Chapter-VI

CONCLUSION

There need not be disagreements regarding the situation which led to the study of language in philosophy, and same situation led Russell and Wittgenstein to study language in philosophy. The situation in which a philosopher professionally finds ways of thinking and conceptual structures which are normally employed without trouble, and which everyone handles easily and with satisfactory results, problematic and riddled with difficulties the philosopher usually makes a choice between two ways of resolving his problems. There are philosophers who conclude that our usual patterns of thought are worthless, and that the concepts of everyday life are unverifiable. Therefore they believe that it is necessary to replace them by a way of thinking, a system of concepts, and a use of words which will permit an exact and satisfactory description of reality.

For Plato the everyday vision of the world was mere illusion and a lie. F.H. Bradley also found that the fundamental feature of our thought including such basic concepts as “time”, “relation” and “thing” inadequate, and indeed self-contradictory.

But there are also philosophers who, faced with the same problems decide that the trouble does not lie with the concepts of common sense but that they themselves have an insufficient comprehension of these concepts. They try to deepen their understanding of these concepts, and to master all their nuances. Through an exact and thorough analysis of these concepts...
and of common sense ways of thinking, they hope to arrive at a better understanding of common sense itself, and a better understanding of reality. This was the strategy of Aristotle in his Nichomachean Ethics. It is also the point of departure of analytic philosophy.

The fundamental notion of classical analysis is that propositions in ordinary language are correct, in the sense that they are not objectionable in principle. They are neither logically or metaphysically absurd. On the other hand, since the form of these propositions of ordinary language hides their true meaning, they are neither metaphysically nor logically satisfactory. Therefore the task of analysis is to reformulate them so that this meaning will be clearly presented and not to reject them. To analyse, is to reformate, - to translate in to a better wording. Russell and Wittgenstein are two most dominant philosophers of 20th century and the reformulation of analysis was found in the philosophies of both Russell and Wittgenstein.

In spite of being a major figure in the philosophy of the 20th century, Russell’s philosophical work suffers from neglect and misunderstanding.

(1) Misunderstandings of Russells’ Works

Among various misunderstandings on various topics, Russell said that Max Black’s essay on Russell’s theory of language rests on a number of misunderstandings that the ideal language must consist only of proper names, that one can not be acquainted with relations, that a universal word can be uttered only in the presence of an instance of it. The misunderstanding and misinterpretation of his philosophy can be seen in those shorter papers and articles which take some aspects of Russell’s thought as their special target of criticism. For example in the philosophy of
Bertrand Russell, 'The Library of Living Philosopher' volume devoted to his thought, the most striking feature of the book is the number of misinterpretations requiring correction by Russell in his reply to this critics. Ernest Nagel has misunderstood his theory of matter.

Other aspects of Russell’s way of writing philosophy have contributed to the misunderstanding of his views. Russell refers to the contributions in conversation of many major and minor figures students, or friends with whom he discussed philosophical issues. For this kind of attitude, in the eyes of Russell’s philosophical critics it has seemed an evidence of fickleness and instability in one who is influenced by each new.

Russell is always careful to note where his opinions have changed and where a former opinion is no longer regarded as tenable. He is not only willing to change his mind, but scrupulous about warning his readers against his own former errors. Most of the changes in Russell’s thought have been on relatively less important aspects of his philosophy, and they have come about through the more rigorous application of a consistent method. But these are not clear to readers. The general impression of numerous changes in Russell’s thought has produced a tendency among his critics to overlook the many respects in which there has been a steady purpose.²

(2) Russell’s Influence on Vienna Circle

Russell’s work in mathematical logic of the first two decades of his century, The Principles of Mathematics, Principia Mathematica and The Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, was of revolutionary importance and had an impact on many contemporary philosophers. The development of the new techniques of mathematical logic and the application of these
techniques to epistemological problems. The problems of philosophy, Our knowledge of the External World, Mysticism and Logic, and the Philosophy of Logical Atomism, were strongly influential on the emerging Vienna Circle, and through them on later generation of logical positivists or logical empiricists. In this sense Russell might be called a 'father' of Logical Positivism; he is widely recognised as contributing to the movement. For this reason, Russell's later carefully reasoned criticisms of logical positivists, and the important respects in which his mature philosophy differs from the philosophy of the logical positivists have tended to be forgotten or ignored. Both the logical empiricists and the critics of logical empiricism, have come to class Russell as himself a logical empiricist. In one case he is accepted, in the other he is rejected; but in both contexts his own contributions to philosophy and the work he had done since 1920s have been neglected.³

(3) Russell is Treated Historically:

There is a tendency to treat Russell historically in the treatment of Russell's thought by the followers of Wittgenstein. Here the interest is centered on two aspects of Russell's thought. One is the period in which Russell and Wittgenstein agreed, ending with the publication of the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus and with Russell's philosophy of Logical Atomism.⁴

The restriction of seeing Russell always in a historical context which stresses his early work is perhaps understandable, although unfortunate, when the context of the consideration of his philosophies either to connect his early views with later developments of them in logical empiricism, or to contrast these early views with later rejection of them in linguistic analysis.
But we find a neglect of Russell's mature thought in the context of the presentation of a variety of alternative views on a given topic.

The distorting effects of the contemporary context in which Russell's historical importance leads to neglect of his mature philosophy can be summed up by saying that Russell is, in one sense, no longer a strictly contemporary Philosopher. It is due to the fact that in the last forty years the mainstream of development in Anglo-American philosophy has diverged from Russell. Present philosophers are close enough to feel Russell's influence as a pioneer of their own positions, or as a false prophet from which philosophy is still striving to be fully liberated. It is also true that the way Russell writes has had an effect on his philosophical reputation. Russell regards philosophy as akin to science in this respect that it is improper to carry on one's inquiries with the consistency in dogma in mind. To change one's mind, to correct earlier errors, is commendable, and no favoured status is attached to unchanging beliefs or philosophic systems. Accordingly, Russell has passed from the consideration of one problem; to the consideration of a different problem; each book is an inquiry of its own. He did not attempt to employ the same terminology or to make any continuity between his present inquiry and what he had done before. Usually he did not stop to correct misunderstanding of his own philosophy, or to show any continuity in the development of his own work that interests the language analysis is the inimical influence of Russell's view of language or to show any continuity in the development of his own work.⁵

Analytic Method

Russell's analytic method is an example of the errors of 'Logical
Atomism'. This analysis is said to be metaphysically oriented since the atomism, the belief in 'irreducible facts' at which analysis ends, is the real motive and foundation for the method of analysis. The reductive analysis of logical atomism erros in assuming same ultimates at which the logical truth functional analysis and the empiricist analysis of 'facts' must end. This inquiry or search for certainty, the desire to 'justify' the knowledge of science involves Russell in problems of solipsism. Because it locates elusive basic propositions and their referents. We may sum up some of the defects in logical atomism as —

(I) **Logical Atomism leads to solipsism**

Logical atomism inevitably leads to solipsism. We have seen that the atomic propositions from which all others are derived as truth functions of them. They may contain only logically proper names apart from names and relations. The constituents of logically proper names are facts depicted and not 'descriptions. Because if a description is used instead of a purely demonstrative symbol, then by the theory of descriptions general proposition is produced, and not a picture of a single atomic fact. A logically proper name can be given only to object of acquaintance while one is actually acquainted with it; one can not use a demonstrative symbol to name a thing which is not present. The only particular objects of acquaintance are sense data. But sense data are essentially private to the person who has them and hence it follows that no two people can ever both be acquainted with the same object.  

(II) **Concept of A logically Perfect Language Distorts The Meanings of ordinary Language :**

Russell's Analytic method is influenced by his interest in mathematics
and mathematical logic. The use of an artificial language, the concept of an ideal language, or a 'logically perfect language', is the central and common target of many contemporary critics of Russell. This conception of an 'ideal language' assumes that common language is in some way inferior and that it ought to be reformed and corrected according to the standards of regularity, of precision, of a logically elegant order, and of explicitness of mathematical logic. But ordinary or natural language is itself the standard by which philosophical discourse is to be judged and by which philosophical conclusions are to be tested. Language is perfectly in order as it is philosophical meaning deal with its complexity, subtlety of distinctions, richness, and variety of shades of meaning. The imposition of the model of the perfect language distorts, oversimplifies and mis-interprets the proper meanings and the proper logic of ordinary discourse. Its use as a primary method of analysis as in logical atomism, leads to many griveous metaphysical errors.7

(III) **Atomic propositions are impossible:**

Some confusions may arise regarding the concept of an atomic proposition. Because, the atomists contained that an atomic proposition consists of only logically proper names of particulars. But they had been very reluctant to attempt to give an example of one. Wisdom rightly suspected that 'this was always a concealed description, equivalent to, say, 'the thing I am pointing to' and the words like 'red' always referred to a range of colour and not to a perfectly determined shade. In either case an element of generality would have entered the proposition, and hence it would not be atomic.8

(iv) **Picture theory underestimated the conventional character of**
linguistic forms:

The basic objection to the doctrine of picturing at this period was that 'picturing' theory underestimated the conventional character of linguistic forms. It wrongly implied that there was a natural appropriateness of some linguistic forms, some structural likeness of language and fact.

First: it is not always right to say that an ordinary indicative statement refers to a fact by picturing or otherwise.

Secondly: It is not always clear what is meant by taking of the form, logical or other of a fact. There is some danger when in doing so we are reading into the fact what is to be found in the language of use.

Thirdly: We are not right in supposing that we find the world divided into a number of fact. Russell has confused the standard meaning of a statement with reference meaning of a sentence:

(V) Russell has confused the standard meaning of a statement with reference meaning of a sentence:

The logical forms used by mathematical logic are necessarily standardized and necessarily impose a standard which is free from logical ambiguities. Such ambiguities are part of ordinary speech. In stressing 'entailment rules' in logical analysis, mathematical logicians disregard other rules which are an important part of the meaning of sentences. These other rules connecting the specific uses of sentences in specific contexts are, or ought to be, of central importance to logic. The 'ideal sentence' confuses sentences with statements.

Russell has confused the standard meaning of a statement with the reference meaning of a sentence. Similar error is committed by the logical
reduction of different statements of subject-predicate form to the existential forms, affirmatively or negatively. The interest in mathematics and form has misled modern logicians in to oversimplifications of form which obscure the many different and important ways in which sentences may be meaningful.¹⁰

Same error is found both in his treatment of meaning and in his entire logico-analytic method, he tries to impose a perfection of form and a simplicity of analysis on language and its reference.

(VI) **Reductive analysis**:

Russell's analytic method includes his logical and mathematical researches. It is Russell said, 'a kind of logical doctrine which seems to me to result from the philosophy of mathematics'¹¹ After his successful application of the analytic, method in the sphere of mathematics, Russell wanted to apply this method in other spheres also. It was that attempts to do this in other spheres had been made before, but without conspicuous success. But now Russell had provided the paradigms of success for all to imitate and had provided the technique and the skelition of a perfect language. Thus after a long period the traditional reductive analysis of British empiricism was taken up again in a fine fever of enthusiasm.

Analysts might have said that perhaps physical objects were after all basic objects of acquaintance, except in the case of nation statements which are impossible to analyse in to people or people in to events or sense-data. But there are a number of difficulties in giving an analysis in terms of sense data. There is the difficulty of specifying sense data except in terms of physical objects.

Next, if we suppose that we have an analysis of 'There is a desk in the
room' beginning: 'If Jones were in the room' he would be having deskish sense data...’ Now it is clear that if ‘There is a desk in the room’ is equivalent to this hypothetical plus others, then if this hypothetical is false the statement that there is a desk in the room will be false also. Naturally, if \( p \) is equivalent to the conjunction of \( q, r \) and \( s \), then \( \neg q \) entails \( \neg p \). But it is clear that if Jones comes in to the room he may not notice the desk or he may blind or.... Then the hypothetical will be false, and if it is part of the analysis of the physical object statement we shall have to count it also false which is also absurd. Therefore the hypothetical can not be the part of the analysis.

We can not get a finite set of hypothetical statements about sense-data which is a necessary condition of the truth of a physical object. Since there is not a finite set of hypotheticals about sense data as sufficient condition, then the analysis is impossible.

Therefore we can make some general estimate regarding Russell’s philosophy of analysis.

(i) The failure to analyse arose from the insistence that the analysandum should be equivalent to some quite definite statement about what individual did.

But it might be regarded as possible to find an equivalence between such statements about what individual mind did and that every objection to proposed analysis denied that what the analysis said was precisely what the analysandum said, and this objection is true only because the analysandum did not say anything precisely.

The important thing is that to make such a defence of analytic procedures involves the abandonement of the whole attitude to language accepted by both

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the earlier atomists and the logical positivists.

The analysis which for both logical atomists and the logical positivists had been the central activity of philosopher was seen to be impossible of achievement except in comparatively trivial cases, outside the field of mathematical logic in which Russell succeeded. The view of philosophy as having its task in the reductive analysis of the puzzling statements of our ordinary everyday language to the simple atomic reports of immediate experience had to be abandoned. This could not be the way to reveal either the structure of the world or the structure of our language.\textsuperscript{12}

(ii) Whether Russell's kind of analytic philosophy of empiricism is acceptable alternative or not as a modern theory of knowledge, it is clear that we are greatly in his debt for painstaking and honest analysis by which the limitations of the Humean tradition of empiricism are revealed.

(iii) Although Russell is willing to concede that the early form of logical atomism is indefensible, he is unrepentant in other respects. He gives a lively argument in defence of the existential quantifier, holding that if it is true that there are multiple and conflicting meanings for the translations of the logical symbol in to ordinary English, this demonstrates the ambiguities of ordinary speech which require some correction for consistent meanings and patterns of argument to be used.

But Russell has difficulty in grasping the radical departure that the linguistic analyst critics have made from his kind of analysis, Russell looked upon this departure of the linguistic analyst as a stage they have gone through and overcome, just as Wittgenstein himself lived through and then rejected his own early philosophy to become the source of new ideas to British
thinkers. The contemporary British analysts reacted negatively to logical atomism and this negative reaction is part of their meaning.

(iv) Where Russell used analysis to clarify, simplify, and reduce the possibility of error through the use of occams razor, the linguistic analysts use their method of analysis to expand, diversify, enrich the possibilities of meaning in order to avoid simplification for doing justice to the complex of logic of the living language.¹³

(v) As far as the method of analysis is concerned, no other contemporary thinker has as many logical and scientific resources as Russell and no other contemporary thinker can convert, with such sureness, mathematically precise techniques to the analysis of experience and of belief. Whatever may prove to be the decisive direction of contemporary empiricism, Russell's thorough, detailed, explicit analysis is likely to contribute to the ongoing of both scientific and philosophical inquiry. In his writings, seen over a lifetime of work, there is a work out of a theory of knowledge, analytic, empirisist, realist, which promises to be fruitful for his future followers.

Though Wittgenstein accepted the ideas of Russell and modified and developed them in a deeper way than Russell, his earlier and later Philosophical views give rise some serious problems according to some recent contemporary philosophers.

**Metaphysical problem of atomistic view in the Tractatus:**

1. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein said that everything that can be thought can also be said. The limits of language are, the limits of thought. All metaphysical problems arise because of the attempt to say what can not be
Wittgenstein divided all sentences into the complex and the atomic and asserted that complex were built up from the atomic by rules of formation which could be fully interpreted in terms of the elementary names and predicates which are indefinable and picture atomic facts. Only a completed proposition can tell us anything about the world. Hence there can be no basic constituent of the world than that which corresponds to the atomic sentence. This basic constituent is the atomic fact, and the world is therefore the totality of such facts.

The world is described by the totality of true atomic propositions. These propositions are true but being atomic, might have been false, since there is nothing in their structure to determine their truth value. Facts exist in 'logical space'. This logical space defines the possibilities; the true atomic sentence describe what is actual, while tautologies reflect properties of logical space itself.

But here arises the problem of the relation between atomic sentences and atomic facts. Wittgenstein calls this relation, one of 'picturing', and this metaphor has misled many of his commentators. He also says that the relation can not be described, but only shown. What is most basic must be shown so that description can begin. But what is meant by 'showing' is not clear. This theory is a denial to use a later phrase of Wittgenstein that we can use language 'to get between language and the world.' We can not give an account in words of the relation between atomic fact and atomic proposition without using the proposition whose truth we are trying to explain. We can not 'think' the atomic fact without thinking the sentence which 'pictures' it. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein concludes 'that where of we can not speak we
must consign to silence.'

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein says that only atomic sentences, truth functional complexes, and tautologies are meaningful. But is there theory which says so? It is not an atomic sentence, nor any complex of such, it only says, not how things are but how they must be. But it is not a tautology. So, it be regarded as meaningless? Wittgenstein actually says 'yes' and comes to the conclusion that his propositions must serve as a ladder to be thrown away by those who have managed to ascend it.14

Colour statements like 'A is red all over' and 'A is green all over' are incompatible not just as a matter of fact but as a matter of logic. Hence according to the Tractatus, they should be analysed in to logically independent elementary propositions. But this can not be done, and that the same problem arises for all propositions attributing a determinate property out of a determinate range. Therefore Wittgenstein abandoned the requirement that elementary propositions are logically independent.

'A is red' and 'A is green' are logically incompatible even though their conjunction is not a contradiction that could be displayed by a truth table. As a result, the ideal that logic depends soley upon essential bipolarity of elementary propositions collapses. The idea that there is a propositional form and that all meaningful propositions are the result of truth functional operations on elementary propositions collapses. The atomist notion of in decomposable object is equally confused. For one thing, the distinction between simple and complex is not absolute. Standards of complexity must be laid down separately for each kind of thing. The squares of a chess board for example, are simple for the purpose of playing the game, but may be complex

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for the purpose of producing the board.

The collapse of logical atomism undermines the picture theory of the proposition. If there are no ultimate constituents of facts-objects which are simple in an absolute metaphysical sense, then there are no corresponding constituents of propositions which are simple in an absolute semantic sense. Wittgenstein also rejected the idea that a proposition must have a logical form which it shares with what it depicts.

The picture theory provided a partially correct account of the intentionally of thought and language. It was right to insist on the pictorial nature of propositions, which means that their relation to the fact that verifies them is a logical rather than contingent one. But it was wrong in explaining that internal relation by holding that proposition and fact share a logical form, or that a shadowy entity like a possible state of affairs mediates between them. The mysterious harmony between language and reality is simply a distorted reflection of a linguistic convention. Moreover, linguistic representation does not presuppose a one-to-one correlation between words and things but that the linguistic representation have an established use.16

**Difficulties of The Philosophical Investigations**

The basic aim of Wittgenstein's later philosophy is to elaborate the inter connecting themes. And the key concepts of his later philosophy are use, rules, language games family resemblances, public nature of language, no-ownership of experience etc.

(i) What strikes a critical reader of the later works is that the chief concepts occurring in them are either vague or metaphorical or both. The
method of Wittgenstein's later philosophy avoid systematic theorizing, and to insist upon instead the variety of language, his motive being to escape the difficulties exemplified by the Tractatus.

(ii) One important criticism of the later philosophy may be regarded as a generalized appeal to notions like "use" and "rule-following".

In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein identified meaning with use. It is true that the concept of 'use' is itself a various one. But unquestionably it would be a mistake to commit oneself to the strong doctrine that meaning and use are the same. This is shown by the fact that one can know the meaning of a word, without knowing its use, and one can know its use without knowing its meaning. e.g., One can know that the Latin word 'Jennis' means 'hungry' without knowing how to use it in a sentence, and, conversely, one may know how to use the expressions 'anen' and 'QED' without knowing their meanings. Moreover many words have uses without meanings—personal names, prepositions, conjunctions, and the like. Use therefore cannot be the whole story about meaning; it may be part of the story. But to say that use is apart of the story can not help us so much. It is only a beginning for what it is one knows, or is able do, which constitutes one's capacity to use expressions is not suggested by the concept of use itself.

(iii) The notion of language-games dominates Wittgenstein's later philosophy. In the Investigations the term 'language-games' is meant to bring in to prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or form of life. He speaks of language as a part of community activity. It is a way of living in society.

For Wittgenstein the meaning of expressions consists in the use we
make of them. That use being governed by the rules agreed among the share of a form of life. It is presumably applied to expressions like 'true' and 'real' themselves. According to Wittgenstein such expressions cannot be regarded as philosophically significant if we remind ourselves of their ordinary employments. It follows that there are the possibility of other forms of life with different agreements and rules. Each form of life confers its own meaning on 'true' and 'real' and therefore truth and reality are relative not absolute conception.

If we are to talk of 'other forms of life' at all we must be able to recognize them as such, and to recognize the existence of behaviour and patterns of practices which makes up a form of life. There is agreement among the participants by reference to which their practices can go on. If we are to see that the one form of life is different from our own we have to be able to recognize the differences. All participants can not be different in one form of life, otherwise it would not be possible to suppose the existence of other forms of life.

But this requirement for mutual accessibility between forms of life is not possible in cognitive relativism. There are some aspects in which different forms of life share an experiential and conceptual basis and permits mutual accessibility between them. In these aspects in which those forms of life are not cognitively relative at all.

Indeed, cultural relativism is an important thesis which makes a sense that if there is mutual accessibility between cultures at the cognitive level. Hence it appears that the only intelligible kind of relativism there can be is cultural relativism.

Relativism is sometime seems to be implied by Wittgenstein's view. But it makes no distinction between the cultural and cognitive types. Actually he
merely seems to be aware of relativism as a possible and unacceptable implication of some of his remarks and particularly of his notion of "forms of life". That notion provides the ultimate basis for meaning, use, rules, knowledge, and the psychological concept his later philosophy. Therefore, both the intrinsic vagueness of that notion, and its unacceptable entailment or apparent entailment of relativism, raise a question mark over his later philosophy as a whole.17

(iv) According to Wittgenstein logically private language is impossible. Private language is that which only single individual can know. Though there can be contingently private language, which is in fact known only by one person but could be understood by others, which is translatable in public languages. For example, the language invented by some solitary from birth—a life long Robinson Crusoe. Such a language would be private in and interesting sense, but it would be only contingently private because it would admit of being understood by others. On Wittgenstein's view a Robinson's language only counts as a language because it admits of being publicly understood.

Wittgenstein wanted to rule out logical but not contigent privacy that arises from the fact that the conception of contingently private language seem to be perfectly order, according to the commentators.

For Wittgenstein language is essentialy public. Because language use is a rule-followibng activity, and that rules are constituted by agreement within a language community. Within a community only one can succeed in following rules, other wise one could not distiguish between following a rule and only thinking one is doing so.
But the problem is that if language is logically public there cannot be languages which are in any sense private. There cannot be a contingently private language, because on the rule following argument he could not distinguish between a rule and only thinking he is doing so, if he is not a member of a linguistic community. There is also an internal conflict between Wittgenstein's stronger claim that language is logically public and weaker claim that there cannot be logically private language. Wittgenstein advocates the former when specifically discussing rules, and later when specifically discussing private language.

The rule-following and privacy issues give rise to another serious problem. It concerns the fact that if rules are constituted agreement within a language community, and are not determined by any thing external to that community's practices, then a private language user cannot distinguish between following a rule and only thinking he is doing so. But how does the community tell whether it is following a rule? Wittgenstein's answer is that it cannot tell. And this assertion is the central point of the problem. If, in the case of the individual, nothing counts as marking this crucial difference, then according to Wittgenstein the individual is not following rules at all, and hence is not using language. If it is applied to the language-community as a whole, then the paradoxical result would seem to be that language community does not use language.

In spite of these defects we can conclusively say that—

(i) The majority of recent and contemporary analytic philosophers simply disagree with the claim that Wittgenstein is the most influential presence in twentieth century philosophy. Because it is seen that his rejection of the
philosophical tradition is expressed as a rejection of what that tradition specifies and defines as the problems of philosophy. That all but his own disciples disagree with him on his central issue is an indication of the fact that Wittgenstein's effect on recent philosophy has been less than the claims made by Kenny, Von Wright, and others imply.

(ii) Wittgenstein's influence on his philosophical contemporaries was limited. But the fact is that though the wittgensteinian school's existence seems to be puzzling, it is explained by the fact that Wittgenstein made ardent disciples of some of his pupils at Cambridge, and in the interval since his death. The Wittgensteinians accordingly make a distinctive although relatively small group in contemporary philosophy, studying Wittgenstein's texts closely and applying his methods, with some of them refusing to take more recent developments in philosophy seriously on the grounds that they involve departures from Wittgenstein's ideas. A considerable amount has been published by these philosophers.

(iii) What is most important is the continuing response given to Wittgenstein's thought by the philosophical community at large. Though Wittgenstein's fundamental claims are lacking general and widespread agreement, the philosophical community responds to Wittgenstein's work as it does to any work in which interesting ideas are offered. Some of Wittgenstein's ideas have accordingly passed in to the general currency of philosophical discussion. Much of what Wittgenstein says about meaning in the later philosophy has failed to persuade, although that use is an important part of meaning widespread, and Wittgenstein's work has had a large part in disseminating it. Philosophical community has taken most profit in
Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind.

(iv) It can be said, as it is already said by Von Wright that what makes a man's work classic is often in the multiplicity of possible interpretations, which invites and at the same time resists our craving for a clear understanding.

The vividness of Wittgenstein's metaphors, the unexpected examples and turns of thought generate the sense that something profound is being expressed in his writings. Though one finds, there is much less agreement and very much less definiteness in the crucial conceptions of Wittgenstein, the value of Wittgenstein's work lies as much as in its poetry, and there in its 'suggestiveness', as in its substance. Wittgenstein's work has stimulated insights and fresh perspectives, especially in philosophical psychology, which have helped to advance thought about these matters. Though future generations may or may not judge Wittgenstein to be one of the great philosophers, there is no doubt that he is always to be counted as one of the great personalities of philosophy. From our perspective it is easy to mistake one for the other; but time will tell what is the actual truth.

After comparing Russell and Wittgenstein and in relevance to the philosophical views of different linguistic philosophers we have come to the conclusion that we cannot ignore the fact that it is a mistake to think of language as a complete and self contained unit. Not only speaking requires other abilities, but in addition language itself is a continuous process with other intelligent behaviours. Linguistic behaviour is not a discrete segment of human behaviour. As Davidson says, we should realize that we have abandoned not only the ordinary notion of a language but we have erased the boundary
between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world generally. One may think of language as a well-defined entity. But when people are engaged in understanding what a speaker means, they also focus on the utterance itself and often think of other aspects of the situation, such as the utterer's belief and intentions and the contextual facts, as merely background or collateral conditions.

No interpretation regarding meaning of language can be regarded as final, and we can expect modification for better understanding meaning, the relation between language and empirical evidence and the interaction between meaning and congnitive states of speakers and so on.18

Notes and References

3. Ibid. p 15
4. Ibid. p 15
5. Ibid p. 18
6. Urmson J. O. Philosophical Analysis pp 134-135
7. Ramsden Eames. Elizabeth Op cit pp. 204-05

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10. Ramsden, Eames, Elizabeth Op cit - 205-06
13. Scruton, Roger From Descartes to Wittgenstein pp - 274-77
15. cf. ‘Every psychical phenomenon’. Brentano writes, is characterized by what the scholastics called intentional and (also mental) in existence of the object and what we would call, a relation to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as something real) or immanent objectivity. Each psychological phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although not always in the same way. In a presentation, something is presented; in a judgement something is affirmed or denied; in love, something is loved; in hatred, something is hated; in desire, something is desired, etc. Franz Brentano, psychology from an Empirical Point of View, Duncker, Leipzig, 1911, quoted by R. Sundara Rajan Studies in Phenomenology Hermeneutics and Decortications. P-156