CHAPTER IV
SECTION I
DEFINITION OF ALAMKĀRA

Since Ruyyaka has said that the Citrakāvya is characterised by Alamkāras (poetic figures), it is, therefore, necessary to analyse Ruyyaka’s idea of the salient feature of Alamkāra. Ruyyaka does not give a precise definition of Alamkāra in the Alamkārasarvasva, but in his commentary on the Vyaktiviveka he says:

tathā ca śabdārthayor vicchittir alamkāraḥ. vicchittiś ca kavi-pratibhollāsarūpatvāt kavi-pratibhollāsasya cānancyād anantatvam bhajamānā pricchettum na śakyate.¹

Thus, according to Ruyyaka, an Alamkāra consists of the charm or vicchitti of sound and sense, and this charm is brought about by the productive imagination of the poet. Ruyyaka finds difficulty in defining this poetic charm which is of infinite variety being identical with the play of individual poetic imagination which is infinite in its scope. The boundlessness of poetic imagination has already been admitted by Ānandavardhana² and Kuntaka.³

¹ VVV. p. 352.
² vācaspati-sahasraṇāṃ sahasrair api yatnāḥ / nibaddhā sā kṣayam ndti prakṛtir jagatāmīva // DL. IV.10.
³ yasmāt kavipratibhānām ānantasyān niyatatvāṃ na sambhavati. VJ. p. 41.
Ruyyaka thinks that a form of expression becomes a poetic figure when a charm is lent to it by the imagination of the poet.

Since the poetic charm cannot be defined, Ruyyaka does not give a precise definition of Alamkāra in the Alamkārasarvasva, but he is never tired of repeating in essence that vicchitti-visesa or special charm or strikingness brought about by the productive imagination of the poet constitutes an Alamkāra or poetic figure. The charm brought out by the imagination of the poet is taken by Ruyyaka to be the test of a poetic figure and this test is applied by him to the detailed examination and classification of individual poetic figure.

The admission of a poetic figure or its variety is dependent on charm. Thus, for example, the ordinary doubt cannot constitute the figure Samdeha, the doubt should be poetical by the imagination of the poet. The figure Svabhāvokti, which is rejected by Kuntaka has been accepted by Ruyyaka on the ground that the realistic description of a thing should be subtle and is attained by the imagination of the poet. The figure Ullekha is different from Atiṣayokti on account of the distinction of charm. The test of charm or strikingness is applied by him to the classification of a poetic figure. The fifth variety of Atisayokti is not defined in the Abhedapradhāna sub-group but it is defined in the Virodha group. The groupings of figures are also prepared by Ruyyaka on the basis of the charm such as višeṇa-vicchitti,
The special charm, which is imparted to a poetic figure by the imagination of the poet, is taken as the basis upon which the poetic figures distinguish themselves in their special peculiarities. Thus, on this fundamental principle, the various figures are minutely defined, differentiated, illustrated and classified.

Thus, we find that Ruyyaka discusses the whole question of poetic figure through test of vicchitti or vaicitrya which has already been accepted by Vāmana. Dr. S.K. De rightly says that Ruyyaka takes the theory of poetic figures from Kuntaka who maintains that a form of expression becomes a poetic figure if the fertile imagination of the poet lends a peculiar charm to it. Ruyyaka's analysis of poetic figure is accepted by later writers without any question.

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4 tathā hi kvacit sādṛṣṭam vivaśītām. tatrāpi kvacid abhedah. tasminnapi kvacid āropah. kvacid adhyāvasāyāh. adhyāvasāye'-pi kvacit sādhyatvām kvacit siddhatvām ityādikrameṇā-nantapraķāram vicchitti - vaicitryam. VVV. p. 352.

5 saundaryam alamkāraḥ. alamkrītir alamkāraḥ. karaṇavyutpaṅṭtyā punar alamkāra-sabdō'yaṁ upamādiśu vartate. KLSV. I. i. 2.


SECTION II

CLASSIFICATION OF ALAMKĀRA

A. Broad Classification

The poetry abounding in Alamkāras or poetic figures is designated as the Citrakāvyā by the followers of the Dhvani School. The Citrakāvyā is divided into two divisions, viz., Sabdacitra and Arthacitra.1 Sabdacitra is instanced in the employment of the arduous figures of sound (śabdālamkāras), such as Yamaka and the like; Arthacitra is the result of the figures of sense (arthālamkāras), such as Utpreksā etc. which are employed in poetry for their own sake without any relation to Rasa. The Dhvanikāra himself, thus, recognises twofold classification of poetic figures.

The Alamkārasarvasva of Ruyyaka is dedicated exclusively to the special purpose of defining, analysing and illustrating various poetic figures. Ruyyaka starts the discussion on Alamkāra by referring to the twofold classification of Alamkāra, viz., Sabdālamkāra and Arthālamkāra.2 But after finishing his discussion on Arthālamkāras, Ruyyaka points out a re-classification of Alamkāras into three broad heads,3 viz., Sabdālamkāra, Arthālamkāra and Ubhayālamkāra, according as they appertain to Śabda (word) or Artha (idea or sense) or

1 DL. III. 42.
2 citram tu śabdārthālamkāra-svabhāvatayā bhutara-prabhedam. AS. p. 19.
3 evam ete śabdārthobhayālamkāraḥ samkṣeptah sūtrītaḥ. Ibid, p. 256.
Sābdārtha (both word and idea).

(a) The classification of Alamkaras into those of Sabda or Artha is not referred to by Pata, although the four figures, viz., Upama, Dipaka, Rūpaka and Yamaka are admitted by him. Of these four figures the former three are treated as Arthālāṃkāras and latter one is treated as Sabdālāṃkāra by later writers. (b) Bhāmaha does not clearly mention Sabdālāṃkāra or Arthālāṃkāra, but there is an implicit reference to the two classes of Alamkaras in his work. The poetic figures are discussed by him in groups of three or four. (c) In his Kavyālāṃkārasaṃgraha Udbhāta follows Bhāmaha's method of Alamkaras. He also does not arrange the figures under two main heads as Sabdālāṃkāra and Arthālāṃkāra, but they are grouped by him in the manner of Vargas. (d) Daṇḍin, Vāmana and Rudrata give two divisions of Alamkaras, viz., Sabdālāṃkāra and Arthālāṃkāra in separate chapters. (e) It is worth noting that Rudrata is the first writer to admit Ubhayālāṃkāra, of which earlier writers remain silent. In his Kavyālāṃkāra, Rudrata recognises Śleṣa being based on word as well as meaning. He includes Śleṣa under the category of both Sabdālāṃkāra and Arthālāṃkāra, and dwells upon each variety in an elaborate manner. Rudrata seems to recognise Upama and

4 vācām vakrārtha-sabdoktir alamkāraya kalpate. KL. V.66.
5 KD. III. 186.
6 tatra sabdālamkārau dvau yamakānuprāsau. KLSV. p. 120.
7 śleṣo'rtasyāpi. RKL. II. 13.
Samuccaya as Udbhayālamkāras. (f) In the history of Alamkāra Bhoja is unique in making the divisions of the poetic figures. In his Sarasvatīkanṭhābharana, Bhoja discusses the three divisions of figures under three separate chapters. Bhoja presents most of the Alamkāras given by other writers under Arthālamkāra as Udbhayalamkāra. He accepts twenty-four Udbhayalamkāras, an equal number of Sabdālamkāras and also of Arthālamkāras given by him. (g) Mammapa recognizes threefold classification of Alamkāra mentioned above but unlike Bhoja he does not assign a separate chapter for Udbhayalamkāras.

Ruyyaka, like Mammapa, does not separately deal with the Udbhayālamkāras. At the end of the Alamkārasarvasya, he says that Yamaka etc. are Sabdālamkāras, Upamā etc. are Arthālamkāras and Latānuprāsa etc. are Udbhayālamkāras. He includes Samsārṣṭi and Samkara under the group of Udbhayālamkāra. Jayaratha points out that, the author wants to include Anuprāsa, Ananvaya and Śleṣa under Udbhayālamkāra. Thus, the total number of Udbhayālamkāras in Ruyyaka’s scheme is six only. The figures, viz., Punaruktavādbhāsa and Vakrokti accepted by Mammapa as Udbhayālamkāras, are taken as Arthālamkāras by Ruyyaka.

The later writers on whom the influence of Mammapa and Ruyyaka is obvious, accept the threefold classification of poetic figures. Following the views of Ruyyaka, Vidyādhara...
and Vidyānātha accepts the figures Punaruktavadābhāsa and Vakrokti as Arthālamkāras. Viśvanātha, on the other hand, follows Mammaṭa in this respect, and accepts these two figures as Ubhayālamkāra. Appaya Dīkṣita and Jagannātha accept it theory these three classes of poetic figures, but they do not take into consideration Sahālamkāra and Ubhayālamkāra.

2. Principle of Classification of Alamkāras.

Though the classification of poetic figures into three heads, viz., Sahālamkāra, Arthālamkāra and Ubhayālamkāra has been admitted by earlier writers, yet the question of the principle of such classification has not been discussed by any of the earlier writers. A discussion on the question of the principle of classifying the poetic figures starts from Rājānaka Tilaka, Ruyyaka’s father. In his commentary on Udbhata’s Kavyālamkārasārasaṅgrahā, Rājānaka Tilaka gives some principles by which the poetic figures are decided as belonging to word or sense. Out of Rājānaka Tilaka’s commentary called Vivṛtti.


15 atra Sahālamkāra arthasya viciratve’pi mukhyataḥ kavipratibhā—srambha—gocarasya Sahālasya vaicitryam iti Sahālamkārataḥ yuktam…vaicitryam alamkāraḥ abhidhyate iti kavipratibhā—srambha—gocarartha’—alamkārāḥ, tad-dharmaḥ cālamkārāḥ…Kavye dosa-guṇālamkārañām ca Sahārthāgaṭatayā anvaya—vyatirekābhyām Vibhāgaḥ kriyate. na ca bhānu-dīpamanādi-Sahāsadbhāve—alamkāraḥ treti Sahāvavya—vyatireka—nuvidhayi—no’sya Sahāalamkāratvam eva yuktam…evaḥ adau Sahāmūlo’lamkāraḥ, na tu Sahālasya alamkāra iti cē, yuktam atra vaicitryam alamkāra iti. Yad—vaicitryam tasya alamkāra iti yathoktam eva sādhu. Quoted from V. Raghavan’s BSP. pp. 381-382.
Mammaṭa formulates the theory of Anvaya-vyatireka, and Ruyyaka, son of Tilaka, propounds the theory of Āśrayāśrayibhāva.¹⁶ Ruyyaka acknowledges that he accepts the theory of Āśrayāśrayibhāva theory given by the ancient writers.¹⁷

Anvaya-vyatireka - Mammaṭa maintains that positive and negative concomitance must form the test of determining the question whether a poetic figure is of word or of sense or of both (word and sense).¹⁸ The test consists in considering whether a particular figure does or does not bear change of synonymous word.¹⁹ If the figure disappears with the change of word by its synonym, it is a figure of word or Śabdālamkāra, if not, it is a figure of sense or Arthālamkāra. Mammaṭa also mentions the Āśrayāśrayibhāva theory, but he does not openly call into question the validity of Āśrayāśrayibhāva theory as a principle. Mammaṭa suggests that the Anvaya-vyatireka theory is of use for determining even the Āśrayāśrayibhāva theory.²⁰ Thus, in ultimate analysis the Āśrayāśrayibhāva theory is a particular type of the Anvaya-vyatireka, and the latter is broad enough to comprehend the former. Hence, Mammaṭa gives emphasis on the Anvayavyatireka theory, which, according to him, forms the test of differentiating different classes of figures from each other.

¹⁶ V. Raghavan elaborately discusses the question of the origin and development of the two theories. Vide Ibid, p. 380 f.
¹⁷ AS. p. 257.
¹⁸ kāvye dosa-guṇa-śabdā-laṃkārānāṃ śabdārthobhayagatatvena vyavasthāyam anvaya-vyatirekāv eva prabhavataḥ, nimittaṇṭaṣya-bhāvāt tataṣ ca yo'lamkaro yadiyānvaya-vyatirekānuvidhāt te sa tad alamkāro vyavasthāpyate. KP. 767.
¹⁹ śabdānvaya-vyatirekānuvidhāyitvām caitad eva yac-cha-bdā-parivṛttty-asahatvam. KPRA. p. 394.
²⁰ KP. pp. 768-69.
Āśrayāśrayibhāva – According to Ruyyaka, a figure belongs to that in which it abides. In his eagerness to make his theory more comprehensible, Ruyyaka draws the analogy of the poetic figures with the worldly ornaments. Just as an worldly ornament such as ear-ring, which abides on the ear, is said to belong to the ear; similarly, a figure which depends on the word or sense or both is said to belong to the word or sense or both. That is to say a śabdāsrita alamkāra is śabdālamkāra, an arthāsrita alamkāra is arthālamkāra and an ubhayāsrita alamkāra is ubhayalamkāra. Hence, the Āśrayāśrayibhāva theory called upaskāryopakāraka-bhava theory by Jayaratha.

Ruyyaka openly calls into question the validity of the Anvaya-vyatireka as a theory formulated by Mammata. Ruyyaka argues that the Anvaya-vyatireka theory proves that word or sense is the cause of a poetic figure, it cannot determine whether a poetic figure belongs to word or to sense. Thus, resorting to that theory one can only say that a certain figure is the effect of a word or sense. In his attempt to clarify the views of the author, Jayaratha says that just as an earring which is said to be the ornament of the ear because it abides on the ear, and not because it is made of gold which is its material cause, similarly in poetry, a figure is said to belong...


22 āśrayāśrayibhāvenetī. upaskāryopakāraka-bhāveneyarthāḥ. tenā yo'lamkāro yad upaskāraḥ (sic) sa tad alamkāra iti pindārthah. Ibid. p. 257.

23 anvaya-vyatirekau tu tat-kāryatve prayojakau. na tad alamkāratve. AS. p. 256.
to the word or sense in which it abides, and is not the effect of the word or sense. 24 Ruyyaka fears that, if the figure of a word is due to the presence of word, i.e., the anvaya of a word, the śrautopama, which is due to the presence of the word 'iva' will be a case of Sabdālamkāra. 25

Thus, Anvaya-vyatireka theory, according to Ruyyaka, cannot be the determining factor in the classification of poetic figures. The Āśrayāśrayibhāva theory, on the other hand, is based on the idea of charm. Since the figure belongs to that in which it depends, the embellished object, word or sense, decides whether the embellishing figure is verbal or ideational. Ruyyaka approaches the question on the basis of his father's dictum 'yadvacitrtya' which means, that which is striking is the figure of that; that is to say, if in a particular case strikingness is of sound, it is a case of verbal figure or Sabdālamkāra; if the strikingness is of sense (or idea), it is a case of ideational figure or Arthālamkāra.

The later writers follow the view of the Alamkārasarvasva of Ruyyaka or the Kāvyaprakāṣa of Mammaṭa. Vidyādhara 26 and Vidyānātha 27 follow Ruyyaka's Āśrayāśrayibhāva; while

26 EV. p. 277 and TR. p. 278.
Viśvanātha appears to follow Mammaṭa's Anvaya-vyatireka. Appaya Diksita probably accept Āsrayāśrayibhāva, for his view can be tentatively guessed from the fact that both Abhaṅga and Sabhaṅga-śleṣa are taken by him as Arthālāṃkāra, although Ruyyaka accepts the later as Šabdālāṃkāra. Jagannātha seems to criticise Mammaṭa's Anvaya-vyatireka and accepts Ruyyaka's theory.

B. Detailed Classification of Alāṃkāra.

In the Alāṃkārasarvasva, Ruuyyaka formulates some principles on the basis of which the individual poetic figures are classified and arranged in different groups according to their general characteristics. Bhāmaha thinks that Vakrokti or Atiśayokti is the general characteristics of all poetic figure. Daṇḍin divides all figures into Svabhāvokti and Vakrokti. Vāmana, however, takes aupamya or similarity as the basis of classification, for he regards that all poetic figures are different aspects of Upamā. But the later writers rightly think that all the figures do not involve similarity. We see that no serious attempt has been by these writers to classify these poetic figures on some common principles. Rudrata gives some principles of arranging the individual poetic figures. The Šabdālāṃkāras are arranged

28 Though Viśvanātha is non-committal, yet from his treatment in the SD (p.612) he seems to follow Mammaṭa.
29 Appaya Diksīta refers to his CM on this point, but unfortunately the extent portion of the work does not contain Śleṣa.
30 Vide RG. p. 536.
31 KL. II. 85.
32 bhinnam dvidhā svabhaVokti-vakrokti ceti vānmayam. KD. II. 363.
33 prativastuprabhṛtir upamāprapaṇcaḥ. KLSV. IV.iii. 1.
in five heads, viz., Vakrokti, Śleṣa, Citra, Anuprāsa and Yamaka. The Arthālāṁkāras are grouped under four different heads, viz., Vāstava (reality), Aupamya (comparison), Atīṣaya (elevatedness) and Śleṣa (coalescence). Rudrata's classification of Arthālāṁkāra is probably based on his idea on Bhāmaha's Vakrokti or Atiśayokti, Dandin's Svabhāvokti, Vāmana's Aupamya and Udbhaṭa's Śleṣa. These features are given importance by these authorities.

But Rudrata's classification of poetic figure is open to serious objection, for in his scheme the same figures reappear as poetic figures under different heads. Thus, Sahokti and Samuccaya have two aspects, based respectively on Vāstava and Aupamya, while the figure Utprekṣā appears similarly under Aupamya and Atīṣaya respectively. The Kāvyapraṅkaśa of Mammaṭa is an authentic treatise, but we do not find in it any guidance about the classification of poetic figures.

Ruuyaka, a younger contemporary of Mammaṭa, therefore, realises the necessity of classifying the poetic figures on the basis of some definite principles. According to the scheme adopted by Ruuyaka in the Alamkārasarvasva the poetic figures are classified into two heads, viz., Suddha (pure) and Miśra (Mixed): The figures of the former head are classified into nine different groups, viz., (1) Paunaruktya (repetition), (2) Aupamya (comparison), (3) Virodha (incongruity), (4) Śrkhhalā (linked succession), (5) Tarkanyāya (logical reasoning), (6) Vākyanyāya (poetic logic), (7) Lokanyāya (popular maxim), (8) Guḍhārthapratīti (understanding of a secret sense) and (9)

34 RKL. II. 13.
Cittavṛtti (mental state). Each of the groups is again divided into many sub-groups.

1. Paunaruktya Group - Ruyyaka starts his discussion on poetic figure proper with this group. The repetition (Paunaruktya) is of three types viz. repetition of sense, repetition of sound and repetition of both sound and sense. The figures coming under this group are based on repetition. Under this group Ruyyaka includes five figures, viz. i) Punaruktavāda-bhāsa, which is based on the semblance of the repetition of sense, ii) Chekanuprāsa and iii) Vṛttyanuprāsa, both are based on the repetition of consonants only, iv) Yamaka which is based on the repetition of vowels and consonants, v) Lātānuprāsa, which is based on the repetition of both sound and sense. Ruyyaka hesitates to give room for Citrālaṃkāra like Padmabandha, Murajabandha etc. in the Paunaruktya group, because in these figures there is no apprehension of repetition, but the Citrālaṃkāra can be included in this group secondarily, because in these figures, there is repetition of letters found in written form. Therefore, R.C. Dwivedi suggests that Citrālaṃkāra is based on patha-paunaruktya.

2. Aupamya Group — According to Ruyyaka comparison implies both difference (bheda) and non-difference (abheda), hence the

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39 AM. p. 184.
figures based on comparison have been sub-divided into three heads according as the bheda and abheda may be combined in three ways, viz., 1) bhedabheda-tylya, ii) abhedapradhāna and iii) bhedapradhāna. In the figures belonging to the bhedabheda-tylya group, the difference between two things (i.e. upamāna and upameya) is acknowledged, but at the same time a perfect equality between the two things is cognised so far as the common attribute is concerned, for we have the idea that the common attribute subsisting between two things is of equal degree. In the figures coming under the abhedapradhāna group, the two things (i.e. upamāna and upameya) are really different, but at the same time they are cognised as non-different because of the similarity of attribute. In the figures belonging to the bhedapradhāna group there is a description of difference between upamāna and upameya, so far as their common attribute is concerned, i.e. there is difference between them because of the greater or smaller degree of the common property, still there is a veiled suggestion of similarity. Thus, it is similarity with the veneer of difference. In the bhedabhedatulya type, four figures are included, viz., 1) Upamā, ii) Ananvaya, iii) Upameyopamā, and iv) Smaraṇa.

The figures belonging to the abheda-pradhāna sub-group are classified into two classes according as they are based on superimposition (āropa) and introsusception (adhyavasāya). In the former the identity of some object (upamāna) is superimposed on another object (upameya), which is mentioned separately.

40 sādharmye trayah prakāraḥ. bhedapradhanyam vyatirekādivat. abhedapradhānyam rūpakādivat dvayos-tulyatvam yathāsyām. AS. p. 31.
The latter (adhyavasāya) is of two types, viz. sādhya and siddha. The adhyavasāya is called Sādhya where the viṣaya is in the process of being swallowed up by viṣayin; and the adhyavasāya is called siddha where the viṣaya is completely swallowed up by the viṣayin. Ruyyaka points out that the identification in the introsusception is carried to a greater extent than that in the superimposition, hence the figures based on superimposition are dealt with first.41 The figures based on superimposition are only six in number. They are: 1) Rūpaka, ii) Parināma, iii) Sandeha, iv) Bhrāntimān, v) Ullekhā and vi) Apa-hnuti.

After discussing the figures based on superimposition, Ruyyaka goes on to deal with the figures based on introsusception (adhyavasaya).42 Thus, the figure i) Utprekṣā is based on sādhya adhyavasāya and the figure ii) Atiṣayokti is based on siddha adhyavasāya.

After discussing the figures based on the abheda-prādhānya group, Ruyyaka begins to deal with the figures that are based on implied resemblance (gamyaupamya).43 It is noticeable that Ruyyaka remains silent about the third sub-group bhedaprabhānaya already referred to. The implied resemblance does not here mean that the figures coming under this group are suggested, but Ruyyaka makes it clear that the figures are based on implied resemblance because the words expressing similarity are not expressed in words. Hence, we find that the relation of upamāna

41 āropād abheda'dhyavasāyah prakṛṣyate iti paścāt tan-mulālāṃkāra-vibhāgāḥ. Ibid, p. 45.
42 evam abheda-prādhānye āropagarbhān alamkārām-llakṣayitvā adhyavasāya-garbham-llakṣayati. Ibid, p. 68.
43 evam adhyavasāyāśrayam alamkāradvayam uktvā gamya-mānaupamyāśrayā alamkāra idanīm ucyāte. Ibid, p. 89.
and upameya is not directly stated. The implied resemblance, Ruyyaka says, may be based on (i) the meaning of the word, or on (ii) the meaning of the sentence. In the former sub-group are included two figures, viz., i) Tulyayogita and ii) Dīpaka; and in the latter, three figures, viz., i) Prativastūpamā, ii) Drṣṭānta and iii) Nidarsāṇā.

Bhedapradhānya sub-group - After discussing the figures based on implied resemblance, Ruyyaka deals with the figures based on bhedapradhānya sub-group. In this sub-group are included the figures, i) Vyatireka and ii) Sahokti and as a sequel of Sahokti, the figure Vinokti is also included in this sub-group.

After considering the figures based on bhedapradhānya, Ruyyaka goes to deal with the figures which are said to depend on the charm resting on viṣeṣaṇa or attribute (viṣeṣaṇa-vicchitti). This group is again sub-divided into two groups, viz., (a) Kevala Viṣeṣaṇa-vicchitti (the charm resting on attribute only) and (b) saviṣeṣya-viṣeṣaṇa-vicchitti (the charm resting on attribute along with noun). Under the former subdivision two figures are included, viz., 1) Samāsokti and ii) Parikara, and in the latter only Śleṣa. After analysing Śleṣa, Ruyyaka defines and analyses five figures, viz., 1) Aprastutapraśāmsā, ii) Arthāntara-nyāsa, iii) Paryāyokta, iv) Vyājastuti and v) Ākṣepa. Ruyyaka does not clearly say that the figures Aprastutapraśāmsā and

Arthantaranyāsa are based on implied comparison, but he says only that Aprastutapraṣāmsā is opposite to Samāsokti, and Arthantaranyāsa is kept near Aprastutapraṣāmsā because in it also there is an idea of 'general and particular' (Sāmānya-viśeṣa). Thus the figures beginning from Aprastutapraṣāmsā to Ākṣepa are included by Ruyyaka in the group of implied resemblance (gamyamanaupamya). But it is to be noted that all the varieties of Aprastutapraṣāmsā and Arthantaranyāsa are not based on implied resemblance. Hence, Jagannātha keeps away Arthantaranyāsa from this group.

The figures, viz. Paryāyokta, Vyājastuti and Ākṣepa are based on implied sense, and not on implied similarity. Dr.R.C.Dwivedi observes that Ruyyaka takes the figures based on comparison (aupamya) into two main heads, viz., vācyāupamya (implicit similarity) and gamyaupamya (implied similarity). Dr.Dwivedi suggests that the figures beginning from Upamā to Atisāyokti are included in the vācyāupamya and the figures from Tulyaupamya.

2. Virodha Group - After discussing the figures based on Aupamya Group, Ruyyaka takes up to deal with the figures the basis of which is Virodha or incongruity. The Virodha Group can conveniently be sub-divided into three sub-groups - (a) Virodha-sāmānya or contradiction in general, (b) Kāra-kāraṇa-bhāva-virodha or contradiction in the relation of cause and

47 RG. p. 634.
48 Vide AS. p. 141.
49 AM. p. 187.
effect and (c) Adhārādheyabhāva virodha or contradiction in the relation of the container and the contained. The figures coming under the sub-group (a) are : i) Virodha (Virodhābhāsa); only; the figures belonging to the sub-group (b) are : ii) Vibhāvanā, iii) Viṣeṣokti, iv) Atiṣayokti (fifth variety), v) Asamgati, vi) Viṣama, vii) Sama, viii) Vicitra, ix) Anyonya, and x) Vyāghāta; and the figures falling under the sub-group (c) are : xi) Viṣeṣa and xii) Adhika. The figure Sama cannot be conveniently placed in Virodha group, but it is given here as a sequel of Viṣama.  

3. Śrṅkhalā Group - After defining and analysing the figures based on Virodha group, Kuyyaka proceeds to deal with the figures based on Śrṅkhalā group. Ruyyaka includes four figures under this group. The figures are : i) Kāraṇamālā, ii) Ekāvali, iii) Mālādīpaka and iv) Sara. The charm of the figures based on the group is resting on the succession of the description of things. Jagannātha does not allow Mālādīpaka as a distinct figure, but according to him, Mālādīpaka is a variety of Ekāvali.

After discussing the figures based on Śrṅkhalā, Ruyyaka proceeds to discuss the figures that are based on various maxims. He first takes up the figures that are based on Tarkanyāya.
4. Tarkanyāya - In this group, two figures are included, viz., i) Kāvyaliṅga and ii) Anumāna. Vidyānātha and Jagannātha include Arthāntaranyāsā in this group. Dr. R.C. Dwivedi informs us that, Dr. R.P. Gode establishes that Arthāntaranyāsā is based on Similarity, but A.S. Bhaṇḍārkār advocates that Arthāntaranyāsā is based on Tarkanyāya.

5. Vākyanyāya - In this group are included the figures, viz., i) Yathāsaṃkhyā, ii) Paryāya, iii) Parivṛtti, iv) Parīsamkhyā, v) Arthāpatti, vi) Vikalpa, vii) Samuccaya and viii) Samādhi. In Yathāsaṃkhyā, the things standing in a particular order are connected with the other in the same order: the arrangement of things in a particular sequence is also found in Paryāya, and there is a semblance of sequence in Parivṛtti. Hence Ruyyaka includes the figures Paryāya and Parivṛtti in this group. In both Samuccaya and Samādhi accomplishment of an object through the operation of another thing is described. Hence both these figures are defined in the same group. In Samuccaya, while one is capable of accomplishing an effect, there are others producing the same effect. In Samādhi there is easy accomplishment of an effect owing to association of another cause. Thus, the easy accomplishment of an effect is the common feature in both the figures. The idea of easy accomplishment is brought out through particular reasoning. Hence, Ruyyaka includes both the figures under Vākyanyāya.

56 Vide AM. p. 191.
57 evam tarkanyāya-mūlam alāmkāra-dvayam iha pratipāditam. adhunā vākyanyāya-mūlā alāmkāra ucyante AS. 187. Samudrābandha explains 'vākyanyāyo mīmāṃsānyāyah.' VR. p. 165.
6. Lokanyāya — After considering the figures based on Vākyanyāya, Ruyyaka proceeds to define the figures based on Lokanyāya. In this group are included the figures, viz.,
i) Pratyanika, ii) Pratīpa, iii) Mālita, iv) Sāmānyā, v) Tadguna, vi) Atadguna and vii) Uttara. These figures are based on popular maxim. Pratīpa is based on similarity, but Ruyyaka includes this figure in this group because of its being based on 'Kaimarthakanyāya'. Vidyādhara also includes Pratīpa under the group Lokanyāya. Mallinātha agrees with Vidyādhara who follows Ruyyaka. Appaya Dīkṣita includes Pratīpa in the Aupamya group. Vidyānātha includes Parivṛtti, Vinokti etc. in this group, and Atadguna in Virodha group.

7. Gūḍhārtha-pratīti group — There is understanding of secret sense in the figures belonging to this group. In this group are included the figures, viz., i) Sūkṣma, ii) Vyājokti, iii) Vakrokti, iv) Svabhāvakāt, v) Bhāvika and vi) Udātta. Samudrabandha suggests the inclusion of the figure Uttara in this group. But according to Ruyyaka, Uttara is not a figure based on Gūḍhārtha-pratīti, for after defining and analysing the figure Uttara, he starts the discussion of the figures based on Gūḍhārtha-pratīti. Vidyācakravartin wants to group the two figures, viz., Bhāvika and Udātta differently. According to this explanation Bhāvika is based on sphuṭārthata (distinctly visible object)

58 evaṁ vākyanyāyāśrayino'lamkārān pratipādyādhunā lokanyāyāśrayino'lamkāra ucyante. AS. p. 206.
59 Vide TR. p. 334.
60 cf. KVL. p.10. But in the C.M. he does not include it in Aupamya group.
61 HID. p. 400.
63 Vide VR. p. 194.
and Udātta is based on Udātata (exaltedness). In Sūkṣma the meaning is concealed and it is subtle enough to baffle an ordinary observer; in Vyājokti the concealed meaning is manifested. Thus, in these two figures we get secret meaning. In Vakrokti, there is secret sense because the sense is interpreted differently and in Savabhāvokti the natural description which it involves must be subtle and is attained only by the imagination of the poet. In Bhāvika the things of the past or future are visualised and not the things of the present. Hence Bhāvika is based on the idea secret sense. In Udātta there is an imaginative description of an object possessed of prosperity beyond the experience of person. We find, therefore, that in all these figures of this group there is an idea of deep meaning.

8. Alamkāras based on mental state — Ānandavardhana regards Rasa etc. as different aspects of mental state. Ruyyaka suggests a group for the figures that are based on mental state. There are seven figures coming under this group, viz., Rasavat, Preyaḥ, Urjasvai, Samāhita, Bhāvodaya, Bhāvasandhi and Bhāvasaṅkalata.

Sequence of Alamkāras:

In most of the works on Alamkāra, the verbal figures ( śabdālamkāras) are considered before the ideational figures (arthālamkāras). Ruyyaka follows the tradition of his predecessors and deals with the verbal figures before considering the

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64 guḍhārthaparāvatve sūkṣma-vyājokti-vakrokti-svabhāvoktayaḥ. Sphuṭārthatve bhāvikām. udāttadvayam. SJ. p. 231.
65 cittavṛtti-viśeṣā hi rasādayaḥ. DL. p. 1221.
ideational figures. He justifies his position by saying that the verbal cognition precedes the ideational cognition, so it is logical to consider the verbal figures before considering the ideational ones. This shows that the approach of the author of the Alamkārasarvasva is very scientific and based on sound logic.

We have seen that Ruyyaka arranges the figures particularly figures of sense in various groups and sub-groups. He tacitly follows the principle 'uttarottara-sāmya-prakārā-vivakṣā' in arranging the figures based on similarity. The principle of 'uttarottaraprakārā-vivakṣā' is also applied by him to arrange the figures of other groups and sub-groups. The figures are arranged in a group or a sub-group in such a way that each succeeding figure becomes more striking than its preceding one. The figure, which is given the first place in a group or a sub-group, is regarded as lying at the root of the figures belonging to that group or sub-group. Thus, the idea of Upamā, which lies at the root of all figures based on comparison, is given the first place of that group. Similarly the idea of Virodhābhāsa, Kāraṇamālā etc. lies at the root of the figures based on contradiction, linked succession etc. The figure which is given the first place in a group or a sub-group represents the figures belonging to that group or sub-group. The growing degree of excellence is the criterion on which the figures are arranged in a


68 AS. p. 253.

group or a sub-group. Thus, in considering the question as to which one of the two groups - the Āropa or the Adhyavasāya precedes, Ruyyaka says that the Āropa sub-group should precede the Adhyavasāya sub-group, because the figures based on Adhyavasāya excel the figures based on Āropa in strikingness, so the figures based on Āropa should be placed before the figures based on Adhyavasāya. Therefore, the treatment of Rūpaka, which lies at the root of all figures based on Āropa precedes the treatment of Utpreksā based on Adhyavasāya. In the Adhyavasāya sub-group, the idea of sādhyatva precedes the idea of siddhatva; so the treatment of Utpreksā based on sādhyā adhyavasāya precedes the treatment of Atisayokti based on siddha adhyavasāya.

Ruyyaka divides the figures based on gamyaupamya (implied similarity) into two classes according as they are based on the meaning of the word or on the meaning of sentence. The cognition of meaning of the word precedes the cognition of meaning of the sentence. So the figures based on padārthagata-gamyatva are treated before the figures based on vākyārthagata-gamyatva. Hence, the figures Tulyayogitā and Dīpaka are placed before the figures Prativastūpama, Drṣṭānta and Nidarśana.

The figures based on Bhedaprādhānya are Vyatireka and Sahokti. These two figures should have been placed before the figures based on gamyaupamya, because the Bhedaprādhānya sub-group should follow the Abhedaprādhānya sub-group. But the placing of the Bhedaprādhānya sub-group after gamyaupamya sub-group is anomalous.

70 aropād abhede' dhyavasāyaḥ prakṛṣyate iti paścāt tan-mūlālāmākāra-vibhāgaḥ. Ibid, p. 45.
71 tatrāpy-āropamūlālāmākāraṃ bijabhūtam rūpakaṃ ādau sūtrayati. SJ. p. 44.
72 vākyārthāpekṣaṇā padmārtha-pratīter antaraṅgatvāt. VS. p. 89.
The two figures, viz., Samāsokti and Parikara are said to depend on the charm resting on viṣeṣaṇa or attribute. Samāsokti depends on the charm resting on single viṣeṣaṇa and Parikara on a number of viṣeṣaṇas. Śleṣa is said to depend on the charm of viṣeṣaṇa along with viṣeṣya. So in the sub-group of viṣeṣaṇa-vicchitti, Samāsokti occupies the first place and then Parikara, and after Parikara the place of Śleṣa is given, as it is based on saviṣeṣya-viṣeṣaṇa-vicchitti.  

Atiśayokti(II) and Mālādīpaka are said to have depend on the charm of incongruity of cause and effect (Kārya-kāraṇa-virodha) and linked succession (Srṅkhalā) respectively. Therefore Atiśayokti(II) is placed in Virodha group and Mālādīpaka is placed in Srṅkhalā group.  

Some figures are placed in certain main group or sub-group on the basis of laksāṇa sādharmya or laksana-vaidharmya. The figures, the characteristics of which have a partial commonness with those of their preceding ones, have laksāṇa-sādharmya. Thus, the figure Upameyopama has laksāṇa-sādharmya with Ananvaya, because in Ananvaya there is idea of exclusion of the second thing and in Upameyopama there is idea of exclusion of the third thing. The figures Bhrāntimān, Nidāraṇā, Arthāntaranyāsa, Asamgati, Viṣama, Parisamkhya, Samādhi etc. have partial similarity with their preceding ones, viz., Samdeha, Drśtānta, 

73 yat tu samāsokty-anantaram parikara-śleṣayor vacanam tad viṣeṣaṇa-sāmyādinā prasaṅgāgamā. VS. p. 132.  
74 prakāra-paścacakamadhyāt kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvena yah prakāraya sa kārya-kāraṇatāśrayā-laṃkāra-prastāve prapañcārtham lakṣaiṣyate. AS. p. 89.  
Aprastutapraśamsā, Atiśayokti(II), Asamgati, Parivṛtti and Samuccaya respectively. Ruyyaka takes lakṣaṇa-sādharmya probably in the sense of nāma-sāmya, śabda-sāmya and samāna-nyāya-sāmya also. When certain figures are similar in name, they are placed in the same group. The figures like Ākṣepa(II) and Udātta(II) are placed after Ākṣepa and Udātta because of the sameness of nyāya or name only. When the names of some figures end in the same word, they are placed in the same group. Thus the figures Vyājokti, Vakrokti and Svabhāvokti are placed one after another in the same group because the name of each of the figures ends in ukti. But it is to be noted in this connexion that these figures are arranged in the same group because of their basis being the gūḍhārthapratīti. In grouping the figures, Ruyyaka gives foremost importance to the common feature lying at the root of the figures. Hence, he does not arrange Sahokti and Vyājokti in one group. The poetic figures are also arranged on the basis of lakṣaṇa-vāidharmya. Thus, a figure, which is distinct in nature from its preceding one, is said to have different characteristics. But the difference of nature between two figures does not always mean that the underlying principle on which the figures are based is different.

76 Ibid, p. 152.
77 Ibid, p. 231.
Thus, the figures, viz., Apa-ahnuti, Vinokti, Aprastuta-prasamsa, Višeokti, Sama, Vikalpa, Atadguna, etc. are antitheses of the figures, viz., Ullekha, Sahokti, Samaokti, Vibhavanā, Viṣama, Samuccaya, Tadguna etc. respectively.

Thus, from what we have discussed it is clear that behind the arrangement of every individual poetic figure, Ruyyaka has a sound logic. He clearly explains the reason why a particular poetic figure is included in certain group or sub-group or why one figure should follow another. This shows that Ruyyaka's approach is very methodical. Though, some of the sub-groups, individual figures and divisions of an individual figure misplaced in Ruyyaka's arrangement of figures, it is an undeniable fact that the author of the Alamkārasarvasva makes for the first time an earnest attempt on his part to group the individual poetic figures on the basis of some definite principles. That, all the later writers follow Ruyyaka's classification of poetic figures, however, with slight modification, is an eloquent testimony to the hold the Alamkārasarvasva has on later writers.

82 prastutād aprastuta-pratītau samāsoktir ukta. adhuna tad vaiparītyenā-prastutāt prastutapratītāv aprastutaprasamsa. Ibid, p. 132.
83 vibhāvanām lakṣayitvā tad-viparyaya-svarūpām višeoktim lakṣayati. Ibid, p. 160
87 A.B.Keith remarks that the division of poetic figure even in Ruyyaka is not logical. Vide HSL.p.399. S.K.De also raises doubt about the scientific classification of poetic figures made by Ruyyaka and his followers. Vide HSP. Vol.II. p. 74.
SECTION III.

DETAILED STUDY OF ALÄMKÄRAS

(I)

ALÄMKÄRAS BASED ON PAUNARUKTYA

1) Punaruktavädabhäsa - Though Ruyyaka is aware of the fact that the verbal cognition precedes the ideological cognition, yet he begins the discussion on Alamkāra or poetic figure with an ideological figure or Arthālamkāra called Punaruktavädabhäsa, solely because he follows Udbhata who opens his Kavyāalamkārasārasamgraha with the same figure.

The figure Punaruktavādabhāsa is based on the repetition of sense. The repetition of sense or tautology is generally considered as a fault, but when there is a semblance of repetition of sense, there is charm; and this charm constitutes this poetic figure. The author of the Alāmkārasarvasva, therefore, defines that the figure Punaruktavādabhāsa consists in the appearance of repetition of sense, but the seeming repetition of sense or tautology disappears ultimately when both the senses are clearly understood. Since the charm consists in the repetition of sense, the name Punaruktavādabhāsa given to

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1 arthāpekṣayā śabdasyā- pratītyā antarāṅgatve' pi pratha mam arthagata-dharmanirdeśaś ciramāṇa-prasiddhyā punarukta-vadābhāsasya pūrvam laksāṇārthaḥ. AS. p. 10. By cirantana Ruyyaka means Udbhata, who has been referred to by him elsewhere as : cirantanair alamkāra- tantraprajāpatibhir bhaṭṭodbhāta-prabhṛtibhiḥ. VVV.p.23.

this figure is significant. The illustration of this figure is given by Ruyyaka in verse:

dārunaḥ kāṣṭhato jāto bhasma-bhūtikaraḥ paraḥ /
raktaśonorcīr uccaṇḍaḥ pātu vah pāvakaḥ śikhī //

Here the word dārunaḥ being taken in the fifth case-ending becomes tautologous with the word kāṣṭharaḥ and means wood, but ultimately it means cruel and thus, the apparent tautology disappears.

Following Udbhāta, Ruyyaka gives the name of the figure in the neuter gender Punaruktavadābhasam, though Mammata and most of the later writers call it Punaruktavadābhāsaḥ. Though Ruyyaka follows Udbhāta in naming the figure in the neuter gender, he deviates from Udbhāta who regards Punaruktavadābhasam as an adjective to padam, but Ruyyaka regards Punarukta-vadābhasam as an adjective to Kāvyam, which is in neuter gender. Following the view of Pratīhārendurāja, Ruyyaka justifies his usage by pointing out that the poetic figures are subordinate to Kāvyam that is adorned by it. It is worth noting that herein a very significant idea of literary criticism is emphasized by Ruyyaka.

3 Udbhāta names the figure as Punaruktābhasam in the definition, cf. punaruktābhasam abhinna-vastvivodbhāsibhinnarūpa-padam, KLSS. p. 250; while in the enumeration of the figure he calls it Punarukavadābhasam. Ibid, p. 248.


6 Vide infra, Chap. V.
There is a great controversy among the Ālaṃkārikas regarding the question of classifying Punaruktavadābhāsa whether a figure of word or that of sense. Udbhāṭa, who is the first to conceive of this figure, says that it is a 'vācām ālaṃkāra'; but the term vācām is so ambiguous that it has been interpreted in different ways by the two commentators of Udbhāṭa. Pratīhārenduraṇḍa considers it to be a figure of word,⁷ while Rājānaka Tilaka regards it to be a figure of both word and sense.⁸ Mammaṭā follows Rājānaka Tilaka, but Ruyyaka follows neither Pratīhārenduraṇḍa nor his father, Rājānaka Tilaka, but he believes that Punaruktavadābhāsa should be considered as a figure of sense. According to Mammaṭā, who upholds the Avyaya-vyatireka theory, Punaruktavadābhāsa is a ubhayālāṃkāra, because the figure is lost if certain words are changed, and certain words in it can bear the change of synonymous word.⁹ But Ruyyaka who upholds the Āśrayāśrayibhāva theory, thinks that the charm of this figure depends on sense, which appears to be repeated and not the word. Since the figure depends for its charm on the semblance of repetition of sense, it is a figure of sense.¹⁰ Jayaratha supports the author and rules out the possibility of becoming Punaruktavadābhāsa a figure of sound or of both (sound and sense).¹¹

⁷ Laghu, p. 249.
⁸ ubhayāvalambanō'yaṃ alaṃkāraḥ. TVR. p.3. Quoted from AIV. p. 67.
⁹ atraiṣaṃ pade parivartite nālaṃkāra iti śabdāśrayah, aparāsmiṃstu parivartite'pi sa na hiyate, ityartha-niṣṭā ityubhayā-laṃkāro'yaṃ. K.P. p. 539.
¹⁰ artha-paunaraktyād evārthāśritatvād arthālaṃkāratvam jñeyam. AS. p. 21.
¹¹ Vide : VS. p. 22.
Ruyyaka does not classify this figure for fear of prolixity; but from his treatment of this figure it appears that he wants two fold division of this figure according as it is based either on subanta or tiñanta.

Punaruktavadābhāsa has been recognised by almost all later writers. Both Appaya Dīkṣita and Jagannātha remain silent about this figure. But the Ālaṃkārikas, who accept it, are divided among themselves on the question of classifying figures. Jayadova and Viśvanātha consider it to be anubhayālaṃkāra,\textsuperscript{12} while Vidyādhara and Vidyanātha believe Punaruktavadābhāsa to be considered as a figure of sense.\textsuperscript{13}

Anuprāsa - Though Ruyyaka remains silent about the general definition of Anuprāsa, yet his analysis of Sabdapaunaruktya which is the basis of Anuprāsa clearly indicates his fair idea about this figure. According to Ruyyaka, Anuprāsa is based on the repetition of sound, and this repetition of sound is of two types, viz., (a) repetition of mere consonants along with vowels.\textsuperscript{14} Ruyyaka says that repetition of mere vowels does not constitute the poetic figure, in so far as the charm essential for a poetic figure is wanting in the repetition of vowels.\textsuperscript{15} Ruyyaka speaks of the two types of Anuprāsa based on the repetition of consonants, viz., i) Chekānuprāsa and ii) Vṛtyanuprāsa.

\textsuperscript{12} CL. p. 85, SD. p.
\textsuperscript{13} EV. p. 192. PRD. p. 407.
\textsuperscript{14} Loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{15} ālaṃkāra-prastāve kevalaṃ svara-paunaruktyam acārutvan-na gānyate. AS. p. 24.
2. Chekanuprāsa – This figure consists in the consecutive repetition of the same group of two consonants irrespective of vowels.\(^\text{16}\) As for eg.,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{kim nāma dardura duradhyavasāya sāyaṃ} \\
kāyaṃ nipiḍya ninadāṃ kuruṣe ruṣeva
\end{align*}
\]

Here, dura dura and sāya sāya constitute this figure. Ruuyyaka gives emphasis on the repetition of the group of two consonants. Though the author of the Alamkārasarvasva is indebted to Udbhāta for the idea of Chekanuprāsa, yet he shows his originality in defining this figure. Udbhāta does not define Yamaka, but he is the first to conceive of Chekanuprāsa. Udbhāta says that in Chekanuprāsa there is a repetition of the group of two consonants along with vowels.\(^\text{17}\) From this definition it appears that Udbhāta's Chekanuprāsa is wide enough to include Yamaka of other writers. But Ruuyyaka differentiates the figure Chekanuprāsa from Yamaka. Ruuyyaka does not agree with Mammaṭa who says that Chekanuprāsa is the repetition of the several consonants only once.\(^\text{18}\) Mammaṭa's Chekanuprāsa is in reality not different from Ruuyyaka's Vṛttyanuprāsa.\(^\text{19}\) In explaining the significance of the name of this figure, Ruuyyaka follows Pratihāreudurāja and Mammaṭa. This figure is called Chekanuprāsa because it is appreciated by persons 'versed in belles-letters'. (vidagdhas).

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\(^{17}\) chekanuprāsas tu dvayordvayoh susadṛṣokti-kṛtau. KLSS. p. 254.

\(^{18}\) anekasya, arthāt vyañjanasya sakṛd ekavāram sādṛṣyam chekanuprāsaḥ. KP. p. 496.

\(^{19}\) asakṛd āyṛttir vṛttyanuprāsa ityaha kāvyaprakāśakārah. alamkārasarvasvakāras tu tad viparītāṃ siddhānta-yāñcakāraḥ. TR. p. 195.
Ruuyaka's Chekanuprāsa has been accepted by later writers, and no noticeable improvement of the definition is seen in later Alamkāra works. Viśvanātha adds a new point. He says that the repetition of consonants should be maintained in their own form as well as order. Thus 'rasasara' cannot be an illustration of Chekanuprāsa.

3) Vṛttyanuprāsa - The nature of Vṛttyanuprāsa is different from that of Chekanuprāsa, and this difference leads Ruuyaka to formulate the sūtra - 'Anyathā Vṛttyanuprāsā: This anyathātva, he explains, may occur in three different ways, viz, (a) the repetition of a single consonant in several times, (b) the repetition of the group of two consonants only once and (c) the repetition of more than two consonants several times. As for example:

\[
\text{śūpena patīyamā yadapi sā vaṇī kaver āmukhe}
\text{khelantī prathate tathāpi kurute no man-manoraṇjanam/}
\text{na syadyāvad amandasundara-guṇālāmśakrijhamkāritaḥ}
\text{saprasyandi-lasad-rasāyanarasā-sārānuśarī rasah //}
\]

Ruuyaka appears to have taken the idea of Vṛttyanuprāsa from Udbhata. But neither Udbhata nor his commentators attach importance to the number of consonants to be repeated and also the time of their repetition. Mammāta wants to fix the number, when he says that Vṛttyanuprāsa is the repetition of one or several consonants twice or several times. But Mammāta

20 kevala-vyañjanamātra-sādṛṣyam ekadhā samudāya-sādṛṣyam
tryādiṁ ca paraspara-sādṛṣyam anyathā-bhāvaḥ. AS. p. 25.
21 KLSS. p. 260.
22 ekasya, api śabdād anekasya vyañjanasya dvir-bahukṛtvam vā sādṛṣyam vṛttyanuprāsah. KP. p. 496.
remains silent in mentioning the group of consonants. Therefore, Ruuyaka wants to fix the number of consonants and the time of their repetition. Thus Ruuyaka's treatment of Vṛttyanuprāsa is opposed to that of Mammaṭa. 23

Ruuyaka differs slightly from Udbhāṭa in explaining the significance of the name of Vṛttyanuprāsa. Udbhāṭa says that this figure is called Vṛttyanuprāsa because in it there is suitable sound adjustment of letters (svarūpa-varṇa-vinyāsa), but in this connexion he makes no reference to rasa. Udbhāṭa's commentator Pratīhārendurāja, on the other hand, following Ānanda-vardhana's speculation of śabda-vṛtti, points out that the letters employed in Vṛttyanuprāsa are conducive to suggest Rasa. 24 Mammaṭa and Ruuyaka follow Pratīhārendurāja in justifying the name of this figure. Ruuyaka says that Vṛtti primarily means the function of suggesting Rasa, but the Vṛtti in Vṛttyanuprāsa is applied to the suitable sound adjustment of letters for suggesting Rasa. 25

Though Ruuyaka does not directly speak of the division of this figure, yet from his explanation it appears that he admits three varieties of this figure, viz., (a) repetition of single consonant for a number of times, (b) repetition of the group of two consonants only once and (c) repetition of more than two consonants in several times. The second division appears to be same as Chekanuprāsa, but the difference between the two is,

23 TR. p. 195.
25 vṛttistu rasa-viṣayo vyāpārah. tadvatī punar varṇara-caneha vṛttīḥ. ... tadupalakṣīto'yam anuprāsaḥ. AS.p.25.
thus, maintained: in Vṛttyanuprāsa there is repetition of the two consonants only once and there is no rule of their similarity in svarūpa (as āṭopena paṭīyasā), while in Chekānu-prāsa the group of two consonants is repeated more than once.

4) Yamaka - This figure is based on the repetition of sound. According to the definition given in the Alamkārasarvasva, the figure Yamaka consists in the repetition of the group of consonants as well as vowels.26 This definition of Yamaka distinguishes it from Anuprāsa on the one hand and Lāṭānuprāsa on the other. Thus in Anuprāsa there is a repetition of one or more consonants, but necessarily along with accompanying vowels. In Yamaka, the consonants as well as vowels are repeated strictly in the same order or sequence. In Lāṭānuprāsa, there is repetition of word in the same sense but with different purport, in Yamaka the same group of vocable is repeated, but it need not have the same meaning and may even be quite meaningless in itself. An illustration of Yamaka is is given in the verse:

yo yaḥ paśyati tan-netre rucire vanajāyate /
tasya tasyānīya-netreṣu rucireva na jāyate //

Yamaka is a very old figure recognised as early as in the Nāṭyaśāstra. Almost all writers on Alamkāra recognise this figure excepting Udbhaṭa, Appaya Dīkṣita and Jagannātha. Ānandavardhana, however, thinks that Yamaka is detrimental to the delineation of Śrṅgara rasa.27 The predecessors of Ruyyaka

27 DL. II. 15.
speak of the manifold division of this figure, but these divisions are not acceptable to Ruyyaka. Ruyyaka seems to think that these divisions are of no practical value. According to the Alamkārasarvasva Yamaka can briefly and conveniently be divided into three varieties, viz., (a) repetition of the same group of vocables having different meanings, (b) repetition of the same group of vocables having no meaning and (c) repetition of the same group of vocables — one group having meaning and another having no meaning. Ruyyaka's classification of Yamaka is very brief, but it is so scientific that it includes all the varieties mentioned and elaborately discussed by his predecessors. Ruyyaka does not illustrate the three varieties of Yamaka, but furnishes the illustration of the first variety. Ruyyaka's classification of this figure is accepted by almost all writers like Jayadeva, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha.

5) Lāṭānuprāsa — This figure is based on the repetition of word and sense. The repetition of word in the same sense is considered generally as a fault, but when the sense of each word is of different significance, the repetition of word in the same sense is not regarded as a fault, but it becomes an ornament or poetic figure.

28 Bharata gives ten varieties, Bhāmaha gives five, Daṇḍins divisions exceed hundred, Vāmana gives forty-three varieties, Rudraṇa follows Daṇḍin, Mammāta gives eleven varieties.

29 kvacid bhinnarthatvam kvacid anarthakatvam kvacid ekasya anarthakatvam aparasya sārthakatvam iti sāmksepatah prakāratrayam. AS (MLBD. ed.). The reading of the NSP ed. appears to be defective as the commentators do not accept the reading.

30 anyatra tātparyabhedat cac-ca bhūṣaṇam eva dūṣaṇam. VW. p. 333.
According to the author of the *Alamkārasarvasvā*, the figure *Laṭānuprāsa* consists in the repetition of the same word and sense with the difference of purport. Here the words are used in the same appearance and sense with the difference that each is construed in different way. In the verse:

\[
\text{tālā jaamti guṇa jāla de sahi–āehin gheppamti} / \\
\text{rai–kiraṇāṅgūgāhi āin hoṃti kamalāīn kamalāīn} //
\]

Here the repetition of the word lotus signifies not merely 'a lotus', but 'a lotus as possessing attributes like fragrance, tenderness' etc. Thus the difference of purport (tātparya-bhedā) is the essence of this figure, and the expressed mention of which in Ruyyaka's definition distinguishes it from Anuprāsa on the one hand and from Yamaka on the other.

Laṭānuprāsa is for the first time mentioned by Bhāmaha. Without defining this figure Bhāmaha furnishes its illustration. Udbhāta defines and illustrates it; and his definition becomes standardised in later Alamkāra literature. The phrase 'tātpaya bheda' taken by Mammata and Ruyyaka as an essential feature of this figure, is taken directly from Pratīnārendrāja's comments.

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31 tāt-paryabhedavatttu laṭānuprāsah. The Vṛtti explains this sūtra: tātparyam anyaparatvam. tadeva bhidyate, na tu sābdārthayoh svarūpam. AS. p. 28.
32 Vide: EV. p. 201.
33 KL. II. 8.
34 svarūpārthaviseṣepi punaruktih phatāntarat / sābdānaṁ vā padānaṁ vā laṭānuprāsa iṣyate // KLSS.p.261.
35 tātparyabhedena tu teṣāṁ punaruktih. Laṅghu, p. 263.
That Ruyyaka takes the idea of Lāṭāṇuprāsa from Udbhata is evidenced from his commentary on Mahimabhaṭṭa’s Vyaktiviveka.

Ruyyaka does not speak of the divisions of this figure, although Udbhata and Mammaṭa have already discussed the five varieties of Lāṭāṇuprāsa.

There is possibility of mutual overlapping of Lāṭāṇuprāsa with the figure Ananvaya. In Ananvaya, the poet conveys the idea of the excellence of the object by comparing it with itself. Thus in Ananvaya, the same thing is used twice. Hence, in the instance like 'kāśāḥ kāsā eva' etc. which is quoted by Udbhata as an illustration of Lāṭāṇuprāsa, there is overlapping of Lāṭāṇuprāsa with Ananvaya. But Ruyyaka rightly says that the province of Lāṭāṇuprāsa is quite distinct from that of the figure Ananvaya. In Lāṭāṇuprāsa, the charm lies in the repetition of the same word and sense which are mutually related, while in Ananvaya, it should not be absolutely necessary that the same word should be repeated, the repetition required is of sense only. In Lāṭāṇuprāsa, the repetition of the same word is essential to constitute this figure, while in Ananvaya, the sameness of word is accidental, because it is more suitable. This view on the differentiation of Lāṭāṇuprāsa from Ananvaya is readily accepted by later writers like Vidyādhara, Viśvanātha and others.

6) Citrālāṃkāra - The figure citra is not primarily included by Ruyyaka in the Paunaruktya Group. According to the

36 VVV, pp. 333 - 34.
37 ananvaye ca śabdālkyam aucityād ānuṣaṅgikam / asmimṣtu lāṭāṇuprāse sākṣādeva prayojakam // AS.p.29.
definition given in the Alāmṛtārasarvasva the Citrālamkāra occurs when the letters constituting a verse are placed in such a particular order so as to form the design of a sword, lotus etc. In the Citrālamkāra, the letters, that form the design of a sword etc., are repeated in a punning way in certain places; hence, this figure is secondarily included in the Paunaruktya group.

The figure Citra is for the first time recognised by Daṇḍin, who defines Sarvatobhadra, Arddhabhrama etc. which are defined in Rudrata's Kāvyālamkāra, and they are given name Citrālamkāra. Hence, Namisādhu remarks that this figure is not mentioned by others, but it is recognised for the first time by Rudrata. Mammaṭa recognises this figure. Ruuyaka appears to have borrowed directly the definition of Citrālamkāra from Mammaṭa.

Citrālamkāra is admitted as a figure of word by Mammaṭa and Ruuyaka. There is a problem of recognising Citrālamkāra as a figure of word, for the pictorial design formed out of letters in a verse are to be seen by the eyes and appreciated, while in the figure of word, the sound effects are heard by the ear and appreciated. Mammaṭa does not explain the problem as to why Citrālamkāra is called a figure of word. Ruuyaka tries to explain the problem by referring to a popular notion that the letters of the alphabet as written, are taken as identical with

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39 anyair anuktam citraṃ śabdālamkāra madhye samucciyate. NSC. p. 37.
40 KP. IX. 85.
those that are heard. Thus Citrālamkāra is called a figure of word only through upacāra. The later writers accept this view of the author of the Alamkārasarvasva. Ruyyaka extends recognition to all the varieties of Citrālamkāra, but he illustrates Padmabandha only.


42 aupacāriko'yam saṃdālāmkaṇāra iti tātparyārthaḥ. VS. p. 30.
ALAMKĀRAS BASED ON SIMILARITY

A Note on Technical Terms

An Alamkāra based on similarity generally requires three constituent elements, viz., Upamāna, Upameya and Sāmānyadharma (and in some Alamkāras the words expressive of comparison). The basic concepts of Upamāna and Upameya may be traced back to the Nirukta of Yāska; but these terms are not used by him in the same name, although the term Upamāna is used by him to denote particles of comparison like iva, yathā etc. We, however, find in Pāṇini’s Aṣṭadhyāyī the use of the technical terms Upamāna, Upameya and sāmānyadharma in various sūtras. The rhetoricians are, in many respects, indebted to the grammarians and they have borrowed these technical terms from the grammarians.

Upamāna: The object with which something is compared is called Upamāna or the standard of comparison.

Upameya: The object which is compared, i.e. the object which the poet by association of ideas compares with another is called Upameya or object of comparison.

Like other correlates like Kārya and Kāraṇa, the Upamāna and Upameya are always correlated.

1 NK. VII. 31.
2 ADA. II. i. 55; III. i. 10, III. ii. 79; V. iv. 97. etc.
3 Ibid. II. i. 56.
4 Ibid. II. i. 55–56; VIII. i. 73.
5 Upamīyate sādreyam anīyate yenotkṛṣṭa guṇeṇānyat tad upamānam. KLSV. p. 137.
6 yad upamīyate nyūnagunam tad upameyam. Ibid. p. 137.
Sāmānyadharma: It is also called sādhārana dharma or common property because it is common to both upamāna and upameya, on the basis of which one thing is compared with another.

Synonyms for Upamāna and Upameya: Various synonyms for the Upamāna and the Upameya are applied by the rhetoricians, and we find that Ruyyaka makes use of them. The Upamāna is styled aprakṛta, viṣayin, aprastuta, āropamāna, aprākaraṇika etc. while the Upameya is called prakṛta, viṣaya prastuta, āropaṃviṣaya, prākaraṇika etc. These self-explanatory Sanskrit terms are generally retained in our discussion on the individual poetic figure or Alamkāra.

(4) The Alamkāras based on Bhedābhedatulya Sub-group.

1. Upamā:

Upamā (simile) is the oldest figure because its use is found in the Rgveda, the oldest extant document of Indo-European language. The discussion on Upamā is traced back to the Nirukta of Yāska, who quotes his predecessor Gārgya's definition of Upamā. Upamā is a very popular figure because it employed by all poets. It also finds a place of honour in the works on Poetics, because this figure is defined and illustrated by all writers beginning from Bharata to Viśveśvara.

7 athāta upamāḥyaḥ atat tat-sadṛśam iti gargyaḥ. tad āsāṃ karma. jyāyasā vā guṇena prakhyātatamena vā kāniṃyāṃsaṃ vāprakhyātam vopamimiteśāpi kāniṃyāsa jyāyasam. NK. III. 13.

8 alamkāra-sīroratnam sarvasvam kāvyā-sampadām / upamā kavivāmśasya mātaiteti matir mama // ALS.p. 34.
The *Alamkārasarvasva* begins the treatment of the figure of sense or *Arthālaṃkāra* with *Upamā*. Ruyyaka observes that *Upamā* forms the basis of several poetic figures, hence it deserves the first position in the figures of sense.⁹ In his eagerness to explain the viewpoint of Ruyyaka, his commentator Vidyācakravartin demonstrates with examples how the same figure *Upamā* results in a number of poetic figures.¹⁰ Taking cue from Ruyyaka and his commentator, Appaya Dīkṣita pronounces that *Upamā* is the solitary actress who appears on the stage of poetry in different roles and delights the heart of the appreciators.¹¹ Appaya Dīkṣita quotes Vidyācakravartin's commentary *Sañjīvanī* almost in verbatim and shows that the one figure *Upamā* assumes the characters of different poetic figures under different circumstances.¹²

(a) The figure *Upama* is defined in the *Alamkārasarvasva* as:

\[
\text{upamānopameyayoḥ sadharmye bhedābheda-tulyatve upama.} \tag{13}
\]

That is to say, *Upama* consists in the similarity of attributes subsisting in the cognition of the equality of the difference and sameness between the *upamāna* and the *upameya*. The figure *Upamā* establishes a particular type of relation between two things or ideas, hence the interest of the poet lies in comparing the *upameya* with the *upamāna*. The charm of this figure lies

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¹⁰ *SJ*. p. 36.

¹¹ *upamaika śailūṣi samprāptā citrabhumikā-bhedat / rañjayati kavyāraṅge nṛtyantī tad-vidām cetaḥ // CM.p.33.

¹² Ibid, p. 35.

¹³ *AS*. p. 31.
in establishing the similarity between two dissimilar objects. In his eagerness to show the accuracy of the definition given by him, Ruyyaka explains the significance of each of the words employed in the definition. Sādharmya subsists only between the pair of correlates, viz., Upamāṇa and Upameya and not between other pair of correlates like cause and effect, container and contained and the like. Considering the superfluity of the expression mention of Upamāṇa and Upameya in the definition of Upamā, Mammaṭa omits this pair of correlates from the definition.14 Ruyyaka, on the other hand, feels the necessity of mentioning the pair of Upamāṇa and Upameya in the definition of Upamā as this pair of correlates is the essential constituents of Upamā. The expressed mention of the pair of Upamāṇa and Upameya in the definition, Ruyyaka says, is for the exclusion of the unintelligible and unfamiliar Upamāṇa and Upameya.15 Ruyyaka is of the view that the Upamāṇa should be better known and appropriate in relation to the Upameya, otherwise the idea of similarity will not be clearly brought out. Ruyyaka takes this idea from Vāmana who says that the pair of the Upamāṇa and Upameya should be well-known.16

Ruyyaka does not, like Vāmana and Mammaṭa, deal with the fault pertaining to Upamā (Upamā-doṣa), but it appears from his treatment of Upamā that he does not allow faulty pair of Upamāṇa and Upameya constituting this figure. Again, any object in this

14 sādharmyam upamā bhede. KP. p. 540.
15 upamānopameyayor ityapratītopamāṇo-pameya-niṣedhārtham. AS. p. 31.
16 Vide KLSV. p. 137.
world may be the subject of description (Upameya) to the poet, but the poet does not choose such object as a subject of description which does deserve description at all because of vulgarity etc. Ruyyaka reiterates that a poetic figure is charm; if the charm is impeded by something, a poetic figure cannot give delight in the heart of the appreciator of poetic art, and if a poetic figure fails to accomplish its function, it cannot claim to be a poetic figure. The faulty pair of Upamāna and Upameya cannot give delight to the appreciator. So it should be avoided by the poet.

After explaining the utility of the inclusion of the Upamāna and the Upameya in the definition, Ruyyaka explains the significance of the word sādharmya employed in the definition. The idea of similarity involved in the definition of Upamā is expressed differently by various writers on Alāṅkāras. Ruyyaka follows Udbhata and Mammatā and employs the term sādharmya. Though the later writers are found maintaining difference of sense between sādharmya and sādṛśya, Ruyyaka is found using sādharmya and sādṛśya as if they are synonyms. Sādharmya has been derived as: samāno dharmo yayos tau sadharmānau, tayor bhāvaḥ sadharmyamiti.

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17 Jayaratha's explanation on this point is very elaborate. Vide VS. p. 31.
18 We find Bharata using the word sādṛśya (NS. XVII.44), Bhāmaha sāmya (KL.II.30), Dāndin sādṛśya (KD.II.14), Udbhata sādharmya (KLSS.I.15), Vāmana sāmya (KLSV.IV.ii.1), Rūdrata samāna-agnādi (RKL. viii.4), Bhoja sāmānya-yoga (SKA. iv.5), Māmattedā sādharmya (KP. p.540), Ruyyaka sādharmya (AS.p. 31), Jayadeva sādṛśya (CL.v.II), Vidvādhara sādharmya (EV.VIII.2), Vidvānātha sāmya (PRD. p.414), Viśvanātha sāmya (SD.X.14), Appaya Dīkṣita sādṛśya (CM.p.37), sādṛśya (KVL.6.p.2), Jagannātha sādṛśya (RG.p. 204).
19 Ruyyaka's quotation: 'yatra kimcit sāmānyam kaśčīc ca viśeṣaḥ sa viṣayah sādṛṣa-tāyāḥ' from the MB. approves the view.
20 UD. p.3.
(bheda) and sameness (abheda). The figures based on similarity, Ruuyyaka says, have been divided under three heads according as the difference and the sameness combined in three ways, viz.,

(1) Bhedapradyāna, where the idea of difference between the Upamāna and the Upameya is prominent, although there is an undertone of sameness, like Vyatireka, (II) Abhedapradyāna, where the idea of non-difference (or identity) is prominent although there is an undertone of difference, like Rūpaka and (III) Bhedabhedatulya, where the idea of difference as well as the idea of sameness is equal, so far as the common attribute is concerned. The figure Upamā is based on bhedabhedatulyatva unlike other figures, for when we say 'mukham candra iva ramaṇīyam' we are much conscious of the difference between the face and the moon, but we acknowledge at the same time perfect equality between the two so far as the beauty (ramaṇīyatva) is concerned. If, however, there is slightest consciousness of inequality in respect of common property (here ramaṇīyatva), there cannot be Upamā, but it may be the province of other poetic figures. Thus the word 'bhedabhedatulya' used in the definition of Upamā given in the Alamkārasarvasva excludes other figures that are based bhedapradyāna or abhedapradyāna sub-group. The word sādharmya used in the definition, again, excludes other figures that are not based on the idea of similarity.21

(b) In formulating the definition of Upamā, Ruuyyaka borrows the idea from Patañjali on the one hand, and Udbhata and Mammaṭa

on the other. His indebtedness to Patañjali is evidenced by the fact that he quotes for approval of his idea of bhedabheda-tulyatva from the Mahābhāṣya. Ruyyaka's indebtedness to Udbhaṭa is obvious, but it is also obvious that he does blindly copy Udbhaṭa's definition, for Udbhaṭa believes that the word charming (cetohāri) as an adjective to sādharmya should be embodied in the definition of Upamā; but Ruyyaka considers that the word cetohāri is redundant, as the idea of charmingness is already implied by considering Upamā as falling under the head of Alamkāra, and the term Alamkāra carries with it the notion of charmingness or strikingness. Hence, he omits this word from the definition. Mammaṭa also omits the word cetohāri from the definition probably on the same ground. It is surprising to note that Jagannātha criticises Ruyyaka's definition of Upamā because of its failing to embody ṣrīdyatva (charmingness) as essential element of Upamā. It is worth noting that Ruyyaka does not allow the omission of the Upamāna and the Upameya from the definition as is done by Mammaṭa. Ruyyaka, therefore, improves upon the definitions of Upamā given by Udbhaṭa and Mammaṭa. His definition is complete and free from the faults of too wide, too narrow and impossible definition.

(c) Divisions of Upamā: Ruyyaka does not deal with the divisions and sub-divisions of Upamā into Pūrṇa, Lupta etc. as his predecessors have already dealt with them in greater detail.

22 Loc. cit.
24 Vide RG. p. 213.
Ruyyaka proposes for new divisions of this figure. He divides Upamā into three varieties according to the three ways in which the common property is expressly stated: (a) The common property expressed in one and the same word is connected with both the Upamāna and the Upameya. (b) Sometimes the common property expressed in two different words of similar meaning, going separately with the Upamāna and the Upameya. It is expressed in two ways: (I) The common property mentioned in two different words (with reference to the Upamāna and the Upameya) is, in reality, non-different in essence as in the case of Prativastūpama. This relation of common property with the Upamāna and the Upameya is called Vastuprativastubhāva. (II) The common property may be expressed in two different words, though the property in the Upameya is distinct from that of the Upamāna, still corresponds to it, just as a thing reflected is different from the reflection, though one corresponds to the other, just as the case found in Drṣṭānta. This relation of common property with the Upamāna and the Upameya is called bimbapratibimbabhāva. Thus Ruyyaka regards three divisions of Upamā. The illustrations of these three varieties are given in the Alamkltrasarvasva.

(I) The first variety is illustrated in Kalidasa's verse:

prabhā-mahatyā śikhayeva dīpas
trimārgayeva tridivasya mārgaḥ /
saṃskāravatyeva girā maniṣī
tayā sa pūtasca vibhūṣitaśca //

25 Kumāra, I. 28.
where the common properties, viz., pūtatva (sanctity) and vibhūṣitvatva (glorification) are mentioned only once and are directly connected with the Himalaya (Upameya) and the dīpa (lamp), tridivamārga (heavenly path) and manīṣī (wise man) (Upamānas).

(II) The second variety is illustrated in the verse of Bhavabhūti:

\[
yāntyā muhur valitakandāram ānanaṃta -
dāvṛtta-vṛntasāta-patranibham vahantyā /
digdho'mṛtena ca viśeṇa ca pakṣmalakṣyā
gāḍham mikhāta iva me hṛdaye katakṣaḥ //^{26}\]

where the common property of turning down is expressed in two different words valita and āvṛtta, both have the same meaning; they are respectively connected with Kandara (neck) and vṛnta (stalk of a lotus).

(III) The third variety is instanced in the verse of Kālidāsa's Rāghuvamśā:

\[
pāṇḍyo'yaṃ aśāmsārpitalambaharāḥ
kīptāṅgarāgo haricandanena /
ābhāti bālālaparaktasānuṃk
sanirjharodgāra ivādṛirājaḥ //^{27}\]

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26 Malati, I. 29.
27 Raghu, VI. 60.
Where Pāṇḍya (Upameya) and adrirāja (Upamāna) are considered similar, because the common qualities viz., hāra and āngarāga in the former and nirjhara and bālātapa in the latter, appear in the relation of bimbapratibimba.

The divisions and sub-divisions of Upamā into Pūrṇā, Luptā etc. which have been discussed by earlier writers are essentially grammatical in their significance. Hence, Ruyyaka makes no scruples to ignore these divisions. Ruyyaka probably thinks that these divisions do not have distinct charm and may be included in the three divisions recognised for the first time by him.

The author of the Alāmkārasarvasva exerts great influence on later writers, who accept without question the bhedābheda-tulyatva as the essential characteristics of Upamā. The threefold division of Upamā, recognised by Ruyyaka for the first time, has been accepted by them. Though Appaya Dīkṣita criticises Ruyyaka's definition of Upamā to be too wide to the figure Upameyopamā, and Jagannātha criticises Ruyyaka's definition of Upama being inaccurate, yet their criticism is not backed by sound logic.

2. Ananvaya.

(a) The figure Ananvaya, according to Ruyyaka, occurs when the same object occupies the position of the Upamāna and the Upameya. The figure, therefore, consists in comparing a thing with itself; it is self-comparison. Comparison usually

28 eksyaivopamānopameyatve'nanyat. AS. p. 37.
takes place between two things, but the comparison of a thing with itself appears unusual. But it is this apparent unusuality which constitutes the charm of this figure. The purpose of comparing a thing with itself implies the idea that no second thing resembling it is known to exist; that is to say, the thing is incomparable in this world.\textsuperscript{29} Thus, for instance; 'Yuddhe arjunaḥ arjuna iva', where Arjuna is intentionally compared with himself in order to convey the idea that he is unparalleled or matchless in fighting. Ruyyaka says that the name Ananvaya given to this figure is due to the incongruity inherent in comparing a thing with itself.\textsuperscript{30}

The separate existence of this figure is not admitted by Bharata and following him Daṇḍin, although both the authorities admit the figure in substance, if not in name. In the illustration of Sadṛśi Upamā\textsuperscript{31} - given by Bharata and in that of Asādhāraṇopama\textsuperscript{32} given by Daṇḍin, the exact nature of Ananvaya is noticed. Thus both Bharata and Daṇḍin consider this figure as a variety of Upamā. Bhāmaha is the first to recognise the separate existence of this figure and its name Ananvaya.\textsuperscript{33} Udbhāta and Vāmana admit its separate entity, while Rudrāṭa accept it to be a variety of Upamā named Ananvayopama.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{29} ekasya tu viruddhadharma-saṁsargo dvitiya-saṁbrahmacāri-nirṛtyarthah. - Ibid, p.38. In connexion with his review of the views of earlier writers with regard to their attitude towards suggested sense, Ruyyaka opines that in Ananvaya the matter being suggested embellishes the expressed figure. The matter suggested here is the exclusion of the second thing.

\textsuperscript{30} AS. p. 38.

\textsuperscript{31} NS. XVII. 53.

\textsuperscript{32} KD. II. 37.

\textsuperscript{33} KL. III. 45

\textsuperscript{34} RKL. VIII. 11.
(b) Bhāmaha defines Ananvaya as upamānopameyatā; and the purpose of self-comparison, he says, is asādṛśya-vivakṣā. Bhāmaha embodies the phrase asādṛśya-vivakṣā in the definition. Udbhāta copies Bhāmaha's definition. Considering redundancy of the phrase asādṛśyavivakṣā in the definition, Vāmana omits this phrase and defines it as ekasyopameyopamānatve'nanvayaḥ. This definition has been standardised in later Alamkāra works.

(c) Ananvaya is Based on Similarity: Similarity subsists only between two distinct objects, viz., the Upamāna and the Upameya. Since in Ananvaya one thing is compared with itself, there is no two distinct objects in it. Now there is a pertinent question as to how Ananvaya is based on similarity. In reply to this question Ruyyaka says 'Vācyābhīprāyena pūrvarūpāvagamah.' The employment of two words conveying the same meaning gives the appearance of two things. Though the thing is one, yet it is imagined as two and they are compared with each other, but in reality they are not two things. Hence, there is only verbal similarity in Ananvaya. Vidyācakravartīn regards that the two words used in Ananvaya are different from the point of view of expression and suggestion. The sense of the word, Vidyācakravartīn continues, used for the Upameya is expressed

35 IV, iii. 14.
37 ittham śābdam eva sādṛśyānugamam āśrityehāsya lakṣaṇam. VS. p. 38.
and the sense of the word used for the Upamāṇa is suggested. 38 Thus, there is distinction between two things; and Ananvaya is based on similarity. It is, however, admitted by Ruyyaka as the figure of both sound and sense.

3. Upameyopamā.

(a) After dealing with Ananvaya, Ruyyaka proceeds to deal with the figure Upameyopamā. This figure occurs when the Upameya and the Upamāna alternately occupy the position of the Upamāna and the Upameya. 39 In this figure two things are compared, one with another, each in succession being the Upamāna and the Upameya; as in the example: candra iva mukham mukham iva candraḥ, where the face and the moon are in their turn compared to one another. The mutual comparison in this figure naturally involve sequence and as such absence of simultaneity, as a result, this figure takes place in two sentences. 40

The name Upameyopamā given to this figure is significant inasmuch as in it the Upameya in the first comparison becomes in turn the Upamāna in the second comparison. The purpose of this reciprocal comparison is for implying the idea that there

38 pūrvam rūpam upameyatvam tadanugamo vācyābhīprāyena yat punar apūrvam rūpam upamānatvam tadanugamo vyāṅgyābhīprāyena iti yāvat .... atra prathamārjuna-bhīma-śabdau vācyā-parau, caramau tu vyāṅgyaparau. SJ.pp. 39-40.

39 dvayoh paryāyena tasminn-upameyopamā. AS. 39.

40 Explaining the word paryāyena, Ruyyaka says that it means yaugapadyābhāva (absence of simultaneity), which is explained by Jayaratha as: yaugapadyābhāva iti kramarūpavat, ata iti yaugapadyā-bhāvat. sa ca vākyabhedah. śabdā ērthaś ca. VS. 39.
is no third thing resembling the two. Where there is no exclusion of the third thing there is no figure named Upameyopama.\footnote{asyaś-copamānāntara-tiraskāra eva phalam.ata evopameyeno-pamā ityāsa anvarthābhi-dhānam. yatra punar upamānāntara-tiraskāro na pratiyate tatra nāyam alasākāraḥ.\cite{Ibid,p.40.}}

Though the sameness of words in Upameyopama is not inevitable as in Ananvayya, yet the sameness of words indeed heightens the charm in this figure. In the illustration 'kamaleva matiḥ matiriva kamalā' the existence of this figure is clear, but in the expression 'Kamaleva matir buddhiriva laṅkāmih' the presence of this figure is not clear. So the sameness of words is necessary, if not inevitable, from the point of view of propriety.

(b) Upameyopama is an old figure recognised as early as in the time of Bhāmaha. It has been treated as an independent poetic figure by Bhāmaha. Daṇḍin recognises a division of Upama called Anyonyopama,\footnote{KD.II,18.} which is in essence the figure Upameyopama of other writers. All the later writers on Alamkāra admit the independent status of this figure. The definition\footnote{upamānopameyatam yatra paryāyato bhavet / upameyopamāṃ nāma bruvate tāṃ yathoditām // KL.III.37.} of Upameyopama given by Bhāmaha has been accepted as authoritative by Vāmana,\footnote{KLSV. IV. iii. 15.} Mammaṭa\footnote{KP. p. 583.} and Ruuyaka. These three writers have accepted Bhāmaha's words for formulating the definition of Upameyopama in the sūtra form. The definition given by Ruuyaka

\begin{quote}
41 asyaś-copamānāntara-tiraskāra eva phalam.ata evopameyeno-pamā ityāsa anvarthābhi-dhānam. yatra punar upamānāntara-tiraskāro na pratiyate tatra nāyam alasākāraḥ.\cite{Ibid,p.40.}
42 KD.II,18.
43 upamānopameyatam yatra paryāyato bhavet / upameyopamāṃ nāma bruvate tāṃ yathoditām // KL.III.37.
44 KLSV. IV. iii. 15.
45 KP. p. 583.
\end{quote}
in the Alamkārasarvasva has been copied almost verbatim by his followers like Jayadeva, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha and Visvanātha. Udbhaṭa's definition of this figure differs slightly from that given by Bhamaha. In his eagerness to make his definition more precise, Udbhaṭa embodies the expression pakṣāntararāhānīga (exclusion of third thing resembling the Upamāna and the Upameya) in the definition. Both Rudrata and Jagannātha follow Udbhata in this matter. Ruyyaka does not refer to any such special feature of this figure. Ruyyaka appears to think that the expression 'tṛṭīya-sadṛśa-vyavaccheda' in the definition of Upameyopamā is redundant, as the notion of 'exclusion of the third thing resembling the two' is implied in reciprocal comparison. He does not speak of this special feature in the vṛtti probably on the ground that this idea of this feature can be had from his analysis of Ananvaya, where this feature is discussed well. That Ruyyaka admits that suggestion of the exclusion of the third thing in Upameyapamā is evident also from his review of the views of the ancients with regard to the suggested sense.

(c) Distinction of Upameyopama from other Figures:

(i) Upameyopamā and Upamā : In Upamā, one thing is compared with another in one sentence; while in Upameyopamā, the

46 CL. V. 13.
47 EV. VIII. 3.
48 PRD. p. 441.
49 SD. X. 27 (p.657).
50 anyonyameva yatra syād upamānopameyatā / upameyopamāmahāṃ pakṣāntararāhānīga // KLSS.V.14(p.392).
51 Rudrata admits Upameyopamā as a variety of Upamā. RKL. VIII. 9.
52 RG. p. 262.
same thing is the Upamāna and the Upameya, in turn, in two sentences. The mention of the word 'paryāyeṇa' in the definition distinguishes Upameyopamā from Upamā. In Upamā, there is no implication of the exclusion of another thing resembling the upameya; while in Upameyopamā, there is suggestion of the exclusion of the third thing resembling the two (Upamāna and the Upameya).

(ii) Upameyopamā and Ananvaya: In Ananvaya, one object is compared with itself with the purpose of implying the idea that there is no second thing resembling it; while in Upameyopamā, two things are compared with one another, in turn, with the purpose of excluding a third thing resembling the two. In Ananvaya, there is one sentence, while in Upameyopamā, there are two sentences. The word paryāeṇa mentioned in the definition of Upameyopamā distinguishes it from Ananvaya.

(d) Divisions of Upameyopamā: Ruṣyaka is the first writer to refer to the two divisions of Upameyopamā. It is divided into two varieties according as the common property is mentioned only once or separately.

The first variety is illustrated in the verse:

\[ \text{khamiva jalam jalam iva kham etc.}\]

Where the common property nairmalya (clearness) that connects the sky and water is implied.

The second variety is illustrated in the verse:

\[ \text{sacchāyā-ṃbhohavadanāḥ sacchāya-vadanāmbujā etc.}\]

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53 AS. p. 40.
54 Ibid, p. 40.
Where the common quality sacchāyatva (beauty) is connected separately with ambhojavādanā and vadanāmbujā.

4. Smaraṇa

(a) Smaraṇa is the last poetic figure in the Bheda-bhedatulya sub-group of Anupamya. According to the Alakārasarvasva, the figure Smaraṇa consists in the recollection of another object arising from the perception of something similar to it. The perception of an object leaves impression on our mind; this impression when stirred up by a circumstance like sight of something similar, revives the memory of the object. This is the process of remembrance that we get in our everyday experience. The process adopted by the poet in effecting the figure Smaraṇa is much the same. Remembrance may be due to anything else, such as anxiety, contemplation etc.; but in the figure Smaraṇa the recollection arises from the similar object. Ruuyaka gives emphasis on the point that the recollection must be due to the perception of a similar object, i.e. the object perceived and the object remembered must be similar. This similarity constitutes the charm of this figure. The figure Smaraṇa is illustrated by Ruuyaka in the verse of Bhavabhūti:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{atiśayita-surāsura-prabhāvaṁ} \\
\text{śiṣum avalokya tathāva tulyarūpam} / \\
\text{kauśikasuta-makhadviśāṁ pramaśthe} \\
\text{dhṛtadhanuśaṁ ragnunandanam smarāmi} //
\end{align*}
\]

In this verse, the sight of Lava with bow and who resembles

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55 sadṛśānubhavād vastvantarasmṛṭīḥ smarāṇam. AS. p.40.
56 vastvantarasaṁ sadṛśameva. Ibid. p. 40.
57 URC. V. 4.
Rāma rouses immediately the memory of Rāma in Sumantra. Here Lava who is present before Sumantra is the Upameya, and Rāma who is remembered is the Upamāṇa. The similarity between Lava and Rāma is expressed and constitutes the charm of the expression.

Ruyyaka does not allow the figure Smarāṇa in the cases where recollection is not based on similarity. Ruyyaka's view has been accepted as authoritative by all writers.

In Smarāṇa there are two things - perceived and recollected. Now the question arises as to which of the two things is Upamāṇa or Upameya. Though Ruyyaka remains silent on this question, from his illustration quoted above it appears that he regards the thing perceived (Lava) as Upameya and the thing recollected (Rama) as Upamāṇa.

Compared with the definitions of earlier writers, Ruyyaka's definition of Smarāṇa appears to be more scientific and improved. Rudrata, who first defines this figure, limits the scope of Smarāṇa to the dargāna or sight only, when he says 'vastuvigēṣam dṛṣṭvā'. Rudrata's view is also accepted by Mammaṭa in his definition. Ruyyaka rightly modifies the definition by using the word 'anubhava' in place of 'dṛṣṭvā', for the thing in this figure may

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58 sādṛṣṭvāṃ vinā tu sūrṭir nāyam alāṃkāraḥ. AS. p. 41.
59 Vide Cl. V. 31; EV. p. 221; PRD. p. 441; SD. X 27; CM.p. 189.
60 tatra īśoreva raghunandanena sādṛṣṭvāṃ vivaktisam. VS.p.41.
61 atasa ca smaryamāṇenā-nubhūyamāṇasya, anubhūya-mānenā vā smaryamāṇasya sādṛṣṭvā-pārikalpanam ayam alāṃkāraḥ. VS.p.41.
63 yathānubhavam arthasya dṛṣṭe tat-sadṛṣṭe sūrṭiḥ /smaraṇam. KP. p. 731.
be perceived by any sense-organs like ear, nose etc. and not only by the eyes. But Jagannātha, however does not agree with Ruṣyaka and wants to rule out the word 'anubhava' from the definition.64

(b) Smarāṇa and Other Alamkāras:

(i) Smarāṇa and Anumāṇa: In both the figures Smarāṇa and Anumāṇa, the sight of one object leads to the knowledge of another. In Anumāṇa there is invariable concomitance between sādhya and sādhana as in the case of fire and smoke; while in Smarāṇa there is no invariable connexion between the thing perceived and the thing recollected.65 When one sees a thing, one is not necessarily reminded of something that is similar to it, for instance, the sight of a cow does not necessarily results in the recollection gayal (gavaya).

(ii) Smarāṇa and Preyah: Smṛiti (recollection) is one of the thirtythree vyabhicāribhāvas accepted by the theorists. In a variety of Preyah there is a description of recollection of something. The recollection in the figure Preyah is awakened not through the perception of the similar object,66 but through anything else like anxiety, contemplation etc. This variety of Preyah is instanced in the expression: 'aho kōpe'pi kāntam mukham', where the lover's impressions about his beloved are awakened not through the perception of similar object, but by

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64 Vide: RG. pp. 292-93.
65 avinābhāvan-nānumānam. AS. p. 40.
his contemplation about the movements of his beloved. But in Smaraṇa, the recollection of something is due to the perception of the object similar to it. In Preyaḥ, the recollection is brought out by excitant (Vibhāva), ensuant (anubhāva) etc., and the words conveying remembrance like smarati, sasmāra etc. are not mentioned in words; while in Smaraṇa the words conveying recollection are generally expressed in words.

Ruyyaka points out that the cases, where the recollection is not due to the perception of similar object or the idea of recollection is conveyed in words, cannot be treated as an illustration of Smaraṇa or Preyaḥ. Such cases are regarded by Ruyyaka as description of facts. 67 Jagannātha agrees with Ruyyaka on this point. 68

(iii) Smaraṇa and Viśeṣa : In one of the varieties of the figure Viśeṣa there is an apprehension of another object; but the charm of Viśeṣa consists not in the resemblance between the things, but in the accomplishment of some other impossible thing. But the charm in Smaraṇa lies in the resemblance between two things—perceived and recollected.

Ruyyaka probably thinks that the earlier writers who do not mention this figure include the characteristics of Smaraṇa in Anumāna or Preyaḥ or Viśeṣa. Therefore, by distinguishing Smaraṇa from these figures Ruyyaka establishes the separate entity of this figure.

67 Ibid, p. 42.
(6) Alamkāras based on Āropa

1. Rūpaka

(a) The figure Rūpaka, according to Ruuyaka, consists in the superimposition and non-concealment of the object upon which superimposition is made, and there is, therefore an idea of the predominence of non-difference between the višaya and the višayin. Strictly speaking, there is difference between the višaya and the višayin in all the figures based on similarity. In Rūpaka, the višayin is superimposed on the višaya and there is an idea of identity between the two in spite of their basic difference. Ruuyaka, therefore, says that the mention of prominence of non-difference in the definition does not exclude the idea of difference between the two; but this difference is obliterated as both are regarded identified. Though the višaya is identified with the višayin, the višaya is not concealed or negated, which feature is found in Apahnuti.

The idea of identity between the two things in Rūpaka is volitional, and is not due to confusion or dubiety or probability, but on account of extreme similarity we identify one with the other. In the example 'mukham candrah' the poet wants to derive identity between the face and the moon deliberately because of their extreme resemblance. This identity between the two things is Rūpaka is accomplished through the process of

1 abhedapradhānye ārope āropavīṣayānāpahnave rūpakam. AS. p. 43.
2 abhedasya prādhānyad bhedasya vastutaḥ sadbhavah. Ibid, p. 43.
superimposition. The name Rūpaka given to this figure is, therefore, significant, as in it the viṣayin imposes its form on the viṣaya.3

(b) Scope of Rūpaka: Ruṣyaka maintains that identification of two distinct objects based on the idea of similarity constitutes this figure. In the process of indicating similarity between two distinct objects, Rūpaka is the subsequent stage of Upamā, inasmuch as the comparison is effected in a greater degree in the former. In this context Ruṣyaka agrees with Daṇḍin who says that Rūpaka is only Upamā where the distinction between two things is supressed.4 Thus according to the Alamkārasarvasva the figure Rūpaka is based only on similarity. Jayaratha informs us that some rhetoricians regard Rūpaka to be based on some sort of relation other than similarity. Thus, according to Jayaratha's information, the author of the Alamkārabhāṣya regards saropa-lakṣāna as the basis of Rūpaka.5 Saropa-lakṣāna is of two kinds, viz., suddhā and gaunjī. The former is based on similarity and the latter is based on something other than similarity, like relation of cause and effect etc. Jayaratha further informs us that Ruṣyaka in his Alamkāranusārinī follows the Alamkārabhāṣyakāra and regards Rūpaka to be based on the relation of cause and effect.6 But we find that Ruṣyaka does not hold such a view in the Alamkārasarvasva.

3 viṣayinā viṣayasya rūpavataḥ karanād rūpakam. Ibid, p.44.
4 upamaiva tirobhūta-bhedā-rūpakam ucyate. KD. II. 66.
5 Vide VS. p. 44.
6 Vide Ibid, p. 44.
(c) The figure Rūpaka is of great antiquity. Bharata includes it in the list of his four figures. All later writers recognise this figure. Among older writers Daṇḍin understands this figure in a far wider sense, for he brings the figures Apahnuti, Ākṣepa and Vyatireka under its wide scope. The definitions of Rūpaka given by older writers may be divided into three classes according to the emphasis laid on the three aspects, viz. (i) abheda, (ii) āropa and (iii) sādṛśya. Ruṣyaka borrows these characteristics of Rūpaka from his predecessors, includes the idea of abheda and āropa in the definition of Rūpaka and thus incorporates these three aspects in the definition.

(d) Varieties of Rūpaka: Ruṣyaka divides Rūpaka first into three varieties, viz., (i) Niravayava, (ii) Sāvayava and (iii) Paramparita. Ruṣyaka does not explain these terms. Probably he thinks that these terms are self-explanatory. In Niravayava Rūpaka, the relation of the principle and subordinate does not exist, because here only one object is metaphorically represented without any reference to objects subordinate it. It has two subdivisions, viz., (a) Kevala, i.e. single and (b) mālā, i.e. serial. In the former case, there is only one metaphorical superimposition; and in the latter, there may be successive superimpositions on one object. In Sāvayava Rūpaka, the principal object is metaphorically represented together with those that are parts of it. It has two subdivisions, viz., (a) Samastavastuviṣayaḥ and (b) Ekadeśā-vivarti. In the former case, the

7 KD. II. 88, 91 & 95.
8 This question is elaborately discussed by Biswanath Bhattacharya. Vide HRA. p. 40f.
metaphorical representation dwells in all the objects, and the latter it resides only in a portion. In the Paramparita Rūpaka, the superimposition of one thing on another is the cause of another superimposition. This variety is divided into two subdivisions, according as it rests on ślesa or not; each of these divisions again is of twofold, as each occurs singly or serially. Ruuyyaka, thus enumerates eight varieties of Rūpaka. These eight varieties of Rūpaka are also admitted the first time by Mammata. Mammata, however, borrows the idea of these varieties from Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and Rudraṭa. Ruuyyaka illustrates these varieties with apt quotations. Though there are many varieties of Rūpaka like Samasta Rūpaka and Vyasta Rūpaka given by Daṇḍin, Vākyagata Rūpaka and Samāsagata Rūpaka given by Rudraṭa, yet these varieties of Rūpaka are not allowed by the author of the Alamkāra-sarvasva probably on the ground that these divisions do not possess separate charm other than those of the eight varieties. Ruuyyaka is of the opinion that Paramparita Rūpaka may also be based on vaidharmya or contrast. These varieties of Rūpaka are admitted by later writers.

(e) Accord of Number and Gender in Rūpaka: Ruuyyaka is the first writer to point out that there should be accord of number and gender of the two objects in Rūpaka. In the absence of this accord, there may be fault in Rūpaka. In some cases like

9 pratyākam vākyakta-samāsoktādi-bhedāḥ..te'nyato draṣṭavyāḥ. AS. p. 45. These varieties are found in the KD.II. 68 and in the RKL. VIII. 40-41. cf. Jayaratha's remark on this point: teśām tattve'py etad-bhedāstaka-kṛtam eva vaicitryām. VS. pp. 45-46.

10 AS. p. 49.
'kacij jaṭa-valkalālabhināh kapila dāvāgnayah', there is lack of natural accord of number, as the fires are many and the sage superimposed on them is only one. Ruṣyaka explains that the quality of Sage Kapila is to be superimposed on every single fire. The later writers accept this view of Ruṣyaka as authoritative. Jagannātha agrees with Ruṣyaka on this point, but at the same time he remarks that the cases, where the absence of accord is not detrimental to the appreciation of charm, cannot be regarded as faulty.

(f) Ruṣpaka and Ślesa: Among the many varieties of Ruṣpaka some are based on Ślesa. So the question naturally arises about the scope of Ślesa and Ruṣpaka. Ruṣyaka says that where Ślesa is preexistent, it should be regarded as a prevailing figure, but where Ślesa depends for its existence on the other figure like Ruṣpaka, and is not preexistent there is Ruṣpaka and not Ślesa. In this context Ruṣyaka quotes the verse:

bhramimaratim alasa-hṛdayatām
pralayaṁ mūrccham tamaḥ sarīrasādam /
marasnam ca jalada-bhujagajam prasahya
kurute viṣam viyoginīnām /

and accepts Ślesa, because here Ślesa in viṣa is not dependent on Ruṣpaka. Ānanaavardhana also quotes this verse as an example of Ślesa.

11 HC. p. 23.
12 ayam agniḥ Kapilo'yam agniḥ Kapila ityevamṛūpāt. VS.p.50.
13 RG. p. 329.
14 DL. p.528.
15 AS. p. 50.
2. Samdeha.

(a) The figure Samdeha is defined in the Alamkārasarvasva as: viṣayasya samdihyamānātve samdehaḥ. i.e. the figure Samdeha occurs when the viṣaya is suspected to be something else. In the definition, the author speaks of the doubt with reference to the viṣaya alone, and no reference to the viṣayin is made. Hence, a question naturally arises as to the viṣaya is suspected to be what. In his eagerness to clarify this matter Ruyyaka says that the viṣaya (or the prakṛta) is doubted to be the viṣayin (or the aprakṛta), and the viṣayin (or the aprakṛta) is doubted to be the viṣaya (or the prakṛta). Ruyyaka, therefore, thinks that the doubt is both-sided. Thus, in Samdeha, we have a state of incertitude wherein the mind wavers equally between the prakṛta and the aprakṛta, without a special leaning towards either. According to the Alamkārasarvasva the mere doubt cannot constitute this figure. Ruyyaka asserts that the doubt involved in this figure is an element which must be brought into being by the imagination of the poet. Therefore, the doubt must be poetical, and a natural doubt cannot attain the status of a poetic figure. Jayaratha notes that it is not the idea of similarity but the fact of the poetic imagination which gives it the status of a poetic figure. Hence, the sentence, 'sthānur va syāt puruṣo vā syād', cannot be regarded as an illustration of the figure Samdeha.

(b) The figure Samdeha is recognised by all the writers since

16 Ibid, p. 53.
17 Vide VS. pp. 54-55.
18 kavipratibhotthāpīte samdehe saṃdehaḥalamkāraḥ. AS. p. 53.
the time of Bhāmaha. However, Daṇḍin does not admit it as a distinct figure, but considers it to be a variety of Upamā called Samśayopamā. Some writers call it Sasamdeha, others, Samdeha. Rudraṭa alone calls it Samśaya. All the writers admit that this figure is based on similarity. Ruuyaka says that this figure is based on superimposition of one on the other and consequently, there is an idea of non-difference between the viśaya and the viśayin, for the doubt itself is the outcome of the idea of non-difference (abheda buddhi). Ruuyaka's original contribution to this figure is that he regards poetic doubt constituting the figure Samdeha.

(c) Divisions of Samdeha: Ruuyaka accepts three varieties of Samdeha, viz., (1) Suddha, (2) niścayagarbha and (3) niścayanta. These three varieties of Samdeha have already been admitted by Rudraṭa and Māmāṭa. (1) The Suddha variety is that where the doubt terminates at doubt and no certitude as to the identity of the prakṛta is arrived at. (2) That is niścayagarbha where there is doubt at the beginning and at the end, but there is certainty in the middle. (3) Niścayanta Samdeha is that where there is doubt in the beginning, but this doubt is dispelled and certainty is arrived at, at the end.

There may be cases of the figure Samdeha where the things superimposed have different substrata. As an illustration of this kind of Samdeha, Ruuyaka cites the verse 'rañjitānu'¹⁹ etc.

¹⁹ The complete verse is:

rañjitā nu vividhās taruṣailā
nāmitam nu gaṇanām sthagitam nu /
pūritā nu viśameṣu dharitrī
samhṛtā nu kakubhas timireṇa // Kirat, IX. 15.
from the Kirāta of Bhāravi. In this context Ruyyaka records the opinion of other rhetoricians. Some recognise in this verse the figure Samdeha based on adhyavasāya, while others accept it as an example of Utpreksā because the particle 'nu' conveying the idea of poetic fancy. Jayaratha thinks that Ruyyaka admits adhyavasāya also as the basis Samdeha. But Samudrabandha and Vidyācakravartin do not agree with Jayaratha. Jagannātha also criticises Jayaratha's assertion that Samdeha is based on adhyavasāya.20 We find that Ruyyaka does not regard adhyavasāya to be the basis of Samdeha.


(a) The figure Bhrāntimān, according to the Alāmkārasarvasva, consists in the apprehension of one thing as another on account of their similarity.21 In this figure there is description of an error committed by some one on account of the illusory apprehension of an object as another; the illusion arising out of the resemblance between the two objects. Since bhrānti or error is a state of mind, the name bhrāntimān primarily means, a person who is under error. The name Bhrāntimān is given to this figure in a secondary sense, because in it the perceiver's error is given expression.22 The later writers accept this view of Ruyyaka. Taking cue from the Alāmkārasarvasva, Jagannātha notes that error of animals, birds etc. are expressed in this figure.23

20 RG. p. 343.
21 sadṛśyād vastvantara-pratītir bhrāntimān. AS. p. 55.
22 bhrāntiś cittadharmaḥ. sa vidyate yasmin bhaniti-prakāre sa bhrāntimān. AS. p.56. On this Jayaratha remarks : atāś caālmkāre bhrānti-sadbhāva upacarita iti bhāvah. VS. p. 56.
23 paśu-pakṣyādigatā yasmin vāksamdharbhe'nu dhyaṇe sa bhrāntimān. RG. p. 353.
But it should not be forgotten that this figure appears when the error is based on similarity which is the key note of this figure. When there is a perverted notion like giddiness etc. we cannot have the figure Bhrāntimān. Ruyyaka lays down that the underlying element of error must not only be due to similarity, but should be strikingness produced by the imagination of the poet. Jayaratha, therefore, notes that it is not only the idea of similarity but the fact of the imagination of the poet which gives the error the status of a poetic figure Bhrāntimān.

(b) The figure Bhrāntimān is for the first time recognised by Rudraṭa as a distinct figure, though earlier still, a fore­runner of the figure can be found in Danḍin's Mohopamā. All later writers admit Bhrāntimān as a distinct figure. Ruyyaka's indebtedness to Rudraṭa and Mammata is obvious, but it is also obvious that he does not blindly follow them. He says that the ordinary error cannot constitute this figure. The error should be poetic. This view of Ruyyaka is accepted by all later writers without any question.

(c) Jagannātha agrees with Ruyyaka in many respects, but he criticises the failure of Ruyyaka to give an accurate definition.
of Bhrāntimān. Jagannātha says that Ruṣyaka's definition of Bhrāntimān is vitiated by the fallacy of ativyapti. According to Jagannātha, Ruṣyaka's definition is very wide to embrace the figures Samdeha, Utpreksā, Rūpaka and Atiśayokti.

But a close scrutiny of the definition of Bhrāntimān formulated by Ruṣyaka reveals the fact that it is free from the three faults viz., ativyapti, avyapti and asambhava. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish this figure from Samdeha, Utpreksā and Rūpaka on the light of Ruṣyaka's definition. The phrase 'vastvan-tarapraptī' in the definition of Bhrāntimān distinguishes it from other figures. In Samdeha, there is no apprehension of another thing, for we have a state of incretitude wherein the mind wavers between the viṣaya and the viṣayin. But in Bhrāntimān there is certainty of a thing which is though apprehended through error. In Utpreksā there is an idea sambhāvanā of another thing as our mind wavers between two alternatives, viz. the prakṛta and the aprakṛta, while in Bhrāntimān there is certainty of knowledge though based on error. In Rūpaka there is idea of non-difference between two things, though they are different, but there is no apprehension of one thing as another. In Atiśayokti one thing is swallowed up by another and the idea of non-difference (abheda) is volitional, while in Bhrāntimān the idea of the apprehension of one thing as another is not volitional but natural.

4. Apahnuti.

(a) The definition of Apahnuti given by Ruṣyaka in the following sūtra is very concise: viṣayasy āpahnav'e pahnutih, i.e. 

28 RG. p. 357.
29 AS. p. 63.
Apahnuti consists in the concealment of the subject of description (viṣaya). But mere concealment of an object does not constitute any poetic charm, as in the case of 'nedam mukham', and as such does not constitute the figure Apahnuti. This laconic definition of Apahnuti, therefore, necessitates some classification. Hence, Ruyyaka uses the words 'vastvan-tara-pratiti ityeva', i.e. apprehension of another thing in its place. The words vastavantara-pratiti, as pointed out by Jayaratha, are carried over from the definition of Bhrāntimāna through the process called maṇḍukapālūti. Thus, according to Ruyyaka, the figure Apahnuti consists in the concealment of the subject of description (āropavisaya) and representation of another thing (āropya-māṇa) in its place. Therefore, the sentence 'nedam mukham candro'yam' serves as an illustration of Apahnuti.

Apahnuti is an old figure recognised as early as by Bhamaha. This figure is recognised by all writers on Alamkāra. There is practically no difference between the definitions of Ruyyaka and Mammaṭa. Viśvanātha follows Mammaṭa in defining this figure.

31 āropaprastāvād āropavisayāpahnutāv āropya-māṇa-pratitāv apahnutyākhyo'laṃkaraḥ. Ibid. p. 63.
32 KL. III. 21.
33 prakṛtam yan niṣidhyānyat sādhyate sā tvapahnutih. KP. p. 606.
34 prakṛtam pratiṣidhyānyat sthāpanam syād apahnutih. SD. p. 28.
(b) Distinction of Apahnuti from Rūpaka: Though both Rūpaka and Apahnuti are based on superimposition and consequent identification, yet Apahnuti is distinct from Rūpaka on the ground that, in the former there is a poetical denial of the nature of the viṣaya and the viṣayin is established in its stead; while in the latter, there is no such denial, only the viṣaya is identified with the viṣayin on account of their great resemblance.

(c) Scope of Apahnuti: The Ālāmkārikas are not unanimous on the question of similarity as the essential basis of Apahnuti. Bhāmaha, who for the first time recognises this figure, looks upon it as being based on similarity. But Dāndin widens its scope to include all cases of denial with assertion irrespective of similarity. Dāndin is followed by Bhoja Udbhata, Vāmana, Rudraṭa and Mammata understand this figure to be based on similarity. Some scholars think that Ruuya follows the tradition of Dāndin. But according to the classification of the poetic figures adopted by Ruuya in the Alamkārasarvasva the figures from Rūpaka to Apahnuti from a sub-group, the speciality of which consists in the superimposition of the viṣayin on the

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35 apahnutir abhiṣṭā ca kimcid antargatopamā. KL. III. 21.
36 KD. II. 304.
37 SKA. IV. 43.
38 KLSS. V. 3. (p. 374).
39 KLSV. IV. iii. 5.
40 RKL. VIII. 57.
41 upameyam asatyam kṛtvopamānaṁ satyatayā yat sthāpyate sā tu, apahnutīḥ. KP. p. 606.
viṣaya and their consequent identification. In all the figures coming under this sub-group, there is an implication of similarity that forms the basis of superimposition. Ruṣyaka, therefore, believes that similarity is the basis of Apahnuti.42

Thus, Ruṣyaka follows the tradition of Bhāma and Udbhata and not Daṇḍin. Viśvanātha appears to follow Daṇḍin, and does not want to restrict the scope of this figure to similarity only.43 Appaya Dīkṣita and Jagannātha follow the tradition of Bhāma.

(d) Varieties of Apahnuti: Though earlier writers classify this figure, yet none of them exerts influence on Ruṣyaka. Ruṣyaka classifies this figure into three varieties according as the (i) denial of real nature of the viṣaya being preceded by the superimposition of another (viṣayin), (ii) the superimposition of another character being preceded by the concealment of real nature and (iii) and concealment of real nature by the use of words like chala, chadma rūpa, vapuḥ etc. Ruṣyaka points out that in the former two varieties, there is difference of sentences, because the denial and the superimposition may be embodied in two sentences (denial and the assertion are not possible in one sentence); and in the latter variety there is one sentence only. Ruṣyaka points out that the third variety of Apahnuti may be divided into two sub-varieties according as the superimposition of the viṣayin on the viṣaya follows or precedes the denial of nature of the object concerned, but these sub-varieties are not taken into consideration by Ruṣyaka because there is no special charm in these varieties.

42 AS. p. 132.
43 gopāniyām kathāṁ apyartham dyotayitva kathāṅcana / 
yadi śleṣenānyathā vānythayet sāpy-aphahnutiḥ // SD.p.28.
Ruyyaka is of the opinion that the figure Apahnuti cannot be accepted in the cases where the beautiful thing is denied and an ugly thing is superimposed in its place, although the definition of Apahnuti is applicable to these cases

(c) Alamkaras based on Adhyavasāya.

1. Utpreksā.

Like Upamā, Utpreksā is also an important figure. Poet's imaginative faculty as well as poetic truth is best reflected in this figure. Keśavamiśra assigns the most important place to Utpreksā. According to him, the figure causes fame to the poet, and it is as pleasant as the smile of a newly wedded wife. This figure is considered as more poetical than Upamā.

Utpreksā is one of the few figures that is dealt with in greater detail by Ruyyaka not only in the Alamkarasārvasva, but also in his other works, viz., Harṣacaritavārtika, Sāhityamimāṃsā and Alamkāranusārini. That Ruyyaka considers the different problems relating to this figure in these works is evidenced from his own reference and from the references of Jayaratha.

44 sarvālamkāra-sarvasvam kavikīrti-vidhāyini / utpreksā haratī svāntam acirodhā smitād iva // ALS. p. 36.

45 esaśī samastopama-pratipādaka-viśaye' pi harṣacaritavārtike sāhityamimāṃsāyam ca teṣu teṣu pradesēśūdāhṛta iha tu granthavaistaraḥbhayān na prapañcitā. AS. p. 77.

46 ata evālamkāranusārinyāṃ granthakṛtānayor api sambhavo darśitāh. VS. p. 73 taduktaṃ alamkāranusārinyāṃ 'pratīyāmānottpreksā-śhēdā aśtacātvarīṃśat. Ibid, p. 73. etac cālamkārāṇu-sārinyāṃ utpreksā-vicāre granthakṛtai vā darśitām. Ibid. p. 76.
(a) The definition of Utpreksā attains a new turn in the speculation of Ruyyaka in the Alamkārasarvasva. The figure Utpreksā is defined by Ruyyaka as:

\[ \text{adhyavasāye vyāpāraprādhyanye utpreksā} \].

The term adhyavasāya in the sense of sambhāvanā is used by Vāmana in the definition of Utpreksā. Ruyyaka appears to borrow the idea of adhyavasāya from Vāmana, but he interpretes this term in a new way and widens its scope to comprehend the figure Atiśayokti also. But in order to differentiate Utpreksā from Atiśayokti, Ruyyaka adds the term vyāpāra-prādhyanye in the definition of Utpreksā. The introduction of the term adhyavasāya in the definition of Utpreksā leads him to explain the term adhyavasāya clearly. According to Ruyyaka, it is called adhyavasāya when the viṣaya is swallowed up by the viṣayin, and there is, therefore, an apprehension of identity between the two. Adhyavasāya is of two aspects, viz. sādhyā (process) and siddha (accomplished). It is called sādhyā adhyavasāya where there is probable identification of the viṣayin with the viṣaya when the characteristic like guna or kriyā which actually belongs to the viṣayin is imposed on the viṣaya. Thus, the characteristic, which is probable in the viṣayin and improbable in the viṣaya, is the basis of the false representation of the former as the latter. Hence the viṣayin, which is falsely identified with the viṣaya, appears to be true. As the viṣaya is in the process of

47 AS. p. 69.
represented as probably identical with the viṣaya, the process of identification is, therefore, predominant in this variety of adhyavasāya. The adhyavasāya is called siddha where the viṣayin being false, represents the viṣaya completely and becomes true. When the identification between the viṣaya and visayin is being effected and the process of identification is consequently predominant, this type of adhyavasāya is the same as sambhāvanā and Utpreksā. Therefore, Ruyyaka says that Utpreksā as the fancying of the prakṛta in the grab of the aprakṛta owing to the common relation of guṇa, kriyā etc. In sambhāvanā, the poet's mind is in a state of suspense or incertitude wavering between the viṣaya and the visayin but with a greater bias towards the visayin.

(b) Though Utpreksā is for the first time recognised by Bhāmaha, and it is admitted by all later writers, yet opinions differ regarding the nature of this figure. Bhāmaha and Vāmana

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51 tad evam aprakṛta-gata-guna-kriyābhisambandhād aprakṛtatvena prakṛtasya sambhāvanam utpreksā. Ibid.p.72.

52 KL. II. 91.
regard it to be based on atiśaya and adhyāvasāya. The word sambhāvanā, which is used by the majority of rhetoricians in the definition of Utpreksā is for the first time used by Udbhaṭa. Ruyyaka gives recognition to the views of Bhāmaha and Vāmana and regards adhyāvasāya as the basis of Utpreksā. Ruyyaka, we have seen, improves upon the concept of adhyāvasāya, and equates sādhya adhyāvasāya with sambhāvanā. Though Ruyyaka does not use the term sambhāvanā in the definition of Utpreksā, he accept it as essential requirement of Utpreksā. Jayaratha also remarks that the author of the Alamkārasarvasva admits tulya-kakṣatā of sādhya adhyāvasāya and sambhāvanā.

Thus, Ruyyaka makes an earnest attempt on his part to reconcile the view of earlier writers. Later writers like Viśvanātha and others accept Ruyyaka's speculation as correct and bases Utpreksā on sādhya adhyāvasāya and Atiśayokti on siddha adhyāvasāya.

(c) Šobhākara and following him Jagannātha attempt to reject Ruyyaka's sādhya adhyāvasāya as the basis of Utpreksā. Šobhākara admits that Utpreksā consists in the sambhāvanā of the viṣaya as the viṣayin. This sambhāvanā, according to him, is based on doubt in the form of incertitude. From his treatment it appears that Šobhākara takes adhyāvasāya in the sense of siddha adhyāvasāya only where the viṣaya is swallowed up by the viṣayin.

53 lokātiōkāntaviṣayā bhāvābhāvā-bhimānatah / sambhāvaneyam utpreksā ... KLSS. p. 344.
54 sambhāvanā hyekatarapakṣa-ādityūkāreṇa pakṣāntara- dārdhyena ca prādurbhavatīty-asyāḥ sādhyaādhyāvasāya-tulyakākṣatvam. tasyāpi viṣayā-ādityūkāreṇa viṣayi- dārdhyena cotpattēḥ. VS. p. 70.
55 SD. p. 33.
and he does not recognise sādhya adhyavasāya. Since in Utpreksā, Sobhākara argues, both the viṣaya and the viṣayin are mentioned in words, adhyavasāya cannot be the basis of Utpreksā.56 Jagannātha also agrees with Sobhākara, for he also argues that in adhyavasāya, one thing is swallowed up by another; as in Utpreksā both the viṣaya and the viṣayin are mentioned, so adhyavasāya is not the basis of Utpreksā. Jagannātha says that there is no proof of sādhya adhyavasāya. If sādhya adhyavasāya be the basis of Utpreksā, then the figure Rūpaka would have sādhya adhyavasāya as its basis. Further, adhyavasāya is a kind of Lakṣāṇā, but in Utpreksā the sense of predicate portion is not obtained through the operation of Lakṣāṇā.57

But the adverse criticism put forward by Sobhākara and Jagannātha is quite uncalled for. Jayaratha rejects out right the views of Sobhākara and defends58 the author of the Alāmkārasarvasva.

(d) Varieties of Utpreksā: The elaborate classification of Utpreksā is another noteworthy feature in the Alāmkārasarvasva. Utpreksā is mainly classified into two broad classes, viz., vācyā (expressed) and pritiyamānā (implied). Utpreksā is called expressed when particles like iva, manyē etc. are employed, and implied when they are not employed.

The expressed variety of Utpreksā is of four sub-varieties, according as the thing fancied may either be jāti (genus), guna (quality), kriyā (action) or a dravya (substance). Ruuyaka points

56 AR. p. 47.
57 RG. p. 400.
58 Vide VS. pp. 69-70.
out that there is possibility of admitting another four varieties when the prakṛta is described as fancied, but these varieties cannot be taken into consideration inasmuch as the charm required for a poetic figure is wanting in them. However, each of the four varieties of Vācyotprekṣā, viz. jāti, guṇa etc. is again divided into two sub-varieties according as the fancy is positive (bhāva) and negative (abhāva). This amounts to the eight varieties of the expressed type of Utprekṣā. Each of these eight varieties is again divided into two divisions according as the source (nimitta) of fancy may either be a quality (guṇa) or an action (kriyā). Thus, we find sixteen varieties of Vācyotprekṣā. Each of these sixteen varieties is again divided into two divisions according as the source of Utprekṣā is mentioned or not. Thus the number of Utprekṣā amounts to thirtytwo varieties; each of the thirtytwo varieties is again classified into three varieties pertaining to a cause (hetu), nature (svarūpa) or fruit (phala). The total number of Vācyotprekṣā thus stands to ninetysix only. Ruuyaka points out that an object (dravya) is fancied in its own nature, so the Dravyotprekṣā does not generally admit a cause (hetu) or fruit (phala) to be fancied, but only svarūpa is fancied there. Ruuyaka, thus recognises eighty varieties of Vācyotprekṣā in the Alamkarasarvasva. Jayaratha remarks that in some cases, a cause or a fruit may be fancied in Dravyotprekṣā.

59 tatrāpi dravyasya prāyāḥ svarūpotprekṣānām eveti hetuphalotprekṣā-ḥvedās tataḥ pātaniyāḥ. AS. p. 72-73.

60 prāyāḥ-sabdena ca hetu-phalayoh kutrāpi sambhavo'stit; darṣitam. ata evālamkāranausārinyām granthakṛtānayor api sambhavo darṣitah. tad evam dravyasya hetu-phalayor sambhavē prāg-uktaiyā samkhyā jyāyasi. VS. pp. 72-73.
Ruyyaka's *Alamkāranusārinī*, where the author, according to Jayaratha, admits these varieties. Thus, Ruyyaka recognises ninetysix varieties of vacyotprekṣā in the *Alamkāranusārinī*.

The Pratīyamanā variety of Utpreksā may have the above-mentioned eighty (or ninetysix) varieties, but the number of varieties may be reduced for obvious reason. In Pratīyamanotpreksā, Ruyyaka asserts, there is no possibility of the non-mention of the source (nimitta) of Utpreksā. For if the particle like iva is not mentioned, and if the source of fancy be not mentioned in the pratīyamānā variety of Utpreksā, then it will be impossible to ascertain that there is Utpreksā. So the source (nimitta) can in no way be remained unmentioned in Pratīyamānotprekṣaṇa is not possible. So he recognises thirtytwo (eighty minus fortyeight) varieties of Pratīyamānotprekṣā in the *Alamkārasarvasva*. Jayaratha remarks that Ruyyaka admits svarūpotprekṣaṇa in some cases of Pratīyamānotprekṣaṇa. In this connexion, Jayaratha refers again to Ruyyaka's *Alamkāranusārinī* where Ruyyaka admits fortyeight varieties of Pratīyamānotprekṣa.61

Besides these divisions, Ruyyaka says, Utpreksā may also be classified on the basis of its admixture with other figures like Śīṣa, Upamā and Apahnuti. Though the figure Utpreksā is a figure of sense, sometimes it is found to be based on paronomastic word; sometimes the figure Upamā may gives rise to Utpreksā and sometimes Utpreksā may be founded on concealment because of the use of the word chala etc. Thus, the figure Utpreksā, Ruyyaka admits, attains infinite varieties.62

61 Vide Ibid, p. 73.
62 atāś cokta-vakṣyamāṇa-prakāra-vaicitrye-nānanyam asyāḥ. AS. p. 73.
Ruyyaka appears to borrow the idea of some varieties of Utpreksā viz. vācyā, pratīyamānā and bhāva, abhāva from Udbhata’s Kāvyalāmkārasārasamgraha. 63 Out of four divisions, viz. jāti, guna, kriyā and dravya, the three divisions, viz. jāti, kriyā and dravya are taken by Ruyyaka from Bhoja. 64 The other varieties of Utpreksā are Ruyyaka’s own innovation. Ruyyaka’s elaborate classification of Utpreksā is recognised by all later writers like Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha and Appaya Dīkṣita. Jagannātha makes a remark that there is no difference of strikingness in these manifold sub-divisions of Utpreksā. 65 He recognises three varieties, viz. hetu, phala and svarūpa.

All these divisions and sub-divisions of Utpreksā are not illustrated by Ruyyaka in the Alamkārasarvasva, and it is not possible. Ruyyaka gives illustration only of some of the main divisions.

(e) Determining of Utpreksa in the verse :

\[
\text{limpatīva āmaṇgāni varṣatīvākjanam nabhan} / \\
\text{asatpurāsaśeveva dṛśṭir nisphalatām gata} //
\]

There is a great deal of controversy among the writers regarding the exact way in which Utpreksa is understood in this verse. Mammata says that here pervasion (vyāpana) of darkness comes to be fancied as lepana (anointing). 66 But Ruyyaka does not agree

63 Vide KLSS. pp. 345–46.
64 SKA. IV. 52.
65 RG. pp. 388–89.
66 This verse is quoted from Sudraka’s Mrucchkatikā for illustrating Utpreksā by Dāndin (KD.II.226), Mammata (KP.p.587), Ruyyaka (AS.p.74), Viśvanātha (SD.p.32), Appaya Dīkṣita (CM.p.354) and Jagannātha (RG.p.390).
67 vyāpanādi-lepanadirūpatayā saṃbhāvitam. KP. p. 587.
with Mammaṭa. According to Ruyyaka Utprekṣā is developed in the first half of the verse because darkness, which cannot be the agent of the act of besmearing, is fancied to be such an agent; again the sky which cannot be the agent of the act of showering, is fancied to be such an agent. Ruyyaka says that Utprekṣā arises here because the reason (nimitta), viz. pervasion of darkness of the world is implied. Ruyyaka appears to criticise Mammaṭa without, however, mentioning the name of latter. He argues that if pervasion be the viṣaya and is fancied, then another reason for fancy is to be sought for. Again, if pervasion be the viṣaya, it must not be omitted, for it is the thing upon which something else is fancied. If the viṣaya were swallowed up by lepana, we cannot understand lepana as poetically predicted of it. So the viṣaya should always be mentioned in Utprekṣā.

Ruyyaka does not admit that Utprekṣā occurs invariably by the identity of the two dharmins, but according to him, it may also occur when an attribute (dharma) is fancied as belonging to the dharmins. Therefore, to Ruyyaka, Utprekṣā may be two kinds Dharmotprekṣā and Dharmyutprekṣā. In the verse under discussion, there is Dharmyutprekṣā where lepana (attribute) is fancied as probably belonging to darkness. Later writers like Viśvanātha and Jagannātha consider this topic in detail. Viśvanātha and Jagannātha consider this topic in detail. Viśvanātha


69 suggested by P.V.Kane, SD. Notes, p. 148.

70 SD. p. 32.
follows Māmata, but Jagannātha expresses his opinion in favour of the view of Ruyyaka. Among Māmata's commentators, Mānikiya-candra finds justification in Ruyyaka's view and refers the reader to the Alamkārasarasva. Vidyanātha Tatsat, a commentator on Govinda's Kāvyapradīpa considers this issue in detail, but he also expresses his opinion in favour of the view of Ruyyaka. Vidyācakravartin does not consider this question in the Śānjīvanī but in his Sampradāyaprakāśinī on Māmata's Kāvyaprakāśa he attempts to reconcile the views of the two authors.

(f) Distinction of Utprekṣā from Upamā when the word iva is used: The word iva is expressive of Upamā and also of Utprekṣā. A question naturally arises as to how the figure Utprekṣā is distinguished from Upamā when the word iva is used. On the authority of the grammarians, Dandin lays down that the word iva used after the verb conveys utprekṣānaṁ and not aupāmya. The question remains yet unsettled because there are many instances of Utprekṣā where the word iva is used after the nouns. Ruyyaka's commentator Vidyācakravartin settles down this problem. He says that when the upamāna is one from ordinary life, the word iva expressive of similarity and there is figure Upamā; and when the Upamāna is not one from ordinary life, the word iva becomes

71 Vide RG. pp. 390-91.
73 Prabhā, pp. 324-25.
74 Vide SPN. pp. 402-403.
75 KD. II. 237.
expressive of sambhāvanā and there the figure is Utpreksā. Later writers give due credit to Vidyācakravartin for clarifying this point.

2. Atiśayokti.

(a) Ruyyaka defines the figure Atiśayokti as adhyavasīta prādhānye tvatiśayokti. Ruyyaka has already explained under Utpreksā about the two types of adhyavasāya, viz. sādhya and siddha and showed how siddha adhyavasāya constitutes the charm of Atiśayokti. It is adhyavasāya when the viśaya is swallowed up by the viśayin and there is a cognition of complete identity between the two. Ruyyaka states that adhyavasāya requires three elements, viz. (a) svarūpa, (b) viśaya and (c) viśayin. The identification between the viśaya and the viśayin can be had when the former is completely absorbed by the latter. Thus the viśayin which swallows up the viśaya appears to be prominent and prevails over the viśaya.

(b) The figure Atiśayokti is as early as Bhāmaha. Bhāmaha describes Atiśayokti as an underlying principle of all poetic figures. He states that Atiśayokti consists in a statement which intends to bring out an extra-ordinary charm in an expression that transcends the limit of ordinary expression. But Bhāmaha

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76 upamānāmśaḥ cel-lokātaḥ siddhas tad-upamaiva dvayos siddhatvād iwasabadhāḥ sādharmyā-dyotakah. yadā tu kavikalpitaḥ tadotpreksaiva. upamānasya lokatoḥsambhavādīvā sabdāḥ sambhāvanām dyotayati. SJ. p. 72.

77 AS. p. 83.

78 nimittalo vaṇo yat tu lokāṭikrānta-gocaram / manyante'tiśayoktim ...... // KL. II. 81
has given a vague definition of Atiśayokti. However, Udbhata takes this definition from Bhāmaha, but he gives four varieties which are accepted by later writers like Mammata, Ruyyaka and others. But the four divisions of Atiśayokti given by Udbhata appear to be heterogeneous. Hence, Mammata realises the difficulty in formulating a precise definition, and he is content merely with giving us an enumeration of the varieties of Atiśayokti. He includes in the varieties of Atiśayokti an important division which is called 'nigīryādhyavasāna'. Though Ruyyaka accepts 'lokatīkṛaṇtāgocaratā' resulting from Kavipratibhā as the essential characteristics of an Alamkāra, yet he gives a specific definition of Atiśayokti. Ruyyaka's definition of Atiśayokti appears to be based on the idea of Mammata's nigīryādhyavasāya. Ruyyaka explains, we shall see, that the idea of adhyavasāya lies at the root of all the varieties. Ruyyaka's adhyavasita-prādhanya as the definition of Atiśayokti is accepted by later writer like Viśvanātha. Jagannātha, however, substitutes the word atiśaya in the place of adhyavasāya. By doing so he does not bring in any new idea into the definition. He describes atiśaya as 'viśayinā viśayasya nigaraṇam' which is practically the same as adhyavasāya of the Alamkārasarvasvā. Though Ruyyaka takes the idea of adhyavasāya from others, his definition of Atiśayokti is more comprehensive.

80 KP. p. 628.
81 RG. p. 410.
(c) Scope of Atiśayokti: Ruyyaka is of the view that Atiśayokti is based on similarity. But the idea of adhyavasāya is not restricted to upamānopameyobhāva, but any particular thing established in the place of another thing for some reason or other is also regarded as adhyavasāya. Thus the establishment of bheda, the assertion of sāṃbandha as subsisting between two things where no sāṃbandha really exists, the paurvāparya-viparyaya of kārya and kāraṇa are all regarded as different species of the genus adhyavasāya. Therefore, this figure is not restricted to the similarity alone, but its scope is wide.

(d) Varieties of Atiśayokti: The figure Atiśayokti, according to the Alamkarasarvasva is of five varieties, viz. (1) bhede-abheda or denial of difference where there is no difference in reality, (ii) abhede bheda or statement of difference where there is no difference in reality, (iii) sambandhe-sambhandha or negation of connexion where there is a connexion, (iv) asambandhe sambandha of the statement of connexion where there is, in reality, no connexion and (v) Kārya-kāraṇa-paurvāparya-viparyaya or inversion of the sequence of the cause and effect. Ruyyaka accepts Mammata's fourfold classification of this figure. Mammata's classification is based on Udbhāta's classification. It is to be noted that Udbhāta and Mammata do not accept the third variety, viz. sambandhe-sambandha. This variety is Ruyyaka's innovation. Udbhāta's sambhvāvyamānarthāśraya variety becomes yadyarthokta-kalpanam in Mammata and sambandhe-sambandha in Ruyyaka. Viśvanātha accepts Ruyyaka's classification.

We have seen that all the varieties of Atiśayokti appear to be heterogeneous and the definition of Atiśayokti cannot be applied to all the varieties. It can only be applied to the first
variety. But a clear analysis made by Ruuyaka reveals the fact that these divisions are not heterogeneous as they appear at the first glance. Ruuyaka explains that the common feature in all the varieties of Atisâyokti is the extra-ordinariness, which is conveyed in different ways in the expressions like bhede'abhedâ etc. The object of such a statement is to concretise a sense of surpassing excellence and that is also the cause or motive for the adhyavasaya. Thus in the verse 'kamalâm anamvasi' etc. the ordinary excellence belonging to the face is fancied as being extra-ordinary. It should not be supposed that the face is introsuspected under the character of lotus, but what is introsuspected is natural beauty, which is here fancied to be identical with the beauty imagined by the poet. Therefore, it is not the face that is fancied to be identical with the lotus, but the natural beauty of the face is fancied to be identical with the beauty imagined by the poet as pertaining to the lotus. Thus we find the adhyavasâya takes place not between two things (dharmins) but between the attributes (dharma) one natural and the other imaginary.

For the relevancy of his treatment Ruuyaka discusses the fifth division in the Virodha group.

82 kamalâm anambhasi kamale ca kuvalaye tâni kanaka-latikeyam / sã ca sukumâra-subhag-etyutpata-parampara keyam //
83 Cf. AS. p. 88.
(1) ALĀMKĀRAS BASED ON GAMYAUPAMYA

1. Tulyayogitā.

(a) The figure Tulyayogitā, according to the Alamkārasarvasva occurs when the contextual and non-contextual things are connected with the same attribute. The attribute may either be a quality (guna) or an action (kriyā). Ruyyaka is of the view that mere connexion of the contextual or the non-contextual things with the same attribute is not sufficient to constitute this figure. Ruyyaka, like Udbhāta, says that between the contextual or the non-contextual things that are connected with the same attribute there must be implied resemblance. Therefore, the words like iva expressing similarity is not mentioned in this figure. The name Tulyayogitā given to this figure is significant because in it there is a connexion of the contextual or the non-contextual things with the same attribute. The plural number in the prastūta or in the aprastūta does not imply that only many contextual or non-contextual things constitute this figure, but the two contextual or the two non-contextual things can constitute this figure. The figure may be illustrated in the following verse:

\[
\text{sajjāta-patraprakāśā
dināni paddānī ca vrīddhim īyuh} //
\]

1 aupamyasya gāmyatve padārthagatatvena prastutānāṁ aprastutānāṁ va samāna-dharmābhisaṁbandhe tulyayogitā. AS. p. 89.

2 bahūnāṁ aupamyā-grahanāyetya na vācyam ... dvayor aupamāvasyodbhāsamaṁatvāt. evam dīpake'pi jñeyam. VS. p. 89.
This is a description of Summar. Therefore, the days and the lotuses are contextual things. They are connected with the same attribute action.

(b) The figure Tulyayogitā is as earlier as Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, but both the writers do not say that both the parts must either be prastuta or aprastuta. The figure Tulyayogitā of these writers does not differ from Dīpaka of later writers. Udbhata is the first writer to demarcate the line of distinction between these two figures. Udbhata's definition of Tulyayogitā has been accepted by Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka however with different wordings. Though Ruyyaka's definition is based on that of Udbhata, yet his definition appears to be complete and easily comprehensible. That Ruyyaka is indebted to Udbhata is evidenced by the fact that the former quotes two illustrations from latter's work. The later writers like Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha accept Ruyyaka's definition almost in verbatim.

(c) Varieties of Tulyayogitā: Udbhata speaks only of common attribute with which the contextual things or the non-contextual things are connected. He does not specifically say that common attribute should be guna or kriyā. Udbhata, therefore, recognises two varieties, according as the contextual or

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3 KL. III. 27.
4 KD. 330.
5 upamāno-pameyokti-sūnyair prastutair vacaḥ / sāmyābhidhāyi prastāva-bhāgbhir vā tulyayogitā // KLSS. V. 7. (p. 378).
6 niyatānām sakṛd dharmah sā punastulyayogitā. KP. 642.
the non-contextual things are associated with the same attribute. Mammadtha recognises the two varieties of this figure. The author of the Alankarasarvasva first classifies Tulyayogita into two varieties according as contextual or the non-contextual things are connected with the common attribute. Each of these two varieties is again divided into two sub-varieties according as it is based on guna or kriya. Ruyyaka, thus, recognises four varieties of Tulyayogita. Each of the varieties are illustrated by Ruyyaka. Jayaratha informs us that Ruyyaka deals with other varieties of Tulyayogita based on the relation of bimba-pratibimba in his Alankaravartika.

2. Dipaka.

(a) The poetic figure Dipaka is defined as a poetic figure in which the contextual and the non-contextual objects are associated with the same attribute. The definition of Dipaka given in the sutra of the Alankarasarvasva is very concise, 'prastutapristutanam tu dipakam'. This laconic definition necessitates his own vratti where the author says that the words aupamyasya gamyatve etc. are to be carried over in this sutra from the definition of Tulyayogita. Thus the complete definition of Dipaka stands as: aupamyasya gamyatve padartha-gatatvena prastutapristutanam samanadharmanabhisambandhe dipakam. The name Dipaka given to this figure is significant because it is like a lamp which when employed for illuminating one object, illuminates others.

8 VS. p. 91.
9 AS. p. 91.
10 prakaranikaparakaranikayor madhyad ekatra nirdistah samanodharmanaprasangena-nyatropakarad dipanad dipasadrsyena dipakakhylamkaroctthapaka. Ibid, p. 91.
Since the word ‘iva’ expressing similarity is not here employed, the similarity between two things is implied in this figure. Ruyyaka points out that the relation of the upamāna and the upameya with the aprastuta and the prastuta is real, i.e. to say, the upameya is prastuta and the upamāna is aprastuta here; but in the figure Tulyayogita the relation of the upamāna and the upameya with the aprastuta and the prastuta is optional, it is left to the volition of the appreciator to regard one as the upamāna and the other as the upameya. This figure may be illustrated in the verse:

\[
\text{saṃcārāpūtani digantarāṇi} \\
\text{kṛtvā dinānte nilayāya gantum} \\
\text{pracakrame palla]ā]gatāmra} \\
\text{prabhā patamgasya muneś ca dhenuḥ} // 11
\]

Where dhenu and prabhā are connected with the same attribute, viz. ‘nilayāya guntum pracakrame’. Here dhenu is prastuta and therefore, upameya and prabhā is aprastuta and therefore upamāna. 12

(b) The figure Dīpaka is recognised as early as by Bharata. But Bharata and Bhāmaha do not speak of the relation of the upamāna and upameya, nor do they speak of the relation of the prastuta and aprastuta in their treatment of Dīpaka. Udbhata is the first to admit the relation of the upamāna and the upameya, and the implied similarity between them. 13 Rudrata, however,

11 Raghu, II. 15.
12 atra ca dvayoh prabhādhenvo prakaranikatvāt tulyayogita-
tam adyatanā manyante. dvayoḥ api prakaranikatvem 
mahāprakaranapaksayadheno prakṛṣṭam prakaranikatvam 
prabhāyastv aprakṛṣṭam ity-etatad apeksayō cirantanair 
dīpakam etat sthāpitam. VVV. p. 355.
13 ādi-madhyaṁta-viṣayāḥprādhānyetara-yogināḥ / 
antargatopamaharmā yatra tad dīpakam viduḥ // KLSS.I.14.
Ruyyaka does not recognise implied similarity to be the basis of this figure. Ruyyaka accepts Udbhata's idea that the figure is based on implied resemblance. Udbhata's threefold classification of this figure, we shall see, is accepted by Ruyyaka. Like Mammata, Ruyyaka accepts Rudraṭa's Dipaka, as a Kārakadīpaka, a variety of Dīpaka. But in Kārakadīpaka there is no implied resemblance, but a superficial limeness.

(c) Varieties of Dīpaka: The figure Dīpaka has been classified by Ruyyaka into three varieties according as the single attribute occurs in the beginning, in the middle or at the end of sentence. Thus, the three varieties of Dīpaka are: (1) Ādīdīpaka, (ii) Madhyadīpaka and (iii) Anīdīpaka. In these varieties the verb is the same and is connected with many cases. Therefore, these varieties are called Ekakriyādīpaka. Ruyyaka accepts another variety of Dīpaka, where one case is connected with many verbs. This variety is called Kārakadīpaka. The first three varieties are taken from Udbhata, who, however, borrows them from Bhāmaha, and the last variety is taken from Rudraṭa, who, however, borrows it from Dandin. Viśvanātha remarks that there is no special charm in these divisions. In the fourth variety, viz. Kārakadīpaka, there is no implied similarity. In the verse,

14 RKL. VIII. 64.
15 yathāneka-kārakagatatvenaikakriyā-dīpakam tathāneka-kriyāgatatvenai-kakārakam api dīpakam. AS. p. 93.
16 KL. II. 25.
17 atra ca guna-kriyayor ādimadhyāvasāna-sadbhāvena traśvidhyam na lakṣitam, tathāvidha-vaicitryasya sarvatrāpi sahasradhā sambhavāt. SD. p. 35.
different kriyas, viz. upakartum, dhartum etc. have the same kāraka, viz. kutuhali-manah. There is no implied similarity when all the kriyās are related to the same kāraka. S.S. Sukthankar remarks that there is superficial similarity in such cases. Ruuyaka, like Mammata, is content with this semblance of similarity.

Jayaratha and Jagannātha remark that Tulyayogitā and Dīpaka are not two independent figures, but they are two divisions of a same figure.18

3. Prativastūpamā.

(a) Prativastūpamā is defined as a figure in which the same common attribute is expressed differently in two sentences.19 The figure is based on implied resemblance that rests on the meaning of the sentence. Ruuyaka says that the common attribute in the figure stands in the relation of vastu-prativastu. That is to say, the common attribute, mentioned twice in two different words, is not different in essence. In this figure there are two independent sentences, of which one sentence (vākyārtha) may be regarded as prakṛta (contextual) in relation to other which is aprakṛta (non-contextual). Each sentence must embody the common attribute, which, though same, must be stated in different words in different sentences. In his eagerness to explain the

18 VS. p. 91; RG. pp. 436-37.
19 vākyarthagatatvena sāmānyasya vākya-dvaye prativastūpamā. AS. p. 94.
propriety of the name of this figure, Ruyyaka says that the word vastu is taken here in the sense of vākyārtha, i.e. the meaning of the sentence; the word prativastu is taken in the sense of prati-vākyārtha, i.e. the meaning of every sentence, and the word upamā is taken in the sense of sāmya, i.e. similarity. Ruyyaka, therefore, says that the name Prativastupamā given to this figure is significant, because in it there is similarity of attribute in every sentence. In this figure, one and the same attribute is expressed in two different but synonymous expressions in order to avoid the fault tautology.

(b) During the time of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin the figure Prativastupamā is not regarded as an independent figure, but it is admitted as a variety of Upamā. This variety of Upamā is broad enough to comprehend Drśṭānta also. Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin do not admit Drśṭānta. Prativastupamā as an independent figure finds recognition for the first time in Udbhata, who, however, differentiates Prativastupamā from Drśṭānta. Vāmana admits Prativastupamā as a variety of Upamā. Rudraṇa defines Ubhayanyāsa in place of Prativastupamā. Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka follows the tradition of Udbhata, but Ruyyaka appears to have been more indebted to Rājānaka Tilaka and Mammaṭa; for vastu in the sense of vākyārtha is taken first by Rājānaka Tilaka. The later writers follow

20 vastutāha (sic) sābdasya vākyārtha-vācīte prati-
vākyārtham upamā sāmyam ity-anvarthāśrayanāt. Ibid., p.
21 KLSS. I. 22-3
22 yatropamānopamyayor dvayor api samīpaṃ sādhāraṇadharm-
mopādānāṃ sa prativastupamā. ata eva vastu vākyārthāh
upamānaṃ vastuno vākyārthāntarasyātra cāneka vākyatve
ivāder aprayoge kim upameyam kim vopamānam iti prakara-
māddhi vyavasthetyāḥ prakaraṇiketareti. TVR. pp.49-50.
/ Quoted from AIV. p. 325. /
Mammatā and Ruyyaka. The idea of implied resemblance that we find in the definitions and expositions of Prativastūpamā given by later writers is accepted by them from Ruyyaka.

(c) Distinction of Prativastūpamā from other figures:

(i) In upamā, there is only one sentence, the common attribute is mentioned only once and the words like iva etc. are mentioned; while in Prativastūpamā, there are two sentences, the common attribute is mentioned twice with difference synonym and the words like iva etc. are not mentioned at all. In upamā, resemblance rests on the meaning of the word, while in Prativastūpamā the resemblance rests on the meaning of the sentence.

(ii) In Dīpaka and Tulyayogitā, the common attribute is stated only once, while in Prativastūpamā, the common property is stated twice. Like Upamā, in Dīpaka and Tulyayogitā, the similarity rests on the meaning of the word, while in Prativastūpamā, the idea of similarity rests on the meaning of two sentences.

(iii) The figure Prativastūpamā is also distinct from Nidarsanā. Nidarsanā is based on two sentences: generally, but it may also be based on one sentence; while in Prativastūpamā, two sentences are inevitable. In Nidarsanā the common attribute stands in the relation bimbapratibimba; while in Prativastūpamā, the common attribute is stated to subsist in the relation of vastuprativastu.

(iv) Prativastūpamā is also distinct from Drṣṭānta where the common attribute subsists in the relation of bimbapratibimba; while in Prativastūpamā, the common property is stated to subsist in the relation of vastuprativastu.
(d) Varieties of Prativastūpamā : Ruyyaka admits two varieties of this figure, according as the similarity between the two sentences may be conveyed (i) positively or (ii) negatively. The figure is illustrated in the verse:

\[
\text{cakorya eva caturāś candrikācāmā-karmanī} / \\
\text{āvantya eva nipuṇāḥ sudṝgo ratanarmanī} //
\]

Where the common attribute is caturatva in the upamanavākya and nipunatva in the upameya-vākya, but both are same in essence. It is the example of the first variety. If the second line of the verse quoted above reads 'vināvantir na nipuṇāḥ sudṝgo rata-karmanī' it will be the illustration of the second variety.

Mammatā's Mālaprativastūpamā is not accepted by Ruyyaka. The second variety, viz. vaidharmye prativastūpamā is Ruyyaka's innovation. The later writers like Viśvanātha, Appaya Dīkṣita, Jagannātha admit it.

4. Drṣṭānta.

(a) The figure Drṣṭānta is defined as a figure in which the same common attribute stands in the relation of the thing reflected and its reflection (bimba-pratibimba-bhāva). Ruyyaka is of the view that the relation of bimba and pratibimba in Drṣṭānta is present not only between attributes (dharmas) but also between the upamāna and upameya (dharmins). That Ruyyaka

\[23 \text{ SD. X. 50; KVL. p. 65; RG. p. 444.} \]
\[24 \text{ tasyāpi bimba-pratibimbabhāvataya nirdeśe drṣṭāntah.} \\
\text{tasyāpīti na kevalam upamānopameyayoh. tac-chabdena} \\
\text{sāmanya-dharmāḥ pratyavamṛśtah. AS. p. 96.} \]
admits bimba-pratibimba-bhāva between two dharmins is evident from his exposition of this figure. Ruvyaka's position has been made clear by his commentators also. 25

The figure Drśṭānta is based on the similarity of vākyārthas. Both the vākyas are here independent. In each vākya, the common attribute is stated, but the attribute of the upameya-vākya is distinct from that in the upamāna-vākya. Though both the attributes are different, yet they correspond one to the other in the way in which reflection (pratibimba) corresponds to the object reflected (bimba), though both are distinct. Thus, for example

\[
\text{abdhir laṅghita eva vānarabhaṭaḥ}
\]
\[
\text{kiṁ taśya gambhīratāṁ}
\]
\[
\text{āpātālani magnapīvaratanur}
\]
\[
\text{jāṇāti manthācalah} /\]
\[
\text{daivīm vācam upāsate hi bahavaḥ}
\]
\[
\text{sāraṁ tu sārasvataṁ}
\]
\[
\text{jānte nitarāṁ asau gurukulakṛṣṭo}
\]
\[
\text{murāriḥ kaviḥ} //
\]

Here the crossing of the ocean and worship to sarasvati are not the same, but there is some similarity between them as there is between original and its reflection. The crossing of the ocean is original (bimba) and the worship of sarasvati is its reflection (pratibimba).

25 astaś'ca dharmāṇam dharminām ca bimba-pratibimba-bhāvena nirdeśo'yaṁ alamkāraḥ. VS. p. 96.
We have seen in connexion with our discussion of Prativastūpama that the figure Drśṭānta is for the first time conceived of by Udbhaṭa. Udbhaṭa names it Kāvyadṛśṭānta in order to differentiate it from the dṛśṭānta of logic. Udbhaṭa does not say that bimba-pratibimba-bhāva is present between two dharminṣ or dharmas. Mammata improves the idea when he specifically says that the reflection (pratibimba) of all these in Dṛśṭānta.

Ruyyaka accepts Mammata’s assertion and insists on the bimba-pratibimba-bhāva between dharmas and dharminṣ. The later writers do not bring any new idea into the definition and analyses of this figure. They accept the views of Mammata and Ruyyaka without any question. Jagannātha, however, is of the view that the two figures, viz. Prativastūpama and Drśṭānta are two divisions of a same figure. But other writers do not hold this view, but they think that the idea of bimbapratibimba and that of vastuprati-vastu are completely distinct. Since the source of charm of the two figures is not same, they should be regarded as two independent figures. There are, however, some later writers who want say that there is relation of samarthya-samarthaka-bhāva in the two vākyas of Drśṭānta. If the relation of samarthya-samarthaka-bhāva be admitted in Drśṭānta, the scope of Arthāntaranyā would be restricted. But Ruyyaka does not consider samarthya-samarthaka-bhāva in Drśṭānta.

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26 istasyārthasya vispaśṭa-pratibimba-nidarśanam/ yatheva dipadaiḥ śunyam budhāir dṛśṭānta ucyate//KLSS.V.8.
28 Vide VS. p. 95-96.
(c) Varieties of Drṣṭānta: The figure Drṣṭānta has some similarity with Prativastūpamā, so its varieties are same as those of Prativastūpama. Ruyyaka admits its two varieties according as the common attribute is based on sādharmya and vaidharmya. Ruyyaka appears to accept these two divisions from Mammaṭa who is specific in recognising these two varieties. These two divisions of Drṣṭānta are accepted by all later writers.

5. Nidarśanā.

(a) The figure Nidarśanā is based on the idea of implied similarity. In this figure the relation between two things being possible or impossible leads to the comprehension of similarity between them. The figure Nidarśanā is, therefore, defined by Ruyyaka as a figure in which the possible or impossible connexion between two things implies the idea of similarity. A case of Nidarśanā contains for its content two entities, viz. (a) the object of description, that is, the contextual and (b) the thing introduced by the imagination of the poet for poetical purpose, that is, the non-contextual. Sometimes the connexion between the two entities being possible and leads to the comprehension of the relation of bimba and pratibimba between them. Sometimes, there is no apparently possible connexion between the two entities and this impossible connexion between the two entities causes us to

29 sādharmyaṇa. vaidharmyaṇa tu. KP. p. 638.
30 EV. p. 259; PRD. p. 515; SD. p. 36; KVL. p. 69; RG. p. 455.
31 sambhavata-sambhavata va vastu-sambandhena gamyamanam pratibimba-kaṇaṇam nidarśanā. AS. p. 97.
suppose the existence of similarity between them. In this type (b) two apparently unconnected facts are juxtaposed only with a view to driving at their similarity.

(b) The figure Nidarśanā is for the first time admitted by Bhāmaha, whose definition\(^{32}\) embraces the sambhavad-vastusambandha variety of Nidarśanā. Udbhāṭa names this figure as Vidarśanā, but his definition\(^ {33}\) explicitly speaks of the two relations, viz. abhavad-vastusambandha and bhavad-vastusambandha. Ruyyaka appears to borrow the idea of this figure from Udbhāṭa and his commentator Pratihārendurāja. Ruyyaka brings some new idea into the definition by adding the word pratibimbanam. So in Nidarśanā, the similarity is not of ordinary type, but the similarity is based on the relation of bimba-pratibimba-bhāva. Later writers like Vidyādhara, Viśvanātha accept Ruyyaka's definition as authoritative and copy the definition almost verbatim. Though Jagannātha defines this figure in a different language, the relation of bimba and pratibimba is accepted by him.\(^ {34}\)

(c) Distinction of Nidarśanā from Drṣṭānta: The figure Nidarśanā is in many respects similar to Drṣṭānta, but there is also distinction between them. Ruyyaka distinguishes\(^ {35}\) Nidarśanā

\(^ {32}\) KL. III. 33.


\(^ {34}\) RG. p. 457.

\(^ {35}\) nirapeksayor vākyārthayor hi bimba-pratibimba-bhāvo drṣṭāntaḥ. yatra ca prakṛte vākyārthe vākyārthāntaram āropayate sāmāṇādhikaranyena tatra sambandhānupatti-mūlā nidarśana-iva yuktā, na drṣṭāntaḥ. AS. p. 99.
from Drṣṭānta on the ground that in Drṣṭānta two sentences are grammatically independent and stand in the relation of bimba and pratibimba; while in Drṣṭānta the sentences are dependent with one another. In Nidarsanā, with the sense of the contextual, another sense is brought into relation, and the impossibility of the connexion thus brought about is the cause of supposing similarity.

(d) Divisions of Nidarsanā: The figure Nidarsanā, according to Ruyyaka's classification, is divided mainly into two varieties, according as the possible or impossible connexion of things. The second variety is again divided into two sub-varieties, according as the meaning pertaining to the single sentence or sentences. Ruyyaka points out that the earlier writers regard that the attribute of the upamāna is represented as impossible to the upameya in Nidarsanā. Since the upamāna is not the object of description and as such not a contextual, Ruyyaka does not admit it. According to him, sometimes an attribute of the upameya is represented as belonging to the upamāna and leads to the idea of similarity. Ruyyaka is of opinion that this figure may be found in the form of ārākhala (linked succession) or mālā (serial). Since denial of something is followed by a obtainment of something, Ruyyaka says that sometimes a case of Nidarsanā can be found in the impossible connexion of obtaining a thing which is implied by the denial.

(1) An illustration of Nidarsanā where the possible connexion of things causes us to comprehend the existence of similarity is:
Here the connexion of the mountain as the agent in fact of advising 'like me you render hospitality to the guest' is possible, inasmuch as the attribute of holding the sun at its top, which (attribute) belongs to the mountain is quite capable of conveying such an advice, because use of the suffix nic.  
This possible connexion implies the relation of bimba and prati-bimba between the mountain's holding the sun and the advice: 'render (like me) hospitality to the guest'.

(ii) An illustration of Nidarsanā, where an impossible connexion of things leads us to comprehend the existence of similarity is

It is impossible for the moon to take the beauty of Cupid's bow, because one thing cannot possess the quality of another thing. This impossible relation leads us to comprehend the idea of similarity between them.

36 AS. p. 97.
37 atra bodhayan-niti niças tat-samarthācarane prayogāt sambhavati vastu-sambandhaḥ. Ibid. p. 98.
38 Ibid, p. 98.
In these figures, we find that, two things are linked up on the basis of some similar attribute or same attribute. Rightly does R.R. Mukherji remarks: 'Adoption of these devices shows that neither the particular nor the general floats in isolation, but rather they form a part of an organised whole'.

40 IPIA. p. 141.
ALAMKĀRAS BASED ON VIRODHA

In Ākṣepa there is apparent anomaly in the description of what is intended is negated and what is negated is intended. This apparent anomaly in the statements, which is found in the figures based on Virodha (incongruity), is the reason why Ruuyaka proceeds to deal with the figures based on Virodha after the treatment of Ākṣepa. Since the charm of Ākṣepa depends not on anomaly but on the conveyance of some special meaning, it is not included in the Virodha group. The charm of the figures based on Virodha group depends on apparent contradiction.

1. Virodha.

(a) The figure Virodha, according to Ruuyaka, consists in the representation of the semblance of incongruity between two things. In this figure there is representation of two things which though apparently incongruous are not really so, because the incongruity can be explained away by properly construing the two things. Ruuyaka limits the scope of this figure to the four attributes, viz., genus (jāti), quality (guṇa), action (kriyā) and substance (dravya) when he says that each of the four attributes may be incongruous with another attribute of its own class or with another of different class. The figure Virodha is really speaking Virodhābhāsa i.e., semblance of contradiction.

1 viruddhābhāsatvam virodhah. AS. p. 158. This definition is quoted by Ruuyaka KLSV of Vāmana.
If the contradiction cannot be explained away and is final, there is fault, but when the contradiction between two attributes is reconciled and thus shown to be merely apparent there is the figure Virodha. Thus, for example,

\[ 'mahāsattvenāpi paraloka-bhīrunā. \]

There is incongruity in saying that those who are powerful are afraid of their enemies. This contradiction can be removed by explaining that the people of Ujjainī are exceedingly righteous and are afraid of the next world. Here Virodha is based on śieṣa because the word paraloka conveys two meanings, viz., enemy and the next world. Hence, the contradiction here is not real but only apparent.

(b) Varieties of Virodha: Ruyyaka mentions ten varieties of this figure. He says that (a) a genus may be apparently incongruous with the four, viz., genus, quality, action and substance; (b) a quality may be incongruous with the three, viz., quality, action and substance; (c) an action may be incongruous with the two, viz., action and substance and (d) a substance may be incongruous with another substance. So there are ten \((4 + 3 + 2 + 1)\) varieties in all.

Ruyyaka does not illustrate all the varieties. He gives illustration of the apparent incongruity between (i) action and action and (ii) substance and action. Ruyyaka does not want to

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2 sa ca saṁādhanām vinā prarūdho dosaḥ. satī tu saṁādhanena pramukha evābhāsamānatavaḥ virodhābhāsaḥ. Ibid, p. 158.
3 Kād, p. 87.
4 tadevaṁ dasā virodha-bhedāḥ. AS. p. 159.
multiply the number of illustrations probably on the ground
that he finds no distinction of charm in all the varieties.

(c) Position of Virodha based on Śleṣa: Śleṣa plays an
important part in giving rise to Virodha. Though the figure
Virodha is possible without Śleṣa (e.g., sā kamalāpi dalayati
mama hṛdayam), still in Sanskrit literature, the figure Virodha
based on Śleṣa is of frequent occurrence. A question may be
raised whether the figure Virodha based on Śleṣa should be
regarded as Virodha or Śleṣa or commixture of both. Ruyyaka
records two different views on this issue. He points out that
(a) the followers of Udbhata regard such a case as a case of
Śleṣa, but (b) according to others, there should be commixture of
(samkara) of Śleṣa and Virodha in such a case. According to
Udbhata, Śleṣa is more powerful than any other figure, that
where it is present, there is merely the appearance (pratibhā)
of the other figure and that the real figure in such a case is
Śleṣa. Jayaratha remarks that the second view is the view of
the author himself. Illustrations of Virodha based on Śleṣa are quoted by
Ruyyaka from Bāṇabhaṭṭa's Haṃsacarita and Kadambari.

(a) 'saṃnihita-bālāṇdhakārā bhāsvan mūrtis ca'
Here both the words are paronomistic and as such have two mean-
ings. The first word, viz. saṃnihita-bālāṇdhakārā has two senses:

---

5 vivikta-viṣayatvena cāsyā drṣṭeḥ śleṣa-garbhatve virodha-
pratibhotpattihetuh śleṣa udbhātanaṁ. darśanāntare tu
samkarālamkārāh. Ibid. p. 156.
6 darśanāntara iti granthakṛd abhimate. VS. p. 156.
7 HC. p. 12.
(1) saṁnihitah bālāḥ andhakārāḥ yasyām (in whom fresh darkness was present); (2) saṁnihitah bālesu (keśesu) andhakārāḥ yasyām (who had darkness in her locks). Similarly the second word has two senses: (1) bhāsvatah (sūryasya) mūrtiḥ yasyām (in whom the sun was present); (2) bhāsvati mūrtiḥ yasyāḥ (whose form was brilliant). Here there is incongruity when we take the first meaning of the words, but this incongruity can be removed when the second meaning of each clause is taken.

(b) 'kupatimapi kalatравallabham'\(^8\)

There is incongruity in saying that although he was a bad husband, still he was loved by his wives. The word kupati is paronomastic meaning a (1) bad husband and (2) lord of the earth. This contradiction is removed when we take the word kupati in the sense of the lord of the earth.

These two passages are, according to Ruyyaka, the illustrations of the commixture of Virodha and Śleṣa.

Ruyyaka opines that the incongruous things must be set forth as abiding in one abode; thus, the contradiction must be in a field other than that of the relation of cause and effect (Kāryakāraṇabhāva).

2. Vibhāvanā.

(a) The figure Vibhāvanā, according to the Alamkārasarvasva, occurs when an effect is said to arise in the absence of its cause.\(^9\) The cause and effect are invariably associated, so the effect is bound by the law of causation to be present or to be

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\(^8\) Kād, p. 21.

absent with the presence or absence of its cause. It is impossible that an effect can come into existence in the absence of its cause. But if under some striking mode of expression it is stated that an effect comes into existence in the absence of its cause, there is the figure Vibhāvana. There is apparent contradiction when an effect comes into existence in the absence of its cause. But this apparent contradiction can be explained away when we find that the effect in such cases is due to another cause which is not well-known.10 The figure Vibhāvana is illustrated in the verse:

\[
\text{asambhṛtam maṇḍanam aṅgayāster} \\
\text{anāsavākhyam kāraṇam madasya} / \\
\text{kāmasya puṣpa-vyatiriktaṃ astraṃ} \\
\text{bālyat paraṃ sātha vayaḥ prapede} //^{11}
\]

This verse describes the advent of youth in Pārvatī. Kuuyaka says that in the second foot of this verse there is Vibhāvana because the effect, viz. exhilaration (mada) is represented as present even in the absence of its well-known cause, viz. wine (āsava). This apparent incongruity can be removed when we see that there is an unwell-known cause that produces the effect. This unwell-known cause is youth which is mentioned in this verse.12

Kuuyaka observes that there is conscious identification of the two things in the above illustration, for the exhilaration due to youth is not the same as the exhilaration due to wine, but

10 aprastutam kāraṇam vastuto'ṣṭīti virodha-paniharaḥ. 

11 Kumāra, I. 31.

12 AS. pp. 158-9.
they are spoken of as identical. Ruyyaka, therefore, opines that Atisáyokti lies at the root of Vibhávaná.13 Jagannátha critiques this view of Ruyyaka. He says that all the cases of Vibhávaná do not involve Atisáyokti. Vibhávaná, according to him, depends on 'āharya abhedabuddhi' in the form of Atisáyokti or Rūpaka, in so far as one effect has to be identified with another.

Ruyyaka regards the second foot of the verse 'asambhrtam' etc. as an instance of Vibhávaná, and no difference of opinion on this is recorded by him. With reference to the figure in the first and the third feet of this verse, Ruyyaka refers to four distinct views anonymously. He says that (i) some accept the two feet as instances of Vibhávaná, (ii) some take it as examples of Viśeṣokti, (iii) some other writers admit Rūpaka in these two feet and (iv) the moderners admit Parináma here.14 Ruyyaka appears to criticise the first view when he says that 'sambharana' and 'puspa' are not the causes of mandana and astra, hence description of the absence of the two is not the cause of admitting Vibhánaná in these two feet. There is no Alamkára in these two feet, but it is nothing but a uktimátra.

(b) Distinction of Vibhávaná from Virodha and Viśeṣokti: These three figures are based on apparent incongruity. In Vibhávaná and Viśeṣokti the field of incongruity is limited in the field of the cause and effect; while the field of Virodha is wide, the incongruity is introduced between genus and genus etc.

13 Ibid, p. 159.
(i) Vibhāvanā and Virodha: Vibhāvanā is distinct from Virodha on the ground that in Vibhāvanā, the description is started with the absence of cause, it is effect only (which is said to arise even in the absence of cause) that is seemingly incongruous, and not the cause. Therefore, the absence of the cause (karaṇābhava) is bādhaka and the effect (kārya) is bādhya, because the absence of cause is real, while the effect is only poetically fancied. Now what is real cannot be opposed by what is fancied, but what is merely fancied is actually opposed by the real. But in Virodha, both the things are equally powerful and one is represented as opposing the other. Thus both the things are bādhya and bādhaka.

(ii) Vibhāvanā and Viśeṣokti: In Vibhāvanā the production of effect is seemingly incongruous in the absence of the cause. In Viśeṣokti, Ruyyaka says, the non-production of effect (kāryabhāva) even in the presence of the causes is represented as more powerful than the cause and, therefore, the cause is apprehended as seemingly incongruous, or in other words, kāryabhāva is bādhaka and karaṇasattā is bādhya.

But Jayaratha holds the opposite view. He says that in Viśeṣokti the non-production of effect is seemingly incongruous when the causes are present. According to him kāryabhāva is bādhya and karaṇa-sattā is bādhaka. Jayaratha remarks that the words of the Alamkārasarvasva are interpolation and he supports his remark by a quotation from Tilaka whom the author of the Alamkārasarvasva generally follows. Jayaratha's view appears to be sounder. Hence Jagannātha follows Jayaratha.
Varieties of Vibhāvanā: This figure is classified by Ruṣṭaka into two varieties according as the cause (which is of course unwell-known) for the production of effect is mentioned or not. The first variety is illustrated in the verse 'asambhṛtam' etc. where, we have already told, the cause (youth) is mentioned. The second variety of Vibhāvanā is illustrated by Ruṣṭaka in the verse 'aṅgalekham' etc. quoting it from Udbhaṭa's Kavyālakṣārasarasamgraha. These two varieties of Vibhāvanā are admitted by later writers.

3. Viṣeṣokti.

(a) The figure Viṣeṣokti occurs when the effect is represented as absent even though the causes are present. It is well-known that when all the causes are present they invariably produce the effect. But when it is represented that the effect does not follow the causes although they are present, there is apparent contradiction because of the violation of the law of causality. In this paradox lies the figure Viṣeṣokti. Though prima facie all the causes seem to be present there, yet if we examine carefully we may discover some reason, which may be expressed in words or not as the case may be, to account for the absence of the effect. Thus the law of causality remains inviolated and the apparent contradiction may be explained away. Ruṣṭaka says that the name Viṣeṣokti given to this figure is appropriate because this peculiar mode of expression is adopted for suggesting some speciality.  

15 kāraṇasāmagrye kāryānupattir viṣeṣoktih, Ibid., p. 160.
16 kamcid viṣeṣam abhivyāktum prayujyamānā viṣeṣoktin. Ibid., p. 161.
example,

karpūra iva dagdho'pi śaktimān yo jane jane /

namo'śtv-avārya-vīryāya tasmai kusumadhanvane //

Destruction of body is the cause of the destruction of strength. Here the strength of Cupid is represented as being not destroyed even though his body has been destroyed. The non-production of effect, viz., the non-destruction of strength indirectly conveys the idea that Cupid though burnt by Śiva continues to be powerful in every man. The reason of the non-destruction of Cupid's strength, even though he is burnt, is his irresistible vigour (avārya-vīrya). The reason is expressed in words.

(b) Varieties of Viśeṣokti: Ruṣyaka classifies the figure Viśeṣokti mainly into two varieties, viz. (1) Uktanimita and (2) anuktanimita, according as the reason that prevents the production of the effect may be expressed in words or not. The anuktanimita variety is again divided into two varieties, viz. (i) cintyanimita and (ii) acintyanimita, according as the reason is comprehensible or incomprehensible. The two main varieties of this figure are accepted by Ruṣyaka from Udbhata. Mammaṭa recognises these two main varieties given by Udbhata and at the same time he adds a new variety called acintyanimita. But Ruṣyaka does not recognise the acintyanimita to be a main variety. According to him, the reason that is not mentioned may easily be comprehensible or may not be

17 Ibid, p. 161. This verse is also quoted by Mammaṭa. Vide KP. p.
18 Vide, KP.
comprehensible. The acintyanimittā variety may be included in the anuktanimittā. Hence, he classifies anuktanimittā into two varieties. However, Ruyyaka illustrates all the three varieties of Viśeṣokti quoting verses from the works of his predecessors.

(c) Scope of Vibhāvanā and Viṣeṣokti: Ruyyaka widens the scope of Vibhāvanā and Viṣeṣokti in order to include cases where a cause is followed by a phenomenon contrary to its normal effect. Ruyyaka says that Viṣeṣokti occurs not only when the effect is stated to be absent, but also when something opposed to the effect is stated to be present. Similarly, Vibhāvanā occurs not only when the cause is stated to be absent though the effect is present, but also when something opposed to the cause is stated to be present. Thus in the verse:

\[
\text{yaḥ kaumāraharaḥsa eva hi varastā eva caitraśkapā}
\]
\[
\text{ste conmīlita-mālali-surabhayaḥ praudhāḥ kadambānītāḥ/}
\]
\[
\text{sā caivāsmi tathāpi tātra suratavyāpāra-līlāvidhau}
\]
\[
\text{revarodhasi vetasī-tarutale cātāḥ samutkanṭhate // 20}
\]

Here the cause of longing is the absence of the lover etc. The opposite of this is the presence of lover etc. Thus, there is Vibhāvanā because the opposite of the cause (absence of lover) is stated to be present. Similarly, the presence of lover etc. is the cause which should produce the effect, viz. absence of

\[19\] kāryānutpattis’ cātra kvacit kārya-virodhotpattyā nibadhyate. evam vibhāvanāyaṃ api karaṇābhāvah karaṇa-viruddhamukhena kvacit pratipādyate. AS. p. 161.

\[20\] AS. p. 161.
longing. The opposite of the absence of longing is longing which is stated to be present. Therefore, there is Višeṣokti also in this verse. In this verse, the absence of the cause or the absence of the effect is not directly stated, what is stated in the presence of what is opposed to the cause or of what is opposed to the effect. In this verse, neither Višeṣokti nor Vibhāvāna is distinct because the absence of the effect or the absence of the cause is stated only indirectly. The two figures being indistinct, the union of which constitutes a separate figure called samdehasām卡拉 because there are no circumstances which enable us to determine the presence of particular figure in this verse.21

(d) Though the treatment of Višeṣokti is started from the time of Bhāmaḥa and Daṇḍin, yet their definitions22 do not clearly bring out the exact nature of Višeṣokti. In their view, an effect presenting itself despite a defective cause constitutes this figure. This nature of Višeṣokti brings it nearer to Vibhāvāna of Mammata and Ruṣyaṇa. Vāmana defines this figure quite differently. He says that the confirmation of similarity resulting from the representation of the absence of one quality constitutes Višeṣokti. Vāmana's Višeṣokti, we shall see, is no more than Rūpaka of Ruṣyaṇa. Udbhāta is the first authority who

21 sādhaka-bādhaka-pramāṇābhāvāc cātra samdeha-sām卡拉h. AS. p. 162.
23 Vide infra Chap. VII.
gives a definition, which has been accepted as correct and authoritative by later writers.

Ruyyaka appears to have been directly indebted to Udbhata and Mammata for formulating the definition of Viṣeṣokti, for Ruyyaka formulates definition of this figure which is similar to that of Mammata's Vṛtti on Viṣeṣokti. We observe that Udbhata's twofold classification of this figure has been accepted by Ruyyaka. Thus, we find that the nature and scope of Viṣeṣokti have been fixed up in Mammata and Ruyyaka, and no new idea has in later time been brought into the definition.

4. Asaṃgati.

(a) Asaṃgati is defined as a figure in which the cause and the effect are represented as appearing in different places.

It is a general rule that the effect is found in the same place where the cause exists, for smoke is found in the kitchen where fire is kindled; fire lightened in the kitchen does not produce smoke in the mountain. When, however, two things related as cause and effect are represented as residing in different places, there is the break of association of the cause and effect and there is the figure Asaṃgati. The name Asaṃgati, thus, given to this figure is appropriate.

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24 yat sāmagre'pi saktīnām phalānupatti-bandhanam / viṣeṣasyābhidhītāsāt va viṣeṣokti ucyate // KLSS.V.4.
26 tayos tu bhinnadeśatve'samgatiḥ. tayor iti kārya-kāraṇayoḥ. AS. pp. 163-4.
Ruyyaka says that this figure is based on apparent contradiction because in it there is violation of the law of casuality. But this contradiction is not real because it may be explained away by the idea of abhedādhyāvasāya that lies at the root of this figure. The example is:

śā bālā vayam apragalbha-vacasaḥ sā strī vayaṁ kātarāḥ
sā pīnonnatimat payodharabhāraṁ dhatte sakhedā vayaṁ

Generally the rule is that the person who is young has lack of maturity of understanding. Here the lady is young and, therefore, the lack of maturity of understanding should belong to her, but it is represented here as belonging to the lover; similarly, whosoever carries the burden feels the strain, here lovely woman carries the burden of the elevated breasts and the strain is felt by the wistful lover. Ruyyaka says that in this example, the 'lack of maturity of understanding' due to childhood is different from that due to love; similarly the strain due to the burden of the elevated breast is different from that due to lovesickness. But both of them are regarded as non-different, hence there abhedādhyāvasāya between apragalbhavacanatva due childhood and apragalbhavacanatva due love; similarly, between khedatva due to payodharabhāra and khedatva due to lovesickness. Thus, the apparent contradiction may be explained away. Ruyyaka, therefore, says that abhedādhyāvasāya lies at the root of Asamgati.

28 Ibid, p.164. This verse is quoted by Vāmana as an illustration of Virodha. Vide KLSV. p.170.
(b) The treatment of Asamgati is started from Rudrata's time. The earlier writers do not mention this figure. Rudrata's idea of this figure is accepted by Mammaṭa. Ruyyaka appears to have been directly indebted to Mammaṭa whose explanation has almost in verbatim been quoted by Ruyyaka. The new idea that is added to our knowledge by Ruyyaka is that the figure involve abhedādhyavasāya as its basis, otherwise the contradiction cannot be shown to be only apparent.

5. Viṣama.

(a) Ruyyaka starts the discussion of the figure Viṣama by referring to its three varieties: 'virūpakārya'narthayor utpattir virūpasamghatanā ca viṣamam'. After explaining the three varieties, Ruyyaka comes to the conclusion that these varieties have a common feature, viz. ananurūpa-saṃsarga, i.e. disparate association of things. Ruyyaka's phrase 'ananurūpa-saṃsarga' may be taken as the general definition of Viṣama, for we find that later writer like Jagannātha defines Viṣama as 'ananurūpasamsargaḥ'.

Ruyyaka is of the opinion that the figure Visama dervies its charm from contradiction between things. It is, therefore, a scion of the figure Virodha, and has attained an independent status.

29 Vide KP. p. 714.
30 AS. p. 165.
32 RG. p. 596.
(b) Varieties of Viṣama: Ruyyaka admits three varieties of this figure.

(i) The first variety of this figure consists in the disparity between the quality of the cause and that of the effect. It is a general rule that the qualities of a cause produce in the effect similar qualities, for white thread produce a white piece of cloth. Where the poet represents the qualities of the effect as opposed to those of the cause, there is Viṣama. The production of qualities (in the effect) different from those of the cause must be due to the imagination of the poet, otherwise this figure will not occur, as in the expression: 'gomayāḍ vrścikotpatti', which is not considered to be an instance of Viṣama. The first variety of Viṣama is illustrated in the verse:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{sadyaḥ karaśparśam avāpya citram} \\
\text{raṇe raṇe yasya kṛpānalekhā} \\
\text{tamślanīla saradindupandu} \\
\text{yasās trilokābharanam prasūте} //
\end{align*}
\]

Here the poet describes that while fame (effect) arises from the dark sword (cause), this is opposed to the general rule that the qualities of the cause produce in effect qualities similar to themselves. The quality darkness of the cause (sword) is opposed to the quality (whiteness) residing in the effect (fame).

\[33 \text{ AS. p. 165.}\]
(ii) The second variety of Viṣama consists in the disparity between one's expectations and their frustrations. In this variety there is description of some who after making an effort of doing one thing is not only frustrated of his hopes, but encounter an adverse result which is not desired at all. As for example:

\[
tīrthāṅfareṣu mālapāṅkavatīr vihāya
divyās-tanus-tanubhṛtaḥ sahasā labhante /
varāṇasi tvayi tu muktakalevarāṇām
labho'stu mūlam api yāty-apunarbhavāya //^{34}
\]

People come to Vāraṇāsī with a desire to detain a body free from sin, but here there is not only the non-attainment of the desired object, but on the contrary there is attainment of adverse result of losing the original body. (In this verse there may be Vyājastuti also because people attain salvation).

(iii) The third variety of Viṣama consists in the association between two things which are most ill-suited one for another, i.e., there is an extreme disparity between them. As for example:

\[
arāṇyānī kveyaṁ dhṛta-kanakasūtraḥ kva sa mṛgaḥ
kva muktāhāro'yaṁ kva ca sa patagah kveyaṁ abalā /
kva tat-kanyāratnam lañīra-mahībhahṛtuḥ kva ca vayaṁ
svamākūtan dhātā kim api nibhṛtaṁ pāllavayati //^{35}
\]

Here there is description of the association between things

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34 Ibid, p. 166.
which are most ill-suited. Ruyyaka admits that there is also Vyājastuti in this verse.

Jayaratha thinks that these three varieties of Viṣama are three independent figures. But Ruyyaka says that these varieties have a common feature of ananuropaṁsarga. Jagannatha develops this feature and shows how all the varieties of Viṣama have some unifying principle running through them.

(c) The treatment of the figure Viṣama is started from Rudraṭa's time. Rudraṭa's Viṣama appears once in the vāstava group and once in the Atisaya group. He recognises no less than five varieties of this figure.

Rudraṭa's five divisions have been reduced themselves to four varieties in Mammaṭa's scheme. Mammaṭa recognises guna-vaiṣamya and kriyā-vaiṣamya as two varieties. Rudraṭa and Mammaṭa do not give a common definition that embrace these varieties.

Ruyyaka follows Mammaṭa very closely in the treatment of this figure, but Mammaṭa's guna-vaiṣamya and kriyā-vaiṣamya have been reduced to one variety in Ruyyaka's scheme. Ruyyaka appears to give a common definition of this figure and advances the speculation of his predecessors. Later writers like Appaya Dīkṣita and Jagannātha accept Ruyyaka's definition as correct and accurate and adopt it. Ruyyaka's three varieties of this figure are accepted by later writers like Vidyādhara, Vidyāhatha and Visvanātha.

36 KVL. pp. 154-55.
Sama.

(a) After dealing with the figure Viṣama, Ruyyaka proceeds to deal with the figure Sama, which according to him is reverse of Viṣama. Ruyyaka does not give the general definition of Sama, but he simply says 'tad-viparyayaḥ samam'.

Sama, according to Ruyyaka, is the course of the third variety of Viṣama (virūpa-saṃghaṭanā) and not converse of the other two varieties of Viṣama, because the converse of the other two varieties of Viṣama does not possess the characteristic strikingness that is essential for a poetic figure. There is no strikingness in the expression where the qualities of the cause are represented as being present in the effect, or a person, who is represented as striving to attain his object, attains it. Thus, from Ruyyaka's statement it appears that he admits suitable association of two things as the characteristic feature of this figure.

(b) Varieties of Sama: Ruyyaka admits twofold classification of this figure, viz. (i) when two things associated are both good and (ii) when both of them are bad.

The first variety is illustrated in the verse:

tvam evam saundaryāḥ sa ca ruciratāyāḥ
paricitāḥ
kalānāṃ simāntāṃ param iha yuvām eva
bhajathāḥ /
ayi dvandvāṃ diṣṭyā tadiha subhage
samvadati vā-
mataḥ ṛesāṃ yat syājjitam iha tadānīṃ
guṇitayā // 38

37 AS. p. 167.
Here there is a combination of the union of the husband and wife, which combination is due to their fitness for one another. The second variety is illustrated by Ruyyaka.

The treatment of the figure Sama appears for the first time in the Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa. Though Ruyyaka appears to borrow the idea of this figure from Mammaṭa, yet he makes an advance to the speculation of Mammaṭa by showing that this figure is reverse of Viṣama. Ruyyaka recognises two varieties of this figure given by Mammaṭa. We have seen that Ruyyaka does not regard the three divisions of Sama based on reverse of the three divisions of Viṣama because of absence of strikingness in these divisions.

7. Adhika.

(a) Definition and its analysis: The figure Adhika consists in the disparity between the container and the thing contained. This figure is based on the disparity between two things described as container and the thing contained. The disparity between these two things described in this figure is due to the vastness of the container or smallness of the thing contained, or vastness of the thing contained and smallness of the container.

The vastness or the smallness of the container or the thing contained must be brought into being by the imagination of the

39 Vide KP. p. 717.
40 āśrayāśrayinor anānurūpyam adhikam. AS. p. 190.
poet. The vastness or smallness which is real cannot constitute this figure, because we do not find any charm in the expression where the case is described as bigger than a parrot. A beautiful illustration of Adhika is found Māgha's Sūrapālavādha. The verse is:

\[
yugāntakāla-pratisamhṛtātmano \\
jaganti yasyāṁ savikāsam āsata / \\
tanau mamus tatra na kaitabha-dviṣas \\
tapodhanābhyaśīgamasambhāvā mudah //
\]

where the body of Kṛṣṇa in which all the worlds are absorbed at the time of yugānta and which is the container of rapture is described as being smaller than the thing contained (rapture) due to the arrival of Nārada at his home. This verse is quoted by Mammata and Viśvanātha for illustrating the second variety of Adhika.

(b) Varieties of Adhika: Ruyyaka admits two varieties of this figure, viz. (i) where the container is described as bigger than the thing contained and (ii) where the thing contained is bigger than the container. Ruyyaka illustrates both the varieties.

(c) Ruyyaka appears to borrow the idea of this figure directly from Mammata. Mammata's twofold division of this

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41 tac-cāśrayāśrayinoḥ kavipraṭibhā-kalpitam eva grahyam na punar vāstavam. VS. p. 170.
42 Sisu, I.
43 mahator yan mahīyāṁśav-āśritāśrayayoh kramāt / āśrayāśrayaṁ syātām tanutve'py-adhikam tu tat // KP. p. 723.
figure is also recognised by Ruyyaka. No new idea is brought into the speculation of this figure by Ruyyaka except his enunciation that this figure is based on Virodha.

8. Anyonya.

(a) The figure Anyonya consists in the representation of the two objects producing the same action in each other. Ruyyaka says that this figure is based on contradiction, for it is not possible that two things produce the form of each other, but when two things are represented as producing the same action or quality in each other, there is no contradiction and there is the figure Anyanya. The figure is illustrated in the verse:

```
kañṭhasya tasyāḥ stanabandhārasya
muktākalāpasya ca nistalasya /
anyonya-sobhājananād babhūva
sādhāraṇo bhūṣāna-bhūsyā-bhāvaḥ //
```

quoted from the Kumārasambhava of Kalidasa. Generally pearl-necklace adds beauty to the neck of the person who wears it, but in the case of Parvatī the pearl-necklace too is set off her neck. Here both the neck and the necklace conduce to each other's beauty.

(b) The figure Anyonya appears for the first time in the Kāvyalamkāra of Rudrāṭa. It is, therefore not unlikely to suppose that Rudrāṭa is the first rhetorician to conceive of this figure. Rudrāṭa says that in Anyonya, two things are represented

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44 parasparam kriyā-janane’nyonyam. AS. p. 170.
45 I. 45.
as causing speciality in each other. Rudrata has been accepted by Mamrata who omits the words 'sphārita-tattva-viśeṣa' in his definition. Ruuyaka seems to borrow Mamrața's definition with slight modification. Ruuyaka's definition appears to be more direct.

viśeṣa.

(a) The figure Viśeṣa is defined by Ruuyaka as :

\[ \text{anādhāram ādheym ekam anekagocaram } \]
\[ \text{aṣākyavastvantararakaraṇam viśeṣah.} \]

Ruuyaka here speaks of three Viśeṣas. So the definition may be split up into three parts, viz. (i) anādhāram ādheym, (ii) ekam anekagocaram and (iii) aṣākyavastvantararakaraṇam.

(I) Anādhāram ādheym : It is well-known that a thing cannot exist in the absence of its abode, but when a thing i- described as existing even in the absence of its abode there is first Viśeṣa. This Viśeṣa is illustrated in the verse :

\[ \text{divamapya-upayātānām śkalpam analpaganaganā } \]
\[ \text{yesām / } \]
\[ \text{ramayanti jaganti girah katham iva kavayo } \]
\[ \text{na te vandyah} // \]

Here the speeches of the poet are described as existing even in the absence of their abode, i.e. when the poets are no more).

46 yatra parasparam ēkah kārakabhāvo 'bhīyayoh kriyayā / sanjāyeta sphārita-tattvaviśeṣas tad anyonyam // RKL. VII. 91.
47 kriyayā tu parasparam vastunor janane 'nyonam. KP.p.767.
48 AS. p. 171.
(II) Ekam anekagocaram: In this variety of Viṣeṣa, one and the same thing the scope of which is limited is described as abiding, in the same capacity, in the different abodes simultaneously. Thus, for example,

\[\text{prasāde sā pathi pathi ca sā prṣṭatah sā purah sā} \]
\[\text{paryanke sā disidiśi ca sā tad-viyogāturasya} / \]

Here the same nayikā is presented as being present simultaneously in different places. A nayikā cannot be present in different places at the same time, but the lover is overwhelmed by her death and beholds her everywhere.

(III) Asākyavastvantarakaranaṇam: The third variety of Viṣeṣa is that in which some one who is described as doing one thing, unexpectedly accomplishes something else which is impossible. This variety of Viṣeṣa is illustrated in the verse:

\[\text{nimesām api yadyekam kātinadoṣe} \]
\[\text{kariṣyasi /} \]
\[\text{padam citte tadā sambo kīm na sampādayīs} \]
\[\text{yatī //} \]

Where the placing of foot on the heart by Śiva is contextual, but his accomplishment of a supermundane thing which is not expected is described as possible.

(b) Ruyyaka borrows the idea of the figure Viṣeṣa from Rudraṭa who is the first theorist to define this figure. Rudraṭa gives three sub-divisions of this figure.\(^52\) The later

\(^{50}\) Ibid, p. 172. 
\(^{51}\) Ibid, p. 172, 
\(^{52}\) RKL. IX. 5, 7, 9.
writers like Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka, Viśvanātha and others recognise these three varieties of this figure.

It is noticeable that none of the authorities gives a general definition of this figure, but they speak of the three varieties in the definition. Jagannātha, therefore, remarks that these three varieties are three distinct figures because they are not governed by any common characteristic. They are called Viśeṣas because they are based on some special qualities.

Samudrabandha, however, attempts to give a general definition of this figure, so that the three varieties can be treated as the three varieties of a single figure Viśeṣa. Thus, Samudrabandha says: 'asambhavīnaḥ sambhavītvena nibandho viśeṣa iti sāmānyalakṣānam'. Samudrabandha appears to hold the view that these three Viśeṣas are nothing but the Asambandhesambandharūpa Atisāyokti. A critical examination of the illustrations of the three varieties of Viśeṣa reveal the fact that in all the illustrations there is connection where there is practically no connexion (sambandha asambandha). Hence Mammaṭa says that Viśeṣa derives its charm from Atiśayokti. But Mammaṭa uses the word Atiśayokti here in the general sense of poetic beauty and not in the particular sense of a poetic figure. In this connection

53 Viśeṣas cātra trayo na punar ekastrīviddhaḥ. laksāṇasya bhinnatvāt. VS. p. 172.
54 VR. p. 153.
55 saestrā evamvidha-viśaye'tiśayoktir eva prāṇatvenā-vatiśthate tām vina prāyenālāṃkārāvatvāyogat. KP. p.743.
Mammatā cites Bhāmaha's verse.

saiṣā sarvatra vakroktir anāyār—the vibhāvyate /
yatro'syam kavīnā kāryaḥ ko' lamkāro'nayā vīnā //

10. Vyāghāta.

(a) The last figure defined by Ruuyaka in the Virodha group in Vyāghāta. It is Vyāghāta where a certain thing which is accomplished by some one by a certain means is rendered otherwise by another person by the same means. The name Vyāghāta given to this figure is appropriate as in it the thing which is accomplished is made frustrated. The figure is illustrated in the verse:

drśā dagdhaṁ manasijam jīvayanti drśaiva yah /
virūpākṣasya jayinīs tāḥ stumo vāmalocanāḥ // 57

Cupid was burnt by Śiva with a glance of his third eye, but he is revived by women with the glances. Here what is accomplished is represented as frustrated because burning is opposed to reviving. Therefore Ruuyaka is justified in his view that this figure is based on contradiction.

The figure gets a deep tinge of Vyatireka because when it is stated that the thing which is accomplished is rendered frustrated by other person by the same means there is supremacy of the thing which is taken as the means by the person who renders it frustrated. In the above verse the two things (parties) are

56 yathā sādhitasya tathaivānyathākaraṇam vyāghātaḥ. AS. p. 173.
regarded as existing in the relation of the Upamāna and the Upameya. The poet wants to suggest that vāmalocana is Upameya because there is tribute to them. The poet, thus, suggests that vāmalocana outstrips virūpakṣa. Ruuyaka, therefore, rightly observe that Vyatireka lies at the root of Vyāghāta. Jayaratha remarks that without Vyatireka the figure Vyāghāta is not possible.

(b) Ruuyaka admits another variety of Vyāghāta where there is not vivalry in action, as in the first, but rivalry in repartee. In this variety of Vyāghāta the contrary of a certain act is justified by the same reason with facility. In explaining this variety Ruuyaka says that some person represents a certain cause as probably producing a certain effect, but another person represents that the very cause is capable of producing exactly an opposite effect with great ease than the first. This variety is also called Vyāghāta because the effect, which has been represented as probable, is rendered frustrated. This variety is illustrated by Ruuyaka in the following passage of the Harṣacarīta where Harṣavadhana replies to Rājyavardhana’s words.

'yadi bāla iti sutārām aparitājyo'smi,
rakṣanīya iti bhavad-bhuja-pañjaram eva
raksāthānam'.

59 anenāsya vyatirekam vinoithānām eva na syāditi sucitam. VS. p. 174.
60 saukaryena kārya-viruddhakriyā ca vyāghātaḥ. AS. p. 11.
61 HC. p. 76
Here Rājyavardhana mentions the boyhood etc. of Harṣa as the reasons against his accompanying him (in the forest life), but Harṣa, on the other hand, represents this boyhood etc. with still greater force as the reasons for accompanying him.

(c) The recognition of this new type of Vyāghāta leads Ruuyyaka to distinguish the second Vyāghāta from the second kind of Viṣama, where also there is production of opposite effect. In the second kind of Viṣama, the effect does not follow the cause and moreover, there is production of something which is not desired by the person concerned; while in the second variety of Vyāghāta, what is spoken of as probable effect is admitted as effect, but another person represents that this effect opposed to the first can be more easily brought out by the same means.

(d) Though the figure Vyāghāta is for the first time found in Rudraṭa's Kavyālaṃkāra, his Vyāghāta is altogether different from that of Ruuyyaka. Mammaṭa is the first writer to give the exact definition of this figure. Ruuyyaka finds Mammaṭa's definition as correct and quotes it almost verbatim. The second kind of Vyāghāta is discovered by Ruuyyaka himself.

The later writers like Viśvaṇātha, Appaya Dīkṣita and Jagannātha recognise the two kinds of Vyāghāta.

62 anyaiḥ pratihatam api kāraṇam utpādanam na kāryasya / yasmin nā-bhidhiyeta vyāghātaḥ sa iti vijñeyah. RKL.IX.52.
63 yad yathā sādhitaṃ kenāpy aparāna tad anyathā / tathaiva yadvidhiyeta sa vyāghāta iti smṛtah // KP.p.748.
64 SD. p. 52.
65 KVL. pp. 172-73.
66 RG. p. 617.
After considering the figures based on Virodha, Ruyyaka proceeds to deal with the figures that are based on Śrṅkhalā. The figures included in this group are made of units that are interlinked like the links in a girdle.

1. Kāraṇamālā.

(a) The figure Kāraṇamālā, according to the Alamkārasarvasva, occurs when each preceding object is represented as the cause of each succeeding one.† The cause and effect are invariably associated, so in this figure each succeeding object becomes the effect. Therefore, in this figure, there is Kāryamālā also. But the name Kāraṇamālā given to this figure is due to the poet's greater emphasis on the causes. The scheme of Kāraṇamālā may be shown thus: a(cause)- b(effect), b(cause)- c(effect), c(cause)- d(effect) and so on. The figure is illustrated in the verse:

\[
\text{jitendriyatvam vinayasya kāraṇaṁ} \\
\text{guṇaprakārṣo vinayād avāpyate /} \\
\text{guṇaprakāraṇa jano'nurajyate} \\
\text{janānurāgaprabhava hi sampadaḥ //}
\]

(b) The figure Kāraṇamālā is for the first time recognised by Rudrāta whose definition has been standardised in later

1 pūrvasya pūrvasyottarottara-hetutve kāraṇamālā. AS. p. 176.
2 Ibid, p. 177. This is also quoted in the KP. p. 705.
3 kāraṇamālā seyam yatra-yathāpūrvaṁ eti kāraṇatāṁ / arthānaṁ, pūrvārthād bhavatīdam sarvāṁ eveti // RKL. VII. 84.
writings. But the definition of Kāraṇāmālā given by Ruyyaka has more precision in comparison with that of others. The special feature of Ruyyaka's speculation lies in the fact that he regards the charm of this figure being not only dependent on linked succession but also in the peculiar sequence of the cause and effect. No improvement of the speculation of Ruyyaka is seen in later writings.

(c) Varieties of Kāraṇāmālā: Rudraṭa, Māmata and Ruyyaka do not give varieties of this figure. Jayaratha, Appaya Dīksita and Jagannātha recognise another variety, wherein each preceding thing is the effect of each succeeding thing.

2. Ekāvalī.

(a) Definition and its Analysis: The figure Ekāvalī occurs where each succeeding thing is represented as affirmed or denied as being attribute of each preceding thing. In the Vṛttī, Ruyyaka explains that each succeeding thing gradually becomes an attribute of each preceding thing. The word attribute (viśeṣaṇa) used in the definition of Ekāvalī is not taken in the restricted sense of an adjective, but it is used here in the sense of any circumstance that exalts the other, viz. viśeṣaṇa. Ruyyaka, therefore, maintains that each preceding object gradually exalts the each succeeding object in this figure. The name Ekāvalī given to this figure is appropriate, as in it the preceding thing

4 kārya-kāraṇa-krama evātra cāṭrutvahetuh. AS. p. 177.
5 Vide VS. p. 177; KVL. p. 175; RG. p. 621.
6 yatha-pūrvam parasya viśeṣaṇatayā sthāpanāpohane ekāvali. AS. p. 177.
7 svarūpa-mātrenāvagatasya vastuno yat-sambandha-balena vaiśīṣṭhyam avagamyate tad viśeṣanam. VS. p. 178.
being connected together make up a chain. An example of this figure is,

\[ \text{purāṇi yasyām savaraṅganāṇī} \]
\[ \text{varāṅganā rūpapuraskṛtāngyāḥ} / \]
\[ \text{rūpam samunmīlitasadvilāsam} \]
\[ \text{astrām vilāsāḥ kusumāyudhasya //} \]

In formulating the definition of this figure Ruyyaka appears to have been directly indebted to Mammāta.  

(c) Varieties of Ekāvali : The figure is divided into two varieties according as the affirmation and negation of each succeeding thing. These two varieties are illustrated by Ruyyaka quoting verses from the Kāvyaprakāśā.

3. Mālādīpaka.

(a) According to the Ālāmkārasarvasva, Mālādīpaka occurs when each preceding object serves as qualification of each succeeding thing. This figure is just apposite to the figure Ekāvali. The essential features of this figure are - (a) each preceding object qualifies each succeeding object and (b) many objects are connected with the same attribute. The scheme of the chain of objects interlinked may be shown as : \( a:b, b:c, c:d \) and so on. The name Mālādīpaka given to this figure is significant, as in it many objects are connected with one and the same attribute, just as many objects are illumined by a single lamp. This figure is illustrated by Ruyyaka in the verse :

8 sthāpyate'pohyate vāpi yathāpurvat param param / viṣeṣanatayā yatra vastu saikāvalī dvidhā //KP. p. 729.
9 pūrvasya pūrvasyottarottara-guṇāvahatve mālādīpakam. AS. p. 178.
10 Vide VS. p. 179.
In this verse the bows etc. are enhancing excellence to the arrows etc. Here the action samāsādana which is mentioned only is connected with all the things and, thus, all the things are interlinked.

(b) Ruyyaka has taken definition of Mālādīpaka almost verbatim from Mammata. Ruyyaka thinks that the definition given by Mammata is correct and fit to be adopted. The illustrative verse of Mālādīpaka is quoted by Ruyyaka from the Kavya-prakāśa of Mammata. But Ruyyaka differs from Mammata on the question of the independent entity of this figure. Mammata thinks Mālādīpaka to be a kind of Dīpaka and defines it after Dīpaka: while Ruyyaka asserts that Mālādīpaka is an independent figure.

(c) Scope of Mālādīpaka: We find that Mammata defines Mālādīpaka after Dīpaka. But Ruyyaka says that it is not proper to define Mālādīpaka after Dīpaka because in Mālādīpaka, the objects are not presented in the relation of the prakṛta and aprakṛta. In his eagerness to clarify the author's view Jayaratha points out that the word mālā in the definition of Mālādīpaka is used not in the sense in which it is used in the word Mālopanā, but the word mālā is used here in the sense of chain.

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11 This verse is also quoted by Mammata in the same context from Bhoja's SKA. p. 227.
12 mālādīpakam ādyam ced yathottaragunāvalaṃ|KP. p.641.
13 Vide VS. pp. 178-79.
says that the charm of this figure depends not on implied resemblance, but on linking together of the objects.\textsuperscript{14} Ruyyaka's view has been accepted by later writers like Vidyādhara,\textsuperscript{15} Vidyānātha\textsuperscript{16} and Viśvanātha.\textsuperscript{17} Though Jagannātha accepts in theory Ruyyaka's view, he does not recognise Mālādīpaka as an independent figure. He wants to include it under Ekāvalī.\textsuperscript{18}

(d) Distinction of Mālādīpaka from Ekāvalī: Mālādīpaka is distinct from Ekāvalī on the ground that in Mālādīpaka, each preceding thing lends charm to each succeeding thing; while in Ekāvalī each succeeding thing enhance the charm of each preceding thing. In Mālādīpaka, all the things are connected with the same attribute; while in Ekāvalī they are not necessarily connected.

4. Sāra.\textsuperscript{19}

(a) Definition and its Analysis: This figure, according to Ruyyaka, consists in the gradual rising of excellence of things.\textsuperscript{20} In this figure, each succeeding thing is represented as better than each preceding one. The name Sāra given to this figure is appropriate because in it, excellence rises gradually.

\textsuperscript{14} mālātvena cārutva-viśeṣam āśrtiya dīpaka-prastāvo jñāṅhaneneha lakṣaṇanām kṛtam. AS. pp. 178-79.
\textsuperscript{15} EV. p. 314.
\textsuperscript{16} PRD. p. 532.
\textsuperscript{17} SD. p. 53.
\textsuperscript{18} RG. pp. 439, 625.
\textsuperscript{19} In the NSP ed. of the AS. the name of this figure is given as Udara, but in the other eds, the name is Sāra. R.C.Dwivedi, the editor of the MLBD ed. justifies the reading 'Sara'. Vide: AS. MLBD ed. p. 199. ftn. 8.
\textsuperscript{20} uttarottaram utkarṣaḥ sāraḥ. AS(MLBD.ed) p. 199.
The figure is illustrated in the verse:

\[
\text{jayē dharitryāḥ puram eva sāram}
\]
\[
pure gṛham sadmanī caikadesaḥ /
\]
\[
tatrāpi sāyyā sāyane varā strī
\]
\[
ratnojjvalā rājasukhasya sāram //
\]

In the rising of excellence there must be sequence, without which, as Namisādhu points out,\(^{21}\) there is no Sāra, as in the verse:

\[
nadīṣu gaṅgā nagarīṣu kāncī
\]
\[
puspeṣu jātī ramaṇīṣu rambhā /
\]
\[
sadottamatvam puruṣeṣu viṣṇur
\]
\[
airavāno gacchati vāraṇeṣu //
\]

(b) This figure is for the first time recognised by Rudrāṭa.\(^{22}\) Rudrāṭa's definition has been accepted by Mammaṭa and Mammaṭa's definition\(^{23}\) has been quoted almost verbatim by Ruyyaka with the omission of the word parāvādhi (to the highest pitch). The highest excellence is naturally reached to the limit when the description does not proceed, and consequently, the last thing coming under the description is regarded as having highest excellence. This is probably the reason why Ruuyaka omits the term parāvādhi from his definition. No new idea is brought by the later writers into the definition of this figure formulated by Mammaṭa and Ruuyaka.

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21 NSC. p. 236.
22 RKL. VII. 96.
23 uttarottaram utkārṣo bhavet sāraḥ parāvādhi. KP. p. 713.
THE FIGURES BASED ON POPULAR MAXIM

1. Pratyanika.

(a) The figure Pratyanika consists in the description of some one who being unable to injure his opponent takes revenge on some one else who is connected with the opponent.¹

It is natural that a weak antagonist is not able to do harm to his strong rival, but with a view to doing harm to his rival, the weak antagonist takes revenge on his weak ally. The representative of the army is called Pratyanika; the name of this figure is given Pratyanika because it is analogical to the case of the representative of the army. Just as an antagonist being unable to attack the strong army, attacks another who happens to be the representative of the army, similarly in this figure, there is description of some one who being unable to take revenge on his strong rival, conquers another connected with the rival. The purpose of such mode of expression is to convey the idea that the rival is superior to the antagonist.

The figure is illustrated by Ruyyaka in the verse:

\[
yasya kimcid apakartum aksamaḥ
ekayanigraha-grihītavigrahaḥ /
kāntavakra-sadṛṣākṛtim kṛtI
rāhur indum adhunāpi bādhate //²\]

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¹ Pratipakṣatiraskārāsaktau tadīyasa tiraskāraḥ pratyanikam. AS. p. 206.
² Śisu, XIV, 78. This verse is also quoted by Mammata (KP. p. 726).
Kṛṣṇa is a more powerful adversary of Rāhu. Rāhu, not being able to do any harm to Kṛṣṇa (who mutilated his body) attacks the weak moon who is related to Kṛṣṇa in so far as the moon is similar to Kṛṣṇa's face. This implies the superiority of Kṛṣṇa.

(b) The treatment of the figure Pratyanika appears for the first time in the Kāvyālāṃkāra of Rudrata. Rudrata says that this figure is based on similarity because the two things presented there as rivals subsist in the relation of the upamāna and the upameya. Rudrata says that the poet aims to establish the upameya as superior to the upamāna. Mammata takes the idea of this figure from Rudrata. But Mammata does not put emphasis on the similarity between two rivals, but he gives emphasis on the revenge between the compeers. A close study of the Kāvyaprāśa and the Alāṃkārasarvasva reveals the fact that Ruyyaka reproduces in his own words the speculation of Mammata.

2. Pratīpa.

(a) When the upamāna is condemned or conceived of as the upameya, there is Pratīpa.

Normally, the upameya is expected to be less than the upamāna, but in Pratīpa the case is reversed. Here the upameya does not only ceases to be less than the upamāna but becomes its rival. Sometimes the upameya even usurps the lofty place of the

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3 vaktum upameyam uttamaṃ upamānam tajjigīṣayā/ tasya virodhītyuktyā kalpyate pratyanIkam tat // RKL. VIII.92.
4 pratipakṣam aśaktena pratikartum tiraskriyā / yā tādiyasya tat-stutyai pratyanIkam taducyate // KP. p. 725.
5 upamānasyākṣepa upameyatā-kalpanām vā pratīpam. AS. p. 207.
In this figure the poet attempts to exalt the upameya by making it a powerful adversary to the upamāṇa, hence the name Pratīpa given to this figure is significant.

(b) Varieties of Pratīpa: The definition of Pratīpa speaks of the two main varieties of Pratīpa.

(i) In the first variety of Pratīpa, the upameya is represented as capable of serving the purpose of the upamāṇa and thereby the upamāṇa is discarded as useless. Thus, when the upameya can do the job of the upamāṇa, the latter becomes superfluous. This variety of Pratīpa is illustrated by Ruyyaka in the passage:

'yatra ca pramadānām cakṣur eva sahajām
munḍmālā-maṇḍanam bhāras tu
kuvalayadala-mālyani'.

Where the eyes (upameya) are represented as capable of serving the purpose of decoding the head, which (purpose) is generally served by the wreath (upamāṇa) and, therefore, the latter is condemned as superfluous.

(ii) In the second variety of Pratīpa, the thing well-known as an upamāṇa is conceived of as an upameya for the purpose of its being condemned in favour of another upamāṇa. In other words, the well-known upamāṇa is turned into an upameya in order to convey the idea that it is really inferior to what is generally regarded as the upameya. This variety is illustrated by Ruyyaka in the verse:

6 HC. p. 44.
Here the moon is turned into an upameya by being compared to the face. The reason why this is done is to convey the idea that the upameya is superior to the upamāna and that the speaker has a low opinion of the thing that is well-known as an upamāna.

In this illustration, the contempt for the upamāna is indicated by comparison that is not accomplished, because the beauty of the moon being less than the face is not accomplished as it is implied by the word vaṣāṇīyam. In some cases, Ruuyaka says, the contempt is indicated by comparison which is accomplished. This is illustrated in the verse:

\[
garvam asamvāhyam idam locana-yugalena kim
\]
\[
vahasi mugdhe /
\]
\[
santi drśānī diśi diśi sarasau nanu
\]
\[
nila-nalināni //
\]

Where the blue-lotuses which are well-known as upamānas are turned into the upameya by being compared to the eyes. This fact suggests that the blue-lotuses are inferior to the eyes. Here the comparison is accomplished because of the words 'idṛśānī santi.'

Sometimes when an object, being possessed of pre-eminent qualities, did never before experience so much as the state of being

7 AS. p. 208.
8 Ibid, p. 209. This verse is quoted by Rudraṭa (RKL.VIII. 78) and Mammaṭa (KP. p. 737).
the upamāna, is conceived as such, there is also Pratīpa. This type of Pratīpa is illustrated in the verse:

\begin{quote}
ahan eva guruh sudāruṇānām
iti hālāhala mā sma tāta dṛpyaḥ /
nanu santi bhavā-ḍṛśāni bhūyo
bhuveśaṃ mva vacanāni durjanānām //
\end{quote}

Halāhala is well-known to be such a deadly thing that there is nothing to compare to it; but here the words of the wicked are compared to it and as such halāhala is conceived as an upamāna. Thus, the words of the wicked attain the eminence to which halāhala was lifted.

(c) The figure Pratīpa, if not in name but in substance, appears for the first time in the Kāvyādarā of Daṇḍin. His Viparyāsopamā corresponds to the second variety of Ruṣyaka's Pratīpa. It is noticeable that Bhāmaha and Udbhāṭa do not define the figure Pratīpa nor do they admit it in another name. But Vāmana accepts this figure under the name Ākṣepa. Rudraṭa is the first writer who recognises this figure and names it Pratīpa. In Pratīpa, according to Rudraṭa, the upameya, which attains a miserable state of its being compared to the upamāna, is favoured or blamed for the purpose of declaring its laudation.  

\begin{itemize}
  \item[10] tavāṇanam ivonnidram aravindam abhūḍ iti /
  \hspace{1cm} sa prasiddhi-viparyyāsad viparyyāsopameṣyate // KD.II.17.
  \item[11] RKL. VIII. 76.
\end{itemize}
Mammatā realises that Rudraṭa's definition does not clearly bring out the exact nature of Pratīpa. Mammatā, therefore redefines this figure as:

\[ \text{ākṣepa upamānasya pratīpam upameyata} / \]
\[ \text{tasyaiva yadi vā kalpyā tiraskāranibandhanam} / \]

and gives a scientific exposition of this figure.

A careful study of the text on Pratīpa of the Kāvyaprakāśa and that of the Alamkārasarvasva reveals the fact that Ruyyaka finds Mammatā's definition and exposition of this figure as correct and fit to be adopted. Hence, he paraphrases Mammatā's definition and exposition of Pratīpa.

The nature of this figure has been fixed by the time of Mammatā and Ruyyaka. No new idea is added to our knowledge by later writers like Viśvanātha, Appaya Dīkṣita and Jagannātha. The last named two authorities are however, in favour of increasing the number of varieties of this figure.


(a) The figure Milita, according to Ruyyaka, occurs when something is observed by another.

Ruyyaka thinks that the special feature of this figure consists in the obscurity of an object possessing quality in an inferior degree by another possessing quality in a superior degree. Ruyyaka says that the name Milita given to this figure is significant because in it one thing comes to be obscured by

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12 KP. p. 735.
another through the characteristics which may either be innate or adventitious. As for example:

raso nālakṣi lākṣāyāś caraṇe sahajārūne.\textsuperscript{15}

In this passage the lac-dye and the feet are said to possess the same quality, viz., the redness; but the lac-dye, which possesses redness in a inferior degree, is obscured by the redness of the feet which possess redness in a superior degree. So the on-looker fails to make out the lac-dye in the feet of the lady. Here the obscurity of the lac-dye is due to the innate redness of the feet.

(b) Distinction between Mīlita and Sāmanya: In Mīlita, as we have just told, an object possessing a quality in an inferior degree is concealed by another possessing the same quality in a superior degree, and the object which is of inferior quality is not perceived; while in the figure Sāmanya, both the objects are perceived, but they are cognised as indistinguishable on account of their possessing of the like properties.\textsuperscript{16}

(c) Varieties of Mīlita: Ruṣyaka, like Rudrata and Māmata, speaks of the two varieties of this figure according as the characteristic that obscures in inherent or adventitious. Two varieties of this figure are illustrated by Ruṣyaka by quoting verses from the Kāvyaprakāśa. Thus,

\begin{quote}
apāṅgatarale drśau madhura-vaktravārṇa giro
vilāsbhāra-manthāra gatir atīva kāntam mukham /
iti sphurītam āṅgakair mṛgadṛṣṭām svato līlayā
yad atra na madodayah kṛtapado'pi samlaksyate //\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid, p. 210.
\item \textsuperscript{15} KVL. p. 239.
\item \textsuperscript{16} AS. pp. 210-11.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Ibid, p. 211. This verse is also quoted in the KP. p. 728.
\end{itemize}
Here both līlā and mada have the same indications, viz. fickleness of the eyes, sweetness and ornateness of the speech, heavy gait and lovely face. But as līlā or grace is natural, these symptoms are attributed to līlā, which, thus being stronger, obscures the mada which is weaker because it cannot be as easily discerned as līlā. Hence, there is Mīlīta in this verse. The obscuring circumstance līlā being natural its symptoms are also natural. Hence Mīlīta is sahajalakṣaṇama.

(d) The figure Mīlīta appears for the first time in Rudraṭa's Kāvyalāṃkāra. Rudraṭa's Mīlīta and one of variety of Pīhita are equal in essence. Mammaṭa borrows the idea of this figure from Rudraṭa, for Mammaṭa's definition and exposition of Mīlīta are based on Rudraṭa's two figures viz. Mīlīta and Pīhita.

A careful study of the text of the Alāmpkārasarvasva of Ruyyaka and the Kāvyaprakāsa of Mammaṭa on Mīlīta reveals the fact that Ruyyaka borrows the idea of this figure Mīlīta directly from Mammaṭa. Ruyyaka appears to think that Mammaṭa's definition and exposition of this figure are correct and fit to be adopted; hence paraphrases Mammaṭa's definition and exposition of this figure.

The nature of Mīlīta appears to have been fixed in the hands of Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka. The later writers accept the speculation of Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka without any question. Sōbhākara,

18 tanmīlitam iti yasmin samāna-cihnena hārṣakopādi / aparēṇa tiraskriyate nityenaṅgantukenaṇī // RKL.VII.106.
19 yatratipraṇalatayā guṇaḥ samānādhiṣṭiṣṭaḥ asamanam / arthāntaram pīdāhyād āvibhūtam api tātpihitam // ibid. IX. 50.
20. samena laksmaṇa vaṣtu vaṣṭunā yannigūhyate / nijenāgantunā vapi tanmīlitam iti smṛtam // KP. p.727.
21 Vide SD. p.58; KVL. p.239; RG. p. 694.
however, does not regard Mīlita and Sāmānyā as two distinct figures; according to him they are two varieties of the same figure.  

4. Sāmānyā.

   (a) Ruyyaka says that in the figure Sāmānyā, the thin; under description (prastuta) is identified with another on account of their similarity of attribute.  

   In this figure, the object which is the matter of description (prastuta) is represented as being merged into another thing which is not a matter of description (aprastuta) on account of their similarity of attribute. Thus, both the things appear to be indistinguishable. The figure is called Sāmānyā because there is connexion of two things with the same attribute.  

   Ruyyaka says that the scope of this figure is distinct from Apahnuti because in it there is no denial of anything and assertion of something in its place.

The figure is illustrated in the verse:

malayajarasa-viliptatanjavo navahāralatā-vibhūṣitāḥ
sitatara-dantapatra-krtavaktraruco rucirāmalāṁ
sukāḥ /

sāśabhṛti vitatadhāmni dhavalayasi dharām
avibhāvyatām gataḥ
priya-vasatiṁ prayānti sukham eva nirasta-
bhiyōbhisārikāḥ //

22 Vide AR. pp. 170-71.
23 prastutasānyena guṇāsāmyad aikāmyam sāmānyam. AS. p. 212.
Here abhisārikas are described as being merged into the moon-light on account of the possession of common attribute, viz. whiteness by both. The abhisarikaras are, therefore, not distinguishable from the moon-light.

(c) The earlier writers like Bhāmaha, Udbhata and others do not mention this figure. Probably they think that its characteristics are not different from Atiśayokti. Though this figure is admitted by Mammaṭa for the first time in the Kāvyaprakāsa, the first variety of Rudrata's Tadguna appears to be a forerunner of Mammaṭa's Sāmānyya. Ruuyyaka borrows the idea of this figure from Mammaṭa. If we compare the text of the Kāvyaprakāsa with that of the Alāmpkārasaṁvsa, we find that Ruuyyaka's text on Sāmānyya is nothing but a paraphrase of Mammaṭa's text.

The later writers like Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha and others recognise this figure.

5. Tadguna.

(a) We have seen that in Mīlita, a thing is obscured by another and in Sāmānyya, a thing is assimilated with another. In Tadguna, we shall now see, a quality of an object is suppressed by a more brilliant quality of another object. The figure Tadguna is defined by Ruuyyaka as:

\[
\text{yasminnekagunānām ārthānām yogalākṣya fūpaṇām / samsarge nānātvam na lakṣyate tadguṇaḥ sa iti //RKL.IX.22.}
\]

\[
\text{prasūtasya yadanyena guṇasāmyavivakṣaya / aikatmyam badhyate yogāt tat sāmānyam iti smṛtam. KP. p. 738.}
\]
In this figure, the object of description possessing less quality is represented as giving up its own quality and assuming the brilliant quality of another object that comes in its contact.

The name Tadguṇa given to this figure on the ground that in this figure the object of description assumes the qualities of that thing which possesses the same quality in an eminent degree.

The figure is illustrated in the verse:

\[
\begin{align*}
vibhinnavarna & \text{ garudāgrajena} \\
sūryasya पाथ्याः paritaḥ sphurantyā / \\
ratnaiḥ punar yatra rucā rucā svām āninyire vaṃśakarīranīlaiḥ //
\end{align*}
\]

Here the horses of the sun are first represented as giving up their original colour and assuming the splendour of Arunu by coming in its contact, and then they (horses) are represented as assuming the green splendour of the jewels by coming in their contact.

(b) Distinction between Tadguṇa and Mīlita: Ruyyaka differentiates the scope of Tadguṇa from Mīlita as in both the figures there is idea of concealment of one thing by the other. In Mīlita, the thing of description is itself covered up by another object and there is no idea that one thing gives up its own quality; while in Tadguṇa, the thing of description does not

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28 AS. p. 213.
lose its original form, but it loses its own quality and assumes a different one.

(c) When we trace the history of this figure we find that Tadgūṇa is not defined or mentioned by Bhāmaha, Udbhāta, Dandin and Vāmana. This figure appears for the first time in the Kāvyālāṃkāra of Rudrāṭa. But Rudrāṭa’s first variety of Tadgūṇa, as we have already told, is accepted by Mammatā and his followers as Sāmanya and the second variety of Tadgūṇa30 is recognised by Mammatā31 and others as a figure of this name. Though Mammatā’s speculation of this figure is accepted by Ruuyaka, he simplifies the definition and clearly explains the nature of this figure. Moreover, he distinguishes Tadgūṇa from Mīlīta. The later writers like Viśvanātha, Jagannātha and others accept the speculation of Mammatā and Ruuyaka as authoritative. Replying to a question that the three figures, viz. Mīlīta, Sāmanya and Tadgūṇa should be different varieties of a single figure, because the common feature in them is the non-perception of difference, Jagannātha says that they should not considered as varieties of a single figure because of their distinction of charm.32

6. Atadgūṇa.

(a) The figure Atadgūṇa, according to Ruuyaka, occurs when an object does not assume the quality of another even though there is reason to assume it.33

30 RKL. IX. 24.
32 Vide RG. p. 696.
33 sati hetau tadvunānamahāro'tadgūṇah. AS. p. 214.
Ruuyaka says that this figure is opposite to the figure Tadguna because in it there is violation of the principle which underlies in Tadguna, viz., the superior quality of an object obscuring another having quality in an inferior degree. 34

It is generally expected that a thing of inferior quality assumes the quality of another superior object coming in contact with the latter. But when it is represented that an object of inferior quality does not assume the quality of an object of superior quality even though coming in contact with the latter, there is the figure Atadguna. Thus, the name Atadguna given to this figure is appropriate. 35 As for example:

\[
\begin{align*}
gāngam ambu sitam & \text{ ambu yāmunam} \\
kajjalābham ubhayatra & \text{ majjataḥ} \\
rājahamsa tava & \text{ saiva subhṛtā} \\
ciye te & \text{ na ca na cāpacīyate} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Here the swan is described as not assuming the qualities of water of the Ganges and the Jumna although he is in close contact with them.

(b) Varieties of Atadguna: Ruuyaka admits two varieties of this figure, viz., (i) where the aprakṛta does not assume the quality of the prakṛta and (ii) when the prakṛta does not assume the quality of the aprakṛta. Ruuyaka illustrates both the varieties quoting verses from the work of Mammaṭa. The second variety is illustrated in the above verse.

34 Ibid, p. 214.
(c) Distinction between Atadguna and Viśeṣokti: Ruyyaka says that Atadguna is distinct from Viśeṣokti, because in the former, the causal relation between two things is not intended by the poet; what the poet emphasises is the non-assumption of one's quality by the other; while in Viśeṣokti, we have already seen, there is representation that the effect does not follow although the well-known causes are present.

(d) A careful study of the different works on Alamkāra reveals the fact that this figure is introduced for the first time in the Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa. The earlier writers like Bhāmaha, Udbhata and others do not refer to this figure. Ruyyaka's indebtedness to Mammaṭa for this figure is revealed by the fact that the former substantiates the views of the latter. But it is a fact that Mammaṭa unnecessarily restricts the scope of this figure where he says that tad-rūpānanuḥāra is the special feature of this figure, but Ruyyaka widens the scope of this figure by

37 The NSP. ed. of the AS reads: kāryakāraṇa-bhāvasya catrāvivakṣanāṇāṇa viśamālamkārā-vakāsah (p.215). But this reading is not accepted as correct by Jayaratha who remarks that the author of the Alamkārasāra includes Atadguna under Viśeṣokti. Therefore, Ruyyaka distinguishes Atadguna from Viśeṣokti. Vide Jayaratha's remark on the reading 'viṣamālamkāra-' iti pāthastu pustakāntaresu stito'pyatrayuktah. na hi kāryakāraṇa-bhāva-vivakṣāmatrenātra tattvam syad yena tannisedhena tasyānava-kāsah. VS. p. 215. Therefore, the reading viṣeṣokti is preferable.

38 tadrūpānanuḥāras cedasya tat syad atadgunah. KP. p.747.
saying that tād-guṇānuhāra is the nature of this figure. Ruṣyaka recognises Mammaṭa's two varieties of Atadguṇa. But Ruṣyaka justifies his novelty of treatment of this figure by drawing a line of demarcation between Tadguṇa and Viśesokti. The nature of Atadguṇa appears to have fairly fixed in the speculation of Ruṣyaka.

The laters like Viśvaṇātha and others extend their recognition to Ruṣyaka's tād-guṇānuhāra as the nature of Tadguṇa. Jagannātha following Ruṣyaka says that Atadguṇa is a viparyayaya to Tadguṇa.

7. Uttara.

(a) Definition of this figure: The figure Uttara consists in the reply or replies from which the figure derives its name. Ruṣyaka defines it as when a question is inferred from a reply or when an unexpected or inconceivable de made is made more than once, there is Uttara.

(b) Varieties of Uttara: The definition of Uttara itself speaks of its two varieties. In the first variety, the inference of a question is made from a reply although the question is understood. Though the question is inferred from a reply, yet this variety of Uttara is distinct from Anumāṇa where the proban and probandum are mentioned as subsisting in one substratum; while in this variety of Uttara the question and the reply abide in different individuals. Thus, in the illustration

39 SD. p. 58.
40 RG. p. 693.
41 uttarat praśnonnayanam asakṛd asambhāvyam uttaram cottaram. AS. p. 216.
ekākinī yadabala tarunī tathāham-
asmad-grhe gṛhapatīs’ca gato vídesām /
kām yacase tad iha vāsam iyam varāki
śvasrūr mamāndha-badhīrā nanu mūdha pāntha //

The question, 'May I stay at your home?' is inferred from the reply of the prośitobhartṛkā. The question which is inferred (proban) and the reply which is ground for inference (probandura) are described as subsisting in different individuals. So it is not a Anumāna.

The second variety of Uttara embodies several questions and their replies. The answers are too striking to occur in ordinary intelligence. Ruuyaka remarks that this variety of Uttara cannot be charming unless we have an array of questions and answers. This variety of this figure cannot be subsumed in Praśnapūrvikā variety of Parisāmkhyā where the charm lies in the suggestion of exclusion of similar things; while in this variety of Uttara, there is no idea of exclusion of another thing, but there is simply an assertion of a thing which is inconceivable. Thus in the illustration:

kā viṣamā daivagatiḥ kim labhyām yajjano guṇa grāhī /
kīm saṣṭhyām sukalatram kim duḥkham yat khalo lokaḥ //

Here there is series of questions and answers; the answers are not conceivable by ordinary intellect.

(c) The figure Uttara is introduced by Rudraṭa. It is

42 asakṛṇ nibändhe dvitiyam uttaram. Ibid, p. 216.
43 RKL. VIII. 72.
accepted by Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka and also by all later writers. Ruyyaka appears to be more indebted to Mammaṭa in formulating the definition. But Ruyyaka's definition is simple and easily comprehensible.

Jayaratha remarks that the two varieties of Uttara are aractically two figures because there is no common characteristics in them.

\[ \text{uttarasṛutimātrataḥ / praśnasvonnayamanam yatra kriyate tatra va sati / asakṛd yad asambhāvyam uttaram syat tad uttaram / KP. p. 708.} \]

\[ \text{etac cottarākhyaṃ alamkāradvayam, na punar ekaḥ, sāmānyalakṣaṇayogat. VS. p. 216.} \]