CHAPTER III

Organisation of the MNF

The MNF was organised on the line of U.S. governmental organisation. The president of the party was the head of the government, the head of the state and supreme Commander of the armed forces. In the beginning, the MNF volunteers were called "The Mizo National Volunteers (MNV)" but during the insurgency the combatant force was divided into two forces, namely, "The Mizo Army" fully armed with different calibres of arms including sophisticated weapons, and the "The Mizo National Volunteers" whose weapons were less sophisticated and less in quantity, because they did not have enough weapons for a long time. The Mizo National Volunteers (MNV) were, therefore, treated as a reserved force.

The organisation of the party, right from the inception, was exactly like a full-fledged government consisting of civil and military wings. The set up of the government was as follows:

- President: Laldenga
- Vice President: Lalnunmawia
- Defence Secretary: Sainghaka
- Foreign Secretary: Lalhmingthanga
Mizoram was divided into four administrative divisions each of them being under a Chief Commissioner. The chief Commissioners and their jurisdictions were as follows:

- Ngurchhina - Eastern Region or Lurh Bung
- P.B. Rosanga - Western Region or Dampa Bung
- Tlangchhuaka - Northern Region or Run Bung (i.e. including Mizo occupied area of Manipur State)
- Hrangchhinga - Southern Region or Phawngpui Bung.

Parliament:

The MNF parliament consisted of two houses - The Upper House and the Lower House. The Upper House was called Senate which consisted of 9 members, namely:

1. Malsawma Colney - Pro-Tempore Chairman
2. Bualhranga
3. Rev. Sakhawliana
4. Thangmawia
5. Saikunga Sailo
6. Ngunhulha
7. Lallianzuala Sailo
8. Vanmawia
9. Lalhmuaka

During the insurgency Lalkhawhena was added to the Senators,
Lalhmuaka became the Chief Justice since J.F. Manliana was captured by the Indian Army, and Vanmawia became the Chief Secretary. The power of the Upper House was something like that of the U.S. Senate.

The members of the Lower House:

1. Chuailokunga - Speaker
2. V.L. Nghaka - Deputy Speaker
3. Chhunzawna - Deputy Speaker in place of V.L. Nghaka since Sialsir Conference.

4. Lamputa 5. Vala 6. Thanghuta
28. Vanhela (Speaker, in place of Chuailokunga since Sialsir Conference)
29. Robula 30. Thanglawra

Members of the Executive Committee of the MNF Party:

1. Laldenga - Chairman
2. S. Lianzuala - General Secretary
The Executive Committee under the Chairmanship of President Laldenga was the High Command of the MNF, constitutionally absolute authority.

The Mizo National Volunteers (MNV)

The Mizo National Volunteers (MNV) was a body which was organised throughout Mizoram, politically and militarily trained by the MNF leaders and ex-servicemen to propagate the party policy and programmes, and to take part in armed revolution. They were organised in three groups in every unit or village as under:

**Group A:** The youngmen who were given military and political training to be ready to join combatant force if and when called for, as well as to spread party propagandas.

**Group B:** The youngmen trained in nursing, signalling and even in the use of arms to be ready to join the Mizo National Army if and when called for.
Group C: Parents and children who were ready to help the underground government in any way possible.

During the insurgency the MNV was divided into two categories, namely, the underground MNF and Village MNV. The village MNV organisation was extended even to Manipur State where Thado people, being enrolled into MNV, willingly and actively helping the Mizo National Army (MNA). In most parts of Mizoram the village MNV units were the main stay of the underground government because circumstances compelled the whole village to enroll into MNV members, almost everywhere, for a certain period of time. Under the suppressive military operation there was no chance for the villagers to split into different factions or political parties for quite sometime, particularly in the beginning of the insurgency. However, before the insurgency the MNV members were recruited only from the MNF party.

Fear of Subversion: Laldenga feared that a subversive element might have crept into the leadership of the party. He, therefore, thought it inevitable to reshuffle his de facto ministry for a precautionary measure, so as to make his leadership secure. He feared that Sainghaka, the Defence Secretary, who was the most powerful and popular among his Secretaries, might, someday, turn a source of danger to his leadership. For this end he instigated the leaders of some units of the party to demand, in the coming General Assembly
of the party, the reshuffle of the leadership. When the demand was submitted to the Assembly on his instruction, Laldenga, however, defended his colleagues outwardly, but yielded at last to the demand as if he could not resist the strong pressure or demand. As a result Defence Ministry was taken off from Sainghaka and given to R.Zamawia, the organiser of Volunteers. The Ministry of Home Affairs was given to Sainghaka.

As to the foreign relations besides the one with Pakistan Laldenga wanted to internationalise the cause of the Mizo people in order to receive foreign support from the countries which were unfriendly to India. On the 21st January 1966 he sent a lengthy letter to President Sukarno of Indonesia. The text of the letter was similar to that of the MNF memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister of India. He told President Sukarno that the cry for self determination and creation of a separate homeland were the only wish and aspiration of the Mizo people. But he got no reply whatever.

As the arms supply entered Mizoram and was distributed to the SF they had to keep them as secretly as possible. Such being the case they had to give code names to different calibres of weapons and the code names were as follows:

Peaches = hand grenades
pineapples = 2" mortar bombs,

20. From interview with Rochhinga (alia, Bengchhenga) at Sialsir.
Before the revolutionary upsurge the Mizos had a signalling system throughout Mizoram for passing messages from village to village by night with the help of battery torches by Morse code. Every Mizo boy (even a good number of girls) was expected to be able to send and receive messages by Morse code. Owing to the lack of communication facilities most of the village had duty post run by the community, on the hilltop of the village (it should be noted that the typical Mizo Village is located on or around the hilltop). This signalling system was introduced in the late 1940's and its overall control was in the hand of Signalling Corps until it was taken over by MNF in 1965.

Later, the government worried and warned the People that should they use it again they would be liable to be prosecuted and jailed. But the MNF made use of this heliography for passing information from village to village.

The MNF party's preparation for independence movement then, reached its saturated level. For the internal preparation they indoctrinated the people that they were separate nation, distinct from Indians nearly in every respect, that the leaders of the Mizo Union were traitors, choosing through ignorance
and political immaturity, integration with India and that it (Mizo Union) was to be condemned for its political mistake as well as for the faults of its government, such as partiality, corruption, not taking precautionary measures against the last Mautam famine, etc. Laldenga could no longer improve his relations with Pakistan unless he started movement, nor could he get any more arms though he had been promised more of it. At the same time, the central, as well as the state Intelligence Department intensified their activities causing a great danger to the security of MNF leaders.

The increase in the rate of daily enrollment of MNF Volunteers made preparation for independence movement more and more conspicuous. The programme of armed training given to the Volunteers in every village could no longer be kept secret from the public and the government. Had it not been for malignant relationship between the Mizo Union and B.P.Chaliha, Chief Minister of Assam, MNF leaders would have been arrested and the suppressive measures must have been taken much earlier.

The MNF campaigners fanned the fire of public grievances against the government of India into the flame of revolutionary feeling. Public grievances were lack of development which was the "result of negligence of Mizoram by the Government of India" and late introduction of metalled roads into Mizoram. They said that Mizoram had been neglected for a long time and the newly introduced roads were also only for
effective control of the district and military strategy.

The advantage of any brawl between the Mizos and non-Mizos was always readily taken for the maintenance of solidarity of the Mizos against non-Mizos. Thus the volunteers became ready and eager for action. The government closely watched the movement of the MNF and the military preparation was afoot for the suppression should any revolutionary movement started. At the same time the MNF leaders also had a careful watch on the military preparation for suppressive measures. Therefore, Laldenga made an appeal to Chief Minister Chaliha not to send into Mizoram any fresh detachment or group of army. In his message to Chaliha Laldenga indicated that military troops would do worse than good should they be sent to Mizoram. It was strange that Chaliha still had a bit of faith in the loyalty of Laldenga to the Government of India, and in his sincerity in the promise he had made, at this dangerous and critical period when nearly everyone in the street sensed the imminent outbreak of the armed revolution. He hesitated to take military action and waited for sometime in compliance with Laldenga's appeal.

In the meantime, Laldenga's preparation for independence movement was going on in full swing and his relations with Chaliha also grew from bad to worse everyday. Laldenga had then been tight cornered. His relations with Chief Minister Chaliha became deteriorated and the military operation was impending while his colleagues and party gave
him a strong pressure to start the movement for which he had never been prepared personally. He suggested rather, that Tasken Declaration be verified before declaration of Mizoram independence. However, his colleagues did not see the point for verifying the Tasken Declaration which, according to them, did not have any relation with the cause of Mizoram.21 The MNF's possession of arms and military training were publicly known which invited government's suppressive operation while more arms could not be expected from Pakistan unless and until the independence movement was started. At the same time the quantity of arms so far possessed was far from adequate. Circumstances compelled him to start the movement, the political atmosphere in Mizoram was so saturated that it could not remain for days in the same condition, the Indian Army was about to move into Mizoram within a few days, their preparation for independence movement could no longer be denied and the pressure from the party and his colleagues was so hard. But Laldenga had not been mentally prepared to start the movement. He frankly expressed after declaration of independence that he had not been prepared to declare independence but it was only because of the strong pressure put on him by his colleagues and members of the party that he declared it and started the movement.

In February 1966, the MNF intensified its activities

21. From interview with Sainghaka.
High Level Party Committee decided to start an armed revolution by the end of that month. Two days before the outbreak of revolution, an MNF representative in the Assam Legislative Assembly, John F. Manliana was recalled by Laldenga to Mizo Hills and ordered him to resign as soon as he reached Aizawl. The order said, "Using the power of the constitution of Mizoram Government, the president of Mizoram orders you to leave your membership in the Assam Assembly and give it to the Assam Government then resign immediately on receipt of this order. As your security is not good enough, if you can, go to the residence of the President at once."

By the end of February 1966 Laldenga could no longer speak to B.P. Chaliha on the Telephone. When he booked a trunk call the only response he could receive was, "The Chief Minister of Assam does not like to speak to you any more." Thereupon, Laldenga found that he had no alternative. It appeared to him that he had no more time to waste and nothing more to wait for, but to strike the blow. The longer he delayed the movement the greater the danger of his being finished. However, he could not see his way through if he resorted to arms. Even if he took the other course, it appeared no lesser evil. Then he

23. Church and Political Upheaval in Mizoram - John Vanlalhluna p 96.
found himself on the horns of dilemma. "He was caught in a trap set by himself". He was compelled to move forward along the course he had started so long ago, for he had reached the point of no return though for which he had never been mentally prepared. To make the matter worse, the preparation for independence movement became more and more conspicuous and it was reported that a detachment of the Indian Army was about to move into Mizoram.

**Insurgency**

**Operation Jericho:**

Altogether seven battalions of MNF volunteers had been raised prior to the declaration of independence which were named after the heroes of yore as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Battalion</th>
<th>Name of hero</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 'CH' Battalion</td>
<td>Chawngbawla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 'V' Battalion</td>
<td>Vana Pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 'T' Battalion</td>
<td>Taitesena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 'L' Battalion</td>
<td>Lamlira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 'Z' Battalion</td>
<td>Zampuimanga</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. 'K' Battalion</td>
<td>Khuangchera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 'N' Battalion</td>
<td>Neuva</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(but this was renamed 'S' battalion after the

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24. From interview with R. Zamawia.
During the insurgency another battalion was raised and named 'E' Battalion after the name of Enzapau. This was the eighth battalion which consisted of volunteers from Manipur area and it was called "Run" Battalion before it was changed into "E" Battalion. "Run" is the name of a river in Manipur.

These battalions were grouped into two brigades, namely, the Dagger Brigade and the Lion Brigade. The Dagger Brigade was commanded by Brig.Gen.Muankima while the Lion Brigade was under the command of Brig.Gen.Sangkawia. The Dagger Brigade comprised of the following battalions:

1. 'K' Battalion commanded by Lt.Col.Chuaudinga,
2. 'T' Battalion commanded by Lt.Col.Vanthanga
3. 'S' Battalion commanded by Lt.Col.Biakvela, and
4. 'Z' Battalion commanded by Lt.Col.Haleluia,

while the Lion Brigade consisted of:

1. 'V' Battalion commanded by Lt.Col.Lalliana,
2. 'CH' Battalion commanded by Lt.Col.Lianhnuna,
3. 'L' Battalion commanded by Lt.Col.Kapthuama,
4. 'E' Battalion commanded by Lt.Col.Demkhawiak.

The armed volunteers took up battle position around the Aizawl Town and the surreptitious siege was completed by the noon of 28th February, 1966. Then the commander reported to the President that the final preparation for Operation Jericho was completed and the combatant force was not in a position
to wait any more day, and the situation became "now or never" and any delay would go against them. Messengers were also sent from the MNF Headquarters to two directions - Champhai and Lunglei the seats of MNF eastern and southern commands respectively, where guerrilla chiefs Thangkima and Lalngura secretly sieged Champhai town and Lunglei town respectively. The timing for commencement of Operation Jericho was a closely guarded secret with the messengers.

The zero hour was set at midnight of 28th February, 1966. The volunteers in battle positions around the towns were impatiently waiting for the order of operation Jericho. More and more volunteers were pouring in, wave after wave from various directions and reported themselves to the duty posts on the outskirts of the towns from where they got instructions as to what they were to do and to which posts they had to go. While all this preparation was going on the First Battalion of the Assam Rifles in Aizawl hardly anticipated any assault from the MNF, because they were not aware of the clandestine preparation afoot in and around the towns - Aizawl, Lunglei, and Champhai.

The Chief of Army Staff was Lt.Gen.Thangzuala,
The Vice Chief of Army Staff was Maj.Gen.Vanlalhruaia

26. Ibid.
Adjutant General was Maj.Gen.Thangkima and the Quarter Master was Liandawla.

The MNP had two secret agents who acted the fifth column in the Assam Rifles' camp, Aizawl, namely, Hav.Ralkhuma and L/Nk Lalzawna. With the help of those two agents the Headquarters of the First Assam Rifles at Aizawl could have been an easy prey for the MNF, had the scheme and plan of assault on it been exactly followed. On the contrary, on the night of 28th February, only five hours before the Zero hour, a certain volunteer Rokima, the younger brother of vice President Lalnummawia had been killed in an accident while practising the handling and use of explosives brought from Pakistan. Two other volunteers of SF commandos namely, Malsawma and Zamana were also injured. This incident created an alarm among the public, and Assam Rifles also immediately stood to. The accident, therefore, spoiled the whole plan of assault on the 1st Assam Rifles, because Rokima, who had been killed and his friends Malsawma and Zamana who had been injured were specially trained to be spearhead for the assault and no one among the commandos could take their place off-hand.

The Finance Secretary (late Finance Minister) Lalkhawliana lingered over his last supper with his family until an Sf personnel barged into the dining room and reported that

27. An interview with R.Zamawia.
the 1st Assam Rifles had been alerted and their number increased. Thereupon, Lalkhawliana, with a quick farewell to his wife and children, rushed off to Laldenga's residence where all Secretaries (later, Ministers), Senators and other leaders had already been present except J.F.Manliana who had not yet arrived from Shillong. It seemed that the message did not reach him.

When the Zero hour came, none of the members of the spearhead could turn up to the rendezvous which was at McDonald Hill. Other volunteers who turned up were all ignorant of the use of the Light Machine Gun which was their mainstay. For this reason the plan of attack on the 1st Assam Rifles fell to the ground and the commander R.Zamawia turned his attention to the main treasury and the Armed Police camp because most of the Armed Policemen and treasury guards were Mizos who would put up little or no resistance. If and when the Armed Police Camp and the treasury were captured the Assam Rifles Camp would be attacked with more weapons. Since the plan of assault on the 1st Assam Rifles was foiled the members of the fifth column had to escape from their camp and join the MNF volunteers. According to their information the Assam Rifles had been off-guard until the accident happened among the Mizo commandos. The Armed Police Camp and the main treasury were captured as planned without real resistance.

Hauhnuna Paihte, Havildar, A.B., son of Khuangthanga Paihte of Zotlang village, P.O. Champhai was the commander of
te treasury guard on the night of 28.2.1966. When he gave his statement before the magistrate he asserted that he was detailed for treasury duty at Aizawl with nine constables armed with a rifle and 100 rounds of ammunition each, for one week, i.e. from 26.2.1966 to 4.3.1966.\textsuperscript{28} He stated that he issued rifles and ammunition as stated above and made entry in the Arms Register on page 133. The Havildar stated further that at about 1:50 a.m on the morning of 1.3.1966 the MNF volunteers, numbering about four hundred, wearing green dress, armed with rifles, sten guns and J.M.G. (Jhuncha machine Gun), suddenly appeared from the right and left sides of the treasury building overpowering two constables on duty on both sides. Except those two sentries, all the guards including the commander and the second in command were fallen asleep on the verandah of the treasury. The commander went on stating that constable No.242 Saidailova one of the sentries immediately stood to but two other volunteers suddenly came from the back and caught hold of him in the neck. The rear sentry Vankhuma came running to the front to see what the matter was. But that constable was also caught hold of in the neck from behind. Immediately many other volunteers came running to the verandah and woke up the guard commander, Hauhnuna Paihte and other guards asking them for the key of the treasury.

\textsuperscript{28} First Information Report of Hauhnuna Paihte
The volunteers came by vehicles which did not have number plates on them. Since there was no key with the guards the volunteers broke the first door and entered the treasury. Lalkhawliana, the MNF Minister of Finance, stated that he could not remember the amount of money they took away from the treasury, but he could remember that the amount was little because they could not open the main vault. Hemedra Lal Das made a statement in this connection as follows: - "I, Hemedra Lal Das, Inspector of Police, CID, Shillong, do hereby seize the following records on 30.4.68 at Aizawl treasury...Treasurer's daily balance sheet Book of Aizawl treasury from 1.11.'65 to 9.1.'67 where there is no entry ... by the D.C. stating that Rs 341.32p was looted from the treasury on the night of 28.2.1966. This has a reference vide C.D.No.227 dated 2.9.67. 29 5. The Deputy Commissioner, Mizo District after verification of cash of Aizawl treasury gave the following remarks :-

"Verified on 2.3.1966 total cash under double lock and single lock, and found to be Rs 24,979.21p against drawing balance of Rs 25,320.53p. The rest, i.e. Rs 341.32p was looted from the treasury by an armed gang on the night of 28.2.1966. Rs 24979.21p is, therefore, to be taken as the opening balance. 30

T. S. Gill

30. Ibid.
J.S. Pathak, Deputy Superintendent of police, Aizawl, submitted his complaint to the O/C of Aizawl Police Station stating that the MNF party led by Laldenga declared themselves independent waging war against India. He added that the MNF party started extra territorial contacts with unfriendly foreign countries and collected huge quantity of arms and ammunition, and had also sent a good number of volunteers to those countries to receive military training and training of guerrilla warfare. The volunteers, after receiving training in foreign country returned to Mizo district surreptitiously through unauthorised routes and started giving training to other to other volunteers of MNF. J.S. Pathak alledged Laldenga to have informed the people of Mizoram that the foreign powers were ready to help the MNF in the event of its armed struggle with India for achieving Mizo independence...

J.S. Pathak went on stating that the MNF rose in rebellion and conducted a large scale insurrection throughout the whole district of Mizo Hills by attacking Assam Rifles, police and BSF posts raiding and looting a number of government offices, cutting and disrupting the lines of communication, damaging bridges, killing, kidnapping and wrongfully confining loyal citizens, such as police ND A.R. personnel and government
officials adopting their guerrilla tactics simultaneously in different towns and villages of Mizo Hills. He stated further that the telephone exchange of Aizawl was also damaged, the treasury looted. He described the activities of the MNF volunteers, how they took government vehicles for use in their movement and how they treated non-Mizos, ambushed the Army/A.R./Police convoy and patrol parties inflicting casualties on them.

He, therefore, requested the O/C of Aizawl Police station to register a case against the MNF hostilities under Rule 41 (5) read with Rules 35 (6) (a) (m)-(m) (0) and (p) of the Defence of India Rules 1962, Rules 32 (5) of the said Rules, Section 6 of the Defence of India Act and section 121 of the Indian Penal Code. 31

The MNF declaration of independence stated that assuming their social, economic and political status which God entitled them, they claimed that it was their right to institute a government of their own on the basis of the principle that all men are equal and that they are endowed with inalienable fundamental human rights and dignity of human person. They expressed also that the Mizos, created and moulded into a nation and nurtured as such by God had been intolerably dominated by the people of India in contravention of the Law of Nature.

They pointed out also that the leaders of the Mizo nation had, many a time, verbally and in writing, put forward to the Government of India, their desire of self-determination for creation of free and independent Mizoram for bringing about protection of Human Rights and Dignity, which the Mizos, by nature, ought to have, but the Government of India, violating the Charter of the United Nations and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was re-affirmed in the principles of Bandung Conference, have ignored the voice of the Mizo people and determined to continue domination and colonisation ruling over them with tyranny and despotism.

They alleged the Government of India that it despised, persecuted, tortured, manhandled and even murdered the Mizo people without displaying justice while it professed throughout the world that India had instituted for the Mizos a separate administrative set up in conformity with the principles of Democracy. They further imputed India of designing religious assimilation and indoctrination with Hinduism for the suppression of Christianity.

To prove the fact that the Government of India had instituted a government to rule over them in their own country without any respect for Human Rights and Dignity. In addition to this they stated that India had been pursuing a policy of exploitation in their attempt to wipe out Christianity and no consideration had been paid to their national way of life.
They made mention of the failure of the Government in taking precautionary measures during the mautam famine and interpreted the failure as the result of negligence on the part of the Government. They imputed the government to have sent swarms of immoral government officers to Mizoram who seduced Mizo women. They mentioned also the arrest of the MNF leaders and condemned it as injustice. The economic growth was stopped and the poverty of the people was exploited by the government for their advantage.

They said further that in spite of their repeated appeal for peaceful settlement of their rightful and legitimate demand for full self-determination the Government of India had brought exploitative and suppressive measures employing their military might, waging war against them as was done to the Nagas and Kashmiris. They also blamed the government for the absence of medical facilities in Mizoram which resulted in the death of many people. For these and all other innumerable causes, they said, that they declared to the world that India was unworthy and unfit to rule over them. They repeated that as they were created and moulded into a nation it was their right to declare Mizoram as a free and independent country and that they were absolved from all allegiance to India and its parliament and all political connections between them. They declared further, that as free and independent state Mizoram had full power to declare war, conclude peace, contract
alliances, establish commerce and to do all other acts and things which an independent state may of right, do.

They also stated that for the support of the declaration they mutually pledged to each other with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honour. They appealed to the world for the extension of help and support to the Mizo people for realisation of their rightful and legitimate demand for self-determination. They appealed also to all independent countries to give recognition to the independence of Mizoram.32

The Declaration of Independence was signed by 60 signatories headed by Laldenga. Actually, most of the signatories did not affix their signatures for they had been away from the Headquarters at the time of the Declaration.33

Scrutinising the Declaration, one can find some points to be doubtful and others baseless or exaggerated. It is said that India determined to continue domination and colonisation ruling over the Mizos with tyranny and despotism by instituting self-designed administrative machinery with which they (India) endeavour to mislead the world to win their confidence. But this is a misleading statement. The fact was that Mizoram was

32. Church and Political Upheaval in Mizoram - John Vanlal Hluna pp 187-188.
33. From interview with Sainghaka.
neglected by the Government of India and Assam was beyond doubt, but that the people were ruled with tyranny and despotism was doubtful or exaggerated. Neither was Mizoram colonised by the Government of India in any sense of the term.

In another point they stated, "Our people are despised, tortured, persecuted, manhandled and murdered without displaying justice...." Before and during the time of preparing the Declaration such incidents had never happened whatever. Therefore, this statement was absolutely baseless and unfounded. Another statement "They have instituted the government to rule over us in our own country without any respect for Human Rights and Dignity" is also an exaggerated statement. They gave 13 points in support of the Declaration of Independence.

Some of Incidents:

On the night of 28th February, 1966 the MNF volunteers attacked the bungalow of Shri R.V.Pillai, the Sub-Divisional Officer, (Civil), Lunglei and kidnapped him. Similarly, SBI M.C.Pathak, S.I.,Ramesh Barman, S.I.A.Wahab, S.I.Dawka, SBI A.B.Tarat, S.I. D.Chakraborty and some other government servants stationed at various places were kidnapped by the MNF volunteers. On the same night six trucks belonging to Border Road Task Force (BRTF), one state Transport bus and one jeep belonging to State Transport left Aizawl and reached Kolasib. On arrival at Kolasib they were stopped by the MNF volunteers who kidnapped all the drivers and took away their vehicles.
The MNP force was in full control of Kolasib, Sairang, Champhai and Lunglai by overpowering and disarming the Assam Rifles and Police forces there. All non-Mizos within their occupied areas were arrested and the post of Assam Rifles and police stations were occupied by the volunteers. They also collected all arms from the civilians in the district to increase their armoury.

At Lunglei the MNF force captured the Police camp which surrendered to them without much resistance. They seized the following weapons from the camp:—

1. One revolver No. B 744 meant for SDPO (sub-Divisional Police Officer),
2. 54 rifles, each of them with bayonets,
3. 6 muskets with bayonets fixed on them,
4. Live revolver cartridges -250 rounds,
5. Live 410 cartidges-1630 rounds and
6. .303 live cartridges -3568 rounds. 34

Lunglei town fell into the hand of MNF after a few days of gallant fighting between the offenders and defenders. The defenders (Assam Rifles) had no other choice than to surrender since they had exhausted their water supply. Surrendering reluctantly all the inmates of the Assam Rifles' bunkers were taken prisoners by the MNF force who sent them

34. From the report given by Neihliana, Lunglei Police camp.
right away to the improvised jail at Lunglawn. The arms and ammunition held by the 1st Assam Rifles were immediately collected and despatched to the MNF Headquarters Aizawl, where fighting was going on. Meanwhile the 5th A.B. Platoon stationed at Lunglei was also completely overpowered and the troop was disarmed so as to increase the armoury of the MNF.

On the morning of March 1, 1966, Chawngte BCOP and Indo-Pakistan border post manned by one platoon of 5th BSF was attacked by about 300 volunteers armed with rifles, LMG's and grenades. But the camp held out till the help came. Meanwhile, the 5th BSF post at Lunglei was completely overrun by about one thousand MNF volunteers taking the post by surprise in the morning of March 1, only one BSF personnel could be traced. On the evening of March 1, two soldiers of Assam Rifles, namely, Sambahadur Limbu and Mokra Lakher were kidnapped at Kharosawal village while they went on patrol duty from Darngawn Outpost at 6:20 p.m. The post was surrounded from all sides by the MNF volunteers who continued heavy firing on the post until the occupants surrendered.

The Assam Rifles' post at Champhai was surprised with a few rifles received earlier from Pakistan. The attack was successful without much bloodshed on both sides. As a result of the fall of different forces such as Police force, 1st Assam

35. First Information Report.
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4. Live revolver cartridges - 250 rounds,
5. Live 410 cartridges - 1630 rounds and 
6. .303 live cartridges - 3568 rounds.  

Lunglei town fell into the hand of MNF after a few days of gallant fighting between the offenders and defenders. The defenders (Assam Rifles) had no other choice than to surrender since they had exhausted their water supply. Surrendering reluctantly all the inmates of the Assam Rifles' bunkers were taken prisoners by the MNF force who sent them

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34. From the report given by Neihliana, Lunglei Police camp.
right away to the improvised jail at Lunglawn. The arms and ammunition held by the 1st Assam Rifles were immediately collected and despatched to the MNF Headquarters Aizawl, where fighting was going on. Meanwhile the 5th A.B. Platoon stationed at Lunglei was also completely overpowered and the troop was disarmed so as to increase the armoury of the MNF.

On the morning of March 1, 1966, Chawngte BCOP and Indo-Pakistan border post manned by one platoon of 5th BSF was attacked by about 300 volunteers armed with rifles, LMG's and grenades. But the camp held out till the help came. Meanwhile, the 5th BSF post at Lunglei was completely overrun by about one thousand MNF volunteers taking the post by surprise in the morning of March 1, only one BSF personnel could be traced.35 On the evening of March 1, two soldiers of Assam Rifles, namely, Sambahadur Limbu and Mokra Lakher were kidnapped at kharosawal village while they went on patrol duty from Darngawn Outpost at 6:20 p.m. The post was surrounded from all sides by the MNF volunteers who continued heavy firing on the post until the occupants surrendered.

The Assam Rifles' post at Champhai was surprised with a few rifles received earlier from Pakistan. The attack was successful without much bloodshed on both sides. As a result of the fall of different forces such as Police force, 1st Assam

35. First Information Report.
Rifles, Border Security Force (BSF) in different places the MNF force became better equipped with their captured weapons. In many places of Mizoram the MNF enjoyed independence for 15 days.

Then the MNF party was declared unlawful by the Government of India under their notification NO. s.o. dated 6.3.1966, published in the extraordinary Gazette of India Part II Section 3, Sub-Section 1, dated 6.3.1966, and republished in Assam Government Notification No. PLE-69/65/62 dated 10.3.1966. This declaration was widely circulated in Mizo district by issuing printed leaflets both in English and Mizo languages.

Following the fall of Lunglei town the S.D.O. (Civil), the head of administration in the whole sub-division, SDO (PWD), the Lieutenant of the 1st Assam Rifles (A.R.) who was stationed at Lunglei, three BRTF officers and many other government servants (mostly non-Mizos) were arrested and sent to the MNF jail. The SDO's (civil) bungalow was occupied and used as the MNF office, while the Assam Rifles' Quarter Guard was used as the Sub-Head-quarters of MNF volunteers. The Lunglei sub-treasury was also seized with more than 16 lakhs of rupees in its vault.

Then the de facto government of Mizoram flew its flags

on important buildings of Lunglei town for some days till the arrival of the Indian Army. The MNF government had, in fact, virtual control over the whole of Mizoram, except Aizawl town, Tlabung and a few other places until the arrival of the Army. As a result the administration in Mizoram was completely paralysed. For reasons stated above the Government of Assam declared Mizoram (Mizo District) a disturbed area.

R.V. Pillai, the SDO. Lunglei, BRTF officers, namely Kapila, Maj. Gurswami and Capt. Mangalbet, and other civil and Assam Rifles' Officers mentioned in the foregoing paragraph were taken from village to village towards East Pakistan. First, they were taken from Lunglei to Lunglawn where the quarters of E.E. (PWD) was used as a jail. They were kept there for a few days, then they were taken to Chithar under a heavy guard commanded Capt. Taichhunga. On 12.3.1966 they were shifted from Chithar to South Lungrang village. On 13.3.1966 they were taken again from Lungrang to Ruallung village. On the next day to Vairawkai, then to Ngharum on 15th March. From Ngharum they were led to Kanghmun village which was on the border of East Pakistan.

From Kanghmun they crossed the International border and reached Andermanik, a village in East Pakistan situated on the border of India. On 19th March the prisoners were taken from Andermanik to Lunginkhar where they were kept for four days. On 24th March they were led to Khagrachari under the
escort party commanded by Maj. Lalnghinga. As some of the prisoners had fallen ill they were kept at Khagrachari for 22 days. On 4th April, President Laldenga delivered a public speech there. On 6th May, 1966 all the prisoners, including R.V. Pillai, SDO, Lunglei were released by the MNF authority from their custody. The SDO reached Lunglei on 18th May, 1966 and reported his arrival to JIO, N.R. Rajbongshi.

On March 1, Chief Minister Chaliha broke the news to the agitated legislators that about ten thousand Mizos of the MNF had simultaneously raided the treasuries at Aizawl and Lunglei, and armoury in the Mizo Hills District shortly after the midnight on 28th February. In the parliament the then Home Minister Gulzarilal Nanda mollified sore MP's by promising "Stern action to crush the rebels with all the force of our command...." Nanda said that while the Government was willing to look into genuine grievances it would not tolerate spreading of dissatisfaction and defiance of authority.38

Counter-attack:

The Mizoram armed revolution was a terrible shock to New Delhi. The Eastern Command of the Indian Army immediately drew up the plan of counter-attack. Coming after 22-day war with Pakistan, and four years after the border dispute with

37. From the diary of Saiengliana Sailo, Hav. S.I.B.
38. Mizoram. The Dagger Brigade, - Nirmal Nibedon p 78.
China the Mizo armed revolution was strongly suspected of having connection with foreign countries. Some journalists even hinted that military instructors from China and Pakistan had been actively working in Mizoram. Since the Government of India was taken by surprise it was extremely embarrassing for her. As a matter of course the Home Ministry was severely attacked by the newspapers and politicians for being unaware of preparation for armed revolution going on in Mizoram. They criticised also Foreign Affairs Ministry for having blundered into a kind of ceasefire with the leaders of the Naga revolt which, they thought, encourage the Mizo people to follow suit.\textsuperscript{39}

Before leaving for Mizoram the G.O.C. of the Eastern Command conducted a strategy Conference at Fort William, Calcutta\textsuperscript{40}. The top Military Intelligence Officer who had gone to Shillong and Silchar to study the situation in Mizoram suggested a full-fledged military operation to be started in Mizoram as early as possible, before MNF could consolidate. In the meantime, political uproar was made both in Assam Legislative Assembly and Parliament in New Delhi against the government's inability to check the development of MNF preparation before reaching the stage of insurgency.

On March 2, 1966 the Government of Assam declared

\textsuperscript{39} Mizoram. The Dagger Brigade - Nirmal Nibedon p 77.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
the whole Mizo Hills a disturbed area under the Armed Force (Assam and Manipur) special Power Act 1958, and as a result army columns moved into Mizo District to suppress the armed revolution there. Jet fighters were also employed to attack the MNF force that surrounded the Headquarters of the 1st Assam Rifles at Aizawl Town. Had the Air Force not been employed to their rescue the Assam Rifles in the Headquarters would certainly have surrendered to the MNF force before the arrival of the army.

Aizawl and Tlabung (Demagiri) came under air attacks with incendiary bombs and air strafe which demoralised the volunteers. But other posts of Assam Rifles had fallen before any air attack could be made. In spite of incendiary bombs and air strafe the border outpost of Demagiri (Now Tlabung) fell on March 7, with a Subedar and five other ranks being able to escape to tell the tale. On the same day paratroopers were dropped over Lunglei.

When the Brigade of the Indian Army, fully equipped with all kinds of modern weapons, came to Aizawl they found the town evacuated and burnt to ashes by the Air Force with the incendiary bombs. The brigade, before starting operation, started restoration of communication and local government in the town, and sent public notification into interior villages calling the people to come back home.

Meanwhile, the paratroopers were dropped in various
places of Mizoram and reinforcements were sent by helicopters on March 7, 1966 and afterwards by road. By this time Lalnunmawia, the vice President of the MNF sent a letter to the Deputy Commissioner (D.C) of Mizoram, Aizawl, proposing a talk between the MNF and the Government for a peaceful settlement. However the D.C refused the proposal and called the MNF to surrender unconditionally. At the same time one battalion of the Indian Army moved towards Lunglei and another to Champhai. In spite of many road blocks on the road to Lunglei and the bridge over the river Mat being blasted the Army battalion reached Lunglei on 13th March, 1966 without any resistance on the way. Even this town was found empty of the MNF and civilians.

Thus there were many relieving columns from Aizawl and Lunglei sent out in all directions. Whenever the advancing column met with the rebels' resistance or snipping, they always burnt the nearby villages. For instance, Khawngbawk, Pangzawl, Pukpui, Chhipphir, Vuakmual, Minpui and many other villages were burnt. In this way the troop consolidated their positions in the district, within a month; most of the important places were cleared of the MNF personnel.41

With the help of army operation the civil

administration was restored in Mizoram within a month's time. Night curfews were imposed in the towns and every area under army operation. Even 24 hours curfews were imposed sometime somewhere. Movement of civilians was so restricted throughout the district that no one was allowed to get out of his or her village or town without a movement permit from the competent authority. Anyone found outside a village or town without proper permit was liable to be arrested even if he or she was only to go to the jhum to return in the evening of the same day. The life of anyone who happened to fall into the hand of the army was purely under the mercy of the arresting soldiers for he or she could not be brought to the court of justice. Moving out of the village without a permit could, therefore, result in one’s death.

Understanding that their strength was no match for the Indian Army the Mizo National Army (MNA) was on the run ambushing the patrols of their opponents wherever possible, for they wisely took to guerrilla warfare. They had shifted, therefore, their Headquarters from place to place. First, they shifted it from Aizawl to Reiek Village, 9 miles west of Aizawl, then to the jungle and at last to East Pakistan.

In spite of tightened security measures, the courageous Mizo rebels, who were imbued with a political ideology, continued lying in ambushes, whenever an opportunity came to them. Thus ambushes and counter-ambushes went on. The Indian Army had,
of course, great difficulty to cope with the underground forces due to the difficult terrain and bad communications.

In the meantime, about the latter part of March 1966, President Laldenga, with his family and friends, namely, Lalthangliana and Thankima escaped to East Pakistan leaving behind the whole combatant force and civil government of the MNF to be chased from pillar to post by the Indian Army. Many were seized and killed in the jungle and in village which were under military combing operations.

Since the whole area of the Mizo District was under the operations of the two warring parties the people therein had been suffering from untold misery complicated by military atrocity which was rampant throughout the length and breadth of the district. Though martial law was not officially declared, the central government entrusted the responsibility of law and order in the district to the army. However, the army commanders were strictly instructed not to fight on a war footing but to function strictly in aid of civil power and to protect civilians. That is, the army was to use the minimum force and render maximum protection to the loyal citizens. 42

In spite of this instruction the Officers and the rank and file of the army let loose atrocity and punished the

civilians indiscriminately. The members of the Mizo Union Party and the neutrals who were antagonised by the MNF activities expected better treatment or leniency from the army. On the contrary, they were treated as if they were members of the MNF party. Such being the case, loyalty to the government of India did not have any meaning. Looting, burning of houses and barns, persecution of disloyal and loyal citizens alike, molestation of women were without limit or restraint.

Laldenga and family, including his assistants, Lalthangliana and Thankima lived in Dhaka with all facilities and amenities provided by the Government of Pakistan. There was nothing much to do for Laldenga, for he was not allowed by the Government of Pakistan to meet any foreigner nor even local people, otherwise his presence in East Pakistan would leak out to India and other countries, then it would not be possible for Pakistan to deny that she helped the MNF and harboured their President. When he went to market or cinema he should tell people that he was a Chakma or Azad Kashmiri in the event of being asked his nationality or identity by anybody. Dealing with other countries through their embassies in Dhaka was done by Lalthangliana mostly alone and sometimes with his friend. This will be dealt with more fully under the sub-heading of "Foreign Relations".

In his attempt to shift the blame for great suffering and bloodshed in Mizoram, to his colleagues Laldenga expressed
time and again to many people, that he had already foreseen all those distress and suffering under military operation, and had never, therefore, been prepared for such foolish action (i.e declaration of independence) with an untold consequence which had never been unforeseen by his "thoughtless colleagues" who foolishly pressed him hard against his will, to declare independence and to start the movement. This proved that he was not prepared to fight for independence which he had preached vigorously and skilfully.\footnote{43}{An interview with Sainghaka.}

As to the living condition of Laldenga in Dhaka, he was provided with a fashionable quarters with all facilities. But for the sake of security he was shifted to various places of Dhaka from time to time. His children were sent to the best English Medium School in Dhaka and the Government of Pakistan provided their school fees, uniforms, books, taxi fares, etc. He himself was presented with a new pair of suit at least every year. The family could buy all kinds of meat everyday supplemented with vegetables of various kinds. The family could go to cinema and do shopping everyday or any time if they so desired.

The activities of the Indian Army - their antagonism against Christianity, their inhumane atrocity somewhere sometime made the whole population united against them to a great extent.

\footnote{43}{An interview with Sainghaka.}
However, the MNF, on the other hand made many serious blunders out of jealousy and over zeal. They put many innocent people to death by mistake and thus made themselves enemies of their own people for whom they struggled. There were many who looked upon the Indian Army as their enemies but could not at all be on the side of the MNF. They were, therefore, between the anvil and the hammer to borrow their own term.

Since the MNF force took to guerrilla warfare fleeing from the towns to interior villages the army had not met any resistance in re-occupying Aizawl, Lunglei, Champhai, Kolasib, Tlabung and Lawngtlai. Within three weeks the civil authority resumed normal functioning of administration in the said towns. For more effective administration in the district new administration centres were opened in addition to the said centres in the following towns: Serchhip, Mamit, Darlawn, Bairabi, etc. The officers-in-charge of administrative Centres in the interior country were strengthened and protected by the security Force who built strong forts at the centres with stockade bristling with bamboo spikes around them.

It seemed that the Army had a policy of reducing the Mizo people to extreme poverty so as to make them wholly dependent on their mercy and unable to support the underground force. Seemingly to implement this policy the army burnt down most of the villages along with the property of the villagers and food supplies procured through hard labour. Many of the
houses burnt down were very costly. One should not think of the houses of protected progressive villages to be like huts in villages or other parts of India. The post of the houses were sawn timbers with doubled bamboo walls diagonally woven or walls of asbestos sheets, tin roofs and wooden floors made of planks. Those described were normal or ordinary quality and there were houses better than those described and some others were poorer than those.

The army gathered all the inhabitants of the village at gun point at the village playground where each and everyone was examined to see if he/she brought out money or any piece of property. The Army seized all the money or any piece of property found in the possession of anyone of the villagers. When they made sure that none of the villagers was with money or piece of property they set the whole village on fire. Thus the villagers were rendered homeless, penniless, without food, bedding, change of clothes or any tool for work to earn their livelihood. The work of cruelty did not end there. Any barn found with rations in it was burnt to ashes. The people were thus compelled to depend wholly on the meagre supply of food from the excess of military rations. Many people had to live on bamboo shoots, wild roots and leaves which resulted in diarrhea, dysentery, beriberi etc. The villagers were compelled to part with their age-long cherished hearth and home to shift to the new forced abode in another village ten or twenty miles
babies, handicaps, aged, etc. in a single file along the narrow intervillage footpaths under heavy guards of the army men.

When they came to their new abode they were left without shelter from rain, cold and heat for some days. The village where the surrounding villages were grouped together were called Grouping Centres or Protected Progressive Village(P.P.V's) There were many Grouping Centres in the whole of Mizo Hills. The villagers who were brought together to the Protected Progressive Villages were to build shelters for their respective families with their own hands. These helpless, poor villagers had to go miles out of the group centre to collect materials such as saplings, bamboos, thatch, etc. for building temporary huts. They had to borrow knives for cutting these materials from someones who had or from those whose tools and property had not been burnt. There were some villages which had not been burnt before they were driven to the group centres. The necessary building materials they could find in the jungles were not sufficient for all the people of surrounding villages who were brought to the grouping centres.

While the inhabitants of many villages were brought together to the grouping centres by force, people of many other villages who would like to move into the grouping centres of their own accord, for safety from the MNF as well as from the Army, were not allowed to move into the grouping centres because the Army would not be able to provide food for them. However
those villages were burnt to ashes along with their food supplies so as to make them unable to give food and shelter to the MNF underground. When they rebuilt their villages with great difficulty the Army came and burned them down again. Many villages were burnt two times in that way. Chhipphir village and Pukpui village were examples. Helpless men of the villages broke into bitter tears while women and children were beyond tears trembling with fear and distress.44

It must be noted however, that the sufferings of the people were not, of course, of the same degree everywhere, because very much depended on the leniency and mercy of the operating army. While some of them were merciful and friendly to the people some others were extremely cruel and oppressive. Therefore, the people of Mizoram had different impressions on the Indian Army because they received different treatments from them. In other words, the hatred of the people for the army varied in degree according to the acts of cruelty they received from the army.

The military atrocity and the MNF bloodlust remain in the mindsof the people which will last at least one generation. But as Christians the Mizo people have no heart to take revenge generally. It was a fact that the Mizo rebels also threatened and terrorised the section of the Mizo people

44. An interview with Rochhuma of Chhipphir village.
whom they believed to be loyal to India including the government servants by a campaign of murder, intimidation and kidnapping with a view to paralysing the restored civil administration. They forced, as far as possible, the Mizo, serving in the Government of India, to stay away from their offices. The members of the District Council and its officials, wherever found in the interior villages, were harassed and forced to resign their services. Many of the innocent Mizos were kidnapped and even murdered by the underground force of the MNF by mistake or out of personal hatred or on false reports.

The innocent citizens had to fear the Indian Army as well as the Mizo National Army (MNA), because to please the MNA was to be the enemy of the Indian Army and to please the Indian Army on the other hand, was to be the enemy and target of the MNA or MNF. It was, therefore, safer for the government servants, members of the District Council, etc. to take night shelters in the houses near the security posts. A large number of citizens of the Mizo district fled the district to Shillong, Manipur and Hailong due to these acts of violence.

Outstanding Ambushes: The following are the outstanding ambushes and attacks made by the Mizo Army upon the Indian Army:

Early in the Month of April 1966, the Mizo National Army (MNA) captured a vehicle carrying Jawans of the Bihar military Police, near Kolasib, and killed everyone of them.45

45. Government and Politics in Mizoram 1947 - 86 - R.N. Prasad p 189 (But this is not recorded anywhere else).
On May 5, 1966, a troop 60 of MNP volunteers under the command of Lt.Col.Laliana lay in wait for the Security Force enroute from Silchar to Aizawl in a convoy, near Zanlawn village, 26 miles to the north of Aizawl. They set a mine on the road at 400 metres away from them, towards Aizawl. At noon the convoy reached the place. But before the first vehicle of the convoy reached the mine one of the MNF personnel accidentally fired his rifles compelling his companions to shoot at the convoy, and the security Force to stand to.

The strength of the Security Force and their number of casualty was unknown. According to interview with Chalrikhuma, later Captain, who took part in the ambush, 16 Army vehicles including jeeps and saktimans were burnt and destroyed, 17 rifles with ammunition were also captured. They said that in the vehicles were steel trunks filled with money. But as their commander ordered them to burn the vehicles they burnt them without taking the money. Some of them had the idea of taking the money. But they were afraid of their commander who had no knowledge of boxes of money in the vehicles. A number of Indian soldiers were killed and wounded in the battle while there was no casualty on the MNF side. This ambush was called "Operation Gideon".

46. An interview with Chalrikhuma.
47. Ibid.
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46. An interview with Chalrikhuma.
47. Ibid.
Vaitin Operation: In the month of August, 1967, a group of the MNA under the command of Capt. Kapthanga put up for a night at Vaitin village near the border of Manipur State. This came to the knowledge of the Security Force who at once advanced on the village. When they entered the village the MNA troop, who did not like to turn the village into the battlefield, had already withdrawn from the village into the jungle. Thus the Security Force did not see the MNA in the village.

The commander of the Security Force was displeased to find the village empty of the MNA soldiers. He, therefore, led his men out into the jungle in pursuit of them. The commander of the MNA Capt. Kapthanga became infuriated for being pursued while his retreat was not at all for fear of the Security Force, but, according to him, owing to the consideration of public safety. He, then, consulted his colleagues Capt. Rualkhuma, Lt. Thangrehlova and Lt. Kapchhawna who all agreed to withdraw no more but to put up resistance at all cost in order to safeguard their reputation at least.

At about 5 Kms to the south of the village (Vaitin) the MNA thus lay in ambush. At about 3 p.m. came the Security Force and entered into their encirclement. The delaying group effectively prevented the incoming of the Security Force to reinforce their fellow Jawans who fell into the trap, being unable to advance nor retreat, outflanked by the MNA. They were held up just in front of the destroying group or attackers.
who strafed them from unexpected close quarters as easy targets.

After an hour of hard fighting, the battle ended in heavy casualty on the Security Force, but only one person killed and two wounded on the side of MNA who captured about ten automatic rifles including ammunition and equipment. All the jawans within the trap were completely annihilated. 48

A Raid on the Underground Civilians Camp by Security Force:
In the Month of February, 1968, Zaithanmawia, Chief Commissioner of Dampa Area, Lalkunga Commissioner and two of their staff members encamped on the bank of the river Tut, near Phaisau village. On 12.2.1968, Thangbuiaia MP, Malsawma Armourer and Hmingthankunga joined this camp. Being civilians these people did not have any weapons with them and as such they did not have military discipline among them as well. For this reason, neither did they station any sentry or watchman nor did they take any precautionary measure against the possible surprise attack by the Security Force. Round about between 1 a.m and 2 p.m the Security Force happened to locate and surrounded their camp, and opened fire on them. Lalkunga who attempted to escape was shot at the knee but managed to escape in the dark. Thangbuaiya, seriously wounded, also made his escape but succumbed to the wound on his way to a safety place.

Zaithanmawia the Chief Commissioner, Sangluaia Assistant Director, Malsawma an armourer and Biakthuama Assistant Director died on the spot. Only Hmingthankunga escaped unhurt.

Lalkunga, who escaped with his knee wounded, happened to meet his fellow underground who looked after him for three months in the jungle. However, in May 1968 he was captured by the Security Force after all, when they took the MNF camp by surprise near Dampui village. The security Force took good care of him and sent him to a hospital outside Mizoram for better treatment and has got well now.

The Security Force laid the bodies of their victims, in a line against a fallen tree and set a hand-grenade under each one of them so as to go off when the bodies were lifted. The Security Force, then lay in wait for someones to come to collect those bodies so that they might shoot them down no matter whosoever they might be - villagers or MNA personnel. On the eighth day from the day of killing, the Security Force abandoned and left the bodies of their victims.

On the day when the Security Force left a group of MNA commanded by Capt. Lalthlana of 'Z' Battalion accompanied by the villagers of Phaizau and surrounding villages collected the rotten bodies and buried them with military honours. Fortunately for them the hand-grenades set under the bodies did not go off when they lifted the bodies.49
Baite Freedom Organization disarmed: There is a small community within Burma along the border of North East Mizoram. This community is known as Baite. They organised volunteers to fight for freedom. That is, they wanted to carve out an independent state of their own and claimed the easternmost range of Mizoram opposite to their habitat. Armed with local arms Baite volunteers were encamped within Mizoram territory near Teikhang village. A detachment of 'CH' Battalion of MNA under the command of Lt. Kapkima marched towards Baite camp by the end of 1966. The Baite volunteers numbered 100 in all and all of them were in the camp. The Mizo Army took them surprise and disarmed them. They preached the MNF policy to them and convinced them that the MNF movement was for Baite community also. Dissolving their volunteer organisation the Mizo Army dispersed them and sent all of them home.  

Tualbung Operation: Tualbung is a village situated at the foot of the Chalfilh Mountain. A company of the Security Force was encamped at the most strategic point of the village. The post commander daily shouted to the people of the village challenging the MNF force and their God Jesus Christ. The eastern and southern sides of the post were upright precipice and only western and northern sides were penetrable which were

50. Kawlbuai - C. Zama pp 4-6.
strictly and heavily guarded, and that was why he felt secure. The camp was surrounded by a double row of trenches and four duty posts were erected around it.

The 'V' Battalion Commanding Officer Lt.Col.Laliana and his officers drew up a plan of assault on the camp and fixed the operation at 1 a.m. on 11 January 1967. On 10th January the 'V' Battalion moved from Buhban village to Lungpher, the nearest village to Tualbung camp. After resting for a while they started from Lungpher at dusk. Groping their way in the dark some of them rolled down the slope of the hill and some others fell off the edge of the path to the bottom of the precipice, but luckily unhurt. They entered Tualbung village between 12:00 midnight and 1 a.m. At their arrival of the village many dogs were barking at them which made them afraid that the Security Force might become alert. Fortunately for them, the barking of the dogs died down soon and the Mizo Army made a contact with Mizo National Volunteers (MNV) commanders of the village with whom they made a plan of attack.

According to the plan the soldiers of MNA climbed the cliffs on the eastern and southern sides of the camp groping their way in the dark. The level ground on top of the hill was the best strategic point of the camp. Knowing this the Mizo Army first occupied the level ground before the barrack of the Security Force was set on fire by the MNV commanders of the village. They planned that the burning of the barrack
should be regarded as a firing order. Lalthlana and zatawna, who were the first to climb over the cliffs of the rock, surveyed the ground and strategic positions. As soon as the barrack was set on fire, members of the Security Force ran to their bunkers some of which were already occupied by the Mizo Army who shot them down point-blank and from top of the hill in the light of the burning barracks. Some of the Mizo Army charged the camp from the northern side and captured the barrack which was on fire. They went on attacking trench after trench killing all the occupants of the camp except only three of them who could escape with great difficulty, one of them being wounded.

The fierce fighting lasted two hours and a half. The Security Force gallantly fought to the last, refusing to surrender even when they had no longer any hope of escape alive. Whenever the Mizo Army threw hand grenades into their trenches the survivors of them shouted "Come on! Mizo Army!" The Mizo Army captured more than thirty weapons of different calibres, such as Self-loading (SL) rifles, LMG's, sten guns and 2 inch mortars. But two of them, Vanramnghaka and Biakkima lost their lives in the gun battle, and one of their heroes Zatawna was wounded on his left arm.51

In the month of April 1967 a small band of soldiers

51. Kawlbuaiia - C.Zama pp 6-13 and interview with Lalthlana (Capt.) of Mizo Army who took part in the operation.
commanded by Capt. Biaktluanga ambushed the Security Force near Tualcheng village and got the better of their opponents in the fighting, resulting in the death of a number of Security Force. In some places sometimes both sides of the warring parties avoided armed conflict as far as possible believing that clashes would not bring about anything good between them. The Mizo National Army in particular, avoided most of the clashes except when circumstances favoured them, or when it seemed that the civil populace would not suffer the consequence.

A raid on Champhai Camp: During the early part of September 1967 Lt.Col.Kapthuama, the commanding Officer of 'L' Battalion planned to make a raid on Champhai camp of Security Force. They divided themselves into 4 groups as follows: - The first group should attack the bungalow where the Security Force encamped, the second group should try to destroy government offices, the third group should attack the Security Force who patrolled the street and the fourth group should attack the outposts within and in the outskirt of the town.

The first group, the largest of them all, which was detailed to attack bungalow was commanded by Kawlbuaia. They entered Champhai at 10 p.m. and the group approached its own destination. The bungalow was surrounded by lines of trenches.

52. Ibid.
and within the compound were many tents in the lawn and around the bungalow. Without knowing the strength of the Security Force within the compound of the bungalow Kawlbuaia and force simply tried to enter the compound. But sentries saw them and shot at them at once. There and then the Mizo Army took position and answered the firing. Since the firing was so heavy from the Security Force they found it quite difficult to advance or their advance was rather too slow. After firing for about an hour or so, a very light bullet was shot by MNA Commanding Officer for a signal for all the groups to retreat. Then they retreated without any loss of life. The number of casualty on the side of the Security Force was unknown.53

Kelkang ambush: From their attack on Champhai camp the Mizo Army retreated to Kelkang village where they prepared a breakfast on the following morning. Before their breakfast was ready the paratroopers arrived at Kelkang village. Without taking breakfast the Mizo Army retreated to Khuangleng village. The paratroopers pursued them. Lt.Col.Kapthuama, the Commanding officer of 'L' Battalion felt it humiliating to keep on running before the Indian forces and told his men that they retreated only for the sake of public safety and not at all for fear of Indian soldiers. He said, therefore, that the Indian soldiers

should be taught a lesson in a language they could understand, otherwise, they would have the impression that the Mizo Army were afraid of them. Accordingly, he, and his officers decided to lie in ambush.

The paratroopers came behind them following the traces of their footmarks and reached the place where they lay in ambush without any inkling of being ambushed. The delaying group of the Mizo Army commanded by Kawlbaruia took positions nearest to the paratroopers, the stoppers took positions farthest from them to stop their advance while the third group was in the middle between the delaying group and stoppers to shoot and to charge their enemies within their encirclement.

The first gun fire of the stoppers was immediately followed by thunders of gun fire from every quarter unceasingly for an hour until the withdrawal of paratroopers. The Mizo Army captured eight rifles from the paratroopers and five of them were captured by Kawlbaruia alone. This ambush took place at 10 a.m. on 10th September, 1967. According to the information given by the villagers 22 paratroopers were killed and quite a number of them were wounded but the number of them was not actually known. Anyway, the paratroopers suffered heavy casualty. On the side of the Mizo Army three soldiers were wounded.54

Kawlkulh camp attack: Some rocket launchers had been brought to the Mizo Army Headquarters from Pakistan. It was said that it was so powerful that it could destroy tanks at a shot. The 'L' Battalion was also given one of them. They were very happy with it and made a plan to attack the camp of the Security Force at Kawlkulh. It was said that the commander of the Kawlkulh camp of the Security Force was so annoying and troublesome to the people of the village that he was a heavy burden to them. That was why they selected that camp to be attacked with the rocket launcher for a test to see how powerful the new weapon was.

The 'L' Battalion, left their camp near Vankal village for Kawlkulh during the third week of December 1967 to attack the camp of the Security Force. They reached Kawlkulh before dawn and took positions on a hill opposite the camp. It was shot by the commander Lt.Col.Kapthuama himself. But the first shot was miss fired. The second shot went off with a loud sound. The rocket fell on the target but did not explode as expected. It simply emitted a cloud of smoke. Some of the Security Force personnel came out of their camp and looked askance at the smoke-emitting rocket. They looked at it in an open-mouthed bewilderment. The Mizo soldiers thought that they were maddened by the smoke of the rocket and charged them. But the Security Force were not at all maddened. They hurriedly stood to and took battle positions. They exchanged fire and the gun fire
died down after an hour of firing. The casualty on the side of the Security Force was not known. There was no casualty on the MNA side but an old woman who came from Vankal village was killed. Thus the new sophisticated weapon proved useless.\textsuperscript{55}

On 5.8.1968 the Mizo Army crossed the river Run on their way to China, and entered Thimbung village. They encamped on a hill top above Thimbung village. Since they could not get enough food they plucked corn from the corn-field. The owner of the corn-field reported the matter to the Security Force, Bihar Regiment, to be more precise. The Security Force lay in ambush in the corn-field. The Mizo Army came to the field once again to collect some cobs of maize having no knowledge of the presence of the Security Force. All of a sudden, the Bihar Regiment opened fire on them. But they immediately shot back killing and wounding some of the Bihar Regiment who did not have any trench or shelter. Both sides withdrew as early as possible. This ambush took place on 25th August 1968. There was no casualty on the Mizo Army.

From the Thimbung camp the Commanding Officer Lt.Col.Kapthuama and one hundred soldiers of 'L' Battalion went back to Mizoram while the rest of them crossed the Burmese border on 30th August 1968. Before they entered Darkhai, the nearest village from the border they sent an advanced party to enter

\textsuperscript{55} Kawlbuiaia - C.Zama pp 25-31.
the village. The Burmese force had already reached the village and surveyed the places for strategy when the advance party of the Mizo Army entered the village. As soon as the Burma Rifles saw the Advanced party they opened fire on them. The Mizo Army immediately took positions and returned the fire. After thirty minutes of firing the Mizo Army retreated without suffering any casualty. But they were scattered to many different places, unable to meet together and forming different small groups.

One group led by Lt.Challianthanga was cooking food at a certain abandoned jhumshed without any idea of being pursued by their enemies. All of a sudden the Burma Rifles appeared and took them by surprise. Their leader Lt.Challianthanga was shot dead at the spot and a two inch motor was taken away from his hand by the Burma Rifles. Other members of his group escaped by the skin of their teeth. The whole battalion returned to Mizoram from different places of their hidings leaving behind them their comrades in arms who died of fever as well as from their wounds or with their boots on. Thus the first Mizo Army's attempt to undergo a military training in China ended in failure.\textsuperscript{56}

Bloodless operation at Hnahthial: Soon after the fall of Lunglei town a small band of soldiers of Mizo Army went to Hnahthial

\textsuperscript{56} Kawlbuaia - C.Zama pp 31-40.
village to attack the Border Road Task Force's camp where the Security Force personnel were stationed to guard the Border Road Task Force (BRTF). The band of the Mizo Army was commanded by Ramliana, one of the heroes of Lunglei town operation. Some of the soldiers proposed delaying the attack so as to get information from the villagers about the strength of the Security Force in the camp so that the information may guide the plan of action. But Ramliana the leader of the band told his men to stay off a little distant from the camp while he would enter the camp alone.

He then left his men behind and went alone to the camp. At the entrance of the camp the sentries of the camp levelled their guns at him from the trenches. But without fear Ramliana beaconed them to come out of their trenches. So did they comply with his order, coming out of their trenches one after another. Then Ramliana called his friends to come to the spot. Seeing other soldiers of the Mizo Army the Security Force personnel surrendered without putting up resistance. Thus the camp was captured without bloodshed.  

Buhban Operation: The 'V' Battalion, under the command of Lt.Col.Lalliana encamped near Khawkawi village. After staying there for three months their security leaked out to the Security

57. Mizo Pasalthate Part I - C.Zama p 17.
Force. Two companies of the Security Force were sent out to attack the 'V' Battalion camp. On hearing this the commander of 'V' Battalion and his officers preferred to take offensive to defensive. Accordingly, they left their camp on 11.10.1967 and had been waiting till 17th October, 1967.

On the morning of 17th October, a messenger came running from Lungpher village, informing the Mizo Army that the Security Force came to Lungpher village seemingly intending to come to Buhban village where the MNA camp was. The Commanding Officer of 'V' Battalion, therefore, gave an order to his men to leave the village and lie in ambush in the jungle on the way to Khawkawi camp which they had already abandoned. The Security Force came to Buhban village and rested there for two hours to take meal. Some villagers on duty posts ran to the Mizo Army informing them the arrival of the Security Force.

When the Security Force entered well within their encirclement the Mizo Army opened fire on them killing quite a number of them. They captured S.L.rifles and carbines at the cost of two lives of their splendid fighters, namely Sgt.Thanglawta and Pvt.Lalrinawma.58

A fight at Lumtui: There was a BRTF camp at Lumtui where there were some Security Force personnel to guard them. The Mizo

58. Mizo Pasalthate Part II - C.Zama pp 22-23.
Army surrounded this camp early in the morning before dawn, October 5, 1968. At dawn, when the cooks got up to prepare breakfast the Mizo Army suddenly charged the camp without shooting. One member of the Security Force took up rifle hastily, but was shot dead before he could open fire. Other inhabitants of the camp surrendered without putting up any resistance. The Mizo Army captured ten rifles, hand grenades, ammunition and equipment, but released all the inhabitants of the camp safely except the one who was shot dead. They were told to go home straight and their camp was burnt down.\textsuperscript{59}

\textbf{Hmunpui operation:} Capt. Kapthanga of 'V' Battalion and his men were encamped in jhumsheds near Hmunpui village. Since they contracted malaria many soldiers of 'V' Battalion came to this place to get medical facilities from Sairang hospital a few miles away from Hmunpui village. There were four jhumsheds in that area and all of them were occupied by the Mizo Army. They were forty of them ten soldiers living in one jhumshed. More than half of them were suffering from fever. On 11.7.1968 the Security Force suddenly attacked one of the jhumsheds. Seven of the inhabitants of the jhumshed immediately got up and fought back the Security Force valiantly and drove them away. But three of them were shot dead by the Security

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
A fight near Serzawl village: The Mizo Army that left the Hmunpui jhumsheds came over to Serzawl village through the jungle and set up a camp in the forest 7 miles away from Serzawl village. They were 37 of them and nearly half of them were taken ill. On August 3, 1968, some of them went out of the camp to take rice from the village. On their way they suddenly met the Security Force who came to attack their camp. They immediately ran back to the camp and the soldiers on the camp duty opened fire on the Security Force holding them back for a few minutes during which the sick soldiers in the camp withdrew to the forest. There was no report of casualty from both sides.

Muallunghthu camp came under attack: From East Pakistan Mizo Army were sent into Mizoram batch by batch for various missions. They were called Invisible Raiders because they should not be seen by anybody nor should they see anybody. These contingents were provided with dry ration so as to enable them not to see or not to be seen by anybody. Their missions were different from one another, such as, to blast some buildings or important offices, to burn some houses or buildings, to snipe or kidnap someones, to blast bridges, etc.

One group of Mizo Army under the command of

60. Mizo Pasalthate Part II - C.Zama pp 36-37.
Lt. Col. Zamana were encamped near Muallungthu village after reaching Aizawl from East Pakistan. By that time the Indian Army was launching Combing Operation throughout Mizoram. As such, every part of the jungle or forest in Mizoram was under active operation of the Indian Army. Muallungthu camp was also discovered by the Security Force.

One morning, at dawn, one of the campers, Thlumruma got up and went a little distance to have a motion. While stooling he was shot by the Security Force from the back and hit him at his lumber. The bullet went through his body. In spite of this he ran back to the camp and woke up all his friends. They all ran helter-skelter. When they met together their commander was not among them. Two of the soldiers ran back to the camp in search of their commander. But the Security Force had already occupied their camp and shot dead the two soldiers. Thlumruma who was wounded also died to his wound. Thus three of them were killed while no casualty was inflicted on the Security Force. Their Commander Lt. Col. Zamana met them within an hour.\textsuperscript{61}

Sertan Incident: On 14th June 1967, the Mizo Army ambushed the Security Force near Sertan village which resulted in the death of 15 Indian soldiers while one of the Mizo Army was killed.

\textsuperscript{61} Mizo Pasalthate Part I - C. Zama pp 39-41.
A clash at the entrance of Zamuang village: In the second week of July 1967, a troop of Mizo Army was on their way to Zamuang village as their rendezvous in case they were dispersed by the Security Force on the way. But just at the entrance of the village there was a clash between the two armies. The Security Force had already entered the village and took positions in it. They had been fighting from 5:30 p.m. till daybreak on the following morning. At daybreak, the Mizo Army withdrew to the jungle and the fighting ceased. No casualty was inflicted on the Mizo Army and no information about the casualty on the Security Force was received. There was continuous heavy firing on both sides.

Vanghmun Operation: By the third week of December 1967, Vanghmun post was attacked by 'Z' Battalion of Mizo Army under the command of Lt.Col.R.Haleluia. That camp was manned by a company of Indian Army under the command of a captain. The Mizo Army took them by surprise and after ten minutes of fighting the Indian Army surrendered. The Mizo Army captured arms and ammunition including all the equipment they could take away. They returned with heavy booty, but they released the Indian Army without doing them any harm.

A clash at Hriphaw: 'Z' Battalion, the raider of the Vanghmun post moved to Hriphaw village from Vanghmun. An annual meeting
of the Presbyterian Church was in progress at that time. There were many delegates of Presbyterian Church in the village coming from the surrounding villages and from Aizawl town. 'Z' Battalion stayed there for a night's halt. On the same night came the Security Force to the village late at night. Having no knowledge of the presence of 'Z' Battalion in the village they tried to stay in the same houses where the Mizo Army stayed. No sooner had they entered the houses than hand-to-hand fightings took place inside the house. Since the civilians and the soldiers stayed together under the same roofs that night, the Security Force shot them indiscriminately.

In the dark it was very difficult to distinguish friends from foes because their dresses were similar to some extent. Even the Mizo Army put on the Indian Army uniforms which they captured from Vanghmun post. Since they could not discern their friends from their enemies they had to speak to them or to the nearest soldier in order to know whether he was a friend or a foe. If one spoke to the enemy one should be replied with shots of guns. As they stood too close to each other or one another, their rifles could not be used for shooting but for beating or batting while some others laid down their rifles to enable them to engage in hand-to-hand fighting. But in the street and in some houses continuous gunfire was heard. Capt. Lalthlana, one of the best fighters of the Mizo Army ran round the village shouting words of encouragement for the MNA.
One Malsawma, a Mizo soldier, followed the Indian soldiers to some distance taking them for his friends and he was nearly killed by them. For fear of the consequence that should be suffered by the villages of Hriphaw, the Mizo Army withdrew to the jungle, at last. Three of the Mizo soldiers were killed in the fighting. 62

Having withdrawn from Hriphaw village the Mizo Army set up a camp in the forest near Kanghmun village. They celebrated the Christmas and the New Year there. On 2.1.1968 the Security Force made a dawn attack on the camp taking them by surprise. Within a few minutes of fighting the Mizo Army withdrew without taking their ration with them and as a result they had to live without food for some days.

Puankhai Incident: During the early part of 1968 an order was issued for the whole Mizo Army to retreat to East Pakistan where they established the headquarters of Mizo Army. 13 members of 'Z' Battalion, under the command of Lt.Col.Darkhuma tried to cross the border of East Pakistan on 9th June, 1968, near Puankhai village. The MNF personnel used to force passage through a thick forest to cross the border at a certain point. The point where the borderline was usually crossed by the MNF was known by the Indian Army from the Chakmas. Therefore, the

62. C.Zama : Mizo Pasalthate pp 43-44.
Security Force lay in ambush on that point. All of a sudden they opened fire on the 13 members of 'Z' Battalion and their leader Darkhuma lay dead on the spot. Immediately his men fought back. One of them, Malsawma approached the security Force and shot dead two of them at point blank. Being too few to fight against the unknown strength of the Indian Army the Mizo Army personnel withdrew and crossed the border.63

Shooting of the Lieutenant Governor of Mizoram: Capt.Kawlbuaiia and six of his men had a meeting at Kolasib at 6 a.m. on 7.3.1974 to draw up a plan of action. He said to his men that there was no hope of getting independence of Mizoram in the near future and many of their friends had been waiting from prisons looking forward to the time of getting independence. He said that they must try to rescue their friends from prisons by making their movement more effective and more meaningful. He proposed that they should kidnap important persons of the government, as done in other parts of the world, for hostages to demand the release of their friends in prisons in exchange of the hostages. Then he made it a point that they should kidnap non-Mizo high-ranking officers and said further that it would be easy or convenient for them to execute the plan along the Aizawl-Silchar road.

The Mizo Army on duty along the North Hlimen range were also enthusiastic about the plan and wanted to take part in the plan. The plan was appreciated by all of them. S.P. Mukherjee, the first Lieutenant Governor of Mizoram chalked out his tour programme on 8th March, 1974 for a tour to Hortoki on the next day i.e. 9th March. R.L. Thanzawna, the Director of the Department of Information, Public Relation and Tourism happened to learn the tour programme of the Lieutenant Governor (L.G) from his Secretary and felt it his official duty to go along with the L.G. as an interpreter or a guide. So, he proposed to go with him. But the L.G. suggested that R.L. Thanzawna should enjoy the holidays with his family on the 9th and 10th. All the same R.L. Thanzawna offered his free service.

Since one of the car did not work they used only one car Chevelle in which R.L. Thanzawna and the L.G. sat together. They left Raj Niwas at 7.20 a.m. for Hortoki. The MNF personnel on duty followed the L.G's car from Durtlang by a truck lorry. The L.G. party halted at Kawnpui village where he had tea at the Rest House and met the leader of the village. The truck lorry ran past the L.G. party and reached Kolasib ahead of them reporting to Capt. Kawlbuiaia that the L.G. party had a stop-over at Kawnpui village. Then Capt. Kawlbuiaia sent a messenger to Kawnpui to collect information about the programme of the L.G. All that the messenger could collect was that the L.G. left Kawnpui for Hortoki. He did not know when he would come back.
Since that day was Saturday, they simply guessed that the L.G. would not come back on Sunday but on the following Monday.

The L.G. changed his vehicle and used a jeep from Kawnpui to Hortoki. In the meantime Kawlbuaia sent a messenger to North Hlimen where a troop of Mizo Army was stationed, to send a section of soldiers to arrive at Thingdawl village on the night of the coming Sunday not later than 10 p.m. At the same time he sent another messenger to Kawnpui to collect information about the return of the L.G. from Hortoki. Also, he had a jeep stood by with full petrol tank.

According to their plan, the L.G. should be captured alive and kidnapped for a hostage. He should be taken immediately to Bairabi to the west of Kolasib and thence to Dampa forest. At the same time, some of the Mizo Army personnel should run to Darlawn and Sawleng villages to the northeast of Aizawl to make the Indian authority and Government of Mizoram believe that the L.G. was taken to the north east of Aizawl. Therefore, every dealing with the Government of India should be done from Sawleng village and the Mizo Army personnel should be stationed in all the surrounding villages, such as Pehlawn, Kepran, Phaileng (E) and Khanpui but without military uniform to act as simple villagers. There should be a line of restriction which the police, C.I.D. and Security Force should not cross except at the cost of the L.G.'s life.

At the same time, the Security Force who were stationed
to north of the restriction line should be demanded not to leave their camps, and the release of the MNF detainees should also be demanded in exchange of the L.G. In the meantime, the L.G should be taken to the MNF Headquarters in Arrakan.

The L.G and party reached Hortoki where he was accorded a tremendous welcome with a grand banquet in his honour. He visited some paddy fields where wet cultivation was employed. He visited different fields on foot and came back to the village, and address a public meeting in the village playground. After being garlanded ceremoniously, he promised to help Hortoki village in every way he could to develop their economic condition. Truly, there was much scope for the development of the village. At 3 p.m. the L.G. and party left Hortoki for Kawnpui village where he was given a grand reception. A large number of school children stood in line on both sides of the road to pay him homage and threw petals on him. All the school children nodded their heads to greet the L.G. He also returned their greetings by raising his hand.

The leader of Kawnpui village organised a grand public meeting at a public square called 'Convoy Ground'. Different dances were displayed in his honour. After being garlanded he delivered a public speech. In rhyme with the music of the Cheraw dance presented by a large group of girls, the L.G. nodded his head and moved his body as if he was dancing, without knowing that an ill luck had been waiting for him. After meeting with
the leaders of Kawnpui village at the Rest House he retire to sleep there for the night. The next morning after, after visiting the Kawnpui village Hospital, he started for Aizawl at 8:30 a.m. on 9th March 1974.

The MNP personnel who were detailed to kidnap the L.G. were present in the reception at Kawnpui so as to make themselves familiar with the face and appearance of the L.G. so that they might not be mistaken in capturing and kidnapping him. Since the other members of their group had not arrived the number of kidnapping party was only two. They planned to leave Kawnpui village on the evening of 9th March. But since vehicle was not available on that evening they left the village on the next morning by a certain full-loaded truck lorry, bound for Aizawl. They got off the truck at Zanlawn village about 20kms from Kawnpui village. They took position behind a bush, a few yards from the road.

The L.G's car, Chevelle, ran after a pilot. In the Chevelle were seated five persons including the driver. In the front seat beside the driver was seated Kanungo, the security guard and in the back seat, the L.G. was on the left side, R.L.Thanzawna in the middle and J.K.Kapur, the personal Secretary to the L.G. on the right end of the seat. The L.G's car was followed by a jeep fully loaded with security guards armed with rifles. They came to the place where the Mizo Army personnel, Kunga and Liana by assumed names lay in ambush. Liana and Kunga...
were at a loss to what they should do. They expected their friends to have arrived well ahead of the L.G's party to help them. Before they left Kawnpui village they gave words to their agents to tell their friends to tie a white big piece of cloth on the bracket of their jeep for a sign to indicate that they were the members of their group. But when the L.G's party came to the place where they were, their friends had not arrived yet. They thought that their chance should be forever lost if they miss it that time. But they were sure that it would be quite impossible for only two of them to capture the L.G. alive and kidnap him from the midst of the security guards who were no match for them. So, they, at last, decided to kill him if they could.

Then, Liana jumped out of his hiding place as soon as the pilot ran past them and the L.G's car slowed down in a bid to circumvent a boulder placed in the middle of the road by them, so as to slow down the speed of the car which would give them chance to shoot or take an appropriate action. Just before the security guards appeared he opened fire on the car injuring Kanungo, the security guard officer who was seated in the front seat of the car, in the upper arm, and the L.G. in the knee. Just then R.L. Thanzawna fell on the L.G. and covered his body. As Liana stated later, since he did not like to shoot the Mizo officer he could not kill the L.G. At this time Kunga threw his hand grenade near the car but without
causing much damage. Being an erf-serviceman J.K.Kapur knew how to take defensive position and told his friends to lie down immediately. So did they. Though the windscreen of the car was not a bullet proof it was harder than ordinary one that could branch off many of the bullets.

Since the driver jumped out of it the car went back down the slope of the road uncontrolled. J.K.Kapur the Secretary to the L.G. also jumped out immediately and tried to stop the car. Fortunately for them the car was stopped by a roadside electric post. J.K.Kapur gallantly fought back and the security guards that followed them arrived within no time and opened rapid fire on the wayside but Liana and Kunga had already withdrawn to the jungle. There was a bullet mark just on the head of the L.G. Had he not lain down he should have been killed.

Hurriedly, R.L.Thanzawna and J.K.Kapur attended the L.G. who refused to be looked after unless Kanungo, the officer of security guards was first looked after. S.P.Mukherjee was very patient in bearing the pain of his injury. He inserted his first finger into his wound and said that there was no fracture and it was not, therefore, serious. After dressing the wound they started again for Aizawl. On their way to Aizawl S.P.Mukherjee the L.G. told R.L.Thanzawna that he could not understand why he was shot shortly after his meeting with the MNF leaders. When they reached Aizawl he was taken direct-
to the military hospital at Zemabawk, and thence he was flown by helicopter to outside Mizoram for better treatment. On their way to Aizawl Lieutenant Governor S.P.Mukherjee requested R.L.Thanzawna to carry out his promises to Hortoki villages as well as to Kawnpui villagers.

Liana and Kunga, who withdrew to the jungle came out to the main road again near Zanlawn village and caught a certain truck lorry ASC 1088 bound for Silchar. Between Kawnpui and Kolasib they met a speeding jeep on which were their friends. They got off the truck and went on board the jeep which turned around and ran towards Kolasib. Liana and Kunga told their friends about the incident and said that their scheme ended in failure only because they arrived much too late. Before they entered Kolasib they all got off the jeep and went into the jungle. But they instructed the jeep driver to meet their commander Kawlbuaia at Kolasib and tell everything about the incident and how it ended in failure. When he was told this, Kawlbuaia exclaimed that it was too bad that their plan was misfired, and he immediately got up and went out of the village into the jungle to join his troop.64

Capt.Kawlbuaia sent the report of the above incident to the Army Chief of MNA, stating that the Lieutenant Governor of Mizoram, S.P.Mukherjee was shot on 10th March (Sunday) at

64. C.Zama : Mizo Pasalthate Part III pp 69-84.
9:05 a.m. between Zanlawn and Serkhan 2kms from Zanlawn. He stated also that the L.G. was sheltered by R.L. Thanzawna with his body and therefore, he could not be shot again for fear of shooting the Mizo officer. In his report Kawlbuaia stated further that it was not their plan to shoot or kill the L.G. but to capture him alive and kidnap him for a hostage to be released in exchange of MNA personnel who were in Indian prisons. He went on stating that Cpl. Liana and Pvt. Kunga were sent to reconnoitre the suitable ground for ambush; but the L.G.'s party came all too soon than expected and they were compelled to shoot them which was not at all their choice. After making apology Capt. Kawlbuaia recommended Cpl. Liana and Pvt. Kunga for promotion. This report was sent under the letter No. M.S.C. No. 127/002/14/3/4/A.S.T.A. MSC stood for Mizo Sipai Chanchin and ASTA for Aizawl-Silchar Tlangdung Area.

Capt. Kawlbuaia, the commander of the Aizawl-Silchar Tlangdung Area Operation was captured in a certain house at Durtlang village. This is how they captured him: - Since the shooting of the L.G. the Government of India was trying to locate the whereabout of the snipers and anyone who was involved in the ambush. They tightened the security in the whole area of Aizawl-Silchar Tlangdung Area (ASTA). They made more informers among the members of the Mizo society and at last traced out

65. C.zama: Mizo Pasalthate p 84.
the whereabout of Capt. Kawlbuaia, the commander of the Area operation. The Security Force Arrested him in the Durtlang camp for interrogation. Along with him were arrested two girls, daughters of the owner of the house where he was arrested. These two girls were also kept in the camp for interrogation and were released in the afternoon of the following day. They were released because they denied their acquaintance with Capt. Kawlbuaia and Kawlbuaia also denied his acquaintance with them. He secretly handed over the important documents that he had in his pocket to the girls on their way to the camp.

As he was interrogated on pain of death Capt. Kawlbuaia disclosed his identity but he refused to give further information about their hideouts or the whereabout of his men telling them that he was a gentleman and they should treat him as such. They tortured him to elicit more information but with no success. The next day the Security Force took him to the spot where the L.G. was shot. But they failed to get any more information. On their way back to Durtlang post all the guards except one went out of the vehicle to take tea. Kawlbuaia told the guard that he wanted to pass water. So, the guard took him out of the vehicle and both of them went to the wayside. Capt. Kawlbuaia's hands were tied behind his body and the end of the rope was tied on the belt of the guard. All of a sudden Kawlbuaia jumped down the precipice and the end of the rope which was tightly tied on the belt of the guard loosed. Then
Kawlbuaia ran as fast as he could with his hand still bound behind his body.

He climbed a slippery rock and fell off its cliff and got so hurt that he could not get up and the guards who ran after him quickly overtook him and shot him dead there and then. His body was taken to Ngopa, his home village. On its way to Ngopa village his body was given a grand hero reception in every village.

Shooting of IGP in his Office: On January 3, 1975, Capt. Lalhleia, Capt. Thangrehlova, Lt. Rohnuna and their colleagues sat together in a large sitting room of a certain house in Aizawl town, making a scheme of kidnapping the Inspector General of Police (IGP) of Mizoram to be kept for a hostage. They planned to demand the release of the MNF personnel in Indian prisons in exchange of IGP if they could kidnap him. In order to do this they felt that they should obtain police uniforms to disguise themselves as policemen. The procurement of police uniforms for all of them was entrusted to Lt. Rohnuna, who could get them within a day.

On 5th January 1975, at about 8 p.m. these commandos met together and planned to lie in wait of the IGP on his way to office from his residence which was at McDonald Hill, about one kilometre and a half to the north of his office. They schemed to hijack his car at the ill-protected point of the
road. They planned that some of them should be in full uniform of police while others in civil dress. Thus they lay in ambush at a convenient place for four times, but they could not get opportunity. They therefore, sat again again in committee on 11th January, to draw up a strategic plan for kidnapping the IGP from his office since the waylayin plan was not successful. They planned that they should disguise themselves as a policemen, one of them as a police officer and drive to the IGP office by an official jeep which should also be procured by Lt.Rohnuna.

On January 13, 1975, Lt.Rohnuna and one of the commandos procured a government vehicle (jeep) ZRG 124 allotted to Khuanga the President of the District Council Court and Director of Law Department, which was taken at the point of gun. These commandos, six in number, were equipped with sophisticated automatic small guns. All of them were in police uniforms and Capt.Lalhleia, their commander was with peaked cap, shoulder straps, etc. They drove in the jeep towards the IGP office at about 4 p.m.

They reached the office at 4:30 p.m. and the policeman on duty at the gate saluted Capt.Lalhleia the commanding officer as he opened the gate for them. Just in front of the office they all jumped off the jeep smartly and each one of them quickly ran to his appointed position as previously arranged. Capt.Lalhleia and Lt.Rohnuna directly entered the IGP room to
bring him out. Capt. Thangrehlova, Second in Command was stationed at the verandah guarding his friends against possible danger from outside. He was walking to and fro on the verandah waiting for Capt. Lalhleia and Lt. Rohnuna to bring out the IGP from his room. Some other commandos were stationed near the windows outside the office room. Meanwhile the jeep was turned around and kept ready to run at any moment, without switching off the engine, with one of them in charge of it. It was parked as close to the verandah as possible so as to enable them to run away as quickly as possible. The policeman on guard of the IGP did not aware of any untowards atmosphere in the premises of the office.

When Capt. Lalhleia and Lt. Rohnuna entered the office chamber they found two visitors—DIGP L.B. Sewa IPS and SP (CID) Panchapagasen sitting with the IGP talking together over a cup of tea. Seeing the strange visitors with cocked up guns ready to shoot them, the IGP and other officers received a great fright for a second or two. However, being highly responsible persons to a great country like India, they quickly mustered up their courage and confronted the terrorists without any sign of fear. Though they armed themselves with pistols, these high ranking officers had no time to pull them out of holsters to compete with the sharp shooters with cocked up guns already pointed to them. In spite of all these, the IGP and friends did not like to give in to the intimidation but defied the threat at
the cost of their lives. Thus they all chose to be shot dead rather than surrender.

After shooting dead the three big officers, Capt. Lalhleia and Lt. Rohnuna came running out of the IGP office chamber and all the commandos rushed into the waiting jeep and made their escape before anybody around them could make out what was happening. Capt. Lalhleia praised the bravery of their victims saying that they were too brave to be kidnapped. He added that he was sorry that he could not bring them out alive and regretted to have to kill them.  

66. C. Zama: Chhim Keite a Fam ta. pp 77-80.