposition to the fact which makes it true or false as its ‘objective reference’, or simply reference.

The most important thing about a proposition is that, whether it consists of images or of words. Whether it has a certain analogy of structure to be further investigated — with fact which makes it true or false; A word proposition, apart from niceties, means the corresponding image proposition, and an image proposition has an objective reference dependent upon the meanings of its constituent images.

When we believe a proposition, we have a certain feeling which is related to the content of the proposition in the way described as ‘believing that proposition’. Various different feelings are collected together under the one word ‘belief’ and that there is not any one feeling which pre-eminently is belief.

Regarding belief it is necessary to consider a theory according to which there is not single occurrence which can be described as believing a proposition, but belief simply consists in causal efficacy. Some ideas move us to action, others do not, that which move us to action are said to be ‘believed’.

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A behaviourist who denies images will have to go even further and deny image propositions altogether. For him a belief will be, like a force in physics - an imagined fictions cause of a series of action. An animal, desiring A, proceeds to try to realize B; we then say that the animal 'believes' that 'B' is a means to A. This is merely a way of collecting together a certain set of acts, it does not represent any single occurrence in the animal. But this view, whatever may be said in its favour where animals are concerned, is condemned as regards human beings by the admission of images. Therefore it becomes impossible to deny that image proposition occur in people, and it is clear that belief has specially to do with propositions, given that propositions occur. And this being admitted we can not make the differentia between a proposition believed and a proposition merely considered consist only in the presence or absence of causal efficacy. If we emphasise on the maximum 'same cause, same effect' we must hold that if a proposition believed has different effects from those of the same proposition merely considered, there must be some intrinsic difference between believing and considering. The fact that believing moves us as considering does not, is evidence of some intrinsic difference between the two phenomena, even when the proposition concerned is the same in both cases.

There are various feelings that may attach to a proposition, any one of which constitutes belief eg. memory, expectation, and bare non temporal assent. Memory requires for its truth that the objective of the proposition should be in the past, that it should be in the future while bare assent does not necessitate any special time relation of the belief to the objective, possibly disjunction and implications may involve other kinds of belief feelings.
The memory image constitutes the image proposition, but the translation of our belief into words is 'something like this was', not 'something like this is', as it would be in assent not of the nature of memory or expectation. And even this translation is hardly accurate, for words point not only to images, but beyond images to what these mean.

It may be conceded that a mere image, without the addition of any positive feeling that could be called 'belief', is apt to have a certain dynamic power, and in this sense an uncompleted image has the force of a belief. But though this may be true, it does not account for any but the simplest phenomena of belief. It will not explain either memory or expectation, though they differ widely in their effects an action. Nor can it explain the belief which do not issue in any proximate action, such as those of mathematics. Therefore there are belief feelings of the same order as those of doubt or desire or disbelief can be produced by mere uncontradicted images. E.g. The boy imagining a winged horse are liable to produce a certain confusion. The image of the winged horse of course exists, and if the boy took this to be real, he would not be in error. But images accompanied by belief are normally taken as signs; the belief is not in the image, but in something else that is indicated by the image. This is obvious is such a case as memory. When we remember an event by means of present images we are not believing in the present existence of the images, but in the past existence of something resembling them. It is almost impossible to translate what is occurring into words without great distortion.

Therefore, when we use a word as it meant the image, we need an unnatural duplication of words in order to reach what the image stand for the
image is a sign, something pointing beyond itself a different event. This produces the appearance of unexpected complication, leading to an undue task of plausibility\(^27\).

The relation of the content of belief to its ‘objective’, i.e. to the fact which makes it true or false. The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon its relation to a fact other than itself. This fact Russell calls ‘its objective’. A proposition ‘refers to’ its objective. Thus when we are concerned with image propositions, ‘referring to’ takes the place of ‘meaning’. Word propositions, on the other hand, while also referring to objectives, may in simple cases, be legitimately spoken of as ‘meaning’ image proposition\(^28\).

The meaning of a single word is defined by the situations that cause to be used and the effects that result from hearing it. The significance of a sentence can be similarly defined. An object word is a sentence when used in an exclamatory manner. So long as we confine ourselves to these generalities there is no problem as to the significance of sentences. The problem arise when we attempt to explain in psychological terms the relation between the significance of a sentence and the meanings of its constituent words. To the logician, the significance is definable in terms of the meanings of the words and the rules of syntax. But psychologically the sentence is a causal unit, and its effect does not seem to be compounded of separate effects of separate words. In the psychological theory of significance, a spoken sentence is “significant” if its causes are of a certain kind, and a heard sentence is “significant” if its effects are a certain kind. The psychological theory of significance consists in defining these kinds.

“Belief is a certain condition of mind and body, not essentially involving
words. A person ‘A’ may be in a condition which is described in the words “A believes that there is about to be a loud bang”. When ‘A’ is in a condition, it may cause him to use the words “there is about to be loud bang”. A sentence “P” is significant when there can be a state of mind and body described in the words “A believes P”. Hearing the sentence “P” is one possible cause of the state that consists in believing “P”. A heard sentence is significant when it can be such a cause.

Therefore there are two different definitions of “significance”. (1) one is relative to the linguistic habits of a person who says “A believes P”, (2) the other to those of a person who hears A uttering P. A man who is in a state of belief may utter a sentence “P” with the intention of expressing his belief, but a hearer, with other linguistic habits, may consider the expression inaccurate. A man ‘A’ may say “the moon looks as large as a soup plate”. B may say “no, only as large as a dollar”; C may say “both your sentences are incomplete; you must specify the distance of the soup plate or dollar from the eye”. What does C mean by “must”? He means that the sentences of A and B, though apparently inconsistent, are not really so, since neither describes a definite state of affairs.

Like Hume’s “impression” and “idea” every object word has two uses. A word in the speaker, applies to an impression, when it is directly caused by a sensible occurrence. When it is heard, or used in narrative, it does not apply to an impression, but it is still a word, not a mere noise; it still "means something, and what it means" may be called an “idea”. The same distinction applies to sentences: a spoken sentence may describe an impression, but a heard sentence does not.
According to the psychological theory of significance there are states which may be called states of "believing" these states do not essentially involve words. Two states of believing may be so related that we call them instances of the same belief. A man with suitable language habits has a given belief in which he utters a certain sentence. When the utterance of a certain sentence is an instance of a certain belief, the sentence is said to "express" the belief. A spoken sentence is "significant" when there is a possible belief that it "expresses". A heard sentence "S" may be believed or rejected or doubted. If believed, the hearer's belief is "expressed" by the some sentence "S". If rejected the hear's disbelief is "expressed" by the sentence "not-S", if doubted, by "perhaps S". A heard sentence "S" is significant if it can cause any of the three kinds of states "expressed" by "S" “no-S”, and "perhaps S". When we say simply that "S" is significant, we mean that it has this latter kind of significance. This whole theory is completely independent of any consideration of truth and falsehood. But this theory is incomplete. Because it has not decided what two states must have in common in order to be instances of the same belief. When verbal habits are sufficiently developed, we may say that two states are instances of the same belief if they can be expressed by the same sentence. Here the only definition is causal; where two states are instances of the same belief when they cause the same behaviour. But this causal definition is inadequate.

What makes a sentence interesting is its significance or its capacity for expressing a belief and for indicating a fact. It acquires the latter through the former, and the former through the meanings of its words, which meanings are causal properties of noises acquired through the mechanism of conditioned

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Meaning is limited to experience, but, significance is not. As regards meaning we may, on the usual grounds, ignore words that have a dictionary definition, and confine ourselves to words of which the definition is ostensive. Therefore it is obvious that an ostensive definition must depend upon experience; Hume’s principle "no idea without an antecedent impression", certainly applies to learning the meaning of object words.

As regards significance: this transcends my personal experience whenever one receive information it transcends the experience of all mankind in works of fiction. We experience “Hamlet”, not Hamlet; but our emotions in reading the play have to do with Hamlet not with “Hamlet”. “Hamlet” is a word of six letters; whether it should be or not be is a question of little interest, and therefore “Hamlet” consists entirely of false propositions, which transcend experience, but which are certainly significant, since they can arouse emotions. When we say that our emotions are about Hamlet, no “Hamlet”, we must qualify this statement; they are really not about the man named “Hamlet”. The propositions in the play are significant because we know from experience the noise “Hamlet”, the meaning of “name” and the meaning of “man”. The fundamental falsehood in the play is the proposition; the noise “Hamlet” is a name.

Linguistically, a word has a meaning which lies within “experience” if it has an ostensive definition. The word “Hamlet” does not have meaning which lies within experience; because it makes the word ‘Hamlet’, which we can point to. When a word has an ostensive definition, we will call it an “experience-word”. All genuine proper names, all the apparatus of predicates
are relations that have no dictionary definitions and also some few logical words as expressing states of mind such as rejection or hesitation are included in "experience word."

Dependence upon one's experience is complete in the case of all beliefs in the verbal expression of which there are no variable, i.e. no such words as 'all' or 'some'. Such beliefs must express, one's perceptive experiences the only extension being that the experience may be recollected. The experience concerned must be one's own. Everything that one learns from others involves variables. In such cases, the belief conveyed to the auditor is never that expressed by the speaker, though it may, in favorable cases, be logically deducible from it. "When a man in my hearing, makes a statement "fa", where "a" is the name of something that I have not experienced, if I believe him I believe, not "fa" (since for me "a" is not a name), but "there is a x such that "fx". Such a belief although it transcends my experience, would not be excluded by any of the philosophers, who wish to define "truth" in terms of "experience".

But if it is meaningless to suppose that there are unexperienced events the light waves and sound waves involved in the realist hypothesis are meaningless. Thus if we assert that it is meaningless to say that there are events which no one experiences we can not avoid conflicting grossly with scientific commonsense.

We may take the statement about something that no one experiences, e.g. Sound waves or light waves. "Suppose you and I are not at a considerable distance from each other along some measured road. You fire a pistol, and I first see the smoke and then hear the report. You move along
the 'road while I stand still. I find by experiment that the time between my seeing the flash, and hearing the report is proportional to your distance from me. So far I have introduced nothing that transcends my experience. Your movement may be taken as the movement of my percept of you, your position on the road may be taken as the position of my percept of you on may percept of the road, and your distance from me may be taken to be the number of percepts of measuring posts between my percept of my body and my percept of yours. Equality of distance between successive measuring posts is easily interpreted subjectively, since the space concerned may be taken to be the space of my percepts not physical space".

The essential transition involved in that from perceptual to physical space. But how can we enunciate the hypothesis that there is physical space and what sort of principle would (if true) justify us in believing this hypothesis?

In hypothesis, if a cause and its effect is separated by a finite time interval, must be connected by a continuous intermediate causal chain. There is evidently a causal relation between seeing and hearing the explosion: when I am on the spot, they are simultaneous; we therefore assume that, when they are not simultaneous there has been a series of intermediate occurrences which, however, were not received, and are therefore not perceptual space.

Regarding the hypothesis of sound waves, it can be said that it enables us to predict occurrences which are verifiable, and thus receives indirect inductive confirmation. This depends upon the general assumption that, as a rule, false hypothesis will have some consequences that can be shown by experience to be false.

But there is a substantial difference between hypothesis about what can
be experienced and hypothesis about what can not. If the hypothesis that whatever I have seen an explosion I shall soon hear a noise it will sooner or later be proved false by my experience. But the hypothesis that the sound reaches me by means of sound-waves might be false without ever leading to any consequence that experience would show to be false; we can suppose that the sound waves are a convenient fiction, and the sounds which I hear occurs as if borne by sound waves but in fact without non sensible antecedents. This hypothesis can not be rejected on grounds of induction; if it is to be rejected, it must be on grounds of some other kind, e.g. on the basis of the principle of continuity mentioned above.

Therefore the epistemological theory of truth confines "truth" to propositions asserting what we now perceive or remember. Since no one is willing to adopt such a narrow a theory, we are driven to the logical theory of truth, involving the possibility of events that no one experiences and of propositions that true although there can never be any evidence in their favour. But facts are wider than experiences. A "verifiable" proposition is one having a certain kind of correspondence with an experience; a "true" proposition is one which has exactly the same kind of correspondence with a fact. But the simplest type of correspondence, that which occurs in judgments of perception, is impossible in the case of all other judgments, since these involve variables. Since an experience is a fact, verifiable proposition are true; but there is no reason to suppose that all "true propositions are verifiable".

To make clear Russell's concept of meaning we should discuss some points of Carnap's concept of meaning. Carnap begins with a discussion of the relation between the three concepts "meaning", "truth" and "verifiability".
What Carnap calls "meaning" is called by Russell significance. Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification.

The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how can we find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Before we try to find out whether it is true or false we must know its meaning.

From the point of view of empiricism, there is a clear connection between the two problems and there is only is only one answer to the two questions. If we know what makes a given sentence true. If the conditions under which we take two sentences as true, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way in which we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible.

Carnap says "if we know what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is". According to Russell here we must distinguish sentences containing variable from the sentences containing only constants. We can examine the sentences in which there are only contents—e.g. some subject predicate sentence "P(a)", where the predicate "P" and the name "a" both have ostensive definitions. This implies our experiences which were expressed in sentences "P(b), "P(c)" P(d)" .... by means of which we acquired the habit of associating "P" with P; it also implies that we have had experiences which were expressed in sentences "Q(a), "R(a), "S(a)" by means of which we acquired the habit of associating
"a" with a. But it is assumed that we have never had an experience which we should express in the sentence “P(a)”. Though we suppose “to know what it would be for this sentence to be found true”, we do not see what this can mean expect that we can imagine the percept which would lead us to pronounce the sentence “P(a)” as a judgment of perception. This is certainly a sufficient condition for understanding the sentence, but it can not surely be regarded as a necessary one. E.g. if we hear “P(a)” asserted, we may act appropriately without any intermediary between hearing and acting, and we must then be said to understand the sentence.

In the case of a sentence of the form "there is an x such that ..." to say “what it would be for the sentence to be found true” is not easy, and involves another sentence of the same form. If we take the case of murder, committed, according to the verdict of the Coroner’s Court, by some person or persons unknown. In what sense do we know “what it would be for this sentence to be found true”? The simplest hypothesis is that some new witness comes forward and says he saw the murder committed by Mr. A.

Thus while we are considering the possibility of a new witness, we have a whole series of hypothetical percepts; B or C or D or Z seeing A do it; A or C or D or Z seeing B do it; and so on.

Therefore to know what it would be for the sentence to be found true is to know what it would be for some man to see some other man committing the murder, i.e. to know what is meant by another sentence of the same form. The sentence has a multitude of possible verifiers and so we can not, in advance, describe its verification except by another existence sentence.

If memory is accepted as an independent source of knowledge, then a
sentence must be considered verified if it either expresses or follows from present recollection. In that case, there will be a kind of verification which consists in arriving at an existence proposition expressing a memory belief. This kind of verification however, in view of the fallibility of memory, is inferior to that by perception, and we shall always endeavour, as far as we can to supplement it perceptive verification.

The evidence in favour of a sentence like "this is red", "that is bright", is not other sentences, but a non verbal occurrence; the whole of the evidence is contained in a single such occurrence; and nothing that happens at any other time or place can confirm or confute this evidence. Previous occurrences are concerned causally in our use of language: We say "red" because of a habit generated by past experiences. But the manner in which the habit was formed is irrelevant to the meaning of the word "red", which depends upon what the habit is, not upon how it came about.

For Carnap every particular sentence is logically independent of all the others severally and collectively. Whenever, therefore, one such sentence is said to increase or decrease the probability of another such sentence, this must be in virtue of some principle of inter connection, which if believed, must be believed on evidence other than that of perception. The most obvious example of such a principle is induction.

It is therefore obvious that Carnap is thinking of sentence having some degree of generality since various different occurrences may have a bearing on their truth or false hood. He speak of experiments which confirm in some degree the sentence or its negation. He does not tell us what it is that we learn from each experiment. It is difficult see how it could have increased or
diminished the probability of its truth, if each experiment does not teach us something. Therefore the sentence must have had a greater degree of generality than the sentences embodying the result of the several experiments. Therefore the sentences embodying the results of the several experiments must be of a logically simpler form than the sentence which they confirm or confute, and our theory of knowledge ought to begin with them not with the sentence that they are to prove or disprove.

All use of language involves a certain universality. But not necessary in knowledge. E.g. A predicate is a class of similar noises connected with a certain habit. If \( P \) is for a given organism \( N \), a ‘predicate’, if there is a class \( E \) of similar events such that the occurrence of any member of the class \( E \) causes in \( N \) an impulse to make a noise of the class \( P \)" The class of noises \( P \) will only have this property for \( N \) if \( N \) has frequently experienced members of \( E \) and \( P \) in conjunction. Repetition and universality, in fact are of the essence of the matter, for language consists of habits, habit involves repetition and repetition can only be of universals. But in knowledge none of this is necessary, since we use language, and can use it correctly, without being aware of the process by which we acquired it\(^3\).

Thus Russell's theory of meaning is to be distinguished from Schlick's Ayear's and Wittgenstein's Role theory of meaning along with Carnap. But being basically empiricist theories of meaning among them there is a family resemblance.

According to verifiability theory of meaning, a sentence is significant if its truth value can be empirically established; that means, if its truth can be confirmed or confuted by the method of verification, and evidently this method
verification is an empirical method.

Russell's complain against Schlick's verification theory of meaning, that it cannot account for the universally recognised meaning claim of fictious propositions is quite justified

Russell's admission that the meaning of a word is dependent on experience is a disputable point. It has been disputed by Wittgenstein in his Brown Book. Wittgenstein says "we can not point to an object corresponding to words like 'because', 'immediate', 'chance', 'again', etc. For these words are require the presence of certain complex situations and the meaning of words is defined by the way we use them in these different situations."

Thus according to Wittgenstein, the meaning of word or a sentence is the rule of its grammar. A word can be claimed to be meaningful if there is a rule regarding its use or placement in sentence. Similarly a sentence, according to Wittgenstein, can be claimed to be significant if there is a rule of its grammar or usage. A word or a phrase is meaningful if there is a rule for its proper placement in sentence; a sentence is meaningful if there is a rule of its grammar or usage. But the field or the scope of the usage of a significant sentence according to Wittgenstein must be limited and confined to empirical experience. In other words, a sentence is meaningful if there is a rule as to in what class of empirical situations it can be meaningfully used.

Russell's theory of meaning, in some degree, seems to be trans-empiricist' in its character, which is expressed in his statement that "a sentence can be claimed to be significant' even if its is meaning situation does not fall with in the field of perception or memory or imagination, provided subjectively it expresses a belief".
Russell has introduced a trans-empiricist element in his criterion of meaning or significance of sentences because he is committed to his belief in abstract concepts and propositions found in Mathematics and other abstract studies.

According to Wittgenstein, there are abstract terms, but there are no abstract concepts or ideas corresponding to abstract terms. The meaning claim of any abstract proposition according to Wittgenstein, has to be assessed in terms of the established rules of grammar or usage of the constituent abstract terms in reference to empirical situations. But Russell's statement of his criterion of significance, mentioned earlier, clearly implies that a sentence can be claimed to be significant even if it does not pertain to what is perceived or recollected or imagined; which again implies that a sentence can be claimed to be significant even if it pertains to what may be trans-empiricist in character. In his theory of meaning, he introduces the trans-empiricist element distinguishing between 'meaning' and 'significance'. Meaning, according to Russell, is limited to experience. By this he implies that a word or a string of words can be characterised as meaningful if it is definable in terms of experience, or if it is derived from what is definable in terms of experience. But significance, according to him, is not limited to experience. This distinction enables him to account for the significance of fictions propositions which cannot be accounted for in terms of verifiability theory of meaning. In this theory of meaning it is clearly and categorically stated and implied that, the unverifiable is not meaningless.

A similar trans-empiricist conclusion is worked out by him in his theory of truth in which connection he makes the following statement. "We are driven to the logical theory of truth involving the possibility of events that no person
experiences and of propositions that are true although there can never be any evidence in their favour."

Russell's real reason for compromising his empiricist standpoint in regard to meaning and truth was what Prof. Moore described in his class lecturers as "A philosopher's faith in the commonsense intelligence'. This commonsense intelligence made Russell subscribe to the view that whatever is commonly recognised as significant ought to be accepted in empirical philosophy is significant though it may not be ostensively definable or derived from what is ostensively definable.

But the fictitious propositions and mathematical propositions both of which are, according to Russell, significant, though unverifiable, transcend experience in different manners. And this needs to be further looked into33.

Notes and References

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12
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10. Russell. B.
11. Ramsden. Eames E.
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21. Ibid - pp. 174 - 75
22. Ibid - pp. 175 - 80
27. Ibid - pp 313 - 314 Logic and Knowledge pp. 306 - 310
28. Ibid - p. 314 op. cit - pp. 189 -93
30. Ibid - p. 209
32. Ibid. pp. 308 - 313