PART II

TEXT
With the above Kārikā, Viśvanātha initiates his treatment of the problem of Sābdabodha (Verbal Comprehension).

This Kārikā involves certain technical terms which we propose to discuss in two series. The terms, Pada, Padārtha, Sākti and Sābdabodha, because of their inherent mutual relation are discussed in the first series, and the terms, Karana, Dvāra, Sahakāri (-Karana) and Phala in the second, because of all of them being concerned with the concepts of cause and effect.

Pada : As to the basic constitution of Pada by Varṇa or Varṇas (letters), there is no difference of opinion amongst the scholars of different schools of Philosophy, Grammar and Rhetorics.¹ What goes by the name of Pada in the domain of Linguistics and Logic basically comprises of varnas which we have discussed earlier. Now we are simply to examine what differentiates a Pada from a Varṇa. Pāṇini

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1. Varṇātmakameva padam. PP., p. 89
   Varṇāḥ ----- padasājñā bhavanti. VB, under NS 2.2.60.
defines Pada as that which contains as its end either an inflectional (sup) or a conjugational (tiṅ) suffix (vibhakti).\textsuperscript{1}

Gautama accepts this grammatical notion of Pada. He defines Pada as those (letters) which end in suffixes.\textsuperscript{2} The Bhāṣyakāra clarifies that the term 'te' (those) of Gautama referring to the constituents of a Pada, actually means letters.\textsuperscript{3} Viśvāsīvāna appears to have accepted the Grammarian's division of the words into 'suvanta' and 'tiṅanta' varieties by way of classifying and illustrating Vibhakti as Nāmiki and Ākhyātiki.\textsuperscript{4}

Thus in early Nyāya, there did not exist any basic difference from Vyākaraṇa with regard to the concept of Pada. It may be added here that the Prācīna Nyāya fully acknowledged the utility of Grammar in the matter of representation of linguistic symbols, Pada and Vākya.\textsuperscript{5} But with the passage of time, the Naiyāyikas came to be gradually liberal in their concept of Pada and Vākya. The later Naiyāyikas including Viśvānātha understand as Pada whatever letter or cluster of

3. Te vibhaktyantaḥ pādam. NS 2.2.60.
4. Vārṇā vibhaktyantāṁ padasaṁjñā bhavanti. VB, under ibid.
5. Vibhaktīrdvayī nāmiki ākhyātikī ca. ibid.
6. samayapālanārthaṁ cedāṁ padalakṣapāyā vaiḍo' nākhyānāṁ vyākaraṇāṁ vākyalakṣapāyā vaiḍo' rtho lākṣaṇaṁ. VB, under NS 2.1.56.
letters is found to be significant. In other words, what is endowed with the significative power (Sakti) is a Pada. The concept of this significative power is also controversial. In this regard, the Naiyāyikas as we shall see in the succeeding pages differ from the Mīmāṃsakas, Vaiyākaraṇas and others. There remains a difference also between the older and the later Naiyāyikas. It cannot be said again that there is complete agreement in their notion in this context even amongst the Navyanaiyāyikas themselves. Pending our discussion on the issue for the time being, we may say that this significative power is the power of primary signification. On the strength of the knowledge of current convention (Samaya or Saṃketa) people come to understand a single meaning being primarily signified by a letter or cluster of letters. The unit formed by that letter or letters in primarily signifying a single meaning is the Pada in the view of the later Naiyāyikas. For the later Naiyāyikas, to be a Pada, a letter or letters donot end in any suffix. The suffixes occurring in what are recognised as words by the Grammarians, are independent Padas by virtue of their having own independent significances. Thus the Ghaṭapada of the Vaiyākaraṇas is a 'padasamūha' for the Naiyāyikas. The expression 'ghataḥ' consists of two parts, the Prātipādika and the suffix sup. Both the parts being significative (sakta) by themselves, can be Padas for the Naiyāyikas.

7. sāktam padam. TS, p. 66; M, vide BPS, p. 438.
The Vākyā for the Naiyāyikas is the collection of more than one such Padas. Thus a Pada of the Vaiyākarana is treated as a Vākyā by the Naiyāyika for the logical purposes. Visvanātha himself introduces the terms 'khaṇḍavākyā' and 'mahāvākyā' in the Muktāvalī. The expression 'khaṇḍavākyā' there stands for smaller Vākyas like 'ghaṭā' and the other term 'mahāvākyā' for bigger sentences starting from 'bhuṭale ghaṭo'sti' to even a long treatise. The use of the terms is to be understood as relative. Under the circumstances, in handling Navya Nyāya texts on Ādīda, it requires us to be vigilant about the intended meaning of the terms concerned.

Padārtha: The term 'Padārtha' here stands for 'the meaning of a word'. We shall see in due course that this Padārtha is viewed by Viṣvanātha to be usually a denoted (Sakya) and only casually an indicated (Laksya) one.


9. This again should not create an impression that the Naiyāyikas are prepared to accept as Vākyā any collection of 'suvantas' and 'tiṇantas'. We find Jagadīśa quite critical of Amārasimha for his defining a Vākyā as a mere collection of 'suvantas' and 'tiṇantas'.

10. Here at the earliest opportunity, we may note that with the Naiyāyikas, a Padārtha worth the name must be a meaning as understood from a word by means of the knowledge of the very significative power of the word. cf. vṛttā padaprātipādyā eva padārtha ityābhidhiyate. Śāk V, p. 5.
Sakti: Here in the Karika, Visvanatha uses the term in the sense of the denotative power or the power of primary signification of a word. Alamkarikas use the term Sakti in a broad sense to cover all the three significative powers of a word, namely Abhidha (Denotation), Lakṣaṇa (Indication) and Vyanjanā (Suggestion). But as with other Naiyāyikas, Visvanatha's Sakti is here to mean only Abhidha (the Denotation or the Primary power of Signification). Visvanatha is found to use the word 'Vṛtti' in place of Sakti in the same context in the Muktavali. Scholars are there to opine that Visvanatha uses the word Sakti in the aforesaid Karika in the sense of a Vṛtti to cover both Lakṣaṇa and Sakti or Abhidha. Here we donot agree and our arguments will be presented under the relevant Muktavali text. Mīmāṃsakas also understand this Sakti in the sense of primary signification that works on the strength of a relation between the word and its meaning. But the Naiyāyikas including Visvanātha conceive this Sakti directly as a particular relation that exists between a Pada and a Padārtha. The Muktavali bears testimony to this effect. We may note further that while the Mīmāṃsakas recognise the relation existing between a Pada and the Padārtha as natural and eternal, the Naiyāyikas recognise the same as mere conventional.
Sabdabodha: The term 'Sabdabodha' may be derived thus: Sabdasya ayam sabdaḥ, sabdaḥ (sabdásambandḥi yuh) bodhaḥ sabdabodhaḥ. It may be presented thus: sabdāgataḥ sabdaḥ, sabdaścāsau bodhaśca sabdabodhaḥ. It means the knowledge pertaining to or coming from a 'Sabda'. As the Naiyāyikas understand the word Sabda technically as a Prarānavaṇṇya, Sabda here in the context of the term sabdabodha as intended by Viśvanātha undoubtedly means a Vākya and Sabda stands for a Vākyaṭrthā. The entire expression may be replaced by another term Sabdajñāna also. The expressions 'sabdabodha' and 'sabdajñāna' are understood universally in the circle of Naiyāyikas as the Vākyaṭrthajñāna, the knowledge of the total meaning of a sentence. Pending our discussion on the process involved in the understanding of that very Vākyaṭrthā, we can sum-up here with this much that this Sabdabodha in the sense of Vākyaṭrthajñāna is the valid verbal knowledge (Sabdaprāmaṇa) to which Sabda in the form of Āptavākya serves as the Pramāṇa, i.e., sabdaprāmaṇakaṇa. Or even without going to the technical use of the word Sabda, we may argue that there can be no doubt as to Visvanātha's presenting the term Sabdabodha in the sense of Vākyaṭrthajñāna. This is warranted by his naming Proximity etc. as the auxiliary cause of Sabdabodha in a later Kārikā. It is obvious that Proximity etc. may pertain only to a sentence and not to a single word. As we shall see in the succeeding pages, the knowledge of Āsatti etc. has no scope
in the production of the meaning of an individual word. Asatti, yogyata etc. are essential only in effecting the logical relation between the meanings of different words in a sentence in order to bring out a total meaning, i.e., a Vakyartha. We can explain the Sabdabodha as the Vakyartha-jnana from a general point of view also. It is a fact, no doubt, that we do not find Sabda directly understood as a Pramanavakya in all systems of thought other than Nyaya. It is understood in the sense of Vedic word or words in general even when viewed by the Mimamsakas as the Pramaṇa. But yet there is no difference with regard to the opinion that the result of Sabdapramaṇa, whether it is a Pada or Vakya, is a Vakyarthajñana. All universally understand Sabdabodha as the Vakyarthajñana which is not different from the 'anvayabodha'.

Now we come to the second series ——

Karaṇa: The word Karaṇa is used in a variety of senses. Here, however, Karaṇa is a technical term used in the sense of a specific cause (Karaṇa) of an effect (Phala). In the

11. tatra tāvatpadairjñataiḥ padarthsamarape krte. asannikṛṣṭavakyarthajñanam sābdamitiiryate. MM, p. 92
   padarthaśnāne sthite ----- svasaṁsargarūpaṁ vākyārtham bodhayati ityayam tāvattārkikādisādāraṇaḥ paksah. MM, pp. 93-94.

12. It is used to mean a sense organ, bodily activity, effect, because, handwriting, specific dance or song, a particular tribe, a specific posture of a yogi, a court document etc.
   Vide Vācaspatyam.
sphere of Nyāya we come across two different concepts of Karana.

According to an earlier opinion, 'Karana' is an extra-ordinary cause possessed of an operation (Vyāpāra). But as per a later definition, Karana is simply an extra-ordinary cause. In the former definition a cause of an effect is viewed as extra-ordinary (asadḥāraṇa) when it is found not to be common; in the latter, this extra-ordinary cause is one that is immediately antecedent to an effect in the sense that the delay in its occurrence results in the non-occurrence of the effect.

In view of the earlier definition, the Karanasaṃjñā can be given to an extra-ordinary, i.e., uncommon cause provided that it is possessed of an operation (Vyāpāra) or its own. In view of the latter, the said Karana - Samīṇa would go to any immediately antecedent cause. From the

13. cf. karaṇatvam ca vyāpāravadāsādhaṇaḥkaraṇatvaṁ ghaṭaṁ prati kāpālasamyaśyagavāraṇāya vyāpāravaditi īśvarajñāna-vāraṇāyāḥsadhaṇaṇA. NSMR, p.5.
14. asadhaṇaḥ karaṇam karaṇam. TS(MB), p.37
15. phalayogavyaścchinnaḥ karaṇam karaṇam, padarthacandrika (commentary on Saptapadarthi), quoted in NK, p. 200.
later stand-point, the Vyāpāra itself would come to be admitted as a Karana since it precedes the effect more immediately than anything else. Such an admission would lead to an undesirable position. 17 As it is evident from the above Kārikā, of the EP, Viśvanātha leaves no room for confusing Vyāpāra for Karana. In the context of Śabdabodha as a Phala (effect), the element which is given the status of Vyāpāra is undoubtedly an immediately antecedent cause (asadhaṇāṇam karaṇam) which most immediately precedes the effect. But he gives the status of Karana to another element which of course is possessed of an operation. So in the case of Viśvanātha's Karana, only the earlier definition fits in. It may be pointed out again that the commentator, Govardhananāmīśra in course of his exposition of Annaṁbhāṭṭa's definition of Karana, comments that the qualification 'Vyāpāraṇa' (Possessed of an operation) should also be added. 18 Some editions of Annaṁbhāṭṭa's work show the reading 'vyāpāraṇa' also along with 'asadhaṇaṇa.' 19 If we accept this reading in case of the Tarkasamgraha, we may safely conclude that there is no general difference between the earlier and the later Nyāya-scholars regarding the concept of the Karana.

17. Dr. Dayānanda Bhārgava has also brought this undesirable position to our notice. Vide TS(MB), pp. 87-90.

18. vyāpāraṇaḥ satīti pūraṇīyam.
   anyathā kapālataṁ svayogayorativyāptih.
   Nyāyabodhinī, vide TS, p. 41.

19. (vyāpāraṇaḥ) asadhaṇāṇakaraṇaṃ karaṇam. TS, p. 36.
Here we may bring the analogy of the Grammarian's Karana not without an advantage. The Karana (the instrumental case) in Grammar is defined as a 'sādhakatama' Kāraka. The six types of cases (Kārakas), namely Kartā (Nominative), Karma (Accusative), Kārana (Instrumental), Sampradāna (Dative), Apādāna (Ablative) and Adhikaranaṇa (Locative) come to be beneficial (sādhaka) to i.e. give their own service to the Kriyā (the contextual verb) by being syntactically related to it (Kriyānvayin) in their respective way. But the Kārana Kāraka comes to be most beneficial (sādhakatama) to Kriyā by way of giving the best or greatest service (Prakṛṣṭopakāraka) in the matter of the completion of the action (Kriyāniśpatti).

The explanation of the qualification 'sādhakatama' as 'prakṛṣṭopakāraka' is further elucidated thus: Instrumentality (Karanatva) is recognised with regard to that thing just after the operation of which there emerges the completion of an action.

21. kriyānvayi kārakam.
   It is the traditional notion of the Pāṇinian system of Grammar as presented in a Convenient way by late Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar in his Vyākaraṇa Kaumādi.
22. kriyāsidhāhau prakṛṣṭopakārakāṁ kārakaṁ karanasaṁśād at kriyāniśpattāṁ syāt. 3K, under P 1.4.42.
   yadvāpārāṇantaraṁ kriyāniśpattāṁ tat prakṛṣṭam.
   kartṛvyāpārādhīnayadyapārāvyavahitaṁ kriyāniśpattāṁ tattasyāṁ karaṇaṁiti yāvat. Pālamonorāma, under above.
23. kriyāyāḥ pariniśpattiryadyapārādhāntaram.
   vivakṣyate yadā tatra karaṇatvaṁ tādaṁ smṛtām.
   VP, 3.7.90, p. 86.
action. In other words, a Karana is that which operates to bring in a result in immediate succession. As for illustration in the preposition, 'Hari cuts the wood with an axe,' we understand Hari as Kartā, the wood as Karma and an axe as Karana; all the three, come to contribute towards the act of cutting. But the presence of Hari and the wood would be of no avail unless the axe comes to operate. The operation of the axe in the form of contact with the wood (Kāstha-sāmyoga) would immediately bring about the result of cutting the wood.

The analogy between Karana of Grammarians and that of logicians may not be drawn too far. The Naiyāyikas conceive Karana basically as a Kāraṇa; while the Vaiyākaraṇas draw a line of demarcation between a Kāraṇa and a Kāraṇa. But here we want to point out only the affinity of the two schools in the matter of the concept of Kāraṇa. The affinity lies in the insistence on Vyāpāra (the state of possessing a Vyāpāra) of the element to be regarded as a Kāraṇa. We have reasons to believe that the Naiyāyikas' concept of Kāraṇa developed under the influence of that of the Vaiyā-karaṇas. 24

Of the Naiyāyikas, however, Jayantabhaṭṭa wants to give the status of Karana only to the sum-total of the causes responsible for the production of an effect as he feels that it is not possible to regard a particular cause as the most instrumental (Sādhakatama) in the matter. The other Naiyāyikas reject his view as they accept as Karana only a single cause possessed of an 'operation' (Vyāpāra). The widely accepted view is that this Karana is an 'asādhāraṇa kāraṇa' in the sense of being 'Vyāpārarat' and not in the sense of being 'phalayogavyavacchinnaam'. Hence in the matter of cutting some wood by an axe, the axe (and not the contact of the axe with the wood) comes to be the Karana. Only with this concept of Vyāpāra, the position of Visānātha tallys.

Dvāra: Dvāra in the above Kārika is used in the sense of Vyāpāra. The word Dvāra is found traditionally used as a synonym of Vyāpāra. Visānātha himself replaces the word Dvāra by the word 'vyāpāra' in the relevant Muktāvalī text. The word 'Dvāra' also means a way or medium or means. Hence the term is used in the sense of Vyāpāra which stands as a medium in-between the effect and the principal cause.

In the process of causation, Vyāpāra occupies an intermediate position. It is the immediate cause of the effect.

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25. *ibid.*
27. cf. *upāye nirgane dvāram.*

Trikāṇḍaseṣam quoted in the *Nārthasaśasamgraha,* p. 161.
itself being the effect of the chief cause (Karaṇa) of the final effect it (Vyāpara) produces. In traditionally handed down definition of Vyāpara, i.e., 'tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanakatvaṁ nāma vyāpārasyatvam'; 'tat' stands for 'karaṇa'. Hence 'tajjanyatve' means 'karaṇajanyatve'. Vyāpara itself is the effect of the Karaṇa, the principal cause of an effect. We have already stated that Karaṇa comes to distinguish itself from other causes of the effect by being 'vyāpāravat' i.e. by virtue of the possession of an operation. Now the final effect to be produced by Karaṇa immediately follows the Vyāpara. Thus Vyāpara comes to be immediately responsible for production of the (final) effect of which Karaṇa is the chief cause. Hence in the above definition, the second 'tajjanya' also stands for 'karaṇajanyana', meaning the final effect of which Vyāpara comes to be a 'janaka'. As for illustration, in the matter of cutting of some wood with an axe by someone, say Hari, the actual cutting of the wood (Vṛksachedana) immediately follows the contact (of the axe) with the wood (Kāśṭhasaṁyoga). This 'saṁyoga' is the immediate cause of the result, the cutting

23. cf. vyāpāratvaṁ ca dravyaṁ sati bhāvatve sati tajjanyatve ca sati tajjanyajanakatvam, NSMR, p.2, as quoted in NK, p. 830.

karaṇajanyatve sati karaṇajanyaphalajanakatvam ityartvah.

Nyāyasiddhāntamāṇjari-Prakṣa of Laugākṣibhāṣka, p.5, as quoted in NK, p. 830.
(chedana). This Śāmyoga occurs because of the 'kuṭhāra' which is the Samavāyikāraṇa for it. Here 'kuṭhāra' is the Karana and "Kāsthasaṃyoga" is the Vyāpāra. Now in the context of the verbal cognition, the final effect, i.e., the Sābdabodha immediately follows the knowledge of the meanings of words (Padārthajñāna). But this knowledge of meanings of words is caused by the knowledge of corresponding words (Padajñāna) which is the main cause in producing the Sābdabodha. Thus while Padajñāna serves as the Kāraṇa of a Sābdabodha, the Padārthajñāna comes to be the Vyāpāra as it is itself Kāraṇajanya, i.e., Padajñānajanya and yet is the Kāraṇajanyaphalajanaka, i.e., the immediate cause of the verbal cognition which is the final effect of the knowledge of words. We here do not discuss two other characteristics of Vyāpāra, i.e., 'dravyānyatva' (the state of being other than the Dravya) and 'bhāvatva' (the state of being bhāva) as the part of the definition of Vyāpāra containing these two characteristics does not have relevance to the context of verbal cognition as viewed by Viśvanātha. In the view of Viśvanātha, all the causes of Sābdabodha, i.e., Kāraṇa, Vyāpāra and Sahakārikāraṇas are finally some knowledge (jñāṇa) of this or that sort. Here, in the context of Sābdabodha, the Vyāpāra distinguishes itself from other Kāraṇas only by being Kāraṇajanya and Kāraṇajanyajanaka.
Sahakāri (Kāraṇa):

The word 'Sahakārini' is used in the Kārikā under discussion to mean a 'Sahakāri-Kāraṇa'.

Viśvanātha himself has defined a Kāraṇa (cause) as an invariable antecedent failing which there is no occurrence of the effect. The Kāraṇa is basically divided into three types, viz., Samavāyi, Asamavāyi and Nimitta Kāraṇa. It is apparently needless on our part to go for a discussion on the earlier two varieties as all the causes (Kāraṇa) responsible for the effect in the form of Verbal Knowledge (Sābdabodhaphala) belong to the third category. In the context of Sābdabodha, we have three Nimitta Kāraṇas, namely, Karana, Vyāpāra and Sahakāri Kāraṇa. But a Nimitta Kāraṇa is described as neither Samavāyi nor Asamavāyi. Hence, we shall have to take note also of Samavāyi and Asamavāyi Kāraṇas.

A Samavāyi Kāraṇa is that cause in which an effect (Karva) exists through the relation of Samavāya (Inherence). The cause which remains in the Samavāyi cause of an effect by the relation of Inherence is an Asamavāyi Kāraṇa. Of the three Nimitta Kāraṇas responsible for a Sābdabodha, Kāraṇa

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29. cf. anyathāsiddhiśūnyasya niyatā purvavartitā.
K 16.

30. samavāyikāraṇatvam jñeyamathāpyasamavāyīhetutvam
   evam nyāyanayajñāistṛtyamuktam nimittahetutvam.
K 17.

31. yat samavetām kāryām bhavati jñeyantu samāvayījanakaṁ tat.
    tatrāsannām janakaṁ dvitiyamābhyaṁ param tṛtyaṁ svat.
K 18.
is the chief one. This is because it is an extra-ordinary cause possessed of a Vyāpāra. Vyāpāra again is different from the other two causes as it is an effect of the Karana and at the same time a cause of the effect of that very Karana. The Sahakārikāraṇa is neither a Vyāpāra nor a Vyāpāravat (Kāraṇa). For the convenience of understanding, we can describe the three Kāranaś respectively as the instrumental, operative and auxiliary causes of an effect. 'Phala', as we usually understand, is a result or effect. But we are to note here that this Phala or result in the context of a 'Pramāṇa, the (Principal) cause of conveying a knowledge, is the very Pramāṇa or Valid knowledge. So, appropriately in the context of Śabdaprāmaṇa, the Śabdabodha or valid verbal knowledge is viewed as the Phala or result.

Vīśvaśāṅkha's description of the Śabdabodha with Prasādetvā as its Karana is in consonance with his earlier statement, 'padajñānakaranaḥ jñānam śabdabodhaḥ' which we come across in the chapter on Perception (Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa) of the Bhāṣāpariccheda. In course of the examination of the sources of valid knowledge (Pramāṇaparikṣā), Vīśvaśāṅkha divides knowledge basically into two types, Anubhava and Smṛti. Anubhava is again divided into four types, namely,

32. phalasmāṁyālakṣaṇāṁ tu janyatvam.
NSV, under NS 1.1.20.
33. idam tāvad pramāṇam ------ tatphalam,
pramāṇa bodha iti. STK, under 3K 5.
Perceptual, Inferential, Comparative and Verbal. Thereafter he determines them by showing their chief or extraordinary causes technically known as the Karana. He is found in that context to state that the Sabdabodha is the knowledge which has the knowledge of a Pada as its Karana. Thus we find that Visvanatha's description of Sabdabodha as having Padajnana as its Karana above is not abrupt.

Now we shall have to note that the 'tu' in the expression 'Padajnanta' in the Karika under discussion is obviously significant as it suggests an already existing controversy on the issue. The indeclinable 'tu' is used to give the idea that the author's present view is a departure from earlier ones.

In this context we have to remember that prior to Visvanatha, there existed several notions regarding the Sabdapramana, i.e., the Karana of Sabdabodha. Kumarila himself, under the Jaimini Sutra 1.1.2 introduces the alternatives in the context of the Sabdabodhakarana. The problem

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34. ------ buddhistu dvividhā matā. anubhūtiḥ smṛtisca syāt; anubhūtis’catuḥvidhā ---- pratyaksamapyaḥ smṛto’bhopamitiśabdajē. K, 51-52.

35. etāsām catasṛṇākaraṇāni catvāri ----- vyāptijñānakaraṇakām jñānamanumitiḥ. evaṁ sādṛśyajñānakaraṇakām jñānamupamamitiḥ. padajñānakaraṇakām jñānam sābdabodhaḥ. M text, vide BP, p.260-66

36. pramanāṁ tvapi sābdō va tajjñānam va nirūpyate. padārthastanmativā syādvākyārthādhihamo’pi va. pūrveśantu pramanatve phalatvam tasya gamyate. SV, 9 & 10, under MS 1.1.2.
is, which of these, namely, the word, its knowledge, the
meaning or its knowledge, or even the knowledge of the
sentence meaning be regarded as the Pramāṇa, i.e., Pramā-
Karaṇa. Animated discussions on the issue are conspicuously
present in all the important philosophical treatises. Śālika-
nātha also refers to such divergent views on the subject.37

We find in fine that while the Prābhākaras regard Pada
as the Śabdabodha-Karaṇa,38 the Bhāttas accept Padārtha as
such.39 In the school of Nyāya, Gautama and some of his

37. vākyamekām na nirbhāgaṁ vākyāntyo'vayavo'pi va
padaṁdām śārt isthānām va prathamaṁ padameva vā.
īyākhyātadapatamātraṁ va padārthaṁ vāpyanavitaṁ
sāmānyānvayabodhe yo heturvākyārthabodhane.
VM, p.24, vide PP.

38. padabhyā eva vākyārthapratyayo jāyate yathā/tathā
vayaṁ nibadhniṁāṁ prabhākararagurormatam
padabhya eva, na vākyad, nāpyantyavarnād, nāpi padārthebhya
ityarthah. VM, p.1, vide PP. and BR, under MS 1.1.24.
atovagamyate padabhya paḍārthā eva'vagamyante, na
vākyārthāh, paḍārthasamudāyena vākyārthāh avagamyate
---- tasmāt padabhya eva padārthapratyayah, padārthe-
bhyn vākyārthapratyayah. BR, pp. 257 & 298.
prāthamayādabhidhātrtvād tātparvāvagamādapi
padānāmāna sā saktirvaramabhypagamyatām.
VM, p.14, vide PP.

39. paḍārtheṇaṁ hi vākyārthe spaṣṭoktā'tra nimmattā. 32b
paḍairabhhihitāṁ svārthā vākyārthasyāvabodhakah. 34a
NRM, p. 98.
tasmānna vākyāṁ na padāṁi sāksādvākyārthabuddhim,
janayanti kintu/padasvarūpābhhihitaih paḍārthaiḥ
samlakṣyate'sāviti siddhametāt.
NRM, 42, p. 102.
followers admit Šabda as the Karana under discussion. We have earlier shown that this term 'Śabda' carries the sense of a Vākya. The later Naiyāyikas directly use this Śabda in the sense of a Vākya. Some Naiyāyikas proceed further even to regard Vākyajñāna or even Vākyartājñāna as the Śabdabodhakarana. Hence, Visvanātha had to include 'tu' in his Kārika quite significantly to assert his own position.

Regarding the question as to whether the Padas or Padarthas are the causes of Verbal Knowledge, the Prabhākaras hold that the Vākyārtha in the form of an Anvaya is expressed by the Padas themselves. If it could be understood from the Padarthas directly, then there should have been a Śabdabodha even on the basis of ideas of an object comprehended by other means of valid knowledge. This is out of experience.

40. āptopadesaḥ śabdah. NS 1.1.7; āptopadesaśaṁarthāyaḥ accādbhādaroṣṭhāsampratyayā. NS 2.1.53.

41. āptavākyam śabdah ——— vākyārthajñānaṁ śabdajñānaṁ. tatkaraṇaṁ śabdah. TS, p. 65-68.

42. āptopadesaḥ śabdah atra śabda iti lakṣyapadam. āptopadesa iti laksanam. upadisyate 'nenetypadeso vākyajñānaṁ tadarthajñānaṁ vābhidhiyate, tatra vākyajñānapramāṇapakṣa tadarthajñānaṁ phalam, padārthasart-yādayas tatvāntarālikā itikartavyatā. tadarthajñānapramāṇapakṣe tu hānādi buddhiḥ phalam. NVTT, p. 201.

43. atah padābhidheya evānvitarūpo vākyārthaḥ na tu padārthagamyah. padārthagamyatve ca pramāṇaṁantarapratipannānāmapi padārthānāmanvayaḥ syāt. na sāsau dhṛṣṭaye. MM, p. 96. - 97
Prabhākaras hold that the words do have isolated meanings, but they do not stop at that. They proceed further to give the related sense, the Vākyārtha. Thus the Prabhākaras' approach to Śābdabodhakarana is from their bias for Anvita-bhidhānāvāda. Similarly the Bhāttas, the Abhihitānvayavadins, true to their spirit as such, maintain that words denote unrelated meanings, and these meanings aided by Ākāṃkṣā, Yogyātā and Sanniddhi come factually to give rise to the Vākyārthaśāna, i.e., the Śābdabodha.

In view of such an already existing controversy on the issue, the use of 'tu' by a later writer in the context of ascertaining the Śābdabodhakarana, comes to be quite natural. But Viśvanātha, as is apparent from the relevant Muktāvalī

44. nanu kiṃ kevalapadārthabodhaḥ padabhyo nāṣtyeva.
   astīti brūmaḥ padāni tāvatprthakpadārthānāṃ smārayantyeva,
   na tu tāvatā viramanti, smāritameva tu svām svamartham
   punaritarapadārthānvitataḥ smārayantyeva viramantīti
   rāddhāntāḥ, ataḥ padābhidheya evānvitarūpo vākyārthaḥ,
   na tu padārthagamyah. MM, p. 96.

45. cf. tadidaṃ gurumataṁ gauravādeva heyam. asmanmate hi
   padārthānāṃ smṛtisiddhatvāt vākyārthaśāpyāpi laksanāsvidd-
   hatvāt śākyantarakalpanaiva nāstī iti padesu śaktikal-
   panāprastāva eva bhavatāṁ gauravamāyātamaṃ. kiṃca padaśāk-
   titāḥ padārthasaktireva laghīyasi ---- yattu padārthāra-
   manvayabodhakatve pramanāntarapratipannāmaṃapayvayaḥ
   syādityuktaḥ tatra brūmaḥ ---- tasmād yavasthākta evānvaya-
   prakāro laghīyān iti ---- atrākāṃkṣā ca yogyavān sannī-
   dhiśceti tattvāyam. vākyārthāvagame sarvāḥ karāṇatvena
text, seems to be interested only in refuting the logic that the Pada is the Karana of Sābdabodha. He does not discuss or refer to the claims of factors like Padārtha, Vākya and Vākyārtha in the context.

Now we propose to examine Visvanātha's position regarding the Karana of Sābdabodha in the light of his assertion 'Padajñānantu' etc. If we explain the term 'Padajñānam' in the expression 'Padajñānantu Karanam' as 'Padasya jñānam' and understand thereby that Visvanātha conceives the knowledge of a Pada (a single word) as the Karana of Sābdabodha it will give rise to some difficulties as detailed below.

(1) The generally accepted position in the entire school of Nyāya is that Sābda as Pramāṇa, i.e., a Pramā-Karana is a 'Vākya' (a sentence). Gautama defines Sābda as 'Aptopadesa' and the later Naiyāyikas, as already pointed out have in their analysis shown clear indications of understanding this 'upadesa' in the sense of Vākya. As we have already observed, presumably for both perspicuity and simplification, the Navya Naiyāyikas like Anambhātta have directly declared Aptavākya as the Sābda. Keeping apart the issue of requiring an Āpta for its utterance or use to validate itself, it is in structure a Vākya or sentence which stands already accepted as the Karana for Sābdabodha. Under the circumstances is it possible for Visvanātha to deviate so much from the stand taken by all his predecessors including Gautama in order to make the knowledge of even a single Pada accepted as
(123)

Sābdabodhakaraṇa?

(2) Such a position is not logically tenable for Visvānātha himself, in view of his own concept of Sābdabodha. If the knowledge of a single word be the Karaṇa, the knowledge of its meaning will be the Vyāpāra of the contextual Sābdabodha. The Sābdabodha as the effect (Phala) must immediately follow the knowledge of the meaning of that word as demanded by the definitions of Vyāpāra and Karaṇa. But it does not take place as it is not possible. Sābdabodha is universally accepted as the Vākyārthajñāna, i.e., the knowledge of the total meaning of a sentence brought about by the syntactical connection amongst different meanings of different words in it. Visvānātha himself envisages such a position as he accepts the knowledge of proximity, compatibility, expectancy and the speaker's intention (Asatiyogāyatākāśatātparyajñānam) as an auxiliary cause in the matter of Sābdabodha. He uses the word Sābdabodha and not Sābdabodha, and there is nothing to prove that he does not understand the Sābdabodha in the universally accepted sense of 'Vākyārthajñāna'. There is again no scope for the knowledge of Āsatti, etc., to enter in between a single word and its meaning. Sābdabodha or 'Vākyārthajñāna', i.e., the 'Sādāpramaṇaphala' is universally understood as brought about by the knowledge of the relation of a meaning of a word with regard to that of another in a sentence and so and so forth (ekapadarthe aparapadarthasamsargaviṣayaśastra-jñānam). So it is not possible for Visvānātha to make a
big departure by not admitting Vākya as the Sābdabodhakarana.

It will be reasonable, therefore, on our part, to understand the term 'Padajñānam' as 'Padānām jñānam'. In that case, 'Padajñāna' would amount to mean 'Padasamāhajñāna' and the stand taken by Visvanātha would be neither off the track nor out of logic. Here we note that there is no difficulty on our part to understand a 'Padasamāha' (read from the expression Padānām) in the sense of a Vākya, as in the concept of Naiyāyikas, any collection of words possessed of a syntactical connection amongst themselves because of satisfying the necessary conditions, Asattijñāna etc., can be regarded as a Vākya.46 Instead of explaining the Padajñānam of Visvanātha as 'Padānām jñānam' we can also interpret the single word 'Padam' to carry the sense of plurality to mean a collection of words and finally a Vākya. We can do it on the strength of a grammatical rule which enjoins that a word may be used optionally in the singular number to mean an entire class.47

46. mithaḥ sākāmkaśaśābdasya vyūha vākyaṁ caturvidham. SSP, p. 63.
subantaṁ ca tīṁantaṁ ca subantaikasamanvitam.
suptiṁantadvayigarbham vākyametaccaturvidham.
Kṛṣṇaṁkaritaṁ, under above.

47. Jātyākhyāyāmekasmin eva vacanamanyatācasyām.

P 1.2.58.
If we understand, however, the word 'Pada' in Visvanātha's expression 'Padajñāna' in its grammatical sense supported by the definition 'Suptiñantaṁ padam', we may not find any difference between Visvanātha and other Naiyāyikas like Annāmbhaṭṭa, even in case of recognising a single Pada as the Sābdabodhakaraṇa. This is because a Pada of the Vaiyākaraṇas is a Vākya for the Naiyāyikas. We have already pointed out that according to the later Naiyāyikas including Visvanātha, anything that can signify a meaning is a Pada. We may recapitulate the idea again. A 'Pada' of the Vaiyākaraṇas has two parts, namely a 'Pratipadika' or a 'dhatu' and a suffix. Whichever group here we choose for examination, the parts by themselves are significant (Śakta, i.e., Śaktimat) and hence are 'padas' in view of the Naiyāyikas. We shall find in the exposition of the Muktāvalī hereafter that Visvanātha himself admits 'dhatu', 'prakṛti', 'pratyaya' etc. as significative as he maintains that "one can learn the significative power of 'dhatu', 'prakṛti', etc. with the aid of Grammar." And by being significative a letter or letters in any combination may be a Pada. So when judged from the standpoint of the Naiyāyikas, the difference between a grammatical Pada and a grammatical Vākya comes to be almost nil. A grammatical Pada is a logical Vākya which allows scope between its parts for functioning of Āsattijñāna etc. in order to produce a total meaning in the shape of a relational thought. Thus Sābdabodha is possible even in the context of the so-called
grammatically single expression 'ghaṭah'. The expression 'ghaṭah', a Vākya for the Naiyāyikas, comes to give its own Sabdabodha which is the knowledge of the relation that exists between the meanings of the Pratipadika ghaṭa and the suffix 'su' in the sense of Kartā. Under the circumstances the term Pada in the expression Padajñānantu may be taken to mean a Vākya for the Naiyāyika Visvanātha.

It may be noticed that Visvanātha makes an improvement in the Naiyāyikas' concept of Sabdabodhakarana. Gautama, maintains that Āptopadesa is the Sabdaprāmaṇa, i.e., Sabdabodhakarana. Now if we understand 'upadesa' only in the sense of instruction, the non-instructive sentences consequently would lose the status of the Pramāṇa even when they are Āptokta (i.e., uttered by Āptas). Hence, to accept Āpta-vākyya (and not Āpta-upadesa), as the Pramāṇa covering thereby all reliable statements, instructive or otherwise, is an improvement no doubt. But there still remains a lacuna. When the emphasis is laid on a Vākya being directly recognised as the Sabdaprāmaṇa, it carries the impression that words involved in the sentence shall have to be audibly uttered. But the Sabdabodha is found to take place even when the Vākya or the collection of words physically stands unheard for not being uttered. So Gautama's concept of Sabda leaves a loophole to catch the notice of his successors like Visvanātha. So Visvanātha

48. cf. āptopadesāḥ Sabda iti gautamasūtrānuruddhācchabdasya pramāṇatve doṣah syādataḥ Sabdabodhe padajñānād karaṇamit-yabhhihitam. MUS, vide BPS, p. 411.
maintains in his *Muktāvalī* that in order to give due recognition to the *Sābdabodhas* occurring as they do in case of writings by a silent person etc., the knowledge of a *Pada* (samūha) (i.e. *Vākya*) and not directly the *Pada* (samūha), should be treated as the *Karaṇa* of *Sābdabodha*. It cannot be said that prior to *Vīṣvanātha*, none did try to improve upon the earlier concept of *Sābdabodhakaraṇa*. *Vācaspatimisra* in his *Tātparyatīkā* counts the knowledge of the meaning of a *Vākya* along with that of a *Vākya* as the *Sābdabodhakaraṇa*. *Vīṣvanātha* might have been influenced by *Vācaspati* to make a further improvement. The admission of mere *Vākya*, as the *Karaṇa* of *Sābdabodha* does not cover all cases of *Sābdabodha*. But the admission of the knowledge of a *Vākya* even in the form of *Padasamūha* as such would cover all cases. Hence, *Vīṣvanātha* as a matter of simplification comes to admit only the *Vākyajñāna* as the *Sābdabodhakaraṇa*. He has reasonably done so. The knowledge of a *Vākya* presupposes the existence of a *Vākya*. Can there be the knowledge of a *Vākya* without a *Vākya*, uttered or otherwise? So the admission of the knowledge of a *Vākya* as the *Karaṇa* in question amounts to the basic admission of *Vākya* as such.

49. *atra śābda iti laksyapadam. āptopadesā iti laksanaṃ. upadisyate′nennyupadeso vākyajñānaṃ tadarthajñānaṃ vābhidhiyate, tatra vākyajñānaprāmāṇyapakṣe tadarthajñānaṃ phalam, padarthasmṛtyādayastvāntarālikā itikartavyata tadarthajñānaprāmāṇyapakṣe* — *NVTT* p. 201.
A very pertinent question arises here. If Viśvanātha did accept Vākyajñāna as the Śabdabodhakaraṇa, he should have directly used the expression 'vākyajñāna' instead of 'padajñāna' to mean the former in a round about way. Yes, Viśvanātha avoids the use of the word Vākya in the concept of Śabdabodhakaraṇa deliberately to arrest misgivings that may arise as a result.

As far as we can gather the idea from Viśvanātha and other Naiyāyikas, the process through which a Śabdabodha is produced is as follows:

(1) At first the words (padas) in a sentence come to be heard or understood as heard. In the sentence 'ghāto'ti', the words will be 'ghāta', 'h', 'as' and 'ti'. Thus the knowledge of all the words in the sentence form 'one and the first unit' as a factor responsible for a Śabdabodha. Now just as there is difficulty in admitting a single Pada as the Śabdabodhakaraṇa, there is similarly a difficulty in naming directly a Vākya as such. The necessity of all the individual words being known shall not be duly recognised in that case, and the role that the individual words play in bringing about their respective individual meanings by virtue of their own significative power will stand unadmitted. But the admission of Padasamūha which virtually means a Vākya, in the concept of Śabdabodhakaraṇa is the most possible ideal position in the context.
(2) Next to the knowledge of Padas in a Vākyā, in the context of a Śabdabodha, there comes the recollection of the meanings of the words (Padārthasmaranam). This Padārthasmarana is actually the knowledge of the things signified by the words. Now if Vākyā is directly named as Śabdabodhakaraṇa, it will be utterly confusing and misleading to say that by the knowledge of a Vākyā, one comes to recollect the meanings of the individual words. And there must be the recollection of the individual words to serve as Vyāpāra in the process of Śabdabodha. Moreover, only individual words are significant (sakta) to convey their individual meanings. Naiyāyikas are clear in this regard that the Vākyā or sentence as a whole does not possess the primary power of signification. The knowledge of the Vākyārtha again can never be Vyāpāra as it is itself the effect (Phala). Under the circumstances it is not possible to speak of Vākyā directly as the Śabdabodhakaraṇa in the interest of the recognition of the intermediate stages involved. As a matter of fact, the knowledge of the meanings of all the words in a sentence form the second unit as a factor responsible for production of a Śabdabodha.

(3) Then comes the knowledge of the mutual connection (saṁsargajñāna) of things already recollected. This saṁsargajñāna is virtually the Śabdabodha.
We may conclude that by admitting Pada (samūha) jñāra as the Kāraṇā Viśvanātha not only simplifies the issue, but presents also the concept of the Sābdapramāṇa in a clear way so as to cover all cases of Sābdabodha, but at the same time he does not make any basic departure from the stand taken by the earlier Naiyāyikas including Gautama.

M(1). sābdabodhaprakāraṁ darśayati padajñānāntviti:

'Here the Kārika-kāra shows the process of Sābdabodha with the words — only the knowledge of Pada etc.'

As is observed in the Muktāvalī above, Viśvanātha has shown the process of Sābdabodha in his Kārika 'padajñānaṁ' etc. The term Sābdabodha is already explained. 'Sābdabodha śya prakāraṁ, tam'. 'Prakāra' here means the process of the involvement of causes leading to an effect. Viśvanātha's intention is to show how the Sābdabodha as an effect results from the operation of some principal cause along with certain auxiliary ones. That Viśvanātha comes to deal with the 'sābdabodha' a bit elaborately may be the result of a direct influence over him of his celebrated predecessor, Gaṅgesā, the author of the Tattvacīntāmaṇi. Though Sābda has been accepted by all the Naiyāyikas, their treatment of Sābdabodha is not found to be so much elaborate as that of Gaṅgesā. Gaṅgesā for the first time deals with the topic in a very detailed manner in the fourth section of his work Tattvacīntāmaṇi. Thereafter Jānakīnātha Bhāṭṭācārya, though less
extensively, follows Gaṅgēsa's pattern of exposition of śabda. Hence the work that has influenced the Bhasāpariścheda in the context of such a treatment of śabda may also be the Nyāyasiddhāntamānjarī of Ṣaṇkhinātha Bhāttācārya. In comparison to Gaṅgēsa, however, Viśvanātha is less elaborate, much simpler and even less cryptic in his language. Nevertheless, the pattern of the treatment as well as the approach to the topic along with the illustrations in Viśvanātha's work immediately remind the reader of the earlier Nyāya treatise, Tattvacintāmani. While Gaṅgēsa presents the older views exhaustively same-time even with categorical references to the sources of the views discussed, Viśvanātha's references to the earlier views are casual, concise and sometimes even not immediately discernible.

It is interesting to note that unlike some other Naiyāyikas such as Annambhāṭṭa, Viśvanātha does not proceed in his treatment of śabdabodha with a definition of śabda. We do not come across any specific definition of śabda in Viśvanātha's work. We simply find Viśvanātha describing śabda as a specific attribute of ākāśa and dividing it into Dhvani and Varna.

As we have already observed, a śabdabodha as a 'vākārthajñāna' involves certain Padas constituting a Vākya. But

50. ākāsasya tu vijñeyah śabdo vaisēśiko guṇah. K, 44.
Visvanātha is not found defining the technical terms, Pāṇa and Vākya also. It may be guessed that Visvanātha is bent on making a treatment in his work of only those topics and issues which stand hitherto undiscussed or not yet well-chalked out or which still remain controversial. In the context of problems and issues, therefore, except those which are found to be treated independently or atleast found to be contradicted, we may have to accept the position that Visvanātha believes in definitions and ideas as given by his predecessors in the school of Nyāya.

M(2). na tu jñāyamānaṁ padaṁ karaṇam, padābhāve'pi maunislokādau sābdabodhāt.

'But the Pada that is being known is not the Karaṇa (of sābdabodha), inasmuch as there is sābdabodha even where there is no such 'jñāyamāna pada' as in the case of a verse (mentally recited) by a person under the vow of silence and so on.'

The text of the Muktāvalī above is obviously with reference to the Kārikā text, 'padajñānantu'. As we have already pointed out, the particle 'tu' in the Kārikā is significant. Visvanātha here in the Muktāvalī, as we have observed earlier, explains in his own way the significance of 'tu' he uses in the Kārikā.
In the light of our earlier arguments, the word 'pada' used by Visvanātha in the context of the concept of Śabdabodhakarana is to be understood as 'padasamūha' if and when Pada is taken from the stand-point of the Naiyayikas. If, however, it is understood in the sense accepted by the Vaiyākaranas, it would, of its own course, come to be a 'padasamūha' of the Naiyayikas.

Visvanātha describes the knowledge of a Pada as the Karaṇa of Śabdabodha. He thereby means that the Pada in question is not necessarily to be uttered (uccāryamāṇa). This very idea is sought to be brought home by the use of the particle 'tu' in the Kārikā. There the particle is being used in the sense of 'eva' (only). Thereby a stress is given on the very knowledge of a word instead of on a word as being known, i.e., uttered. This idea as is rightly pointed out in DK,52 has been sought to be brought out in the Muktāvalī above 'na tu jñāyamānaṁ', etc. The idea may be otherwise presented thus: even if there is no utterance of a Pada, the very knowledge of it will be entitled to be the Karaṇa of the corresponding Śabdabodha. If only a Pada known by virtue of being uttered is allowed the status of a Śabdabodhakarana, it would lead us to an anomalous position; because one comes to have Śabdabodha even from the writings of a silent person like some one under a vow of

52. evakārārthakasya mūlastha-'tu'-śabdasya vyavacchedyām spaṣṭayati muktāvalyām na tu jñāyamānanīti.
DK, vide NSM, pp. 263-64.
silence. On the strength of the word 'etc.' (ādi) in the expression 'maunixlokađau', the physical movements by hand etc. indicative of number etc. are also to be understood. Here we are to note that the expression 'jñāyamāna' in the Muktāvalī above is to be understood as 'uccāryamāna' and the expression 'padabhāve'pi' should stand for 'uccāryamānapadabhāve'pi'. Thus a Pada can safely remain 'unknown' (na jñāyamānam) in the sense of being unuttered (na uccāryamānam), while its mere knowledge comes to be a Sābdabodhakarana. In the light of such a position, the concept of Karana would justifiably cover all cases including those which involve even the writings of a silent person, mere movement of two hands or fingers etc. In addition to Viśvanātha's own explanation in the Muktāvalī, we can also recapitulate our earlier discussion on the issue here. In addition to what we have already stated, we like to add that even the earlier Naiyāyikas were seized of this controversial issue of Sābdabodhakarana. We already referred to Vācaspati Miśra having admitted both Vākyajñāna and Vākyārthajñāna as the Karana of a Sābdabodha.

53. maunixlokađau ityādinā dvitvādibodhakavijātiyahastaceśțādeś saṅgrahaḥ. DK, vide NSM, p. 264.
   ādinā dvitvādibodhaka-hastaceśṭādeś parigrahaḥ.
   MUS, vide BPS, p. 411.

54. padabhāve jñāyamānapadabhāve, padajñēcāraṇābharāve iti yāvat.
   MUS, vide BPS, p. 411.
Udayanācārya, as is understood by the scholars, was also alive to the rival views of the two schools of Mīmāṃsakas in this regard. The Bhāttas insisted that the Padārtha directly serves as the Karana of a Sāabdabodha in the shape of a Vākyārthajñāna. The Prabhakaras, to the contrary, assert that the Pada and not the Padārtha should be given the status of a Karana. They contend that Padas appear earlier to Padārthas; the former signify the latter and come to be the determinate of the purport in the sentence. Hence Padas deserve to be admitted as being possessed of the basic capacity in producing a verbal knowledge. The author of the Nyāyakusumāñjali, as we can understand him, tried to strike a balance by maintaining that neither Pada nor Padārtha, but the Padajñāna be accepted as Sāabdabodhakarana.55

We find that Gaṅgesopādhyaśya, names 'Sābda' as Ābca-bodbhakarana. Annambhatta also admits 'Sābda' as Sābdajñāna-karana.56 In view of the Naiyāyikas' general acceptance of

55. yattu "padām na karaṇam, kintu padārtha eva, at eva padārthakarana kāvya-ārthajñānāt kavi-kavyādi-kaṃ; dvāramityatra dvāropasthitavai padārthani śthānam, kṣāvi-rāhana anvaya' bodhih. "sābdi hi ākaśaḥ sābdena eva pūryate" iti nyāyat. at eva padānāmavacchedakatvam, padajñopasthitam vinā padārthā'nvaya' bodhaḥ taduktaṃ prāthamāyādabhidhārttvāt tātparyopagamadānī padānāmeva sā śaktirvaramabhupagamyātām.---- iti gurumatamapāyāstam ---- padajñānasvaiyā karana tvāt padārthasmrtervyāparatvāt ---- vide NKU, pp. 153-161

56. vākyārthajñānam śabdajñānam. tatkaranaṃ śabdaḥ TS, n.16.
Aptavākya as the Śabdaprāmaṇa, it follows that this word 'Śabda' which is given the status of Śabdaprāmākaraṇa is after all a Vākyā. But in view of the Naiyāyikas' notion of Śabdabodna in the shape of Vakyaṛthajñāna involving a process of syntactical relation between the Padārthas conveyed by the Padas with the aid of Āsatti, Yogyata etc., it is very difficult to understand the Śabdabodhakaraṇa directly as a Vākyā. So we tend to understand even the word 'Śabda' used by Gaṅgāśa and Annāmbhaṭṭa in the sense of 'padasamūha' or loosely the speech. As against this amount of ambiguity Visvanātha's description of Kāraṇa as Padāyāna is quite clear and precise.

M(3). padārthadhihīriti. padajñayapadārthasmarāṇam vyāpārām. anyathā padajñānavataḥ pratyakṣādinā padārthopasthitāvapi śabdabodhāpatteḥ.

'The knowledge of the meaning of Pada etc. The recollection of the meaning of Pada produced by (the knowledge of) that (very) Pada is the Vyāpāra. Otherwise it could not be claimed that a man who possesses the knowledge of a Pada should have Śabdabodha even when he has the knowledge of the object that could be denoted by the Pada only through perception etc.'

Here in the Muktāvālī, Visvanātha elucidates the expression 'padārthadhīḥ' occurring in the Kārikā, 'padajñavanta' etc.
After the 'padajñāna' being ascertained as the karaṇa for a sābdabodha, 'padarthadhī' is named here as the Vyāpāra of that karaṇa. The word Dvāra in the Āraṇī is obviously used in the sense of this Vyāpāra. We have already discussed the concept of Vyāpāra and the use of the word Dvāra in the sense of Vyāpāra.

Visvanātha, as he explains in the Muktavali above, understands the word 'dhiḥ' in the sense of smarana (recollection) and replaces Padarthadhī as 'padarthasmarāṇaṃ'.

Now the Padarthadhīḥ, i.e., 'padarthasmarāṇaṃ' (the knowledge of the meaning of a word) must be 'Padajñānaṃ' or, i.e., is to be invariably generated or produced by the knowledge of the corresponding Pada in order to qualify itself as the Vyāpāra of a corresponding sābdabodha. As rightly pointed out by Pancānana Sāstrī, the expression 'Padajanya' in 'Padajanyapadarthasmarāṇaṃ' etc. of the Muktavali is to be understood as 'Padajñānajanya' in the light of Visvanātha's own stand that only 'Padajñāna' is to be admitted as sābdabodhakaraṇa. If the mere knowledge of an object (Padarthasmarāṇa) without any reference to its being produced by the knowledge of the corresponding Pada is allowed to be a Vyāpāra of a sābdabodhakaraṇa, it would lead to serious irregularities. In such a case, a person with the knowledge of a Pada would be supposed to have the sābdabodha.

even where the knowledge of the object (padārtha) occurs to him through Perception etc. (pratyakṣādi) and not as 'prajñānajanya'. This is not a desirable position as other Pramāṇas should find no place in the domain of Sabdāpramāṇa, at its own cost. We have to concede that 'pratyakṣāpramāṇa' is involved in the auditory perception of individual words, in the very initial stage. Anumānapramāṇa is also involved in one's learning the significative power (saktigraha) of a word by observing the usage of the elderly persons. After ascertaining the significative power of the Padas one comes from the knowledge of the Padas to the knowledge of the objects signified by the Padas. Thus the process leads to what is called Sābdabodha. But if the knowledge of the Padas is deprived of or disallowed the function of signifying the objects, the knowledge of Padas no longer remains a Karana in true sense of the term. As a matter of fact, the domain of Sabdāpramāṇa stands disrupted thereby. Hence the need to restrict the status of a Vyāpāra of a Sābdabodhakarana only to Padajñānajanyapadārthasmarana, i.e., the knowledge of an object only as generated by the knowledge of the corresponding Pada. The idea can be put like this. If a person knows the word 'Ganges' and at the same time has a visual perception of the current of water of the river Ganges and yet does not have any knowledge of necessary connection between his knowledge of the 'Gaṅgāpada' and that of a 'jalapravāhavisesa', the object perceived, he may be said to have a 'pratyakṣaiśāna'.
and never a Sābdabodha. This is because his knowledge of the object (Padārthasāmarāṇa) here results not from any knowledge of the corresponding Pada although it may be that he knows the Pada.

M(4).  tatrāpi vṛttyā padajñyatvām bodhyam. anyathā
ghaṭādipadāt samavāyasambandhānākāśāsmaṇe jāte
ākāśasyāpi sābdabodhāpatteḥ.

'Even in that case, the act of producing (the recollection of the meaning of a Pada) by the (knowledge of the) Pada should be understood to be by means of (the knowledge of) a Vṛtti. Otherwise, there will be the scope for claiming that even the idea of the Ether (ākāśa) is a case of Sābdabodha from the word jar (ghaṭa) simply because of its being recollected by virtue of its having the relation of inherence (samavāya) with the jar (ghaṭa)'.

'Tatrāpi' in the Muktavali above refers to the preceding text 'padajñyapadārthasāmarāṇam'. By virtue of its locative sense, 'tatrāpi' means 'padajñyapadārthasāmarāṇa'. Here also 'padajña' is to be taken as 'padajñānajña'. In the earlier Muktavali 'padajñyapadārthasāmarāṇam' etc., Viśvētāttra asserts that in order to generate the Sābdabodha in a particular context, the knowledge of the meaning of a word (Padārthasāmarāṇa) must be due to the knowledge of the corresponding word (Padajñāna) and not because of any other factor. Here
he observes further that the generation of the Padārthajñāna by the Padajñāna must be specifically by means of Vṛtti-jñāna (the knowledge of the significative power of the word in the context). In the exposition of the immediately preceding Muktāvalī, we observed that even if a person possesses both 'Padajñāna' and 'Padārthajñāna', he cannot be said to have obtained the contextual Śabdabodha unless his 'Padārthajñāna' is due to his knowledge of some sort of connection between the Pada and the Padārtha. This connection hinted earlier must not be other than Vṛtti. Viśvanātha will assert hereafter that this Vṛtti is nothing but a specific relation that exists between Pada and Padārtha. In 'anyatha' etc. of the Muktāvalī, Viśvanātha points out the serious irregularity that may result in the event of not admitting the knowledge of Vṛtti in the matter of producing the Padārthasmarana by the relevant Padajñāna. If the Padajñāna is allowed to give rise to the 'Padārthasmarana' by means of the knowledge of any sort of sambandha (relation), then one will obviously have the Śabdabodha with reference to Ether (ākāśa) from any word like 'jar' (ghata) inasmuch as the relation of Inherence (samavāya) exists between Ākāśa and any Pada that is basically a sound-unit or a collection of it. Viśvanātha earlier maintains that Śabda (sound unit) is a specific quality (Vaiśeṣika guna) of Ākāśa (ether), one of/nine Dravyas. A

53. ākāśasya tu vijñeyah śabdo vaiśeṣiko guṇah.

K, Vide BPS, p. 194.
quality exists only being inherent in i.e. not being separable from the qualified (gūṇī). Hence the knowledge of the qualified object will lead to that of the quality, vice versa. As a result, the knowledge of the Śabda in the form of 'ghaṭa' etc. will automatically bring about the knowledge of the Ākāśa (Ether) also. It will not be a desirable position to admit Śabdabodha in case the knowledge of a sound resulting from hearing of any word brings about the knowledge of Ether. In order to avoid such a difficulty, Viśvanātha demands the knowledge of Vṛtti in the matter of giving rise to the knowledge of a meaning by the knowledge of a word.

Thus, Viśvanātha, in full agreement with his predecessors recognises the 'Vṛttidhiḥ' (the Knowledge of Vṛtti) as responsible in the matter of a 'Padajñāna' giving rise to corresponding 'Padarthajñāna', which leads to the corresponding Śabdabodha. But here is a problem. Viśvanātha, in the Kārikā above, refers only to the 'Saktidhiḥ' (the knowledge of Sakti) as an aid in the matter. Sakti there cannot be taken to stand for Vṛtti as Viśvanātha himself in the Muktāvalī text hereafter describes Sakti as one of the two kinds of Vṛtti. A particular variety cannot be taken to mean the whole class it belongs to. Had there been two authors, separately for the Kāmd the M, there would have been, however, no problem. But as we have not objected to

59. vṛttis'ca śabdabodhahetupadarthopasthityanukulaṇpadarthajñānahaṁ sambandhah. TC, p. 627.
the single authorship for both the works, we are to see if the author is not involved in a self-contradiction. We are here to read the mind of Visvanātha for not using 'Vṛtti' directly in place of Saktidhiḥ in the Kārikā. We also cannot argue the case as a metrical necessity for lack of any difference in structure of both the expressions.

On the strength of the following calculations, we feel that Visvanātha's reference to 'Saktidhiḥ' instead of Vṛtti is neither arbitrary nor without motive.

(1) Visvanātha, recognises only two significative powers of a word, namely Śakti and Laksanā. There is nothing to prove Visvanātha's admission of Vyākaraṇa and Viyakaraṇa. The two 'Padavruttis' admitted by him, Śakti and Laksanā, respectively stand for primary and secondary powers of verbal signification. He uses the word Vṛtti widely in the sense of any significative verbal function in order to cover both Śakti and Laksanā. Unlike an Ālāmkaśika or Vaiyakaraṇa, he does not make indiscriminate use of the word Śakti as a synonym of Vṛtti. The Śakti of Visvanātha undoubtedly stands for Abhidhā function as admitted in other schools of thought. Hence there arises the possibility of Visvanātha being involved in a case of self contradiction as the knowledge of both Śakti and Vṛtti has been held as auxiliary cause in the matter of Saṃdabodha in two separate observations. It stands admitted that in the matter of Saṃdabodha, the
Padajñāna as 'Śabdabodhakaraṇa' comes to give rise to the 'padārthadhīḥ', the 'śabdabodhavyāpāṁś' on the strength of a significative power, sometimes Śakti and sometimes Lakṣaṇā. So our immediate impression is quite likely that Viśvanātha should have directly used 'Vṛttidhīḥ' in the concerned Karikā.

But compared to the scope of Śakti, that of Lakṣaṇā is very much limited. In our day to-day life, only a few cases of Śabdabodha are covered by Lakṣaṇā in comparision to Śakti or Abhidhā. Lakṣaṇā operates in the matter of production of a Śabdabodha only when Śakti fails to cover it for whichever reason it may be.

(2) It is Śakti that may be called a relation between a Pada and Padārtha (padapadārthasambandha) in true sense of the term. Because according to Viśvanātha himself, Lakṣaṇā is a relation only between śakyārtha and another meaning (that comes to be later designated as Lakṣyārtha). We can call Lakṣaṇā a relation between a Pada and Padārtha only indirectly. Hence Viśvanātha might have felt the necessity to bring Śakti to lime-light which it deserves by mentioning it at the earliest opportunity.

(3) So we feel that by giving the expression 'Śaktidhīḥ', Viśvanātha wants to pinpoint the importance of Śakti (or the primary power) and in doing so, he commits not crime. It is because every case of Lakṣaṇā presupposes an earlier Śakti. Without
a preceding Sakti for conveying a sakyaarthta, there can be
no Lakṣaṇā in the form of 'sakyasambandha'. We shall eluc-
date the concept in the succeeding pages in the context of
the exposition of the relevant BP text dealing with Lakṣaṇā.
Though Vṛtti is subsequently divided into Sakti and Lakṣaṇā,
Visvānātha's presentation of Sakti to stand for both itsel-
and Lakṣaṇā is quite logical in view of Sakti being the very
basis of Lakṣaṇā.

M(5). vṛttisā ca sakti-laksanānyatarasambandhayat. 'vṛtti
again is the relation (in the form) of either Sakti or Lakṣaṇā.'

Now Visvānātha comes to deal with the significative
power of a word. The general name given by him to it is
Vṛtti. He understands this power to be of two kinds, Sakti,
the power of primary signification and Lakṣaṇā, the power
of secondary signification. Here we must be careful to note
that the general name vṛtti for the significative power of a
word is also not always the same with all the systems of
thought and thinkers as well. As for illustration, the
Ālaṁkārikas use the terms Sakti, Vṛtti and Vyāpāra indisci-
minately to mean any one of the three significative powers
of a word admitted by them.60 The individual names of those

60. vācyo'rtho'bhidhaya bodhyo lakṣyō lakṣaṇāyā mātah
vyañgyo vyañjanaā tāh syustisrāḥ sābdasya-sākṣtayāh.
Sa 2.3, p. 31;
viratāvavhitihādyāsu yayā'rtho bodhyate paraḥ
sā vṛttirvyañjanaā nāma sābdasyārthaṅkāsyā ca.
Sm 2.12-13, p. 53;
sa mukhyo'rthastatra mukhyo vyāpāro syābhidhohvate.
KP, Sūtra 11, p. 37.
three powers of a word as admitted by the Ālāmkārikas are Abhidhā, Lakṣanā and Vyañjanā. Visvanātha uses only the term Āyrtti to mean any kind of significative power of a word. Here we may fruitfully examine the Nyāya tradition. In the early stage of Nyāya the picture of Lakṣanā does not seem to be clear. Sakti is virtually the only significative power of a word admitted at that stage. Even at the stage when Lakṣanā comes to be admitted the Naiyāyikas' concept of Lakṣanā stands in the way of placing it on par with Sakti. Sakti is understood by the Naiyāyikas as the relation of a Pada with a Padārtha. Lakṣanā is again thought of in the form of a relation between a Sakyaartha with another artha'. As every case of Lakṣanā presupposes a case of Sakti, some of the Naiyāyikas seem not to have reckoned Lakṣanā as very much distinguished from Sakti. So they might not have felt the necessity of maintaining a general name to cover Lakṣanā also along with Abhidhā. Such an impression we may gather from Annamābhata, a later Naiyāyika of the Navya group. Apparently he admits only Sakti as we find him in his Tarkasaṁgraha. But he clearly adds Lakṣanā as Śabdāvrtti (significative function of a word) in his Tarkadipīka. Yet we find some eminent Naiyāyikas like Gadādhara and Gaṅgeśa who have unhesitatingly given the general name Vṛttti in order to include Lakṣanā along with

61. Īśvarasaṁketaḥ saktiḥ. TS, p. 66
lakṣanāpi śabdāvrttih. TD, vide ibid, p. 152.
Sakti. The Vaiyākaraṇas also use the term Vṛtti only to mean all the three kinds of significative powers admitted by them. We find other Naiyāyikas using the term Saṃketa also along with Sakti in the same sense. This Sakti or Saṃketa of the Naiyāyikas goes by the name of Abhidhā in other circles as amongst the Mīmāṃsakas, Vaiyākaraṇas and the Ālaṃkārīkās.

Now to pursue our examination of the Muktiavālī above, we have to remember that the essential nature of a word lies in its significative power. Hence the relation between a word and its meaning stands undeniable. So Viśvanātha understands his Vṛtti, the significative power of a word in the form of either of the two relations, Sakti and Laksana. An examination of this relation between a word and its meaning:


63. Sā ca vṛttistridhā - saktirlaksana vyanjana ca.

64. Samketo ------- padavṛttih. Sak V, p. 1;

65. Abhidhābhāvanāmāhūḥ TV, vide MD, p. 344;
abhidhaiva śabdaniśthā ------- sā ca śabdāśritatvācch-abdāsaktīḥ. TP, vide EHC, p. 68;
prāthamyādabhidhātṛtvāttātparyāgagamadapi.

Padañāmeva sā saktirvaramabhyyapagamyatam. VH, p.14 vide BR.
abhidhānam punah śvābhāvikam V,
svābhāvikamabhidhānam. MBHunder P 1.2.64 vide VMB, p.264;
sa mukhyo'rthastatra mukhya vyāpāro'syābhidhocyate. KP, p. 39.
demands a discussion of the views on the issue prevailing in other circles.

The Māmāśakas have admitted two functions of a word to convey a meaning. Abhidhā is the name for the primary function and Laksanā is that for the secondary one. The Vedāntics and the Naiyāyikas have done the same. But they have generally used the term Sakti to mean Abhidhā. The Naiyākāraṇas have admitted three functions, namely, Abhidhā or Sakti, Laksanā and Vyañjanā. The Ālāmkaārikas have generally recognised three functions, Abhidhā, Laksanā and Vyañjanā. Some Ālāmkaārikas have come to recognise Tātparya as another function. As a matter of fact, it is the function not of an individual word, but of a whole sentence. By means of this function, according to a section of scholars, the

66. tadayaṁ bhattamate bodhakramah ——— sabdabhavaṁabodhah saktyākāraṇanena laksanayā vopapadayate. TP, KB, p.74; vārtikakāraṇapādāstau laksanikān sarvavākyārthānīcchantaḥ ——— atrāpare brūvate ——— neyāṁ laksanā svārtha-parityāgat. svārthaparītyāgena hi gangādīsu laksanā ādṛśteți. MM, pp. 12-13, vide PP.


68. sā ca vṛttistridhā — saktirlaksanā vyañjanā ca. PLV, p.13.

69. vācyo'ṛtho'bhidhaya bodhyo laksyō laksanayā mataḥ vyañgo vyañjanayā tāh syustisraḥ sabdasya sāktayah. SD 2.3, p.31.

70. tātparyākhyāṁ vṛttimānuḥ padārthānvanvabodhane tātparyārthāṁ tadarterm ca vākaṁ tadbodhakam pare. SD 2.20, p. 67; tātparyārtho'pi keśucit— K', 57, p. 26.
unrelated meanings of the individual words come to be syntactically connected with each other. As a result, the meaning of the sentence is conveyed. If this Tātarpaya śārti is admitted as a function pertaining to a word as some critics have done, the number of functions of a word for conveying meanings comes to be four in the scheme of certain Ālaṁkārikas. Mahimabhaṭṭa stands as a striking exception as he admits only one function of a word to convey its meaning. That is Abhidhā. According to him, the so-called Laksyārthaś and Vyaṅgyārthās can be apprehended through Anumāna.

M(6). atraiva śaktijānasyopayogah, pūrvaś śaktigrahābhāve padajāne'pi tattsmabandhena tattsmapānaupatteh. padānānasya hyekasambandhijānānavidhayā padārthopasthāpakatvan.

Here is the utility of the knowledge of Śakti. (As because,) in the absence of a prior knowledge of Śakti, (as because,) in the absence of a prior knowledge of Śakti,
there can be no recollection of the meaning of a Pada through the association of Pada, not withstanding the knowledge of the Pada (being there). For, the recollection of the meaning of a Pada is brought forth by the knowledge of a Pada on the strength of principle of the knowledge of either of two related objects bringing forth the knowledge of the other related objects also.'

In the Muktāvalī above, Viśvanātha proceeds to point out the necessity of admitting 'sāktidhi' in the Kārikā text as an auxiliary cause in the matter of production of a Sābdabodha. Here the author of the Muktāvalī, by way of an illustration, wants to show the serious anomaly that may crop-up if Sakti be not given the singular privilege of helping the 'padajñāna'in producing a 'padārthasmarapa'. Now before we move further with the explanation of Viśvanātha in the context, we shall have to answer a very pertinent question.

In the earlier Muktāvalī, 'atra'pi vṛttiya padajñayatvam' etc, Viśvanātha asserted that the recollection of Padārthas by the knowledge of Padas must be understood as being due to the operation of Vṛtti, the significative power of words in general covering both Abhidhā and Laksanā. But he comes to speak of the utility only of Sakti in the very same matter. Is he not involved in a self-contradiction? It is why, we to arrest such a notion, a modern commentator hastens to
replace in his own explanation, Viśvanātha's above expression 'śaktijñānasya' by 'Vṛttijñānasya*. In this regard, we are promoted to observe as follows.

In 'tatra'pi vṛttijñānasya' etc. Viśvanātha already pointed out the irregularities that might take place in the event of not admitting the assistance of a word's significative power in general in the matter of producing the knowledge of the meaning by that of a word. But his intention here is solely to draw the attention to the peculiar relation that exists between a Pada and a Padārtha and to the process by which one can convey the other. Here we reiterate our earlier point that as Viśvanātha wants to refer to the 'padapadārthasambandha', he must refer to Śakti alone. It is because Śakti is the direct relation between a Pada and a Padārtha. It is the 'padapadārthasambandha' worth the name. Laksana is only an indirect relation between a Pada and Padārtha since it is only a relation of the denoted sense (sākyārtha) with another sense. In other words, it is a direct relation between two meanings and not between a word and its meaning. Hence Viśvanātha's expression 'śaktijñānasya' in 'atraiva' etc. above seems to be significant.

Viśvanātha's idea as expressed in the Muktāvali above is this: In the case of a Śabdabodha, the knowledge of words

73. śaktijñānasya - vṛttijñānasya. MUS, vide BPS, p.-.
In the sentence occurs first, then follows the stage of ascertaining the significative power of these words leading to the knowledge of the meanings of those words. Then follows the knowledge of the syntactical connection in shape of the total meaning of the sentence with the aid of some other factors involved in the process. Now in all cases, Sakti, the primary power of signification, of the words involved must get ascertained. There can be no case of Lakṣaṇa also, without a prior knowledge of Sakti. Sakti being a 'sambandha' between a Pada and its 'artha', without the knowledge of this Sakti, the Padārtha cannot be known even where, the corresponding Pada stands known. This is obvious as the very concept of 'sambandha' demands it. A relation presupposes two related things on two sides. The relation being known, the knowledge of one would lead to that of the other. This is what Viśvanātha wants to mean by the 'ekasambandhijnānavidhā', i.e., the process (of the knowing the other related factor or object) by the knowledge of one related factor or object. By this very process, the Sakti (i.e., the Padapadārthasambandha) being earlier known, the knowledge of Pada, one related factor automatically leads to that of the Padārtha, the other related factor.
M(7). सांक्तिष्का पदेना साहा पदार्थस्या सांबंधाः.

'sākti again is the relation of a Pada with a Padārtha.'

Visvanātha here introduces Sākti as the relation between a word (Pada) and its meaning (Padārtha). In the succeeding Muktāvalī text he would further divulge the nature of this relation in order to reject the notion in this regard of the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇas. Pañcānana Jāstri explains the significance of the particle 'ca' in the expression 'sākṣṭiṣ्का' as 'api' so as to cover Laksāṇā also as a relation between a Pada and Padārtha. 74 But this explanation seems to be untenable. It will be seen hereafter that Laksāṇā is defined as the relation of the sākyārtha (with another meaning i.e., the Laksāṇā). As such, in Laksāṇā, the relation between Sākyārtha and Laksāṇā is immediate and direct and that between the Pada and Laksāṇā is remote and indirect. Hence Laksāṇā cannot be tagged together with Sākti as 'padapadārthasambandha'. If Visvanātha would have understood Laksāṇā as 'padapadārthasambandha' on a par with Sākti, he would have justifiably used Vṛtti in place of Sākti in the above context. To understand the aforesaid 'ca-kāra' of Visvanātha in the sense of 'api' is to delegate the Sākti itself to a secondary position in relation to Laksāṇā. I

74. sāktiṣ्कति. sāktirapiṣ्यतः. tathā ca sākti'laksāṇe
ca padapadārthhayoḥ sambandha ityarthah.

MUS, 'vide BP3, p. 41.'
That case, it would mean 'śakti also' (śaktirapi) along with Lakṣaṇā. If we accept Pañcānaṇa Śāstrī's interpretation, Lakṣaṇā would come to be of primary consideration as the 'padapādārthasambandha'. This is not a desirable position.

So we understand the 'ca-kāra' in Śaktiśca above in the sense of an emphatic 'again'.

In the context of our examination of the Kārika 'padajñānantu' etc., we have already discussed how the term Śakti is used variously in different schools of thought even in the sense of a significative power of a word. Simply to recapitulate the idea here, we may mention that the Ālamkārikas make indiscriminate use of the words, Śakti, Vyāpāra in the sense of any of the three or four significative powers of words admitted by them. But the Naiyāyikas like Viśvanātha and the Vaiyākaraṇas like Nāgara use the term Vyāpāra alone in such a broad sense to cover any of the significative powers admitted by them. They use the term Śakti only in the sense of the primary significative power. Viśvanātha's Śakti in the context of Śabdabodha stands for Śruti or Abhidhāna or abhidhā of the Mīmāṃsakas, and only Abhidhā of the Ālaṃkārikas. Like the Naiyāyikas and Vaiyākaraṇas, the Vedāntins also use Śakti in the sense of only the primary significative power of a word.

75. samēkto laksana cārthe pāda-vṛttiḥ. Sak V, p. 1;
    vṛttiśca etc, M text, vide BPJ, p. 412;
    sā ca vṛttistridhā. PLM, p. 13.
But yet amongst the Naiyāyikas, themselves, we notice a difference. Old Naiyāyikas are found using the term Saṁketa in a broader sense to cover within its fold 'īśvarasāṁketa' and 'ādhunikasāṁketa'. They give the name Sakti only to 'īśvarasāṁketa' and 'paribhāṣa to the 'ādhunikasāṁketa'. This is because, they understood Sakti as only the divine will (īśvarecchā). But as the Navyanaiyāyikas can be liberal in their concept of Sakti in order to understand it in the sense of any will, divine or non-divine, they understand the terms Sakti and Saṁketa as synonymous. Though Viśvañātana is not vocal on this point, we have nothing to doubt that he can be an exception as a Navyanaiyāyikas in this regard. He presents the Navyanaiyāyikas' concept of Sakti as mere Icchā in the manner of a conclusive proposition (siddhāntipakṣa).

The problem of the nature of this primary significative power of the word, i.e., the issue of the relation between a word and its meaning leads to the emergence of two theories. The Mīmāṁsakas and the Vaiyākarāṇas advocate the 'natural' or 'inherent' theory while the Naiyāyikas advocate the 'conventional' theory.

76. tatādhunikasaṁketaḥ paribhāṣā ---- īśvarasāṁketaḥ saktīḥ. Sāk V, pp. 5-6;
According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the relationship between a word and its meaning is eternal in the sense that it stands everfixed by nature without a beginning or end. There is inherent capacity of words to convey instantaneously the ideas of objects invariably associated with them. The relation is not manmade. This significative power of a word is, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, as eternal as the property of burning in fire. In the context of such an opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas, two questions are very much pertinent. (1) Firstly, if it is so natural, then why the meanings of words are not grasped by all people as soon as they are heard? Kumārila replies that the understanding of meanings from words is restricted to one with prior knowledge.

77. autpattikastu śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ. MS 1.1.5.

78. autpattika iti nityāṁ brūmaḥ. utpattirhi bhāva ucyate laksāṇayā aviyuktah śabdārthayorbhāvaḥ sambando notpannayoḥ pāscātsambandhaḥ. autpattikaḥ śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ ------ SB, under MS 1.1.5.

79. tasmānmanyāmahe keṇāpi puruṣeṇa śabdānārthaṁ saha sambandhaṁ kṛtvā sandhyāvahartuṁ vedāḥ prañītā iti. tadbūdhi ucyate. apauruṣeyatvātsambandhasya siddhamiti. 

SB, under MS 1.1.5.
of the same eternal relation. Secondly, if it is as inherent as the burning capacity of fire, then why the utterance of the word 'ksura' does not result in cutting of the mouth of the utterer? The reply of this question is that the word conveys the idea of the object and does not present the object itself. The Mīmāṃsakas have described this denotative capacity of a word as an uncommon power like the extra-ordinary power of a visual organ to reveal the coloured shapes.

The Naiyāyikas fully oppose such a view. The Nyāya philosophers do not recognise sakti as a different category (Padārtha) and do not accept it as 'natural'. According to them, an object is apprehended from

80. aha yadi pratyāyakāḥ sābdāḥ pratīhamasṛutaḥ kim na pratyāyayati. ucyate sarvatra no darśanām pramaṇam. pratyāyaka iti hi pratyayam dṛṣṭvā'vagacchāmo na pratīha- masṛuta iti pratīhamasṛavā pratyayamaddṛṣṭvā yavatkārt- vah śrutenaṃ samjñā'yaṃ samjñītīyavadhāritāṃ bhavati ---- etc. SB, under MS 1.1.5; sarvā'karaparicchedyasākta'śte vācaka'pi vā sarvā'kā'rthavijñānasamarthe niyamaśaktaḥ. SV 228, under MS 1.1.4, p. 151.

81. syāccedarthena sambandhāḥ kṣuramodakāsābdoccārāne mukhasya pāṭanapūrāṇe syātām --- ucyate. yo hyatra vyapadesāyaḥ sambhadhastme kaṁ na vyapadisāti bhavan- pratyāyasya pratyāyakasya ca yah samjñāsamjñilaksana iti. SB, under MS 1.1.5.

82. pratyāyakatvāḥ hi vācakatvāḥ tacca svabhāvaśaktyā'pyu- papannāṃ ca kṣurārūḍānāṃ rūpādiṣu ---- śaktireva tvasā- dhāraṇāṃ pratyāyakatve nimittam. tadvacchabdasyāpi svabhāvikāiva śaktyā pratipādagatvām bhaviṣyatīti. NRŚ p. 36.
the relevant word due to 'convention' (samaya or samketa). As Sakti of Naiyayikas is entirely dependant on Samketa, some Naiyayikas like Gadadhara and Gangesa as we have already seen, unhesitatingly use Samketa as a synonym of the term, 'Sakti'. We find Vatsayana mentioning in his Bhasya the possible sources from which the common people acquire the knowledge of the same convention. The Naiyayikas, unlike the Mimamsakas, do not accept the significative power of a word on a par with the burning capacity of fire. As the utterance of words like 'udaka', 'agni' etc. does not result in filling up and burning the mouth etc, the author of the Nyayasutra does not believe in any 'natural' relation that may exist between a word and its meaning. Gautama points out that there is no fixed law for the use of the same set of words amongst the different groups of people. He catechetically asserts that the apprehension of an object from a word is 'Conventional' (Saamayika). Vatsayana expounds

83. saamayikatvacchabdabdatrasampratyayasya. NS 11.1.56; na sambandhakaritaam sabdarthavyavasth analyam, kim tirnai samayakaritaam yattadabdaam. VB, on NS 11.1.56 vide "", n. 115.

84. kaapunarayaam saamaya 'asya sabdasayadantarthaabhirhembheyam' iti abhidhanabhitrheyamanyaniyogam ---- pramayam managrahanaacca samayopayogo laukikanam. VB, under NS 11.1.56 vide ND p. 139.

85. puranapradhanapatanapanupalabdhesca sambandhabhavaat. NS 11.1.54, vide ND, p. 124.

86. na, saamayikatvacchabadtradhasampratyayasya NS 11.1.56; jativiseacanyamant. NS 11.1.57, vide ND, pp. 125-26.
this 'convention' of Gautama and maintains that the object is known from a word through 'Convention' and not because of any natural relation. According to him, the words are used to signify specific objects according to the arbitrary wishes of the sages, nobles and the mlecchas. If the relation between the word and its meaning would have been fixed, this much of latitude would not have been possible. 37 This 'Convention', Vātsyāyana observes, is known to the common people by observing the use by the olders of specific words to denote specific objects. If there be no knowledge of this 'Convention', the comprehension of the object is not likely to occur even in the event of the relevant word being heard. 38 It is seen further that 'groups of people' come to use the same word to mean different objects. 39 This fact all the

87. sāmayikah sābdādārthasampratyayaḥ, na svabhāvikah.
ṛṣyāryamlecchanāṁ yathākāmaṁ sābdaviniyogaṁ aprat-
yāyanāya pravarttate. svabhāvike hi sābdasyārtharat-
yakatve yathākāmaṁ na syād, -----

88. tasminnupayukte sābdādārthasampratyayayo bhavati.

89. jātiviseṣe śānīyamāt. NS 2.1.57;

Contd...
more confirms the notion that the relation between a Pada and Padártha is rather 'Conventional' (Sāmayika) and never natural (autpattika). Sometimes even amongst people belonging to different groups in a country, a word is found to carry the same meaning. Hence, Uddyotakara hastens to explain Gautama's expression, 'group of people' as 'different groups of people belonging to different countries.'

In the Muktávali hereafter, we shall find Visvanātha recording the notion of Sakti, as maintained in both Prācīna and Navya schools of Nyāya. In Prācīna Nyāya, Sakti is understood as the will of God and in Navya Nyāya as the will of anybody. Either case carries a sense of arbitrariness. Thus, being conceived as an 'icca', Sakti, the relation between a word and its meaning is regarded by the Naiyāyikas obviously as conventional and never natural.

It will not be out of context to record here the views of the Vaiśeṣikas in this regard. The Vaiśeṣikas as we have already stated, admit only two Pramanas, namely, Pratyakṣa and Anumāna. Kanāda describes Śabda as the perception of

89(Contd) padārthān pratipādyante mlecchāstu priyā́ṅga, pratipādyante ------ na ca vācyāṁ sarva eva saśādṛśaśā tirvairvārthaiḥ svabhāvataḥ sambaddhāṁ samketaḥ niyamyante iti pramāṇābhaṭvāt. NVTT, p. 420
90. jātivāyāsaśābdena punardeśo'bhidhyata iti. NV, p. 265.
the ear. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that the verbal cognition can be included within the sphere of Inference (Anumāna) because of its similar activity. A word in fact, according to them, leads to the knowledge of an object through Inference. Yet in the context of the concept of relation between a word and its meaning the Vaiśeṣikas think like the Naiyāyikas. The Vaiśeṣikas do not believe that a 'Sābdā' can possess conjugation (saṃyoga) with its Artha. Saṃyoga is a quality. Sābdā also is a quality of Ākāśa (Ether). How can it be possible for a quality to possess another quality? So they cannot accept the position that there is a natural relation between the word and its meaning. On the other hand, the Vaiśeṣikas assert, the relation between the word and its concept owes its existence to the 'Convention' of a particular community. Hence, the relation under discussion, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, is conventional.

The Vaiyākaraṇas, again, rally behind the Mīmāṃsakas. According to them, the relation between the word and its meaning is eternal. Bhartṛhari understands this relation as fixed and permanent. According to him, the essential

91. pratyakṣamekāṃ cārvākaḥ kaṇḍāsugatau punaḥanumāna-kāṇa-vat
tākṣ, quoted in MU3, vide EPS, 260;
śrotragrahaṇo sābdaḥ. Ṣāj II. 2.22.

92. sābdādīnām apyanumāne intarbhāvah saṃvidnāvitrā
PBR, p. 576.

93. nityaḥ sābdārthasambandhāḥ. VP 1.23, p. 3.
nature of this relation lies in an endless potentiality
(anādiyogya) of a word to convey its meaning. It is like
the capacity of the sense-organs to reveal their respective
objects. In the opinion of the Vaiśākyāṇas, this Sakti
is other than the generally accepted sambandhas like Saṁyaya,
Samavāya etc. It is a phenomenon producing conceptual cogni-
tion only when the relation between the object and the word
is ascertained. Just as the illuminative capacity of a lamp,
though inherent in it, can illumine an object only when the
object comes into the contact of the light, similarly the
Sakti of a word can give rise to an idea of an object to a
listener only when the relation of the word and the object
is already known to him. Nāgēsa, however, conceives this
Sakti as a different type of relation that may be called
Vācyavāca-kabāvasambandhaḥ. To elucidate the point further,
the relation between a Pada and a Padārtha, as viewed by
Nāgēsa, rests not on samketa or convention (as the Vaiśākyāṇas

94. indriyānāṁ svaviśayesvanādiriyogyaṁ yathā
anādirarthaṁ śabdānāṁ sambandho yogyatā tat-ā.
VP 111.3.29, p. 70

95. tasmāt padapadārthayoh sambandhāntarameva saktīṁ,
vācyavāca-kabāvāparaparyaya. VP 111.3.29, p. 70

96. tasmāt padapadārthayoh sambandhāntarameva saktīṁ,
vācyavāca-kabāvāparaparyaya. PLM, p. 15.
including Viśvanātha put it); but the said relation is apprehended through an identity (tādātmya) between the word and the object signified by it. This notion of Tādātmya is again realized on the strength of what may be called mutual illusory attribution (itaretarādhyāsa). The idea can be explained thus: In the process of Itaretarādhyāsa, the 'artha' is superimposed upon the Jābā and the Jābā is superimposed upon the 'artha'. Now they come to be identical like Guṇa and Guṇin. This is not possible in 'ghaṭaḥ pāṇa', but is possible in 'Nīlo ghaṭaḥ'. It is because we can think as follows — 'Nīla is (the) ghaṭa' and '(the) ghaṭa is Nīla'. Thus without superimposition the notion of identity is not possible and without the notion of identity, the words don't denote and the meanings also do not get denoted. Thus the 'Padapadārthasambandha' viewed by Nāgēśa as the 'Vāc-vācakasambandha' is virtually a (tādātmyasambandha) of which 'itaretarādhyāsa' is the source. As is admitted by Nāgēśa himself, he is influenced some way in this concept of 'Padapadārthasambandha' by Patañjali's idea of Saṅketa in the shape of 'itaretarādhyāsa'. We shall discuss Nāgēśa's

97. tasmat padapadārthayoh —— tādrāhakaḥ-œṣṭarañāvā —— mūlakām tādātmyāh, tadeva sambandhāḥ. ubhayaniṁritatā—
dātmyavānubhaya ityarthapadāyorvyavahārāt. PLM, p. 18.

98. taduktah patañjalabhāṣye — saṅketastu padārthasor-itathā
dārhyāsarūpāḥ smṛtyātmako yo'yām sābdāḥ so'ṛtho yo'ṛtho
sa sābdāḥ iti. PLM, p. 18.
view again in succeeding pages in the context of our examining the Naiyāyikas' concept of  śakti as 'icchā'.

As for Ālaṃkārikas, they regard convention as the basis for the primary relation between the word and its meaning. A word is 'vāca' (expressive), as Mammaṭa points out, only when it conveys a meaning through direct convention. 9 But they treat Abhīdha as different from the conventional relation. Jagannāṭha, author of the Rasagāndhara, however, follows the Naiyāyikas fully in this regard. He maintains that Abhīdha is same with the conventional relation. 100 The attitude of the Naiyāyikas revealed in their anxiety to equate both 'Īśvarasāmketa' and  śakti is opposed by the Grammarian Nāgēśa by way of showing difference between the two. 101 This is because, being inspired by Patanālalī, Nāgēśa also understands that the general relation between words and meanings is eternal in the sense that all words are related to all meanings. The convention in the form of...

93. sākṣātsamketaṁ yo'ṛthamabhidhatte sa vācaṁ.<br>The Passage you are referring to is not complete. It appears to be a continuation from Page 163 of the document. The missing part seems to be an incomplete quote from a source or a reference that needs to be filled in for a complete understanding. The missing text might be something like:

93. sākṣātsamketaṁ yo'ṛthamabhidhatte sa vācaṁ.<br>
94. s'aktyākhyo'ṛthasya śabdagataḥ sambhandhaviśāḥ bhūdhāḥ.<br>
95. ukta īśvarasāmketa eva śaktiriti naiyāyikamataṁ na yuktam. 'ayametacchakyaḥ' 'atrasya śaktiḥ' itvasya saṁketaṁ Śaktitaṁ pārthakyaṇa prasiddhavitāt. PRV, p. 13.
mutual illusory superimposition (itaretarādhyaśarūpasāṃketa) helps in ascertaining the Sakti, the relation of identity on the strength of which words come to denote and meaning come to be denoted.\textsuperscript{102}

M(8). sa cāsmācchadbādayamārtho boddhavya itiśvareccchārūpa. ādhunike nāmni sāktirastyeva, "ekādaśe'hani pīṭa nāma kuryādi"tiśvareccchāyāḥ sattvāt. ādhunikasaṃketa te na sāktiriti sampradāyāḥ. navyāstvesvareccchā na saktiḥ, kintvivačalīva. tenādhunikasaṃketa'pi sāktirastyeva- tyāhūḥ.

'That (Sakti) is of the form of a Divine will in the shape that such and such a meaning should be understood from such and such a Pada (word). Even modern names have Sakti (in them), for there is Divine will (to the effect in the form of 'on the eleventh day the father should name his child.' According to one school (of thought), there is not Sakti in the (purely) modern names. The new school, to the contrary, holds that any will, not merely the Divine Will, constitute the Sakti. Hence, even the modern names, it is held, do possess the Sakti.'

\textsuperscript{102} tasmādiśvarasaṅketa eva sāktiriti Naiyāyikoktaṁ nādaraṇīyam, kintu itaretarādhyaśātmaka eva saṃketa: sāktigrāhako nānyaḥ, ata eva sarve sarvārthavācaśā iti bhāṣyat, sarvairarthaiḥ sarveṣāṃ sambandhaḥ sthita --- sābdārthasambandhasaya nityatvāt iti hi nāgesa- siddhāntaḥ, TPr, Vide PLM, p. 22.
Here Visvanātha presents the peculiar Naiyāyika concept of the 'Padapadārthasambandha' in clear contrast with that of the Mīmāṃsakas. Before we proceed to examine the Naiyāyikas' view, we have to note that Mīmāṃsakas do not understand the significative power of a word (Padasākthi) separately from the power in general like the burning capacity of fire. They conceive even Sākthi in general as a separate category (Padārthāntara). The Naiyāyikas including Visvanātha do not subscribe to that view also. For fear of digression, we may avoid a discussion on that issue here. Mīmāṃsakas divide their Sākthi as 'Sahaja' (natural) and 'ādheya' (produced). They regard the power pertaining to a word (padaniṣṭhamāsākthi) also as 'Sahaja-āsākthi' of the 'nitya' (Permanent or eternal) type. Some later Mīmāṃsakas, however, are found to admit Padasākthi differently as the third type of Sākthi in addition to the already accepted 'sahaja' and 'adheya' types. In view of this, the Naiyāyikas' concept of Sākthi as 'Īsvarāya' or mere 'icchā' comes to strike a contrast. We have already stated that the Naiyāyikas do not believe that there is any eternal, natural or permanent relation between a word and its meaning. They conceive this relation in the form of some Samaya or Saṃketa. But what is the true nature of this

104. Saktistridhā. sahaja"dheya padaśaktisceeti.
       TP, Vide BHC, p. 17.
Samaya or Saṃketa? Here the Prācīna and Navya school of Nyāya maintain a difference. Viśvanātha alludes to that difference here. In 'sā ca -----. īśvarecḥārūpā', Viśvanātha refers to the view of the older Naiyāyikas that the Śakti i.e. Padasākāti is nothing but the will of God in the form of 'this meaning be understood from this word.' In other words, the samaya or saṃketa established by God Himself with regard to a word in the matter of conveying a meaning is the very primary power of signification. The Nyāyasūtrakāra asserted first that the understanding of meanings from words is due to some 'samaya' (convention). 105 In explaining the position of the Sūtrakāra, the Bhāsyakāra interpreted this 'samaya' as the application of the regulations in the matter of denoting the denoted senses in the shape of 'these meanings stand as denotable by this word.' 106 Whose is this first application which comes as the source of such permanent regulations regarding the denotive capacity of words? The picture in this regard comes to be clear a bit later. Vacaśpati Miśra, in course of his examination of the position of the Sūtrakāra and the Bhāsyakāra in his Nyāyavṛttikatātpāryatikā, points out that the object possessing dewlap etc.

105. sāmayikatvācchābdārthasampratyayasya. NS 2.1.56.
106. kaḥ pumarayāṃ samayāḥ? 'asya śabdasyedamārthajātama-bhidheyam' iti abhidhānābhidheyaniyamaniyogah.

VB, under NS above.
(śaśnādīmānevartha) is what is denoted by the word 'cow' and thus again the object possessing manes etc. (kesaradi man is what is denoted by the word 'horse'. Now, as to the source of this regulation regarding such denotativeness of such words, the Samaya (convention) established by the almighty God before the creation by making the use of such and such words with reference to such and such meanings is to be understood.

Vātsyāyana himself pointed out the utility of Vyākaraṇa in preserving the Samayas (conventions) regarding the words signifying the meanings. As Gācspati explains, the words with regard to which Divine convention exists are correct and those without the same are corrupt. And in maintaining the correct words apart from the corrupt ones, the competence of Grammar is to be admitted. Now a pertinent question arises. If only the Divine will be admitted as the real nature of the primary power of signification, what will be the fate of modern or non-Vedic words. The Prācīna

107. abhidhānabhidheyaniyamaniyoga iti ----- gośābdasya sāśnādīmānevartha evamasvāsābdasya ----- tasmāniyogobodhavyā iti bhagavataḥ paramesvārasya sargādau so'yaḥ samaya iti. NVTT, p. 418

108. samayāpalanārthaṃ cedām padalakṣaṇāyā vāco'nvākhyānaṃ vyākaraṇam. VB, under NS 2.1.36.

109. tathā ca yeṣām padānāṃ yenārthena paramesvareṇā kṛtaḥ samayaḥ tāni tatra sādhūnī asādhūnītāratreti vibhāgāya vyākaraṇamārthavaditī siddham. NVTT, p. 419
Naiyāyikas donot find any difficulty in replying to this query. Viśvanātha refers to this in the Muktāvalī above, i.e. "adḥunikanāmni sāktirastyeva ----- sattvāt." : When a son is born, he is named by the father as 'Devadatta'. The word 'Devadatta' signifies the boy apparently on the strength of the will of an individual other than God. But, we must not forget that the father of 'Devadatta' is empowered to exercise the will of God by the Divine Will standing in the form of an injunction: 'the father should name (his child) on the 11th day (since birth)'. In other words, the Divine Will is revealed here in the form of the will of the father.

The author of the Tattvacintāmani also refers to such a logic...

110. From the manner of argument it appears that the expression 'ekadāse'hani pītā nāma kuryāt' is claimed as a Vedic injunction. The Naiyāyikas take Īśvara to be the author of the Vedas and as such all Vedic expressions are supposed to involve the will of Īśvara as the speaker. But it could not be possible to trace out the expression 'ekadāse'hani' etc. as it is in the whole of the extant corpus of the Vedic literature. In the Prāraskaragṛhyasūtra, however, we find the injunction that the father should name the son on the 10th day. cf. 'dāśamāmutthāpya brāhmaṇan-bhojavitvā pītā nāma karotī' Prāraskaragṛhyasūtra 1.22. In the Manusāṃhitā it is enjoined that the child should be named on the 10th or the 12th day. cf. nāmadheyaṁ dāśamāṁ tu dvādaśāṁ vāsyā kārayet. Manu 2.30. While commenting on Manu, Kullūka suggests that the 10th day of Manu should be interpreted as the 11th day in the light of the Saṅkhacudāmasmṛti which opines that the naming should take place only after the period of 'asāuca' is over. cf. asāuca caṇyatikṛante nāmakarma vidhiyate (saṁ. smṛ. 2.2) iti saṅkhavacanaṅdadasāme'hanyatīte ekadasāḥ iti vyākhyeyam. under Manu 2.30.
of the Prācīna Naiyāyikas by illustrating the naming of a boy as Maitra by his father on the strength of such an injunction. Thus, in case of non-Vedic or modern names, the Prācīna Naiyāyikas accept the existence of a Divine Will as determining the convention, in the shape of such general divine statements. At this stage we may remember that the Vedas according to the Naiyāyikas, are created by Īśwara, while the Mīmāṃsakas accept the Vedas as being eternal and self-existant. Here we may record the dissent of a modern Naiyāyika, Jagadīśa. As new names are ever in the process of being coined by the moderners, Jagadīśa is not happy with such a weak argument in admitting Śakti in modern names on the strength of such general scriptural propositions. He maintains that in the case under discussion, the shastric injunction in the context prescribes the duty of the father in the matter of naming the son and it has nothing to do with the significative power of the word Caitra etc. Thus he does

111. cf. nanu maitrādiśabdāṅamāṁśvarasaṁketābhāvādvasādhutva
yajñādau na prayoga syāditi cet na 'dvādaśe' hani pitānāma
duryādityanena sāmānyatastesāmāṁśvarasaṁketaṁ visayatva.
TC, p. 650

112. cf. ādhunikastu saṅketo na sākṛtirṇyasyaiva tasya
tathātvaḥ — na ca pitrādīna saṅketite caitrādipade
nityasaṅketatve mānamasti, 'dvādaśe' hani pitā nāma
duryāditytī śrutaḥ pitṛkartavyasaṅketavidhāyakamātra-
ratvāt, caitrādipadasya sākṛtirṇattve pūrvapūrvaprayukta
tvāpātacca — caitrādipadanāṁmiva pārasīkādīśabdāṅma
saṅketavattiśeṣe'pi ——— SSP, pp. 124-25
not accept the presence of Sakti in modern words, Caitra etc. on the presumption of the presence of 'Isvarasamketa' in their regard. In the context of purely modern names in respect of which such divine sanctions cannot be traced-out, the Pracina Naiyayikas are not prepared to admit any Sakti.

This idea of the Pracina Naiyayikas is referred to by Visvanatha in the Muktavali above in 'adhunikasamketite tu na saktiriti sampradayaḥ'. As a matter of fact, we find that with the Pracina Naiyayikas, the convention (Samketa) as the relation between Pada and Padarthā is of two types. (1) one is permanent and is known as Sakti. This Sakti depends upon the will of God manifesting itself in the form of 'let such and such a thing be understood by such and such a word.' (2) The other type of Samketa is occasional and is called Paribhasa (technicality). Technical terms of Vyakarana like Nadi and Vṛddhi are examples of this sort.113 The Pracina Naiyayikas feel that the Samketa of the words 'go' etc. with regard to certain meanings stand determined, as of God, at the very beginning of the creation. That very Samketa comes to be learnt in subsequent times, even today, by children.

113. tatradhunikasamketaḥ paribhasā; taya ca rathabodhakaṁ padaṁ pāribhāṣikāṁ yathā sāstrakārārdisamketaṁ padarthaṁ dṛddhyādipadam ——— Isvarasamketaḥ saktīḥ, taya ca rathabodhakaṁ padaṁ vācakam, yathā gotvādiviṣṭabodhakaṁ gavādipadam ——— mukhyārtha ityucyate. Sāk V, pp.5-6.
also, without any knowledge of relevance, merely by observing the use of the words by elderly people. The children finally understand the meanings which they infer as the cause of the reactions of the elderly people who hear the more elderly ones. Thus for the moderns Vṛddhavyavahara comes to be the ascertainer of this Saṃketa made by God himself.

The Navya Naiyāyikas do not endorse the view of their predecessors in this regard. They simplify the idea and accept mere will, to whomsoever it may belong, as the Sakti or Significative Power of a word. Viśvanātha refers to this view of the Navya Naiyāyikas in the Muktāvalī above, 'navavāstu ---- etc. In this context, we may speak of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya who elaborately examines the position of the Prācīna Naiyāyikas and tends towards evolving a new formula. He questions the propriety of accepting as correct only the words in case of which the Saṃketa stands fixed by God. It is risky to presume that only the 'Īśvarasaṃketa' words (with regard to which the convention stands set by God) are

114. paramesvareṇa hi yaḥ sṛṣṭyādau gavādisabdānāmarthe saṃketaḥ kṛtaḥ so'dhunā vṛddhavyavahāre prayuṣyaṁānānāṁ sabdānāmarviditasaṃgatibhirapi bālaḥ sakyo gīmītum. tatra hi vṛddhavacanānāntaraṁ tacchāvino vṛddhāntarasya prayuṣ- tinivṛttibhayasoka ---- pratipattestadhetum prayamamum-mimīte bālaḥ ---- so'yaṁ vṛddhavyavahāraḥ sampratikanaṁ saṃkетagrahopāyaḥ "---- NVTT, pp. 418-19.
'sādhū! (correct). It may lead us to accept at one stage that all possible words are correct as 'iśvarasāmıketa' is found with regard to all. Or it may so happen that all the secondary uses are to be admitted as corrupt for lack of 'iśvarasāmıketa'. Again it is found that even without the knowledge of 'iśvarasāmıketa', one comes to make a correct use. Sometimes even the reverse is seen. Thus Gaṅgesā¹¹⁵ appears to be reasonably aware of the loopholes in the older concept of Padaśakti. As evidenced by the observation of Viśvanātha, the Navya Naiyāyikas gradually come to accept the liberal view that any will and not merely God's will is the Sakti or Sāmketa of a word. But, we cannot offhand declare it as the only opinion of the Navya Naiyāyikas since the weakness to regard only 'iśvarasāmıketa' as Sakti is seen in case of certain Navya Naiyāyikas also. Jagadilśa,

¹¹⁵. atra vadanti, neśvarasāmaketitavam sādhutvavam tasya niṣpratīyogikatvam sarvatra sarvasya sādhutvāpattēḥ. nāpi yaḥ śabdāḥ yatreśvarena saṃketitaḥ sa tatra sādhuḥ gaunālākṣaṇikayorasaḥdutvāpattēḥ ----- tasmāc chakṣaṇam isvārasāmaketitavam vā ajñātvāpi sādhutvavyavahārāt jñātvāpyavyavarhārāccha na tat sādhutvavam kintu vyākaraṇa-parigṛhitavitadabhāvābhāvyām eva prāmaṇīkām sādhvasādhutvavyavahārāt tāveva te ----- evaṃca taddhijanakatvamā jñātaṁ yatpadaṁ yadanubhāvaṁ janayati tasyaiva tatrasāktitavam na tu sāktirīśvarasāmaketoveti etc.

TC, pp. 651-57
for instance, refuses to recognise Šakti in modern names like Caitra and enlists them as technical (Pārībhaṣāki)\textsuperscript{11} since such words with what are connotated by them now could not have existed in the very beginning of the creation.

Annaṁbhaṭṭa records only the old views in his Samgraha.\textsuperscript{11} But Dr. Dayānanda Bhārgava presumes that Annaṁbhaṭṭa was aware of the weakness of the arguments to cover the modern names by 'īśvaraśaṅketa' and wanted also to present a more ideal notion in the context. So he defines Šakti in his Dīpikā as a relation between a Pada and a Padārtha\textsuperscript{118} which conditions the recollection of meanings. Annaṁbhaṭṭa is understood by Dr. Bhārgava to have made hereby an attempt to bring about a compromise between the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas.\textsuperscript{119} Dr. Bhārgava's impression is based on the relevant portion of the commentary Nilakaṇṭha-prakāśikā.\textsuperscript{120}

\begin{enumerate}
\item[116.] yatrārthe yannamādhunikasamketavattadeva tatra pārībhaṣikam, yathā pitrādibhiḥ putrādau saṃketitaṃ caitrādī, ——— ādhunikastu saṅketo na śaktirnityasyavaiṃ tasya tathātvat. SSP, pp. 122-24.
\item[117.] asmāt padādayamarthe bodhavya itiśvaraśaṅketah śaktim. TS, p.66.
\item[118.] arthasmṛtyanukūlapadapadārthasambandhah śaktiḥ. TD, Vide TS, pp.211.
\item[119.] Notes on above Dīpikā text by Dayānanda Bhārgava, vide TS (MB), p. 155.
\item[120.] Mīmāṁsakamatanirāṣaṅkavena ——— sābdabodhajanakartha-smṛtyanukūlo ghaṭā dipadaghataśādirūpārthayaḥ sambandhah sāktirnityarthaḥ Nilakaṇṭha-Prakāśikā on TD, vide TS, pp. 314--
To the Mīmāṃsakas, Sākta is a separate category and a Dravya. To the Naiyāyikas, it is an 'icchā' and as such is a Guṇa. We for ourselves, on varification of the concerned texts in the Tarkadīpikā and the Nīlakanṭhaprakāśika on it, could not be so convinced. The text of the Dīpikā, "arthasmṛtyamukūla" etc comes as an explanatory note of the word Sākta. This is not at all different from Viśvanātha's earlier Muktavalī text 'saktiśca padena saha padārthasya sambandhah'.

Here also there is no difference, rather a conformity between Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas. Difference lies in the fact that while the Mīmāṃsakas treat the 'śabdārthasambandha' as eternal or natural (autpattika or sahaja), the Naiyāyikas treat it as (merely) conventional or artificial (s'amayika). To bring about this difference only, the Naiyāyikas proceed to divulge the real nature of the samaya or samketa as 'īśvarecchā' or mere 'icchā'. Only to confirm the position that they do not believe in Sākta as an additional category (Padārthāntara), both Viśvanātha and Annaṁbhaṭṭa proceed to add 'asmācchābdādayamartho etc.' in the Muktavalī and 'asmātpadādayamartho etc.' in the Samgraha. In Annaṁbhaṭṭa's case, this is clear from the relevant Dīpikā and Nīlakanṭhaprakāśika texts. But we do not find Annaṁbhaṭṭa giving any evidence of his accepting or introducing any newer formula in respect of the concept of Sākta. Here we may add that Nāgesa objects to the Naiyāyikas' conceiving of Sākta
simultaneously as both 'sambandha' and 'icchā'. By way of quoting the definition of 'sambandha' by some unnamed learned people, Nāgęśa says that a 'sambandha' or relation belongs to both the 'sambandhins' (related objects) and yet remains different from both the related objects. The 'sambandha' leads to the recognition of one of the related objects to be qualified (Visiṣṭa) in terms of the other related object. Under the circumstances, 'icchā' and 'sambandha' can not be equivalent inasmuch as 'icchā' unlike 'sambandha' here can not pertain to both Pada and Padārtha, the 'sambandhins'. Icchā being an 'ātma-guṇa' in the view of Naiyāyikas themselves, it will be an unsound proposition to talk of it as belonging to Pada and Padāttha. 121

But in the view of the Naiyāyikas' peculiar concept of the 'padapadārthasambandha', we do not feel that the Naiyāyikas are out of their way in conceiving the 'sambandha' under discussion as the very 'icchā'. Naiyāyikas have admitted

121. tanna icchāyāḥ sambandhinorāśrayatāniyāmakatvābhāvena sambandhatsvāsambhavat 'sambandho hi sambandhīdvayabhinnatvate sati, dvīṣṭhatvāt ca sati āsrayatatā viśiṣṭabuddhiyāmakaḥ ityābhīyuktavya-vyavahārāt. yathā ghaṭa-vad bhūtalambityādau saṃyogarūpāḥ sambandhāḥ sambandhibhyāḥ bhinnno dvīṣṭho ghaṭanirūpitasaṃyogādṛṣṭo bhūtalamiti viśiṣṭabuddhiyāmakaś ca, nātra tathā ghaṭasabda icchavān tadartho vā icchāvāniti vyavahāraḥ. PLM, p. 15.
'icchā' undoubtedly as an attribute of the self, either an individual self or the supreme self. But the 'sambandha' they conceive between Pada and Padārtha is peculiar to themselves. It does not belong to known types of relations like inherence (samavaya), contact (samayoga) etc. But then what it is? The relation between a word and its meaning as conceived by the Naiyāyikas, unlike the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇas is noting eternal, natural or real. It is superimposed on Pada and Padārtha by the will of a self. Thus it is artificial and unreal. In essence, it is a result of the functioning of a conscious factor. So virtually there stands no difference between a 'padapadārthasambandha' and the 'icchā' of the original speaker or employer of the Pada or Padās. Nāgęśa's objection would have carried any meaning if the Naiyāyikas would have understood the 'sambandha' as natural or eternally existing in Pada and Padārtha. The 'sambandha' as conceived by the Naiyāyikas virtually and originally does not pertain either to a Pada or a Padārtha but to a conscious self. It comes to be understood as belonging to a pair of Pada and Padārtha only subsequently, after the Saṁketa, in form of the will of someone, stands ascertained.

122. cf. yathā"tmagunatā hicchādevāderupapatsyate sabdo nayena tenaiva bhaviṣyati nabhoguṇaḥ. NM, p. 211.
Now by way of examining the earlier Muktavali, ‘śaksiśca padena saha padārthasya sambandhah’ along with the subsequent one. ‘sā ca icchaiva’, we can conclude, as Nāgęśa notices it, that for the Naiyāyikas, the Saṅketa and ‘padapadārthasambandha’ are identical. But a difference between the two sections of the Naiyāyikas is here noticed. While the Navya Naiyāyikas deem Saṅketa and Śakti as equivalent, to the Prācina Naiyāyikas, all Saṅketas cannot get the status of Śakti.

M(9). śaktigrahastu vyākaraṇādītah tatha hi —

‘saktigrahāṁ vyākaranopamānakośāptavākyād vyavahārataśca / vākyasya sesād vivṛttavadanti sānvidhyatāḥ siddhapadasya vrddhāḥ //

'The knowledge of Śakti again is obtained from Grammar etc.; for we find — 'the senior (scholars) say that the Śakti is ascertained from Grammar, Comparision, Lexicon, statement of a trust-worthy person, usage, supplementary statement, paraphrase and the proximity of a well-known word.'

Now that the Śakti is understood as a specific relation between a word and its meaning, there is the subsequent problem as to how one can have the knowledge of this denotative power of a word or as to how some one understands this

123 atra tārıkāḥ = ‘asmācchaḥdādayamartho boddhavyah’

----- saiva saṅketaḥ sambandhah. PLM, p. 13.
relation between a word and its meaning: This is the problem known in the circles of Grammarians, Logicians and Rhetoricians as the problem of Śaktigraha, Śaktijñāna or Saṁketagraha. We have already seen in the context of our discussion on Kārika I and the relevant text of the Muktāvalī that the Padārthadhī is the immediate cause of a Śabdabodha. But the Padārthadhī must be, however, produced by the corresponding 'Padajñāna'. But the 'Padajñāna' may lead to the corresponding 'Padārthajñāna' only through the relevant 'Śaktijñāna' (the knowledge of Śakti). This Śakti is nothing but a specific relation of a word with its meaning. This specific relation in its essence is the Saṁketa or Saṁaya that stands already set by the God or by society. Hence, in all the appropriate circles, the very ways of understanding this relation between a Pada and its 'artha' have been discussed. The aforesaid ways may otherwise be described as the means of ascertaining Saṁketa. It is suggested that there are as many as eight ways for learning a new word or Vocabulary. These ways have been summarily recorded in the aforesaid verse 'śaktigrahaḥ' etc. The verse comes to be oftquoted in later circles of scholars belonging to various schools. This is a summarising verse (saṁgrahaśloka) based on the crystalised opinion of the earlier scholars. For instance, we find that Jagadīśācārya recognises all the ways.

124. TP, vide BHC, p. 56; PLM, p. 216; KK,SSP, p. 103
said Śaktigrāhakas without literally quoting the verse and that Gaṅgeśa who preceded Jagadīśa refers to the said 'śaktigrāhakas', except Vivṛti or Vivaraṇa, though not in verse.  

We may, however, mention that the number of ways prescribed for learning the meaning of a new word i.e. for obtaining the knowledge of Śakti in particular context is not always the same with all scholars. Of the Grammarians, Nāgęśa quotes this list 'śaktigrahām' etc. entirely. In sāmikhya only three ways have been admitted for learning the meanings of words. They are, namely Āptopadesa, Vṛddhavyavahāra and Prasiddhapadasannidhi. Of the Ālaṃkārikas, Vāmana recognises only Koṣa (Lexicon) in this context. Modern Ālaṃkārikas have come to admit ways more than one. As for instance, Viśvanātha Kavirāja deals with Vṛddhavyavahāra primarily and elaborately and adds two others, namely 'prasiddhapadasamabhivyāhāra' (simultaneous utterance of a famous or known word) and Āptopadesa.

125. SSP, pp. 103-10;

Iśvarasya ketaññanañca vyavahārāt upamānāt prasiddhārthatpadasāmanādhikaranyāt āptopadesāt yavavarāhendradiśabdeṣu vākyasēṣāt koṣāt tadabhiyuktendrapāṇiṣyādi-pranītasābdanāusāsanācca. TC, p. 649.

126. tribhiḥ sambandhasiddhiḥ. SS- 38


127. abhidhanakosataḥ padārthaniscayaḥ. KLSV 1.3.5.
Even amongst the Naiyāyikas, Annaṁbhaṭṭa recognises only the Vyavahāra as the 'saktigrāhaka'. He maintains that to say that the Sakti of an unknown word can be ascertained from the knowledge of an already known word uttered along with the earlier one is not finally acceptable. It is because even in that case, the Sakti of the very known word as originally ascertained through Vṛddhavyavahāra.

Though the number of ways suggested for acquiring the knowledge of a new words varies in different treatises, it is interesting to find that Vṛddhavyavahāra is invariably recognised by almost all the scholars of various schools and hence it deserves to be admitted as the most important of the ways suggested in this regard. It is why we find Nāgeśa referring to (Vṛddha) Vyavahāra as Saktigrāhakaśāstra, the chief (lit. the crest jewel) of the factors of statement of a trustworthy person).

128. uttama vṛddhena madhyama vṛddhamuddisya 'gāmānaya' ityukte tām gavānayanapravṛttamupalabhya bālo'sya vākyasya 'sāsnādimitpindānayanamarthāḥ' iti prathamaṁ pratipadyate, anantaraṁ ca 'gām badhāna' 'āśvamānaya' ityādāvāvapdvāpabhyaṁ gosabdasya 'sāsnādimitānarthāḥ' ānāyanapadosya ca 'āharaṇamarthāḥ' iti sankeṭamavadhārayati. kvacicca prasiddhapadasamabhivyāṅgṝt, yathā 'iha prabhinnakamalodare madhvani madhukaraḥ pibati' ityatra. kvaciddśopadeśat, yathā 'ayamāsvaśabdavācyāḥ' ityatra. SD, p. 32-33.

129. saktigrāhaśca vṛddhavyavahārāt — 'vikasitapadme madhukaraṣṭiṣṭhati' ityādau prasiddhapadasamabhivyāṅgṝt, yathā-'hārāśiddhe'pi madhukaraśādivyutpattidarsa. ND, vide TS, pp.319-23.
determining the denotative power (of words). This singular position is given to Vṛddhavyavahāra in all the chief schools including Mīmāṃsā. In the circle of Naiyāyikas also, generally speaking, this Vṛddhavyavahāra gets due recognition. Of the predecessors of Viśvanātha, Gaṅgāśa comes to admit that the knowledge of all words primarily results from Vṛddhavyavahāra i.e. the observations of usage of elderly persons. He understands the other ways to be dependant on the basic knowledge of meanings of words derived through Vṛddhavyavahāra. Jagadīśa categorically asserts that the knowledge of Saṃketa first takes place in all cases through Vṛddhavyavahāra and only thereafter, scope arises for the knowledge of Sakti through other factors like Upamāna. Viśvanātha Nyāya Pañcānana, however, quotes the aforesaid verse 'saktigrāhas' etc. and explains each of the eight 'saktigrāhas' in the

130. sā ca saktissādhuśvivapabhramāṃśāvapi,
saktigrāhasīromāṇeravavahārasingasya tulyatvāt. PLM, p. 27

131. vṛddhavyavahāraūdautpattikatvamuktām śabdārthajñānasya ------- na Cā'tra vṛddhavyavahāraṁ muktā'nyat kāraṇamupalabhāmahe. NR, pp. 254-258
vṛddhavyavahārapūrvikaivā sarvā vyutpattih.
VM, p. 2, vide PP.
vyavahāraḥ prayojaḥ vṛddhapyayojakaḥ vṛddhavyavahāraḥ
---- tadanantaraḥ vyākaraṇopamāna ---- yathāyogāḥ
saktimāvadhārayati ti dik. TP, vide BHC, pp. 56-57.

132. vṛddhavyavahārādeva sarvvesāmyāḥ vyutpattih
upayāntasya śabdāvyutpattiyadhīnatvāt. TC, pp. 460-63.

133. saṅketasya grahah pūrvaḥ vṛddhasya vyavahārataḥ pasçādevopamānādyaiḥ saktidhipūrvakairasāx.
SSP, pp. 103-04
same order as is given in the verse. He seems to place all the 'śaktigrāhakas' on a par. He cannot be said to have attached any special importance to any one of them.

Now 'tu' in the expression 'śaktigrāhastu' in the text of the Muktāvalī above seems to carry some significance. Śaktijñāna being admitted as essential for bringing about the knowledge of the meaning of a word concerned, the author of the Bhāsāpariccheda cautions that the very knowledge of Śakti of words is to be gathered only from recognised sources as enlisted in the quoted verse. Otherwise there is the risk of the resulting verbal knowledge being invalided. We shall see in our discussion later on that all the 'śaktigrāhakas' mentioned in the kārikā are in consonance with the Naiyāyikas' understanding of the Śabda Pramāṇa in the sense of Āpta-vākyā. As we shall find that these 'śaktigrāhakas' are only certain specific Āptavākyas, we can interpret Viśvanātha's 'tu' as carrying a sense of caution not to violate the sanction made in the list. Or we may say that in presenting the list of 'śaktigrāhakas', he is influenced by his predecessor Gaṅgeśa who raises the doubt, on behalf of a Pūrvapakṣa, that as there are no means of ascertaining Saktigraha, the Śabdabodha for which Saktigraha stands admitted as a pre-requisite is not possible.\textsuperscript{134}

\begin{flushright}
134. namu gosābdah asve prayukta sādhureva na jñāpakastu na bhavati, tachchaktatvenājñānāditi cet -- TC, p.646.
\end{flushright}
The Śakti of a Prakṛti (stem) in the form of a Dhatu (verbal root) and of Pratyayas (suffixes) etc. is ascertained from Grammar. In the event of a hindrance, however, it (i.e. the act of apprehending Śakti from Vyakaraṇa) is discarded. For instance, the grammarians hold that the Śakti of Ākhyāta (the tenfold verbal suffix) is with regard to the Kartā (agent). In (the proposition) such as 'Caitra cooks', Caitra is syntactically connected with the Kartā of the action (of cooking) by the relation of identity. As because this is cumbrous (gauravāt), it is rejected. But owing to simplicity (lāghavāt), the Śakti (of Ākhyāta) is understood with regard to Kṛti (effort). Kṛti is understood as being a feature (prakāra) of Caitra and others.'

In the Mukta-vallī above, Viśvanātha begins his exposition and illustration of these 'śaktigrāhakas' or 'śaktigrāhopalyas' (the methods or means for acquiring the knowledge of the primary meanings of words). At the first instance Viśvanātha admits Grammar as a means of learning
the meaning of Prakṛtis (in the form of Dhātus), Pratyayas (suffixes), etc. As such he appears to echo an earlier opinion. Even according to Patañjali we can learn the meanings of the radicals, verbal roots, suffixes etc. of a language easily with the aid of Grammar. It is a fact that in the view of Patañjali, the words stand in a fixed relationship with their respective meanings. Yet, according to him, the help of Grammar is indispensable for learning the meanings of words used in a sentence. Whatever may be the basic difference between Naiyāyikas and others in the approach to the relation between a word and its meaning or, in other words, to the nature of Sakti, the importance of Grammar in the matter of learning language is widely admitted. Of the Naiyāyikas, the older theorists stressed the utility of Grammar for distinguishing between correct and corrupt uses of words on the strength of corresponding convention. This we may gather from Vātsyāyana’s Nyāyabhāṣya135 and Vacaspati’s Viśvaṃśa’s Tatparyatīkā.136 Vacaspati explicitly puts that

135. prayujyamānagrahaṇaḥ ca samayopayogolaukikānām.
    samayapālanārthaḥ cedāḥ padalakṣanāyā vāco’nvākhyanānānāḥ
    vyākaraṇānāṁ. V. B. under N.3. 2.1.56.

136. —— sādhuḥ saṃdhubhiḥdāgāparyantah vyākaraṇena, ——
    tathā ca yeṣaḥ padānāṁ yenaṁ yanārtheṇa paramesvarena kūtah,
    samayah tāṁ tatra sādhuṁ asādhuṁitaratreti viśhāntah
    vyākaraṇamarthavatāditi siddham. NVTT, p. 419.
Grammar is essential for distinguishing between the correct and corrupt forms even in case of learning a language through Vṛddhavyavahāra.¹³⁷

Now to resume our exposition of the text of the Muktavali above, we find the expression Dhatuprakṛti quite interesting. As accepted in the circle of the Naiyāyikas, Prakṛti stands for Dhatu also. Jagadīśa directly divides Prakṛti into Nāmapadas and Dhatus.¹³⁸ By Nāmapadas he covers the Pratipadikas of Pāṇini. Now the question arises as to why Viśvanātha makes a separate mention of Dhatu in addition to Prakṛti which covers the former. Hence Rāmarudrabhatta explains Viśvanātha’s Muktavali text 'dhatuprakṛti' as 'dhaturūpaprakṛti'.¹³⁹ This may be that hereby Viśvanātha wants to exclude the Nāmapadas from the scope of Vyākaraṇa as a saktigrāhaka. If Viśvanātha would have wanted to include the Nāmapadas, he could and should have used only the word

¹³⁷. vṛddhavyavahārāvadhṛtasamayo vyākaraṇātsadhvasadhu-vibhāgaḥ ca pratipadyata ityarthah. ibid, p. 420.

¹³⁸. niruktā prakṛtirdvedā nāma-dhautuprabhedaḥ yatpratipadikāṃ proktaṃ tannāmmo nātiricyate. SSP, p. 68.

¹³⁹. vastuto dhautuprakṛtītyasya dhaturūpaprakṛtītyarthah. RR, Vide NSM, p. 267.
Prakṛti. So in the commentary Rāmarudrī, it is opined that actually the Śaktigraha in case of Pratipadikas, e.g., Garga, takes place from Kośa.\(^{140}\) Now Dhatu stands for the roots 'bhu', 'pac' etc.\(^{141}\) The word 'ādi' in the Muktavali text above is there to cover Samāsa as well, since the Vaiyākarāṇas admit Sakti in Samāsa also.\(^{142}\) The term Pratyaya stands for Subādi (inflexional suffixes), tiṇādi (conjunctival suffixes) taddhita and kṛt (primary and secondary suffixes).\(^{143}\)

140. gavādipradhānapraṭipadikānaṁ kośādeva sāktigraha iti mantavyam. HR, Vide NSM, p. 266.

In fact, if Grammar itself is recognised as Śakti-grāhaka for the nāmapadas also, then there would be no job for the other Śakti-grāhakas at all. But the other Śakti-grāhakas would find enough field of operation, when the nāmapadas are not assigned to the jurisdiction of Grammar.

141. bhūvādayo dhatavaḥ. P 1.3.1.
kriyāvācino bhūvādayo dhatusaṁjñā syuh. SIK, under above.

142. ādīnā samāśādiparigrahaḥ samāśādāvapi vaiyākaraṇaṁ śaktyaṁtiṅkārāt. HR, Vide NSM, p. 266.

143. pratyayaḥ. P 3.1.1.

\(\text{ṃṛṅ} \) paraśca. P 3.1.2.
nyāntādābantāpratipadikāca pare svādayaḥ pratyayaḥ syuh. SIK, under P 4.1.2.
vibhaktiśca. P 1.4.103
suptīnau vibhaktīsamājñāu staḥ. SIK, under above.

143. krpaṭin. P 3.1.93.
sannihite dhātvadhiṅkāre tiṅbhinnāḥ pratyayaḥ kṛtasaṁjñāḥ syāt. SIK, under above.
taddhitāḥ. P 4.1.76
vakṣyāmānāḥ pratyayāḥ taddhitasaṁjñākāḥ pratyestavyā ityarthāḥ. Ekamānoraśā under above Vide SIK, p. 404.
Now it is found that Grammar fixes the meanings of Dhātu-prakṛti etc. mentioned above. As for instance, the Dhātu (root) 'bhū' is read in the sense of 'being' (sattā), the pratyayas (suffixes) 'tip' etc. in the sense of present tense (vartamāna) or the pratyayas (suffixes) 'sup' etc. are read in the sense of number one etc. The Navya Naiyāyikas like Viśvanātha also accept these meanings as determined by Grammar. It is, however, not that the Naiyāyikas do accept all the meanings as fixed by Grammar. When there is a chance of their fundamental principles being contradicted, they do not agree with the Grammarians. An instance of difference of idea between the Grammarians and the Naiyāyikas is provided by the denotation of the term Ākhyāta. While the Naiyāyikas understand the 'tin' suffixes by the term Ākhyāta, the Grammarians understand the tin-antas, i.e. the verbs comprising of roots, tin suffixes and

144. bhū sattāyam. Pāṇiniyadhātupāthaḥ
       ------ Vartata iti deśaḥ. Mādhaviya-Dhātuvṛtti
by Sāyana.

145. vartamāne lat. P 3.2.23.

146. supaḥ. P 3.4.103; supastrīṇī tinī vacanānyska-
deśaekavacanaadvīvacanabahuvacanasāmījūnāni syuh.
SK, under above.
and also other augments. In the sentence 'Caitraḥ pacati', for example, the ākhyāta 'pacati', according to the Grammarians, means 'Kartā' (the agent). So the entire Verbal form stands for 'Pākakartā'. Caitra as the proper name standing for the actual agent of cooking in the context comes to be syntactically connected by the relation of identity (abheda) with the verbal form 'pacati' which means nothing but the 'pākakartā' (the agent of cooking) himself. So the Sābdabodha in the context comes in the form of

147. The word ākhyāta comes to be used in different senses in different systems. But we feel that Naiyāyikas accepted the sense of ākhyāta as the suffixes 'tiṇādi'.

cf. dhātvarthena viśiṣṭasya vidheyatvena bodhane
samarthah svārthayatnasya sabdo vā"khyātamucyate.
dhātvarthāvacchinnasvārthayatnavidheyatana vā arthayodbodha
samarthah sabdo vā"khyātam, tadeva ca tiṇityarthāllabhaye,
tiṇākhyaṭayoh paryyāyatvāt. SSP, p. 395;

But the Grammarians come to understand it not as tiṇ but as tiṇanta. cf. tanna. ākhyātamākhyātena kriyasāt
tatyātīti sūtre ākhyātapatena tiṇantasyaiva grahaṇat
----- ākhyātapatena tiṇantasyaiva grahaṇamityalam.
PLM, p. 111.

148. lāh karmapi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ. p. 3.4.69;
On the strength of the Sūtra above, Nāgēśa comes to oppose Mīmāṁsakas' understanding ākhyāta in the sense of Vyāpāra.

cf. yattu mīmāṁsakaḥ phalam dhātvartho, vyāpāraḥ
pratyayārtha iti vadanti. tanna. 'lāh karmapi'
ityādīsūtraśvirodhpattē. na hi tena vyāpārasya
pratyayārthatā labhyate. PLM, p. 89.
'Caitrabhimnaḥ pākakartā' giving the idea of Caitra as (not different from i.e. identified as) the agent of cooking. The Navya-Naiyāyikas come to reject this position. As Viśvanātha points out, they understand 'an effort' (Kṛti) and not the 'agent' (Karta) as the meaning of a verbal suffix (Ākhyāta). It requires to be noted here that, as shown under foot-note (no. 147) above, the Naiyāyikas and the Grammarians differ in respect of the very concept of Ākhyāta. The Naiyāyikas discard the view of the Grammarians as the stand taken by the latter leads to a fallacy of complexity (Gaurava). For the sake of the merit of simplicity (Laghava), the Naiyāyikas assert that it is wiser to understand the Sakti of Ākhyāta with regard to Kṛti. The Naiyāyikas understand 'effort' (Yatna) by the word Kṛti.149

In the matter of recognising the signification of effort (Yatnavācyatvam) from Ākhyāta, the Naiyāyikas clash also with the Mīmāṃsakas. Udayanacārya points out this difference of opinion amongst the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas. The Mīmāṃsakas who understand Vyapāra as the Sākyārtha are not prepared to accept Kṛti (Yatna) as denoted by an

149. kṛtā'kṛtavibhāgena kartṛupavyavasthayā /
yatna eva kṛṭiḥ ------------------ NKU 9, p. 230.
Ākhyāta. They of coarse understand a sense of 'Yatna' or Kṛti corresponding to an Ākhyāta only by 'ākṣepa' (i.e. by Anumāna). The process of Anumāna involved therein according to the Māmāsakas takes such a form: 'Caitraḥ pākānukula kṛtimān pākānukula vyāpāravattvāt.' They donot pretend not to know that a sense of effort comes to be conveyed in case of every Ākhyāta, though they do not understand it by the very Ākhyātaśakti. Without going to the detailed arguments, we can conclude that even at the stage of Udayanācārya, the Naiyāyikas have asserted that the 'Krtyartha' (Yatnārtha) cannot be had through an inferential process but by the Śakti only of Ākhyātārtha itself. Jagadīśa also confirms Kṛti as Ākhyatārtha. In consonance with this earlier position, Viśvanātha now points out the Śakti of an Ākhyāta with regard to Kṛti in the sense of effort. As a result, 'Pacati' means 'Pākākṛti' and the total meaning of the sentence comes to be

150. ——— māmāsakāḥ phalaṁ dhātvartho,
vyāpāraḥ pratyayārthāḥ iti vadanti. PLM, p. 89;
nanu ——— ākhyātāntaraḥ ca na yatnavācakam,
anukula — vyāpāramātre eva ākhyātaśakteḥ, ratho
gacchatītyādau tathākalpanāt. vṛtti ——— ākṣepa-
pādeva ca yatnalākhaḥ, vṛtti. NKU, pp. 229-33.

151. bhāvanaiva hi yatnātmā sarvākhyātasya gocaraḥ.
tayā vivaraṇadhrauvyāt ākṣepanupaptitaḥ.
NKU, 10, p. 233.

152. caitraḥ pacatiyādau dhātvartharthāvacchinnasya
yatnasya vidheyatayā ——— yatnatvaveva tiṇah śakyata-
vacchedakam ——— nanu kṛtyadikam sākhyātasyārthāh
——— iti prābhākarah. tadastat ——— sābdikāstut
——— kartāpitiṁarthāḥ ——— SSF, pp. 395-402.
'Pākakṛtīmān caitrāḥ'. The (Pāka) kṛti as the Sākyārtha of the Ākhyaṭa in 'Pacati' stands as Prakāra or Viśeṣaṇa (qualification) of the agent Caitra here. Such is the way of explaining other Ākhyaṭās also.

Now the notion of Gaurava and Lāghava, involved in the context as being thought of by Viśvanātha may be explained thus: All Sākyārthas must have their Sākyatavacchedakas (i.e., the exclusive factor which restricts the state of being a Sākyārtha to the Sākyārtha alone). All the Sākyatavacchedakas again except Jāti must be understood along with their own Sākyatavacchedakas. The Sākyatavacchedaka is the 'dharma' (qualification) or attribute and the Sākyārtha is the 'dhrma' (qualified or that which is possessed of an attribute). Without the knowledge of 'dharma', that of 'dhrma' cannot follow. Whenever there is 'Pārthajñāna', through 'saktiñāna', the Sākyārtha comes to be understood along with its Sākyatavacchedaka.

Now, if Karta is the Sākyārtha of an Ākhyaṭa, the Karta or agent comes to be Kṛtīmān, i.e., one that possesses the effort. Hence Kṛti is obviously the Sākyatavaccheka here. Now Kṛti being a meaning other than a Jāti, it must also have a Sākyatavacchedaka for its own in the form of 'Kṛtitva'. Thus it will lead to a 'Kalpana-gaurava' (complexity in imagination, i.e., a complex imagination).
Moreover as even the Kṛti can be innumerable, one is to admit innumerable denotative powers (anantasakti) again to have the knowledge of Kṛti. In this way also, a scope for another 'Kalpanāgaurava' arises. But if the Kṛti is directly understood as the Śakyārtha of an Ākhyāta, the 'Kṛtitva' will be the Śakyatēvacchedaka. The Kṛtitva standing for a Jāti and being one in number, no scope for 'Kalpanāgaurava' will arise in either way. Thus, for sake of simplicity (Lāghava), the Naiyāyikas come to reject the view of Vaiyākaraṇas in the matter of understanding the meaning of an Ākhyāta.

Thus in a sentence like 'Caitraḥ pacati', the Naiyāyikas understand only Kṛti as Śakyārtha from the Akhyata in 'Pacati' and have the Śabdabodha as 'Pākakṛtimān Caitraḥ'. But they are silent as to how they come to get the meaning 'Kṛtimān' from Kṛti, which is necessary to effect the syntactical relation between Caitraḥ and Kṛti. In our opinion here also an involvement of Laksanā is to be admitted. While Sakti gives the sense of Kṛti, it must be none other than Laksanā to convey the sense of the Kṛtimān. But Viśvanātha maintains an enigmatic silence about the possibility of the involvement of a Laksanā here.

Here we may note that Nāgēśa as a Grammarian could not appreciate the view of the Naiyāyikas in this regard. He refers to the grammatical view of recognising Sakti of
suffixes\(^{153}\) (that is tin) with regard to Kartā and Karma. He in that context refers to the Naiyāyikas who accept Sakti of 'lakāras' with regard to Kṛti and not Kartā for sake of a Lāghava\(^{154}\) (Simplicity). He opposes the Nyāya view as inaccurate.\(^{155}\)

\[\text{M(11). na ca kartturanabhidhānaścaitrādipadottaram} \]
\[\text{tṛtīyā syāditi vācyam, karttṛsaṃkhyaṅabhidhānasya} \]
\[\text{tatra tantratvāt. saṃkhyaṅabhidhānayogasya karmatvā-} \]
\[\text{dyanavaruddhah prathamāntapadopasthapyah. karmatvā-} \]
\[\text{dityasyetaretavisēṣaṇatvena tātparyavisayatvamārthaḥ.} \]
\[\text{tena caitra iva maitro gacchatītyādau na caitre} \]
\[\text{saṃkhyaṅvayah. yatra karmādau na viṣeṣaṇatve tāt-} \]
\[\text{paryam, tadvāraṇāya prathamānteti. yadvā dhātvarthā-} \]
\[\text{tirikta viṣeṣaṇatvam prathamadalārthaḥ. tena caitra} \]
\[\text{iva maitro gacchatītyādau caitrādervāraṇam. stokām} \]
\[\text{pacatītyādau stokādervāraṇāya dvitiyadalam. tasya} \]

\(^{153}\) kartrkarmaṁthakatattatpratyayasamabhivyāhārasaṁ
tattadodbhāne niyāmako ityāhuh. PİM, p. 87.

\(^{154}\) yattu tārkiḥ - phalavyāpārau dhātvarthāḥ.

\(^{155}\) tanna. yuṣmādyasmadorlakārena saṃmāndhikaranyābhāvat
puruṣavyavasthānāpatteḥ. pacantām caitraṁ paśya, pacate
devadattāya dehityādau sātrāṣaṇajādīnāmapi tibādivallā-
deśāviṣeṣaṇa tebyah kṛtimātrabhodhāpatteśca. na ceṣṭā-
pattih. āśrayāśrayibhāvena karmāṇi sampradāne ca
kṛteranvayāditi vācyam. nāmarthayorabhedānvayo vyutpanna
iti vyutpattibhāṅgāpatteḥ. ibid, p. 105.
'it should not be claimed that there should be the third case-ending after the word like Caitra on the ground that the Kartā is the denoted meaning (of the Ākhyāta); because such a case-ending is warranted by a non-denotation of the number of the Kartā (by the Ākhyāta). One which deserves to have one's number (saṃkhya) denoted (by the Ākhyāta) must be one, i.e., not fettered by the state of being a Karma etc. and (at the same time) occurring in the first case-ending. The meaning of 'the state of being a Karma etc.' is 'the state of being not intended' to be denoted as attribute of anything else. Hence in the expression, 'Maitra, similar to Caitra, goes', the number of Caitra is not syntactically related (to the number of the Ākhyāta). The clause, 'prathamāntapadopasthāpya' (i.e., 'occurs in the first case-ending') is given to eliminate such 'Karma' etc. which are not intended to be attributes (of others). Or the meaning of the first clause (i.e., 'Karmatvādyāñavaruddha' is the state of being an attribute of anything other than the meaning of the root. Hence Caitra etc. in the expressions like 'Maitra, similar to Caitra goes', are eliminated (from the possibility of having the number denoted by the Ākhyāta). The second clause is there for the elimination of words like 'stoka' in the expressions like 'stokām pacati'; that word is eliminated because of occurring in the second case-ending.'
In the foregoing passage, it has been established that the Ākhyaṭa does not have a Sākti in respect of the Kartā. This amounts to saying that the Kartā is not denoted (i.e., not 'abhihitā) by the Ākhyaṭa. This position ushers in a problem. According to the Grammarians' rule 'kartṛkaraṇa-yostṛtīyā' (P 2.3.18), a Kartā which is not 'abhihitā' (i.e., not denoted by the Ākhyaṭa) should occur in the third case-ending. Hence in the expression, 'Caitraḥ pacati', Caitra being not denoted by the Ākhyaṭa in 'pacati', the word 'caitra' should have occurred in the third case-ending. Viśvanātha says that such an objection is not tenable, because, when it is said that a certain Kartā is not 'abhihitā' by the Ākhyaṭa, what is meant is that the number of the Kartā is not denoted by the number of the Akhyata. In other words, the state of the number of the Kartā being not denoted by the Ākhyaṭa is the governing factor for the Kartā having the third case-ending. In this connection, it is further pointed out that the Kartā or the Karma which deserves to have its number being denoted by the Ākhyaṭa must be 'karmatvādyanavaruddha' and at the same time 'prathamāntapadopasthāpya'. The plain meaning of the clause 'karmatvādyanavaruddha' is that it should not be fettered by the state of being Karma etc; but the actual purport of the clause is that the meaning of the word should not occur as an attribute of some other meaning. For example, in the expression, 'Caitra iva Maitro gacchati', the number of the
word 'Caitra' is not denoted by the Ākhyāta in 'gacchati' or in other words, there need not necessarily be a syntactical conformity between 'Caitra' and 'gacchati' in respect of their number. This is because, Caitra occurs here as an attribute of the idea of 'sādṛśya' (i.e., similarity) conveyed by the word 'iva'. Because from the expression 'Caitra iva', what we understand is 'caitraviṣayakasādṛśya' where the idea of 'sādṛśya' is qualified by the idea of 'Caitra'. Hence there need not be a conformity between 'Caitra' and 'gacchati' and we can also have an expression like 'Caitra iva Maitro gacchati' without affecting the denotation of the Ākhyāta. Our author further says that the clause 'prathamāntapadopasthāpya' is given to make sure the elimination of a situation where the purport is not in respect of the state of being an attribute for the Karma etc. For example, in the expression, 'taṇḍulam pacati', the Sābdabodha occurs in the form of 'taṇḍulakarmakāpākānukulakṛṭīḥ' where 'taṇḍula' is a Viśeṣaṇa of the meaning of the root nodoubt but it is not the attribute of anything else. Hence the number in 'taṇḍula' should have been in conformity with the number of the Ākhyāta. But it is not so, since we can have the expression 'taṇḍulān pacati' also. Now 'taṇḍula' cannot claim this conformity only because of not occurring in the first case ending. In the expression, 'taṇḍulam pacyate', where the Sābdabodha is in the form of 'pākānukūlakṛṭikarmatvavat taṇḍulam', 'taṇḍulam' occurs only as a
Visēšya and not as a Visēśaṇa and hence there is full conformity between 'taṇḍula' and the Ākhyāta in respect of the number. In the example, 'taṇḍulaṁ pacati', 'taṇḍulam' is a Visēśaṇa only of the meaning of the Dhātu and not of anything else. When anything occurs as the attribute of the meaning of a Dhātu and not of anything else, that is taken to be as good as being not the attribute of anything at all. Hence there was the doubt that the word 'taṇḍulam' of the expression, 'taṇḍulaṁ pacati' should have been covered by the purport of the clause 'karmatvādyanavaruddha' or by that of 'itaravisēśaṇatvenaḥ śatparyaviśayatvam'. We do not have the number in the word 'taṇḍulam' denoted by the Ākhyāta only because it occurs in the first case-ending.

To make it clear that being an attribute of the meaning of a root is not taken to be the state of being an attribute, the author improves upon his position by saying that the earlier clause (i.e., Karmatvādyanavaruddha) should mean that the particular object is not an attribute of anything other than the meaning of a root. Hence the word 'Caitra' in the expression 'Caitra iva maitro gacchati', even though it is 'Prathamāṇatapadopasthāpya', does not have its number denoted by the number of the Ākhyāta, because of being the attribute of something other than the meaning of a root. In the expression, 'stokam pacati' (Cooks slightly) the word 'stokam' is an attribute of the meaning of the concerned root. As such it is not an attribute of anything
else and hence it should have had its number denoted by the number of the Ākhyāta. But the scope for such a denotation is not there and we can have an expression like 'stokām pacati' because the word 'stokam', as desired by the grammatical injunctions, occurs in the second case-ending and is thus debarred by the clause 'Prathamāntapadopasthāpya'.

Now coming back to the original position of Visvanātha that the Kṛti and not the Kartā is the meaning of the Ākhyāta, we have to face the question as to how the idea of the Kartā comes to be understood at all. Visvanātha is himself silent on this point. But we find that the question in the context has been replied as early as in Udayana's Nyāyakusumānijali. According to Udayana the sense of a Kartā can be had through an 'ākṣepa' (an inferential process) from the number (saṁkhyā) of a Kartā, which stands undoubtedly denoted by an Ākhyāta. Such an 'ākṣepa' is possible as because, a Kartā is the substratum of its own saṁkhyā which is a quality. Hence according to Udayana, there is no necessity of imagining the Šakti of an Ākhyāta with regard to a Kartā.156

Nāgėśa also makes a reference to Naiyāyikas' admitting Kartā as known by its being presented only in the first case-ending and that to the meaning of a word ending only in the

156. ākṣepa-labhye saṁkhyeyeye nā'bhidhānasya kalpanā saṁkheyamātralābhe tu saṁkāmśena vyavasthitih. NKU, p. 238.
ākhyāta-vācyayā saṁkhyayā āśrayasya ākṣepādeva lābhat na karttari śakti-kalpanā. Vṛtti, under above.
first case-ending, the meaning of an ākhyāta also comes to be an attribute. In a sentence like 'Caitraḥ pacati' the Śabdabodha as a result will take the shape of 'pākānu-kūlavyāpārānukūlakṛtimaṁścaitraḥ.'

In summing-up this context of Śaktigraha from Vyākaraṇa we may add that Gaṅgēśa recognised but did not illustrate it. Gaṅgēśa, of course illustrated the utility of Grammar in distinguishing between corrupt and correct words. Jagadiśa very briefly refers to it by way of illustrating the Śaktigraha of Pratyayas from it (Vyākaraṇa).

Similarly the Śakti (of an ākhyāta) is not to be understood with regard to Vyāpāra also, as it is found to be

157. praṭhamaṁ no taṁlaṁ bhaḥ ca. ---- praṭhamaṁ-
ārthe ākhyatārtho viśeṣam. ---- tathā ca caitraḥ
pacatītyādau vikliṭtyanukūlavyāpārānukūlakṛtimaṁścaitra
iti bodhah. PLM, pp. 104-05.

158. viśrāma-viśramasābdayośca sādhutve pāṇini-candra
gosvāmīvyākaraṇavirodhe vauśramervikalpa iṣyata iti
dhābhāṣyakāravacanādubhayamaṇi sādhu. TC, p. 650.

159. kvac ca vyākaraṇāt, yathā 'karmāṇi dvitiyā'
'karttari parasmaipadaṁ tyādyāntaṁ karmatvādau
dvitiyādeḥ. SSP, p. 106.
cumbrous. In sentences like 'the Chariot is moving' therefore, there is (to be admitted) Laksana (of 'akhyata') with regard to either its Vyapara or its 'asrayatva' (i.e., the state of being the substratum). (Similarly) there is Nirudha Laksana of the Akhyata (to be admitted) in sentences like 'He knows' with regard to the state of being the substratum (of the knowledge) and the sentences like '(It) perishes' with regard to the 'pratiyogitva' (i.e., the state of being the counter-positive of the destruction).

Visvanatha now proceeds to explain cases where it is not possible to understand Krti as Sakyaartha of the concerned Akhyata.

Visvanatha first takes up the expression 'ratho gacchati' to bring home the idea that in certain cases where Krti cannot be had as a denoted sense of an Akhyata, the idea of a Vyapara is conveyed by the same Akhyata to give the contextual Sabdabodha. But in any case, a Vyapara can at best be a Laksyaartha of the Akhyata. Here it may be useful to make a reference to the Mimamsakas' assertion that only a Vyapara can be the Sakyaartha of an Akhyata.160

160. cf. abhidhahhidhano vyaparah samasti mdmamnam tvasau vyaparah pruaprapvritisbhavanaphalavatvad bhave neti pravartaneti ca giyte. NRM, p. 48

The Laks or Pratyayas which are given to denote Vyapara are nothing but (i.e., no other than) Tins which only get the status of Akhyata in the school of Naiyayikas.
The Mīmāṃsakas, particularly the Prabhakaras took great pain in maintaining that neither Kartā nor Kṛti can be the denoted sense of an Ākhyāta. We come across lengthy discussions on the issue in works like the Prakaraṇapancikā. Nāgāraja also refers to Mīmāṃsakas' admission of Vyāpāra as the Sākyartha of the Ākhyāta and disapproves of the same.

Viśvanātha has already voiced his opposition to the Kartā being a Sākyartha of an Ākhyāta. Presumably to show

161. cf. katham tathā śabdasyābhidhānalakṣaṇo vyāpāra āśrīyate yathā tattathā śrūyatām ——— nanu ca sarvākhyaṃ raṃ bhāvanā vacanāṃ karotiśātānādhikaranyādadhyaśiyate. tathāhi bhavatyarthisa kartuḥ prayojakavyāpāro bhāvanā. saiva ca kṛtis ——— ākhyātapratyayasannidhāne ca tadavagamād ākhyātānāmeva so'rtha iti nāciyate. tadasat ——— api ca vrddhavyāvahārācchabdārthaniṃbayah. na cākhyātānām bhāvanāvacanatvamantareṇa kasya cidvṛddhavyāvahārasyānupapattis ——— ākhyātām tu kevalakartṛsamākhyānām vaktīti siddhām tanmātravācītvam ——— nanu prabhākara api bhāvanāvacakataḥ kathamākhyātapratyayasyecheon. ucyate. na sarvākhyātapratyayāṇām bhāvanāvacanatvamabhyupemanām kim tu kāryābhidhāyino liṇādayaḥ ——— kṛtisca nābhidhīyaṃ kāryaṃ ca nābhidhiyata iti. syāṃmatām, yathā liṇām karttrādismākhyāmātravacanatā kriyākṣepena ca kartṛdinaṃ pratītiḥ. tathēpi kriyāprayatnamākṣipatīmābhūttasya liṇācyatati. PP, pp. 174-77.

162. yattu mīmāṃsakāḥ phalam ----------------------------- labhyate. PLM, p. 89.
his disagreement with also the Mīmāṃsakas as with the Vaiyākaraṇas, Viśvanātha discusses the position of Vyāpāra in the context. Normally when both Kṛti and Vyāpāra are there to put their claims to be an 'ākhyātaśakya' (i.e., a meaning denoted by ākhyāta), the choice would naturally fall on Kṛti. If Vyāpāra be admitted as a Śakyaśāstra, then the Śakyaśāstra-Vyāpāratva, as demanded by the definition of Vyāpāra, is a state of being the cause of an effect of something of which it itself is an effect. So the concept of Vyāpāra is not simple at the very face of it. In case Kṛti is admitted as 'ākhyātaśukya', on the other hand, 'Kṛtitva' will be a Śakyaśāstravaccheda. Compared to Vyāpāratva, Kṛtitva is much easier to be conceived. Hence to avoid 'kalpanāgaudra' ('i.e., cumbrousness in imagination) Vyāpāra is not to be admitted as 'ākhyātaśukya'.

But a sentence like 'ratho gacchati' gives us the śabdabodha only in the form of 'gamanānuṅkūlavyāpāravān rathah'. The śabdabodha in the form of 'gamanānuṅkūlakṛtāmin rathah' is not possible as no deliberate effort can ever be thought of as pertaining to an unconscious agent like a Chariot. Vyāpāra is undoubtedly the only possible meaning of the ākhyāta in 'gacchati' in the expression 'ratho gacchati'. This sense of Vyāpāra comes undoubtedly to be syntactically connected as an attribute

163. janyādīghatitasya vyāpāratvasya kṛtitvajātya-
peksayā gurutvāditi bhāvaḥ. DK, vide NSM, p. 271.
of the Kartā in the aforesaid expression. Under such unavoidable circumstances, Naiyāyikas like Viśvanātha are prepared to understand Vyāpāra only through Laksanā. A further analysis will show that the Vyāpāra in the case of "ratho gacchati" is the saṃyoga of the reins (i.e., ropes) with the 'ratha'. But, such a saṃyoga is present even when there is no 'gamana' i.e., no movement at all. Hence there is less justification even for admitting Vyāpāra as the Laksyārtha of the Ākhyāta. Conceding to such an objection, Viśvanātha says that the meaning of the Ākhyāta could better be taken as a Laksyārtha in the form of 'āśrayatva', i.e. the state of being a substratum. But Viśvanātha is silent as to whose 'āśrayatva' he means. It could be the 'āśrayatva' for the Vyāpāra or for the Kṛti or for the 'Phala', i.e., 'gamana'. As pointed out in the DK,164 it is the 'āśrayatva' for the 'Phala', i.e., 'gamana'. Hence in the expression, 'ratho gacchati', the Śabdabodha should be in the form of 'gamanā-āśrayatvavānpṛathah' and that is quite tenable in so far as the movement, though not the deliberate effort actually belongs to the 'ratha'.

164. ratho gacchātītyatra gamanānukūlavāpayārasya na bodhaḥ kintu gamanā-āśrayatvavaiyati navīnamatama-śrityā"ha āśrayate veti.

DK, vide NSM, p. 271.
In 'jānāti', a 'karttṛpada' like Caitra is to be supplied. In 'Caitraḥ jānāti', the Śabdabodha can never take place as 'jñānānukūlakṛtīmāṇa Caitraḥ', because no kṛti or physical effort can be involved in the matter of knowing. It cannot be placed on a par with 'caitraḥ pacati'. Again it cannot mean 'jñānānukūlavāyāparavān' as it does not involve a Vyāpāra. It cannot be on a par with 'kuññāreṇa kāṣṭhāṁ chinatti' to involve a Vyāpāra. So Laksāṇā in respect of Vyāpāra is not possible. But the idea we get is 'caitraḥ jñānāśrayavān' (Caitra is a repository of Knowledge). So there is 'āśrayatve laksāṇā' (Caitra = ātman of Caitra. The 'jñāna' occurs as a 'guna' of ātman.) Similarly, in 'nasyati', a Karta, say 'ghataḥ' is to be supplied. Here also Śabdabodha cannot be like 'ghataḥ nāśanukūlakṛtīmāṇa'. The pitcher does not make any effort for its destruction. It also obviously does not involve a Vyāpāra. In the Nyāya system whatever is subject to a destruction is called the Pratiyogī of the destruction. Hence there is the state of being a Pratiyogī (i.e., counter-positive) in the 'ghaṭa' in respect of its own destruction. So the meaning of 'nasyati' is a Laksyaṁtha in respect of 'nāśapratīyogītvā. The Śabdabodha will be 'nāśapratīyogītvavān ghaṭaḥ'.

According to Viśvanātha the Laksāṇā in 'caitraḥ jānāti' and 'ghaṭo nasyati' is of 'nirūḍhā' type. We reserve our discussion on it till our examination of Viśvanātha's Laksāṇā.
M(13). upamānād yathā saktigrahaśasthoktam.

'How the sakti can be understood from Upamāna has already been stated.'

Viśvanātha here refers to his earlier treatment of Upamāna which is accepted as one of the 'saktigrahakas'.

The process of Upamāna, as recognised by Viśvanātha, has been already discussed by us in the introduction of the present work. The very definition of Upamāna asserts that its only utility lies in producing the knowledge of Śakti of words. Viśvanātha's idea in admitting Upamāna as 'saktigrahaka' is that the knowledge, 'gosadṛśāḥ gavayāḥ' (the gavaya is like a cow) finally comes to lead to the knowledge, 'gavayāḥ gavayaśpadavācyāḥ' (the creature 'gavaya' is what is denoted by the word 'gavaya'). Thus we find Viśvanātha accepting Upamāna as 'saktigrahopaya'. We have already discussed in the introduction the position of Upamāna Pramāṇa vis-a-vis śabdapramāṇa. We have also discussed the reason for Viśvanātha's treatment of Upamāna prior to that of Śabda. It has also been observed that by virtue of involving an Āptavākya in the form of the Atidesāvākya, every Upamāna involves the earlier operation of Śabdapramāṇa. Here it will obviously be useful to examine the position of Upamāna in other systems and in the works of other writers also. Of the Mīmāṃsakas, Śabdrasvāmin regards Upamāna as a Pramāṇa and defends it as an instrument of knowledge on the
basis of similarity. The Vedāntins also hold that Upamāna is based on the knowledge of similarity. Of the Prācīna-Naiyāyikas, Gautama who recognises Upamāna as a Pramāna along with Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śābda, defines it as the instrument of valid knowledge of an object derived through its similarity with another well-known (prasiddha) object. Vātsyāyana holds that Upamāna conveys the knowledge of the relation of a name with the corresponding object signified by it (sāmjñāsaṃjñī-śambandha), and it is an instrument for the attainment of the valid knowledge of similarity which is technically called Upamiti.

165. Upamānamapi sādṛṣyamasannikṛṣṭe'rtthe buddhimut-pādayati, yathā - gavayadarsanam gosmaranasya.
SB, vide BR., p. 82.

166. tatra sādṛṣyapramākaraṇam upamānam.
VPB, p. 78

167. prasiddhasādharmyātsādhyaśādhanam upamānam.
NS 1.1.6.

168. prajñātena sāmānyatpraśnāpanīyasya prajñāpanamānimiti - 'yathā gaurevaḥ gavayaḥ iti, kim punaratropamānena kriyate, ------ 'yathā gaurevaḥ gavayaḥ' ity upamāne ------ 'asya gavayasadāh saṃjñā' iti saṃjñāsaṃjñīśambandhaḥ pratipadyate iti.
VB, under NS 1.1.6.
Similarly the Sakti is to be ascertained through the Lexicon also. In the event of a hindrance it is sometimes avoided. For instance, the Lexicon maintains that the Sakti of words such as 'blue' (nīla) is with regard to the 'blue colour' etc. as well as the things possessed of the blue colour etc. Yet for the sake of simplicity, the Sakti (of the 'nīla-pada') is (to be understood) with regard to the blue colour only; with reference to the things possessed of 'blue and other colours', however, there is Laksana (to be admitted).

Here Viśvanātha observes that the meaning of an unknown word is obtained through 'Kośa' (Lexicon or Dictionary) also. Dictionary gives us the knowledge of the equivalent word-meanings with regard to a particular word. But in the event of there arising any clash with their own principles, the Naiyāyikas are ever prepared to reject the knowledge of Sakti gathered through the Kośa in the context of a particular word. For example, for the word 'nīla' (blue), Dictionary gives both 'nīlavāraṇa' (blue colour) and 'nīlavāraṇavisīṣṭa' (blue coloured objects) as the primary meaning. It has been observed in the Dictionary...
that the words 'sukla' etc. denote 'suklavarna' etc. (white colour etc.) and also the 'suklavarnavisista-dravya' etc. (the objects possessed of white colour etc.) The list of words hinted in the Dictionary referred to above obviously includes 'nila'. Similarly Visvanatha's list of words in the context beginning with 'nila' (niladipadanam) also surely includes 'sukla', 'pita' etc. Now the Sakti of the word 'nila' is recognised by the Naiyayikas including Visvanatha only with regard to 'blue colour'. The meaning 'blue coloured object' is said to be conveyed by Lakṣapā, the power of secondary signification. They point out to 'simplicity' (Lāghava) as the ground for coming to such a conclusion.

If the Sakti of 'niladipada' is admitted even with regard to 'niladivisista', 'niladivisista' will be the Sakyārtha. Of the meaning, namely 'niladivisista' (the object possessed of blue colour etc.), the determinant (Sakyatavacchedaka) will obviously be 'nilatvavisista-nilarupa' (the blue colour characterised by blueness). But in the case of admitting 'nilavarna' or 'nilarupa' as a Sakyaartha, only the 'nilatva' (blueness) will be the Sakyatavacchedaka. In the earlier case, even the Sakyatavacchedaka

169. guna suklddayah puusi gu-nilinigastu tadvati.

AK 311.
i.e., the blue colour can also be immeasurable and hence for the knowledge of blue colour, immeasurable significative powers (anantāṇaśakti) shall have to be admitted. But in the later case, the blueness (nīlātva) being one and one only, the admission of only one Śakti would suffice. So Viśvanātha rejects the 'śaktigraha' of 'nīlādipada' with regard to 'nīlādiviśīṣṭa' for avoiding a 'Kalpanāgaurava'. This phenomenon, as we have already observed, occurs in respect of all words which signify colours. We know from Jagadīśa that Kosa allows such two-fold 'śaktigraha' in respect of certain other words also such as 'Śīta' when they come to be used in the sense of quality and qualified. The idea is this: we find in the dictionary that the word 'Śīta' in the masculine gender means the 'cold temperature' and it may also mean any object 'having a cold temperature' with a gender similar to that of the qualified object. Now though Kosa allows both the meanings as Śakyārthas, from the stand point of Viśvanātha, we can recognise only the first meaning as Śakyārtha and the second only as Lakṣyārtha.

170. kvacit kośādapi, yathā
guṇe śuklādayaḥ puṃsā guṇiliṅgastu tadvati /
Śītaṁ guṇe tadvadarthāḥ susīmaḥ śīśiro jaḍaḥ //
SSP, p. 106;

171. of. Śītaṁ guṇe tadvadarthāḥ susūmaḥ śīśiro jaḍaḥ /
tuṣāraḥ sītalaḥ sīto himaḥ saptañyaliṅgakah //
AK 182-83.
Thus even from the statement of trusted person Sakti (of a Pada) is to be apprehended. As from the statement, 'The Cuckoo is what is expressed by the word 'pika', we understand the Sakti of words like 'pika' with regard to 'Cuckoo' (etc.)'

Here Viśvanātha observes, that like the already mentioned 'Saktigrāhakas', Āpta-vākya or the statement of a trustworthy person also comes to serve as such. We have already dealt with the notion of an Āpta in the context of our examination of Sabda in the introduction of the present work. Now according to Viśvanātha, we may know the meaning of a word from the statement of a trustworthy person (Āpta). For example, an Āpta may give some ignorant person to learn directly that the word 'pika' means a 'Cuckoo' (Kokila). In the succeeding pages at an appropriate stage, we shall examine the Āpta-vākya again in comparison with some of the other 'Saktigrāhakas'.

We find Jagadīśa not referring to Āptavākya as a 'Saktigrāhaka'. It of course, does not speak of any difference in attitude between Jagadīśa and Viśvanātha. It is because the other 'Saktigrāhakas' viz. Vyākaraṇa, Upamāna, Kośa, Vakyā-śega, Vivaraṇa, and 'Prasiddhapada-sannidhi' are also certain
specific cases of Āptavākyas. We shall point out later on that the special mention of Āptavākyas as a 'saktigrāhaka' is only to cover the non-specific cases or the cases other than the specific Āptavākyas such as Vyākaraṇa etc.

M(16). evam vyavahārādapi. yathā prayojaka-vṛddhena
ghaṭamāṇayetyuktam. tacca śrutvā prayojyavrddhena
ghaṭa ānītaḥ. Tadavadhārya pārsaśvasto bālo ghaṭānayan-
arūpaṁ kāryaṁ ghaṭamāṇayeti śabdapravojyamityavadhāra-
yati. tatasca ghaṭaṁ naya gāmānayetyādivākyādāvāpodvā-
pābhyām ghaṭādipadānāṁ kāryānvita - ghaṭādau saktim
grññati.

'Similarly from usage also, Sakti is ascertained. For example, an elderly person gives the direction: 'Bring a jar', hearing that again, another elderly person brings the jar. Pondering on this, a boy, standing beside ascertains the act of bringing the jar as the result of the words 'bring the jar'. Thereafter, in the expressions like 'Remove the jar' and 'Bring the cows', he (i.e., the boy) understands through the process of Āvāpa (inclusion) and Udāpa (exclusion) that the Sakti of the words like 'jar' (ghaṭa) is with regard to the (objects) 'jar' etc., as connected with certain actions.'
Here Viśvanātha names and illustrates Vyavahāra as a means of determining the Śakti of a word. This Vyavahāra is popularly known as Vṛddhavyavahāra. Viśvanātha's exposition also confirms that his 'vyavahāra' is nothing other than the commonly known Vṛddhavyavahāra. In his illustrative statement, Viśvanātha uses the terms 'prayojakavrddha' 'prayojyavrddha' and 'bāla' to mean respectively an experienced person who is in command, a less experienced person under Command and an ignorant person who simply observes and learns thereby. His example is this: The experienced person utters 'Bring the jar'. Hearing that (expression), the less experienced person under direction brings the jar. Observing this, as he happens to be nearby, the child, i.e., a person who is ignorant of the Śakti of the uttered words infers that the act of bringing the jar is due to the utterence of the expression 'Bring the jar'. Thereafter, on further hearing of directions 'Take away the jar' 'Bring the cow' etc. by means of the inclusion (Āvāpa) and the exclusion (Udvāpa) of the particular words, he ascertains the Śakti or significative power of the words, 'ghaṭa' etc. with regard to objects, 'jar' etc. as connected with some action like bringing. The idea regarding Vṛddhavyavahāra can be put in the following manner also. The Vṛddha or experienced person utters a sentence in the form of a certain imperative statement. Another Vṛddha or experienced person who is junior to the former acts in a certain manner
in response to the direction. The inexperienced person who stands near by hears the utterances and observes the performance. He then infers vaguely that the meaning of the sentence is a Command and the action done is the result. Observing many other utterances and subsequent performances, he comes to have a general idea about the meanings of individual words through the process of the inclusions and exclusions of words (in and from the directing sentences).

Now it will be relevant on our part to examine the approach by other scholars to this Vṛddhavyavahāra or simply Vyavahāra. As we have already mentioned, Vṛddhavyavahāra seems to be the most important of the 'saktigrāhakas' as it is invariably recognised in almost all the schools of thought. According to the Prabhakara school of Purvamāma, this method leads to the knowledge of sakti through three definite stages and involves three Pramanās.\(^{172}\) They are

\(^{172}\) sabavṛddhābhidheyaṁśca pratyakṣenātra pasyati śrotusca pratipannatvam-anumānena ceṣṭayā. anyathānapattyā tu bodhechaktiṁ dvayātmiṁ karthāpattyāvabodheta sambandhām tripramāṇakam. iti pratipāditadiśā 'devadatta gāmānaya' ityādyuttama-vṛddha ----- madhyamavṛddhe nayati sati 'anenāsmadva-kṛyādevavādhirthaḥ pratipannah' iti taceṣṭayānumāyā tayarakhaṇḍavākyāvākyārthayor-arthāpattyā --- bālastatra. vyutpadyate. Parataḥ 'Caitra gāmānaya devadatta, asvamānaya devedatta gām naya' ityādivākyaprayoge tasya tasya sābdasya taṁ tamartham avadhārayati.

KP V, pp. 219-21.
(1) Pratyakṣa or direct perception. The child or the learner in the above instance has direct auditory perception of the uttered sentence and a direct visual perception of the action of the directed person, performed in response to the uttered injunction. (2) Anumāna or Inference: The child infers from the listener's activity that he has understood the meaning of the utterance. (3) Arthāpatti (Postulation or Assumption): The child postulates that what is performed by the directed person is the meaning of the verbal statement concerned. According to the Prābhākaras, it is the only method of learning a language. ¹⁷³

Of the Grammarians, we find Katyāyana giving preference to the usage of day to day life for learning a language. If anybody is curious to know a language properly, he should observe the usage of words by the experienced persons. That is what he says in the beginning of his Vārtikas on Pāṇini's Sūtras. ¹⁷⁴ Nāgęśā considers the Vyavahāra to be the best method of learning. ¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁵. Saktigrāhakasīromāṇervyavahārasya tulyatvāt. PLM, p. 27.
Of the Naiyāyikas, Jagadīśa claims Vṛddha-Vyavahāra to be the foremost of all the eight-methods. But the order of enumeration as we have it in the verse 'saktigraham' etc. and in the subsequent illustration of the 'saktigrāhakas' by Viśvanātha in the BP does not tally with this approach of Jagadīśa. Jagadīśa contends that Vṛddhavyavahāra should come first and then the others Viz. Upamāna etc.176

176. Saṅketasya kutah...
śabdāntaramadhyāhāryam; mānabhāvāt, "Caitra! putraste jāto mṛtaśce" tyādau tadabhāvacca. itthaṅca lāghavādān-vita-ghāte'pi saktim tyaktvā ghaṭapadasya ghaṭamātre saktimavadhārayati.

'In this way, according to some, there is no Śabdabodha in expressions like 'there is a blue jar on the ground.' As the words like 'jar' (ghaṭa) can convey the object 'jar' etc. as connected with certain acts (only) and as only the 'vidhilin' and other suffixes (carrying the sense of 'vidhilin' suffixes) have the competence to signify an action, there is no Śabdabodha (in expressions like 'a blue jar' etc.) because of the absence of a verb ending in 'liṅ' etc. But that is not (the case), (because) even though at first one understands the Śakti (of the word 'jar') with regard to (the object) 'jar' etc. as connected with certain actions, it is proper to give up that (notion of a connection with an action) afterwards for the sake of simplicity. In the expressions like 'Caitra, a son is born to you' and 'your (unmarried) daughter is pregnant', pleasure and pain come to be inferred from the brightness and otherwise of the face, and finally Śabdabodha is ascertained as the cause (of those two, i.e., pleasure and pain). (Thus finally) that (corresponding) Śabda (i.e., sentence) is ascertained as the cause of that Śabdabodha. There being also cases of non-conformity (vyabhicāra), therefore, the Śakti must not be understood with regard to objects as connected with
certain actions (only). Nor should there be the supplying (Adhyāhāra) of some other Śabda (i.e., sentence) like 'Look at him' as this is unwarranted and because it is not possible in utterances like 'Caitra, a son was born to you and is dead.' For the sake of simplicity also, in this way, one discards (the notion of) Śakti with regard to a jar as connected with a certain action and (finally) understands it with reference to simply a jar.'

In "itthanca ------- kecīt," Viśvanātha records and refutes an opinion which may be traced back to the Prabhakara Mīmāṁsakas. Like Viśvanātha other Naiyāyikas also have taken note of this attitude of the Prabhakaras. According to these Prabhakaras, it is not possible to have Śabdamānādhada from expressions like *bhūtaṃ nīle ḍhatuṃ* (a blue jar on the ground). It is because, in view of ascertaining the Śakti by means of Vṛddhavyāvahāra, the Śakti of words 'ṛga' etc. is understood with regard to objects 'jar' etc. only as belonging to a state of remaining connected with some actions (Kārya).

177. kāryānvitaśvārthe padānām sāktirīti vādinām gurūṇām etc. SĀKV. p. 18.
    nanvarthavādādīnāṃ siddhārthatayā na prāmāṇyam
kāryānvita eva padānām sāktyavadhāraṇāt ------- TC, p.460
    namu vyavahāradanumite gavādyānaya nadharmi̊kakāryya
    nvayajñāne padānām ------- iti prabhākarāśāṅkām ----,
The Mīmāṃsakas insist that all sentences must convey the idea of some Vidhi, which involves the idea of the state of being enjoined as duty (Kāryatā). The presence of suffixes like 'liṅ' (as in 'gāṁ nayet'), 'lot' (as in 'gāṁ naya') and 'tavya' (as in 'gau ānetavyaḥ') serves as the determinant (prayojaka) of the knowledge of the 'Kāryatā-bodha'. As in the expression 'hitale nilo ghaṭaḥ', there is no suffix like Liṅ, no knowledge of any action being enjoined occurs in this context. Hence the word 'ghaṭa' cannot be understood to mean the object 'jar' as connected with some action. Prabhākaras understand all 'saktigraha's initially through vrddhavyavahāra. The Vrddhavyavahāra involves in its turn the engaging of someone by a Vṛddha (i.e., an elderly person) in some actions (Kārya). Only by observing one engaged in an action in accordance with the 'Vṛddhavacana', the child comes to know the meaning of words through an inferential process. The Vṛddha can make one go for some action only by the use of Liṅ and similar suffixes. Under the circumstances, the 'saktijñāna' from Vṛddha-vyavahāra is possible only in the form of some 'Kāryānvitajñāna'. So the Prabhākaras are not prepared to recognise 'saktigraha' from a statement like 'a blue jar on the earth' which does not involve the knowledge of something as connected with some action. The Prabhākaras are again not prepared to recognise directly any 'saktigrāhaka'
other than Vṛddhavyavahāra which facilitates only 'Kāryānvitaśaktijñāna' and not otherwise. In 'tanna parityāgaucityāt' of the Muktāvalī the 'Kāryānvitaśaktivāda' of the Prabhākaras stands opposed. Even if for the first time the Sakti of a Pada like 'ghaṭa' is ascertained with regard to the object 'jar' only as connected with some action like 'bringing', it is proper for the sake of simplicity. Visvānātha argues, that one would come to understand it with reference to mere 'ghaṭa' (i.e., jar) without any regard to its connection with some action. In advocating such an opinion, Visvānātha is obviously influenced by his predecessors. In 'ataeva sabdamavadhārayati', Visvānātha proceeds to substantiate his contention with illustrations. Some Caitra is told, 'putraste jatah' (a son is born to you). The child (i.e., one ignorant in the matter) who does not know the Sakti of the words involved in the sentence observes that the cheeks of the person spoken to come to flush. He infers from the brightness of the face that the man is happy. He ascertains the knowledge of the

173. vṛddhavyavahārapūrvikāva sarvā vyutpattih.
VM, p. 2, vide PP

179. kāryatvasyānvayajñāne prāggrhitāpi hetutā.
padānāmārthavādebhyaḥ paścādbodhādupeksyate.
SSP, p. 115.
sentence or the cluster of words as the cause for the happiness of the person. Here the word 'Sabda' in the Muktavali stands for a vakya. Again if that caitra is told, 'kanyā te garbhini' (your unmarried daughter is pregnant), the child similarly observes that the face of the man darkens. The child infers that that the man is wounded and ascertains the knowledge of that sentence or that cluster of words as the cause (kāraṇa) for the plight of the man. In these cases, without the involvement of any action, there is the scope for corresponding Sabdabodha.

In 'tathā ca ----------- kāryānvite śaktiḥ', Visvanātha wants to bring home the idea that the occurrence of Sabdabodha in sentences like 'caitra putraste jātah, kanyāte garbhini' present cases of deviations to nullify the contention that there can be the knowledge of a word with regard to an object only as connected with some action, i.e., the 'kāryānvitaśaktivāda' of the Prabhakaras. In the Muktavali text 'na ca tatāca ------ tadabhāvāca', Visvanātha seeks to meet more points of the 'kāryānvitaśaktīvādins' in this context. Those who advocate only the 'kāryānvitaśaktigraha' may speak of the necessity of supplying some action like seeing in 'caitra putrastajātah' etc. Visvanātha feels that it will be farfetched as we cannot deduce any proof in support of such a necessity. Or to supply some action in certain contexts comes or may come to be void of any sense and propriety. For instance, in connection with the sentence,
'Caitra putraste'gato mṛtaśca' (Caitra, a son born to you is dead), such a supply is not possible as because it will be cruel on one's part to ask Caitra to see his dead son. In "ithāṅca ------- śaktimavadhārayati", Viśvanātha concludes that even if the child learns first only the 'kār yānvitasākti' of a Pada, he thereafter, simplifies the process of his knowledge of Sakti. The child discards his knowledge of the 'ghaṭa' Pada with regard to the object 'ghaṭa' as connected with some action and finally understands the mere object 'ghaṭa' as the śakyārtha of the 'ghaṭapada'.

In order to get rid of the Prābhākaras' notion of kār yānvitasākti, Viśvanātha brings in the argument of simplification. Now a doubt may arise whether a child is competent enough to come to the logic of simplification. It may be said that the child is not necessarily a minor. He may be a mature man with ignorance only in this matter and is, therefore, capable of utilising his own logical sense for simplification. In that case, one who is a child from the view point of age will get obstructed in having śabdabodha from sentences like 'caitra putraste jātaḥ' etc. The expression 'ata-eva' between 'tanna ------- parityāgau- cityāt' and 'caitra putraste jāta' etc. in the Muktāvalī above confirms that Viśvanātha offers the two sentences 'caitra putraste jātaḥ' and 'kanyā te garbhini' as examples
of simplification from 'kāryānvitaśaktijñāna' to mere 'śakti-
ñāna'. Visvanātha would have done better by illustrating the
process of simplification in the very example of 'kāryānvita-
asāktijnāna' from Vṛddhavyavahāra, i.e., in the sentence
'ghaṭamānaya'. He takes up the sentences, 'Caitra putraste
jātah' and 'kanyā te garbhinī' presumably because these are
two examples already current in the circle of scholars for
showing the non-conformity of the 'kāryānvitaśaktīvāda' of
the Prābhākaraś. Rather, he could have easily asserted
that as virtually Śādabodha takes place in sentences like
'caitra putraste jātah' etc., the 'kāryānvitaśaktīvāda' does
not factually hold good. On this argument, he would have
better supplied 'parityāganiyamāt' instead of 'parityāga-
mcityāt'. In the event of such a modification, the afore-
said 'ata eva' is to be dropped.

Though Visvanātha concludes that one learns the Śakti
of the 'ghaṭapada' with regard to the mere object 'ghaṭa',
in his illustration of the process of simplification of

180. yatpunarabhāni nākhyaśaśunyam vākyām prayogārham
tenā vinā nairākāṅkṣyānupapatteḥ ------ tadapi na
sampratam, putraste jātah kanyā te garbhinīti sukha-
duḥkhakāriṇaṁanupadiṣṭapravṛttinivṛttikānāmanākhyāt-
āmapi vākyānām loke praçuryena prayujyamānaṭvāt.
NM, p. 263.
'saktijnāna', in sentences like 'caitra putraste jātaḥ' etc. he refers to the entire sentence 'caitra putraste jātaḥ' or 'kanyā te garbhiṅī' as the cause of the happiness or otherwise of Caitra. His reference to the cause as 'that Sabda' (tāt Śabdam) is actually a reference to a Vākya. Here he is not free from the influence of the Prābhākaraś who hold that as 'saktigraha' is possible only through Vṛddhavyavahāra, the knowledge of a padārtha from a Pada is possible only where a 'samudāya' (a cluster of words, i.e., a padasamūha) is involved. In such a position, the acceptance as 'saktigrāhaka' of Vyakarana, Kośa etc., which do not involve a 'samudāya' would create a difficulty.

M(18). evām vākyasēṣādapi sāktigrāhah.

yathā yavamayaścārurbhavatītyatra yavapadasya
dīrgha śūkvasiṣ ṣe āryaṅam prayogaḥ, kaṅgau tu
mlecchānām. tatra hi "yatrāṇyā oṣadhayo māyante"
thaite mādāmānāstiṣṭhanti". tathā -
"vasante sarvasāsyānāṁ jāyate patraśātanam
mādāmānāsa tiṣṭhanti yavāḥ kaniśasālīnāḥ."

181. na c'atra vṛddhavyavahāramuktavā'nyatārapamupapa-
labhāmahe. tasmādyatra samudāyaḥ prayuktah tatra-
iva padām padārthamavadgamaṣyati etc.

FR p. 258.
Similarly from supplementary statement also, Śakti (of a Pada) comes to be ascertained. For instance, in the expression, 'the porridge should be of yava', the word 'yava' is used by the Aryans to signify 'Barley' (a long-awned grain) while the Mlecchas use it in the sense of 'kaṅgu' (Panic seed). (Now) with regard to this, there is the statement, 'while other herbs wither, these stand flourishing' (or) similarly (again), (we find the statement). 'In the spring all the grains lose their leaves, but Barley with its awns stands blooming'. From either of the supplementary statements, the Śakti (of yava), comes to be apprehended with regard to long-awned grain (Barley). Its use, however, to denote panic seed is due to a wrong notion of its Śakti, because of the cumbrousness involved in admitting multiplicity of Śakti (of a Pada). The admission of multiple Śakti in words like Hari and others is because of absence of 'vinigamaka' (decisive reasoning one way or other).

Viśvanātha now comes to illustrate saktigraha on the strength of Vākyasēṣa. Certain words, as we find, have two or more primary meanings. For avoiding ambiguity, such a word should convey only one meaning with reference to a
certain context. Here remaining sentence or sentences uttered in continuity come to our aid. In other words, the meanings of such words as may have more than one primary meaning are ascertained on the strength of Vākyāsēṣa, i.e., the rest of the passage. As for example, in the Vedic passage 'yavamayaṣcārurbhavati', a doubt arises with regard to the meaning of the word 'yava'. The word 'yava' is used in the sense of 'barley' (lit. long bearded seed) by the 'cultured people' (Āryas) and in the sense of 'kṣūgū' (panic seed) by the 'uncultured' (Mlecchas, i.e., the lay men). Here we have to consult the rest of the passage or the supplementary text, if there be any, in the context. The context gives us a statement simultaneously uttered, 'yatrānyā' etc. which describes the 'yava's flourishing with green leaves at a time when other plants are found withering away. Or we may have recourse to another passage read together with 'yavamayaṣcārurbhavati'. This passage, namely 'vasante sarvasasyānām' etc. also describes the longawned 'yava's rejoicing (i.e., thriving with new leaves), in the season of spring, when generally all herbs and plants come to be devoid of leaves. On the strength of either of these two passages, we

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182. SBR 4.2.12; JNV 1.3.4.
183. SBR 3.6.1; JNV 1.3.5.
184. ibid.
come to be confirmed in the notion that 'yava' in 'yavamayasa\n\n\nyascarurbhavati' means the Barley. Visvanātha points out that if some one understands panic seed from the word 'yava' in that context, He will do it only by mistake; because in order to understand 'kangu' also in addition to a particular variety of long-awned grains from the word 'yava' one is to admit more than one Śakti of the word. This is to be avoided as it obviously leads to a complexity (Gaurava) of imagination. In case of words having many meanings such as Hari which means Viṣṇu, Indra, horse, monkey etc. at the same time, we have to admit more than one Śakti for lack of ascertainer (vinigamaka) i.e., grounds for fixing the denotative capacity of a word only with reference to a particular meaning.

Here we have to note that Visvanātha's recognition of vākyāsēṣa can be traced back to Pūrva Mīmāṁsā of Jaimini. Jaimini first has asserted that in case of a doubt as to which of several meanings should be accepted, the rest of the passage should be taken in to account. Thus in the Vedic sentence 'aktā sārkara upadadhāti' (the wet pabbles are placed nearby), the meaning of the term 'aktā' is not clear as to whether it is soaked in water or in any other liquid. But from the rest of the passage, 'tejo vai ghṛtam' (clarified butter is the brilliance), it is to be understood

185. samādy āheṣu vākyāsēṣāt. MS 1.4.24.
that the pabbles are to be soaked in ghee. Viśvanātha's example of Śaktigraha from Vākyāsēṣa, i.e., 'yavamayaśca-
rur(bhavati)' is also a Vedic passage illustrated by Śabara in his Bhāṣya in the same context of ascertaining the mean-
ing of a word from supplementary passages.186 Viśvanātha's predecessors like Gaṅgeśa and Jagadīśa also have given this very example to illustrate Vākyāsēṣa. They have obviously influenced Viśvanātha in the mode of the treatment of Vākyāsēṣa as a saktigraha. Like Śabara, Gaṅgeśa illustrates how in the event of there being different connotations current in the circles of Aryans and non-aryans, the mean-
ings of words like 'yava', 'varāha' and 'vetasa' have been fixed as barley (yava), boar (śūkara) and cane (vaŋjula) on the strength of supplementary sentences like 'vasante' etc.187

186. yavamayaścaruh, varāhi upānahau, ---- iti yavava-
havetasāśabdān samāmananti. tatra kecidīrghaśūkēṣu yavasābdaṁ prayūṁjate kecit priyaṅgūṣu. SB, under MS 1.3.3.

187. kvacicca vākyāsēṣācchaktigrahaḥ, yathā yavamayaścār-
rbhavati vārāhi copānāt vaṅtase kāte prājāpyaṁ caṁm cioṇītyatra yavavarāhavetasasāśabdāḥ kiṁ kaṅguvāyasāja-
mbūnām vācakāh, uta dirghaśūkāṣūkara vaṅjulamiti mlecchāryavahārāradarśanādvīparatipathanā mukhyārthāna-
dhyavasāyāt tat pade prāmāṇyāniścaye vyavaḥārādvīpar-
pattiḥ ---- śūkarasyeva caṁmaṁ kākasyāpyupānahoh sam-
bhavāditi pūrvapakse "vasante sarva ---- pradṛṣyante ----- kānīśaśālīnaḥ" "varāhaṁ gābo'nudhvanti" ambujo vētasaḥ iti vākyāsēṣārūpavedavirodhini ---- nirastāyaṁ mlecchprasiddhau nīśpratipakṣāyavyaṁhārasāchchaktigrahaḥ. TC, p. 526-29.
In the case of 'nānārthapadas' like Hari, Jagadīśācārya, also made a similar observation with the same illustration in respect of 'yavapada' in the context of vākyasēṣa as a 'saktigrāha.' Gaṅgeśa was more elaborate than his two successors. For the portion 'modamanastu tiṣṭhanti' there is also an alternative reading 'modamanah pradṛṣṭyante' as evidenced in the text of Gaṅgūsopadhyāya.

Similarly from Paraphrase also, we understand Śakti (of a Pada). Vivaraṇa is a statement of the meaning of a word by means of a synonym. For example, because of paraphrasing the statement 'there is a jar,' by the statement 'there is a pitcher,' the word 'jar' is taken to signify 'a pitcher';

133. kvacidvākyasēṣādapi, yathā yavapadasya kaṅguprabhṛtau mlecchānām, dīrghaśūke ca sīstānām, vyavahārādakamātre saktēḥ paricchettumasākṣayatvāt, nānārthavasya cānyāyavatvāt, yavamayāsasyarbhayati śrutau yavapadasārthahandhe 'vasante ------ śalināh' iti ------ vākyasēṣaaddīrghaśūke eva yavapadasya saktigrāhaḥ. SSP, p. 109-10.
similarly because of paraphrasing of the word 'cooks' by the words 'does the cooking', the Ākhyāta (verbal suffix) is understood as signifying 'effort' (yatna).

By the term 'vivarana', Viśvanātha means to refer to the term 'vivṛtī' of the verse, 'śaktigrahaḥ vyākaraṇopama' etc. Here Viśvanātha observes that even on the strength of Vivaraṇa, one can ascertain the śakti of a word with regard to a particular meaning. Now Vivaraṇa or Vivṛtī is the act of putting some synonymous words for the original. In the words of Viśvanātha, it is the statement of the meaning of a particular word by means of another synonymous word or a word having a similar meaning. Thus, the sentence 'ghaṭo'sti' is explained by putting the sentence 'kalaśo'sti' and as a result, the meaning of the word 'ghaṭa' is understood as 'kalaśa'. Here we actually come to know the meaning of an unknown word through a commentary describing the meaning. Patanjali also observes that the meaning of a word is to be understood or determined with the help of a commentary in cases of doubt. Viśvanātha gives another instance of śaktigraha through Vivaraṇa in explaining 'pacati' by the expression 'pākaṃ kafoṭi'. By the Paraphrasing of 'pacati' it is ascertained that the Ākhyāta in 'pacati' means an

139. Vākyānato visēṣapratipattirna hi samdehadalakśanamiti. MBh1.1.1, vide VMP, p. 6.
effort\textsuperscript{190} (yatna) that facilitates the cooking (pāka). Thus Vivaraṇa's service as a 'śaktigrāhaka' is evident, of course, through an Inference. So, the entire sābdabodha in the context will be finally 'pākānukūlakṛtīmān' (caitrāh). It has been already stated that Gaṅgēśa does not mention Vivaraṇa as a 'śaktigrāhaka'. Jagadīśa recognises Vivaraṇa as a 'śaktigrāhaka' and gives the same illustration as that given by Viśvanātha, and admits the sakti of 'tīṅ' in 'pacati' with regard to Kṛti which means effort.\textsuperscript{191}

Here it becomes necessary to make a comparative examination of Vṛddhavyāvahāra, Kośa, Vivaraṇa and Āptavākyya. It appears that while the Āptavākyya means the statement of a trustworthy person, Kośa and Vivaraṇa or Vivṛti also in fact happen to be statements made by certain trustworthy authorities. It is therefore, necessary to examine the differences amongst them. It requires to be examined if

\textsuperscript{190} na ca vivaraṇasya katham śaktigrāhakatvam, tadvā- cakapadābhāvādīti vācyam. ākhyaṁ yatnatavāśiṣṭe saktāṁ, yatnatavāśiṣṭaśaśaka - karoti - pratipādit- ārtha - pratipādakatvādityanumānavidhayā tasya saktigrāhakatvāt.

DK, vide NSM, p. 276.

\textsuperscript{191} kvacidvivaraṇādāpi, yathā 'pacati', pākaṁ karoti'ti tulyārthakavākyāt kṛtyādau tīṅādeḥ.

SSP, p. 107.
there is any basis for not allowing the term Āptavākya to cover all these three. It may be pointed out that Āptavākya means a statement made by an authority who is physically present. He gives the statement apparently on the spot as a reply to specific query. In the Kosā, the Āpta presents the meanings in a ready-made form and in a systematic manner. The Kosā presents all the words irrespective of their familiarity and otherwise. In Vivaraṇa, the man of authority furnishes at his own initiative meanings of only such and such words and expressions which are supposed by himself to be unfamiliar. The Kosā in the shape of a book and the Vivaraṇa in the form of a commentary come to serve the purpose of the entire community and the succeeding generations of learners. The Āpta in case of an Āptavākya serves the purpose of only an individual physically close to himself.

Āptavākya, again, is different from Vyadhavyavahāra, because, the former is a deliberate process of tutoring while in the latter process the learner simply happens to learn without anybody's deliberate effort in that direction, e.g.: The authoritative person (Āpta) deliberately teaches the child regarding the identity of his parents by pointing out the parents and making the statements like 'he is your father', 'she is your mother' etc. The child, through this process learns the Śakti of words like 'pitr'.
'mātr', etc. But in case of Vṛddhavyavahāra, while the 'prayojaka' or 'uttama-vṛddha', the seniormost person commanding, engages the 'prayojya' or 'madhyama-vṛddha', the less senior person in some act, say, in bringing a horse or tying a cow, and the latter obliges the former, they may not actually know on the spot and at the time that the Bala, a person, ignorant in respect of the meanings of certain words, observes them and comes to know thereby the significative power of certain words like 'cow' or 'horse', with reference to certain meanings like 'an individual cow' or 'an individual horse' etc.

Again, there is the need to examine the justification of Āptavākyas being named as a 'saktigrāhaka' at all, in presence of the other ones. As we understand an 'Āpta-vākyas' as the statement of a trustworthy person, the Āpta being one who speaks with knowledge (yathārthavaktā), all other 'saktigrāhaka's like Vyākaraṇa etc. also are to be regarded as Āptavākyas: Hence we are to find out reasons for separately naming Āpta-vākya as one of the 'saktigrāhaka's. The great treatises pertaining to the domain of Vyākaraṇa are obviously the verses of trustworthy persons like Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali.192

192. cf. munitrayam namaskṛtya taduktiḥ paribhāvyca vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudīyāḥ viracyate.  
SIK, p. 1.
The Upamāṇa Pramāṇa, as we have already observed in the introduction in the context of the order of the enlisted Pramāṇas, involves as its basis an Atidesāvākyya, which is nothing less than an Āptavākyya. We cannot maintain that great lexicographers, like Amarasimha have made their contributions without adequate knowledge. As such, the Koṣas are also the Āptavākyas. (Vṛddha) Vyāhāra involves the statements of some Vṛddhas who are to be regarded as Āptas as their words are warranted by facts. The 'madhyamavṛddha' engages himself in doings only, on the trust of the 'uttama-vṛddha. As the 'bāla' observes, there is exact correspondence between the words of 'uttama-vṛddha' and objects handled by the 'madhyamavṛddha'. The 'bāla' also finalizes his conclusions only on the strength of the reliability of the two 'vṛddhas', senior and less senior. Thus Vṛddhavyāhāra involves Āptavākyas. In case of Vākyasēga also, we observe that one learns the significative power of a word in relation to a specific meaning on the strength of supplementary statements. The supplementary statements are already established or proved statements, demanding no further scrutiny on their own veracity. As such, they are obviously Āptavākyas. Their acceptability being not questioned, the reliability of the speakers or authors involved therein also stands admitted. A Vivṛti or Vivaraṇa, i.e., a commentary comes to be accepted only when the commentator is trusted or reliable. So Vivṛti also is basically an Āptavākya.
Learning the meaning of a word because of 'siddhapadāsannidhi' presupposes the earlier knowledge of the meanings of certain words uttered side by side with unknown words. Those 'prasiddhapada's or already known words might have been earlier known through one of the aforesaid 'saktigrahaka's or directly by an Āptavākyya. So the 'siddhapadāsannidhi' directly or indirectly involves an earlier Āptavākyya. Now the pertinent question is: All other 'saktigrahaka's, being Āptavākyas in this or that way, where is the necessity of naming Āptavākya as a Saktigrāhaka again? The most plausible reply is this: The 'saktigrāhaka's other than Āptavākya, mentioned in the list, are specific cases of Āptavākya. Hence Āptavākya is separately named as a 'saktigrāhaka' to cover the non-specific cases of Āptavākyas. There may be an Āpta or trustworthy person who is not a Grammarian, nor a Lexicographer nor even a commentator. Sometimes an Āpta or reliable person may not speak regarding the similarity between two things as the forester did in case of the stock example of the Upāmāna Pramāṇa, 'gosadṛśo gavayah', or he may not be an 'uttamavṛddha', one commending another to get engaged in some specific action. But yet sometimes from a comparatively reliable person, in ordinary contexts, one happens to be trained in the matter of meanings of unknown words. One may argue thus: In that case, the word Āptavākya should have been
uttered in a broader sense to cover all the 'saktigrāha-ka's. But simply naming Āptavākya as the only 'saktigrāhaka' would not have been a desirable position as it might have led to many misgivings and confusions regarding the services rendered by Grammar etc. in learning the meanings of new words of a language. The Āptavākya, named separately can cover the non-specific cases of Āptavākya and at the same time may be broad enough to stand for all. Such an arrangement in the Shastras even in the Nyāya comes to our notice. After the enumeration and necessary illustration of the five kinds of Anyathāsiddha, Viśvanātha in the Bhāṣāpariccheda admits the essentiality of the fifth one and opines that it (the fifth Anyathāsiddha) covers also the earlier four.193

M(20). evam prasiddhapadasya śān nidhyādapi saktigrahah.
yathā - iha sahakāra - tarau madhurām piko rautītyādau
piṅgabdasya kokile saktigraha iti.

193. ete pañcā'nyathāsiddhā ------------------------
pañcamo rāsabhadiḥ syādetesvāvāvāśyakastvasau.

etēśu pañcasvanyathāsiddheṣu madhye pañcamo'nyathā-
siddha āvāśyakastenaiva, paresāṁ caritarthatvat.
M, under ibid.
'Similarly, from the proximity of a well-known word also, we understand the Sakti of a word. As in the sentence "The pika is singing sweetly in this mango tree", the Sakti of the word 'pika' is ascertained with regard to a Cuckoo.

Viśvanātha has rightly substituted the word 'siddha' in the verse, 'saktigrahaḥ' etc. by the word 'prasiddha' in his Muktāvalī. Here Viśvanātha explains that proximity (sānnidhya) to a well-known word (Prasiddhapada) helps in ascertaining the Sakti of a word (so long unfamiliar, i.e., aprasiddha.) For instance, in the expression like "iha sahakāratarau madhurāṇ piko rauti", the Sakti of the word 'pika' is ascertained on such a ground with regard to a Cuckoo (Kokila). Viśvanātha's idea here is this: In this sentence 'iha sahakāratarau' etc., the word 'pika' is unfamiliar, while the words 'sahakārataru', 'madhura' and 'rauti' are already familiar. The familiar words under discussion convey the idea of sweet singing on a mango tree, an activity invariably attributed to the Kokila (Cuckoo). Now, the unfamiliar word 'pika' having physical proximity with the familiar words comes to convey the idea of Kokila as its Śakyārtha. It may be added that the word 'pika' cannot be taken to mean a human singer because such a singer is without any tradition of singing seated on a mango tree. The other birds 'crow' etc. may be, however, found opening their mouths as seated on a mango tree. But yet as the
singing happens to be sweet, the said word 'pika' cannot be taken in the sense of crow etc. Hence the word 'pika' comes to stand for a Cuckoo. It is interesting to note that Gaṅgesopādhyāya and Jagadīśācārya did not accept mere proximity (Saṃnīḍhāya) of a familiar word as a responsible factor in ascertaining the Sakti of an unfamiliar word uttered with it. The two predecessors of Viśvanātha wanted that both the familiar and unfamiliar words for that account are to be in agreement regarding their case-endings (i.e., in Sāmānyādhikaraṇa). It means that there should be an 'abhedānvaya' between two Padas and then, only one being known, the other would naturally be known. Moreover, they used the expression 'prasiddhārthakāśabda' instead of 'prasiddhāśabda' (i.e., siddhapada). The underlying idea is that one should not have a chance to mistake that the familiarity of a word in its mere external structure or form can come to serve as a Saktigrāhaka of another word even though they are in the

Mūs, vide BPS, p. 433.

195. Iśvarasaṅketajñānaṁ ca vyavahārāt —— prasiddhārthapadaśaṃśāṇādhikaranyat —— TC, p. 649
kvacit prasiddhārthakāśabdaśaṃśāṇādhikaranyādapi.
SSP, p. 107.
same case agreement. The familiarity is to be there with the very meaning of the word. Only the knowledge of the meaning of a word can make us know that of another word which stands syntactically connected with the former by a relation of identity. Jagadīśa objects to this type of Saktigraha in the sentence 'iha sahakāratarau madhurām rauti pikaḥ', which is given by Viśvanātha as an illustration of Saktigraha from the 'siddhapadasānnidhya'. Jagadīśa points out that it is not possible as there can be no 'abhedānvaya' between 'pika', a 'nāmapada' with 'rauti', a 'tiṇanta pada'. It is because Naiyāyikas are already committed to admitting Kṛti as the 'tiṇartha' (i.e., ākhyātārtha). Presumably, being aware of such an objection, Viśvanātha avoided the expression 'sāmānādhikaraṇa'. He means to say that only from the proximity of other already known words, 'pika' comes to be understood as signifying a Cuckoo. Jagadīśa however, finds it simpler in this case to have the Saktigraha otherwise. Such a stand seems to be

196. 'iha sahakāratarau madhurām rauti pika' ityādikantu na yuktamuktakrameṇa saktigrahasyodāharanam, tiṇarthe dharmiyabhedena nāmārthānvayasyāvyutpannatvāt.
SSP, p. 108.

more plausible. Armambhaṭṭa, as already, seen, accepted only Vṛddhavyavahāra as a 'saktigrāhaka'. He refers to the Saktigraha from this 'prasiddhapadaśannidhya' in order to show that even herein is seen the involvement of Vṛddhavyavahāra. The act of ascertaining the Śakti of a Pada from the 'siddhapadasāmānādhikaraṇa', it is admitted, is possible only through an inferential process.

M(21). tatra jātāveva saktigrahaḥ; na tu vyaktau, vyabhicārād, ānanyācca. vyaktīṁ vinā jātibhānasyā'śambhavāt vyakteśāpī bhaṇamiti kecit.

In this context, some opine that the Śakti (of a Pada) is with regard to the Jāti (the Universal) and not to the Vyakti (the individual) because of Violation and endlessness (of Śakti) (involved therein) and (further opine) that because of the impossibility of the knowledge of Jāti without (that of) the Vyakti, the latter also comes to be known.

Vīśvanāṭha here introduces the problem of the import of a word. It involves the controversial issue of recognising Jāti etc. as the Śakyārtha of a word.

The issue of exact nature of Śakyārtha has arrested the minds of almost all the thinkers of Ancient India working in various fields of Philosophy, Grammar and Rhetorics. The problem is whether a word through Śakti signifies
a certain generic meaning (Jātī) or the idea of a particular object (Vyakti) or a form (Ākṛti) or more than one of these entities. In other words, the issue is what does a word like 'go' (cow) convey primarily. Do we understand the Śaktī with regard to the form 'cow' constituted by dewlap, tail, horn etc., or, to the object 'cow' or the common property 'cow-ness' or all the two or three of these meanings together? The issue has given rise to a great controversy amongst the scholars who can be broadly divided into seven groups in this context: (1) Ākṛtivādinaḥ, (2) Jātivādinaḥ, (3) Vyaktivādinaḥ, (4) Jātyākṛtivaktivādinaḥ, (5) Jātivisṛṣṭavyaktivādinaḥ and Jātyākṛtisṛṣṭa-vyaktivādinaḥ, (6) Apohavādinaḥ and (7) Jātyādivādinaḥ.

Before we analyse Viśvanātha's viewpoint on the issue, we feel it necessary to make a brief survey of the views generally prevalent in the various schools of thought in the light of the aforesaid divisions.

(1) Ākṛtivāda is an assertion that the Ākṛti (configuration) is the primary import of a word. The scholars hold this view on the plea that the denoted sense of any particular word is determined by what the speaker wants to convey and what is understood by the listener. It is reasonably only the Ākṛti that can be the denoted sense of a word as, these scholars feel, what is cognised by Perception is nothing but this Ākṛti. It is form or configuration (Ākṛti)
that is attested by Perception. We may here note that the Jainas may be identified as Ākṛtivādins. The Jainas believe that the words denote an Ākṛti (form or shape of an object). This Ākṛti is nothing but 'aVayava' that every object (Vyakti) must have. Obviously then an Ākṛti gives the idea of a Vyakti. This notion of Jainas is also noticed by Gautama.

Dr. Gauri Nath Shastri holds that the different schools of thinkers have not taken any serious notice of the theory of the Ākṛtivādins. It is, as Dr. Shastri points out, because of its obvious inherent weakness. The whole problem relating to understanding of Ākṛti as the only import of a word is based on a superficial view of nature. The theory may hold good 'in case of specific kinds of the animal and Botanic kingdom', but with reference to material things which do not possess 'definite structure or morphological characteristics,' the view can have no relevance. The view will be of no use especially in the case of

198.  
tatrākṛtivādinastāvadāhuh prayogapratipattibhyām  
kila sābdārthaniścayah, vṛddhāḥ svārthena vyavaharanto  
yasminnarthya gośabdām prayuñjate śrotārasa yamarthām  
tataḥ pratipadyante sa tasyārthaḥ; ------ atah pratyakṣ-  
aviśaye padām pravarttamānamakṛtya veva vartatūrmiḥ.  
NM, pp. 200-91;  
PWM, pp. 136-37.

199.  
ākṛtiḥ, tadapekṣatvātsattvavyavasthānasiddheḥ ?  
NS 2.2865

200.  
PWM, p. 137.
abstract ideas. Furthermore, as the Ākṛti is nothing but the 'organisation of parts', it must differ in each case. Hence it cannot be the import of a word, which must be common to all the members of a class. To check any chance of confusion, here we may note that Jaimini, who as a Mīmāṃsaks is a Jātivādin, uses this word 'Ākṛti' only in the sense of Jāti. Jayantabhaṭṭa takes cognizance of this use of Jaimini while he himself understands 'Ākṛti' only in the sense of 'saṃsthāna' (organisation of parts) in consonance with Gautama's approach to it in his Sūtra.

(2) As Patañjali informs us, it was some sage, Vājapya-yana by name, who first initiated the view of Kevalajñāvāda. The Mīmāṃsakas, both the Bhāṭtas and Prabhākaras, as well as the Vedāntins can be identified as the Kevalajñāvādinaḥ. They hold that only the Jāti (the Universal) is the import or denoted sense (Śakyārtha) of a word. Dr. Gauri Nath Shastri presents the mind of the Jātivādins very transparently in his Philosophy of word and meaning in the light of Jayantabhaṭṭa's analysis of the Jātivāda. Let us take the problem of understanding the import of the word 'go'

201. Anākṛtivyaṅgyāyām jātau mṛt, suvarṇam, rājadhatamīyeyamādiśvākṛtīrṇivartate, jahāti padārthatvamīti. 
   VB, under NS 2.2.70.

202. tatrākṛtipadeneh saṃsthāmahīdhiyate
   sūtre prthagupādānna jātirdaiminīyavat. NM, p. 290

203. PWM, p. 138.
As there are millions of cows in this world itself, the cows as individuals vary widely amongst themselves in respect of age, configuration, colour and the like. If the word 'go' means an individual cow, say, the cow whom I saw yesterday, it will be of no use in the context of signifying any other individual cow, say, the cow I see just now. It is, indeed, a fact that two individuals are never identical. In the event of admitting 'a particular cow' as the import of the word 'Cow', we must seek a second word 'Cow' to signify another individual cow. But it will be practically inconvenient to coin as many different words to signify every individual. Moreover, it may be argued as follows. A child for instance, is told that the creature that stands before him is a horse. The child happens to see another horse later on and without any difficulty he understands the animal as a horse. What is it that enables the child to understand like that? If we proceed in the light of the Vyaktivādins who believe that an individual horse is the import of the word 'horse', there can be no justification on the part of the child in the matter of understanding the second animal also as a horse. But it is undeniable that the understanding of the child is correct. The Jātivādins maintain that there is such a 'commumty' (i.e., identity of character) amongst the numerous horses, which enables one to use the term 'horse' suitably with regard to each of the individual horses. This

204. PWM, p. 139.
community, which goes by the name Jāti is the import or denoted sense of a word. This is the basic view of the Jātvādins. It may be pointed out that the Vyaktivādin also believe in understanding the Jāti from a word. But they maintain that the 'jātyartha' (the sense of a Jati, i.e., the universal) does not enter into the import of a word just as the determinant of the nature of a cause (Kāraṇatāvacchedaka) is not regarded as the cause proper. The 'jātyartha' also is not to be reckoned as the actual denoted sense of a word. In reply to the Vyaktivādins, the Jātvādins contend that if Jāti is to be understood, it must be understood from the very śabda as the source of knowledge. And between the two cognitions of Jāti and Vyakti, the knowledge of Jāti precedes that of the Vyakti. It is because, in case of a qualified cognition, the knowledge of attribute precedes that of what is possessed of that attribute (i.e., the substantives). Hence, it follows that in the present case, the cognition of the individual cannot be gathered prior to that of the universal itself.

204. PWM, p. 139.

205. gotvameva niyāmakamiti sādāyupśmansādhupudhyasekim tu tadgotvavagatamavagatam veti. NM, p. 292.

206. sabdāccettarhi śabdaḥ prathamatarah gotve varttīmatmarhāti nāgrhitavīśeṣaṇā visiṣṭe buddhirīti nyāyāt. NM, p. 292; PWM, p. 140.
The scholars of this group understand even the proper names like Dittha as signifying a 'Jāti'. The Jātivādins, however, come to be compelled to admit the arguments of the Vyaktivādins that the syntactical construction of cases with verbs is possible only when words are understood with regard to individuals. They hold that as the Vyakti is inseparably connected (i.e., as it is not possible to understand a Jāti without the Knowledge of the corresponding Vyaktis), the Knowledge of Vyakti automatically comes to us. Yet the Jātivādins maintain a marked difference from the Vyaktivādins. Both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras understand a Vyakti only as a Vākyārtha. The Bhāṭṭas recognise Lakṣāṇā function to obtain this Vākyārtha (i.e., the 'Vyakttyartha', i.e., the sense of particular objects). But in the view of Prābhākaras, Abhīdhā itself is competent to convey the Vākyārtha, i.e., the meaning of the Vyakti. We shall discuss this difference elaborately in the context of our examination of Mīmāṁsakas' approach to the Lakṣāṇā function. This 'kevalajātavāda' of the Mīmāṁsakas shall have to be examined again in the context of our exposition of the

207. cf. Jātireva sābdena pratipādyate vyaktīnāmānanantyāt

\[\text{samjñasabdānamparyupattiprabhṛtyāvināsāttrapariprśasya} \]

relevant Muktāvalī text. Regarding the Vedāntins, we find them making no difference between a Jāti and a Vyakti. They, however, maintain that if the Jāti is understood through Śakti, the Vyakti comes to be understood through Lakṣāṇa. 203

(3) The Vyaktivādins, on the other hand, contend that for all practical purposes, reference is invariably to be made to the individuals (Vyaktis) and never to a universal (Jāti). Individuals alone are possessed of necessary intelligence for getting engaged in or abstaining from an activity. It requires no proof to believe that only the individuals are capable of serving a practical purpose. As for instance, in the Context of the Command, 'Bring a Cow', obviously what is required to be brought is an 'individual cow' and not a universal (Jāti) existing in the entire class of Cows of all the times. The Vyaktivādins further assert that it is the individuals and not the abstract universal which form, the context of Perceptual Knowledge. There is no difference of opinion that what a word denotes is what is perceived. Hence it is certain that only the individuals being perceived can be the import of a word. 209 The scholars of the Īśā

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208. * kathāṁ tarhi gavādipadāt vyaktibānāmīti cetāte-
vyaktisamānānasamvitsamvedyatayeti brūmah. yadva gavadi-
padanāṁ vyaktāu śaktih svarūpasati — — — — — athavā
vyaktir lakṣāṇayāvagamaḥ. VPB, pp. 88-89.

209. pratyakṣaśvisaye vittih mādasye'sta padairapi.
niskṛṣṭam na ca sāmānyamātram pratyakṣaśca eva
vyaktereva padārthatvām tasmādabhupagamyatām.

NM, p. 292; PWM, p. 137-38.
school as Vyaktivādins hold this view because they think that a word cannot convey a Jāti inasmuch as portability, countability, growth, colour, sensibility, multiplicity etc. are superimposed on the Vyakti. The Vyakti is called so because of these very attributes. The Nyāyasaṅgrahaka takes cognizance of this view of the Sākhyakya Philosophers.

MM. P.V. Kane refers to a section\(^{211}\) of Nāyikāyas who can be described as Vyaktivādins. In this context, he refers for illustration to the author of the Dīdhiti commentary, who maintains that Sakti is to be admitted only in Vyakti and not in Jati which remains only as the Sakyatāvacchedaka of the former.\(^{212}\) In view of the criticism of their opponents, some of the Vyaktivādins come to remodel their theory to admit that Jāti is to be understood as the determinant of the denoted sense (Sakyatāvacchedaka) which is not to be understood as entering into the very import of a word (Sakyarthra). The Vyaktivādins maintain that the Vyakti as the import of a word is a substantive in relation to the Universal which is its determinant or attribute.

\(^{210}\) NS 2.2.57 and VB, under above.

\(^{211}\) Vide SDK, pp. 41-43.

\(^{212}\) Dīdhitikṛtastu gotvādināṁ sakyatāvacchedakatve'pi-tatra na saktīḥ kintu vyaktāvevetyāhuḥ.

MUS, Vide BPS, p. 438.
(4) It is all the more interesting to note that it is Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya school of thought who initiates the Jātyākṛtivyaktivāda. Gautama finds no truth in the views detailed above. He feels that any one of the three entities, namely Ākṛti (Configuration), Vyakti (individual) and Jāti (universal) cannot by itself be the denoted sense of a word. Gautama analyses the process with arguments against the earlier theories and finally concludes that all the three entities, namely, Vyakti, Ākṛti and Jāti get combined to be the import of a word.213 As Vātsyāyana, the Bhāṣyakāra, points out, the word 'tu' in the sutra 'vyaktv-ākṛtijātayastu padarthāḥ' is significant.214 It is given to mean that Vyakti, Ākṛti and Jāti together come to be the denoted sense of a word without any invariable notion of relative superiority or inferiority. None of these three is to hold a permanent position of importance or otherwise. As Vātsyāyana expounds,215 when it is desired to convey a sense of differentiation and when the knowledge of a particular is mainly sought to be conveyed, then Vyakti is

213. vyaktyākṛtijātayastu padarthāḥ. NS 2.2.68.
214. tuśabdo viśeṣānārthaḥ. kim viśiṣyate ? pradhanāṅga-bhāvasyāniyamena padarthatvamīti. VB, under NS 2.2.62.
215. yadā hi bhedāvivakṣā viśeṣagatiṣca, tadā vyaktiḥ pradhānam, āṅgaḥ tu Jātyākṛti yadā tu bhedāvivakṣitāḥ sāmānyagatiṣca, tadā Jātiḥ pradhānam āṅgaḥ tu Vyaktyākṛti ——— Ākṛtestu pradhānabhāva upakṛṣṭivyāḥ. ibid.
principally understood; Jäti and Akṛti remain subordinate in the matter of signification. When a notion of differentiation is not sought and only the idea of a general is desired to be conveyed, Jäti is principally understood; Vyakti and Akṛti are secondarily expressed. The principal status of an Akṛti is cognised in such expressions like 'a cow made of clay' (mṛḍgovaka) etc.

(5) The Navya Naiyāyikas in the context of the issue under discussion can be divided into two groups and as such be identified as Jātivāśistavyaktivādins and Jātyakṛtivāśista­tavyaktivādins. The scholars of the first group do not seem to pay any heed to the view that Akṛti is the import or a part of the import of a word. Regarding Jäti and Vyakti, they take a balanced view and thereby make a fresh contribution on the subject. Their view may be explained as follows: A Jäti (the Universal) alone can never be the denoted sense of a word. A word consists of two elements, namely, a base, nominal or Verbal and a suffix. The import of a suffix is case, gender and number. If the Universal be recognised as the only import of the stem, it comes to be impossible to construe the import of the stem with that of the suffix. It is because only the individuals are capable of being qualified by case, number and gender. We can practically ascribe a Kartṛtva (agenthood) or Karmatva (objecthood) only to a Vyakti (individual). Under these circumstances, only individuals can reasonably form the
Import of a word. But here again there is a limitation. Individuals are innumerable. Hence it is necessary that the particular individuals that can be denoted by a word should be restricted or determined. This restriction or determination can be achieved only through a reference to the Universal which underlies all these individuals: So these Navyanaiyāyikas contend that the individuals as determined by an Universal (Jātivisistavyakti) be the import of a word.\textsuperscript{216} The Navya Nyāya thinkers of the other group, including Viśvanātha, are 'Jātyakṛti visistavādins' in the sense that they include the concept of Ākṛti also along with Jāti as qualifying the denoted Vykti. We shall know more of the view of these scholars in succeeding pages in course of our examination of the view of Viśvanātha.

(6) Regarding the signification of a word, the Bauddha scholars maintain that anything understood is momentary (Kṣanika). A word, according to them, denotes a particular object as belonging to a particular moment only. An object of today being completely different from another of tomorrow, the word 'go' for instance can signify only one cow and that again as belonging to a particular moment. The Buddhists are called 'apohavādinas' as they believe, that the import of all words is 'apoha' or 'atadvyāvṛti' (distinction from all

\textsuperscript{216} PPM, p. 142;

gavādpadānām jātāveva śaktiḥ ------- iti
kecit, tanna ---- Jātivisistavyaktāveva śaktikalpanat. 
TD, vide TS, pp. 317-18.
other different objects). As Vyaktis (individuals) are innumerable, we cannot understand the Saṃketa with regard to them. As all things are 'Kṣanika', a Jāti is impossible in view of its own nature. Therefore, what the word 'ghaṭa' really signifies is that a certain thing possesses peculiarities which distinguish it from all other things.²¹⁷ As MM P.V. Kane explains the position, "we do not exactly know what ghaṭa is, we know what it is not; we know that is not Patā or anything else."²¹⁸

(7) The Vaiyākaraṇas and the Ālaṁkārikas may be identified as Jātyādīvādins as they hold that the import of a word is either a Jāti or a Guṇa or a Dravya or again a Kriyā. Thus they believe in four sets of words. Grammarians first come to believe in words signifying these four entities and the Rhetoricians simply follow them. Hence, to the Grammarians and the Rhetoricians, there are Jātiśabdas, Guṇasābdas, Dravyaśabdas and Kriyāśabdas.²¹⁹ These four kind of words,

²¹⁷ saugatāstū vyaktāvānanyādīdābhāvasya ca desakālā- nungamābhāvāttadanugātāyāmatadvāvṛttau samketaḥ. Pradāpā, quoted in SDK, p. 42.
²¹⁸ SDK, p. 42.
²¹⁹ jātidravya-guṇaspandairdharmaiḥ samketa-vattaya jātiśabdāddibhedena cāturvidhyām pare jaguh. K 18, SSP, p. 77;

(Here Jagadīśa refers to Vaiyākaraṇas as 'pare' (others). That his 'spanda' means 'kriyā' here can be gathered from the commentary kṛṣṇaṁśānti, vide SSP, p. 77fr) yaduktam danda daṅdyācāryaiḥ "śabdaih eva pratiyante jātidravyagunakriyaḥ. cāturvidhyādīśāntu śābda ukta-caturvidhāḥ ---- iti. SSP, p. 78;

saṁketo gṛhyate jātau guṇadravyakriyāsu ca. SD II.4.
Grammarians observe, denote the attributes (Upādhis) belonging to the Vyaktis (individuals). The words do not directly signify the Vyakti. The Ālāmkarikas admit this four-fold classification of the Vaiyākaraṇas. They follow the Vaiyākaraṇas even in the matter of bringing out the relative difference between the four entities of words. The Ālāmkarikas do not at least basically differ from the Vaiyākaraṇas in their approach to the problem of the import of words.

Of modern scholars, Dr. Gaurinath Sāstrī reviews the entire problem critically and analytically. He sums-up his discussions on the subject with Bhartṛhari's opinion that the meaning of words is largely determined by our subjective attitude and culture and so the denotation of words is held to be different in different systems of thought. Bhartrhari wants us not to be surprised at the incompatibility or conflict of one theory with another. Bhartrhari

820. PWM, pp. 136-71

221. cf. PWM, p. 170;

asamākhyeyatattvānāmarthānāṁ laukikair yathā /
vyavahāre samākhyānāṁ tat prājñō na vikalpayet /

VP 2-142.
further thinks that the discussion on the import of words should not be carried to any inordinate length. He is inclined to accept a state of indeterminism and thinks that it is impossible to 'hit upon' a theory which will meet universal approval.

In the Muktāvalī text 'tatra jātāveva sāktiḥ ------ vyakterapi bhānāmiti kṣeṣit', quoted above, the author of the Bhāṣāpariccheda refers to the Mīmāṃsakas who admit only Jāti as the Śakyaṛtha of a Pada, and object to recognising Sākti with reference to Vyakti on grounds of involving two irregularities, namely 'violation' and 'endlessness'. They also find the knowledge of the Vyaktis (belonging to a particular Jāti) being inevitable as the knowledge of a Jāti is not possible without that of the Vyaktis (concerned).

We have already examined the view of the Mīmāṃsakas as Jātivadins. To recapitulate, the Mīmāṃsakas assert that a word denotes a Jāti only and is not further competent to

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222. na sābdataḥ vyaktipratītiṁśmakāṁ jātireva tu sābdataḥ prathamāvakṛgata pascādyakāṭam yām kāṇcidākṣiptet.

k 38 ;

jātyabhidhāyī hi sābdaḥ tāmeva bodhayati na vyaktīṁ tatrāsamarthatvāt --------- vr̥tti.

NRM, p. 99
It is to be understood that a Sābdabodha in the form of Padaṛthasamsarga (mutual connection of objects signified by individual words) necessarily involves the knowledge of Vyaktis. (the particulars, the objects or individuals).

The knowledge of Vyaktis also would be meaningful only with that of the community to which they belong. Now between the two cognitions of Jāti and Vyakti, that of Jāti, the Viṣeṣaṇa,

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223. prabhākarastra jātiśaktijñānādeva jātiprakāreṇa vyakteḥ

smaraṇam -------

vyaktisambandhajñānavirahena tadaṁśānudbhodhādyakti

smaraṇāsambhava iti tu nāśaṅkanīyām, vyaktimāyāśīkrtya

svarūpato gotvādi jñānāsambhavana gotvādṛṣṭudbhodhakasyaiva

vyaktyudbhodhakatvād udbhodhakasya phalabalakalpyatvāt.

SAKV, 130.

ākrtyā sābdenābhidyamānaya saha pratīyamānā vyaktiḥ

------ ākrtipratyayo hi vyaktipratyayasya nimittamiti

------ kevalāyā jāteḥ pratītyumāśakyatvāt. svabhāvāḥ

khalvasāvaṁkṛtyadarsaum nāntarenā vyaktiṁ pratītīmāro-

ḍhunā kṣamate rūpam hi sa vyakteḥ na ca rūpiśūṇyā rūpe

buddhirasti. yadi śyāt rūpitaiva na śyāt. tasmātsaṁha

vyaktivaiva jātiḥ pratiyate --------, vṛtti,

NRM, p. 97;

(In the school of Mīmāṃsā, we are to note here, the word Ākrtyā is used to mean the Jāti and not the 'avayavasam-

sthāna');

mīmāṃsakāstu gavādipadānāṁ jātireva vācyā, na tu

vyaktirākṛtivā. SAK V, p. 173.

224. athajātiśaktimate'pi śābdabodhe vyaktibhānamāvasvāmāṁ
garunstā, gaurjāta, gāmānayetādau samabhivyāṅṛtapadar-
thāṇvayasyajājātau bādhāt paramparāsambandhena --------

SAKV, p. 176.
should precede the other relating to Vyakti, the Viśeṣya. The denotative capacity of a word gets exhausted with the conveying of the Viśeṣaṇa and cannot proceed further to signify the Viśeṣya. But as the Knowledge of Vyaktis is a must to carry any meaning in the sentences like 'gāmānaya', 'aśvam vadhana' etc., it comes in some other way and not by Abhidhā. Here Mīmāṁsakas differ amongst themselves. Some contend that the knowledge of Vyakti occurs due to postulation and some say that it is because of Inference as both Jāti and Vyakti form the same unit of knowledge. Others hold that the power of secondary signification comes to our aid at this stage.

225. purvavagatirjāterāṅgikartavyā NRM, p. 99; nāgrhitaviśeṣaṇā viṣīṣṭe buddhiriti nyayaḥ. NM, p. 292.
226. viśeṣyam nābhidhā gacchet kāśanasāktirviśeṣaṇā.
227. jātireva nāmaṁtha, utkayuktyā ākṣepacc ca vyaktilābhaḥ.

atha padanā vyakteḥ samānāvittvedyayatvāṁ vā ākṣepaḥ. nirūdhah- lakṣaṇaṁ vā -------------- BHC, p. 90;
atra bhattāḥ - padanā vyakteḥ smaranamanubhavo vā kintvākṣepādeva vyaktidhiḥ, ākṣepikā ca jātireva, ākṣepaścānumānumarthaḥpattirvā. SAKVa, p. 183;
vyakterapi bodhaḥ śabdādeva na tvākṣepādito, vyakti-
śabdabodhe ----- lakṣanāta eva tadupapatteriti maṇḍanācāryamatam. ibid, p. 187;
prabhākarāstu - jātisaktijñānādeva jātiprakāreṇa
vyakteḥ smaranāṁ śabdabodhaḥca ----- ibid, p. 190
Again, as Viśvanātha has pointed out above, the Mīmāṁsakas have raised the possibility of the occurrence of two irregularities in case Sakti of a Pada is admitted with regard to Vyakti also. In the context of admitting Sakti, ow widely Sāmketa, with reference to Vyaktis belonging to a Jāti, we have to face two problems: (1) Whether Sakti is to be admitted in respect of one or many individuals? If only one Sakti is admitted to mean innumerable individuals, it will give rise to the irregularity known as Vyabhicāra (Violation); (2) If innumerable Saktis come to be admitted to signify innumerable Vyaktis, it will again lead to the defect of ānantya (endlessness).

The objections of Mīmāṁsakas may be expressed in other words as follows:

(1) Śabdabodha finally arises from the knowledge of Padārthas brought about by the knowledge of the Padas with specific aid of the knowledge of the Sakti of their own. Now if the Sakti of a word, e.g. 'ghaṭa', gives the idea not only of a particular individual 'ghaṭa' (jar) concerned but also comes to be responsible for conveying the knowledge of all other individual 'ghaṭas' (without the involvement of the knowledge of Sakti of those other ghaṭas), obviously

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228. vyaktisanṛketapakṣe sarvasu vyaktiṣu saṁketa eko nānā vā nādyah, ānantyaḥ, nāntyoy, vyabhicārāpatteḥ. TP, vide BHC, p. 90.
it will be a departure from the accepted regulations concerning Sābdabodha. This is what goes as Vyabhicāra.229

(2) If Śakti is to be separately admitted to understand every different individual 'ghāta' from every different use of the word 'ghāta', then there will be the admission of innumerable Śaktis inasmuch as the individuals (Vyaktis) belonging to a genus (Jāti) also are innumerable. This is what goes as Ānantyadōṣa (the defect involving on endless process) and is not at all desirable.230 Under these circumstances, Mīmāṃsakas are not prepared to admit Śakti of a Pada with regard to Vyakti. It may be added that these two objections of the Mīmāṃsakas were taken note of for the sake of refutation also by some of the predecessors of Viśvanātha.231

229. tathā ca yatkiñcidekaghaṭavyaktau ghaṭapādaśakti- stikāre ghaṭāntaradharmikasāktijñānābhāve'pi ghaṭapād ghaṭāntara - viṣayakasābdabodhodayena sāktijñānakāra- ṇatāyāṃ vyatirekavyabhicāra iti bhāvaḥ. MUS, vide BPS, p. 43.

230. sakalavyaktīṣu sāktisvīkāre vyaktināmānāntyācchak- tīnāmānāntyam. tathā cānantaśaktikalpanāyām gauravāt vyaktau sāktirna svākhyatibhāvaḥ. ibid.

231. cf. tatra prabhākarāh. yadyapayanānādivyavahārāt vyaktavāva sāktirucitā tām tathāpyānāntyavyabhicārābhvām tatra na sāktigrahaḥ, samuccayena sākyatve gām dadyā- dityādu sarvopādānāśāmarthyamekasya sākyatve'nadhya- avasāyah etc. TC, p. 556.
In view of the objections raised, Mīmāṃsakas rule out the recognition of Vyakti as Śākyārtha. They assert that the knowledge of Jāti obtained through the knowledge of the Śakti of a Pada would automatically bring forth the knowledge of Vyakti also as a Jāti can never be known without a reference to the Vyaktis that constitute it. Gaṅgesopādhyāya and Jagadīśācārya also have elaborately discussed this point of the Mīmāṃsakas. The Mīmāṃsakas referred to by Viśvanātha as some (Kecit), who believe in the knowledge of Vyakti as an automatic result of the knowledge of Jāti through Abhidhā, can be easily identified as the Prabhakaras.

As we have already observed, the Bhaṭṭas have maintained a different opinion regarding how the undenoted Vyakti comes to be known from the denoted Jāti.

232. cf. kutastarhi vyaktidhīḥ, jātiśaktādeva ------- jātiśaktijñānāj jātidhirbhavanti vyaktimapi gocarayati. vyaktim vīna jāterabhāvāt yo yena vīna na bhāsate taddhīhetustamavābodhayati; ------- jātiśaktereva vyaktijñāpakatvāt ------- evaṁca jātiśaktatvena jñātām padaṁ jātiviśiṣṭasya smārakamanubhāvakaṁca.

TC, pp. 562-66;

prabhakarāstu gotvaśaktatvena jñātām padaṁ tādṛṣṭvena gośābdatvāvacchinnaṁ pratyeva hetuḥ; ato gotvaśakti-grahānna gotvena gavayādeḥ ---------- na caiva jāteriva vyakterapi śakyatvāmavaśyakam, ------ etc.

SSP, pp. 90-91.
M(22). tanna. saktiṁ vinā vyaktibhānānuvapatteḥ.

'This is not accurate, as without Sakti there can be no knowledge of Vyakti.'

Here Viśvanātha asserts that the vyakti is to be understood only by means of the Sakti of a Pada. It is an agreed opinion that even with the knowledge of a Jāti already obtained from a Pada, there can be no corresponding Sābdabodha unless and until the vyakti or vyaktis belonging to that Jāti comes to be known. Now, if a Sābdabodha necessarily involves the knowledge of vyaktis, the very knowledge must come from the Padas (word) occurring in the context. In the process of Sābda (pramāṇa) in the intermediate stages, there is no legitimate scope for any other pramāṇa like Abhāpatti and Anumāṇa. If the 'vyaktijñāna' in a context is not a 'padartha-jñāna' brought about by a 'padajñāna' with the assistance of corresponding 'saktijñāna', then there exists no propriety in calling that 'vyaktijñāna' as being the subject of a Sābdabodha. As such, that 'vyaktijñāna' is no 'vyktijñāna' with the name in the context of a Sābdabodha. Hence we must have recourse to the recognised significative powers of a word in the matter. Viśvanātha as a

233. padajanyapadarthopasthitēḥ sābdabodhaṁ prati hetutavā vyaktisaktijñāna tadbhānānirvähāditi bhāvaḥ.

DK, vide MSM, p. 277.
Nâtyâyika admits only two significative powers of a word, namely Sâkti and Lâksâna. In the succeeding text of the Muktâvalî, Visvanâtha would forward his arguments against admitting Lâksâna for conveying the sense of Vyaktis in a sentence. Granting that the recognition of Lâksâna is ruled out, Visvanâtha here makes his bold assertion of the need of admitting only Sâkti for obtaining the knowledge of Vyaktis. Gadâdhara also makes a similar observation. 234

M(23). na ca vyaktau lakṣaṇaḥ, anupapattipratisandhānaṁ vināpi vyaktibodhāt. na ca vyaktisaktāvānanyāṁ, sakalavyaktāvekasyā eva saktēḥ svīkāraṁ na cānām-gamah gotvādēravānugamakatvāt. kiṁca gauḥ sākyeti sāktigrāho yadi, tādā vyaktau sāktiḥ. yadi tu gotvā sākyamiti sāktigrāhastadā gotvaprakāraka-padrthasmarāṇāṁ śabdabodhaśca na syāt, samānaprakārakatvena sāktijñānasya padṛthasmarāṇāṁ śabdabodham prati ca hetutvāt. kiṁca gotve yadi sāktistadā gotvatvāṁ sākṣa-tāvaccchedakāṁ vācyam, gotvatvantu govetarascamatetav ā sati sakalago-samavetavam. tathā ca govyaktināṁ śākyatāvaccchedake'nupraveśāt tavaiva gauravam. tasmāt tattajjātyākrātivīśiṣṭatattadvaktyābhramajanyalaksanāgraḥājanyatadbhakajanakātayā eva ------ SAK V, p. 177.
'There again is no Lakṣaṇā with regard to Vyakti as even without any knowledge of incompatibility (involved), we come to understand a Vyakti (an individual) (from a Pada). Nor the Sakti with regard to Vyakti can be infinite (in number), for, one and the same Sakti comes to be admitted with regard to all the Vyaktis (individuals). It cannot be stated again that there is absence of 'anugama' (i.e., uniformity of cognition) since a factor like cowhood (gotvādi) itself serves as the 'anugamaka' (i.e., the basis for uniform cognition). Moreover, if Sakti is ascertained in the form, 'the cow is denoted by the Sakti of the word cow' then that function is obviously with regard to Vyakti. If, however, it is understood in the form, 'the cowhood is denoted by the Sakti of the word cow', then there would neither be the recollection of the meaning of the word (Padārthasmarāṇa) nor Verbal comprehension (Śabdabodha) in which cowhood is a feature (Prakāra), because the knowledge of the Sakti of a word leads to the recollection of a meaning of the word as endowed with a certain attribute and then to a Śabdabodha in respect of the same meaning having the same attribute. Moreover, if Sakti is with regard to 'gotva' (cowhood), then the state of being cowhood (gotvatva) comes to be the 'śakyaṭavcchedaka' (the determinant of the state of being the thing denoted by the Sakti of a Pada). And the state of cowhood is inherent in all cows without being
inherent in anything else. Since the idea of the individual cow is included in the idea of the Śākyatāvacchedaka, it only means the cumbrousness of your own view. Hence, because of an inconsistency in respect of a knowledge of the individuals possessing their respective Jātis and Ākṛṭis, (when only Jāti is taken to be the Śakyārtha), the Sakti which is being conceived of, must finally be recognised to be in respect of the individuals having the respective Jātis, and Ākṛṭis.

In the Muktāvalī above, "na ca vyaktau ------- vyakti-bodhāt," Viśvanātha opposes the attempt at explaining Vyakti as a 'laksyārtha' in a sentence and forwards his own argument. Some Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins, plead that the Laksana function is to be resorted to in lieu of Sakti in the matter of signification of Vyaktis. Of the Mīmāṃsakas, Maṇḍānamiśra specially draws the attention of the Naiyāyikas in this regard.  

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235. na vyaktirakṣepah kintu laksanayā gopadād gauritī vyaktidhirīti maṇḍāmah. yadāha, jātavastitvanāstitvā na hi kaścid vivakṣati. nityatvāllakṣyamanayā vyaktesta hi viśeṣaṇe" iti. T.C., p. 587.

yadāhurmaṇḍātanācāryyāḥ - jātemastitva ------- viśeṣaṇe. iti. SSP, p. 87.
As for Vedāntins, we can refer to Dharmarājadhvarīndra, who is of the opinion that the Vyakti and Jāti form one unit of knowledge. 236 So when the Jāti is known through Sakti, Vyakti comes to be automatically known or we can understand Vyakti through Lakṣaṇā also. Just as in the sentence 'niloghaṭah', there is Lakṣaṇā admitted in the word 'nīla' (blue) to mean 'nīlagunaviśiṣṭa' (blue coloured object) also, similarly a word denoting a Jāti comes to signify individuals characterised by that Jāti (i.e., tadviśiṣṭa) only through Lakṣaṇā as that 'vyaktyartha' cannot be known by other means. In the context of Maṇḍanamīśra's view also, Jagadīśa refers to the Tātparyānupapatti as being admitted by the Mīmāṃsaka scholar as the ground for recognising Lakṣaṇā in Vyaktis. 237 But Viśvanātha does not find any scope

236. tādṛśaśaktiśāyaśataṁ śakyatvam. taccā jātereva na vyakteḥ. vyaktimānānyena gurutvāt. katham tari gavādipadād vyaktibhānamitī cet - jātervyaktisam, ānasāāmītvāśāvedyatayeti brūmah ----- athava vyakte- lakṣaṇayāvagamaḥ. yathā nīloghaṭa ityatra nīlasabdasya nīlagunaviśiṣte lakṣaṇā, tathā Jātivācakaśabdasya tadviśiṣte lakṣaṇā. taduktamananyalabhyaḥ sabdārtha iti. VPB, pp. 88-89.

237. yattu gaurjāyate gaurnasāyatī ityādau ----- lakṣaṇayā gotvādviśiṣṭā vyaktirbodhyate, """"tātparyānupapatterapi lakṣaṇāyāṁ bijatvāt. SSP, p. 87.
for 'the knowledge of incompatibility' (i.e. anupapattipratisandhana) and hence rules out the possibility of recognising Lakṣaṇa in conveying a Vyakti or Vyaktis.

Viśvanātha recognises Tātparyānupapatti (i.e., the incompatibility of the intention of the speaker) with reference to the Śakyārtha as the Lakṣaṇābīja (i.e., the ground for the operation of Lakṣaṇa). Hence, the expression 'anupapattipratisandhana' in the text of the Muktāvāli above is to be understood as the 'tātparyānupapattipratisandhana'. 'Pratisandhana' means 'jñāna' (knowledge). Viśvanātha is not convinced of the argument of Vyakti-lakṣaṇa-vādins that it is the Tātparyānupapatti, which leads to the operation of Lakṣaṇa for conveying the idea of the Vyakti. Pending a discussion on Tātparyānupapatti in the context of the relevant text of the Bhāṣāpariccheda on Lakṣaṇa, Viśvanātha's idea is briefly presented as follows. In the expression 'gāmanaya', as for instance, we can somehow admit the operation of a Lakṣaṇa, as, there takes place the failure of the syntactical connection (Anvayānupapatti) between the Śakyārthas of the Padas in the sentence. In the event of only the Jāti being admitted as a Śakyārtha, the word 'gau', primarily signifies 'cowness' which cannot have 'anvaya' with the Śakyārtha of 'ānaya' (bring). The fact that cowness cannot be an object for the act of bringing may be treated as a basis for the Anvayānupapatti which is a ground for Lakṣaṇa.
for the Prabhakaras and some of the Bhattas. Or here we can explain this finally as a case of Tatparyanupapatti also, which is the Lakṣaṇābija for Viśvanātha, the author of the B.P. As it is not possible even to imagine the bringing of the cowness, we may understand that the intention of the speaker is not with regard to the generic property 'cowness' but with reference to an individual possessed of that. This knowledge of the lack or incompatibility of speaker's intention may form the ground for resorting to Lakṣaṇā to convey the sense of an individual cow in the sentence 'gāmānaya'. But in sentences like 'gaurasti' (cowness exists), there is no scope for suspecting any Anvayānupapatti which is understood as the Lakṣaṇābija by the Prabhakaras and some of the Bhattas also. So we cannot make a rule that there arises or will arise some sort of 'anupapatti' to allow the operation of a Lakṣaṇā for conveying the sense of a Vyakti.\textsuperscript{238}

Now some thinkers, like the Vedāntins, who categorically accept Tatparyānupapatti as the Lakṣaṇābija in the matter of Vyaktilakṣaṇā may argue that the cases like 'gaurasti' may be placed on a par with 'kākebhyaḥ dadhi rakṣyatām' where Lakṣaṇā is resorted to only on the ground of Tatparyānupapatti without a prior involvement of Anvayānupapatti.

\textsuperscript{238} gāmānayeyādau \textemdash{} gotvajāterastitvādyaṁvatvānupapattelakṣaṇābijasyāḥ 'bhāvena lakṣaṇāyāṁ svākṣartumāsākṣatvāditi bhāvah. DK, Vide NSM, p. 277.
The reply may be given as follows: 'kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām' and 'gaurasti' cannot be placed on a par. Normally the Sakti stands admitted in the 'kārapada' to convey a crow (a particular bird of the name). It is only casual or occasional that we come to suspect the lack of Tātparya in respect of the sense 'crow alone' from the word 'kāka'. In the sentence 'kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām' (Protect the curd from the crow), we feel that the speaker intends to mean not only the crow but all the spoilers of curd (dadhyupaghaṭākakas) as creatures other than crow are also found to spoil curd. It is the context (Prakaraṇa) which comes to serve as the pointer to the speaker's intention (tātparya-grāhaka). The context demands that in the expression 'kākebhyo' etc. the word 'kāka' is intended to mean all the 'dadhyupaghaṭākakas'. But there is no such 'tātparya-grāhaka' in case of 'gaurasti' to demand that 'gau' should mean an individual cow possessed of cowness as a Lākṣyārtha. As a matter of fact, here the individual cow possessed of cowness is the direct regular meaning of the word 'go' and this regular and normal meaning is unlike the 'tīra' (bank) recognised as the casual Lākṣyārtha of the word 'gaṅgā' or the 'dadhyupaghaṭāka' (spoiler of curd) recognised as the casual Lākṣyārtha of the word 'kāka'.

Viśvanātha uses the word 'pratisandhāna' in the text of the Muktāvalī, viz., 'anupapattīpratisandhāna' to carry the sense of the process of cognising Anvayānupapatti or...
Tatparyanupapatti as the Lakṣaṇābija. In the matter of Śabdabodha from 'gāṅgāyaṁ ghoṣaḥ' or 'kakebhyo dadhī rakṣyatām', the two stock examples of Lakṣaṇā, some transitional stages are undoubtedly involved. We first come to know the Śakyarthas of the words. Then follows our knowledge that the Śakyarthas cannot be syntactically or logically connected. Then we apply our knowledge of Lakṣaṇā to know the Lakṣyārthas. Here again follows our knowledge of the syntactical or logical connections between the Śakyārthas and Lakṣyārthas involved. But as a matter of fact, the expression, 'gāmānaya' or 'gaurasti', at the very first phase, presents to us the idea of an individual cow as being asked to be brought or as existing. Here our knowledge of the mutual connection of the meanings of the words in the sentence takes place once and once only.

In "na ca ------- svīkārāt", Viśvanātha shows the propriety in the admission of Śakti of a Pada with regard to a Vyakti. He points out that there is no fear of the flow of endlessness (ānanyya) being involved in case the Śakti be admitted with reference to Vyakti. Though there are innumerable Vyaktis belonging to a Jāti, we need not admit innumerable Śaktis to understand them. We can understand them even by admitting one Śakti with reference to all the Vyaktis. Viśvanātha asserts that the word concerned should convey the idea of all the individuals with the help of
only one Śakti. This, however, need not necessarily mean
that the word should bring forth the idea of all the probable
individuals at a time. In fact, the word should convey the
idea of only such an individual which may be relevant to the
context. Even with reference to many such individuals which
may be relevant to various contexts, only one Śakti will
operate. The *Dīnakaṛī* commentary elucidates the idea of
Viśvanātha by saying that the Śakti of a certain word,
(employed even to convey the idea of various individuals or
various occasions) is to be taken to be one because Śakti
is nothing but a will of God and that will is undoubtedly
one and the same for all the individuals of all the occa-
sions. The idea of Viśvanātha, as elucidated by the comment-
at or appears to be as follows: Śakti is after all a will
of God that such and such a word should convey such and such
an idea or such and such ideas. Śakti is not a separate
Padārtha, requiring to be numerically limitless in respect
of the limitless number of individuals. Being the will of
God, it is one and uniform for all the individuals that are
required to be gathered as the meaning of a specific word.

In the *Muktavālī* above, 'na cā'nanugamaḥ —— anuga-
makatvāt', Viśvanātha proceeds to arrest further missivings

239. ——— *Īśvarecchārūpāyāstasyā ekatvādityarthāh.*

*DK, Vide NSM, p. 277-78.*
that may arise in the event of admitting Sakti of a Pada with regard to Vyakti. The problem is like this: The Knowledge of the Sakti of a word is generally gathered from Vyavahāra, i.e., from observing the use of the word in respect of one or a few individuals. In that way the knowledge of the Sakti of the word should be restricted to one or a few individuals. How could then the same word be expected to convey the idea of those individuals which do not belong to the group of the individual or the few individuals recognised at the very first instance to be the primary meaning of the word concerned? For example, if the meaning of the word 'go' is learnt for the first time in respect of 'an individual red cow', how could we expect the same word to mean 'another black individual cow' on a later occasion, since the two individuals are different and there is nothing common between them? In reply to this problem, Viśvanātha says that though the individuals are different yet they have something invariably common, an uniform attribute (anugamaka) which should facilitate the employment of the same word for all the different individuals belonging to a certain class. The uniform attribute in most cases is the Jāti or the generic attribute itself. For example, in case of the word 'go' its employment to mean and understand all the different individual cows is possible on account of recognising 'gotva' or cowhood as the common attribute in all of them.
In 'kiñca gauḥ śakyeti -------- vyaktau śaktiḥ', Visvanātha opposes the view of the Prabhākaras who understand the Vyaktis as Śakyārtha by virtue of admitting Śakti with reference to the corresponding Jāti only. They understand the Śakti of a Pada only with reference to a Jāti and not with reference to the Vyaktis belonging to that Jāti. But they also do not recognise a Laksāna in respect of the Vyakti. They deem the Vyakti as the Śakyārtha without however recognising a Śakti in respect of the Vyakti. This is possible, they say, as a Jāti and the Vyaktis pertaining to it, form a single unit. Gaṅgesopādhyāya analyses the view of the Prabhākaras in this regard. 240 Visvanātha has already ruled out the scope of Laksāna for conveying the idea of a

240. cf. tatra prabhākarah yadyapānayanādi vyavahārāt vyaktāveva śaktirucita tathāpyānantyavyabhicārabhyāṁ tatra na śaktigrāhaḥ, ------- na ca vyaktinām jātīṁ vinā rūpāntaramakamastī jñāyate vā, gopādād gaurityeva pratīteḥ, ------- kutastarhi vyaktidhiṁ, jātīśaktādeva, kathamanyaśaktadanyadhīṁ, svabhāvāṁ, tatsvabhāvavameva vyaktiśaktīṁ vinā na nirvahatīti cet ------- jātīśakti- jñānājjatidhīrbhavanti vyaktimapi gocarayati vyaktiṁ vinā jāterabhāvāṁ, yo yena vinā na bhāsate taddhīhetu- stamavabodhayati ------------ TC, pp. 556-64.

Gaṅgesā’s detailed discussion on this point is not incorporated here for the sake of brevity.
Vyakti. The Prabhākaras also are not prepared to see any scope for Lakṣaṇā in this regard. Hence in the matter of conveying the idea of a Vyakti, of the two significative functions accepted by both the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṇāsakas, only Sakti or Abhidhāna remains to be considered. Visvānātha here argues thus. If the Prabhākaras believe that the 'vākyārthajñāna' is nothing but the 'anvitapādcārtajñāna' and that the 'anvayaajñāna' in the sentences like 'gāmānaya', is possible only with the 'vyakti-bhānā' (i.e., the knowledge of the Vyaktis), then the only natural and rational course of action will be to admit Sakti of Padas with reference to Vyaktis also. A meaning can be Śakyārtha if it comes from the knowledge of the relevant Pada by means of its own corresponding Sakti. When an individual 'gau' is finally accepted as understood from the word 'go' and at the same time, no verbal function other than Sakti is admitted to that effect, then there is no meaning in not admitting Sakti of a Pada with regard to Vyakti.

In consonance with what he has stated above Visvānātha now proceeds to point out in the text of the Muktāvalī, 'yadi gotvām śakyamiti saktigrahas ------ hetutvāt', the serious difficulties in the matter of śabdabodha in the event of admitting Sakti only with reference to Jāti. It is an universally accepted formula that the 'saktijñāna' of a Pada is to contribute as a cause (hetu, i.e., a Sahākāri Kāraṇa) in the matter of śabdabodha only by following
a norm. The norm is that it must produce initially a 'padārthajñāna' and thereby finally a Śabdabodha being in the same form or structure. This sameness in its form is to be judged from the sameness of qualification (Prakāra or Viṣeṣaṇa). This symmetry is to take place at two stages, between Śaktijñāna and Padārthajñāna and between the 'padārthajñāna' and the Śabdabodha. If after the Mīmāṃsakas who are Jātivādins — 'gotva' is understood as the Śakyārtha, the 'gopadārthajñāna' (the knowledge of the word 'go') will take the form of 'gotvatvaparakārakagotvaviṣeṣyakajñāna' (the knowledge of the qualified cowness with cowness as its qualification). It is needless to add that whenever there is a Śakyārtha, it includes in its fold the knowledge of its determinant also, which serves as a qualification to distinguish the Śakyārtha from anything else. So, from the above 'gopadārthajñāna', the corresponding Śabdabodha will involve a similar knowledge viz., 'gotvatvaparakārakagotvaviṣeṣyakajñāna'. But it is not warranted by facts. Even the Jātivādins contend that from sentences, 'gāmānaya' etc. by way of observing 'vrddhavyavahāra', the child comes to understand the significance of 'go' etc. with reference to 'go vyaktis' (individual cows etc.). In other words, even the Jātivādins understand the Śabdabodha from a word like 'go' in the form of 'gotvatvaparakārakagotvaviṣeṣyakajñāna' (the knowledge of the individual cows characterised by the generic property 'cowness'). Now if the Śabdabodha in the
context of the word 'go' takes place as 'gotvaprakāra- 
goviśeṣyakajñāna', the corresponding 'saktijñāna' and 
Padārthasmarana also must be admitted as of the same form. 
In other words, these two also must come as 'gotvaprakāra- 
kagoviśeṣyakajñāna'. It is because, as already shown, there 
must be the admission of the same Prakāra in all three 
concepts. Hence the reality demands the recognition of Šakti 
with regard to 'jātivisistavyakti'.

The recognition of mere Jātisakti may again be shaw- 
as more cumbrous than that of mere vyaktisakti. Viśvanātha 
makes such an attempt in the text of the Muktāvalī, 'kiṃ ga-
gotve yad uṣaktistadā ------ tavaiva gauravam.'

As we have already seen, the admission of a Šakyaotrha 
demands along with it the admission of a Šakyaṭavacchedaka 
also. In admitting 'gotva' (Jāti) as the Šakyaṭra after the 
Mīmāṁsakas and Vedāntins etc., 'gotvatva' comes to be auto-
matically admitted as its Avaccheda. Now when one demands 
to know what this 'gotvatva' means, even the Jātivādins at 
this stage have no way out but to admit that it (gotvatva) 
is something which, according to ultimate analysis inherently 
exists in all the individual cows. Thus the notion of all 
cows comes to be involved in that of the cownessness (got- 
vatva), the determinant of the denoted sense 'cowness'. 
Viśvanātha points out that while the Jātisaktivādins prefer 
to recognise Sakti in respect of the Jāti in order to get
rid of the flaw of 'ānanyya' (endlessness), they get indeed more and more involved in cumbrousness themselves, because the notion of a Jāti like 'gotva', recognised as the Śakyaṅya, also includes the notion of 'gotvatva', as the Śakyaṅvaccchedaka, which can be conceived of only in terms of 'gotva'. which again in terms of the innumerable individual cows. Thus the whole process involves a lot of 'kalpaṅga-gaurava' (cumbrousness of ideas) and also the flaw of 'ānanyya' all the same.

In the text of the Muktāvalī, 'tasmāt ---- viśrām-yatīti', Viśvanātha gives his own verdict in the context of the problem of recognition of Sakti with regard to Jāti etc. We have seen that the recognition of Sakti with reference to mere Jāti leaves no scope for understanding Vyakti as Śakyaṅya. We have also seen the inappropriateness of seeking the agid of Lakṣaṇa in the matter. We also cannot deny that the Śabdabodha necessarily involves the knowledge of the Vyakti. When Jāti alone is taken to be the Śakyaṅya it becomes difficult to gather the idea of the individual possessing a relevant Jāti and Ākṛti. But while understanding the Śakyaṅya of a word, we must not fail to understand the individual characterised by its own Jāti and Ākṛti. Hence, Viśvanātha asserts that the Sakti, which is being imagined to be there, must finally be recognised to be in respect of the individuals having the respective Jātis and Ākṛtis.
Viśvanātha calls the Śakti a 'kalpyamāṇā' Śakti (i.e. a Śakti, which is imagined to be there) because while in Mīmāṃśā Śakti is recognised a separate Padārtha, in the Nyāya it is only a will of God supposed to be involved in respect of the word and its meaning.

Now here we are to see if and where Viśvanātha differs from the Prācīna Naiyāyikas and from some other Navya Naiyāyikas also.

We have already seen that the Prācīna Naiyāyikas are of the view that every Pada denotes a Jāti, a Vyakti and an Ākṛti. The singular number of the word 'padārtha' in the relevant Nyāyaśūtra is admitted by scholars as significant. It is to signify that by one and the same Śakti all the above three are conveyed. Viśvanātha is convinced

241. vyaktyākṛtijātayastu padārthāḥ. NS 2.2.68.

242. parasparaparityāgena parasparasya bodhābhavāt trīṣvekaiva śāktih. etad bodhanāyaiva sūtre ityekavacanam iti sampradayāḥ. DK, vide NSM, 280;

  tathā ca nyāyaśūtraṁ "jātyākṛtivyaktyayayāḥ" padārthaḥ iti. padārtho gavādipadasākyah. trīṣvekaśākterlābhārthāṁ ekavacanam, anyathā vibhinna-śaktau visākalitānāmeva tāsāmanubhavasya gaurnityā guno vetyādau lakṣanādyabhāvasya ca prasaṅgādīti sāṃpradāyikāḥ. SSP, pp. 128-29.
of the basic logic of his earlier predecessors that the
universals (Jāti), the individuals (Vyakti) and their
particular forms (Ākṛtis) cannot be cognised apart from
each other. Hence he includes the three concepts in the
same unit of knowledge and employs only Śakti and only one
Śakti, for conveying those ideas. Yet we find a difference
of Viśvanātha from the Prācīna Naiyāyikas. The Prācīna
Naiyāyikas have admitted different degrees of prominence
in all the three that may be gathered on different occa-
sions. While one of the above three factors comes to be
prominent, the other two remain subservient in the meaning
of a word. Viśvanātha however, unlike the old Naiyāyikas,
gives a stress on the Vyakti.

As observed earlier, some of the Navya Naiyāyikas
come to us as the Jātivisistavyaktavādin by way of exclud-
ing the Ākṛti from the concept of a Śakyārtha. As for

243. yadā tu --------- vyaktīḥ pradhānām, āṅgām
tu Ś ā jātiyākṛtī --------- jātiḥ pradhānām āṅgām tu
vyaktyākṛtī --------- ākṛṭīṣṭu pradhānabhāva utprekṣīt-
avyāḥ. VB, under NS 2.2.68.

244. navyāstuv samsthanānupasthitāvapigi gotvādinā gaṉaiy-
avayabodhāj jātivisistāvyaktāveva sāktīḥ. saṁsthāne
ca prthageva sāktīḥ. DK, vide NSM, p. 280;

navyāstuv jātiyavakyorekasakti-prāptyarthāṁ sautra-
mekevacaṇam ākṛṭirūpantu saṁsthānam prthageva sākyāṁ
----- ata eva samsthanānupasthitau kevalagotvādi-
prakārena vyakteravagamaṁ. SSP, pp. 129-30.
instance, we can refer to Jagadīśa and Annaṃbhaṭṭa. Gaṅgeśopādhyāya recognises Śakti in case of Ākṛtī also and admits of the same unit of experience covering all the three. So Viśvanātha might have been influenced by the idea of the author of the Tattvacinatāmaṇī in order to unite all the three factors in the concept of a single denoted sense. There again Viśvanātha concludes with a clear emphasis on Vyakti as the qualified. Thus he maintains his difference somewhat from some Navya Naiyāyikas and somewhat from the Prācīna Naiyāyikas.

M(24). śaktaṁ padam.

'The Pada is that which possesses the Śakti (denotative powers)'.

Now Viśvanātha comes to give a general definition of Pada before he shows its divisions. The assertion of the

245. jātyavacchinnasaṅketavatī ------- SSP, p. 19; avasyam gotvādiviśiṣṭo gavādirgavādirpadasyārthaḥ. SSP, p. 103; jātiviśiṣṭavyaktāveva saktikalpanat. TD, vide TS, pp. 318-19.

246. cf. na ca jātimātranirvikalpakād vyaktimanādāya, kevalajātau vyahārāḥ tasya viśiṣṭajñānasādhyaṁtvāt, gāṇa paśa gaurastītyādāvapi gotvāviśiṣṭasyaiva jñānaṁ vyahāraśca. tasmāde kavitvavedyāvaniyamāt jātiviśiṣṭam śakyam. ------- jātiviśeśavadaṁvyasyaṁyogarūṣākṛtirapi padaśakyā gopadāt jātyākṛtiviśiṣṭasyaṇivyānu-bhāvāt. TC, p. 590
knowledge of Śakti as a Sahakāri (Karaṇa) or Śabdabheda in the Kārikā ('padajñānantu' etc.) also demands a clear indication as to what Śakti belongs to. It is all the more necessary as the Grammarians and others are there to recognize Śakti in both Pada and Vākya. The admission of Śakti as pertaining to a Vākya would lead one to recognize Vākyalakṣaṇā also which the Naiyāyikas do not. Under the circumstances, Viśvanātha, in the Muktāvalī above, comes to assert that it is only Pada which is 'sākta' in the sense of being 'sāktimat'. In other words, the primary power of signification belongs only to a word and never to a sentence.

Viśvanātha's admission of Śakti only in a Pada is in agreement with the view of his colleagues in the school of Nyāya. But here we can point out that interestingly enough, Nāgęša refers to the Nyāyabhāṣya-kāra Vātsyāyana as admitting Śakti in both Pada and Vākya. Nāgęša maintains

247. sa sambandhaḥ pade vākye ca. PLM, p. 18
248. padasyaiva śaktiḥ kalpyate prathamastastasyaiva karaṇatvāvadhāraṇāt. TC, p. 552; saṃketo laksanaṁ cārthe padavṛttih. SAK V, p. 1. saktam padam. TC, p. 56.
249. tadāha nyāyabhāṣyakāraḥ samayajñānārtham cedam pada-laksanāyā vāco'nvākhyānam vyakaraṇam, vākyalaksanāyā vāco'ṛtha laksanām iti anena padesviva vākyesvaṁśitarasamaya iti spaṭamevokṣam. PLM, p. 18.
that by admitting the utility of Grammar for the preservation of the knowledge of Samaya (convention) corresponding to Vāk (speech) in the form of Padas and Vākyas, Vātsyāyana admits Śakti in both Pada and Vākya. It is because the stage of Vātsyāyana, samaya or saṃketa pertaining to God, i.e., 'Īśvarasaṃketa' itself was accepted as the Śakti.

One may now be inclined to make a reference to the 'Prabhākaras who also accept Śakti as pertaining to a Pada.' But we must bear in mind that the Prabhākaras understand very prolonged capacity of the Abhidhā or Śakti in order to cover even the relational thought (anvayabodha) i.e., the Vākyārtha. Though they do not speak of Vākya as (śaktimati, they, as 'anvitābhidhānavaṇḍins', unhesitatingly utilize the knowledge of Śakti in understanding the Vākyārtha. This is possible because of their peculiar concept of the process of the relational thought. In their concept, as we shall see in succeeding pages, Pada and Vākya and again Padarth and Vākyārtha come just to be the same. Though the Bhāṭṭas do not admit Śakti as pertaining to a Vākya, they recognize

250. prābhāmyāda-abhidhātṛtvat tātparyāvagamādapi / padāṇāmeva sa śaktirvarambhuyupagamyaḥ // VM, p. 14, vide PP.

na vimuñcanti sāmarthyaṁ
vākyārthaṁ-pi padāni naḥ / ibid.
Lakṣaṇā in a Vākya. Vedāntins also believe in understanding Vākyārtha by Sakti, though they recognise Sakti as pertaining to a Pada only. Under these circumstances, Viśvanātha, very reasonably asserts here that only a Pada is 'sakta'. He would pursue the point and make it clear that the Vākyārtha would come as neither Sakyārtha nor Lakṣyārtha.

M(25). taccaturvidham, kvacid yaugikaṁ kvacid rūḍham
kvacid yogarūḍham kvacid yaugikarūḍham.

'It (Pada) is of four types. Some times Yaugika (derivatives), sometimes Ruḍha (conventional), sometimes Yogarūḍha (derivatively conventional) and sometimes Yaugikarūḍha (both derivative and conventional)'

Here is a fourfold classification of the denotative (Sakta) words (Pada). The words are classified into four groups on the basis of nature of the primary meanings signified by them. The groups are, as Viśvanātha puts it, (1) Yaugika (etymological), (2) Ruḍha (conventional), (3) Yogarūḍha (etymolo-conventional and (4) Yaugikarūḍha (etymological cum conventional). This fourfold classification

251. śaktirnāma padānāmartheṣu mukhyā vyṛttiḥ -------
śaktijñāpyaśca yathā padārthastathā vākyārtho’siti
na kācidanupattih. VPB, pp. 37-95.
actually holds good only in respect of namapadas (Nouns). Prior to Viśvanātha, some eminent Naiyāyikas had already taken up the issue of classification of Padas on the strength of Rūḍhi and Yoga. Gaṅgēśa in his characteristic way has dealt at length with the issues that may crop-up in admission of the classification of words on the strength of the concept of Yoga and Rūḍhi in separation and in combination. As we shall see in succeeding pages, several illustrations of the different kinds of Padas as we find in the Muktāvali can be traced back to the work of Gaṅgēśa.

Here we are to note that Jagadīśa who divides Padas into Nāmapada and Dhātu comes to show Padas classified into five varieties. The five varieties of Jagadīśacārya are (1) Rūḍha, (2) Laksāna, (3) Yaugika, (4) Yoganḍha, (5) Rūḍhayaugika. Of these only the first four varieties are recognised by Jagadīśa as genuine and the fifth variety, namely, Rūḍhayaugika is mentioned only as something recognised by others. Annambhaṭṭa seems not to have accepted Yaugikarūḍha Padas. It is because he refers to only three kinds of ṣaktis as Yogarūḍhi, Yoga and Rūḍhi. Thus he

252. rūḍhaṇca laṅkaṇacāiva yogarūḍhaṇca yaugikam
taccāturddhā, paraī rūḍhayaugikam manyate! dhikam.
SSP, p. 72.

253. paṅkajādipadeśu yogarūḍhiḥ avayavaṣaktiryogāḥ sarūḍa-
yasakti rūḍhiḥ. niyatapāmatvādījñanārthām samudāya-ṣaktiḥ.
TD, vide TS pp. 334-36.
appears not to be in favour of recognising the Yaugikaruḍha variety. Of the Grammarians, we know Nāgēśa classifying Abhidhā into three varieties. His 'vācaka' sābda (the denotative word) accordingly comes to be of three varieties. In Nāgēśa's classification, the Yaugikaruḍha variety of the Naiyāyikas is left out. The Yaugikaruḍha Padas are actually homonymous words. Hence his exclusion of Yaugikaruḍha words may (be said to) have some justification. Some later Mīmāṁsakas have come to admit this entire fourfold classification of Padas into Rūḍha, Yaugika, Yogarūḍha and Yaugikaruḍha.

M(26). tathā hi-yatrāvayavārtha eva budhyate, tad yaugikam. yathā pācakādi-padam.

(As for illustration a Pada is Yaugika when the meaning of only its component parts is understood; as for example, words like pācaka (cook).

'Here in the Muktāvalī, the word 'yatra' should be understood in the sense of 'yasmin' (in which) with reference to a Śakta Pada. The expression shall have to be understood thus also in case of other relevant portions of the Muktāvalī in the context of the other varieties of Śakta Pada.

254. tacca padam caturvidham. rūḍham, yaugikam yogarūḍham, yaugikaruḍham, ca ------- etc. TP, vide EHC, p. 3º.
It is universally accepted that a word is named 'yaugika' when only the meaning of the 'avayava' or its component parts comes to be realised. By 'avayava' or the component parts of a word, we are to understand the stem or the base, the prefixes and the suffixes. The word 'pācaka' is an example of this variety of words. The word 'pācaka' is derived from the root 'pac' (read in the Pāṇinīyadhatupātha in the sense 'to cook', cf. (ḍu) pacas pāke) and the suffix 'nvul'. Of 'pac' + 'nvul', 'n' and 'l' are dropped, leaving 'pac' + 'vu'. By the rule 'yuvor-anākau', we come to have 'pac' + 'aka'; 'a' in 'pac' comes to be 'ā' by the rule 'taddhītesvācāmādeḥ'. Thus we get 'pācaka'. Now the meaning of the word 'pācaka' as determined by its derivatives is 'the person who cooks'. The suffix 'nvul' means the subject, (one who acts) by the rule 'kartari kṛt'. Thus a yaugika word, as we find, conveys the meaning of only the 'avayava' or component parts; nothing more or nothing less. Now that the yaugika is a division of Śākta Pada (denotative word), the

255. śāstrakalpitāvayavarthanirūpitā śaktiryogāḥ yathā pācakādau, PLM, p. 30; avayavaśaktyārtha-pratyayakatvam (yaugikatvam).

256. P 7.1.7; cf. P 7.2.113.

257. P 7.2.117.

258. P 3.4.67.
'yaugikārtha' or, the etymological meaning is also a variety of Śakyārtha (the denotative sense).

We find that the denotative power or śakti involved in a Yaugika Pada is called Yogasakti. Jagadīśa, a senior Naiyāyika maintains that the word is Yaugika when it presents as its meaning only as much is conveyed by the Yogasakti. Yet we do not see any basic difference between Viśvanātha and Jagadīśa with regard to their notion of a Yaugika Pada. Jagadīśa, however, proceeds further to divide the Yaugika word into three varieties, namely, 'samāsānta', 'taddhitānta' and 'kṛdanta'. Samāsa or the 'samasta pada' is etymological, because the meaning is determined by the respective meanings of the component parts. Taddhitānta words are secondary derivatives where the meaning is derived from the nouns and the suffixes involved. Kṛdanta words are the primary derivatives formed by the roots and suffixes.

The word 'pācaka' is almost universally accepted as an example of Yaugikapadas.

259. सांस्कारिकावर्णवार्तानिरूपिताः सांतिर्योगघ, यत्रा pācakādau. PLM, p. 30.

260. yogalabhyaarthastra yodhakāṁ nāma yaugikān samāsastaddhitāntaṁ ca kṛdantāñceti tattvadā. SSP, p. 187.

261. SSP, p. 275; PLM, p. 30.
That (Pada) is Rudha (conventional) where irrespective of the Śakti of the component parts (of the Pada), the meaning is understood by means of the 'samudāyasakti' (i.e., the denotative capacity of the Pada in its entirety, i.e., the collective significative strength of the entire Pada), for e.g., words like 'go' (cow) or 'maṇḍala' (circle).

A word is called Rudha when its meaning is conveyed by the denotative capacity of the word as a whole (Samudāyasakti), without any care to the denotative capacity of its component parts (avayavasaktinirapeksaya). The Rudha word conveys an idea as a whole. The total capacity of the word serves the purpose and the etymology of word is not at all taken into consideration. For e.g.; the word 'go' is an example of this variety of word. The word 'gauḥ' comes to be formed according to the 'unadi sutra' 'gama* etc. and comprises of the component parts, the root 'gam' and the suffix 'ṇas' which should give the meaning as

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263. tena kiṃcinnāma kvaсидarthe rūdhameva, yathā so-prabhṛtau gavādi ——- 3SP, pp. 72-73.
'something that goes'. But the primary meaning of the word is 'a cow' in general irrespective of the fact of its moving or sitting idle and this primary meaning is derived irrespective of the component parts of the word.

Along with 'go' 'maṇḍala' and sometimes 'maṇḍapa' also appear in the Muktavali as examples of the Rūḍha variety of words. For instance, the Bhāṣāpariccheda (Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar edition) records 'maṇḍala' and the Nyāyasiddhāntamuktavali (Chowkamba edition) records both 'maṇḍala' and 'maṇḍapa'. Scholars have raised objections to the inclusion of these two words as examples of Rūḍha-pada. Pañcanana Sāstrī objects to naming both the words as examples of Rūḍha variety. It is because both 'maṇḍala' and 'maṇḍapa' can obviously be examples of Yaugikarūḍha variety of words where both the etymological and conventional senses are separately understood. Etymologically or by significative capacity of component parts, 'maṇḍala' means 'one who takes scum of rice' and conventionally it means a 'circle'. Now both these two meanings are recognised as Śakyārthas of 'maṇḍala'. Similarly the etymological meaning of 'maṇḍapa' is 'one who drinks the scum of rice' and the conventional one is a 'pavilion'. Here also both the meanings are derived as Śakyārthas of the word independently of the either at different occasions. Here Pañcanana Sāstrī points out that the illustration of the
Rudha variety by these two words goes against Visvanathas own definition of the Rudha variety. Dinakarabhatta however, accepts 'mandala' as the right example and observes that the insertion of 'manḍapa' in certain texts in place of 'mandala' is actually by mistake. But Ramarudrabhatta does not agree. He observes that though 'manḍapa' is undoubtedly a Yaugikapada its 'rudhatva' is independent of its 'yaugikatva'. A Yaugikapada being Yaugika in one sense may be Rudha in another. Hence the inclusion of a Yaugikarudhapada like 'manḍapa' in the list of Rudhapadas, on the strength of its 'rudhatva' is justified. Ramarudrabhatta might have been inspired by the fact that the great Navyanaiyayika Gangesa also accepts 'manḍapa' as an illustration of Rudha. Here we may conveniently recall how Jagadisa has been justifiably unwilling to admit Yaugikarudha as a separate kind of Pada in addition to the Yaugika and Rudha varieties. Jagadisa, however, recognises 'manḍapa' as

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264. mandapamandalayoryaugikarudhatvāt rūdhopadāraṇatvān
na yuktamiti vibhāvanīyaṁ. MUS, Vide BPS, p. 439.
265. 'maṇḍalādi'ityatra bahupustakeṣu 'maṇḍapādi' iti
pāthah, sa prāmādikah. DK, Vide NSM, p. 283.
266. tanna cārūtaram. yaugikarudhāsyaṁ yaugikarudhatvā-
yorhaviṣeṣe sambhavena maṇḍapapadasya gṛhaviṣeṣe
rūdhatvā yuddhamadhye parigānaṇasambhavat.
RR, Vide NSM, p. 283.
267. Rudheḥ prayogapratibandhakatvāṁ maṇḍapādau drṣṭameva.
TC, p. 613.
only as an illustration of Yaugikarūḍha. It is interesting to note that in the circle of certain Ālaṁkārikas, 'maṇḍapa' is given as an example of a 'ṭīkāṇṣaṇīkaṇapaḍa' and not 'sakta' in the sense of a house (grhaviṣeṣa).

This 'samudāyasākti' or Rūḍhi is actually the commonly known Saṁketa (Convention). Hence the author of the Śabdāsaktiprakāśika equates this Rūḍhi with Saṁketa, refers to its celebrity as Saṁjñā and divides it into three types, viz., Naimittikī, Pāribhāṣikī and Aupādhikī. According to him, the Naimittikī variety of the Rūḍha word denotes the Jātisvāstavyakti, while the Pāribhāṣikī and Aupādhikī varieties denote Jāti and Vyakti respectively. As maintained by the Ālaṁkārikas again, Rūḍhi is the 'akhaṇḍaśākti' (un mutilated denotative capacity). A word is called

269. maṇḍapaḍipadasyāpi grhādua ---- nirūḍhahalakṣaṇaṁ-
giṅkārt ---- Jhalakikar, Vide KP, p. 42.

270. rūḍhām saṁketavannāma, saiva saṁjñetī kīrttyate.
    naimittikī pāribhāṣikyaupādhikyaṁ tadbhidā.
    SSP 17, p. 76.

271. tatra akhaṇḍaśāktimātṛenaikārthapratisaṭpadakatvam
    rūḍhīḥ. VV, p. 1.
Rūḍhasabda when its meaning comes to be apprehended through its 'akhandasakti'. Panditarāja Jagannātha records a very interesting view referred to as 'of others'. According to this view only the Rūḍha variety of words is to be recognised inasmuch as there is actually no scope for Yaugikapadas. It is because the stems, roots, prefixes and suffixes i.e., so called component parts of words are imaginary divisions of words which are originally indivisible.\(^{272}\)

M(28). yatra tvavayavasākti- viśaye samudāyasāktirapyaasti, tadyogarūḍham. yatha paṅkajādi-padam. tatha hi- paṅka-japadamavayavasaktyā paṅkajanikart̥rūpamarthām bodhayati. samudāyasaktyā ca padmatvena rūpeṇa padmām bodhayati. na ca kevalāvayavasaktyā kumude'pi prayogaḥ syāditi vācyam. rūḍhijñānasya kevalayaugikārthā-buddhau pratibandhakatvāditi prāṇe, āh. vastutastu samudāyasāktypasthitapadāme' vayavārtha-paṅkajani-kartturyanvayo bhavati, sānnidhyāt. yatra tu rūḍhyarthasya būdhaḥ pratisandhīyate, tatra laksanaṅga kumudāderbodhah. yatra tu kumudatvena rūpeṇa

\(^{271}\) tatra akhandasaktimātreṇaikārthapratinipādakatvam rūḍhiḥ. \(V\), p. 1.

\(^{272}\) akhandā eva hi sabdāḥ tatra samāseseṣu padanām kṛttaddhitinantesu ca prakṛti-pratyayānam vibhāgaḥ kālpanika eveti kutrāsti yogasaktīḥ ? Viśistasya viśistārthe rūḍhi revisebhhyupagamat ityapi vadanti.

RG, II, p. 141.
bodhe na tātparyajñānam, padāvasya ca bādhastatra
cā'vayavaśaktimātreṇa nirvāhā ityāhuḥ. yatra tu sthalapadāvayavāvarthabodhastatra samudāyaśaktyā padmatvena rūpena bodhāḥ yadi tu sthalapadām viśtiyameva, taṣṭā lākṣaṇayaiveti.

'If there is 'samudāyaśakti' (collective denotative function) also with regard to a thing denoted by the 'avayavaśakti' (the denotative function of the component parts) (of a Pada), then the Pada is Yogaruṣha (derivably conventional), as for instance, the words like 'paṅkaja' (lotus). For illustration, the word 'paṅkaja' denotes by means of the 'avayavaśakti' the idea of an object that grows on mud and by the 'samudāyaśakti', (it) comes to convey the idea of a lotus as a lotus. It cannot be maintained that merely by the 'avayavaśakti' it may also signify a lily, because the knowledge of convention comes to obstruct that of the purely derivative meaning (Yaugikārtha), thus says the old school (Mīmāṁsakas). But actually speaking, to the lotus apprehended through 'samudāyaśakti' comes to be linked-up (even) the meaning (i.e., 'that which grows on mud') of the components through proximity. Where, however, the conventional meaning comes to be contradicted (i.e., where occurs some contradiction with regard to the conventional meaning), there lily etc. are understood by Lākṣaṇā. Where, again, there is no knowledge of Tātparya (intention) with regard
to lily and even with regard to a lotus, there is contra­
diction, there (i.e., in that case) the purpose (i.e.,
Śābdabodha) is served by means of only the 'avayava­sakti'
(the denotative capacity of only the component parts), so
maintains the new-school. Where, in cases like that of the
'land- lotus', the meaning of the component parts is
(found) contradicted, there the meaning is taken to be
just a variety of lotus on the strength of the 'samudāya­
sakti'. If, on the other hand, the land- lotus is state1
to be of a different species altogether, then the meaning
is obtained by virtue of Laksanā alone.

Now Viśvanātha comes to expound the concept of the
Yogarūḍha variety of a Pada. Of the four, this variety
is specially and more elaborately discussed by the scholars
as its concept gives rise to certain delicate issues.
Gaṅgeśa's discussion of the issues involved in the concept
of Yogarūḍhi runs for as many as twenty three pages.

Nāgeśa defines Yogarūḍhi as the denotative capacity
which involves a mutual relation between a specially con­
veyed, i.e., conventional meaning and a meaning allowed by
the Śāstra (Grammar) on the basis of the component parts
of a Pada.\textsuperscript{273} Gaṅgābhaṭṭa presents a simplified definition

\textsuperscript{273} sastrakalpitavyavārthānvitaviseṣyabhutārthanirupita
saktiryogarūḍhī, PLM, p. 30.
which demands of Yogarūḍhi a combination of 'samudāyaśakti' with 'avayavaśakti' in order to convey one meaning only.\(^74\) Or, to put it in a different way, a word is called 'Yogarūḍha' when in the matter of denoting a sense the total capacity of the word is also taken into consideration along with the capacity of its component parts. In case of a Yogarūḍha word, the meaning agrees with the derivation but yet depends on a convention in respect of the scope of its denotation. Here the convention (Rūḍhi) works in such a way that although the meaning is in full agreement with the derivation, it appears to be determined irrespective of its etymology. The word 'pañkaja' is an example of this variety of words. The etymology of the word 'pañkaja' is 'pañke jāyata iti', 'pañka + jan + ā'. Hence the etymological meaning of 'pañkaja' is an object which grows in the mud. But, on the other hand, the word 'pañkaja' is restricted by 'samudāyaśakti' i.e., convention to mean lotus only. In other words, the word 'pañkaja' means a lotus by virtue of its lotusness. So if anybody utters the word 'pañkaja', the idea and the image of a lotus come to the mind immediately. If the sense would not have been restricted then the word 'pañkaja' would have denoted also a lily flower which grows in the mud. The word 'ādi' in

\[\text{samudāyaśaktyā avayavaśaktyā caikārthapratyāyakatvam yogarūḍhatvam. TP, Vide BHC, p. 59.}\]
'paṅkajādi' in the Muktāvalī above is to include in the list of 'yogārūḍhapada' other words like 'krṣṇasarpa'. The word 'krṣṇasarpa' etymologically means a black snake but is restricted to cobra only. In 'na ca kevalāvayaśāktya' above, Viśvanātha like his predecessor Gaṅgeśa records a view of the earlier scholars (prañcaḥ i.e., prāgayartinaḥ). These earlier scholars can be identified as Mīmāṃsakas on the strength of Jagadīśa's ascribing this view to them. Mīmāṃsakas also recognise 'paṅkaja' as a Yogārūḍha Pada. But their approach comes to be different in the matter of explaining why 'paṅkaja' cannot be taken to denote a lily (kumuda) on the strength of etymology. We know that the etymological or derivative meaning (avayavārtha) of the word is the subject of the action of growing in the mud (paṅkajanikartā, i.e., an object that grows in the mud). As a lily is also found

275. evaṁ padāmaṁ paṅkajapadaśakyāṁ tato nyamatāḥ
paṅkajjanikarttrapadmamiti pratiteḥ ------- rūdhīṁ
vīṇā yogāmātrāḥ kumude prayogādhiprasaṅgācca ------
nanu rūdhāvapi yogātakumude tau kuto na syatāṁ, rūdhīṁ
pratibandhāditi prañcaḥ. TC, p. 591-92.

276. mīmāṃsakānāṁ matamupanyasyati —
rūdhyaarthahhinne yogārthabuddau rudhervirodhitām
vadanti kecidekaikabuddhistailḥ kvacidisyate. etc.
SSP, p. 173.
growing in mud, a pertinent question arises as to why a lily is not understood from the word 'paṅkaja). The Mīmāṃsakas hold that it cannot do so inasmuch as the knowledge of the Rūḍhi or convention concerning the word 'paṅkaja' comes to stand in the way of understanding only the etymological sense of a word.277 Viśvanātha rejects the view of the Mīmāṃsakas. In 'vastutastu ----- sānnidhyaḥ' above, he maintains that on hearing the word 'paṅkaja', the meaning 'lotus' occurs first in one's mind on the strength of the 'samudāyaśakti' or convention. Then the etymological meaning of the word 'paṅkaja', i.e., 'an object that grows on mud' comes to be connected with the already obtained conventional meaning, i.e., the lotus. The conventional meaning occurs first in one's mind because of immediacy of knowledge (sānnidhya) as it already stands determined by the convention concerning the word. In presenting this notion, he might have been influenced by Gaṅgēṣā who also holds a similar view. According to Gaṅgēṣā, the knowledge of Rūḍhi is not necessarily to serve as an obstacle or does not serve at all as an obstacle to the knowledge of

277. parantu rūḍhyārthabhinnē yogārthasya bodhaṁ prati rūḍhiddhiyaḥ pratibandhakatvam ------- mīmāṃsakānāḥ matam. SSP, p. 172-73.
Yogasakti of a word. 278 As a matter of fact, the lotus, recollected because of the conventional knowledge (rūdhijnāna) from the word 'paṅkaja', comes to be known as one that grows on mud (i.e., paṅkajanikartā) because of the knowledge of the component parts. Annāmbhaṭṭa corroborates the view of Gaṅgēṣa. 279 Jagadīśa also, after a lengthy discussion on the view of the Mīmāṁsakas, echoes the opinion of the author of the Tattvacintāmaṇi. 280 Now a question may be

278. kiṃca rūdhiyogayorvirodha eva paraśa rūdhya yogapratibhandhaḥ maṇḍapādau tathā nirmayat — evaṁśvirodha'pi rūdheryogapaharitavi tanna —— tasmāna pratibandha- katvena rūdhisiddhirna vā tayā yogapratibhandha iti. atrocyate niyamataḥ padasmṛtyarthameva rūdhīḥ rūdhyā ca niyamataḥ smṛtaḥ padāmamevāvayavaiḥ paṅkajanikarti-tr- venānubhāvyate ——— TC, p. 629-30.

279. niyatapadmatvādijñānārtham samudāyasyaśaktīḥ. anyathā kumude'pi prayogapraskaṅgat. TD, Vide TS, p. 335-36.

280. Manikṛṣṇamataḥ darsaṅcati — rūdharyat'nyatra vā yatra yada"kāmksādiniścayaḥ tadaiva tatha yogarthasyānvayo manikṛṣṇataḥ. samudāyasyaśakttyapasthāpite padāantaravṛttyupasthāpite vā yatra dharmiṇi avāntaravṛtti labhyārthasya yadākāmkṣā(di) niscayādistadaiva tatra tasyānvayabodha utpadyate sambhutasaṃagriṣṭakvāt. rūdharyathabhinne yogarthasyānvayabodhayudāsāya tā rūdheryogāpaharitapravādo rūdharyathamātre yogarthasyānvayabodhasaṃagriṣṭal-ābhīprāyakā iti cintāmanikṛtām matam. SSP, p. 185-36.
pertinent here. If as a matter of fact, it is the 'rūḍhi-
jñāna' which immediately fixes the meaning of the word 'pañkaja' to a lotus and if only for the knowledge of a lotus, the word 'pañkaja' is normally or ordinarily uttered, then we can do well only with the recognition of the Rūḍhi-
sakti. What is it that leads to admit here both Yoga and Rūḍhisakti and to call it a Yogarūḍha Pada? We find the scholars quite aware of this query. As for instance, Gaṅgāsā and Gaṅgābhāṣṭa have spoken of the utility of both Yogaśakti and Rūḍhisakti in the case of words like 'pañkaja' by way of conveying corresponding meanings in the event of failure of the other. 281 Though we cannot say that there is the agreement of Viśvanātha with the aforesaid scholars in the matter, we can, however, say that Viśvanātha also was aware of certain such misgivings regarding the concept of Yogarūḍhi. It is why he takes up the theme a bit elaborately in the Muktāvalī text, 'yatra tu rūḍhyarthasya bādhā; -------------- tadā laksanaṇayaiveti.'

281. nanvevaṁ rūḍhīrevāṣtu tata evo bhayalābhāt kim yogarūḍhyā, na, avayavaśakteḥ kāptatvāt yaugikārthā-
nubhavācca. TC, p. 593.
na, avayavaśakteḥ -------- yaugikārthānubhavācca. ibid;
tātrapyagrāhakavāsāt kevalarūḍhyarthasya kevalayogār-
thāsya bodhah PLM, 31; pañkajapadāt pañkajāninkartṛtvā-
padmatvobhayaśprakāśkopasthiterānubhāvivakatvāt. anyatha pañkajapadāt bhekādibodho'pi syāt. ato yogarūḍhīrāva-
syakī. TP, Vide BHC, p. 59.
In the sentence, 'niśāyāṁ paṅkajah', the word 'paṅkaja' cannot mean a 'lotus'. It is because the lotus thrives only during the day. Here as there is no Tātparya with regard to a lotus, Viśvanātha proceeds to make a Lakṣāṇā on the strength of a Tātparyāṇupapatti. Now a 'kumuda' (Lily) comes to be understood as a Lakṣyārtha of the word 'paṅkaja'. So Viśvanātha makes the rule that when there is a difficulty regarding the understanding of a 'ruḍhyartha', Lakṣāṇā is resorted to. In the sentence 'niśāyāṁ paṅkajah', the Tātparya is finally settled with regard to a lily. But it may happen sometime that while it is difficult to understand a conventional meaning like lotus, it may be that the intention of the speaker is also not with reference to a secondary meaning like a lily. As for instance, we can take the sentence, 'paṅkajo mostaghāsah'. Here the paṅkaja is used as the qualification of a particular kind of grass that grows on mud. In such cases, the business is served only by the Yogaśakti. It does not allow any scope to Ruḍhiśakti or Lakṣāṇā. Sometimes again the Yogaśakti may get obstructed allowing Ruḍhiśakti to function independently. For instance, in the sentence, 'bhumau paṅkajam' word 'paṅkaja' cannot mean a water lotus by the combination of Yogaruḍhaśakti. It also cannot go to mean a water lily by Lakṣāṇā as the Tātparya is not felt with regard to that. The Yogaśakti also is of no
avail because of the presence of the word 'bhūmau'. In
such a case, 'samudāyasākti' or Rudhi will step in to
mean a land lotus (sthala-padma). The knowledge of the
land lotus occurs as a conventional primary meaning by
virtue of understanding it as merely a variety of lotus
without any reference to the etymological meaning of the
word. If, however, the land lotus is not recognised as a
variety of lotus at all to allow the conventional meanin­
to occur easily, Lakṣaṇā shall have to be resorted to get
the desired meaning. In 'yatra tu ------ avayaśaktimātreṇa
nirvāha ityāhuh', the expression 'mātreṇa' is to be taken
to suggest a disregard to Lakṣaṇā. In this context, we may
note that the earlier Naiyāyikas recognised only the
Lakṣaṇāsakti in understanding the mere 'yogārtha' or
'rūdhārtha' from a Yogarūdhapada. Jagadīśa makes a mention
of the Nyāyavārttika wherein either a lily or land lotus
is shown as understandable from the word 'paṅkaja' by
Lakṣaṇā only. 282 But we learn from Gaṅgeśa that the
Neologicians are reluctant to take the aid of Lakṣaṇā in

282. ata eva "paṅkajām kumudām ityātra.
paṅkajaniḥkartoṭvena 'bhūmau paṅkajamutpanna" mityā su
cac padmatvena paṅkajapadasya lakṣaṇayālva kumudastha-
lapadmayorbodhah iti vārttikam.

S3P, p. 163-64.
this matter. They want to have even the aforesaid meanings
by Śakti only. 283

M(29). yatra tu yaugikārtha- rūḍhyarthayoh svātantrye;
   bodhastadyaugikarūḍham. yathodbhidādi-padam. tatra
   hyudbhedanakartātaru- gǔlmādirbudhyate yāgaviseṣo'-
pīti.

'When again a derived meaning as well as a conven­
tional one are conveyed by the same word independently of
each other than the Pada is 'Yaugikaṛūḍha (derivative or con­
ventional); for example, the words like 'udbhid'. There the
meaning conveyed is both 'what shoots up such as trees
and shrubs' and also a particular kind of sacrifice.'

A word is called 'yaugikarūḍha' or etymological con­
ventional when its meaning is determined either by the
derivation i.e., its component parts or by a convention
concerning the whole word irrespective of any derivation. 284

283. navyāstu niyamataḥ smṛtapadmasyaṃvayānuṇapapattyant-
   rameva kumudadhiriti na tatra lakaṇḍavyavahāraḥ. va tuto
   mukhyataiva tāvapi padmaṭvaśyāyagataya ananvaye yogāv-
   deva kumudādhirna lakaṇṇayeti. TC, p. 601.

284. taddhi kācidādavayaṇvṛttaḥ yogārthameva, kādāciyāra
   samudāyaśāktyā rūḍhyarthamevābhidhātta (ityapareṣām
   matam) SSP, p. 75;
   tathaiva bhinnārthapratyāyaktvam.(yaugikarūḍhatvam).
   TP, BHC, p. 53.
In other words, in case of a Yaugikarūḍha word the etymological and conventional meanings come to be inherently understood. As for instance, the word 'udbhid' etymologically means which grow up perforating the ground (i.e., tree, plant, creeper etc.) and again conventionally it means a sacrifice of this name. 285 By 'ādi' in 'udbhidādi padam' in the Muktāvalī text, other similar words like 'maṇḍapa' had been referred to. 286 Now the word 'maṇḍapa' etymologically means one who drinks the scum of rice and Conventionally the open hall. Here from both the examples, we have seen that the Yaugikaṛūḍha words have two meanings, both being determined parallelly. Again we have the idea that this division of words is applicable only in case of 'ānekārthaśabdas' (words having more than one meaning).

We find Nāgēśa not recognising this variety of words. He refers to the variety as recognised by others. 287 It is

285. udbhidā yajeta pasukāma, TBR 19.7.3, JNV 1.4.1.
286. ādīnā maṇḍapādi parigrahaḥ, MUS, vide BPS, p. 441;
   cf. SSP, p. 74; PLM, p. 32;
   TP, vide BHC, p. 59.
287. aśvagandhādi padam asadhivese rūḍham, aśvasambandhi-
   gandhavattayā vājiśālabodhe yaugikam. idam yaugikarī-
   dhamityucyate. evaṁ maṇḍapapadaṁ grhaviśe rūḍham,
   maṇḍapānakarttaṁ yaugikam. PLM, p. 32.
because, according to the Grammarians, an 'anekārthaśākta' is not a single word but it assumes the form of different words varying according to various meanings. The Grammarians’ maxim in this context is 'arthabhede śabdābhedaḥ' (i.e., Difference of words results from difference in meanings). According to the Grammarians, therefore, the words like 'udbhiti' and 'maṇḍapa' are Yaugika on the strength of their etymological meanings and Rūḍha on the strength of their Conventional meanings (i.e., when their meanings are determined by the 'samudāyaśakti'). We have also noticed Jagadīśa’s reluctance to give recognition to this variety of a Pair.

Now it behoves us to discuss a question at this stage. Both the so-called Yogarūḍha and Yaugikarūḍha words involve the operation of Yogaśakti and Rūḍhiśakti. Hence there is the necessity for drawing a line of demarcation. Naiyāyikas are alive to this necessity. Jagadīśacārya states in this context that a Yaugikarūḍha Pada sometimes comes to convey a 'ruḍhyarthā' without any reference to the Yogarthā or sometimes signifies only the 'yogarthā' without any reference to the 'ruḍhayarthā'. As for instance, in 'maṇḍapa' seta the etymological meaning of the word 'maṇḍapa' i.e., 'maṇḍapāṇakartā' does not fit in for necessary connection and is not conveyed. Similarly in 'maṇḍapābhijaya' the Conventional meaning of the word 'maṇḍapa' i.e., a pavilion fails to be syntactically connected and as such is not understood. But, in the case of the words of the Yogarūḍha
variety, like 'pañkaja' the etymology also conveys what has already attained the status of a conventional meaning, and the Conventional force also operates to convey such a meaning which happens to agree also with the etymology.

K(2). LAKŞANĀ ŚAKYASAMBANDHĀSTĀTPARYĀNUPAPATTITĀH. 32a.

'Lakṣanā is the relation with a Śākyartha, (which operates) where the Tātparya (the speaker's intention) is not (directly) compatible'.

In the Kārikā above, Viśvanātha forwards his own definition of Lakṣanā. In the works of scholars anterior to Viśvanātha, we meet with a two fold controversy in the very definition of Lakṣanā. (1) The Mīmāṃsakas understood Lakṣanā as based upon what may be described as 'svabhāva-sambandha' (or 'svajñāpyasambandha'). They did not conceive it as a 'Śākyartha Sambandha'; (2) The Prabhakaras, some of the Bhātta Mīmāṃsakas and even some Feiyōyikas,

including their stalwart Gahgeśopādhyāya, recognised invanupatti and not Tatparyanupapatti as the factor leading to the operation of a Lakṣaṇā. In the face of such differences of opinion, Viśvanātha's definition of Lakṣaṇā deserves to be carefully studied by way of a comparative examination of the earlier views. Hence, we proceed to discuss first the three terms involved in the aforesaid definition, namely, Lakṣaṇa, Śakyasambandha and Tatparyanupapatti.

The term Lakṣaṇa in the Kārikā above, obviously, is with reference to Viśvanātha's earlier contention that Vṛtti is the relation consisting in either Sakti or Lakṣaṇa. After having discussed the issues connected with Śakti and Śakyārtha, the author now proceeds to divulge the nature of Lakṣaṇa.

LAKṢAṆĀ: Ideas are found to be conveyed or at least sought to be conveyed metaphorically in all existing literatures of the world. This metaphor, we may say, is the English word popularly used for what we call a Lakṣaṇa.²³⁹ As

²³⁹ For example, an authority like Dr. K.K. Raja has used the term Metaphor for Lakṣaṇa.

Vide (title page for the chapter on Lakṣaṇa in ) ITM.
Gonda has rightly observed, 290 the metaphorical use
place in languages even of the primitive people. Comparison
is the basis of all metaphorical expressions. The process
of comparison which is easily traced back to primitive
writings and which come to be extensively developed in
later literary works is undoubtedly the basis of figures
of speech like Rūpaka and Atiśayokti. But these figures of
speech clearly exhibit the involvement of Laksana in them.
Here we may take an example from the Vedic literature itself.
The hymn 'dvā suparṇā' 291 wherein the Jātman and Parmātman have been described as two birds, is quoted in the
Kāvyamīmāmsā by Rājaśekhara 292 to show the presence of
'alākara' in the Vedic writings and is taken by Pāṇḍita Jagannātha 293 to illustrate 'Atiśayokti'. In either case, we

290. "Similes are not late phenomena in the history of
human language, we learn from the fact that we are
accustomed to look upon abstract ideas as similar to
things we perceive with our sense-organs and that it
is in the first place people who have no trained way
of thinking that are accustomed to do so. Naive and
primitive men who are scarcely able to abstract, are
inclined to name new things after the familiar and to
compare things unknown to the well-known. By means of
a 'Simile' they bring the unknown within the sphere of
the known." RSL, p. 11.

291. dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā
samānah vṛkṣam pariśasvatāte
 tayoranyah pippalam svādsvattyā
naśnannanyo abhicākaśiti. RV 1.164.20.

292. 'upakārakatvādalahkāraḥ saptamamahṣam iti yāyavariyāh.
ḥte ca tatvārūpaparijñānaśvedārthānavaśagatiḥ. yathā -
dvā ----- abhicākaśiti'. KM, p. 16.

293. iyām cātiśayoktirvede'pi dṛśyate. yathā -
 dvā suparṇā ---------- abhicākaśiti --- RG, p. 34.
may be sure of the presence of Lakṣaṇā (of Śāhīvaśān̄n̄ type, if we speak after the Ālaṃkārikas) in the description. Thus we observe the occurrence of Lakṣaṇā even in Vedic writings.

To make a brief study in retrospect of the treatment of Lakṣaṇā, we are to mention Yāska first. Yāska discusses the various Upamāṇas (in comparing unknown things with well-known ones) and in that context, gives examples of Luṇṭopamā in 'Sīmhaḥ' 'vyāghraḥ' etc.294 These uses of Yāska, came to give expressions like 'sīmho māṇavakāḥ' which are some stock examples of Lakṣaṇā in later theoretical works. Durgācārya’s commentary also confirms our ideas.295 This Luṇṭopamā is sought in later times to be identified as Kūṭaka which, beyond any doubt, involves what we call a Lakṣaṇā, thus many examples of Lakṣaṇā without being named as such occur in Yāska's work. The concept of the phenomenon, however, emerges out only in later writings. Most of the different schools of Indian thought have accepted Śabda (Verbal testimony) as one of the Pramāṇas. Consequently in their treatment of Śabda, the scholars of these schools have examined the

294. atha luṇṭopamāṇyaarthopamāṇityācakṣate sīmho vyāghraḥ
   iti pūjayāṁ svā kāka iti kutsayāṁ kāka iti ------

295. sīmho vyāghra iti pūjayām. yo hi pūjyo bhavati sa
   ucyaate sīmho devadatta iti. atra na sīmha eva deva-
   dattaḥ. kiṁ tarhi. sīmhaṃpastatra kaścidasti
   sauryādih ------ Durgācārya under ibid.
nature of meaning and as such naturally they have dealt with the concept and process as well of the so-called Laksana. As a result, the discussion on Laksana figures in the writings of Philosophers, Grammarians and Rhetoricians of Ancient India.

Of the Mimamsakas, Jaimini, the founder of the school, as a believer in the natural theory of meaning maintains that the words and their corresponding meanings stand in an inherent relation. The words have inherent potentiality to convey their own meanings. Such meanings as are conveyed by the words through their inherent potentiality are understood as soon as the words come to be heard. Hence these meanings are called 'Srutiyaartha' and the significative potentiality of words is called 'Sruti'. In certain cases, however, these Srutiyaarthas come to be irrelevant to the context with all chances to mislead the listener. But in certain cases, this irrelevance is removed by means of conveying a secondary significance. This suggestion comes from Jaimini himself when he assets that if it is taken as

296. गृहत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेनापमब्धांसम्बन्धाः —— MS 1.1.5. गृहत्तिकस्तु इति नित्यां ब्रम्बाह ——— आयुक्ताः शब्दार्थयोर्भवाः समंबन्धो नोतपन्नयोः पांसादांस- बंधस्तत्पन्नयोः पांसादांसम्बन्धाः. SB, under MS above.

297. स्रुतिलिङ्गाव्यायाप्रकारणाः —— विप्रकार्षत. MS, 3.3.14. ययदार्थस्याभिध्यावान्स्याब्दस्या श्रवणा मात्रादेववागम्याते सा स्रुतियावगम्याते, श्रवणां स्रुतिः. SB, under MS above.
a figurative expression, (Guna or Gauni Prayoga), the expression (found to be irrelevant earlier) is felt to be meaningful. 298 In this manner Jaimini recognises the concept of what in later times comes to be popularly known as Lakṣaṇā.

It may be briefly noted that the term Bhakti was used by Jaimini in the sense of secondary signification (Lakṣaṇā) in the sūtra III.2.43. 299 In the said sūtra, the expression 'indrapītasya' is being taken as a Bahuvrīhi Compound and not as a Tatpuruṣa. 300 Here (i.e. in 'bhakti-pānasya') Jaimini uses the term 'bhakti' in the sense of Lakṣaṇā. This interpretation is sought to be ascribed to an earlier authority named Aitiśayana. 301 If so, the

298. gunadavipratisedhaḥ syat. MS 1.2.39.
299. sarveṣaṃ vaikamantryaṃaitiśayanasya bhakti-pānatiḥ savanādhikato hi. Ibid 3.2.43.
300. na indrapītah - iti soma ucyate, kim tarhi ? savanam, prātaḥ savanaśabdena sāmānādhikaraṇyāt. 'nanu some'ōiṣaṭhi'. satyam asti śaṭhi, na tu tena sāmānādhiṃkaraṇyam. nā-sāvindreṇa somah pītaḥ, nāpi indrāya dattah, anye eva pīto dattto vā, sagata eva; na cāṭitaḥ samudāvo vyapadisyate, prayakṣavacano hi ayam śabdaḥ, savane tu na doṣah, indrapītaḥ bhavati savanam, yatra indreṇa pitaḥ. tasmāt anāṅadro'pinḍrapīta savane'ntarbhavati - iti śakyate mantrāṇa vaditum. SB under ibid.
301. syādvāya sāmyogavat phalena sambandhastasmāt karmeti śāyanah. MS 3.4.24.
concept of Bhakti may be traced back to a date much earlier than that of Jaimini. Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Brahma-sūtra is evidently earlier than Jaimini as Jaimini is found to have referred to Bādarāyaṇa in the sūtra 1.1.5. We find the concept of secondary signification as well as the term 'Bhakti' in Bādarāyaṇa also. But this Aitiśayana, referred to by Jaimini, may be earlier even than Bādarāyaṇa as the works of Aitiśayana are not yet available. We come across Jaimini’s use of the term Bhakti once again in the Ākṣepa sūtra. Though we do not find Jaimini using the familiar term Lākṣaṇa, it may be that he uses the term 'Lākṣaṇa', in the same sense in the sūtra III.1.14 in as much as we find a case of secondary signification as admitted by him therein. This is clear from Śabara’s commentary. We may further note that only

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302. अत्पत्तिकास्तु साबदस्यार्थेन साम्बंधहस्तस्या ज्ञानमुपादेसो'व्यतिरेकास्तेर्थे'नुपालवद्धे तत्प्रमाणाम बादरायणस्यानापेक्षत्वात्। ibid 1.1.5.

303. चराचरावपातारायस्तु स्यात्तद्यपादेसो भाक्तास्तबादग्नन्तवत्। BS II.3.16, vide BSB, p. 224.

304. भाक्तिरसामिन्द्वयायर्यायेति चेत। MS. 3.8.43.

305. सर्वेस्मात् लाइक्षावतवद्वादिष्ट त्व लाइक्षापम। ibid 3.1.14.

306. तद्दत ग्राहादलाइक्षायितवा तस्या साम्यर्गदी विद्धियात्।

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SB, under ibid.
the later Mimāṁsakas maintain a distinction between Laksanā and Guna-vṛtti. Jaimini and his Bhāsyakāra, Śābarasvāmin use the term Guna-vṛtti, Bhakti and Laksanā or Laksanā without much discrimination.

We shall have to bear in mind, however, that though Jaimini recognises the scope of secondary signification, he also prefers a direct signification to an indirect one.307 We shall have to make a special discussion on this attitude of Jaimini in the context of our examination of the text of Viśvanātha's Muktāvali on Laksanā, 'ata eva niśādasthapatiṁ yājāyet' etc.

In the Bhāṣya of Śābarasvāmin, we find the use of the term Laksanā very often and in many cases side by side with the term Sruti.308 It may be that Jaimini's 'Laksanā' itself comes to be converted into Laksanā by way of making it a word in the feminine gender for the sake of analogy with the term Sruti. Śābara follows his sūtrakāra very faithfully by way of showing partiality to primary signification in case of conflict with a secondary one. In his

307. guṇamukhyavyatikrame tadgrthatvānmukhyena vedasaṁ-yogaḥ. MS 3.3.9.

308. āpi ca vidhitve laksanā, SB, under MS 1.4.22;
Srūtilaksanāvīśaye ca śrutirnyāyā, na laksanā.
ibid, under MS 6.1.51;
Srūtilaksanāvīśaye ---- nyāyāsyat. ibid, under MS 9.1.21 & 10.4.33.
In his assessment, Śruti is stronger than Laksanā. A very interesting example of Śabara's avoiding Laksanā in preference to Śruti is provided by his treatment of a statement like 'udbhida yajeta' in 'udbhid adhikaraṇa'. While commenting on the MS III.2.1., Śabara characterises a secondary sense as a 'jaghanyārtha'. His explanation is this: the primary meaning is called 'mukhya' as because it appears primarily like a face (what appears earlier than other parts of the body) and the secondary meaning is called 'jaghanya' as it comes after the primary meaning just like a hinder part (jaghana) appearing after the face (mukha). It is worth mentioning that Śabara aims at showing a distinction between Guṇavṛtta and Laksanā. But we feel that a clear cut definition of Laksanā along with a line of demarcation between the two broad divisions

309. śrutiśca laksanāyā jyāyasī ibid, under MS 1.4.24 & 9.3.3; śrutiśca jyāyasī laksanāyāh ibid, under MS 9.1.33; śrutiśca laksanāyā gariyāsī ibid, under MS 10.3.35 mukhyārthata ca nyāyā na laksyārthata. ibid, under MS 3.2.25.

310. kaḥ punarmukhyāḥ ko vā gaṇaḥ? iti ucyate yaḥ śabdā-devāvagamyate, sa prathamo'rtho mukhyaḥ, mukhamiva bhavati iti mukhya ityucyate, yastu khibu pratitādārthāt kenacit sambandhena gamyate, sa paścatbhāvājagnanamiva bhavati iti jaghānyāḥ guṇa sambandhācca gaṇaḥ iti. ibid, under MS, 3.2.1.

311. iha ye bidhivannigadā ———— gudumbara yūpobhavatvīrgvā udumbara ūrk paśava ūraivaśmā ūrjām paśūnapnoti ūrjo'varuddhyaḥ iti. kimasya vidhiḥ kāryamutāsyāpi stutiriti. ibid, under MS 1.2.19.
of Laksana, namely, Gunavratti and Laksana, has not emerged out during the days of Sabara.

Coming to the Bhāṭṭa school of the Mīmāṃsakas, we find that a high status to the secondary signification is given by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa as he accepts Laksana in each and every sentence. According to him, the words individually convey their respective meanings in the form of a 'universal' (Jāti). The power of primary signification (Abhidhā or Sakti) is exhausted in accordance with the maxim 'Śabda-buddhi-karmaṇām viramya vyāpārābhāvaḥ'.

The meanings primarily conveyed by the words through Abhidhā, therefore, come to give the sentence meaning (Vākyārtha) through Laksana. This view of Kumārila is merely the development of the idea contained in a sutra of Jaimini. The earlier thinkers also feel that the sentence meaning is not conveyed by Abhidhā but by 'some other function'. But as the so-called 'some other

312. tadbhutānām kriyārthena samāmnāyo'rthasya tannīmittatvat. MS 1.1.25.

function', was not earlier spelled out, Kumārila is the first scholar to point out that it is the Lakṣaṇā function which operates to convey the sentence meaning in each and every sentence. Kumārila, moreover, finds scope under Jaimini Sūtra 1.4.22 to give his own idea of Guṇavṛtti and Lakṣaṇā and as well on their mutual difference. Kumārila is supported by his followers like Pārthasārāti...

314. vākyārtho lakṣayamāṇo hi sarvatraiva naḥ ātītih.
   SV, Vakya, p. 229.

315. ānarthakaṇḍakāraṇam karturhi kāraṇāni guṇārthāḥvidhiyate. MS 1.4.22.

316. arthavādaprāsanagātādupakāraṇaṇaṃvādavādavidhitallakṣaṇām
   ----- nanu ca sahāśaṇaṣasthānādīnānyāṃgaṇaṣaṣaṇādaprāsrūtibhirgaṇaṃmīttānvuktaṃi. loke ca dṛṣṭaye yaṣṭih
   praveśaya, maṃcāḥ krośānti ----- chatrisamametetaraprātatyaṇadvadhya yaṣṭiṣaḥaharitādiṣpratyo bhavati. atthā
   vā gaṇuṇā vṛtteriha nimittamahbhidhiyate na lakṣaṇāyaḥ.
   kim cānayorbhedopyaṣti. bādhamaṣṭi kutaḥ —
   abhidheyāvīnābhute pravṛttirlakṣaṇesyaṣate
   lakṣyamāṇaṇaṃguṇairvṛgyad vṛtteriśta tuṣunatā.
   tatra yathāivākṛttivacanaḥ sabdastatsahacaritaṃ vyaktīṃ
   lakṣaṇatuḥaḥ yathābharyaḥ maṃcāḥscādayastatsambaddhapuruṣa
   lakṣaṇārthāḥ bhavanti. agnirnātha iti tu nāgnirvāni-
   nābhiṇeva mahāvakaḥ pratiyate. kim tarhi —
   vahniṣṭalakṣitādharthādyapaiṅgalyādi ganyate
   tena māṇavake buddhīḥ sādṛṣyād四大yāyate.

TV, under ibid, Vide MD pp. 313-14.
Coming to the Prâbhâkara school, we find that Prabhâkara Miśra uses the terms Upacâra, Guṇa and Bhakti for secondary signification under various contexts. His illustration of Upacâra, 'kuntan pravesâya' may be said to have been modelled precisely on the example 'yastrîh pravesâya' and 'yastrîkam bhujaya' given by Vatsyâyana under NS II.2.62. Prabhâkara's illustration of Guṇavrtti is 'gaurvâhikâḥ', Śaśikanâtha,

317. itareṣām tu śabdânām svārtharūpam evâbhidheyanavāntarūpastu vākyârthāḥ padāarthagamyā iti. ata eva vākyârtho lâkṣaṇika iti Mîmâṃsakâḥ. NRM, pp. 101-02.

nanvavinâbhavanimitâ lâkṣaṇâ na ca padârtha ---- iti sa kathaṁ lakṣyate nâvâsyaamâvâbhavanimitâiva lâkṣaṇâ ekâvâkyatâ'pi tatra nîmittam. ibid, p. 102.

318. vayâma tu padârthâ lâkṣaṇayaiva vâkyârthâm bodhayan-titi brûmah. vâcyârthânupapattî'ya hi lâkṣaṇâ bhavati. MM, p. 94.

319. nanu ca bhedapratyaysa' pyabhopedopacâro dṛṣṭaṁ kuntan pravesâyati. satyamabhopedopacâraḥ. na punarîyam gaurityatropacârabuddhîrlaukiKimâm. tasmādupacarito'yaṁ pratyaya iti na śākyate vâktum. VR, p. 41-42.

320. sahacarânt - 'yastrîkam bhujaya' iti yastrîkasahacarito brâhmano' bhidhiyata iti. sthânaṁ-maîcâḥ krośantîti maîcâsthâh purusâ abhidhiyante. tâdârthât - katârthesu vîrâñeseu vyuhyamâneu kaṭâm karotîti bhavati.

VB, under NS 2.2.64.

321. nanu cânyatvopalabdhaḥ satyâṁ gaurvâhikasya ca -- gaurvâhikâḥ iti. VR, p. 147.
the follower of Prabhākara, presents the view of Kumārila and asserts that Laksanā cannot be restored to in each and every sentence. It can be resorted to only when the primary meaning of a word comes to be discarded as in 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ'.

Sālikānātha finally analyses the concept of Laksanā in the light of Prabhākara and for that purpose adds a 'saṁgṛaha śloka' as the definition of Laksanā which we find utilized in the Tattvacintāmaṇi by Gaṅgeśa. We find here two indispensable factors admitted by Śālikānātha.

(i) Anupapatti which is Anvayānupapatti and not Tatparya-anupapatti in marked difference with Viśvanātha Nyāya Pañcānana; (ii) Sambandha (between the primary and secondary concepts). Here we find a new concept evolved in place of 'avinābhāvasambandha' and 'ekāvākyatā' of the Bhattas.

Rāmānujācārya, the author of the Tantra Rasasvā, a work of the Prabhākara school, re-establishes the view already

322. vākyaṁ rtho lakṣaṁaṇo hi sarvatraiva hi lakṣayate, iti; atrāpare brūvate-neyam laksanā svārthāparityāgat. svārthaparityāgena hi gaṅgādiṣu laksanā dṛṣṭeti.
VM, p. 13, Vide PP.

323. vācyaśyārthasya vākyārthe sambandhānupapattītaḥ. tatsambandhavāsaprāpatasyānvayāllkṣaṇocyeṣe ityuttaraśālokaḥ.
iibid.
expressed by Śālikanātha.  

In the Vedānta school we find that Bādarāyana recognises the secondary signification under discussion either as Gaurī or as Bhākta prayoga. But we can make some more ideas regarding Bādarāyana's notion of secondary signification only from Saṅkara's commentary on the Brahmaśūtras. In addition to the above two terms, Saṅkara uses the terms Upacāra and Guṇavāda also. Saṅkara finds an occasion to

324. \[ \text{tadāḥurvārtikākārapādāḥ - vākyārtho laksamāṇo hi sarvatraiva hi lakṣyate iti.} \]

\[ \text{----- tadayuktamityanye. neyam laksanā svārthā-parityāgat. tatparityāgena hi gaṅgādiṣu laksanā ċṛṣṭetite hi mīmāṁsābhīṣayaikālyenaivaśamāhuḥ. na hi sarvatra lakṣanāyām svārthasthyajyate. tathāḥ - loke 'chatrino gacchanti' iti chatrisābdendra chatryacchatrisamudāyo lakṣyate. chatrisābdārthaśca na tyajyate. tathā veḍeśpi cāturmāṣeṣu 'vaśvadevena yaśeta' iti vaśvadevasābdendra vaśvadeva vaśvadevagano lakṣyate. svārthaśca na tyajyate. ata eva Jahadajahallaksanēti taddvevidhyām paraṁparāṅgīkṛtam. TR, p. 28;} \]

\[ \text{ato'nyathā duśaṇamucyate. vācyasya gaṅgāsābdārthasya vākyārthe'nanvayātkhalu laksanā. gāmānayēdādau tu gopārthasyāṅvayādayuktaiva sa. kiṃ ca vākyārthamā-trasya lakṣyatvamanupapannam. sambandhānupapatiparā-marsāmantarena padārthavadeva jhaṭiti pratīteḥ -} \]

ibid.
expound the notion of Laksana in connection with BS II.

3.1. & II.3.3. It is held that the scriptural statement on the origin of Ākāśa should be treated as Gaurī (figurative expressions). Śaṅkara cites parallels. We are to take note of Bādarāyaṇa's mention of the term 'Bhākta' and Śaṅkara's comments in that context.

325. 'na viyadas'ruteh' and 'gaunyassambhaṅvat'.
BS II.3.1 & 3, SBH under above, vide BSB, pp. 211-12.

326. tasmādva etasmātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ.
ākāśādvāyu. vāyuragnih. aṃmerāpaḥ -------
TU. II.1.1.

327. tasmādyathā loke ākāsāṁ kurvākāśo jāta ityevaṁ-
jātiyako gaunāḥ prayogo bhavati, yathā ca ghoṭākāśaḥ
karakākāśo gṛhākāśa ityekasyāpyākāśasyaivaṁjātiyako
bhedavyapadeso guṇo bhavati, vede'pi 'āranyākāśeś-
vālabheran' iti. evamutpattiṣrutirapi guṇi dṛṣṭa-

328. carācaravyapāśrayastu syātadvapadeso bhāktastad-
bhāvabhāvītvāt. BS II.3.16.

ucyate - carācaravyapāśrayaḥ. sthāvarajāmgaṃsā-
rīraviṣayau janmamaraṇaśabdau mukhyau santau tatsthe
jīvātmāṇyaupacaryete tadbhāvabhāvītvāt. sārīra-pradur-
bhāvayorhi satōḥ janmamaraṇaśabdau bhavato, nāsatoḥ.
SBH under BS above, Vide BSB, p. 224.
of the Grammarians, Patanjali is the earliest to recognise the phenomenon of the transference of epithet which is nothing other than what we call a Lakṣāṇā. Though he does not mention the terms Lakṣāṇā or Guṇavṛtti, he comes to refer to the practice of using a certain word for something other than what it usually stands for. His examples of transference of epithets, we may note, are precisely the examples of Lakṣāṇā as have been recognised by later theorists.

Bhartrihari comes to use the term Guṇa alone for the secondarily signified meaning. He details, however, the different views regarding the nature of 'gaṇa artha' and its difference from 'mukhya artha' as propounded by different authorities. He opines that the sentence conveys its meaning as a whole and in the total meaning of the sentence the individual word-meanings retain very little of their individual identity. While illustrating this point, Bhartrihari gives some expressions which

329. navaśyamayamevābhīsambandho bhavati - tasyedamiti
    ayamayabhīsambandho bhavati - so'yamiti. katham punar-
    atasmin 'sa' ityetadbhavati ? Caturbhiḥ prakārairatasa-
    min 'sa' ityetadbhavati - tāṭsthyāt, tāḍdhaṁyāt, tatsu-
    mipyāt, tatsuḥacaryāditi. tāṭsthyātavat - mañcā hasanti,
    girirdahyate ---- tāḍdhaṁyāt jaṭīnaṁ yāntam brahmadatta
    ityāha. Brahmadatte yāni kāryāni jaṭīnyapi tāni kriyanta
    ityeto ṣāti 'brahmadatta' ityu cyate ---- Tatsaṁipyaṁ
    - gangāyām ghoṣah, kupe gṛākulaṁ ---- tatsuḥacaryat -
    kuntān pravesāya, yaśṭāṁ pravesāyatī

MBH, under Vārtika 3, 'Siddham tu striyāṁ puṃśabde-
    nābhidhānaṁ. on 'Pūmyogādakhyāyam' P 4.1.48.
in later times come to serve as stock-examples of some or other variety of Lakṣaṇā. For example, the example 'Kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām' may be said to have originated from Bhartrhari's 'Kākebhyo rakṣyatām sarpiḥ'.\footnote{330} In later works, this has been recognised as an example of 'Upalakṣaṇa' or as a case of Ajahatsvartha or of an Upādānalakṣaṇā. It is to be noted that nowhere in his work Bhartrhari has mentioned the term Lakṣaṇā. Of the later Grammarians, Nāgēsa shows originality in his approach to the concept of Lakṣaṇā as we find him in his Paramalaghumāṇjuśa. He is found adding 'tādarthya' to the factors recognised by Patañjali and the illustration given in the context by Nāgēsa is 'āmi indrāḥ'. He concedes to the position of the Naiyāyikas like Viśvanātha Nyāyapānacānana in respect of the nature of Lakṣaṇā. He discusses as to whether Tātparyānupapatti or Anvayānupapatti is the Lakṣaṇābīja and finally decides in favour of Tātparyānupapatti.\footnote{331} We propose to discuss the issue elaborately in the context of our examining the relevant text of the Muktāvalī. As we have already pointed out, Nāgēsa, however, observes that Lakṣaṇā is not a secondary

\footnotetext{330}{kākebhyo rakṣyatām sarpīrī bālo'pi coditaḥ
upaghātapare vākye na svādibhyo na rakṣati.
VP 2.312.}

\footnotetext{331}{vastutastu tātparyānupapattisandhānameva tadājām.
PLM, p. 45.}
function but is also a Śakti, i.e., a denotative potenti-
ality of the word itself in respect of the so-called second-
ary meaning. There is, however, as he maintains, one differ-
ence between the Śakti that conveys the idea of 'the current'
and the Śakti which gives the idea of 'the bank'. The ear-
lier Śakti is 'Prasiddha' and the latter is 'aprasiddha'.
The 'prasiddhā' Śakti is familiar to one and all irrespec-
tive of possession or lack of intelligence while the 'apra-
siddhā' Śakti is familiar only to the connoisseurs.332

The idea that the same word may have more than one . The
classification of Śakti into Prasiddhā and Aprasiddhā
varieties seems to be modelled on the principle of distin-
guishing the Mukhya and Gauṇa arthas on the basis of
'sādhi' (Prasiddhi) and 'asiddhi' (Aprasiddhi) as propo-
unded by Bhartrhari.333 It may be added that Nāgasa admits
here a role to be played by Tātparya in the matter of a
word's conveying a meaning only by means of Śakti.334

332. tathāhi - sāktirdhivīdha - prasiddha'prasiddha ca.
amanabuddhivedyātvam prasiddhātvam. sahārayaḥraya-
mātravedyātvam aprasiddhātvam. tatra gaṅgādipadānāḥ
pravāhādau prasiddhā śaktiḥ, tīrādau cāprasiddetī
kimanupapannam. ibid, p. 51.
333. suddhasyoccarane svarthah prasiddho yasya gamyate
sa mukhya iti vijñeyo rūpamātrani bandhanah
yastvanyasya prayogena yatnādīva niyujyate
tamaprasiddham manyante gaunārthābhinivesinām.
VP 2.265-66.
334. nanu 'sarve sarvārthavāca ka' iti
ced brusektaḥ ----- sati tātparye ityuktatvattātpar-
yābhāvāditi ghrana. tātparyam cātra ----- surūḍham.
PLM, p. 51.
In the circle of Ālāmārikas, it is observed, that the phenomenon of secondary function does not come to light till Ānandavardhana's time. A fringe of speculation in this regard is, however, noticed in the Kāvyālāmākāra of Bhāmaha, the first systematic writer on the science of poetry. An observation of Abhinavagupta confirms our idea (Vide fn 335) in the matter. Daṇḍin following Bhāmāhācārya clearly recognises Guṇavṛtti as the cause of certain Ālāmākaras and recommends its acceptance for the purpose of removing Grāmyatādoṣa in poetry. Vāmana comes to use the term Lakṣaṇā in the sense of secondary significance in general, covering thereby what is called Gaṇi Vṛtti by the Mīmāṃsakas. As classified by Vāmana, Lakṣaṇā is of two varieties, one based on the relation of similarity and the other depending on the relation other than

335. Bhāmaha recommends the knowledge of Sabda and its Artha as one of the important factors in composing a poetry. cf. sābdas'chando'bhidhānārtha ---- mantavyāḥ kāvyagaihyāni (KL 1.9.). Udbhāta, the commentator maintains that the expression 'abhidhāna' of Bhāmaha means Abhidhā which includes both the Mukhyā and Gaṇi Vṛttis. If the explanation be accepted, Bhāmaha shall have to be admitted as the first Ālāmārika to have recognised the transference of epithet, i.e., Gaṇi-vṛtti.

336. bhāmahenoktam - sābdas'chando'bhidhānārthah iti abhidhāhasya sabdābhedam vyākhyātum bhattodbhato babhāse - s'abdhānamabhidhānamabhidhāvāpāro mukhyo guṇavṛttiś a iti. Locana, vide DL, p. 34.

337. niṣṭhyutodgirnavantādi guṇavṛttivāśrayayam atisundaramanyatra grāmyakāśāṃ vigāhate. KD, 1.95.
similarity. Notwithstanding his great anxiety to establish Vyañjanā as an independent function, Ānandavardhana deals with the nature and scope of the secondary signification. Ānanda uses the term Guṇavṛtti in a wider sense so as to cover all possible varieties of secondary signification. His use of the term 'amukhyavṛtti' also comes only as a description of this Guṇavṛtti. Thus Ānanda's Guṇavṛtti is not identical with the Gauṇīvṛtti of the Mīmāṁsakas or with the Gauṇī variety of Laksanā of the later Ālaṁkārikas. It appears to us that he uses the word 'guṇa' in the sense of a subordinate element and not in the sense of qualities. To the contrary, Abhinavagupta understands this word 'guṇa' in the sense of 'dharma' and still covers both the Gauṇī and Śuḍḍhā varieties of Laksanā by the term Guṇavṛtti. Bhojarāja also in his Śṛṅgārapraśāsa still seeks to maintain a line of demarcation.

338. Gahūni hi nivandhāni laksanāyām. sādṛśyaślaksanā vakroktirasāviti. yathā - unmimīla kamalam sarasinaṁ kairavaṁ ca nimimīla mūhūrtat ----- laksanāyām ca jhatityarthapratipattikṣamāttvām rahasyamācakṣata iti, asādṛśyanivandhanaṁ tu laksanā na vakroktiḥ. yathā - 'jarathakamalakandacchedagaurairmayukhaiḥ' KLSV, under KLS 3.

ation between Guṇavṛtti and Laksana. Laksana, however, comes to receive very elaborate treatment with the later Ālaṃkārikas like Mammaṭa, Hemacandra and Viśvanātha. The definition of Laksana as given by Mammaṭa set the standard for all the later Ālaṃkārikas. From Mammaṭa onward Laksana came to be a generic name for all the later varieties of secondary signification including the Guṇavṛtti. Later Ālaṃkārikas insist on the fulfilment of three conditions, (1) Mukhyārthabādha or the failure of the primary meaning, (2) Tadyoga or the relation of the primary sense with the secondary one and (3) Rūḍhi or Prayojana, the usage or motive. In the works of the later Ālaṃkārikas Laksana received such an elaborate treatment that it has been shown to have as many as eighty sub-varieties.

Now we proceed to examine the history of the concept of Laksana in the school of Naiyāyikas. As we are primarily


341. mukhyārthabādhe tadyoge rūḍhitō'ṭha prayojanāt anyo'ṛtho laksyate yatsā laksanā ropitā kriyā. 12 KP, p. 40

342. Loc. cit.; mukhyārthabādhe tadyokto yayā'nyorthāḥ pratiyate rūḍheḥ prayojanādvāsau laksanā śaktirarpita. SD II.5.

343. evamaśītiprakārā Laksana. Vṛtti, vide SD II, p. 53.
concerned with the treatment of Lakṣaṇā by the Naiyāyika Viśvanātha, the history of the origin and development of the concept of Lakṣaṇā in the Nyāya school of thought is naturally of special interest to us.

We meet with the terms Bhākta and Upacāra in Gautama's Nyāyasūtra itself. These very terms have come to be popularly used in the later times for identifying the phenomenon of secondary signification. Gautama uses the term Bhākta only once in the sūtra 2.2.15, but there is very little in the sutra itself to make us understand as to what is technically implied by this term. The sūtra in question is concerned with the probable meanings of the term 'nitya' (tattva) or 'a so-called state of nitya' (i.e., Bhākta). That such a line of demarcation is intended to be drawn by the sutra may be gathered with the help of the Bhāṣya. But the Bhāṣya also does not explain the term Bhākta immediately under the sūtra very elaborately. The question in the context is whether 'ghaṭābhāva' can be called 'nitya' or not. The Bhāṣyakara first explains the 'tattva' (the genuine state of nitya) and then concludes that the word 'nitya' in respect of the 'ghaṭābhāva' is 'Bhākta and as such 'similar to 'nitya' and not 'nitya as it is';

344. tattvabhāktayornānātvāvibhāgadavyabhicārah.
   NS, 2.2.15.

345. nityamityatra kim tāvattattvaṁ?  --------------
   bhāktām tu bhavati yattatāṁmānamābhāsīdyad bhutvā na
   bhavati, na jātu tatpunarbhavati; tatra nitya iva
   nityo ghaṭābhāva ityayaṁ padārtha iti.
   VB, under ibid.
The Bhāṣyakāra, however, gets an opportunity to speak a little more about the 'Bhākta Prayogas' under the sūtra 4.1.16. The question as posed by Gautama in NS 4.1.14 is whether a 'Sat' may arise from 'asat' or not. In support of the earlier alternative, the Bhāṣyakāra supplies the illustration that the 'āṅkura' (the sprouting) rises after demolishing the 'bīja' (seed) implying thereby that the non-existence of the seed caused by the demolishing is the pre-condition for the origin of the 'āṅkura'. At this stage, an objection is raised by the sūtrakāra (in Sūtra 4.1.1-3) saying that the 'āṅkura' must be already there before the demolishing of the 'bīja' as the very agent of the act of demolishing. If the 'āṅkura' would not have been already present it would not have been described as the agent for the said action as in the expression 'bījamupamāpya āṅkurah prādurbhavati.' In reply to the objection it is pointed out in the Sūtra 4.1.16 that even what has already ceased to be or what is yet to come into existence may be described as agent. Explaining this position the Bhāṣyakāra gives a number of illustrations like 'ajātāḥ putrāḥ pitaram tāpayanti' and concludes that such 'bhākta prayogas' are

346. vyāghātādprayogah. NS 4.1.15.

347. nātītāṅgatoyoḥ kārakāsabdaprayogat ? ibid, 4.1.16.
numerous. The he questions himself as to what is the guiding factor for such a Bhakti (i.e., a 'bhāktaprayoga') and replies that an immediacy is the guiding factor for Bhakti in respect of the example of 'bīja' and 'aṅkura'. Because of an immediacy of the origin of the 'aṅkura', it is justified to call the agent of the act of demolishing an instance of 'bhākta prayoga' and though admittedly the 'aṅkura' is not the real agent. It may be noticed that the Bhāsyakāra uses both the terms Bhākta and Bhakti. But even after all the illustrations, a clear picture of Bhakti does not emerge out from his elucidations. The Sūtrakāra himself mentions certain factors or relations which guide the use of words with secondary signification in the Sūtra 2.2.64. But the factor of immediacy (ānantaryā) does not

348. atīte cānāgates cāvidyamāne kārakaśabdāḥ prayujyante. Putro janisyate, janisyamāṇaṁ putramabhinandati, putrasya janisyamāṇasya nāma karoti; abhūtkumbhaḥ, bhinnam kumbhamanusocati, bhinnasya kumbhasya kapalāni, ajātāḥ putrāḥ pitaram tāpayanti - iti bahulam bhāktāḥ prayogyā dṛṣyante. VB, under ibid.

349. kā punariyaṁ bhaktiṁ ? ānantaryāṁ bhaktiṁ, ānantaryāṁ asāmarthyaśupāmpṛṣya prādurbhāvārthaḥ-prādurbhāviṣyaśaṁkura upamṛṇāti bhāktāṁ kartṛptvamiti. ibid.

350. sahaçaranaçasthānātādārthyaavṛttamānañadharaṇasaṁśāmyayo saḥdhanādhipatyebhyo brāhmaṇaśāmyacaktaśaṁkaraśaktucandana-gangāsātakānnapuruṣeśvadbhāve'pi tadupacāraḥ. NS, 2.2.64.
occur in the list given by the Sutrakāra. The Bhāṣyaṅkāra again uses the expressions under Sūtra 1.2.14. Where it seems to stand for all sorts of secondary significations in general. We find Gautama using the term 'Upanāra' in as many as seven sūtras. The first use of the word is made for naming the third variety of 'chala' as 'upacārachala' in sūtra 1.2.14. He repeats it again in the following sūtra. The meaning of the sūtra defining 'upacārachala' is not so much clear. As explained by the Bhāṣyaṅkāra, Upacārachala is the conceit involved in a listener's pretention to have understood the statement in its literal sense, while it is intended by the speaker to convey the idea of a 'dharmavikalpa', i.e., a transference of epithet. The example given here by the Bhāṣyaṅkāra is 'mañcāḥ krośānti'. Where the listeners take the literal sense and raise the objection that it is the people belonging to the

351. bhaktyā prayoge prādhānyena kalpanamupacāraviṣayam chalamupacārachalam. upacāro niśrathah sahacaraṇā- dinimittena atadbhāve tadvadabhidhānam = upacāra iti. VB under NS 1.2.14.

352. dharmavikalpanirdeśe'rthasadbhāvapraṭiṣedha upacārachalam. NS, 1.2.14.
platform are crying and not the platforms themselves. Here the Bhāṣyakāra explains the phenomenon of Upacāra as signifying something by a word, which is other than a literal meaning. He points out that the transference of epithet (Upacāra) must be guided by certain definite relations like 'sahacarana' etc. As we have already noted, the relations of 'sahacarana' etc. are given by the Śūtra-kāra himself in the Śūtra 2.2.64.

In the context of discussing Sabdasakti, Gautama at one stage maintains that a word denotes an universal (gāti). If the idea of an individual (Vyakti) is gathered from such a word it is because of a transference of epithet. This transference of epithet is, in the words of Gautama, 'atadbhave'pi tadupacāraḥ'. In the Śūtra concerned, he

353. dharmavikalpa = anyatra drṣṭasyānyatra prayogsah. tasya nirdése dharmavikalpanirdése. yathā mañcāh kroṣantiti arthaśādbhāvena pratisedhaḥ = 'mañcāsthāḥ puruṣā kroṣantī, na tu mañcāh kroṣantī.' VB, under ibid.

354. bhaktya prayoge prādhānyena kalpanamupacāraviśayaṁ chalampacārarccchalam. upacāro nītārthāḥ sahacaranaṛd-nimittena, atadbhave tadvadabhidhānam = upacāra iti. ibid.

355. yasābdasamūkṣatyāgaparigrahasyaṁkhyaṁṛddhayaṁpacayavarṇasyaṁsamāśaṁ bandhānā vyaktāvupacārād vyaktiḥ? NS. 2.2.62.

356. sahacaranasthānataḍarthya --------------------- ----- gangasātukānnapuruṣesvatadbhave'pi tadupacāraḥ. ibid 2.2.64.
says such a transference of epithet is guided by any one of the relations of 'sahacaraṇa', 'sthāna' etc. The relations and corresponding examples are as follows — Sahacaraṇam-yaśṭiṣṭkām bhojaya etc. Gautama gives only the token standing either for the secondarily signified meaning as in the case of word 'brāhmaṇa' or for the original word itself involving such a secondary signification as in the case of the word 'maṅca'. These token examples are fully elaborated by the Bhāṣyakāra along with an explanation of the term 'atadbhāve'pi tadvapacāraḥ'. The explanation enables us to understand that 'atadbhāve'pi etc. easily as the transference of epithet. 357 The Naiyāyikas of the old school have invariably accepted the position of the Sūtra-kāra and the Bhāṣyakāra. Factually the Naiyāyikas immediately following Gautama and Vātsyāyana do contribute very little towards the development of the concept of Laksāṇā. Towards the close of the line of the old Naiyāyikas, Jayantabhaṭṭa, the author of the Nyāyamaṇjarī, speaks about the

357. atadbhāve'pi tadvapacāra iti - atacchabdasya tena sabdenābhidhānamātī. sahaçaaraṇāt - 'yaśṭiṣṭkām bhojaya' iti yaśtiṣṭkasahacarīto brāhmaṇo'bhidiyata iti. sthānāt- maṅcaḥ krosāntīti maṅcaṣṭhāḥ puruṣā abhidiyante. tādardhīyat kaṭārthaśeva vīraṇeṣu vyūhyamāneṣu kaṭām karoti bhavati ---- etc.

VB, under ibid.
the distinction between the Gaunīvṛtti and the Laksāṇā.\textsuperscript{358} While explaining the 'upacārāchala' he shows that the speaker might make a statement involving either a Gaunīvṛtti or a Laksāṇā with the intention of conveying a secondary sense so as to be wrongly understood by the listener in the primary sense itself. In this context, he finds it essential to show the distinction between a 'gaunī' and a 'lākṣaṇīka prayoga'. We propose to consider this distinction maintained by Jayantabhaṭṭa in the context of our examining the examples of Laksāṇā in the Muktāvalī. 

Gaṅgeśopādhyāya has discussed the operation of Laksāṇā Vṛtti in the Sāktivāda section of the Sābda Khanda, the fourth part of his work, Tattvacintāmāṇi. He defines Laksāṇa as a separate Vṛtti of words to bring forth a secondary meaning for getting involved in a syntactical relation with a primary meaning of other words where the primary meaning of a word fails to do so.\textsuperscript{359} Gaṅgeśā seems

\textsuperscript{358} satyam gosabdah svarthamabhidhaya sasnādimantaṁ
tadīyān guṇāneva jādyamāṇyādīn na mūtraṇām laksayati
na tāvatyeva viramati sa tu sāmānādhikaranyena vāhike'pi
pravartate, gaurvāhika ityevam prayujyamānāṁ sa gaṇo
bhavati, yasti svārthābhidhānānantaraṁ taditaramartham
gunamagunāṁ vā laksayatyeva na sāmānādhikaranyena paratra
prayujyate sābdhaṁ sa lākṣaṇiko bhavati gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ
prativasatīti. NM, Part II, p. 171.

\textsuperscript{359} laksāṇā ca vṛtyantaraṁ yatra vācyārthāṅvavānupapattyā
vācyasambandhopasthapāpite vākyārthāṅvavāḥ. TC, p. 660.
to follow the view of the Prabhakaras so far as the conception of Lakṣaṇa is concerned. This idea can be gathered from his agreeably quoting a verse\textsuperscript{360} which means: When the primary meaning of an individual word fails to get involved in a syntactical relation of the sentence meaning, it brings another meaning having a relation with itself so as to have syntactical relation. This very process is called Lakṣaṇa. This verse can be traced to Śālikanātha who cites it as a definition of Lakṣaṇa.\textsuperscript{361}

From the definition of Lakṣaṇa given by Gaṅgesā, we observe that the operation of Lakṣaṇa is based on two factors. They are (i) Sākyārtha-sambandha and (ii) Anvayānupapatti. Regarding the first factor, we may bear in mind that the Sambandha, i.e., Sākyārtha-sambandha for Viśvanātha, is not merely a factor for the operation of Lakṣaṇa, but is the Lakṣaṇa itself. With regard to the second factor maintained by Gaṅgesā for the operation of Lakṣaṇa, i.e., Anvayānupapatti, there is a series of counter arguments of the opponents which have been discussed at length by the author.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{360} tadacyate, \hfill \textsuperscript{361} cf. VM, p. 13, Vide PP.

\textbf{360.} tadacyate, \\
\textit{vācyasyārthasya vākyārthe sambandhanupapattitah} \\
tatsambandhavasāprāptasyānvayāt Lakṣaṇocyate.

\textit{TC, p. 660}
\end{flushright}
of the Tattvacintamani. He finally establishes that the Anvayānupapatti and not the Tatparyānupapatti is the Lakṣaṇābīja (the ground for the operation of Lakṣaṇā). Visvanātha Nyāyapañcānana believes in the Tatparyānupapatti as the Lakṣaṇābīja. Hence we shall get an opportunity again for discussing the position of Gaṅgeśa in this context. We may simply comment here that from the Nyāya point of view, Gaṅgeśa's assertion is a queer one and that his notion of Lakṣaṇābīja comes to be rejected by his successors like Visvanātha and Jagadīśa.

We shall have to admit however, that it is Gaṅgeśopādhyāya who comes first to detail the process of Lakṣaṇā at length. He covers new issues in his wider and peculiar plan of discussion of the problem. His mode and range of observations have very largely influenced the author of the Bhāsāpariccheda.

ŚAKYASAMBANDHAH : As we have observed earlier, with the earlier Naiyāyikas, the concept of Lakṣaṇā was yet to take a full shape. In the circle of the later Naiyāyikas including Visvanātha, Lakṣaṇā comes to be described as a Śakyasambandha or Svaśakyasambandha.362 The term Śakya stands for

362. svārthasambandha eva ca lakṣaṇā ------- saktismāri-

365-66.

sakyasambandho lakṣaṇā. TD, Vide TS, p. 323.

svaśakyasambandho lakṣaṇā. NSMR, p. 173.
the Šākyārtha. Hence the expression, 'śakyasambandhah' may be expounded as 'śakyasya śakyārthasya sambandhah'. By virtue of this assertion, the Naiyāyikas have maintained a difference with the Mīmāṁsakas and the Ālaṃkārikas in the context of the concept of Lakṣaṇā. The Lakṣyārtha is universally understood as the secondary meaning or the meaning next only to the primary meaning. All have accepted that the Lakṣyārtha stands in a specific relation with the primary meaning. But the Naiyāyikas have gone to the extreme in this direction in so far as they maintain that the very relation of the primary meaning with a newer meaning, i.e. a secondary meaning is the Lakṣaṇā Vṛtti.

The Prabhākara Mīmāṁsakas were quite categorical in maintaining that Lakṣaṇā is brought into operation by a relation of the primary meaning (the relation being with regard to another meaning which comes to be designated as the Lakṣyārtha). The Bhāṭṭas also admitted Lakṣaṇā as being based on a relation of the denoted sense of the word that signifies a secondary sense. The Ālaṃkārikas except

363. vācyasyārthasya vākyārthe sambandhānupapattitah
tatsambandhavaśāprāptasyānvyāllakṣaṇoṣucye.
VM, p. 13, Vide PP.

364. svaśākyasambandhavattvāṃ lakṣaṇā.
TP, Vide BHC, p. 57.
Panditarājā Jagannātha have conceived the relation between the primary and the secondary meanings occurring in a case of Lakṣaṇā as one of the pre-requisites for the operation of the Lakṣaṇā concerned. 365 Jagannātha, however, fully corroborates the view of the Naiyāyikas that the very relation of the denoted sense with a secondary one is Lakṣaṇā. 366 In the circle of the Vedāntins also, Lakṣaṇā is described as a Śākyasambandha. 367 But here we must be cautious to avoid a confusion. For the Naiyāyikas, a Śākya (artha) i.e., a meaning conveyed by Śakti is invariably a Padārtha (i.e., the meaning of an individual word). But for the Vedāntins, a Śākya (artha) may be both a Padārtha and a Vākyārtha (i.e., the total meaning of a sentence). Though the Vedāntins do not conceive Śakti as pertaining to a Vākyā, they cherish the notion that Śakti brings

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365. mukhyārthabādhe tadyoge ------- lakṣaṇāropitā kriyā. 9, KP, p. 40. cf. nātra - 'lakṣaṇāsākyasambandhā' iti mammaṭasyānumataḥ pakṣah. śākyasambandhām dvārikṛtya tatsuṃbhhrthapratipattyamukūlo vyāpāra eva lakṣaṇā iti tasyāḥ vivākṣito'rthah. aṭeva tārktika-pakṣāḥ asya alamkārikapakṣasya bhedāḥ. KTS, under KP above, p. 72; SD. II, 5, p. 35.

366. śākyasambandho lakṣaṇā. RG. 2.

 cf. tārktikamatamevāṅgikṛtya panditarājena ------- iti rasagaṅgādhare lakṣaṇāyāḥ svarūpam niraṇāyī. KTS, p. 72.

367. tatra śākyasāksātsambandhāḥ kevalalakṣaṇā etc. VPB, p. 90.
about the relational thought (in the form of the syntactical connection of the word-meanings) which constitutes a Vākyārtha. So, in the view of the Vedāntins, Laksanā in the form of a 'sākyasambandha' is possible not only in a Pada but also in a Vākya. As against this, the Naiyāyikas conceive only a Padalaksanā. It is because, as viewed by the Naiyāyikas, only a Pada is denotative or what is possessed of a Śakti. As the Vākyārtha is in no way a Sākyārtha in the sense of being conveyed by a Śakti, Laksanā as a Sākyārthasambandha is never possible with regard to a Vākya.

In the circle of the Mīmāṃsakas, the primary meaning (the relation of which with a newer meaning, i.e., Lakṣa-
yārtha, is stated to be the basis for a Lakṣaṇā) is described as 'svabodhya', 'svajñāpya' and sometimes 'svasākya' also. These terms, in the sense of the primary

368. nanu vākyasāktataya kathām sākyasambandharūpā lakṣaṇā? ucyate sāktyā yat padasambandhena jñāpyate tāmsambandho lakṣaṇā. sāktijñāpyaśca yathā paḍārtha-
sthā vākyārtho'pāta na kācidanupapattih. VPB, p. 95; tathā na sākyasambandha ityatra sākyapadaṁ sāktijñā-
pyaparam, sāktijñāpyo yah padasambandhi arthah tato-
sambandho lakṣaṇā. the commentary Arthabodhinī, under above, Vide VPB, p. 95.
meaning, are applicable not only to a Padārtha but also to a Vākyārtha. While in the Bhāṭṭa school the primary meaning is the meaning of an individual word, in the school of Prābhākaras, it may be the total meaning of a sentence. As we know, the Prābhākaras maintain that Abhidhā does not rest with the conveying of the meanings of the individual words. Abhidhā, in their view, extends itself to bring out the total meaning in a sentence, i.e., a Vākyārtha.

TATPARYĀNUPAPATTITĀH: Visvanātha defines Tatparya in the succeeding Kārikā as 'Vakturicchā' (the intention of the speaker). Here in the foregoing Kārikā, he wants to maintain that the Tatparyānupapatti (the failure of the speaker's intention) is the Laksanābīja (the ground for the operation of a Laksana).

It is universally accepted that the operation of Laksana is possible where there is some incompatibility of the primary meaning (mukhyārthabādha); but a very strong controversy exists as to whether this incompatibility is due to the failure of a syntactical relation among the words in a sentence (Anvayānupapatti) or the failure of the intention of the speaker, i.e., the failure of the denoting word or words to convey the intended sense or senses.

369. vaṭārthānupapattyā hi laksanā bhavati. MM, p. 94.
(Tātparyānupapatti). Mīmāṁsakas, some Naiyāyikas like Gaṅgēsopādhya and the Ālaṁkārikas hold that the operation of Lakṣāṇā is caused by the Anvayānupapatti. The Vedāntins, Grammarians and some of the later Naiyāyikas hold an opposite view as they consider Tātparyānupapatti as the Lakṣāṇā-ibija. It is to be noted that the earlier Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas who admit Lakṣāṇā for understanding every sentence-meaning do not subscribe to either of the aforesaid views. But some later Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas have come to accept the necessity of a Lakṣāṇā-ibija. Gaṅgābhaṭṭa, as for illustration, admits Sākyarthānvayānupapatti (the failure of the denoted sense to stand the required syntactical connection) as the determining factor for the operation of a Lakṣāṇā.

Tātparyānupapatti is not obviously accepted by the Bhāṭṭas as it is not possible for them to encourage any free play in the intention of a Speaker in the context of Vedic statements. Even in case of popular statements, it is not possible to accept Tātparyānupapatti as the Lakṣāṇā-ibija. As for instance, in 'yaśtih pravesay', the primary meaning of the word 'pravesāya' in the sense of fetching for the purpose of feeding (bhojanaprayaṇaṇaka-pravesānaparātva) cannot be logically connected with the primary meaning of the word Yaśti in so far as the sticks are not competent

370. vāyam tu padārthā laksanāyaivavākyārthām bodhayantīti brūmḥ. MM, p. 94.

371. lakṣāṇābijaṁ sākyarthānvayānupapattīḥ. TP, Vide BHC, p. 58.
to take food. Hence in order to remove the incompatibility, Laksanā is resorted to for conveying a relevant secondary sense of the term 'yastīḥ', i.e., the persons holding the sticks (Yastīdhara). Thus Laksanā arises out of an Anvayānupapatti. 372

Prabhākara and his followers substantiate that the 'Anvayānupapatti' of the primary meanings leads to the operation of Laksanā. 373 They hold that it is Abhidha that conveys the syntactically related meanings (anvitartha) of the words in a sentence. But if there arises any inconsistency in the syntactical connection of the senses, then Laksanā comes to operate to remove the inconsistency involved. In doing so Laksanā conveys a different meanings of a word the primary meaning of which fails to secure the desirable syntactical connection. The meaning conveyed by Laksanā comes to be consistently connected with the primary meaning of the other words which stand already mutually related. Regarding this problem of

372. laksanābījāṃ sākyarthānvyānupapattiḥ na tu tatpar-yānupapattiḥ. vede tadasambahāvat. yastīḥ pravesāyetyadau tu pravesānupadasya bhojanaprayojanakapravesanaparat-vagrahādvanvyānupapattireva. ibid.

373. vācyasyārthasya vākyārthe sambandhānupapattīḥ tatsambandhavasāprāptasyānvyāllaksanocyate. VM, p. 13;

vācyasya gaṅgāsābdārthasya vākyārthe 'nanvavātkhalu lakṣāṇā gāmānayetyādau tu go-padārthasyānvaya-dayuk-tāiva sā. kiś ca vākyārthamātrasya laksayatvamam-papannā sambandhānupapattiparāmārasmāntareṇa padārthavadeva jhatīti pratiteh. TR, p. 28.
the basic condition for the operation of Laksana, the Alamkarikas appear to have followed the footsteps of the Prabhakaras. In their view also, when the primary meaning of a word is logically incompatible with rest of the sentence, Laksana function is resorted to for bringing into comprehension a new meaning connected with the failing primary meaning of the word. As we have already noticed, Gaṅgeśa makes an unusual departure from the trend of thought prevailing in his own circle. Of the Naiyāyikas, he comes forward to rally behind the Prabhakaras in the context of the problem of Laksanābīja.

We find Gaṅgeśa presenting vast material in the Saktivāda section of the Sabdakhaṇḍa of his work. We meet therein with series of arguments and counter-arguments presented by this erudite Navya Nyāya scholar in search of an answer to the problem of Laksanābīja. His treatment of the subject is undoubtedly confusing. We present below our impression of Gaṅgeśa only as far as we can understand him.

Laksana in the Tattvācintāmaṇi is a separate verbal function that comes to operate when the primary meaning of a particular word fails to get duly involved in a syntactical connection with the primary meanings of the other

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374. miśḥyārthabāde tadyukto yayānyo'rthah pratīyate
rūdhēh prayojanādvā' sau laksana śaktirarpitā.

SD, II-5, p. 35.
words in the same sentence. Now this relation of that particular incompatible primary meaning (Sākyasambandha) with the relevant secondary meaning, is identified as the Laksanāvṛtti. The Laksanāvṛtti which is nothing but the aforesaid Sākyasambandha comes to convey the idea of the relevant secondary sense which as a substitute for the abandoned primary meaning duly gets involved in the syntactical relation of the entire sentence. Thus we find that with Gaṅgeśa, the Anvayānupapatti is the Laksanābija. After having refuted the arguments of opponents, he finally decides that the incompatibility of a primary meaning of a valid word to get involved in a syntactical relation of meanings of words in a sentence is the fundamental factor for the operation of a Laksanā. This Anvayānupapatti is what immediately strikes the mind of a listener. Tātparya or the intention of a speaker is obviously a remote factor. If we accept Tātparyānupapatti as the Laksanābija, then in a valid case of Laksanā, the relevant Tātparya will be the intention of the speaker in respect of conveying a particular secondary sense. Under this

375. laksanā ca vṛtyantaram yatra vācyārthānvyānu-
papattyā vācyasambandho pasthāpite vākyārthānvyayāh. TC, p. 660.
circumstance, a case of Lakṣanā would surely involve the fallacy of a logical gig — saw. It is because for arriving at the idea of the secondary meaning one must already have the idea of the intention of the speaker in respect of the same secondary sense. That is how it 'begs the question' or involves the fallacy of Anyonyāśraya. Gaṅgēśa shows by way of illustrating 'gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ' that the knowledge of an Anvayānupapatti comes necessarily before that of Tātparya with regard to what is sought to be conveyed as Lakṣyārtha. Gaṅgēśa does not seem to intend the total

376. cf. sambandhadhiḥ smṛtihetuḥ kṛptā na tu tātparyadhī- riti api tasyā laksyasmṛtijanyatvenānyonāśrayaprasaṅgāt. TC, p. 687.

vastuto'nvayaparapramāṇaśabdasya mukhyena'nvayāyogvat- vameva lakṣānābāljam, gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣa ityādau pūrvokta- nyāyena lakṣye tātparyagrāhāḥ pūrvvameva mukhyasyānvaya- yogyotvajñānena lakṣānopapādānāt. astu vā tatrāpi lakṣye tātparyagrāhāḥ, tathāpi mukhyo'nvayānupapatti- reva lakṣānābāljam prathamapasthitatvāt, tātparyānupapattiṁ vinaśeva lakṣānābālijatvasambhavāccha. yaśtiḥ pravesayet tāḥ jahataḥvārthāyāṅca mukhyasyānvayānupapattireva tathāḥ prakaraṇādīna pravesayetvāya bhoktrpravesāna- paratvam yāntityasya chatri - taditaraghaṭitasaṃhāma- nakarttraparcodevāca jñātam. tādṛśapravesānanayorvanyā- yāyīveva yaśṭichatriνā atha prakaraṇādinaivetara- padavat yaśti-lenakṣipadayaṁ laṁ kṣye tātparyamavagata- māstadamupapattireva iti cet, na, lakṣānātaḥ pūrvvama- vašyam lakṣopasthitau tatra tātparyagrahe mānābhāvāt. Lakṣaṇaṁyathāpi sambhavāt. bhāve vāstu tatrobhavānupapattistathāpyanvayānupapattireva lakṣānābāljam, gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣa ityādau pūrvoktanyāyena lakṣye tātparyagrāhāḥ pūrvvameva mukhyārthānupapatteḥ kṛptavat.

ibid, pp. 691-93.
rejection of Tātparya. But he seriously contends that only Anvayānupapatti can genuinely prepare the ground for the operation of Laksanā. It is because of the immediacy of its occurrence to the mind of the listener. Gaṅgėśa asserts the status of Anvayānupapatti as the Laksanābīja, fully independent of Tātparya. Even in the examples like 'yaśṭiḥ pravesāya' and 'chatrīṇo yānti' we may accept 'Anvayānupapatti' as the 'Laksanābīja'. In 'yaśṭiḥ pravesāya' for instance, the word 'yaśṭiḥ' is incompatible to get related with the primary meaning of the word 'pravesāya' at least in the context of a feast. Again in the example, 'chatrīṇo yānti' the primary meaning of the word 'chatrīṇah' is incompatible with the primary meaning of the word 'yānti' in the context of movement of a group comprising of carriers and non-carriers of umbrellas.

One may argue that the context determining the Anvayānupapatti also, simultaneously leads to the knowledge of Tātparya with regard to the relevant Laksāyārtha. It may be argued further that the Tātparyānupapatti in the sense of incompatibility of the primary meaning of the particular word with regard to that very Tātparya should be regarded as Laksanābīja. Gaṅgėśa forcefully rejects such a logic. In the event of admitting Tātparyānupapatti as the Laksanābīja, Gaṅgėśa argues, even in the light of above arguments, one shall have to admit the presence of
that particular Laksyārtha prior to the operation of Laksanāvṛtti. In case the scope for both Tātparyānupapatti and Anvayānupapatti is to be admitted, Gaṅgeśa maintains, the knowledge of an Anvayānupapatti would necessarily precede that of a Tātparyānupapatti. Gaṅgeśa in this respect is supported by Jānakīnātha Bhāṭṭācāryya also. 377 Now in the Nyāya school of thought, we come across the other opposite view with regard to the fundamental condition for the operation of a Laksanā. In the older school of Nyāya, of course, we find no concrete proof to the recognition of Tātparyānupapatti as the Laksanābīja. Jayantabhaṭṭa, a Prācīna Naiyāyika accepts Tātparya as a function for conveying a relational thought. 378 According to him, Abhidhā conveys the individual word-meanings which constitute the sentence-meaning is further conveyed by the Tātparayavṛtti. Already we have referred to the Navya Naiyāyikas, generally accepting only the Tātparyānupapatti as the Laksanābīja. (Of the Navya Naiyāyikas, as we have already mentioned, Gangesōpādhyāya is an extraordinary exception). The Navya Naiyāyikas accepting Tātparyānupapatti as the Laksanābīja

377. lakṣāṇāyām mukhyārthe itarānvayānupapattibījām.
NSMR, p. 242.

378. abhidhāṭrī mataśaktiḥ padanāṁ svārthaniśṭhatā
tesām tātparyaśaktistu sāmsārgavagamāvadhīḥ.
NM, p. 372.
have actually taken the clue from Jayantabhatta to prepare the ground for formulating their theory in the context. But they maintain their difference from Jayantabhatta in the sense that they do not admit Tātparya as a Verbal function but as one of the four factors for a Śabdabodha. They advocate that whenever there is the incompatibility of the primary meaning of a word with reference to Tātparya (Speaker's intention), Laksāna comes in to remove the incompatibility by way of conveying a secondary but intended meaning. We gather this impression of the Navya Naiyāyikas from later writers like Jagadīśa and Visvānātha. These scholars have come to discard unhesitatingly the views of their respectable pioneer Gaṅgesopādhyāya. Jagadīśa in his Sabdaśaktiprakāśikā opposes the Ālāmkārikas in their bid to make Anvayānupapatti the fundamental condition for the operation of Lakṣaṇā. He observes that the knowledge of Anvayānupapatti cannot lead to the idea of a Lakṣaṇā as the rule is vitiated in cases like 'yaśṭiḥ pravesāyā'.

379. upasthitārthānvaṭyānuṇupapattidhīrūpasya lakṣaṇābījasya tatrasatvāditi ālāmākārikā vadanti. Tatra anvayānupapattiṇānasasya lakṣaṇābījatvam hi na tajjanakatvam sākṣaṃbandhātmakāṣya lakṣaṇāyaṣtadjanayatvat, nāpi tajjñāpakatvam muhyārthānvaṭyānuṇupapattiṇānamantarenāpi pramanāntarena tadgrahasambhāvat, ata eva na lakṣaṇāyārthātparityātraṇakatvam api prakaranādīto'pi lakṣaṇārthanāravagrahāt na ca lakṣaṇājanyānvaṭyānuṇayodham prati tasyāḥ kāraṇatvameva lakṣaṇābījatvam api sāmpratam 'yaśṭiḥ pravesāyādau vyabhicārat, tādṛṣṭāhetutāyām pramanābha-vācca. SSP, p. 146-47
Visvanātha's views in this regard will be discussed more elaborately later on. Annambhāṭṭa who succeeded Visvanātha maintains that the cause of Laksāna is the non-intelligibility of the intention.

With regard to the Laksānābīja, the Vedāntins are found holding the same view with the Naiyāyikas. According to them Laksāna operates only when there arises the inconsistency of primary meanings in respect of the intention of the speaker. Dharmarājādhwairīndra, in his Vedānta Paribhāṣā, refutes the views of Prabhākara, and Ālaṅkārīkas and asserts that Laksāna is caused by the non-intelligibility of the 'purport' and not that of any 'syntactical relation'. For instance, in 'kākebhyo dadhi rāksyatām', there is no inconsistency with regard to the syntactical relation in the sentence. Yet there is Laksāna because of a Tatparyānupapatti. Here, by resorting to Laksāna the consistent intended meaning of the word 'kākebhyah' has been restored. The intention of the speaker here is to mean

380. tātparyānupapattītākṣaṇābījam. TD, Vide TS, p. 330
381. lakṣaṇābījantā tātparyānupapattireva, na tvaṃvāyānupapattīḥ. kākebhyo dadhi rāksyatāmityatra anvāyānupapatyabhāvāt. Gāṅgāyām ghosa ityādau tātparyānupapatte-rapi sambhavāt.

VPB, p. 95.
all the creatures that spoil the curd.

Likewise, the Grammarians also hold the same view with the Navya Naiyāyikas. According to them Laksanā comes for operation because of a Tātparyānupapatti. As for instance, Nāgese holds that if Tātparyānupapatti be not accepted as the determining factor for the operation of a Laksanā, in the expression 'gaṅgāyām ghosa' the word 'ghosa' may mean an aquatic creature by Laksanā. Again in the expression, 'naksatram dṛṣṭvā vācām visṛjet', Laksanā comes to be admitted because of a Tātparyānupapatti and not due to any sort of Anvayānupapatti. But here we must be cautious to note that Nāgese's very recognition of Laksanā is provisional. He adds subsequently that Laksanā is only the 'aprasiddha' (uncelebrated) type of Sakti. Now to examine


383. tanna. sati tātparye 'sarve sarvārthaवाचकाः iti bhāṣyāllakṣaṇāyā abhāvāt. vṛttidvāyāvacchedakadvavak- alpane gauravāt. Jagnayavṛttikalpanāyā anyāyvatvācā. kathamārhi gaṅgādipādāttīra paryayaḥ bhūṣanō'si, sati tātparye 'sarve sarvārthaवāचकाः iti bhāṣyameva grāhā, tathāhī-śaktirdvividhāprasiddhā prasiddhā ca ...... tatra gaṅgādipādānāṃ pravāhādau prasiddhā saktīḥ, tīrādau cāprasiddhītī kimanupapannam. ibid. p. 51
Visvănātha Nyāya-Pañcâhana in particular in the context of the fundamental condition for the operation of Lakṣaṇa, we skip over to certain portions of the text of his Muktāvalī only for the sake of systematic pursuit of the issue:

'Gaṅgāyām ghoṣa ------ anvayanupattīstātparyānu-

pattirvā yatra pratisandhiyate ----- parantu yadvaṅvā-
nupattirlakṣaṇābijaṁ syāt, tada yaṣṭīṁ pravesāyetādau
lakṣaṇā na syāt, yaṣṭisu pravesāṅvayasyā'ṅupatterabhāvāt
------ evam kākebhyo dadhi raksatāmyēdau ----- tātpar-
yaviśayatvāt. ------ yadi cāṅvayanupappillakṣaṇābijaṁ
syāt, tada kvacīt gaṅgāpadasaya īre kvacid ghoṣapadasya
matsyādau lakṣaṇaṁ tīyam na syāt' (Vide BP3 442-43)

From the Muktāvalī above, it is clear that Visvănātha

fully shares the opinion of his predecessor Jagadīśa in

the matter of Lakṣaṇābija. In the foregoing Kārikā (K 32a)

he precisely defines Lakṣaṇā in the form of a specific

relation of the Śakyārtha (with regard to a relevant

secondary sense), that comes to operate due to the incomp-
atibility of the primary meaning in respect of the inten-
tion of the speaker. (Tātparyānuṇapattī). Notwithstanding

Visvănātha's reference to both Anvayanupattī and Tātpar-

yānuṇapattī as Lakṣaṇaṁbija in the context of explaining

the ground of his first example of Lakṣaṇa, 'gaṅgāyāṁ'

ghoṣaḥ', his belief in the Anvayanupattī seems to be

only initial and not final. Only to arrest an impression
that he finally believes in the Anvayānupapatti as the Lakṣaṇābīja, he hastens to add the anomalies that may crop up if the Tātparyānupapatti be not accepted as the Lakṣaṇābīja. Even in case of the example 'gangayāṁ ghoṣa', where he initially refers to Anvayānupapatti as the Lakṣaṇābīja alternatively with Tātparyānupapatti, he explains in the subsequent text the difficulties involved in the event of recognising Anvayānupapatti as the fundamental condition for the operation of Lakṣaṇā. As we understand him, he wants to cover even this example under Tātparyānupapatti. His decision in respect of Tātparyānupapatti is confirmed not only by his clear assertion in the relevant Kārikā, but also by his examples, the explanatory notes thereon as well as his handling of Lakṣaṇa of words in compounds by his peculiar device of referring to 'Tātparyagrāhakas' in the Muktāvalī which we shall have the scope to examine in the succeeding pages.

M(30). lakṣaṇā śakyasambandha iti. gangayāṁ ghoṣa ityādau gaṅgāpadasya śakyārthe pravāharūpe ghoṣasyā'nvayānup-apattistātparyānupapattirvā yatra pratisandhīyate, tatra lakṣaṇayā tīrasya bodhaḥ. sā ca śakyasambandha-rūpā. tathāhi-pravāharūpasākyārthasambandhasya tīre grhītatvāt tīrasya smaranam. tataḥ śābdabodhaḥ.
Laksanā is the relation with a Śākyārtha etc. In sentences like, "There is a cowherd colony in the Gangesā", where there is the knowledge of the incompatibility as regards either syntactical connection or speaker’s intention in respect of the word 'ghoṣa' with reference to the Śākyārtha of the word 'gaṅgā', i.e., a stream, the bank is understood (from the word Gangesā) by Laksanā; that (Laksanā) is a kind of relation with the Śākyārtha (of a Pada). As for illustration, the relation of the Śākyārtha (of the word Gangesā) viz, a stream being understood with reference to the bank, there is the recollection of the latter. This leads to (contextual) śādbabdabha.

Visvanātha now proceeds to amplify his concept of Laksanā briefly hinted in the Vyāti, 'laksanā śākyasam-bandhaḥ'.

To illustrate Laksanā from the latest standpoint of the Naiyāyikas, Visvanātha brings in the example 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ'. 'Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ' is the foremost of the stock examples of Laksanā, that catch our notice in different works on Grammar, Philosophy and Rehtorics. We meet with this example even in the Bhāsyas of Śabara and Patañjali at a stage when the concept of Laksanā was yet to emerge out. We have already shown that the use of the example by

Sābara and Patañjali was undoubtedly in the context of a secondary sense which finally got recognised as the Laksyārtha. All the later works in different schools illustrate 'gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ' whenever the occasion of Laksana demands.

As we have already observed, Viśvanātha's admission of both Anvayānupamapatti and Tatparyānupamapatti as the possible 'laksanābija' in the case of operation of Laksana in 'gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ' is only initial and not final. As he is aware of the existing controversy in the matter, he makes a provisional admission of both of the much debated factors and proceeds to eliminate one of the two by way of forwarding arguments with illustrations. Viśvanātha first admits 'gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ' as a case of Laksana because of the knowledge of the incompatibility (anupapatti) of the word 'gaṅga' with the word 'ghosa' with reference to either the syntactical connection (Anvaya) or the intention of the speaker (Tatparya). An examination of the succeeding Muktāvalī text, 'yadi cānvayānupamapattīlaksanābijaṁ syāt tadā kvacid gaṅgāpadasya tīre kvacid ghoṣapadasya matsyādau laksanetī niyamo na syāt', will leave no doubt that Viśvanātha intends to cover the example 'gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ' also by the concept of Laksana with Tatparyānupamapatti as its 'bija'.

385. VM, p. 13; NVTT, p. 477; WB, p. 90;
PLM, p. 43; SAKV, p. 23; TC, pp. 660-78;
By Laksanā the word 'gaṅgā' conveys the meaning of 'a bank'. This Laksanā is nothing but the relation of the denoted meaning with an additional meaning. In the present example of 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ', the relation of the Sakyārtha of the word 'gaṅgā', i.e., a current is understand with regard to 'a bank'. This is the Laksanā here. The knowledge of this Laksanāvṛtti in the form of the relation between the two meanings, 'a current' and 'a bank', leads to the recollection of the bank. The recollection of the bank is the contextual 'Padarthadhi' which serves as the Vyāpāra to be immediately followed by the corresponding Sābdabodha.

Just as the Sakti as the relation between a Pada and its Sakyārtha brings about the Sakyārthasmarana which leads to the Sābdabodha, the Laksanā as the relation between a Sakyārtha and a Laksyartha brings forth the idea of the relevant Laksyartha that leads to the corresponding Sābdabodha.

M(31). parantu yadyanvayānupapattirlakṣaṇābījaḥ syāt,
tadā yaṣṭāḥ pravesāyetyādau lakṣaṇa na syāt, yaṣṭiṣu
pravesānvayasyām nupapatterabhāvāt. tena yaṣṭi-pravesā
bhojanatātparyānupapattyā yaṣṭiḍhāresu lakṣaṇa. evam
kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatāṁityādau kakapadasya dadhyupa-
ghātake lakṣaṇa, sarvato dādhirakṣaḥstātparyaviṣav-
avatāt.
'But if the incompatibility in syntactical connection be the ground for Lākṣāṇā, then there would be no Lākṣāṇā in sentences like 'yāṣṭīḥ pravesāya' (Admit the sticks) as there is the absence of incompatibility in syntactical relation of 'pravesā' (admission, the act of admitting entrance) with reference to the 'yāṣṭīḥ' (the sticks). Hence, as there is incompatibility of the intention of the speaker in the form of 'feeding' with regard to the sticks, there is Lākṣāṇā (of the word 'yāṣṭīḥ') with reference to 'yāṣṭīdhara' (the persons carrying the sticks). Similarly in sentences like 'kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām' (protect the curd from the crows), there is Lākṣāṇā of the word 'kāka' with regard to 'dadhyupaghātakas' (the creatures that spoil the curd) as by all means the protection of the curd is the (very) purpose intended by the speaker'.

Viśvanātha here initiates his discussion on possible anomalies in the event of not recognising Tatparyupapatti as the Lākṣāṇābīja. He wants to clarify his stand by illustrating certain stock examples of Lākṣāṇā, namely 'yāṣṭīḥ pravesāya', 'kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām' and 'chatriṇo yānti'. We have already referred to how Gaṅgeśa makes an effort to show in the very above quoted expressions that Lākṣāṇā...
operates owing to Anvayānupapatti and not Tātparyānupapatti.

In the text of the Muktāvalī above, Viśvanātha tries to show the necessity of admitting Tātparyānupapatti as the Laksanābija with regard to the expression 'yaṣṭīḥ praveṣāya'. In 'yaṣṭīḥ praveṣāya' (Bring in the sticks), there is no failure of the syntactical connection inasmuch as the sticks can be the object of the act of bringing in. In case Anvayānupapatti be admitted as the Laksanābija, there can be no admission of Laksana in 'yaṣṭīḥ praveṣāya'. But when one speaks thus in the context of a feast, there being no meaning in admitting the sticks to a dinning hall, 'yaṣṭīḥ' is to be taken to mean the 'yaṣṭīḷdharas' (the holiers of the stick). This is a case of Laksanā because of the incompatibility of the speaker's intention with 'yaṣṭīḥ' in the sense of sticks. This example of Laksanā may be said to have been modelled on Vātsyāyana's 'yaṣṭikān bhojaya'.

386. vastuto'nvayaparapraṇāṇaśabdasya mukhyenaṇvayāyogayata-
vameva laksanābijaṁ gaṅgāyaṁ ghoṣa ityādau pūrvoktan-
āyena tāt paryānupapattim vinalva laksanābijatva-
sambhavācca. Yaṣṭīḥ praveśāyetyatrājahatsvārthāyānca
mukhyasyānvayānupapattireva, tathāhi prakaraṇinā
praveśāyetyasya bhoktāpraveśānanapatratvaṁ yāntityasya
chatti - tāditaraghatitasamūhagamanakarttrparatvānca
jñātam. tādṛśapraveśānanagamanayorvayayogayāviva yaṣṭi-
chatriṇau tathāpyyanvayānupapattireva laksanābijam.
TC, pp. 691-33.

387. yaṣṭikān bhojaya iti yaṣṭikasahacarito brāhmaṇo 'bhi-
dhīyate. VB, under NS 2.2.64.
Viśvanātha's example 'yaśṭīḥ pravesāya' is met with in works of Kumārila, Paṭāṇjali, Gaṅgeśa, Jagadīśa, Nāgēśa and many others. Paṭāṇjali, while illustrating how a word is used for what it usually does not stand for, gives examples of 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣah' and 'yaśṭīḥ pravesāya'. In that content, the words 'gaṅgā' and 'yaśṭīḥ' are shown to give certain unusual meanings on the basis of their relation of 'tatsamīpya' and 'tatsāhacarya' respectively with the usual meanings. Nāgēśa also gives 'yaśṭīḥ pravesāya' based upon the relation of 'sahacarya' between the Sakyārtha and Laksyārtha. Here we can remember that Viśyāyana also gives the example to illustrate the relation of 'sahacarana'. The relation of 'sahacarya' or 'sahacaraṇa' (togetherness) exists between the sticks and the persons carrying them.

Viśvanātha gives another example in 'kākebhyo daḍhī rakṣyatām' to strengthen his plea for admitting Tatparyānupapatti as the Lakṣaṇabāja. The said sentence literally wants someone to guard against the spoiling of the curd or the crow. But as the intention of any milkowner would naturally be the protection of his curd from all the spoilers of curd, the person directed must not take the word 'kāka' seriously in its literal sense. Though apparently there is no inconsistency in the syntactical connection of the words involved in the sentence, the Tatparya is to be thought as

388. Vide MB, WMB, Vol. IV, p. 503; TC, p. 689; SSP, p. 147; PLM, p. 43.
incompatible with only the primary meaning of the word 'kāka'. On the strength of this Tatparyāṇupapatti, the word 'kāka' is to mean all the 'dadhyupaghātakas' as its Lakṣyārtha. This example may be said to have been modelled on Bhaṭṭarhari's 'kākebhyo rakṣyatām sarpiḥ'.\(^{389}\) The example is of course, seen in its present form also in earlier works.\(^{390}\)

M(32) evam chatriṇo yāntītyādau chatripadaśaikasārtha-vāhitve lakṣaṇā. iyamevājahatsvārthālakṣaṇeyucyate, ekāsartha-vāhitvena rūpeṇa chatri-tadanyayorbodhāt.

'Thus in sentences like 'chatriṇo yānti' (The men with umbrellas are going) there is the Lakṣaṇā of the word 'chatriṇ' with regard to 'ekasārthavāhitva' (the state of being of all who are in the same batch). It is said that this is the (instance of) Ajahatsvārtha Lakṣaṇā (the Lakṣaṇā wherein its own meaning, i.e., the primary meaning is not discarded) as both men with umbrellas and those accompanying them without umbrellas come to be understood as belonging to the same batch.'

Viśvanātha here adds that 'in the same way' i.e., only because of the admission of Tatparyāṇupapatti as the

\(^{389}\) VP, 2.312.

\(^{390}\) TC, p. 689; VPB, p. 94.
Laksanābīja, 'chatriṇo yānti' comes to be an example of Laksanā. If we admit Anvayāṇupapatti as the Laksanābīja, there is no scope for having a recourse to Laksanā as the words in the sentence can syntactically be connected even in view of their denoted senses. When by observation, it is felt that the word 'chatriṇaḥ' is used to mean not only the holders of umbrellas but also others in the group even without umbrellas, the Tatparya is felt as incompatible with the mere primary sense of the word 'chatriṇaḥ'. This Tatparyāṇupapatti is the basis for the operation of a Laksanā function in respect of the word 'chatrin' for conveying a secondary sense where the Tatparya practically rests. This new meaning comes to cover all in the group irrespective of holding umbrellas or not. This example also is found in many earlier works including the Bhāṣya of Śabara. 391 Viśvanātha now identifies this sentence 'chatriṇo yānti' as an example of Ajahatsvārthā Laksanā where the Śakyārtha is also retained in full or part along with the Lakṣyārtha. As the Lakṣyārtha of the word 'chatrin' is 'ekasārthavāhin' (all persons belonging to the group), it obviously covers the Śakyārtha, i.e., the holders of the umbrellas. Though Viśvanātha refers to only 'chatriṇo yānti' as an illustration of Ajahatsvārthā, at least two

391. Vide SB, under Ms 1.4.23 (with the reading 'gacchanti' in place of 'yānti'); TC, p. 689; PLM, p. 39.
of the earlier examples, namely, 'yaśṭīḥ pravesāya' and 'kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām' also belong to the same group. The Laksyārtha of 'yaśṭī' in 'yaśṭīḥ etc.' covers the Sakyārtha of the word. Similarly the Sakyārtha of the word 'kāka', i.e., crows stands included in the Laksyārtha of the word, i.e., all the spoilers of curd. Gaṅgeśa refers to 'yaśṭīḥ pravesāya' as an Ajahatsvartha Lakṣaṇa.392 According to Dharmarājadhvarindra, 'kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām' is an instance of Jahadajahallakṣaṇa.393 We shall discuss the issue in the succeeding pages.

M(33). yadi cānvayānupapattirlakṣaṇābījaṃ syāt, tadā kvacid gaṅgāpadasya tīre kvacid ghoṣapadasya matsyādau lakṣaṇeti niyamo na syāt.

'If the Anvayānupapatti (incompatibility in the syntactical connection) is taken to be the ground for Lakṣaṇā, then, there will be no regulation (in respect of the import) as sometimes the Lakṣaṇā will be of the word 'gaṅgā' with regard to 'tīra' and (again) sometimes Lakṣaṇā will be of the word 'ghoṣa' with reference to 'matsya'.'

Viśvanātha points out above that if Anvayānupapatti be accepted as the Lakṣaṇābīja in stead of a Tātparyānupapatti then there would be no regulation in respect of

392. TC, p. 691.
393. VPB, p. 94.
various probable secondary meanings of a verbal expression. As for example, in the example 'gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ' the Anvāyānupapatti (which is accepted as the Lakṣaṇābīja in the context by the Ālaṁkārikas and even by the Navya Naiyāyikas like Gaṅgeśopādhyāya and Jānakīnātha Bhāṭṭācārya) involved therein can be removed either by taking 'bank' as the secondary meaning of the word 'gaṅgā' or by taking 'fish' as the secondary meaning of the word 'ghoṣaḥ'. Under the circumstances, we must be sure of the Tatparya (the intention of the speaker) in order to restrict the Lakṣaṇā to either of the two words. Hence Viśvanātha finds it necessary to accept only the Tātparyānupapatti as the fundamental condition for the operation of Lakṣaṇā. Here we point to a similar argument put forward by the Grammarian Nāgeśa. Nāgeśa also apprehends the possibility of an anomaly in the example, 'gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ' in the event of recognising Anvayānupapatti as the Lakṣaṇābīja. As we understand him, he also feels that one can get rid of Anvayānupapatti in 'gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ' even by understanding an aquatic creature (makara) instead of a 'diary farm' from the word 'ghoṣa' with the aid of Lakṣaṇā. He also feels the need of Tātparya to restrict the Lakṣaṇā only with regard to the meaning 'diary farm' of the word 'ghoṣa'. This argument from Viśvanātha Nyāya Pañcānana and Nāgeśabhaṭṭa seems to contain a loophole. By recognising Lakṣaṇā with regard to
the word 'gaṅgā', one can find both the primary and secondary senses, 'the current' and 'the bank' respectively in the relation of 'sāmīpya'. But in the event of admitting Lakṣaṇā with regard to the word 'ghoṣa', it is not possible to understand a specific relation between the primary and secondary concepts. How can there be a relation between 'the diary firm' and 'an aquatic creature' (either 'matsya' or 'makara')? As we have already observed, the Naiyāyikas including Viśvanātha have accepted Lakṣaṇā as 'śākyasambandhārūpā'. Nägesā also refers to this viewpoint of the Naiyāyikas. Hence in the event of recognising Lakṣaṇā in 'ghoṣa', we do not find any workability of Lakṣaṇā as understood by Viśvanātha and Nägesā. Here, of course, we shall have to add that the very recognition of Lakṣaṇā by Nägesā is only provisional.

Now before we conclude on the issue of Lakṣaṇābīja, we may desirably take a further note of Viśvanātha's concept of Tātparya.

Like Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, Viśvanātha accepts Tātparya as one of the four factors (the other three being āsatti, Yogatā, and ākaṅkṣā) responsible for bringing about a Śādiabodha. It may be that the clue of this idea of Tātparya is taken from Jayantabhaṭṭa, but unlike Jayarta,

394. atra tārtikāḥ - svasākyasambandho laksanā.

PLM, p. 39.
Visvanātha (following Gangesa) does not accept Tatparya as a Vṛtti on par with Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇā. Again unlike Gangesa, the author of the Bhāṣāpariccheda believes only in an Tatparyāṇupapatti as the Lakṣaṇābīja. Now like Gangesa again, he understands Tatparya as the very intention of a speaker (Vakturicchā). Now in illustrating the involvement of Tatparya in the process of Śabdabodha, Visvanātha refers to a sentence containing a homonymous word. The sentence in question, which we shall meet with in the relevant Muktāvall text in a succeeding page is 'Śaṅdhavamānānaya'.

If we take this illustration seriously, then the scope of Tatparya shall have to be admitted as very limited. Tatparya comes to be hardly acceptable as the indispensable factor for the understanding of the meanings of all sorts of sentences. But the subsequent text of the BP. in the context of Tatparya as Śabdabodhakāraṇa does not confirm this impression. By reading between the lines of Visvanātha, one may rather have the idea that the author of the Bhāṣāpariccheda wants Tatparya to be involved in the process of Śabdabodha in all sentences, Vedic and non-Vedic. If we believe in the impression created by the said example regarding Visvanātha's approach to Tatparya as a Śabdabodhakāraṇa, it will lead to limiting the scope of Lakṣaṇā. If Tatparyāṇupapatti be admitted as the Lakṣaṇābīja ard
Tātparya be shown as involved only in sentences like 'saindhavamānāyayā' the scope of the 'anupapatti' of Tātparya will be restricted only to the homonymous words. But we find Viśvanātha recognising Lakṣaṇā in expressions like 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ' which do not involve any homonym. As such, we feel that the example chosen by Viśvanātha for showing the involvement of Tātparya in a sentence as the Jābdabodhakāraṇa, i.e., the expression 'saindhavamānāyayā' is virtually misleading.

Now again, there is the problem whether Tātparya would operate at the level of a word or at the level of the whole sentence. A Tātparyānupapatti may be known only when Tātparya is known. The idea of Tātparyānupapatti may be had only from the minimum idea of the total import of a sentence, because Tātparya (which depends on the Tātparyagrāhākās, i.e., certain determining factors like 'Prakāraṇa') tends to be concerned with a whole sentence and not with any individual word. But the Naiyāyikas including our Viśvanātha are not prepared to recognise a Lakṣaṇā in a whole sentence. Hence it is really confusing as to how they can accept as Lakṣaṇābīṣja the very Tātparyānupapatti, which is concerned with an entire sentence only.

Though Viśvanātha does not accept Tātparya as a Jāttī, yet we find it relevant to refer to the fate of Tātparyānupapatti in case of understanding Tātparya as a verbal function as Jayantabhaṭṭa does. Jayantabhaṭṭa, the author of the
Nyāyamañjari propounds the theory of Tatparya Vṛtti; but he remains satisfied with Lakṣaṇā as Sakyasambandha as he does not come forward to accept either of the two 'anupāpatti's as the Lakṣaṇābīja. But if we now understand Tatparya as a Vṛtti even in the context of Tatparyānupāpatti, the so-called Lakṣaṇābīja, we find that there remains a very thin line of demarcation between a Tatparyānupāpatti and an Anvayānupāpatti. Our idea is this: Where the Tatparya Vṛtti fails, 'anvaya' also obviously fails, because the Tatparya as Vṛtti stands admitted only for effecting an 'anvaya' amongst the meanings of individual words. We may talk just the reverse also. If an 'anvaya' fails, it fails due to a failure of the operation of Tatparya Vṛtti. As we understand from Abhinavagupta, the Abhidhā Vṛtti conveys the unrelated meanings of the individual words and gets exhausted. It cannot come into operation again to bring forth the idea of an anvaya in a context. Here comes in the Tatparya Vṛtti to serve the purpose of presenting the 'anvaya'.

395 In case of a Lakṣaṇā, however, where we have

as the Laksanabīja, a Tatparyānupapatti resulting in an Anvayanupapatti or an Anvayanupapatti, resulting from a Tatparyānupapatti, the Tatparya Vṛtti comes to operate twice. There is, however, no explicit reference to such a two fold operation of Tatparya. Yet we can gather the idea as an implied fact. As for instance, in the expression 'simho māṇavakaḥ', Abhidhā conveys the primary meanings of the individual words and then Tatparya in its turn presents the syntactical relation amongst the meanings in the sentence. But Tatparya fails to identify the 'māṇavaka' (boy) with the 'simha' (lion). Now Laksanā comes in to convey 'simhasadṛśa' (someone like a lion) as the secondary meaning of the word 'simha'. Now again Tatparya operates to bring forth the syntactical relation (anvaya) between the meanings 'māṇavaka' and 'simhasadṛśa'.

Thus we find that

**396.** tathāḥi mukhyārthabādhāyāṁ lakṣanāyāḥ prakṛptih. bādha ca virodhapratitireva. na cātra padārthānāṁ svātmaṇi virodhaḥ parasparaḥ virodha iti cet sāyaṁ tarhyanvaye virodhaḥ pratyeyah. na cāpratipanne'nvaye virodhapratītiḥ, pratipatītiśānvayasya nābhidhāśaktyā, tasyāḥ padārthapratipatipattyupakāśāṁ śrīivyāvyāpārāt iti tātparyāśāktyāvānvayapratipattiḥ

**396.** simho māṇavakaḥ ityatra dvitiyakṣayeśāṁvīṣṭaḥ sātvatārthasamarpitāṇvayābādhakollāśāntaramabhidhātātparyāśaktīsvāntātāṁ tāवत tritiyāva śāktistaddhābhakavidhūrīkaraṇāvipuṇā lakṣanābhidhāṁ samullasati.

*ibid*, pp. 55-56.
an operation of Laksana comes to be preceded by both Tatparyanupapatti and Anvayänupapatti. Here, of course, one is to understand Tatparya in the sense of a Vṛtti responsible for presenting the syntactical relation in a sentence (Padarthänavyasādhikā). We humbly point out that the Tatparyänupapatti as the Laksanabija, wherein Tatparya is taken in the sense of Vakturicchā is not practically tenable. The sentences involving homonyms as in Saindhavamānaya do not generally involve any Laksana. It is because the accepted factors such as 'context' (i.e., prakaraṇa-tatparyagrāhakas) are found available for restricting the Tatparya to one of the senses of such a homonymous word. But in the event of Tatparyänupapatti not being admitted as the Laksanabija, Visvaṅatha fears the possibility of anomalies in sentences like 'gaṅgāyām ghosaḥ'. As there will be not Tatparya restricted in favour of a particular secondary meaning, one will be free to use Laksana even with regard to the word 'ghoṣa' instead of the word 'gaṅgā'. As the Anvayänupapatti is understood in such a case as the basic condition for the operation of a Laksana, one can remain satisfied by removing either way the 'anupapatti' of the 'anvaya' involved therein. In other words, according to Visvaṅatha, in the event of not admitting Tatparyänupapatti as the Laksanabija, the word 'ghoṣa' also may be taken to mean 'a fish' secondarily to remove the inconsistency in respect of syntactical relation in the
sentence 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghosāḥ'. This, we feel, is an argument for argument's sake only. Tatparya itself in the sense of the intention of the speaker is determined on the basis of certain factors like a context. Viśvanātha himself refers to these Tatparyagrāhakas like a 'prakaraṇa' (i.e., context) in course of his explaining Tatparya as a Sābdabodhiḥkāraṇa.

Even if there be no Tatparyānupapatti with reference to the primary meaning of a word, because of the lack of restriction of the Tatparya in the context to a particular secondary meaning, it is unlikely for one to use the word 'ghoṣa' in the sense of an aquatic creature like fish in complete violation of convention (Samketa).

If we accept Viśvanātha's fear of anomalies in sentences like 'gaṅgāyāṃ ghosāḥ' in the event of not admitting Tatparyānupapatti (as the Lakṣaṇābija), we shall automatically admit that because of the ignorance of Tatparya in a context, the listener can arbitrarily use a word in any sense he likes even at the utter neglect of Samketa. If it be argued that it is Sakti or Abhidhā that is to take care for Samketa or Convention it may be said in reply that even the Tatparya as the intention of a speaker is not free from the regulation of the Tatparyagrāhakas. Moreover we reiterate our earlier opinion that Laksana as the Sakyasambandha must be understandable through justifiable and specific relations between the Sakyārthas and Laksyārthas.
While we can reasonably understand Laksana as a relation between 'a current' and 'a bank' respectively as primary and secondary concepts of the word Ganges (i.e. 'gaṅga') because of 'sāmīpya' (nearness) between the two, we naturally find it inconvenient to understand the same as a relation between 'a diary farm' or cowherds' and 'a fish' as primary and secondary senses of the word 'ghoṣa'. We understand that Viśvanātha personally does not believe in the Laksana with reference to 'ghoṣa' in the sense of a 'fish' and that he is very much anxious not to allow a scope for such an admission. But our humble submission is that the very definition of Laksana as Sakyasambandha is a safeguard against such possibilities.

Gakulanātha Upādhyāya in his Vivaraṇa, a commentary on the Kāvyā Prakāśa seems to offer a solution to the problem of Laksana-bija. Gakulanātha points out that if there is to be a Sābdabodha in a sentence that involves the operation of a Laksana in any one of its words, that Sābdabodha must necessarily be preceded by a Mukhyārthabādha (the untenability of a Verbal judgement involving the primary sense of a particular word). Now the Laksana-jīva we have been so long discussing is actually the factor responsible for such a Mukhyārthabādha, Gakulanātha maintains that this Mukhyārthabādha may occur in three different ways.
(1) Sometimes this Mukhyārthabādha may occur because of the realisation of an incompatibility (ayogyatā) of the primary meaning in the context. As for example, in the expression, 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ' the untenability of the Sābdabodha at the first instance takes place due to the realisation of the incompatibility (ayogyatā) of the 'current of water of Ganges', the primary meaning of the word 'gaṅgā' to hold 'the diary farm' or the cowherds' colony (the primary meaning of the other word in the sentence, namely 'ghoṣa').

(2) Sometimes this untenability is due to a lack of expectancy (nirākāṃkṣatva) of the primary meaning concerned. For example, in the compound, 'rājapuruṣa' there are two component parts viz., 'rājan' and 'puruṣa'. Here the primary meaning of the two words may get syntactical relation either through relation of 'abheda' or 'bheda'. The second alternative is not possible since remaining quite apart and independant two primary meanings do not happen to have any mutual expectancy. On account of lack of this expectancy, they fail to bring about a tenable Sābdabodha. In case of the first alternative wherein because of both the words occurring in the same Vibhakti (owing to their having Sāmānādhikaranya) two primary meanings can get mutually connected through the relation of abheda, (identity). But
here arises the fallacy of Ayogyatā, in so far as a King as a rule cannot come down to be identified with an ordinary person.

(3) Sometimes, this untenability of Sābdabodna may occur because the primary meaning of a word does not conform to the actual intention of the speaker. As for instance, in the sentence, 'kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām', if we take only the primary meaning of the word 'kākebhyah' there will be no grammatical irregularity or no occurrence of either incom­patibility (ayogyatā or absence of yogyatā) or lack of expectancy (nirākāṃksatva or absence of ākāṃksā).

Even then the primary meaning requires to be abonuenea at least partially as the speaker here intends to mean by the word (kākebhyah) all the creatures including the crow (kāka) that can spoil the curd (dadhyupaghātakas). Hence here is also the scope of Laksanā to convey the aforesaid idea of 'dadhyupaghātakas' in addition to Kāka. So Gāṅgānātha wants to assert that the factor responsible for the operation of Laksanā by way of causing an untenability of the primary meaning of a particular word varies from situa­tion to situation. He finds, therefore, no justification in asserting either Tatparyānupapatti or Anvayānupapatti as the sole fundamental condition for the operation of a Laksanā.
M(34). idantu bodhyam — s'akyarthasambandho yadi tīratvena rūpeṇa gṛhītastadā tīratvena tīrabodhaḥ, yadi tu ja'gā- tīratvena rūpeṇa gṛhītastadā tenaiva rūpeṇa smaranam.

ata eva lakṣyatāvacchedake na lakṣaṇā, tatprakāraka - bodhasya tatra lakṣaṇām vinpyupapatteḥ. parantve yam krāmena sakyatāvacchedake'pi sāktirna syāt. tatprakāraka - sakyārthasmaraṇam prati tatpadasya sāmarthyamtyasya suvacatvāditi vibhāvavaniyam.

'This (point) must be understood if the relation to the thing denoted (i.e., the denoted meaning) be understood with regard to the bank as a bank, then the bank as simply a bank is understood. If, however, it be taken to be the bank of the Ganges, then the recollection takes place in that very form. Therefore the Lakṣaṇā is not with regard to Lakṣyatāvacchedaka (i.e., the determinant of the state of being the thing indicated). For a cognition having that as a feature is possible even without Lakṣaṇā regarding it. Further it may be understood that likewise Sakti also cannot be recognised with reference to a Sakyatāvacchedaka, for it can easily be said that a word has the power to lead to the recollection of the thing by its Sakti in which the determinant in question is a prakāra.'

Here Viśvanātha draws our attention to the fact that in any case of Lakṣaṇā, the knowledge of Lakṣaṇā, the recollection of the Lakṣyārtha and the contextual Sādhanodha
correspond to each other. He illustrates the point with the example, 'gāṇḍgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ'. As the intention of the Speaker does not tally with the Sākyārtha of the word 'gāṅgā', i.e., because of a Tatparyāṇupapatti with reference to the Sākyārtha of 'gāṅgāpada', there arises the scope of the operation of Laksanā in the word. Now Laksanā being a 'sākyārthasambandha', the meaning on which the relation of the denoted sense can be fixed or ascertained is to be treated as Laksyārtha. In case of 'gāṇḍgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ', the relation of the Sākyārtha of the word 'gāṅgā' may be understood with reference to two meanings, either a bank in general or the bank of the river Ganges. If the 'sākyārthasambandha' is understood with reference to (a bank as characterised by) the bankness, the recollection of the object 'bank' will also be as characterised by the bankness and the Sābdabodha also will correspondingly be of the bankness characterised by bankness. Similarly if the 'sākyārthasambandha' i.e., Laksanā is understood with regard to (the bank of Ganges as characterised by) the Gangetic bankness, the Vṛtti, Padārthasamarana and the corresponding Sābdabodha will also be of the same form. The idea is that in the case of Laksanā also as in the case of Abhidhā or Sakti, the Vṛtti, Padārthasamarana and Sābdabodha occur in the same form. This very regulation regarding Sābdabodha involving either Sakti or Laksanā may be presented in a traditional pattern as follows: 'yaddharmāvacchinnavisēsyakavṛttigrahastaddharmāvacchinnavisēsyakameva padārthasamaranaṃ
Sābdabodhaśceti'.

In 'ata eva -------- upapatteh', Visvanātha points out a consequence of the admission of the said regulation. It is clear from the exposition above that a Lakṣyāvatavacchedaka (i.e., the determinant of a secondary sense, viz., 'tīratva' with regard to the Lakṣyārtha, 'tīra' or 'Gaṅgā- tīratva' with reference to the Lakṣyārtha 'Gaṅgātīra') comes to be known along with the corresponding Lakṣyārtha. As a Lakṣanā can convey a Lakṣyārtha only by virtue of conveying the corresponding Lakṣyatavacchedaka, there is no necessity of admitting another Śakyārthasambandha with reference to the Avacchedaka of a Lakṣyārtha.

Now a question is very much pertinent. The regulation that Vṛttiijnāna, Padārthasmarāṇa and Sābdabodha are to correspond to each other is common to both Śakti and Lakṣanā. If as a consequence to the acceptance of the regulation, there is the admission that another Lakṣanā is not to be admitted again for the knowledge of Lakṣyāvatavacchedaka, the same logic will force the plea that Śakti is also not to be admitted in the case of a Śakyātavacchedaka. In Parantve vaṁ ------- Vibhāvanīyam, Visvanātha refers to this problem. The author of the BP does not straightway give any solution. He admits the logic in the argument (cf. suvacatvāt) and at the same time urges a consideration of the matter (cf. Vibhāvanīyam) in anticipation of the complicacies that may arise in case Śakti is not admitted with regard to the Avacchedaka of a Śakyārtha.
The anticipated complicacy may be like this: In the case of the word 'Prthivi' (Earth), as for illustration, the Śaktijñāna, Padārthasmarana and the Śabdabodha will be of same form as Prthivitvapraκārakapṛthivī — Višeṣyakajñānam. The Avacchedaka, i.e., Prthivītva is a Prakāra or Višeṣaṇa and the Śakyārtha, i.e., Prthivi is a Prakāra or Višeṣya. As there can be no knowledge of the Višeṣya without a prior knowledge of corresponding Višeṣaṇa, the Višeṣaṇa is understood first. If only one Śakti is admitted with regard to the word 'Prthivī' and utilized first to convey the Śakyatāvacchedaka, because of the exhaustion in the matter of conveying the Višeṣaṇa, the same Śakti will not be competent to convey the Višeṣya. This is not a desirable position. As 'Prthivī' is the conventional meaning of the word 'Prthivi', we cannot proceed to understand it otherwise. If in the other way, the meaning 'Prthivītva' is kept out of the jurisdiction of the Śakti of the word 'Prthivi', the recognised need of an Avacchedaka of the Śakyārtha, i.e., the object Earth will forcefully lead to conveying of any meaning that can serve as a Prakāra to the object Earth. As Earth is something that has smell (gandhavat), the meaning 'gandhavattva' (the state of something having smell) being a relevant prakāra can serve the rule that the knowledge of a qualified is to be preceded by that of the qualification.
In that case, the साधवधो of the word 'prthivī' will be as 'gandhavattvaprakārakapṛthivīviśeṣyakajñānam.' This is neither desirable nor is warranted by facts. Hence there is the need of admitting another Śakti for the purpose of conveying a Śakyatāvacchedaka. It may be argued that the fear of the same type of irregularity may demand the admission of another Laksāṇā in order to understand a Laksyatāvacchedaka. It may be replied in this context thus.

In the case of understanding Laksyatāvacchedakas, there is no scope of such an irregularity. A Laksyārtha is a Viśeṣya and its Avacchedaka is a Viśeṣaṇa. Here also the Viśeṣaṇa is to be known first. The Laksāṇā, that is expected to convey a Laksyārtha, cannot be utilized earlier to convey its Avacchedaka as in that case, the very Laksāṇā being exhausted will not remain competent to convey the Laksyārtha. There is also no necessity of admitting any Vṛtti (function) to get the Laksyatāvacchedaka conveyed. The regulation that the knowledge of Viśeṣya is to be preceded by that of Viśeṣaṇa will bring about the knowledge of the Laksyatāvacchedaka along with the Laksyārtha. There is at the same time no scope for a Laksyatāvacchedaka being undesirably conveyed. The very Śakyasambandha will serve as the restriction. The relation of a Śakyārtha with an would be Laksyārtha, as Viśvanātha has shown in 'idantu bodhyam' etc., is understood with due regard to the Avacchedaka.
If the Laksya-vacchedaka is thought otherwise, the Laksya-arthta also would be quite different. Hence the score of irregularity does not arise.

M(35). yatra tu Sakyarthasya paramparasambandharupā lañṣaṇaḥ, sā lakṣita-clakṣaṇetyucyate. yathā dvirephā-

dipade repahdvayasya - sambandho bhramarapade jñāyate,

bhramarapadasya ca sambandho bhramara jñāyate, tatra

lakṣita-lakṣaṇaḥ.

'Where, however, there is lañṣaṇa in the form of an indirect relation of the Sakyarthā, that (lañṣaṇa) is known as Lakṣitalakṣaṇa. As for example, in the words like 'dvirepha', the relation of two 'r's (i.e., repahdvaya) is understood with regard to the word (bhramara) and that of the word 'bhramara' with reference to a bee, it is a case of Lakṣitalakṣaṇa.'

In the examples of lañṣaṇa so long cited, the relation between the Sakyarthas and their corresponding Lakṣya-arthtas is felt as straight or direct. But in certain cases, lañṣaṇa appears in the form of an indirect relation of a Sakyarthā with a Lakṣya-arthta. Such a lañṣaṇa, as Viśvanātha points out, goes by the name of Lakṣitalakṣaṇa. 'Dvirepha' is an example in hand. The word 'dvirepha' primarily means 'two r-sounds'. But because of obvious absence of Tatparya with regard to this Sakyarthā of the word in a context like 'dvirepha'
gunjati', Lakṣaṇa comes to convey the word 'bhramara' as a Lakṣyārtha. The relation between the word 'bhramara' and 'two-r-sounds' is easily discernible. But yet the original Tātparyānupapattī does not go away. The necessity of fixing the Tātparya still exists. In such a position, the word 'bhramara' gives its Sākyārtha, i.e., a bee. With the knowledge of this sense of 'bee' only, the necessary 'anvaya' in 'dvirepho guṇjati' becomes possible. Thus the word 'dvirapha' is instrumental in conveying the sense of a bee. But the relation between the 'two-r-sounds', the Sākyārtha of the word 'dvirepha' and 'a bee' is an indirect one.

As we have pointed out earlier, in the circle of the Vedāntins also, Lakṣitalakṣaṇā stands admitted on the same ground and with the same example. The Guṇavṛtti of the Mīmāṁsakas or the Gauni Lakṣaṇa of the Ālaṃkārikas and some of the Naiyāyikas reveal such an indirect relation between the Lākṣaṇikapada and the final Lakṣyārtha. As for example, we may consider 'sīhoh māṇavakaḥ' or 'gaurvāhīkaḥ'.

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397. yatra sākyaparasparāsambandhenārthāntaraprātitīst-
atra lakṣitalakṣaṇaḥ. dvirephapadasya repadbāyasaaktavya
bhramarapadaghaṭita-parasparsāsambandhena madhukare
vṛttīḥ. VPB, p. 90.
So Dharmarājādvarīndra observes that Gaunī Laksanā is no other than Laksītalaksanā. Dr. N.N. Choudhury also maintains that the Naiyāyikas have admitted the so-called Gaunīvrutti in 'simho maṇavakaḥ' etc. only as a kind of Laksanā on par with Laksanā in 'dvirepha' etc. Here we shall have to point out that the author of the Bhaṣāpariccheda is interestingly silent on the Gaunīvrutti of Hīmāśakas or the Gaunī Laksanā of some of his own colleagues and the Ālaṃkārikas. The examples of Laksanā given by Viśvanātha do not show even a single case of such a Gaunī prayoga where a meaning comes to be conveyed as a 'lakṣyaguna'. In discussing the examples of Laksanā given by the author of the Bhaṣāpariccheda, we have seen that he did not make any precise classification of Laksanā. Before we come to assess Viśvanātha's attitude in the context, we propose to make a historical study in brief of this issue.

398. gaunyapi lakṣītalakṣanāiva. yathā simho maṇavaka iti. atra simhaśārdha vaṇyasambandhi - krauryāhisam-bandhena maṇavakasya pratīteḥ. ibid.

399. iyam gaunī vrūttrlakṣanāto bhidyate iti kunārila-bhāṭṭamatasya. nīkarsaḥ naiyāyikādayastu dvirephad-vadatra lakṣanāmāṇgikurvanti. KT3, p. 90.

400. cf. gaunyapi lakṣanāiva lakṣyamāṇaṇagunasambandharūpi. yathā - agnirmāṇavaka iti. TC, Vide TS, p. 327.
of classification of Lakṣaṇā.

As we have already discussed, the terms, Guṇa, Bhāti and Lakṣaṇā have been used by Jaimini in the sense of secondary signification. But Jaimini does not show any discrimination in using the said terms. But from the treatment of the terms in the Bhāsyā of Śabaravāmin, one comes to have a notion of two different types of secondary signification in the form of Lakṣaṇā and Guṇā. Śābara’s idea of Lakṣaṇā may be understood as the popular usage of a sense by the society. Again in Guṇavṛtti, the generic status of one object is attributed to another on the basis of similarity in qualities. This transference is possible through Guṇavāda. Guṇavāda is the transference of similar attributes metaphorically from one object to another. Thus a difference between Lakṣaṇā and Guṇavṛtti comes out in the Śabarabhāsyā. This idea may be gathered from the explanation of the clause ‘ūrgudumbara’ under the Sūtra 1.2.19.1

Another division of Lakṣaṇā into Jāhatsvartha and Ajaḥatsvartha is revealed in its treatment by Śabaravāmin. He does not define or discuss Jāhatsvartha Lakṣaṇā. In Śābara’s

401. vidhirvā syādapurvatvādvādamātraṁ hyanarthakam.  
M.3. 1.2.19, and namūktvamasāṃvādaco vede, na hyūrgudumbarai ti. guṇavādena prarocanārthatāṁ brūmahe. gaunātvaśatsāṃvādaḥ. SB, under M.3 1.2.22.
view, Ajahatsvartha Lakshan is that where a word while signifying a secondary meaning does not forsake its primary meaning completely, i.e., where a part of its primary meaning is retained along with its secondary sense. In the context of explaining the term 'Lingasamavaya', Sabara cites the expressions 'chatrin yanti' etc. as the examples of secondary signification. He maintains that the words 'chatrin' etc. do not give up their own primary meanings while signifying the group to which the objects literally meant by the words belong as parts.402 Here we observe a very much noteworthy similarity between Visvanatha and Sabara. Like Sabara, Visvanatha also does not define the Jahatsvartha Lakshan. Though he discusses 'gaangayam ghooshah' as his first example of Lakshan, he does not name it as an instance of Jahatsvartha. We know that this expression, 'gaangayam ghooshah' is a stock example of Lakshan or Jahatsvartha in other circles. Visvanatha however, comes forward like Sabarasvamin to name

401. vidhikvva syadapurvatvadvadamatram hyananathakan.
402. na cayaam pranabhrchadbah srstisabdasca jahatsvartham mantragahanam lakshyayat. yadgan ca srstitpranabhrochadibhuv samavetau tavapi parighyate yathvah chatriisabdena sarthalaksanarthena so'pi ochatriiighyata iti.

SB, under MS 1.4.23.
'chatrino yānti' as an example of Ajahatsvarthā. Though Visvanātha does not define Ajahatsvarthā anywhere in his work, his idea of Ajahatsvarthā Laksanā is just the same with that of Šābara. We have this impression from his explanation of the expression 'chatrino yānti' as an example of Ajahatsvarthā Laksanā. But we cannot extend too far the area of similarity between the two scholars in the context of the concept of Ajahatsvarthā Laksanā. The examples of Laksanā, given by Visvanātha do not include even a single instance of Gunavṛtti, as and when understood in the light of Šābara or Kumārila. But Šābara is found to have regarded Gunavṛtti also as Ajahatsvarthā Laksanā because when a word is superimposed on another because of similarity of attributes between the objects conveyed, the Guṇaśabdas do not abandon their primary meanings completely. For example in 'simho mānavakah', in the process of identification between the lion and the child, though the animality of the lion is abandoned, many of its attributes like bravery come to be admitted in the child.

We find a clear cut distinction between Laksanā and Gunavṛtti maintained only in the writings of Kumārilabhaṭṭa. Here we note that Kumārila finds Laksanā and Gunavṛtti as belonging to different planes. But some of the Nyāyāyikas, the Ālaṃkārikas and Vaiyākaraṇas regard Gunavṛtti as a variety of Laksanā itself. According to Kumārilabhaṭṭa
Lakṣaṇā is the invariable association between primary and secondary concepts. Because of this invariable association when a primary meaning leads to the idea of an additional meaning connected invariably with it, what takes place is known as Lakṣaṇā. But when Lakṣaṇā brings the idea of some attribute (Guṇa) invariably connected with the primary meaning, then it is a Guṇavṛtti which operates to convey the idea of yet another object sharing the attributes belonging to the object conveyed primarily by the word. We can gather an idea from Kumārila that every 'nāmapada' would primarily signify a Jāti which in its turn would signify the Vyakti on the strength of an invariable association, i.e., Lakṣaṇā.

Kumārila's example of Guṇavṛtti is 'agnimāṇavakaṇḍ' wherein we get the 'vahnitvajāti' as the Sākyārtha of the word 'agni', by Abhidhā. Then from the same expression we get tpaṅgalyādiguṇa (i.e., the qualities like that of possessing a red colour) as the Laksyārtha by Lakṣaṇā. Herein again by means of Guṇavāda (on the strength of similarity of attributes 'paṅgalyādī' of the boy with those of Agni) finally the boy comes to be understood.  

403. abhidheyaṁvinābhūte pravṛttirlakṣaṇeṣyate lakṣyamāṇagunairyyogād vṛtteristātu gaṇatā. TV, Vide MD, p. 313.

404. vahnitvalakṣitādārthādyatpaṅgalyādī gamyate tena māṇavake buddhiḥ sāḍṛṣyādupajāyate. TV, Vide MD, p. 314.
The Mīmāṃsakas, as a whole, however classify Lākṣaṇā into Jahatsvārthā and Ajahatsvārthā.405 As we find in the Bhāṣya-cintāmaṇi, 'gangayām ghoṣaḥ' is cited as an example of Jahatsvārthā Lākṣaṇā wherein the primary meaning comes to be Virtually dead, leading to an additional meaning, i.e., the secondary meaning. 'Yaṣṭiḥ praveśayā' is given as an illustration of Ajahatsvārthā wherein the primary sense retains a part of itself as a participant in the desired syntactical relation in a sentence. It will not be out of context to record here that the Mīmāṃsakas include Lākṣita lakṣaṇa (recognised by the Vedāntins and even by the author of the Bhāṣāpariccheda) as a separate category under the Jahatsvārthā group.406

The Vedāntins divide Lākṣaṇā into two varieties

(1) Kevalalākṣaṇā and (ii) Lākṣitalākṣaṇā. Kevalalākṣaṇā

405.  sa ca lakoṣaṇa dvedha'jahatsvārthā, jahatsvārthā ca. svāsakṛtyārthaviśeyakānvanvayabhodhaprayojikā, ajahatsvārthā. yathā yaṣṭiḥ praveśayētādau. atra śakṛtyārthaviśeyakānvanvayabhodhaprayojikā lākṣita lakoṣaṇā ghoṣa ityādau. BHC, p. 57.

involves a direct relation between the primary and the secondary meanings of a word whereas Lakṣitalakṣaṇa involves an indirect one. In other words when the secondary sense is directly related with the primary meaning then the function involved is called Kevalalakṣaṇa. When it is otherwise, there occurs the scope for Lakṣitalakṣaṇa.\(^407\) 'Gaṅgāyaṁ gnoṣaḥ' is given as an example of Kevalalakṣaṇa while the word 'dvirepha' as the illustration of the other type. Dharmarājadvarindra holds that Gaṇvṛtti should come under the purview of Lakṣitalakṣaṇa. In the example 'sīmha mānavaśa' (the boy is the lion), which is a typical example of Gaṇvṛtti, the word 'sīmha' gives the idea of a lion as its Vācyārtha. The qualities of a lion like 'cruelity' etc. are connected with the lion and hence come to us as a Lakṣārtha. The idea of the boy now occurs as a secondary sense connected with the expressed sense indirectly through its relation with the earlier secondary sense, 'cruelty' etc.\(^408\) Thus...

\(^{407}\) lakṣaṇa dvividhā kevalalakṣaṇa lakṣitalakṣaṇa ca.
tatra sākyasākṣātsambandhaḥ kevalalakṣaṇaḥ. yathā gaṅgāyaṁ gnoṣa ityatra pravāhasākṣātsambandhinī tiśre gaṅgāpadasya kevalalakṣaṇaḥ. yatra sākyaparasparāsan-
bandhenaṁrthāntaraṁ pratitistatra laksitalakṣaṇaḥ.

\(^{408}\) gaunyāpi lakṣitalakṣaṇaiva. yathā sīmha māṅavaka
iti. atra sīṁhasabда vācyasambandhi-krauryādisambandhena
māṅavakasya pratiteḥ.
the idea of 'the boy' having 'a chained relation' (paramparitasaabandha) with the vacyartha may be recognised as presenting a case of Lakṣitalakṣaṇa. The Vedántins divide Laksana in a different way also. According to them, Laksana is of three types viz., Jahallakṣaṇa, Ajahallakṣaṇa and Jahadajahallakṣaṇa. Jahallakṣaṇa operates in those expressions where primary meanings are not included in the secondary meanings. As for example, in the expression 'viṣam bhumksva', the primary meaning is not retained. The primary meaning being totally abandoned the sentence comes to indicate the secondary sense 'Do not eat in this house' (na cāsya grhe bhaksya). In Ajahallakṣaṇa the primary meaning retains its place in the body of the secondary sense. For example, in 'suklo ghaṭah', the primary meaning of the word 'sukla' is the 'sukla guṇa' (white colour) and the secondary meaning is a 'suklagunavaddravya' (a white coloured object). The idea of a white colour is invariably involved in the idea of a white coloured object. Jahadajahallakṣaṇa comes to operate


410. sakyamantarbhāvyā yatrārthāntarasya pratītiṣṭatra Jahallakṣaṇa. yathā viṣām bhuṅkṣetvi. atra hi svārthaḥ vihāya sātrugṛhe bhojananivṛttir lakṣaṇa. ibid.

411. yatra sakyārthamantarbhāvyaiवर्थाङ्गत्रा - pratītiṣṭatrajahallakṣaṇa. yathā suklaghaṭa iti. atra hi suklaśabdaḥ svārthaḥ suklagunamanantarbhāvyaiva tadvati laksanayā varttate. ibid, p. 91-92.
only when the half of the primary meaning is retained and
the other half of it is abandoned in the process of convey-
ing a secondary sense. In the expression 'so'yam devadatta'
(this is the very Devadatta), the word 'saḥ' signifies
Devadatta belonging to a particular time (tatkalaviṣīṣṭa
devadattaḥ). The word 'āyam' signifies Devadatta of the
present time (etatkali viṣīṣṭo devadattaḥ). To establish the
syntactical relation between these two words, the words
should abandon their parts viz., 'tatkalaviṣīṣṭa' and
'etatkali viṣīṣṭa' and signify only the common part, i.e.,
Devadatta through Laksana. Similarly in the expression
'tattvamasi' the vedantines find a case of Jahadaja-
sana. We are to add that this Jahadajahallaksanā is
known as Bhagalaksanā also. It is worthmentioning that
while recognising Jahadajahallaksanā Dharmarājādhi
tinna

412. tasmādyathā 'so'yam devadatta iti vakyaṁ tadartho
evā tatkalaitatkalaviṣīṣṭa c devadattalaksanasya vakyaṁ-
thatasyaṁśe virodhāvirdhatham tatkalaitatkalaviṣīṣṭvatvām-
śaṁ parityajyāvirdham devadattāṃ samātram lakṣayati
tathā 'tattvamasi' iti vakyaṁ tadartho vā parokṣatvā-
parokṣatvādiviṣīṣṭa Caitanya ityāktaṃ vālaksanasyā vakyārtha-
syāṁśe virodhāvirdhham parokṣatvāparokṣatvādiviṣīṣṭa-
vāmsāṁ parityajyāvirdhaham akhandacaitanya ityāktaṃ
lakṣayati. VS, p. 80-81.

413. ithañca 'tattvamasi' iti vakye bhagalaksanayoiva
ākhaṇḍartha-pratith. Bhavabodhini (commentary), Vide ibid.
p. 81.
does not recognise 'tattvamasi' and 'so'ya' as its examples. For him in these expressions there is no incompatibility of the primary meanings for getting systematically related.\textsuperscript{414} He, however, recognises, 'kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām', where the secondary meaning of the word 'kāka' is 'dadhyupaghātaka' (destroyer of curd) in general. In that secondary sense, the 'crow' also finds a place, but at the cost of discarding its identity as a crow and only by virtue of the state of being a 'destroyer of curd', which is not the primary import of the word.\textsuperscript{415}

As we have earlier observed, Lakṣaṇā received so much elaborate treatment in the works of the Ālāmkārikas that it came to be finally shown as of eighty varieties. Briefly Lakṣaṇā was classified into Rudhima and Pravojana. Each again came to be divided into Upādānalaksana and Lakṣaṇalaksana, which stand for Ajahatsvārtha and Jahatsvārtva respectively. Again there took place a further classification of Lakṣaṇa into Sāropā and Śadhyavasana varieties.

\textsuperscript{414} evameva tattvamasīti vākye'pi na lakṣaṇā. śaktyā svātantrāyena pasthitayos tattvampardarthe ābheda- nvaye bādhakābhāvāt. VPB, p. 93-94.

\textsuperscript{415} jahadajahallaksanodāharanām tu kākebhyo dañhi rakṣyatāmityādikameva. tatra śakya-kākatvaparityā- genāśākyādadhyupaghātakatvapuraskārenākāke'pi kāka- sābdasya pravṛtteh. ibid. p. 94-95.
Each of the aforesaid kinds of Lakṣaṇā came to be shown either as Suddhā or as Gauni. The Prayojanamūla lakṣaṇās again came to have another division because of the suggested motive involved therein (i.e., prayojanarūpavyajñya) being sometimes easily discernible and sometimes very much concealed as can be appreciated only by the connoisseurs of poetry. The suggested motive again sometimes pertains to an attribute (dharma) and sometimes to one possessed of some attribute (dharma). Hence we meet with another classification of the Prayojanamūla lakṣaṇās. All Lakṣaṇās are again shown as pertaining to either a word (Pada) or a sentence (Vākya).

The Naiyāyikas in general, as we find, divide Lakṣaṇā into two broad varieties viz., Gaunāvṛtti and Lakṣaṇā. The terms Bhakti, Guṇa and Upacāra, as we have already pointed out, have been used in the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama to mean the figurative expressions. But no explicit distinction between Lakṣaṇā and Guṇavṛtti is brought about therein. The term Upacāra is used in the sense of superimposition. The superimposition may be qualitative or pure. Unlike the Mīmāṃsakas the Naiyāyikas, generally speaking, include Guṇavṛtti under the purview of Upacāra or Lakṣaṇā.

416. cf. SD, Ch. II, K 5-12a and the Vṛtti under it.
Jayantabhaṭṭa, however, clearly distinguishes Lakṣaṇa from Gaunīvṛtti. He defines Lakṣaṇa as follows — A word is to be recognised as Lākṣaṇika when it conveys a meaning in addition to the primary meaning. The additional meaning may or may not be a quality. In case of Gaunīvṛtti we find the superimposition of one idea upon another because of a word being in apposition (sāmanādhiṃkaranyā) with another word. This is not the case with a Lākṣaṇa. Jayanta gives the expression 'gangāyām ghoṣaḥ' as the example of Lākṣaṇa. Here the word 'gangā' conveys the additional idea of 'the bank of the Ganges' and the operation of Lākṣaṇa is not necessitated by any case of apposition. But in a case of Gaunīvṛtti as in the expression 'Gaurvāhikāḥ' the word 'Gau' is required to convey a secondary sense because of being in apposition with the word 'vāhika'. The word 'gaṇ' conveys first the primary sense in the form of a lump having dewlap etc. Then it conveys the idea of the cows' qualities like dullness and slowness as a secondary sense. Without resting at that stage, the word goes on to convey the idea also of the Vāhika as its further secondary sense because of the sāmanādhiṃkaranyā. It may be noted that the Gaunīvṛtti:

417. yastu svaṛtha bhidhānānāntaram taḍītaramarthaṁ  
guṇamagunāṁ vā laksayatyeva na sāmanādhiṃkaranyena  
paratra prayujyate sābdhaḥ sa lākṣaṇiko bhavati  
gangāyām ghoṣaḥ prativasatīti. NM, Part II, p. 171.
is so-called because it invariably involves the qualities (Guna) belonging to what is conveyed as the primary meaning.\(^\text{413}\)

Jagadīśa divides Laksanā into several types. He classifies it into Jahatsvārtha, Ajahatsvārtha, Nīrūdha, Adhunīka, and Gauni.\(^\text{419}\) The term Gauni is not present in the Karika concerned. He, however, explains the word 'ādi' in the Ārthika on the Karika and maintains that the word 'ādi' signifies the Gaunīvṛtti also.\(^\text{420}\) We find Annambhaṭṭa deviating from other Naiyāyikas in the matter. He divides Laksanā into three types as Jahaṭlaksanā, Ajahallaksanā and Jahadajahallaksanā. His example of Jahadajahallaksanā, we may note, is Tattvamasi.\(^\text{421}\)

\(^{418}\) satyam gośabdaḥ svārthamabhidhāya sāsnādimantaṁ
      tādīyaṁ guṇāneva jādyamāndyādīṁ na mūtraṁilakṣayati
      na tāvātṛyeva viramati sa tu sāmānādhikaranyena vāhikeśāṁ
      pravartate, gaurvahika ityevām prayujyamaṁḥ sa gaunō
      bhavati. ibid.

\(^{419}\) Jahatsvārthājahatsvārthanirūdhādhunīkādikāh
      Laksanā vividhāstabhirlakṣakāṁ syādanekadhā.
      SSP, K25, p. 154.

\(^{420}\) Ādīnā sākyasadṛsātvaprapkāreṇa bodhakatayā
gauṇyupaghrhyate. Prose Vṛtti on K25, Ibid.

\(^{421}\) Laksanā trividhā Jahallaksanā, Ajahallaksanā.
      Jahadajhallaksanā ceti yatra vācyārthasyānvayābhavaḥ
      tatra Jahallaksanā. yathā mañcaḥ krosāntiḥ. yatra
      vācyārthasyāpyānvayaḥ, tatra Ajahaditi yathā chatriṇo
      gacchantiḥ yatra vācyāikadesātyāgena ekadesānvayaḥ.
tatra Jahadajahaditi. yathā tattvamasīti.
Visvanātha's classification of Lakṣaṇā, as we have already observed, is at least apparently not precise. He does not give the definition of the sub-varieties of Lakṣaṇā save and except the Lakṣitalakṣaṇā which is again understood by the scholars only as included in the Jahatsvārthā type of Lakṣaṇā. But Visvanātha makes no direct mention of the Jahatsvārthā variety of Lakṣaṇā. He refers to the expression 'chatriṇo yānti' as an example of Ajahatsvārthā Lakṣaṇā and to the expression 'dvirephaḥ' as an example of Lakṣitalakṣaṇā. While illustrating the other expressions as cases of Lakṣaṇā, he makes no mention as to which varieties of Lakṣaṇā they belong to. Though he makes no mention of the Jahatsvārthā type of Lakṣaṇā, his first example of Lakṣaṇā, viz. 'gaṅga-yām ghoṣaḥ' is undoubtedly a stock example of the variety. So the scholars unhesitatingly describe Visvanātha as classifying Lakṣaṇā into two types, namely Jahatsvārthā and Ajahatsvārthā. Notwithstanding Visvanātha's reference to Lakṣitalakṣaṇā, he is not recognised to have divided Lakṣaṇā into three types, because of his including Lakṣitalakṣaṇā as a division of Jahatsvārthā. Dīnakarabhaṭṭa observes that Visvanātha's very treatment of Lakṣitalakṣaṇā is only to arrest the notion that Lakṣitalakṣaṇā is an additional variety.

422. lakṣaṇā dvividhā-jahatsvārthā'jahatsvārthā ca. tatra dyām pradarsāyati gaṅgāyamiti. DK, Vide NSM, p. 285.

It may be pointed out that in the course of ascertaining the Śakti of an Ākhyaṭa, Viśvanātha admits Laksṇāṇa in the Ākhyaṭa of the expression 'naśyati' (say, in the sentence 'ghaṭo naśyati') with regard to the state of being the counterpositive (i.e., pratiyogitvā) (of destruction). He describes the so admitted case of Laksṇāṇa as a NirūḍhaLaksṇāṇa.

Dinakarabhaṭṭa points out that the Laksṇāṇa admitted by Viśvanātha in the Ākhyaṭa 'gacchati' in the sentence, 'ratho gacchati' is also a NirūḍhaLaksṇāṇa. In support of his assertion he maintains that some manuscripts of the Bhāṣapariccheda show the reading as 'nirūḍhaLaksṇāṇa'.

Now, the question arises as to whether this so-called NirūḍhaLaksṇāṇa is same with or different from Rudhimūla Laksṇāṇa. Should we recognise other examples of Laksṇāṇa given in the Bhāṣapariccheda as those of Prayojanamūla Laksṇāṇa or some variety of Laksṇāṇa other than Rudhimūla? Thus the context may lead to many queries. In anticipation of these queries, we may assert that Viśvanātha did not envisiage any division of Laksṇāṇa like the Prayojanamūla. As a matter of fact, all the examples of Laksṇāṇa given by Viśvanātha are Rudhimūla or in other words, his illustrations of Laksṇāṇa donot include any one representing the Prayojanamūla variety. This Nirūḍha Laksṇāṇa stands for certain special cases of Rudhimūla.

Every case of Laksanā presupposes the incompatibility of the speaker's intention with regard to a Sakyārtha leading to the fixation of the Tātparya to a newer meaning which comes to be designated as a Lakṣyārtha. Thus the Tātparya that comes to be directed to the Lakṣyārtha is of later origin, i.e., that originates in subsequent times. But in the case of Mirūḍhalaksanās, the Tātparya is not of immediate origin and cannot be traced back to an immediate past. 425e

Under the circumstances we may explain the term Mirūḍhalaksanā as 'niḥsēṣena rūḍhā lakṣanā' to give the idea that the Laksanā in these cases is as good as Rūḍhi. In other words, the Lakṣyārtha in these cases is a strongly based as a Sakyārtha. But such an explanation should not create an impression that in a Mirūḍhalaksanā, the Tātparya with regard to a Lakṣyārtha is an original one. It also presupposes an earlier 'āmpapatti' of the Tātparya as a result of which the Tātparya comes to be fixed to the present meaning. But in case of a Mirūḍhā Abhidhā as in the word, 'go', the original Tātparya stands and the 'abhedeyārtha' (the conventional meaning) does not suffer any set back by way of making space for a Lakṣyārtha to come in. We may add

425e mirūḍhalaksanāti. anāditātparyavisayalaksanetparthah.
RR, Vide NSM, p. 271;
anāditātparyavisayibhūtārthanistha laksanā.
Tarkapракāsa of Śrīkantha, CH, I, quoted in NK, p. 430.
again that the examples of Laksana given by Visvanātha in the BP may be described as belonging only to the Suddhā variety of the Ālāmkārikas. Visvanātha makes no reference to the Guṇavāda or Guṇavṛtti of the Mīmāṁsakas as well as to the Gauṇī Laksana of the Ālāmkārikas. Here we may point out that some of his colleagues in the school of Nyāya, unhesitatingly accept Gauṇī as only a variety of Laksana, like the Ālāmkārikas.


'But the Pada that conveys a Laksyārtha (i.e., the Laksana Pada) does not lead to the (corresponding) Śabdabodha; it is some other Pada that comes to be the cause for the Śabdabodha derived from the meaning obtained through Laksana (i.e., Laksānakārtha); for Padas have been ascertained as having the competence of leading to the Śabdabodha of their denoted meanings as connected with the meanings of

426. gaunyapi laksanaiva lakṣyamāṇagunasyaśambandhasvarūpā yathā agnimāṇavaka iti. TD, Vide TS, p. 327.
some other Padas by the relation of either Sakti or Lakṣanā.
The new school, however, holds that even this Lākṣanika
Pada can lead to the Śābdabodha. The very recollection of
the meaning of a word is the Dvāra; otherwise on similar
arguments even a Saktā Pada (a word possessed of Sakti)
would fail to lead to any Śābdabodha whatsoever?*

Here in these lines Viśvanātha records a view of the
Mīmāṁsakas along with a counter view of the Naiyāyikas. A
section of the Mīmāṁsakas maintain that a Lākṣanika Pada
(a word that conveys a secondary sense through secondary
function on satisfaction of recognised conditions) cannot
be an Anubhāvaka, i.e., a Śābdabodhajanaka. If a Lākṣanika
Pada like 'gaṅgā' etc. in case of 'gaṅgāyāṁ ghosā' etc. is

[427. kiṁca yadābhidhānata evānvitatapratītīṁ tārhi
(gaṅgāyāṁ ghosā ityādiśu lākṣaṇikasya tīrāderghoṣān-
vitasya pratipattiṁ. na hi tatsvārūpamapi gaṅgā-
śabdasyābhidheyam prāgevānvitam athocyeta.) gaṅgāśab-
dena nimittabhūterthasvārūpe smārite sati tena yatsam-
bandhāt smāritām tīrasvarūpam tenānvitām svārthām
ghoṣaśabdēb' bhidhatte gaṅgāśabdastutīrasmarāṇamātrot' 
payogītī. NRM, p. 87-88.

padajñānāsya ghaṭasābde kena rūpeṇa hetutvamna tāvāt-
padajñāntvena, vyābhicārāt. nāpi ghaṭa-padajñānātvena
----- kintu ghaṭasaktapadajñānātvena na tu vṛttimat
padajñānātvena, vṛttitvāsya saktilakṣaṇānyatagarbhartya-
gauravāt. tena lākṣaṇikaśyānunabhāvakatvam.

TP, BHC, p. 55-56.]
recognised as "the said Anubhāvaka, then the words, 'gaṅgā' etc. shall have to be recognised also as Śakta (denotative) with reference to the senses 'bank' etc. in view of the accepted principle 'tacchābdānubhāvajanakatvam tacchaktatvam' (the denotedness of a word amounts to its causenness to the corresponding Śābdabodhas). The aforesaid principle gives us to recognise only those words as Śakta which are also Śābdānubhavajanaka. In other words, Padas which are instrumental in the matter of producing relevant verbal comprehension are only to be recognised as Śakta (denotative). And if the words like 'gaṅgā' etc. being recognised as the cause of the corresponding verbal comprehension consequently come to be recognised as denotative with reference to senses like 'bank' etc., then there ceases the scope for recognising a Laksanā in these words. Such a development will obviously lead to discarding the very concept of Laksanā in toto. Hence the Mīmāṁsakas do not recognise a Lākṣaṇika Pada as an Anubhāvaka. They regarded another Śakta Pada which is found related to the contextual Lākṣyārtha due to nearness as the Anubhāvaka in these cases where a Lākṣaṇika Pada occurs. As for instance, in case of 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣah', 'gaṅgā' is a Lākṣaṇika Pada and 'ghoṣa' is a Śakta Pada. Here 'ghoṣa' is the cause of Śābdabodha. Or again if 'ghoṣa' is admitted by any one to be Lākṣaṇika in the sense of a fish, the word 'gaṅgā' being the nearby Śakta word comes to be the relevant Anubhāvaka. Now Viśvanātha records a counter view in
‘navinastu’\textsuperscript{428} etc. According to him, the modern scholars do not accept the view of the Mīmāṃśakas. To the contrary, they believe that even a Lākṣaṇīka Pada is an Anubhāvaka. By the word ‘navināḥ’, Viśvanātha means the Nāyāyikas who are much more modern generally speaking, when compared with the Mīmāṃśakas. According to these thinkers, as Viśvanātha records their views, The non-recognition of a Lākṣaṇīka Pada as ‘ananubhāvaka’ would lead to the non-admission of a Saktapada also as such. The idea of these scholars may be laid bare as follows: Irrespective of the involvement of either Sakti or Lākṣaṇā in the matter of obtaining the meaning from a word, the knowledge of the meaning(s) of word(s) i.e., Padarthadhi is the Vyāpāra as the immediate cause of the effect, the Śabdabodha. Now the status of Karaṇa must be given to that knowledge of words, which gives rise to the aforesaid knowledge of meaning, i.e., Padarthadhi which brings about the Śabdabodha. In ‘gāngāyaṁ matsyah’ where there is no scope for the operation of Lākṣaṇā in the word ‘gāṅgā’, the Śabdabodha of the ‘gāṅgā-pada’ (which is a Khaṇḍa-vākya) follows the knowledge of the Śakyaṁtha of ‘gāṅgā’ i.e., a current, and the knowledge of the ‘gāṅgā-pada’ is the contextual Karaṇa. Similarly in ‘gāṅgāyaṁ

\textsuperscript{428} A certain edition of the Bhāṣāpariccheda, namely NSM, does not contain the Muktāvalī text, ‘navinastu ------ ananubhāvakatvāpatterityāhuh’.
ghoṣaḥ where there is the scope for Laksanā to operate in
the word 'gaṅga', the Sābdabodha of the 'gaṅga-pada' follows
only the knowledge of the Lakṣyārtha of 'gaṅga' i.e., a
bank. Just as in 'gaṅgāyām matsyah', the word 'gaṅga' as
a Saktapada becomes an Anubhāvaka, similarly in 'gaṅgāyām
ghoṣaḥ', the word 'gaṅga' as a laksanika-pada becomes the
Anubhāvaka. If a laksanikapada despite of being Vyāpāravat
by way of producing the knowledge of the laksyārtha, the
immediate cause of the contextual Sābdabodha, is denied the
status of an Anubhāvaka, i.e., a Sābdabodhajanaka or Kāraṇa,
there is no point in admitting as Anubhāvaka even a Saktapada only for generating the knowledge of a Sakyārtha which
brings about a Sābdabodha. Of other Naiyāyikas, Gadādhara
makes a distinct reference to this notion of the Mīmāṃsakas
and boldly refutes the same on the same logic. 430

429. cf. na canubhāvakatā'vacchedakasāktyabhāvallākṣanika-
sya nānubhāvakatvasambhavaḥ tairhi vākyārtha ghaṭakā-
thāntara-vācakameva padāṃ svārthasyeva tadanvayapratīvig-
lakṣyārthas yāpyanubhāvakamupeyata iti vācyam ? evaṃ
sati gaṅgāyām ghoṣa ityādau ghoṣādpadasyāpi gaṅgāti-
dirūpārthānubhāvakatā'vacchedakasāktimattvena tadvāc-
kavatvāpatteḥ, atha lakṣyārthasya na sābdabodhe pravesan,
apitu smṛtasya tasya samabhivyāhṛtpadārthairasamsaṃ-
grahamātram, tathā ca nānupapattih. SAK V, p. 23.

430. vastutastu śakyā laksanayā copasthitasya tattadar-
thsasya sābdabodhe bhānādubhaya vidhā tattadarthopasthitere-
va tattadvisayakasābdabodhahetutā vācyā. ibid. p. 32.
In sentences, however, because of the absence of Śakti therein, there is also no Lakṣaṇa, that (i.e., Lakṣaṇa) being a kind of relation of the Śakyārtha with the Laksyārtha.

The observation of Viśvanātha, above, 'vākye tu' etc., has obvious reference to the assertion of the Mīmāṃsakas that Lakṣaṇa pertains to a vākyā (sentence). The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas led by Kumārila maintain that any sentence-meaning must come to us in the form of a Laksyārtha. According to this position, the function of Lakṣaṇa belongs also to a sentence. But the Naiyāyikas claim that Lakṣaṇa may belong to a word and word alone. It is to be noted that of the Naiyāyikas Gaṅgēśa was the first theorist to discuss this problem at great length. In the light of that very discussion

431. vākyārtho lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiva naḥ stitih
vayantu padārthā lakṣaṇayaiva vākyārthāṁ bodhayantitirūmaḥ. MM, p. 94.

432. namu vākyamapi lakṣakāṁ bhavatyeva ----- kathāṁ va
gabhīrāyām nadyāṁ ghōṣa ityādu gabhīrānāditīrasya ?
----- tasmād vākyameva tatra gabhīrānāditīrālaksakamiti
mīmāṁsakāḥ.

Tanna, gabhīrāyām nadyāṁti vibhaktyantabhāgasya
tādṛśatiralaksakatve ghōṣādāvādheyatvena tadanvayanu-
papattetē ----- tasmādgabhīrāpadam nādi-padam va tatra
gabhīrānāditīrālaksakam, padāntarantu tatra tātparyya-
grāhakamiti siddhāntavidāḥ. SSP, p. 140-43.
by Gangesa the later Naiyayikas like Jagadisa and Visvanatha have come to offer arguments with illustration for not recognising Laksana as belonging to a sentence. We propose to discuss the issue with some elaboration in the following pages.

In the Muktavali above, Visvanatha asserts his opposition to the view that there can be operation of Laksana as pertaining to a whole sentence. According to him, as Sakti (Abhidhā) is a function exclusively belonging to a word only (Padamātra-vṛtti), it cannot exist corresponding to a sentence. Consequently there can never be a Laksana also of the form of 'Sakyasambandha' as pertaining to a sentence. As because a sentence does not possess Sakti, it can possess a Sakyarth (the meaning conveyed by Sakti) also. As Laksana is nothing but the relation of this Sakyarth understood with regard to another meaning, the existence of Laksana as pertaining to a sentence can never be thought of. The presence of the word 'tu' in the aforesaid text of the Bhāsāpariccheda is very much significant as it is used to focus an opinion in sharp contrast to that of other important schools of thought like Mīmāṃsa, Vyākaraṇa and Alamkara.

In the face of the divergent views, we are to take note first of the Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiyākaraṇas. These scholars regard Laksana as a Vākyavyāpāra. The Naiyāyikas in contrast understand Laksana only as a Padamātra-vṛtti. The Vedāntins
and the Ālāmārīkās accept the two extreme positions as they understand Lākṣānā both in Pāda and Vākyā.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakās, as we have already referred to, believe that every Vākyārtha (sentence-meaning) is a Lākṣānyārtha (secondary meaning). They hold that the primary meanings conveyed by the words through Sākṣi or Abhidhā lead up to a sentence-meaning to be conveyed by Lākṣānā. Abhidhā ceases to operate after conveying the primary meaning of each word. These primary or expressed meanings conveyed by Sākṣi constitute a sentence-meaning. This sentence-meaning is conveyed by Lākṣānā. Thus with the Bhāṭṭas, every Vākyārtha is a Lākṣānyārtha as because every Vākyā invariably requires the operation of a Lākṣānā to get its meaning conveyed.

The Prabhākaras, as Anvītābhidhānavaṭīṇs, believe that words convey their own meanings not in isolation. According to them, the words in a sentence get syntactically related and then come to convey the sentence-meaning. In case there

433. SV, Vākyā, 229; MM, p. 94; ata eva vākyārtho lākṣānika iti Mīmāṁsakāḥ. NRM, pp. 101-12

434. tasmāṇna vākyāṁ na padāṁi sākṣād / vākyārthabudhīṁ janayantī kintu // padasvarupādbhihitaṁ padarthaṁ / saṁlaksyate'sāviti Siddhametat. 42, Vide ibid, p. 102.

435. padebhya eva vākyārthapratyayo jāyate yathā / tathā vayaṁ nibadhīṁnaḥ prabhākaraṇaḥ // --- yadyadākāṃśitaṁ yogyaṁ sannidhānāṁ pratapadyate / tadanvītāḥ padarthaḥ svakhyāḥ pratipādyate //

VM, pp. 1-5, Vide PP.
arises any incompatibility in the context of the syntactical relation (anvayānupapatti), of the primary meanings of the individual words, Laksanā comes in to remove the inconsistency.  

Now when a word occurs alone, there is no question of 'anvaya' or syntactical relation. Hence there is no problem of incompatibility in the syntactical relation (Anvayānupapatti) of the primary meanings. As the Prābhākaras believe only in Anvayānupapatti as the Laksanabija, they find no scope at all of Laksanā as pertaining to a single word. The Prābhākaras also, in the light of the above arguments, hold that Laksanā comes to operate in a sentence only when it reveals some hindrance for individual word-meanings to be involved in a syntactical relation in order to give the sentence-meaning. Under the circumstances, Prābhākaras reject the notion of the Bhāṭtas.

As interpreters of the Vedic injunctions which appear in the form of sentences, the Mīmāṃsakas accept Laksanā in a Vākyā for obvious reasons. Whenever any difficulty arises in explaining a Vedic text, they have to take the help of Laksanā. But we shall have to bear in mind that while the

436. vācyasyārthasya vākyartho sambandhānupapattitah
tatśambandhavasaprāptasyānvayāllakṣaṇācyate.
ibid, p. 13.

437. vārtikākārapādāstū lākṣaṇīkām sarvavākyārthānicchante
----- vākyārtho lakṣaṇamāno hi sarvatraiva hi lakṣyate,
iti atrāpare bruvate-neyām lakṣaṇā. svārthāparityāgyant
----- anupapattyā sambandhena ca lakṣaṇā bhavati.
Bhāṭṭas accept Lākṣaṇā in all sentences and again not only in Vaidika (scriptural) but also in laukika (popular) ones, the Prābhākaras find the scope of Lākṣaṇā only in sentences which involve Anvāyānupapatti. The stock-example of both the schools recognising Vākya-Lākṣaṇā or Lākṣaṇā as pertaining in the whole sentence is 'gabhīrayām nadyām ghoṣaḥ'. While opposing the recognition of Vākya-Lākṣaṇā Visvānātha explains his position with the help of this very illustration. Hence we need elaboration of the Mīmāṃsakas' view with regard to this illustration of theirs. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, 'gabhīrayām nadyām ghoṣaḥ' is a case of Lākṣaṇā. It is because they admit Lākṣaṇā with reference to a whole sentence. In their view, the intended sense, 'the bank of a deep river' is conveyed neither by the term 'gabhīra' alone nor by the word 'nadi' alone. If the word 'gabhīra' conveys the Lakṣyārtha (the bank) and the word 'nadi' retains its primary sense, a syntactical relation between the two words cannot be thought of. It is because of the impossibility of identification between a bank and a river. If the word 'nadi' again is taken to convey the secondary sense (the bank) and the word 'gabhīra' is allowed to retain its primary meaning, it is not possible to have the mutual relation between the

438. nanu vākyamāpi lakṣakaṁ bhavatyeva, -----------
tasmād vākyameva tatra gabhīraṇadītīralakṣakaṁ iti
mīmāṁsakaṁ. SSP, p. 140.
two words; because the bank of a river cannot be deep. It is again not possible to have both the words conveying the secondary sense. In that case, the same secondary sense will find itself difficult to be syntactically related with two different primary meanings of two different words. Again there can be no justification for getting the same meaning twice from two different words. Hence they suggest that the proper process is as follows. The syntactical relation between the two primary meanings, i.e., 'deep' and 'river' is first effected. Thereafter, the sentence as a whole, conveys the secondary sense, 'the bank of the deep river' by means of Lākṣaṇā. This secondary sense is related to the two primary meanings. In other words, the Vākyārtha, i.e., what is conveyed by the Vākya is something related to the meaning 'deep river' and that is no other than 'the bank of a deep river'.

But here we must not forget that to the Bhaṭṭas who regard every Vākyārtha as a Lākṣyārtha, the expression 'gabhīrāyām nādyām ghoṣah' is automatically an illustration of Vākyalākṣaṇā without any involvement of 'anupapatti' (incompatibility) as such. The idea of this view of Mīmāṁsakas can be gathered from the Tattvacintāmani of Gangesopādhyāya who records the position of Mīmāṁsakas as his
The Naiyāyikas in complete opposition to the Mīmāṁsakas, hold that Laksanā may belong only to a Pada (word) and not to a Vākyya (sentence). Laksanā is, undoubtedly, only a substitute for Śakti. Since Śakti belongs to the word, Lakṣanā also necessarily belongs to the word only. Hence there can be no possibility of Lakṣanā as belonging to a whole sentence. As Gaṅgeśa puts it, Lakṣanā like Śakti is only a Pada-Vṛtti. We must note that the Naiyāyikas always discuss the concept of Pada-Vṛtti (Verbal functions) in respect of isolated words. They define Lakṣanā as a relation between the Śakyārtha and the Lakṣyārtha. The Śakyārtha may be presented only by what possesses a Śakti. Hence Lakṣanā also remains associated with what possesses the Śakti. It is already known that only a Pada possesses the Śakti.  


440. lakṣanā ca padavṛttirvṛttitvāt śaktivat. TC, p. 718.

441. saktam padam. TS, p. 66; M, under K 81.
is that as there is no Śakti in a Vākya, there is no Śakyārtha also in it. And consequently there is no Laksanā (Śakyasambandha) in a Vākya. We may refer to Gaṅgesopādhyāya and Viśvanātha in this context. Viśvanātha's text in the Muktāvalī, 'vākye tu' etc. confirms his position. Now of all the Naiyāyikas, the author of the Tattvācintāmaṇi handles the problem more seriously and elaborately. Gaṅgesā first presents the views of Prabhākaras, as we have already mentioned, as the 'pūrvapakṣa' in the context. He reproduces the view of the Mīmāṁsakas and in reply maintains that as a sentence as a whole cannot have a Śakyārtha. It is because the Laksyārtha is only a substitute for a Śakyārtha. It may be argued that the Vākyārtha (which is conveyed by the sentence as a whole) is the 'anvaya' (the syntactical relation) of the meanings of the individual words in the sentence and the 'anvaya' is conveyed by the words only being in a group and not individually. In such a context, Gaṅgesā feels otherwise. According to him, the individual word itself conveys the idea of 'anvaya' of its own meaning. The group cannot convey the idea of an 'anvaya' of the meanings of words belonging to it. It is because a group cannot have a definite primary meaning of its own. The Śakyārtha, therefore, belongs only to the individual word.

442. vākyasya jñāpyābhāvema jñāpyasambandhābhāvānna laksanā. TC, p. 72.
and never to a group. Consequently Laksanā as Śakyasambandha can belong to the word (Pada) and never to a sentence (Vākyā). 443 We have already referred to Gaṅgesa's recording the arguments of Mīmāṁsakas with regard to their example of Vākyalaksanā 'gabhīrayām nadyam ghoṣah'. In his refutation of the Mīmāṁsakas' view, Gaṅgesa observes thus: The words 'gabhīra' and 'nadi' first get involved in an 'anvaya' and present the idea of 'a deep river'. Then either of the two words comes to convey the idea of 'the bank of a deep river', as a Laksyārtha. This Laksyārtha is related to the Śakyārtha of the word which is taken to have conveyed the Laksyārtha in the context. 444 Thus it is not the sentence but a single word, either 'gabhīra' or 'nadi', which conveys the Laksyārtha. It may be pointed out that there being no decisive factor as to which of the two words would convey the Laksyārtha, one shall have to admit Laksanā in both the words. In admitting a Vākyalaksanā, the opponents may argue, only one Laksanā would suffice. In reply to such arguments,

443. athānvaṇyabodhakaṁ vākyām padāni hi sambhūyārthāṁ vayaṁ bodhayanti na pratyekamātramīti cet. na padāṁ hi svārthānvaṇyāṁ bodhayati na tu samuḥaṁ samuhe svārthabhāvāt. ibid. p. 721.

444. tathaḥ hi gabhīranaṇyoraṇvayaḥbodhottaram nadipadaṁ gabhīrapadaṁ vā svajñāpyagabhīranaṇyāstīrṇaṁ lakṣayati na vākyam. ibid, p. 722.
Garigesa maintains that even in case of admitting Vākya lakṣaṇā, one is required to recognise Lakṣaṇā in both the words for the same reason, i.e., the lack of a decisive factor. In the event of a Vākya-lakṣaṇā one shall have to admit the third Lakṣaṇā in the Vākya in addition to the two Lakṣaṇās already admitted in the two words. Under the circumstances, Gaṅgēsā strongly argues that the admission of Lakṣaṇā in a Pada instead of in a Vākya does not involve the fallacy of Gaurava. Hence the question of admitting Lakṣaṇā in a Vākya in preference to a single Pada does not arise. In the example under discussion, the Lakṣaṇa is to be admitted as belonging to either of the two words 'gabhīra' and 'nadi'. As a matter of fact it is the word 'nadi' to which Lakṣaṇā belongs. It is because the meaning of the word 'nadi' is directly connected with the bank while that of the word 'gabhīra' is only remotely associated with it (the bank). This logic of Gaṅgēsā comes to be accepted by his successors in the school of Nyāya. Sharing the same opinion, we presume, Visvānātha, as we shall see.

445. na ca vinigamakābhāvāt padayūrlakṣaṇādvyayaṁ vākye caikaiva lakṣaṇeti yuktam, pada klṛptatvādvākyāpeksava laṅhutvācca pada eva lakṣaṇānyathā vinigamakābhāvāllakṣaṇādvyayaṁ pada ekā vākye cāparā lakṣaṇeti gauravaṁ syāt. ibid, p. 722-23.

446. vastutastu gabhīrapadat svārtha-paramparāsambandhena lakṣopasthitau vilambānnadīpadat svārthasāksat sambandhena sīghram tīropasthitisambhavāttatraiva lakṣaṇā. ibid. p. 723-34.
in succeeding text of the Muktavali, categorically asserts that in the example, 'gabhārāyam nadyām ghosah', it is the word 'nādi' that conveys the Lakṣyārtha, i.e., the bank of a deep river.

M(37a) yatra tu gabhārāyam nadyām ghosah ityuktam, tatra nādīpadasya nāditīre laksanā gabhīrapadārthasya nadya sahābhedenānvayaḥ, kvacidekadesānvayasyāpi svikṛtavat. yadi tatraikadesānvayo na svikriyate, tada nādīpadasya gabhīranadītīre laksanā gabhīrapadām tātparyagrāhakam.

'Where it is said, 'gabhārāyam nadyām ghosah' (the cowherd colony is in the deep river), there is Lakṣanā of the word 'nādi' with regard to the bank of the river: the meaning of the word 'gabhāra' comes to be connected by the relation of identification with the river (the meaning of the word 'nādi'), as sometimes even the connection with the part (of a word) is also admitted. If the connection with the part (of a word) is not admitted, then there would be Lakṣanā of the word 'nādi' with regard to 'the bank of the deep river' and the word 'gabhāra' (deep) would be a pointer to the intention of the speaker.' In the text of the Muktavali above, viz. 'yatra to --------- tātparyagrāhakam', Visvanātha shows the operation of Padalakṣanā in the Mimāṃsakas' example of Vākyalakṣanā. As we have already noted, the sentence 'gabhārāyam nadyām ghosah' is the stock example of Vākyalakṣanā in the circle of Mimāṃsakas. As such, the Naiyāyikas
have come to discuss it whenever they find scope for dealing with the problem of recognising Lakṣaṇā in the entire sentence.

We have already pointed out that Gaṅgeśa, the eminent predecessor of Viśvanātha has discussed the Mīmāṃsakas' arguments in the context and has finally asserted that the inconsistency in the syntactical relation involved in the expression could be removed by a Padalakṣaṇa. He does not find any necessity for recognising a Vākyalakṣaṇa in the context of the expression under discussion. Jagadīśa also comes to reject the view of the Mīmāṃsakas and to establish the logic of recognising a Laksana in one of the Padas constituting the sentence. Viśvanātha, however, does not directly refer to the opposing school of thought. Without any discussion of the earlier views on the subject, he briefly records the latest position already arrived at in his circle.

Viśvanātha does not go for elaborate discussion, inasmuch as the recognition of a Padalakṣaṇa instead of a Vākyalakṣaṇa for adequately explaining the expression 'gabhīrayām'.

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447. vastutāḥ padalakṣaṇaśayaiyapapattau na vākyalakṣaṇa, tathā hi gabhīraṇaṃdyoranvayabodhottram nadipadām gabhīrapadām vā svajñāpyagabhīranadyāstīram laksayati na vākyam. ibid. p. 722.

448. nanu vākyamapi laksakaṃ ------ mīmāṃsakah tanna ------- SSP, p. 140-41.
etc. already has come to be an established fact in his own school of thought. In the event of admitting a Padalakṣāna in the expression 'gabhīrāyām' etc., either of both the words 'nadi' and 'gabhīra' stands competent to have a Lakṣāṇā. But the relation between 'the bank' and 'deep' (the meaning of the word 'gabhīra') is obviously very remote in comparison with that between 'the bank' and 'the river' (the meaning of the word 'nadi'). So Gaṅgesa justifiably prefers the Lakṣāṇā from the word 'nadi' and not the word 'gabhīra'. Unlike Jagadīśa, Visvanātha follows Gaṅgesa in this regard. In admitting that in the example 'gabhīrāyām nadyām ghoṣāḥ', it is the word 'nadi' that conveys the Lakṣyārtha, i.e., the bank of the deep river, a very pertinent question arises, as to why the word 'gabhīra' should not be supposed to be redundant. In anticipation of such a question, we may presume that Visvanātha in his BP offers two alternative solutions.

449. vastutastu gabhirapadāt svārthaparamparāsambandhena lakṣyopasthitau vilambannādīpadāt. svārthasākṣāt sambandhena śīghram tīropasthitāsambhavāttatraiva lakṣaṇā.
TC, p. 723-24.

450. tasmādgabhīrāpadām nādīpadām vā tatra gabhīra-nadītīralakṣakam. SSP, p. 143.
(1) The word 'nadi' presents the idea of 'the bank of the river' as the 'laksyartha'. The word 'gabhira' conveys its primary meaning 'deep' which gets involved in a syntactical relation with the meaning 'river'. The two meanings get related as completely identified. But the meaning 'river' is only a part of the meaning 'the bank of the deep river'. Now the connection between 'deep' and 'river' is possible inasmuch as sometimes such a partial syntactical connection (ekadesanvaya) is found to be sanctioned (in cases like 'devadattasya gurukulam' and 'devadattasya guruputraḥ'). We may here add that this concept of 'ekadesānvaya' may be traced back in its origin to Pāṇinian rule 'Samarthaḥ padaviddhiḥ'.

(2) If the principle of 'ekadesānvaya' is not accepted, the word 'nadi' alone may be taken to convey a (wider) secondary sense, i.e., 'the bank of a deep river'. In such a case, the word 'gabhira' with its primary meaning simply will serve as the Tātparyagrāhaka (a pointer or index to the intention of the speaker in the context). We, however, shall have to add that the idea of admitting a word (other than that which presents the Laksyartha) as the Tātparya grāhaka in the context of explaining 'gabhirayām' etc. by way of recognising only a Padalaksanā, has been originally

451. devadattasya gurukulam devadattasya guruputraḥ devadattasya dasabhāryeti. MB under P.2.1.1, vide VBM, p. 360.
There also in words like 'citragu' (the person with the dappled cow), if the connection with the part (of a word) is admitted, then there is Laksana of the word 'go' with regard to(792,147),(958,159) (the owner of the cow), 'dappled' (the meaning of the word 'citra') being connected by the relation of identity with 'cow' (the meaning of the word 'go'). In the event of not admitting the connection with the part (of a word), there is the Lakṣaṇa of the word 'go' with regard to the owner of the dappled cow (citragosvāmin), the word 'citra' (meaning 'dappled') is the pointer to the Tātparya (intention of the speaker). Thus in 'āruḍhavānaro vrkṣa' (a tree climbed by a monkey), there is the Lakṣaṇa of the word 'vānara' (monkey) with regard to 'vānara-ārogya-karma' (the object of the act of climbing of the monkey) and

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452. padantarantu tatra tātparyyagrahakamiti siddhāntavidah. SSP, p. 143.
the word 'ārūdha' is the pointer to the Tatparya. Thus in other (similar) cases also.'

Now in the text of the Muktāvalī above, Visvanātha proceeds to the controversial issue of recognising Laksana in Samāsas. Before we come to examine the text of Visvanātha, it is necessary on our part to have a prior knowledge of the problem as is being handled by other scholars in different schools of thought.

The Mīmāṃsakas admit Laksana in certain Samāsas. They admit it in the entire samāsa and not merely in a constituent word of it. To the contrary, the Naiyāyikas including Visvanātha admit Laksana not in an entire samāsa but in one of the component parts of it. The Grammarians, on the other hand, do not find any scope of admitting Laksana either in the whole or any part of a compounded word. They find the purpose served by the Sakti itself. Hence the issue of recognising Laksana in Samāsas deserves a bit elaborate discussion.

As we have already observed, the Mīmāṃsakas recognise the meaning of certain Samāsas as Laksyārtha. In the context of the sacrifice called 'Raudreṣṭi', there is the Vedic injunction, 'etaya niṣadasthapatīm yājayet', the word 'yājayet' literally means 'should make some one else perform a sacrifice'. But the act of causing others to perform a sacrifice is a professional activity of a
brahmin. It is obviously concerned with some material gain. It is, therefore, to be admitted that there cannot be any injunction in this literal sense of the word 'yājajayet'. Hence the word 'yājajayet' is to be taken to bear the meaning of 'yajet' (one should perform a sacrifice oneself). Now the question is whether the 'niśādasthapatī' who is enjoined to perform the sacrifice should be understood as 'niśādascāsau sthapatīśva' or as 'niśādānāṁ sthapatīṁ'. In the former case we understand some one who is a Niśāda by caste and who is at the same time a leader or chief. In the latter, we understand from the word some one as leader of the Niśādas, himself not necessarily being a Niśāda by caste. The former is a case of Karmadharaya samāsa and in the latter, we have a case of Tatpuruṣa samāsa. If we take the compounded word as a Karmadharaya, on the strength of this Vedic injunction, even a Niśāda, an outcaste would have the right to perform a sacrifice. Yet Jaimini prefers this alternative only because he finds a Karmadharaya samāsa without any involvement of Laksana. On the plea that the meaning of the word 'niśādasthapatī' as a Karmadharaya can be had directly by means of Sruti (Śakti), he shows his anxiety to avoid a Tatpuruṣa compound in the very word as it obviously involves a Laksana compound. To show that there is no scope at all for Laksana in a Karmadharaya compound, the author of the Bhāṣāpariccheda indirectly refers to this position of the Māmāṁsakas by way of illustrating their
approach with this very example. Now to pursue the matter again, in order to solve the conflict between possible direct and secondary meanings arising out of the formation of the word 'nisādasthapati', Jaimini observes that the 'sthapati' (chief) should be taken to be a Niṣāda by caste as because that is the (direct) meaning of the word. Sabaravāmin makes the point clear. We come to know from him that Mīmāṁsakas' preference to the former interpretation of the expression 'nisādasthapati' is because of its not involving a Lakṣaṇā. The latter interpretation shows a case of 'saṣṭhitatpurusasamāsa' that obviously involves the operation of a Lakṣaṇā. Whenever there is a conflict between a direct meaning (conveyed by Abhidhā) and a secondary meaning (conveyed by Lakṣaṇā), it is the principle of the Mīmāṁsakas to accept a direct meaning and to reject the secondary meaning. The later Mīmāṁsakas also are anxious to discard the meaning of the word 'nisādasthapati' when

453. sthapatirniṣādah syācchabdasāmartyat. MS 6.1.31.
454. niṣāda eva sthapatirbhavitumarhati. kasmāt sābdasāmartyat. niṣādam hi niṣādasābdah sāknoti vādītuṁ śravanaṁaiva. niṣādānāṁ tu sthapatīṁ lakṣaṇayā brūvat. śrutilaṅkṣanāṁvāya ca śrutinīṁyaṁ, na lakṣaṇā.

SB, under ibid.
understood as a TatpurusA compound. This very context of interpreting a Vedic injunction bears testimony to the fact that at least in certain Samāsas like Tatpurusa, the Mīmāṃsakas take the meaning to be a Laksyārtha while in some others like Karmadhāraya they take the meaning of the Samāsa only as a Sākyārtha. We shall discuss the reasons for the admission or otherwise of a Laksanā in different Samāsas in the context of our examination of the relevant Bhāṣāpariccheda text.

Already we know that the Mīmāṃsakas do not admit Padalaksanā. Whenever they have to admit the operation of Laksanā either universally (as by the Bhāṭṭas) or casually (as by the Prabhakaras) they understand the Laksyārtha from the entire sentence. In other words, they recognise Vākyalaksanā only. So in case of samasas also, whenever they have to recognise a Laksanā, they do it not in any of the component parts. Instead they understand Laksyārtha from the Samāsa as a whole. As a Samāsa is nothing but a compressed sentence, their concept of Vākyalaksanā also does not suffer thereby.

Similarly the position of the Naiyāyikas as regards recognising Laksanā in Samāsas is linked up with their approach to the problem of recognition of Laksanā in a

455. dvijah sthapatirjbyo vā dvijah saṭṭhisamāsatah.
karmadhārayamukhyatvānīśado raudrayāgakṛdī .......
JNV 5.4.18.
Vākya. As we already know, the Naiyāyikas do not admit Lakṣaṇā in a Vākya (i.e., a sentence as a whole). In their view, Lakṣaṇā may belong to one of the several individual words comprising a sentence. Because of this position of the Naiyāyikas, with regard to Vākyalakṣaṇā, it is obvious that they do not come to recognise Lakṣaṇā also in a Samāsa as a whole. It is because a Samāsa is for them a Compressed sentence only. They feel that to recognise a Lakṣaṇā in a Samāsa will virtually amount to recognising a Lakṣaṇā in a Vākya (a full sentence). So with all anxiety to avoid recognising Lakṣaṇā in a Samāsa, the Naiyāyikas assert that whenever a Lakṣyārtha is to be conveyed in a Samāsa, the corresponding Lakṣaṇā operates as belonging to any one of the component words of the compound. Amongst the Naiyāyikas, Gaṅgaśa and Viśvanātha have exhaustively examined the operation of Lakṣaṇā in different types of compounds (Samāsas). Particularly Viśvanātha's treatment of the issue is very lucid and clear. We shall come to discuss the position of both the Naiyāyikas in the context of our examination of the relevant BP text.

Now to make a mention of the Grammarians, first we are to note their difference in the context from both the Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas. It is because the Vaiyākaraṇas have difference with them in respect of the nature of the implication of Sakti itself. To the Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas there is no Sakti in a Vākya as well as in a
Samāsa which is nothing but a condensed sentence (Vākya). But unlike the thinkers of these two schools the Vaiyākaraṇas understand Śakti as belonging to a Samāsa as a whole. The Grammarians want a Samāsa to be recognised as a single word endowed with Śakti and Śakyaṛtha. It is because they are anxious to maintain the status of Samāsa as a Pratipadika. Their idea is this: If a Samāsa is supposed to be 'śabdasaṃudāya' (a cluster of words) and not as an 'ekapada' (a single word), it will not be possible to apply the definition of Pratipadika to it.

Patanjali in his Mahābhāṣya, under Pāṇini's sūtra 'Arthavadhāturapratyāḥ prātipadikam' (p. 1.2.45) maintains that a cluster of words (śabdasaṃudāya) being meaningless is not entitled to be a Pratipadika. Patanjali's example of samudāya (a cluster of words) as 'aprātipadika' for being 'anarthaka' is 'daśādādimāṇiḥṣaḍaṇḍūpāḥ'. This samudāya, though meaningful, is treated as meaningless. The idea is this: a cluster of words, even though meaningful is to be treated as meaningless only to exclude it from the list of Pratipadikas. Now then a Samāsa must be recognised as a single word and not as a cluster of words. If it be taken as a cluster of words, it will come to be treated as meaningless and will, as a result, be excluded from the list.
of the Prātipadikas. But such a position is not desirable as because in the rule Kṛttaddhitasamāsāśca, a Samāsa is clearly given the status of a Prātipadika. Thus, accordingly, to the Grammarians, a Samāsa is a single word. It is a Prātipadika and the meaning conveyed by it is a Śakyārtha.

Now we find that in a Samāsa like 'citragu', the entire Samāsa comes to convey the meaning, 'the master of spotted cows' (gosvāmin). This meaning is obviously different from what should have been the direct meanings of the component parts of the compound, namely, 'citra' and 'go'. The Grammarians, in that case, understand unhesitatingly this meaning, i.e., 'the master of spotted cows' as the immediate direct meaning (Śakyārtha) of the Samāsa itself without any reference to what could have been the direct meanings of the word 'citra' and 'go'. Thus in the view of the Grammarians, Samāsārtha is a variety of Śakyārtha. If they fail to explain a Samāsārtha as Yaugika, they would then do it as

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456. arthavati prātipadikasamājñāyamanekeṣāpi padasya prātipadikasaṃjñā prāpnotī. 'daśā dādīmāni śaḍapūpāh, kunḍamajājinaḥ palalapiṇḍaḥ adharorukmeta-kumāryaḥ sphaiyakṛtasya pitā pratiśīna iti samudāyo' trānartuṇakaj. MBH, under P 1.2.45, vide VMB, p. 217.

457. P 1.2.46.
either Rudha or Yogarudha. As a representative of later Grammarians, Nagesa endorses the old view that in order to maintain its status as a Pratipadika, a Samasa is to be admitted as an unitary word and the Samasartha is invariably to be recognised as a Sakyartha.

As we see in the Muktavali above, Visvanatha, first of all, takes up the case of Bahuvrihi. He gives the example of 'citragu' wherein he shows that the Samasa has two constituent parts, i.e., the two words 'citra' and 'go'. The word 'citra' means 'spotted' and the word 'go' means a 'cow'. But the compound instead of meaning this 'spotted cow' means 'the owner of spotted cows'. This latter meaning is not a Sakyartha of either of the two words 'citra' and 'go'. Hence the meaning is undoubtedly a Laksyartha. But this Laksyartha can not belong to the compound as a whole as that will amount to the recognition of Laksyartha in a Vakya. Hence in the view of Visvanatha, as we understand him, whatever Laksyartha we get here must belong to any one of the two words. For arriving at this...

458. atrocyate - samase saktyasvikaare visistasyartha- vattvabhaavana pratipadikatvaam na syat. ata evarthava- vatsute bhase 'arhavaditi kim, arthavatam samudayo'- narthakaah - dasa daa>dimaani sadapupaha kundamaja'jinam' iti pratyudha>rtam. evam ca rajapurusapadayostvanmate pratyekamarthavattve'pi samudayaasya dasaadima>divadan- arthakatvaaatpratipadikatvahanapatteh. PLM, p. 234.
position, he offers two solutions as follows:

(i) If the principle of partial syntactical connection is not to be objected to, the word 'go', the second member of the compound may be taken as presenting the Lakṣyārtha as 'gosvāmin' (the master of the cows). The Sakyārtha of 'citra', the first member of the Compound, i.e., 'spotted' comes to have a syntactical relation with the meaning 'cow' which forms a part (ekadesa) of the whole secondary meaning, i.e., 'master of the cows'. In case of not recognising 'ekadesānvyaya', (the principle of partial syntactical connection), Viśvanātha suggests his second alternative.

(ii) Of the two words 'citra' and 'go', the latter may be taken as presenting the entire Lakṣyārtha, i.e., the idea of 'a master of spotted cows'. In that case, the whole desirable meaning is conveyed by only one of the two words and the other comes to be redundant. Viśvanātha's approach in this context seeks to save the other word from the charge of being redundant. The author of the Bhāṣāpariccheda maintains that the other word, i.e., 'citra' in the aforesaid example, serves as the Tatparyagrāhaka (a pointer to the intention of the speaker involved in the presentation of the Lakṣyārtha by a word like 'go' in the expression under discussion). Viśvanātha's idea is this: As in generally the case with the Naiyāyikas, the Tatparyanupapatti has been already accepted as the basic condition for the operation of Laksanā function. When the Sakyārtha obtained
in a context does not satisfy or bring out the intention of the speaker there is the scope for Lakṣaṇā. Hence the cognition of a Lakṣyārtha must invariably be preceded by the knowledge of Tatparya which must be made known by some factors like the present one. Hence in the view of Viśva-
nātha, one will not find scope for treating as redundant the other word, i.e., the word other than the Lakṣaka (the word that conveys the secondary sense). Prior to Viśvanātha, Gaṅgesā also pointed out that in case Lakṣaṇā be admitted in one of the Padas of the Compound, the remaining one should not be viewed as useless. 459

Gaṅgesā discusses the scope of the operation of Lakṣaṇā in Bahuṛīhi Compound so elaborately that his discourse runs to as many as twenty six pages in his Tattvacintāmaṇi. He examines the opinion that Lakṣaṇā is to be admitted in the entire compound to convey the meaning (Anyapadartha) of the compound, which is different from the Sakyārthas of the constituent words. 460 He also pays his attention to

459. na caivamekapade lakṣaṇaṇaya itarapadavaiyarthyaṁ
    itarapadamahimnaiva viśeṣasya lakṣaṇaṁyatatvaṁ. TC, p.727.
460. nanu bahuṛīhau citragumānayetatra vākyārthacitra-
    gosvāminah sambandhitaya anyapadarthasya pratītērvākya
    evānyapadarthe lakṣaṇa etc. TC, p. 727.
the opposite view that a Sakti covering the entire compound i.e., Samudayasakti is to be admitted for the purpose.462

After a vigorous analysis of the issue, Gaṅgeśa concludes that the best and simplest possible solution lies in admitting Lakṣaṇa in only one of the constituent words.462 'Ārūḍhavānaro vṛksa' is the other instance of Bahuvrīhi compound given by Viśvanātha for showing that the operation of a Lakṣaṇa in a compound takes places in respect of one of the constituent members (words) and not as belonging to the entire compound. In the case of 'Ārūḍhavānaro vṛksa', the latter member of the compound, the word 'vānara' gives 'vānarārohaṇakarma' (the object of the act of climbing by the monkey) as its Lakṣyārtha with the aid of Lakṣaṇa. The first member of the compound, i.e., the word 'ārūḍha' serves as the 'Tatparyagrāhaka' in the context. We may and

462. atraḥuḥ - anastamitapadapadārthavibhāgasya citrau—samudāyasānyonyānvitāvayavārthasambandhinyapadārthas saktih kalpyeta ——— anyapadārtha eva sakya iti. ibid, pp. 738-45.

462. atra brumah bahuvṛihau na vākye lakṣaṇaṁ kintu pane ——— bahuvṛīhīsthapadadvaye nirūḍhā lakṣaṇaṁ tayaivānya-padārtho tatparyaniyomopapattau samudāyasāktau mānabhāvāṁ talyābhāgavallakṣaṇaivāvastu. TC, pp. 745-46;

Gaṅgeśa rules out the suspicion that as the padapadārtha virtually comes to signify the total meaning of the sentence in the form of the compound, it may be viewed as the very vākyalakṣaṇa. cf. na caivaṁ vākyārthabodha-kapadalakṣaṇāḥ hyayameva vākyalakṣaṇā, padavākyayorbhi-nnativāṁ. TC, p. 736.
that Jagadīśa refers to the Laksana involved in a Bahuvrihi compound as a Nirūḍhā one and gives the expression 'ārūḍha-
vānaro (vrksa) as the first illustration in the context. Gaṅgeśa who preceded both Visvanātha and Jagadīśa already asserted that Laksana involved in a Bahuvrihi compound is of the 'nirūḍhā' type. In 'evamanyatāpi', Visvanātha observes that similarly is the case also with other expressions involving Bahuvrihi compounds. To reiterate the position, he is prepared to admit Laksana only in respect of one of the component words. Of this compound, the other word, according to him, is there to serve as the Tatparvakgrāhaka.

463. cf. bahuvrīhiḥ svagarbhārthasambandhitvena bodhar#

Makaḥ. nirūḍhayā lakṣaṇayā svāmśajñāpakasabdavān ... 43.
-----------'ārūḍhavānaro vrksa' ityatrārūḍho vānaro

yamiti vyutpattvā svakarmakārohaṅkaratvāṅharasambandhit

vena vrksa. SSP, pp. 244-45.

464. bahuvrīhisthapadadvaye nirūḍhā lakṣaṇa. TC, p. 126.
C 423 )

M(39). tatpuruse tu pūrvapade lakṣaṇā. tathāhi- rājapuruṣa ityādau rājapadārthena puruṣādipādārthasya sākṣānān-vayaḥ, nipātātiriktanāmārthayor bhvendorā'nvayabodhaṃvyutpannatvāt. anyathā rājapuruṣa ityatrapī tathānva-yabodhaḥ syāt. paṭo na ghaṭa ityādau ghaṭapatābhyaḥ; naññaḥ sākṣādevānvaśad - nipātātiriktetī. nīlo ghaṭa ityādau nāmārthayorabhedaśambandhenā'nvayaḥ - bhedenneti. na ca rājapuruṣa ityādau luptavibhakteḥ smaraṇām kalpyami vācyam; asmṛtavibhakterapi tato bodhodavāt. tasmād rājapadādau rājasambandhirīlakṣaṇā. tasya ca puruṣoṣaṇa sahaḥbhedānvayaḥ.

'In a Tatpurusa (compound), however, there is Lakṣaṇa with regard to the first word (pūrvapada). As for illustration, in words like 'rājapuruṣa' (a royal officer), the meaning of the word 'rājan' (King) cannot be directly connected with that of the word 'puruṣa' (Person), for it is contrary to the rule to admit the direct relation of the meanings of two Nāma-padas, not intercepted by particle (nipātātirikta), otherwise even in 'rājapuruṣa', similar connection will have to be conceded to. In sentences like 'paṭo na ghaṭaḥ' (A cloth is not a jar) the meaning of naññaḥ (not) is directly connected with those of 'ghaṭaḥ' and 'paṭaḥ'. Hence the expression 'nipātātirikta' (i.e., other than particles). In expressions like 'nīlo ghaṭaḥ' (blue jar), the two meanings of 'nāmapadas (names) are connected.
by the relation of identity (abhedasambandha). Hence the word 'bhedena' (by a relation of difference). It cannot be said that the recollection of some elided case-ending should be imagined in (the expressions) 'rājapuruṣa' etc. for even a person without (such) a recollection of case-ending comes to understand the meaning from the words themselves. Therefore, in words like 'rājan' there is Lakṣāṇā with regard to 'rājasambandhin'. That (rājasambandhin, i.e., the thing or being pertaining to the king) comes to be connected with the meaning of the word 'puruṣa' by the relation of identity.'

In case of Tatpuruṣa Samāsa, Viśvanātha like his predecessors, Gaṅgesa and Jagadīśa, maintains that Lakṣāṇa must invariably belong to the earlier member (pūrvapada) of the compound. For example, in the compound 'rājapuruṣa', the earlier word 'rāja(n)' gives 'some one related to the king' as its Lakṣāṇa, which by virtue of the word's 'sāmārvadāraṇya' (i.e., the state of remaining in the same case-ending) with the later word, gets syntactically connected with the Sākyārtha of the word 'puruṣa' through the relation of identity (tādātmya). It so happens as anticipated by the

465. tatpuruṣe'pi rājapuruṣa ityādau pūrvapadasya sāṣṭhyarthaṃ sambandhe nirūdhalakṣaṇayaiva rājasambandhipuruṣa-buddhyupapattāṃ samāse sāktirananyalabhyaṃ sabdān thatvāt. TC, p. 753.

466. ata eva 'rājapuruṣa ityādau pūrvapade sāṣṭhyarthasaṃbandhe lakṣaṇe'ti manikṛduktamapi' saṃgacchate. SSP, p. 664.
maxim, 'nipātātiriktanāmārthayorthvedena'nvayabodhasyāvyu-

tpannatvam, according to which the meaning of two nämapadas
(i.e., Nouns, Adjectives and Pronouns) which are in the same

case-endings (vibhakti) and are not intervened by any indec-
linable (Nipāta) must get mutually related through the

relation of identity (abheda). That is why the word 'rāja(n)'
must give such a meaning as the Lakṣyārtha, if not as the

Śakyārtha, which might easily have the relation of identity

with the meaning of the word 'puruṣa' so that we could say

'ya eva puruṣaḥ sa eva rājasāṃbandhi'.

If the syntactical connection through the relation

difference be allowed between two Nämapadas, even when

not intervened by some Nipātas, then such a connection

shall have to be understood even in the expression 'rāja-
puruṣa'. This is naturally unsound. There is nothing here
to make us understand that what is meant by 'rājā' is other

than what is meant by 'puruṣa'. Hence the maxim 'nipātāti-

rikta' etc. which characterises as unnatural any understand-
ing of syntactical connection between two Nämapadas through

the relation of difference unless they are intervened by

some 'Nipāta'. Viśvanātha proceeds to explain the maxim with

illustrations which are obviously not Tatpuruṣa compounds.

If two Nämapadas come to be, however, intercepted by any

Nipāta, the two meanings of these words can be understood

as syntactically connected as different objects. For
instance, in the expression, 'pāto na ghaṭaḥ' (a cloth is not a jar), though the two words 'pāta' and 'ghaṭa' are in the same case-ending, yet they are not understood as identical only on the strength of being intervened by 'na' (nañ). It should be borne in mind that it is the nature for two Nāmapadas to be identically related when not intervened by anything else. For instance, in the expression, 'nīla ghaṭaḥ', the meaning of the two Nāmapadas, i.e., 'blue' and 'jar' get syntactically connected through the relation of identity. We can examine how such a relation of identity is possible. According to the Lexicon, words like 'śukla' (white) etc. signify as their primary meanings not only the colours but also the corresponding coloured things. If we accept this position, the word 'nīla' gives as its primary meaning both the 'blue colour' and 'a thing having the blue colour'. So in the expression, 'nīlo ghaṭaḥ', the meaning of the word 'ghaṭa' i.e., 'a jar' comes to be connected through the relation of identity with the (primary) meaning of the word 'nīla' i.e., some blue-coloured object. Thus two Śākyārthas in the expression come to have the desired relation of identity ('tādātmya') without allowing any operation of Laksāṇā. But as we have seen with Viśvanātha in his approach to Śaktigraha from

467. gune śāklādayaḥ pumāsi gunilingāstu tadvati.

AK, p. 16.
Kośa, he is not prepared to admit Sakti of 'nīlādipadas' with regard to the nīlādiviśiśta (things having blue colour etc.). He understands 'nīlādiviśiśta' from 'nīlādipadas' only by Lakṣana. In the light of Viśvanātha's approach, we shall have to admit Lakṣana in the word 'nīla' in the expression 'nīlo ghaṭa' in order to obtain the relation of identity between the meanings of the two words. In whichever way possible, the two words in the expression 'nīlo ghaṭa' must have their meanings mutually connected by the relation of identity as they are not intercepted by any 'Nipātā'. One must have from the aforesaid expression only the idea of a blue jar and not of the blue colour and a jar separately. According to Viśvanātha, of the two words 'nīla' and 'ghaṭa', the earlier one demands the operation of Lakṣana in the uncompounded stage itself. Hence, when compounded, the words do not demand any fresh operation of Lakṣana. Thus Viśvanātha's opinion appears to be that a Karmadharaya compound does not necessarily demand the operation of Lakṣana as a Samāsa.

Coming back to our expression under discussion, namely, 'rājapuruṣa', which is a Tatpuruṣa compound, we find that the Sākyārthas, 'the king' and 'the person' cannot be understood as connected in the desired relation of identity. Hence we are forced to have recourse to Lakṣana in either of the two words. Viśvanātha fixes the operation
of Laksana to 'raja(n)', as it happens to be the earlier member ('pūrvapada') of the compound. In the text of the Muktāvalī, 'tatpurusa tu' etc., 'tu' is significant. It is desired to be conveyed that Laksana in a Tatpurusa compound can take place only in respect of its earlier member (word). The very definition of a Tatpurusa compound demands that the meaning of the latter member of the compound is all the more important implying there by that the meaning of the earlier word is less important. Now it is the accepted motion in different circles of thinkers that Lakṣyārtha is always to be reckoned as inferior to or at least less important than a śakyārtha. Hence it is reasonably held that only the earlier word in a Tatpurusa compound should be allowed to give a Lakṣyārtha as a result of which the principle of allowing more importance to the meaning of the later member of a Tatpurusa compound will not be adversely affected.

Viśvanātha now proceeds to meet with an objection in the M. 'na ca -------- bodhodayāt.'

One may opine that there is no operation of Laksana in 'rajapuruṣa' as one understands the connection between 'raja' and 'puruṣa' in the expression through the relation of identity only by remembering the meaning of the (6th) case-ending which is applicable to the word 'raja' before it comes to be compounded with 'puruṣa' and which stands

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understood at present because of compounding the two words. The idea behind such an opinion is that factually Lakṣaṇa is not resorted to in a compound like 'rājapuruṣa' as the listener as a matter of fact remembers the uncompounded expression 'rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ' in the context of understanding the compound 'rājapuruṣa'. Such a position is not tenable. We find that a person, even though fully ignorant of the structure of the words in their uncompounded stage, i.e., without remembering or having any scope to remember the understood case-endings, comes to have the desired verbal comprehension on simply hearing the expression 'rājapuruṣaḥ'. Hence, the operation of Lakṣaṇa in respect of the expression, 'rājapuruṣa' is undeniable. Here Viśvanātha concludes that the word 'rāja(n)' gives 'ṛajasambandhi' (one related to the king) as its meaning by Lakṣaṇa to be identically related with the primary meaning of the word 'puruṣa' i.e., the person. From 'ādi' in M, 'tasmāt rājapadādau', it is to be understood that Viśvanātha prescribes the same solution in the form of admitting Lakṣaṇa in 'pūrvapada' in case of other examples of Tatpuruṣa compounds. Even in a Tatpuruṣa compound as in a Bahuṣṭi, Viśvanātha like his predecessors in the Nyāya school, is not prepared to admit Lakṣaṇa in an entire samasa.
Thus, as pointed out by Jagadīśa also, the need for maintaining a relation of identity ('abhedānvaya') between the meanings of the two constituent words of a Tatpurūṣa compound like 'rājapurūṣaḥ' forces the operation of a Laksāṇa in the 'pūrvapada' of the compound.


'In the Dvandva (compound), however, in expressions like 'dhavakhadirau chindhi' (cut the Dhava and Khadira plants) both Dhava and Khadira are understood being characterised by the duality signified by the case-ending; in that case (therefore) there is no Laksāṇa. It cannot be

468. rājapuruṣa ityādikastu tatpuruṣo na puruṣe pūrvapa- dalakṣitarājjasambandhinastādātmyenānvayabodhakah samāsa-vigrahayostulyarthakatvahānyapateh, parantu rājasambandhasyaiva, ata eva rājapuruṣa ityādau pūrvpa- pade sasthyarthasambandhe lakṣaneti --- saṃgacchate. SSP, p. 204.
maintained that there is Laksanā (here) with regard to the association (sāhitya), as the Dvandva (compound) is seen even of (two word-meanings) without association. Again it cannot be argued that there is an association in the form of being connected with the same act (in the case of 'dhavakhadirau'), for even in case of different Verbs as in sentences like 'dhavakhadirau pasya chindhi' (Look at and cut Dhava and Khadira plants), we see the use of it (i.e., of the Dvandva compound) and again there is no cognition of (any) association. Hence 'association' etc. is not the meaning (to be obtained by Laksanā) (in case of a Dvandva compound). Hence, for absence of Laksanā, Dvandva (compound) is resorted to (admitted) in the expression 'rājapurohitau sāyujyakāmau yajeyātām' (M.S. 6.6.12) (Let the king and the priest perform sacrifices with a view to attaining union with God)

In the Muktavali text above, Viśvanātha also rules out any scope for the operation of Laksanā in the Dvandva compound, even to be admitted in one of its component parts. As he points out, in a Dvandva compound like 'Dhavakhadirau chindhi', we can have the desired Sābda-bodha without any recourse to Laksanā anywhere. Here the meanings of the two words involved viz, Dhava and Khadira remain in tact and nothing in addition to the individual meanings of the words is to be recognised. The idea of the
duality associated with the primary meanings of the two words is also conveyed as a śākyārtha by the sign of the viśhakti itself.

Certain Dvandva compounds like 'bhīmarjunau', 'rāmalaksmanau' etc. may make an impression that the compound under discussion is possible only with the words signifying objects that have some mutual association or togetherness. In view of this, it may be argued that this very sense of association or togetherness, i.e., Sāhitya (saḥi-tasya bhāvaḥ, saḥita-syaṁ) is to be atleast secondarily signified, i.e., to be understood by Lakṣapā. In reply to such a contention, Visvarūpa asserts that the Dvandva compound is seen even of words signifying things without such a 'saḥitya'. Visvarūpa, however, does not give any example of such a Dvandva compound to emphasise his point. We for ourselves may take an example like 'Khalasajjanau as in the sentence 'Khalasajjanau parasparam na sahete'. (The wicked and good donot or cannot stand each other). We cannot read any sense of 'saḥitya' from the compound 'khalasajjanau'. This being admitted, it follows that the togetherness or association is not necessarily to be understood from a Dvandva compound.

It may be argued again that the 'saḥitya' atleast in the sense of 'being connected with the one and the same verb' is to be understood in such cases of Dvandva
compound where the objects signified cannot be said to be co-existent. Such an argument is not tenable because, as Visvanatha points out, the Dvandva compound takes places with words signifying objects which are connected not with a common verb but each with a separate verb. To illustrate the point, we can take up the case of the Dvandva compound 'dhavakhadirau' in the sentence, 'dhavakhadirau pasya chindhi' (Look at and cut Dhava and Khadira plants). Here while 'dhava', one of the compounding words is connected with the 'darsana-kriya', the other member of the compound, i.e., 'khadira' is connected with the 'chedana-kriya'. Even when the component words of a Dvandva compound come to be connected with one and the same verb, as a matter of fact, no Sabdabodha takes place in respect of such a sense of 'sahitya' i.e., 'eka-kriyanvayitva'.

Now in support of his assertion that Lakṣaṇa is in no way admitted in a Dvandva compound, Visvanatha refers to the admission of the Dvandva compound by the Mīmāṃsakas in the expression 'rajapurohitau' in the sentence 'raja-purohitau snyujyakāmāv yajeyātām'. If the expression be expounded as 'rajaḥ purohitau' by way of admitting a Tatpurusha compound in it, only two royal priests would have been expected to perform the sacrificial rituals and the

469. cf. vastugatyakakriyanvayitvasya dhavakhadirayoh sattve'pyekakriyanvayitvasya sābdabodhābhāvādityarthah idamupalaksanam. DK, Vide NSM, p. 236.
and the concerned King would have been spared. To perform rituals is desirably a normal duty of priests and not of kings. Hence it would have been better to free the kings from this extra-ordinary duty of performing sacrifices in order to attend more to his administrative works. But the admission of a Tatpuruṣa compound involves the recognition of a Laksana in the earlier member of the compound. The Mīmāṃsakas are always reluctant to accept a secondary sense. We have already referred to Mīmāṃsakas' admission of Śakti and Śakyartha as superior to Laksanā and Lakṣyarthā. Out of their keen desire to avoid Lakṣanā, the Mīmāṃsakas have admitted a Dvandva compound in the expression 'rāja-purohitau' in the injunction 'rājapurohitau sāyujyakāmau' etc. As a consequence, both the king and the priest have been enjoined to get-together in the performance of sacrificial rituals. Mīmāṃsakas' admission only of the Dvandva compound in the expression 'rājapurohitau' in the aforesaid injunction confirms Viśvanātha's contention that there is no scope at all for the operation of Lakṣanā in the Dvandva compound. So Viśvanātha concludes that in a Dvandva compound no additional sense of 'sāhitya' is to be understood. This lack of scope for the operation of Lakṣanā, we may casually note here, gives a position of superiority to the Dvandva compound over the other varieties of compound. This we may gather from the Gītā X. 33,\(^{470}\) wherein Lord Kṛṣṇa describes

\[\text{470.} \quad \text{akṣaraḥmaṇakāro' smi dvandvaḥ sāmāsikasya ca / ahameva kṣayaḥ kālo dhatāham viśvatomukhaḥ //}
\]

Gītā X.33.
Himself as the Dvandva compound amongst all varieties of compounds. This superiority is most probably because of its being free from Laksanā. This notion of superiority due to lack of Laksanā seems to owe its origin to the Mīmāṁsaka's preference of the Śruti or Abhidhā to Laksanā.

ḥimśyaṁ dvandvam abhyantaraṁ samyaktam sa svarāṇaḥ. 

M(41). kintu vāstavo bheda yatra, tatra dandvāḥ. na ca 
nīlāghaṭayorabheda ityādau kathamiti vācyam. tatra 
nīlapadasya nīlatve ghaṭapadasya ghaṭatve laksanā 
abheda ityasya cāṣrayabheda ityarthāt.

But the Dvandva (compound) occurs where there is an actual difference (between meanings of two words). Hence, it cannot be argued as to "how is it that there is (the Dvandva compound) in expressions like 'nīlāghaṭayorabhedaḥ' (there is the identity between blue colour and the jar')."

There is Laksanā of the word 'nīla' with regard to the 'nīlatva' (the blue colourhood) and of the word 'ghaṭa' with regard to 'ghaṭatva' (the jarhood), while the word 'identity' means the identity in respect of the substratum.

In the proceeding text of the Muktāvalī viz. 'tasmāt sāhityādikāṁ nārthaḥ', Visvānātha categorically asserts that the association in any form does not come to be a part of the contextual Sābdabodha in a Dvandva compound like 'dhavaḥkhaḍirau' in the expressions like 'dhavakhadirau chindhi'. The sense of association, even if there be any to
justify the Grammatical sanction\footnote{471} for the dual or plural number of a Dvandva compound, virtually does not enter into the import of an expression in the form of a Dvandva compound. Such a sense of association between the meanings of the words constituting a Dvandva compound does not again come to be understood even before the compound is formed. So, there can be no misgiving that a sense of association is to be conveyed as the factor leading to the constitution of a Dvandva compound. Under the above circumstances, Viśvanātha deems it necessary to point out a basic character of the constituents of a Dvandva compound.

The objects signified by the component words of a Dvandva compound are fully different from each other. As for illustration, Bhīma and Arjuna, understood from the Dvandva, 'bhimārjunau' are two separate individuals who can remain apart from each other. So also is the case with Dhava and Khadira understood from the Dvandva 'dhavakha-
dirau'. Dhava and Khadira are two separate plants of either of which we can think in isolation. The objects signified by the constituents of a Dvandva compound differ basically, i.e., by the true nature of things. In other words, the notion of difference here is not figurative or superficial.

\footnote{471. cf. nanu dhavakhadirāvityādau dvandve sāhityābhāve
------------ 'sāhitye dvivacanaḥahuvacane dvandvasamāsoso
vetyanusāsanāt ---- MUS, Vide BPS, pp. 452-53.}
Thus, the notion of basic difference between or among the things denoted by the compounding words comes to be a differentiating element in the context of Dvandva compound. In the succeeding text of the Muktāvalli, Visvanātha would show the lack of the scope for Laksāṇā even in the Karmadhāraya compound. But in the case of a Karmadhāraya compound, we shall not see such difference between the meanings of the component words of that Samāsa. So, some scholars feel that the above Muktāvalli text, 'kintu vāstavo bheda yatra' etc. is only to record Visvanātha's rejoinder in anticipation of a query as regards the difference between a Dvandva and a Karmadhāraya. But, as a matter of fact, Visvanātha makes this observation only out of his anxiety to counteract the notion that a sense of association is to be conveyed secondarily at least to serve as the pre-requisite for the constitution of a Dvandva. But how is it that an identity is said to exist between 'nīla' and 'ghaṭa' even when they form a Dvandva compound in the expression, 'nīlaghaṭa-yorabhedah'? Visvanātha seeks to solve the problem by saying that in the expression above, the word 'abheda' means an identity only of the substratum (āśrayabhedaḥ). But what


karmadhāraye padadvaye lakṣaṇāviraḥkaṇa lakṣaṇāvira-vitamāsatvasya dvandvakarmadhārayabhāsādhamrāṇatvāditi bhāvaḥ. RR, under DK above."
is that substratum and for what? The expression 'nīlaghaṭ-
ayoh' is the form in the genitive case of the compound 'nīlaghaṭau'. Of the two words constituting the compound 'nīlaghaṭau' the word 'nīla', the earlier member of the compound conveys 'the blue colour' (nīla varṇa) as its Sākyārtha and the word 'ghaṭa', the latter member, signifies 'a jar' (the object, 'ghaṭa') as its Sākyārtha. Neither of these two Sākyārthas can be thought of as the substratum (aśraya) of the other. While a jar as it is can never be thought of as pertaining to the blue colour, the blue colour can also pertain only to a blue jar (nīlaghaṭa) but not to a mere jar. Neither the blue colour nor a jar in general can serve as the common substratum hinted in the context. So, in view of the Sābdabodha demanded by the expression, 'nīlaghaṭayarabhedaḥ', we shall have to admit a Tatparyānupapatti with regard to the Sākyārthas of the two words of the compound, 'nīlaghaṭayoh'. Here Laksāna comes to our rescue and makes us understand 'nīlatva' (blueness) as the Laksyārtha from the word 'nīla' and 'ghaṭatva' (jarness) from the word 'ghaṭa'. A 'nīlaghaṭa' (a blue jar) can be thought of without any difficulty as the common substratum of both 'nīlatva' and 'ghaṭatva'.

An objection may be raised by pointing out that the two meanings between which a difference could be shown are only two Laksyārthas. But we cannot overlook the fact that
the two Lakṣya-ārthas namely, nīlātva' and 'ghaṭa-tva' are again the Sākyatāvacchedakas of the two Sākyārthas, namely 'nīla' and 'ghaṭa', respectively. Thus we find no inconsistency in the expression, 'nīla -------- abheda' even when 'nīlaghaṭayoh' is taken as a case of Dvandva which presupposes a basic difference between the concepts of its component parts.

But the admission of Lakṣana in the word 'nīla' with regard to 'nīlatva' and in the word 'ghaṭa' with regard to 'ghaṭatva' in the context of the expression, 'nīlaghaṭayorabhedaḥ' should not create an impression that Viśvanātha comes to admit Lakṣana in the component parts of a Dvandva compound and swerves from his original stand that the Dvandva compound does not allow any scope for the operation of Lakṣana. The admission of these two Lakṣanas is a must to justify the desired Śābdabodha even if the two words 'nīla' and 'ghaṭa' remain in an uncompounded stage. If the said words, 'nīla' and 'ghaṭa' are not allowed to compound, the expression, 'nīlaghaṭayorabhedaḥ' would take the form of 'nīlasya ghaṭasya ca abhedaḥ'. As demanded by the maxim 'nipātārikta' etc., the two nāmapadas, namely 'nīla' and 'ghaṭa' would be syntactically related with each other as they are intercepted by the indeclinable 'ca'. But the context demands a notion of identity to be conveyed between the two. Hence, obviously there is Tatparyānupapratti with
In regard to the two Śakyārthas. Hence, here is also the operation of Lākṣaṇā to read 'nīlatva' from 'nīla' and 'ghaṭatva' from 'ghaṭa'. Thus it is obvious that the two Lākṣaṇās admitted in the expression 'nīlaghaṭau' are not there because of any basic nature of a Dvandva Compound.

\[\text{M(42).}\] samāhāradvandve tu yadi samāhāro'pyanubhūyata ityucyate, tadā'hinakulamityādau parapade'hinakulasamāhāre lākṣaṇā, pūrvapadam tātparyagrāhakam. na ca bherīmṛd-aṅgaḥ vādayetyaatra katham samāhārasyā'nvayaḥ, apekṣābuddhīvisēṣa cūpasya tasya vādanā'AMBambhāvādi vācyam; paramparāsambandhenā tadanvayaḥ. evaṁ pañcumlītyādāvapi. pare tvāhinakulamityādēvahiṇakulasca budhyate, pratyekamekatvānvayaḥ. samāhārasamājhī ca yatraikatvāh napuṁsakatvām cā 'prāṇitūrye'tyādi sūtreṇoktaṁ, tatratīva. anyatraikavacanamasādāviti vadanti.

'In Samāhāra Dvandva, however, if it be said that (the sense) of aggregation also is understood, then, in expressions like 'ahinakulam' (snake and mongoose), there is Lākṣaṇā of the second word with regard to the 'aggregate of snakes and mongoose' and the first word is the pointer to the Tātparya. It cannot be questioned as to how in the sentence, 'bherīmṛd-aṅgaḥ vādaya' (sound the kettle-drum and the drum), there can be the syntactical relation of the aggregate (with the sounding) since it (Samāhāra) i.e., aggregate, being a notion of mutual dependence cannot be sounded, inasmuch as
the syntactical relation is also possible through a Paramparāsambandha (indirect relation). Same is the case with words like 'pañcamūli' (a group of five roots). Others, however, hold that a word like 'ahinakulam' denotes a snake and a mongoose (separately) and singularity is connected with either of them. And the term Samāhāra is applied only to a compound that is endowed with singular (number) and neuter (gender) on the strength of the aphorism: Prāṇitūrya, etc. Elsewhere the use of the singular number is wrong.

Pāṇini prescribes the Dvandva Compounds by his rule 'cārthe dvandvah'. The particle 'cā' is used in four senses. It is stated that the particle 'cā' in the aforesaid Pāṇinian rule carries the sense of Samāhāra also along with the Itaretāra and thereby the Samāhāra Dvandva Compounds also stand prescribed Samāhāra means 'sāhitya' (togetherness). This sense of 'sāhitya' takes place in two ways. (1) There may be a Samāhāra when two or more 'agents' come to be syntactically connected with the same action (ekakriyānvayitvāt) as in 'ahinakulam pāṣya'. (2) There may also be a Samāhāra when a sense of interdependence (apekṣābuddhiviśayatvāt) is conveyed as in 'bherimṛdaṅgām vādaya' (Here it cannot be said that the bherī and the mṛdaṅgā in the context are connected with the same act of playing upon. Whereas a snake and a mongoose can simultaneously be seen

473. P 2.2.29.
474. cānvācayasmāhāretarasamuccaye. AK, p. 126.
by the same person, it is not possible for one again to strike simultaneously at both a bheri and a mrdanga. Yet by saying 'bherimrdangavan vadayav instead of 'bherimrdangavan vadayav' the interdependence of the strikings at both the instruments is intended in order to serve some musical necessity).

In the Muktavali above, Visvanatha introduces the problem of recognising Laksana in a Samahara Dvandva. The Naiyayikas are not unanimous in admitting Laksana to understand the sense of Samahara. Pandit Srikrsnavallabhacarya reads the mind of Visvanatha thus: Visvanatha is aware of the difference of opinion amongst the scholars regarding the admission of Laksana with regard to understand the sense of a Samahara in a Samahara Compound. The Pracinasaiyikas hold that a sense of Samahara is understood from a Samahara Compound, and that it is understood with the aid of Laksana. Visvanatha alludes to this old view in 'samaharadvandve tu yadi' etc. 475 The Nyayanaiyikas contend that no sense of Samahara is understood at all from a Samahara Compound. Hence the admission of Laksana on that account is out of

475. atha samaharadvandve pracinasate samaharasanya
mubhasiddhatvat samahare lakshanat ngikriyate,
avinamate tu samaharasya tatra nanubhatat na samahare lakshanat iti matadvayormadhya prathamam pracinasatah samaharadvandve lakshanam darayitumaha samaharadvandve tviti. Ki, Vide NSM(K), p. 334.
question. Visvānātha refers to this modern view in 'pare tu' etc. According to Visvānātha, if it is admitted that a Samāhāra Dvandva conveys a sense of Samāhāra, in that case, in the examples 'ahinakulaś' etc., Laksāna is to be admitted in the latter member of the compound to convey the sense of 'ahinakulasamāhāra' (togetherness of a snake and a mongoose) etc. The earlier member of the compound serves as the pointer to the speaker’s intention in the context. Visvānātha also refers to other scholars who argue that sometimes a Samāhāra Dvandva conveys only the Sākyārthas of the members of the compound and does not necessitate the admission of Sakti or Laksāna to convey the additional meaning of Samāhāra. It may be added that even in the case of admitting the additional sense (i.e., a Samāhāra) of a Samāhāra Dvandva, some later Naiyāyikas admit Laksāna in both the Padas involved in a Samāhāra Dvandva. In the Muktavali above, Visvānātha

476. pare tviti.athāhāvinatena samāhāre laksānaś bhavām vyutpādayati. samāhāradvandvasthale samāhārasya anu-bhavā visāyatavādināvānāstvā etc. ibid.

477. pānipādam vādayetyatra pānipādamātraprātīterna samāhāre laksāna śaktir vá. NSMR, p. 187.

478. nāvyāika-ḍesinām mate tūbhayapadasyaiva laksāna. tathā coktam nyāyasiddhāntamānjaryam pānipādam pāni-pratiyogikam pādapaśa pādapratiyogikam samāhāraṁ lakṣayatiti. MUS, Vide BPS, p. 454.

    pānipādamityādau pānipādam pānipratiyogikam ------
    ------ samāhāraṁ lakṣayati. NSMR, p. 187.
observes that in case Laksanā is admitted in a Samāhāra Dvandva, it is to be admitted with regard to the 'uttarapada' and not to the 'pūrvapada'. An explanation is necessary on this point. The sense of Samāhāra is carried by the neuter gender which is affixed only to the latter member of the Compound. Hence as the sense of Samāhāra is to be conveyed, it is appropriate to fix the Laksanā to the 'uttarapada' only.

In 'na ca ----------- tadanvayāt', Visānātha points out a possible opposition to the admission of Samāhāra as conveyed by a Compound like 'bherīmrdangam vādaya'. Now the syntactical connection between the sense of Samāhāra conveyed by Laksanā from the expression 'bherīmrdangam' and the act of playing upon as conveyed by the word 'vādaya' may be questioned on the plea that one cannot play upon the Samāhāra which in the example means a specific notion of interdependence (apeksābuddhivîśeṣa). The idea is this: the act of playing upon (i.e., vādana) takes place in the form of a contact with the instruments by way of striking at them. Such a contact that goes by the name 'abhīghāta' is possible only directly with the instruments, 'bherī' and 'mrdangā' and not with the abstract notion of their interdependence (i.e., the sense of Samāhāra here). The rejoinder to this objection may be given thus: The syntactical relation between the Samāhāra, even in the sense of 'apekṣābuddhi', and the 'vādana-kriya' is possible through an indirect relation that
may be described as 'svāśrayajvṛttisambandha'. The expression 'svāśraya' etc. may be explained thus: 'svaṁ samāhāraḥ
tasya āśrayaḥ bherīṁrdaṅgam 'tayoh (tatra vā) (vādānakarma
vartata iti tasya) vṛttitvarūpāḥ sambandhaḥ'. In other words,
the Samāhara in the sense of a notion of interdependence
exists between the two instruments. The act of playing upon
also pertains to the two instruments. Thus owing to common
substratum, i.e., on the strength of a relation through a
medium, the Samāhara of the expression, 'bherīṁrdaṅgam'
comes, to be syntactically related with 'the vādanākriya'
conveyed by the word 'vādaya'.

Vīśvanātha in "pañcamūlītyaiddāvapi" refers to praśīṇan-
aiyaikas' admission of Lakṣaṇā in a Samāhāra Dvigu Compound.
Vīśvanātha's example of Samāharaadvigu in the context is
'pañcamūlī'. The Samāsa comes to be a Samāhara according to
the Paninian rule 2.1.50. The Samāhara is of the Dvigu
variety as per P 2.1.51. The Compound form may be analysed
as 'pañcānām mūlānām samāhāraḥ'. The Compounded word ends
with the feminine suffix 'ī'. According to old Naiyāyikas,
there is Lakṣaṇā in the latter member of the Compound, i.e.,
the word 'mūla' in order to convey the sense of 'Pañca-mūla-
samāhāra'.

479. taddhītārthottarapadasamāhāre ca, P 2.1.50.
480. samkhya-pūrve dvīgū, ibid. 2.1.51.
481. akārānttarottarapado dvīgūḥ striyāmīṣṭaḥ, V 2.4.17
The earlier member of the Compound, i.e., the word 'pañca' serves as the pointer to the intention of the speaker. The word 'ādi' in the Muktāvalī "pañcamūlītyādāvapi" is taken to cover other Dvigu Compounds like 'pañcapuli', 'pañcavati', 'pañcapātram' etc.\textsuperscript{482} It may be pointed out that almost all the commentators are inclined to believe that Visvanātha has in his mind the viewpoints of 'navinānaiyāyikas' when he writes 'pare tu ahinakulamityādau'.\textsuperscript{483} But the commentators do not categorically name the later Nyāya scholars whom Visvanātha meant as others (pare). Pañcānana Śāstrī, however, feels that Visvanātha with the expression 'pare' (others) makes a respectful reference only to the Pandit Janakinātha Bhāṭṭācāryya, a later Naiyāyika who preceded Visvanātha.\textsuperscript{484} But it is to be noted that the examples furnished by Janakinātha and Visvanātha are different. Visvanātha's example where Samahārasaṃjña is stated to be not admitted by 'the other scholars' is 'ahinakulam pasīya' while Janakinātha's example is

\textsuperscript{482} idinā pañcapuli pañcavati pañcapātram, ityādīgrahaṇam. \textit{KI}, \textit{Vide NSM (K)}, p. 334.


\textsuperscript{484} pare tu - nyāyasiddhāntamaṇjarikṛtastu, \textit{MUS}, \textit{Vide BPS}, p. 455.
‘pañipādaṁ vādaya’.\(^{485}\) Even if we admit both the examples to be on a par, we cannot help admitting that like the author of the Bhāṣāpariccheda, the author of the Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī also refers to both the views for and against admitting Laksanā for understanding a ‘samāhāra’\(^{486}\).

If we take the word ‘pare’ as used by Visvānātha strictly in a plural sense to mean the Navya Naiyāyikas in general, we can explain their position as follows. The Navya Naiyāyikas do not see any scope for the operation of Laksanā in a Samāhāra Dvandva as in their view a sense of what is actually a Samāhāra is not understood at all from a Samāhāra Compound. As for example, in a so-called Samāhāra Dvandva like ‘ahinakulam’, only the meanings, ‘a snake and a mongoose’ are obtained separately from the words ‘ahi’ and ‘nakula’\(^{487}\) without any idea of the aggregation.

If the attention of these scholars is drawn to the singular number of the compounded form, they want to connect

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485. pāñipādaṁ vādayetyatra pāñipādaṁatra pratīterna samāhāre laksanā saktir-va. NSMR, p. 187.
486. cf. nañvevaṁ pāñipādaṁ vādaya ityātraḥ-anvayaḥ samāhāre vādanakarmatvābhāvāditi cetparamparayā tatra karmatvā- nvayādityeke. samāhārotta-ravibhaktyartha-karmatvādeḥ samāhriyamāna evānvayaḥ padavyutpattivaicitryādityanye. ibid.
487. ahinakulam bherīmrdaṅgaṁityādau ahinakulapadābhyaṁ bherīmrdaṅgapadābhyaṁ ca ahiḥ nakulasca bherīmrdaṅgaścā budhyate - sādbabodhaviṣayyo bhavati, na tu samāhāro'- pīti, atāḥ samāhāre na laksanetvāsāyaḥ. KI, Vide NSM(K), p. 334f.
the number separately with each sense.\textsuperscript{488}

As a matter of fact, they regard the use of the singular number in the expression, 'ahinakulam' as incorrect. Their position is this: There is no difference of opinion in so far as a Samāhāra Compound takes a neuter gender and a singular number. But the gender and the number as such should be used only with due cognizance of the rule that governs a Samāhārasamjñā. These scholars refer to that grammatical rule\textsuperscript{489} according to which only the words signifying limbs of animals, musical instruments and divisions of army are competent to be so compounded. The use of singular number and neuter gender without regard to this rule is not correct. Commentator Śrīkṛṣṇavallabhacārya, however, understands the rule 'yesam ca virodhah sāsvatikah' along with 'dvandaśca prāṇiturya' etc. in order to justify the singular number in

\textsuperscript{488} nanu tarhi ekavacanārthaikatvasya kvānvayaḥ, ahinakulayorekatvābhāvat,--------- navinasya mate ahinakulātmakapraṇāṣṭyarthapratyekavyaktau ekatvasyā'nvayo-niravadhaḥ. ibid.

\textsuperscript{489} dvandaśca prāṇituryasenāṅgānām. P 2.4.2.

cf. ekavacanamiti vartate. aṅgasābdasya pratyekām vāk-yaparisamāpāya triṇī vākyāni sampādyante. prāṇyāṅgānām dvandva ekavadbhavatī, tathā turyāṅgānām senāṅgānām ca, prāṇyāṅgānām ca prāṇyāṅgānām tāvatpāṇipādam, senāṅgānām rathikāśvāroham, turyāṅgānām mārdangikapāṇāvakām itaretarayoge samāhāre ca dvandvo hīhitaḥ tatra samāhārasya-ikatvāt siddhamevakvacanam. idaṁ tu prakaraṇam viṣya-yavibhāgārtham. prāṇyāṅgādināṁ samāhāra eva dvandvāḥ
the expression 'ahinakulam' by way of covering it by a
Samāhārasaṃjña.⁴⁹⁰ In any case, it is clear that the Navya
Naiyāyikas understand the Samāhārasaṃjña as a technical term
(Pārībhāṣikī Saṃjña) like Nadi and Vṛddhi and it need not
necessarily convey the sense of an unity or aggregate also.⁴⁹¹
The Samāhāra as a technical term is prescribed to justify
the use of singular number (and neuter gender) in certain
cases of Dvandva Compounds.

M(43). pitarau śvaśūra-vityādau-pitṛapade janakadampatyoḥ
śvaśūrapade strījanakadampatyorlakṣaṇā. evamanayatāpi.
ghaṭa ityādau tu na lakṣaṇā ghaṭatvena rūpeṇa nānāga-
topasthitisambhavāt.

In words like 'pitarau' (parents) and 'śvaśūrau'
(parents in-law) there is Laksana of the word 'pitr' with
regard to 'janakadampatī' (parents) and of the word 'śvaśūra'
with regard to 'strījanakadampatī' (parents of one's wife).

⁴⁹⁰ yatra 'pranitūryasenaṅganāmiti' sūtreṇa 'yeṣām ca
virodhaḥ sās'vatisaṅgaḥ' iti sūtreṇa ca dvandvaḥ ekavat-
syādityarthakena ekatvamukten = ekavabhāvaḥ vihitāḥ,
----- tatrāvā = tādṛśadvandve eva samāhāra-cuṃśaṁjña

⁴⁹¹ tatha ca navinamate samāhārasaṃjña nānvartha kintu
nādi-vṛddhyādisaṃjñāvat pārībhāṣikyeveti bhāvaḥ. ibid.;
nanu pāṇīpādamityādisamudāyasya samāhārabodhakatvā-
bhavāya kathām tasya samāhārasaṃjñētyata āha ----- tathā
cā pārībhāṣikyeva sā, anvarthatve'nyatra'tiprasaṅgadīti
bhāvaḥ. DK, Vide NSM, pp. 298-99.
Similarly, in other cases also. In the word 'ghaṭaḥ' (jars), there is no Laksanā as many 'jars' can be apprehended on the strength of the idea of jarhood'.

Here Visvanātha shows the involvement of Padalaksanā in the case of Virūpa-ekaśeṣa-dvandva compound.492 The Ekaśeṣa compound is prescribed by the Pāṇinian rule 'sarūpanāmekaśeṣa ekavibhakata' for words of the same form. Thus 'ghaṭaścā ghaṭaścā' gives 'ghatau' or 'ghaṭaścā ghaṭaścā ghaṭaścā ghaṭaścā' gives 'ghaṭaḥ'. Here 'ghatau' and 'ghaṭaḥ' are two instances of Ekaśeṣa. But Pāṇini subsequently prescribes the 'ekaśeṣa-samjña' even for certain words not of similar forms.494 Thus Ekaśeṣa is virtually of two types, Sarūpa and Virūpa. In the Māktavahī above, Visvanātha admits Padalaksanā in the case of the Virūpa-ekaśeṣas. Let us first consider such a Virūpa-ekaśeṣa, namely, 'pitarau; pitarau' may be a Sarūpa-ekaśeṣa also in the sense of 'pītā ca pītā ca'. It may mean two fathers corresponding to

492. The admission of Ekaśeṣa as a Samāsa is itself a controversial issue. Even if it be not admitted as a Samāsa, it cannot be denied that it is a Vākya or at least a 'padasamūha'. So Visvanātha deems it necessary to show that here also Laksanā works if and when necessary only as pertaining to a single Pada and not to the 'Samūha'.

493. P 1.2.64

494. ibid. 1.2.65.
two sons. But in the case of the expression, 'caitrasya 
pitarau'. such a meaning is not possible. Hence in such a 
context this expression 'pitarau' must be understood as 
Virūpa-ekāsēṣa and Lākṣaṇā must be resorted to with regard 
to the Pada 'pitṛ' in order to understand 'parents' (janaka-
dampati). The expression 'janakadampati' stands for 'pitā 
ca maṭa ca' which comes to have Ekāsēṣa (the retention of 
one word amongst many such words). Similarly in the 
sentences like 'caitrasya śvasūrau', the word 'śvasūra' 
conveys by Lākṣaṇā 'the parent of the wife' i.e., Śvasūra 
(father in-law) and 'śvasvā' (mother in-law). Here the 
word denoting a female takes the form of the word, meaning 
the male as sanctioned by a Pāṇinian rule. By 'evamanyat-
raṇi' of the Muktāvali, Viśvanātha admits the necessity of 
recognising Padalākṣaṇā in the case of other possible examples 
of Virūpa-ekāsēṣas. For instance, in the example 'bhrataraṇā', 
the word 'bhratā' conveys, by Lākṣaṇā the idea of both a 
brother and a sister. In the example, 'putrau', the word 
'putra' gives the Lākṣyārtha in the form of 'a son and a 
daughter-in-law'. We may note here that Pāṇini prescribes 
Virūpa-ekāsēṣa for 'bhratā ca svasā ca' and for 'putraśca

495. pumān striyā apd pitā maṭrā. ibid 1.2.67 and 1.2.70.
496. pumān striyā and śvaśrāh śvaśrvā. ibid 1.2.67 and 
1.2.71
497. stri puṇvacca. ibid 1.2.66.
duhitā ca'. Dinakarabhaṭṭa also reads such a mind of Viśvanātha in the matter of admitting Padalaksānā for all the Virūpa-ekāṣeṣas.

But in the case of Sarūpa-ekāṣeṣa, Viśvanātha finds no necessity of admitting even Padalaksānā. As for illustration, 'ghaṭasca ghaṭasca ghaṭasca' gives us the Ekāṣeṣa in 'ghaṭāh'. Now without any recourse to Laksanā, we can have the notion of the plurality of the jars. As Viśvanātha understands Saṅkti of a Pada with regard to 'jātyākṛtivīśṭavivaṅkti', the Saṅkti of the word 'ghaṭa' would convey the meaning in the form of individual jars qualified by the generic property 'jarness'. The knowledge of the generic property 'jarness' facilitates the knowledge of many (or more than one) jars possessed of such a property. The desired Saṃbodha of the expression 'ghaṭāh' is the knowledge of many individuals possessed of the generic property 'jarness' (ghaṭatvaparkārakaghaṭavīśayakaṁ jñānam). Hence there is no scope for Tātparyānupapatti and consequently there is also no Laksanā.

498. bhrātrputrau svasrduhitāḥbhyaṁ. Ibid. 1.2.68.
499. bhrātarauputravartyatraś'pi pramāṇāntareṇa striparatvajñāne 'bhrātrputrau svasrduhitāḥbhyaṁ (1.2.68) iti virūpaikāṣeṣat bhrātrpade bhrātrvasroṅ putrapade ca putraduhitorlaksanatātyarthah. DK, Vide NSM, p. 299.
In case of Karmadharaya Compound, however, in words like 'nilotpalam' (blue lotus) the thing conveyed by the word 'nila' is a feature (prakāra), of the thing signified by the word 'upala' (lotus) characterised by the relation of identity; there is (therefore) no Lakṣaṇa. Hence in 'niśadasthapatim yājayeti' there is no tatpurusa as that would involve a case of Lakṣaṇa. But there is Karmadharaya because of lack of Lakṣaṇa in it. But it cannot be maintained that Niśāda belongs to a hybrid caste (Saṅkarajāti) and (thereby) not being entitled to (the study of) Vedas, there is no possibility of his performing a sacrifice; for, from this (very passage), there is the assumption of a Niśāda being admitted to (that) study.

The syntactical connection with the primary meaning (of the word 'niśāda') being (sought to be) maintained for sake of simplicity (arising from avoiding of Lakṣaṇa in the
event of admitting the compound as a Tatpurusa), the assumption (of the right of a Niṣāda to Vedic study), is not to be treated as a defect inasmuch as the cumbrousness (Gaurava) it produces by involving an inconsistency with the primary meaning (tadanupapattyā) (as a matter of fact) leads to the (desired) result (of preserving the primary sense at the avoidance of a deprecable secondary one)."

Visvānātha here asserts that there is no need to admit any Laksana in a Karmadhāraya compound. A Karmadhāraya is a compound between a Viśeṣya (qualified) and a Viśeṣaṇa (qualification). The relation between a Viśeṣaṇa and Viśeṣya is naturally not one of difference (bheda). As a result, the component parts of a Karmadhāraya compound can directly satisfy the requirement of the maxim 'nipātātīrkitanāmārthayorbhedenānvayasyāvyutpannatvatvam'. The maxim demands that a connection of identity (abhedasambandha) must exist between two Nāmapadas Unless they are intervened by some indeclinable (provided that they do not stand in different case-endings). The maxim is obviously applicable in a case of Karmadhāraya compound which consists of two Nāmapadas, a Viśeṣya and a Viśeṣaṇa not intervened by any indeclinable and not standing in different case-endings. The meanings of the two words in a Karmadhāraya compound directly come to be mutually connected by a relation of identity and thus easily satisfy the aforesaid maxim. In doing so the two members of the compound under discussion do not allow any scope for the
operation of a Lakṣaṇa. To illustrate the case of a Karma-
dhāraya compound as being free from Lakṣaṇa, Viśvanātha
gives the example of 'nīlotpalam'. Viśvanātha finds the
meanings of both the words immediately connected by the
relation of abheda as because the meaning of the word 'nīla'
is an attribute (prakāra) of the thing understood from the
word 'utpala' i.e., a lotus. Here we need a careful examin-
ation of Viśvanātha's position.

Now, to be connected with the primary meaning of the
latter word (utpalam) by the relation of identity, the
word 'nīla' must convey the meaning 'nīlavarnavīṣīṣṭa'
something qualified by or possessed of blue colour). This
could have been a Śaṅkara (primary meaning) of the word
'nīla' as per Lexicons. In the event of admitting that,
there would have been no problem to us. But as we have
already observed in 'Muktāvalī, Kośādapi śaktigrahaḥ' etc.
Viśvanātha accepts the word 'nīla' only as conveying 'nīla
varṇa' (blue colour) by means of Abhidhā. So, in the comp-
ound 'nīlotpalam', the word 'nīla', to obtain the desired
relation of identity, must give up its primary sense of
'blue colour' and convey the meaning 'nīlavṛṇṇayukta'
(blue coloured) by means of Lakṣaṇa. Under the circumstances
Viśvanātha would not be correct to say that there is no
scope for Lakṣaṇa in the compound 'nīlotpalam'. As a result
his assertion that there can be no Lakṣaṇa in a Karmadhāraya
compound comes to suffer a setback atleast at this stage.
of our discussion. Moreover, as in the aforesaid earlier observation, Viśvanātha himself recognises as Lakṣyārtha the meaning in the form of 'nīlādīvīṣīṣṭa' etc. from the 'nīlādipada' etc, it is our turn to see if the author of the BP is not involved in a self contradiction. Now as Viśvanātha himself recognises 'nīla (varṇa) viśīṣṭa' as the Lakṣyārtha of the word 'nīla', in the context of his discourse on Śaktigraha. We cannot say that he wants to rule out the possibility of the presence of Lakṣaṇā in the word 'nīla' (in the sense of 'nīlavarṇaviśīṣṭa') in the expression, 'nīlotpalam'. Unless the word 'nīla' is understood in the compound in its sense of 'nīlavarṇaviśīṣṭa', it cannot be thought of being syntactically connected by a relation of identity with the meaning of the word 'utpala' in the said compound. And the meanings of the two words must be understood in the expression 'nīlotpalam' only through the relation of identity as demanded by the maxim 'nipātātirikta' etc. Hence it may be suggested that Viśvanātha actually wants to mean the following:

The Lakṣaṇā here is not imposed by the very nature of the Samāsa; for even when the two words occur separately as 'nīlam utpalam' the word 'nīla' must have Lakṣaṇā in order to satisfy the same rule 'nipātātirikta' etc. Hence the word 'nīla' comes to be a Lakṣaka before it enters into a compound along with the other word, i.e., 'utpalam'. Hence the presence of Lakṣaṇā in 'nīla' of 'nīlotpala' is not necessitated by
the nature of the Samūsa. But a case of Tatpuruṣa discussed earlier is just the opposite. There the Lakṣaṇā as in 'rājapuruṣa' is actually demanded by the very nature of the Samūsa. When the words involved occur separately as 'rājā- puruṣa', it is enough to have the denoted meaning of the word 'rājā'. Only in the compounded form, we are forced to recognise Lakṣaṇā in the word 'rājāpuruṣa'. Possibly observing that, Viśvanātha wants to speak of the absence, in the Karmadharaya compound, of a Lakṣaṇā necessitated by Samūsa. Pañcānana Shastri makes a similar observation in this context in his commentary.\footnote{500 The commentaries Dinakarī and Rāmarudrī are silent on the point. Pandit Dhunghirāja Shastri, in a foot note on Jagadīśa's definition of Karmadharaya quotes one Jayarāma Pañcānanastrīcārya who observes that Karmadharaya is free from a 'samāsaprayuktalakṣaṇa'.\footnote{501 Jagadīśa's definition of Karmadharaya, as we shall see by and by, does not so much demand for an explanation of the nature of Lakṣaṇā in some cases of Karmadharaya. Hence this remark of Jayarāma might have come}}
because of his own knowledge of Visvanātha's treatment of the Karmadhāraya Samāsa. Hence Visvanātha's text in this context may be suitably modified as follows: 'tatra ca na samāsapravyuktalakṣaṇā', supplying the word 'samāsapravyukta' to the existing text. We note that Jagadīśa's treatment of the issue does not lead him to any controversy as he makes no hard and fast rule regarding presence or otherwise of Laksanā in a Karmadhāraya Compound. He recognises Laksanā in a Karmadhāraya Samāsa wherever it is necessary as in the case of 'puruṣasimha'. In fact Jagadīśa does not refer to this possibility of the admission of Laksanā in his definition of Karmadhāraya. As we understand from Jagadīśa, this Karmadhāraya Samāsa can be there only in case of a couple of Nāmapadas occurring in immediate juxtaposition and showing the identity of the meaning of one with that of the other. Besides Jagadīśa has no objection accepting the dictionary meanings of the words like 'sukla' etc. as

502. kramikāṁ yannāmayugamekārthe'nyārthabodhakam
tādātyena bhavedeṣa samāsaḥ karmadhārayaḥ.

-------- '-nilotpalam' tyādāvutpalādipadasyārthe niła-
dipadārthasya tādātyenānvayaḥ. tathā 'puruṣasimha' ityādāvapi puruṣādāvuttarapadalaksyasya simhādisāḍy-
śasya, -------- SSP, p. 201.

Jagadīśa incorporates the notion of the relation of identity (between the meanings of two Nāmapadas) in the definition of a Karmadhāraya compound, illustrates '-nilotpalam' to show the relation of identity between two 'nāmārthas.'
'súklagunayuktā' etc. Thus for 'Tagadīśa there is no difficulty to identify the primary meaning of the word 'nīla' with that of 'utpala' in the expression 'nīlotpalam'. Because of admitting this lack of Laksanā even in constituent words of the Karmadhārāya compound, the Vedic injunction 'nīśadasthapatim yajayet' comes to be accepted as a case of Karmadhārāya instead of Tatpuruṣa which allows the operation of a Laksanā in its earlier word (pūrvapada). This position recorded by Viśvanātha may be traced back to the Mīmāṃsakas. We have already made an examination of Mīmāṃsakas' approach in the matter of explaining the aforementioned Vedic injunction. Now to follow the point in the context, we simply recapitulate that the Mīmāṃsakas prefer the expression 'nīśadasthapatim' as a case of Karmadhārāya compound as it does not involve the operation of any Laksanā in it. When the two component parts directly convey the idea of 'nīśāda' and 'sthapati', the expression comes to be

503. kvacit koṣadapi, yathā-
gune śuklādayaḥ puṃsi guṇilīṅgāstu tadvati
śītaṁ gune tadvadarthāḥ suśīmaḥ śīśiro jādah
cūrṇe kṣodah samutpiṅjapiṅjalau bhṛṣamākule ityādi-
kaṣebhyah śvāityādau śuklādisābdasya. SSP, pp.106-07.

504. nīlotpalamityādāvutpalādipadasyārthe nīlādipadārthasya
tādātmīyenaṁvayaḥ. ibid, p. 201.
a Karmadhārāya compound. When the compound is viewed as a case of 'saṣṭhītapatruṣa', the earlier word 'niṣāda' is to mean 'niṣādānām' (of the Nīṣādas). As this cannot be a direct meaning, it must unfailingly be admitted as a case of secondary meaning. But the principle of the Mīmāṁsakas to prefer a direct meaning to a secondary meaning in the event of a conflict between the two makes them finally accept the expression 'niṣādasthapati' as a case of Karmadhārāya compound which does not allow any scope for Lakṣaṇā. This particular example of the Mīmāṁsakas preferring a Sākyārtha to a Lakṣyārtha bears important socio-cultural implications and throws as well sufficient light on a very important aspect of Vedic society. As the Mīmāṁsakas preferred a direct meaning and were ever anxious to avoid a secondary meaning in the context of Vedic injunction under discussion, they unhesitatingly gave the right of performing a Vedic sacrifice even to a Nīṣāda, an out caste. As Viśvanātha has rightly asserted, from this Vedic injunction the right of Nīṣāda even to acquire necessary Vedic learning can easily be understood. In admitting the Vedic expression 'niṣādasthapati' as a case of Karmadhārāya instead of a Tatpuruṣa, there is the gain of the advantage of a simplicity. This is because of there being the scope of avoiding a Lakṣyārtha. A Tatpuruṣa compound basically involves a Lakṣaṇā whereas a Karmadhārāya does not. The Mīmāṁsakas, as we have already noted, deem Śruti or Abhidhā
as superior to Laksanā. Hence they get the advantage of avoiding the admission of a Lakṣyārtha by way of recognising the aforesaid expression viz. 'niṣādasthapatim' as a case of Karmadhārāya. But the gain is not unmixed with a loss. As we have already seen, the admission of a Karmadhārāya compound in the said expression presupposes the recognition of even a Niṣāda as the Sthapati. Vedas do not explicitly enjoin the right of sacrificing to a Niṣāda. But the admission of the said Karmadhārāya compound by the Mīmāṃsakas in their anxiety to avoid a Laksanā gives one a chance to assume that a Niṣāda also obtains the right to acquire necessary Shastric know-how to be competent to perform a sacrifice. Such an assumption is undoubtedly a complex or cumbrous situation. But yet that complexity or cumbrouness (Gaurava) is to be tolerated or rather welcome inasmuch as the said Gaurava leads to or produces the desired result (phalamukha etc.) i.e., the desired objective of the Mīmāṃsakas in the form of maintaining a Śakyārtha in lieu of a Lakṣyārtha, if and when possible.

M(45). upakumbhamarddhapippalītyādau parapade tatsambandhini laksanā, pūrvapadārthapradhānatayā cānvayabodha iti.

"In expressions like 'upakumbham' and 'arddhapippalī' there is Laksanā of the latter word (in the compound) with
regard to something related to it and the (syntactical) connection (i.e., Śābdabodha) is understood as giving the prominence to the meaning of the first word.'

Here Viśvarūpa proceeds to show the 'parapadalaksanā' in Avyayībhava compounds and in a special type of Tatpuruṣa compounds. In Avyayībhava compounds, the meaning of the first member of the compound is to remain prominent and as such deserves to be the Śakyārtha. Under that circumstance, if Lakṣanā is to be admitted with regard to either of the constituents of an Avyayībhava, it is in all propriety to be admitted with regard to the second member of the compound. As for illustration, in 'upakumbham', the latter word 'kumbha' by Lakṣanā means 'kumbhasambandhi' (related to a pitcher). The 'vigraha-vākya' of this example of Avyayībhava is 'kumbhaśya samīpam'. Now the Lakṣyārtha of the word 'kumbha' i.e., 'kumbhasambandhi' comes to be syntactically related by the relation of identity with the idea of samīpya (proximity) conveyed as vāryārtha by the word 'upa'.

505. pūrvapadārthapradhāno'vyayābhavaḥ ----- ityapi prācāmvadāḥ ------ SIK, p. 627.

506. Vinakarabhaṭṭa points out that some scholars understand the word 'upa' in the sense of 'śamīpya' and not 'samīpa'.

DK, Vide NSM, p. 301.
The last example chosen by Viśvanātha to show the operation of Padalaksana in a compound is 'arddhapippalī' (the half of a pippalī). The compound, when analysed in a sentence will take the form of 'pippalyāḥ arddham'. Thus it is obvious that 'arddhapippalī' is an instance of Tatpurusa. But Viśvanātha has already shown that mere Sakti cannot bring about Sābdabodha in the case of Tatpurusa compounds. He has further shown that the purpose of conveying desired Sābdabodha in Tatpurusa compounds is best served by admitting Lakṣaṇā only to the first member of the compound and not to the whole of it. Here we are to examine if Viśvanātha indulges in repeating the same idea by way of showing Lakṣaṇā in 'arddhapippalī' which is also a Tatpurusa compound; on verification, we find that in an earlier case of Tatpurusa compound, i.e., in 'raja-puruṣa', Viśvanātha shows the admission of Lakṣaṇā in 'pūrvapada' as the meaning of the 'uttarapada' was to remain prominent in the compound. Here in 'arddhapippalī' he desires to show the operation of Lakṣaṇā in the 'uttarapada', i.e., in 'pippalī' as in this case, the meaning of the 'pūrva-pada' (arddhā) is to be all the more important. Dinakarabhaṭṭa also corroborates such an idea. 507 A question is pertinent here. The

507. atra yadyapyarddhapippalīti tatpuruṣe sākti niraḵaraṇam punaruktaṁ pūrvaṁ tatpuruṣe tannirāṣat, tatha'pi pūrvaṁ muttarapadārthapradhānāraja-puruṣādau tannirāraṇāṁ pūrvapadalakṣaṇayā, iha ca pūrwapadārthapradhāne'rddha-pippalītyaditaṭpuruṣe uttarapadalakṣaṇayā tannirāraṇāṁ iti bhedādapaunaruktyamitī dhyeyam. ibid.
accepted notion with regard to a Tatpuruṣa compound is that in it the meaning of the second member of the compound is to remain prominent. Under the circumstances, how is it that the expression 'arddhapippali' is admitted as a Tatpuruṣa compound even though it shows the prominence of the 'pūrva-pada'? The answer to this query is that the word 'arddha' the meaning of which is all the more important in the compound is virtually the 'uttarapada' as is evident from the very vigrahavākya viz. 'pippalyāḥ arddham'.

M(46). ithaṅca samāse na kvāpi śaktiḥ. padasāktyaiva nirvāhāditi.

'Thus in a compound (as a whole), there is no Śakti at all, since the purpose (of Sābdabodha) is served by Śakti of the (component) words only.'

Now Viśvanātha declares with all satisfaction that since Lakṣaṇā as belonging to the Samāsa as a whole could be avoided, the possibility of the presence of Śakti in it is also fully ruled out. In the examples of Samāsas, namely Dvandva and Karmadhārāya where the scope of Lakṣaṇā was completely ruled out, the desired Sābdabodha occurred on the strength of the syntactical connection of the Sakyārthas of the constituent words. In cases where Lakṣaṇā operates in the constituent words in order to effect the desired Sābdabodha, Lakṣaṇā pertains only to the individual Padas. The Laksyārthas in these cases are additional meanings related to the Sakyārthas. Thus it does not necessitate any recognition of a Śakti of the whole Samāsa. Hence the question of Lakṣaṇā belonging to a Samāsa (as a whole) also does not arise.
K(3). Āsatti-yogatākāṅkṣā-tātparyajñānāṁśyate. 82b
Kāraṇāṁ, sannidhānaṁ tu padasyāsattirucyate. 83a

'The knowledge of Proximity, Compatibility, Expectancy and Intention is the cause (of Verbal Comprehension); the juxtaposition of words is called the Proximity.'

In the text of the Kārikāvalī above, Visvānātha names the conditions essential for obtaining the Śabdabodha in the context of a proposition. As we have already observed, a Śabdabodha is virtually a Vākyārtha-jñāna (the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence).508 Our fulfloded ideas in a context come to be conveyed only through a sentence or sentences. A sentence again is a collection of words.509 The words convey their individual meanings either through Śakti, or if and when necessary through Laksanā. But here the process does not end. The words shall have to fulfill certain conditions in order to give us a relational thought in the form of a Vākyārtha. Mere grouping together of certain words cannot lead to the formation of a sentence worth the name unless the words in the group satisfy some specific conditions. Scholars, however, are not unanimous in the choice of these conditions. Hence, the number of these requisites varies in different circles.

508. vākyārthajñānāṁ śabdajñānam. TS, p. 68.
509. vākyam tu padasamūhaḥ. ibid, pp. 65-66.
Panini is known for his insistence on the capacity (sāmarthya) of words. This 'capacity' is the capability of meanings of words to get united. Hence this capacity or Sāmarthya is actually an 'ekarthībhāva' (unification of meanings). Patañjali explains this Sāmarthya of Pāṇini in the sense of Vyapēkṣā, i.e., the mutual connection pertaining to the meanings of words in a sentence. We may compare this 'ekarthībhāva' to 'arthaikatva' and 'vyapēkṣā' to 'ākāṅkṣā' of Jaimini's definition of a sentence. The idea behind the definition is that so long a number of words come to serve a single purpose, they form 'one sentence' (one yajus mantra). This is clear from the impression of Śabarāsvāmin also. Śabara explains the context with reference to a 'yajus mantra'. But Kumārila observes

510. samarthah padavidhiḥ. P 2.2.1.
511. prthagarthānāmekarthībhāvaḥ samarthavacanam. V.I.
512. prthagarthānām padānāmekarthībhāvaḥ 'samartha'mitucyate. kva punah prthagarthāni kvaikārthāni? vākye prthagarthāni- 'rājñāḥ puruṣa' iti. samāse punarekārthāni 'rājapuruṣa' iti. kimucyate 'prthagarthāni' ti yāvatā 'rājñāḥ puruṣa anīyatā' mityukte rājapuruṣa anīyate 'rājapuruṣa' iti ca sa eva nāpi brūmaḥ - 'anyasyānāyanām bhavatīti. kastarhyekarthābhāvakraṃto visṛṣaḥ? MBH, on V. above, under P 2.1.1.
513. arthaikatvādekaṃ vākyāṃ sākāṅkṣaṃ cedvibhāge syāt. MS 2.1.46
514. "Therefore it comes to this that a group of words serving a single purpose, forms one sentence". PMS, p.189
515. yāvatā padasamūhenejyate tävān padasamūha ekam yajuh. kliyata cejyate. yāvatā ---- vākyamitucyate tenābhi-dhiyate arthaikatvādekaṃ vākyamitī. etamocetkārana-dekaṃ vākyāte bhavati tasmādekaṃ padasamūho vākyam ---- ekaprayojanatvādupapannam. SB, Under MS 2.1.46.
that it is applicable to ordinary sentences as well.\textsuperscript{516} He understands the 'arthaikatva' in the sense of a single purpose. Prabhākara takes it in order to understand from it 'a meaning' and 'a purpose' as well.\textsuperscript{517} Of the Grammarians again, Bhartrhari wants a group of mutually expectant words to give a single idea.\textsuperscript{518} Hence, we may hold that the Ākāṅkṣā in the sense of a necessity for interdependence of words to give an unified meaning in a sentence was maintained first by the Grammarians.

In the circle of Mīmāṃsakas, Kumārila himself comes to add two more conditions to his primarily accepted Ākāṅkṣā, namely 'yogyatā' and 'Asatti' (or Sannidhi or Sannidhāna).\textsuperscript{519} Later Mīmāṃsakas, more or less, come to follow Kumārila's

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{516} laukikānāṁ hi vākyānāṁ pramāṇāntareṇārthaḥstadek̄tām
cāvadhāryate tatra prasiddhena hetunā sakyamekāvākyat-
vagantum. TV, Vide MD, p. 432.
\item \textsuperscript{517} We find Kumārila declaring- "The Bhāṣya explains, ------- the word 'Artha' is taken in the sense of purpose (and not in that of Idea or Meaning)." Thus we find Kumārila accepting the explanation of the Bhāṣya ------- The Brhati says ------- the term 'Artha' in the Sutra stands for meaning as well as purpose; both being inter-related but of the two, purpose is the predominant factor; that is why it has been emphasised by the author of the Bhāṣya" PMS, pp.190-3
\item \textsuperscript{518} nirākāṅkṣāni nivṛttau pradhānāni parasparam
tesamātanupakāritvāt kathāṁ syādekāvākyatā .......
VP 2.35\textsuperscript{2}, p. 45.
\item \textsuperscript{519} ākāṅkṣā saṁnidhānāṁ ca yogyatā ceti ca trayam
sambandhakāraṇatvāna kāptam nānantarāśrutīḥ ....
TV, Vide MD, p. 445.
\end{itemize}
position. Though understood in their own way, Prābhākaras also admit the involvement of Sannidhi, Yogyatā and Ākāṃsa in effecting the Anvyaṭya i.e., in giving a Sābdabodha. The involvement of Tatparya also comes to be later on admitted by both Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras. In the course of our examination of the relegen text of the BP on Tatparya, we shall see that Tatparya as understood by the Mīmāṃsakas is not the same as that of the Naiyāyikas. Even the Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras clash amongst themselves as regards the nature of operation of this Tatparya. The Naiyāyikas are divided on the issue of Tatparya. Some like Jayantabhaṭṭa regard Tatparya as a separate Vṛtti while others like Viśvanātha add the knowledge of Tatparya (in the sense of the speaker's intention) as a fourth condition to the list of conditions for the production of a Sābdabodha. Vedāntins seem to accept all the four conditions as such. With the Ālāmkārikas, the admission of the earlier three conditions is universal. Some of them like Abhinavagupta regard

520. yadyadākāṃśitaṃ yogyaṃ sannidhānaṃ prapadyate
tadanvitaḥ padenārthaḥ svakīyaḥ pratipādyate.
VM, p. 5, Vide PP.

521. vākyajanyajñāne ākāṃśāyogatāsattayastātparyajñān-
añca tṛtīyaṃ prajñāni. VPB, p. 80.

522. vākyāṃ syādyogasāvākṣāsattiyuktāḥ padoccahyā.
SD II. 1, p. 27.
ākāṃśāyogatāsāmāniśvādārvakṣamatāsvarūpānām
Tātparya only as a separate vṛtti in order to effect the syntactical connection of words in a sentence. In the concluding part of the Kārikā above, Viśvanātha refers to the usually accepted meaning of the term Āsatti. Āsatti is the juxtaposition or unintervened occurrence of two words. Here we must be cautious to note that any two words, only by the virtue of being uttered without intervention, cannot claim to have had Āsatti. The two words between which an Āsatti is said to exist must be intended for a mutual connection. Viśvanātha refers to this age-old condition in M, 'anvayapratiyogyanuyogipadayoravyavadhānamāsattih.'

We shall take up the issue again to bring out the differences of opinion as regards the concept of Āsatti, in the course of our examination of the relevant text of the Muktāvalī.

Certain editions of the BP (eg. NSM) show the reading 'āsattih' separately, i.e., not as a member of the compound 'āsattiyogatā ----------- tātparyajñānam', in the first half of the Kārikā above. (cf. āsattiyogatākāṅkṣātātparyajñānamiṣyate. Vide NSM, p. 30). In the case of accepting this reading, Āsatti and not Āsattijnāna will be admitted as a Śābdabodhakāraṇa, in the view of Viśvanātha. On the

523. tātparyākhyām vṛttimāhuh padārthānvayabodhane tātparyārtham tadartham ca vākyaṁ tadbodhakām pare ...

SD II. 20. p. 67.
strength of the exposition of the Kārikā in the relevant
text of the Muktāvalī, (of. āsattijñānam ------ śabdabodha-
kāraṇam) Dinakarabhatta observes that Viśvanātha wants to
construe the word 'jnāna' with the word 'āsatti' also as
he recognises āsattijñāna and not āsatti as the said cause.
So the commentator prefers the reading 'āsattiyogyatā' etc.
which is a compound of words including 'āsatti'.\textsuperscript{524} But
this is not tenable. In the succeeding M, 'anvaya-pratiyogy-
yanuyogi -------- iti kecit', he rejects the old view that
the knowledge of āsatti in the sense of juxtaposition of
two words is a cause for Śabdabodha. Again in M, 'vastutā-
stu -------- śabdabodhe kāraṇam', he asserts that āsatti
in the sense of immediacy of two specific concepts is to be
admitted as a Śabdabodhakāraṇa. The admission of āsatti-
jiñāna in the earlier aforesaid text of the Muktāvalī is
only provisional.

\textsuperscript{524} āsattiyogyatākāṅkṣā' iti mūlādāsatteḥ svarūpas-
attyā eva kāraṇatvam labhyate, -------- svarūpasattvyā-
ścā" satteḥ kāraṇatvam na sambhavati ------ ato mūla-
sthām 'āsattipadāmāsattijñānaparatayā vyācaṣṭe -----
'āsattiyogyatā' tivasargaśūnyapāṭhastvṛjureva.

DK, Vide NSM, p. 302.
Visvanātha here proceeds to expound the above Kārikā text, 'āsattirītī etc. By way of exposition, Visvanātha makes it clear that the knowledge of each of the four conditions, namely Āsatti, Yogatā, Ākaṅkṣā and Tatparya, is to be obtained prior to the realisation of the Śabdabodha from a proposition. (But we reiterate, in view of the spirit of the succeeding Muktāvalī text that the reference to Āsattijñāna in lieu of Āsatti itself in the context is only provisional.) The singular number in the expression 'Karaṇam' in both Kārikāvalī and Muktāvalī is significant. The knowledge of all the four conditions is to combine to constitute a single cause. The knowledge of one or two or three cannot serve the purpose (of bringing about a Śabdabodha) at the cost of the rest. In the Muktāvalī, Visvanātha refers to the knowledge of each separately only to pinpoint their indispensability in clear terms. Our reference to each singly and separately as a Śabdabodha-kāraṇa in succeeding lines is only for the sake of ease in elucidating our points. It may be noted further that this kāraṇa (i.e., āsatti ------- jñānam) is also a Sahakāri-kāraṇa like Śaktijñāna towards the effect viz. Śabdabodha.
Now, (the author) speaks of the meaning of the word Āsatti, with the words 'sannidhānam tu' etc. Āsatti is the absence of interval between two words, one being 'pratiyogī' and the other 'Anuyogī' with regard to a (desired) 'Anvaya' (syntactical connection). The knowledge of that Āsatti is the cause of (corresponding) Śabdabodha. As maintained by some, it is because there is sometimes Śabdabodha even despite the interval (between such two Padas), on account of a mistaken notion of a lack of interval. As a matter of fact, the knowledge of the lack of intervention being not (actually) required, the recollection without an interval of those two word meanings the syntactical connection between which is intended, is the cause towards the (corresponding) Śabdabodha. Hence, in 'girirbhukta.magnimān devadattenat cittvā yādau na śabdabodhaḥ. nīlo ghāto dravyām pataḥ ityāda-vāsattibhramāccchābdabodhaḥ. āsattibhramāccchābdabhramā-bhāve'pi na ksāthi.'
is Sabdabodha owing to a mistaken notion of Asatti. There is no harm even if a mistaken notion of Asatti does not lead to a false Sabdabodha.'

In the text of the Muktavali above, Visvanātha proceeds to expound the concept of Asatti. Before we examine the concept of Asatti in the BP, it will be fruitful on our part to have a note on the issue as being handled by other scholars and in other schools of thought.

We find that in certain circles, Asatti is known as Sannidhi or Sannidhāna. Now we find that the Bhaṭṭas also admit Sannidhāna or Sannidhi (i.e., Asatti) as one of the causes of the relation of clauses and words in a sentence. But this Sannidhāna in the sense of sequence in utterance of words is not something indispensable. It is defined by Kumārila as an association of the ideas of the words related to the previous words. This Sannidhāna takes place where there is immediacy in utterance of the words or even where there is no immediacy of utterance because of the intervention of a mutually related word between the two involved words. It is clear from this that Kumārila accepts this intervention by a mutually related word as a variety of Sannidhāna. There is no insistence by Kumārila on the

525. ākaṃksā sannidhāham ca ------- TV, Vide MD, 448.
atha yathā sannidhikathananam ---- WM, p. 8, Vide PP.
ākaṃksā yogyatā sannidhiśca ------, TS, p. 66.

526. ------- sannidhānam ---------------
sambandhakāraṇatvena kāptam nānantarasrutiḥ .
TV, Vide MD, p. 448.
Immediate sequence in uttering the words. This is because it is to justify a need for recapitulating a certain Vedic word for sake of completing the idea intended in a context. As for example, the idea intended in the expression 'yā te agne rajāsāyā' can be completed not by the following of any word but by immediate dragging in of the previously uttered expression 'tanurvarsīṣṭhā'. It appears, therefore, that Kumārila's Sannidhāna (i.e., Āsatti under discussion) is the proximity of a word or sometimes of the idea of a word. 527

In the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṁsakas, however, Sannidhi is understood as the immediate association of the idea of the meaning of a related word. The Prābhākaras do not favour the definition of Sannidhi as the proximity of words. In the concept of 'anvītābhidhāna' which they advocate, it is an accepted fact that the denotative function (Sakti or Abhidhā) conveys only the related meanings of the words.

527. sarvārtho 'yamāmānāyamānāh sarvasādhārānānāntaryāsam-
bhavādvaśakatvācca kasyacidekasya samīpe pathyate.
tasmādakāraṇānāntaryamiti. saṃnidhiriti buddhau
viparivrttiḥ. sa ca'nāntaryā sambaddhapadavyavāye ca
bhavati. sambaddhapadavyavadhīrapyānantaryaprakāra eva
katham.

anantarenā sambaddhāḥ syātparasyāpyanāntaraḥ
tataḥ punastadārudhāḥ paraṇāntaryamāṣnute.
'yā te agne rajāsāyā' ityanenaapeksitaḥ sēṣāḥ parasta-
ādalabhyaṁānāh purastātparāvṛttyā'locyamāno labhyate
tanurvarsīṣṭhāti. etc. ibid.
Only an 'artha' (the meaning of a word) can have a relation with another 'artha'. For one who believes in the concept of 'anvitābhidhāna', 'abhidhāna' succeeds 'anvaya'. As such, one is to accept the position that there is always 'abhidhāna' of an 'anvitārtha'. Hence the school of Prabhakaras contends that if by Sannidhi (Āsatti) we mean the immediate need of something to complete the relation of an expression, then that 'something' is invariably an 'artha' and not merely a 'Sabda'. 528 Here lies the difference between the Bhattas and the Prabhakaras. While Bhattas understand 'Sannidhi' as the proximity of a word or of the idea of a word, the Prabhakaras accept it only as the proximity of the idea of the meaning of a word.

Coming to the text of the Muktāvalī above, We find Visvanātha asserting the qualification of the two Padas that can claim to enjoy an Āsatti between themselves. In the relevant Kārikā portion, the juxtaposition of a word (with another) is stated to be what is known as Āsatti. Such a definition would entitle any two closely placed words to claim an Āsatti. In the utterance 'girirbhuktamagniman devadattanā', one would understand Āsatti even between 'giri'

528. atha yathā sannidhikathanām tathā buddhau viparivruttih. sā ca na sabdanibandhanaiva, kevalā'nvitābhidhānayutpattau upalaksanam. adhyārtenāpi loke'nvitābhiddhānadarśanāt. VM, p. 8, Vide PP.
and 'bhuktam'. To arrest such a wrong notion, Visvanātha in the Muktāvalī proceeds to expound the concept of Āsatti. First he refers to an old view that Āsatti as a condition to contribute towards a Śabdabodha is required to exist between two Padas, one being Pratiyogī and the other Anuvyogī for an Anvaya. In other words, the two Padas between which an Āsatti is required to be there must be suitable for a syntactical connection.

In the light of references above, we come to be clear that in the circle of scholars preceding Visvanātha, there is no universal insistence on the actual juxtaposition of words in their claim for an Āsatti. Even the Bhāṭṭas casually believe as Āsatti in the lack of intervention between the ideas of Padas. Visvanātha disapprovingly refers to this earlier opinion in M, 'tajjnaham śabdabodhan kāraṇam kecit'. According to these scholars, to give rise to the corresponding Śabdabodha, two words need not physically be juxtaposed. To illustrate their point, these scholars point out to the utterence 'girirbhuktamagnimān devadattaḥ' and say that not withstanding the intervention of the word 'bhuktam', one comes to have a Śabdabodha in the form of mutual connection between the two words 'girīṅ' and 'agnimān'. This is possible as and when one wrongly understands the words as proximate. On such an account, not the actual proximity but only the knowledge of proximity is to be regarded as a factor leading to a Śabdabodha.
By way of disapproving of this position, Visvanātha comes to present a better concept of Āsatti in M, 'vastutastvavy-avadhāna, ājñānasāyānapaeksātatvāt-------devadattenetyādau
na sābdabodhaḥ'. As a matter of fact, the knowledge of the lack of an intervention between the words concerned is not a point to be stressed. But what is necessary is the immediacy of the concepts (Padārthas) which stand already intended to be mutually connected. The recollection without a gap of these two meanings between which an Anvaya is already intended comes to be a factor responsible for producing a Sābdabodha. Hence, in the mere utterence of the words 'girirbhuktamagniman devadatta' (hill, eaten, fiery, by devadatta) how is it possible for a sane person to have anything like a Sābdabodha. Thus Visvanātha comes to believe that Āsatti in the sense of immediacy of two concepts is a cause for Sābdabodha. Visvanātha seems to understand Āsatti only as backed by Tatparya. Unless already intended for a mutual connection, he does not attach any significance even to the successive recollection of two meanings. The reading 'tātparyagarbhā cā"sattih", occurring in certain editions like NSM, just after M, 'tena girirbhuktam--------na sābdabodhaḥ' confirms our idea. If some one points out to the fact of one's having a Sābdabodha (in the form of nilatvaprakārakaghatavisēṣyakajñāna) from the utterance, 'nīlo ghaṭo dravyaṃ pataḥ' (even without a Tatparya for such a Sābdabodha), Visvanātha contends, this is owing to
only a false notion of Āsatti. Though there is no intention on the part of the speaker to have the meanings of the two words 'nīla' and 'ghaṇa' mutually related, yet it is very likely for the listener to understand the two meanings as so desired by the speaker inasmuch as the meanings are not only quite capable of being mutually connected but also occur in an immediate succession. If it is pointed out that though the notion of Āsatti in this regard is a mistaken one yet actually it leads to a ūbdabodha which is otherwise quite proper, Viśvanātha would give the rejoinder that there is no harm if sometime a wrong notion of Āsatti does not result in a false ūbdabodha.

M(49). nanu yatra chatrī kuṇḍalī vāsasvī devadatta

'Ityuktam, tatrottarapadasmarāṇanena pūrvarpadasmarāṇasya
nāśādavyadvāhānena tattatpadasmaraṇāsambhava iti cet
na, pratyekapadaṁnubhavajanyasaṁskāraisedcaramam tāvat-
padaviṣayaka-smarāṇasya'vyadvāhānenaṁpatteḥ; nānaśam
-karṣairekapratyakṣasyeva nānāsamskāraikasmaraṇoṁ-
patterapi sambhavat; tāvatpadasmāksamārāhita-caramavar-
naṁjanasyodbhodhakatvāt. kathamanyathā nānāvarṇaireka-
padasmarāṇam.

'Some observe that when it is said, 'chatrī kuṇḍalī
vāsasvī devadattā' (Devadatta with the umbrella, earing
and dress), there being the destruction of the recollection
of preceding words because of the recollection of the succeeding words, then it comes to be impossible to recollect those succeeding words without an interval. No (that is not the case). For, the impressions arising from the apprehension of each word lead to the final recollection of all those words without any interval. As from diverse sense-contacts (sannikārṣa) there arises a single perception, there is the possibility of a single recollection to result from diverse impressions; inasmuch as the knowledge of the last letter combined with the impressions of all (those) words revives (the collective impressions), otherwise how (can) there be the recollection of a single word from several letters.'

In the preceding text of the Muktāvalī, it comes to be maintained that the recollection of the meanings of words (intended for a syntactical connection), in an uninterrupted sequence is necessary to bring about the Sābdabodha from a proposition. It may be argued now that such an unintervened recollection of meanings is possible only in the case of a sentence comprising of two words like 'devadatto'ṣti'. But in the case of a sentence involving several words signifying one substantive with many attributes like 'chatri kundalī vāsasvī devadattah', such an āsatti is virtually impossible. It is because the recollections of the meanings of earlier words are obviously intervened by those of the succeeding words before the former meanings
come to be syntactically connected with the meaning of the last word (or in other words, before the previously expressed attributes come to qualify the substantive expressed at the end). Scholars arguing thus hold further that the recollection of an earlier meaning comes to be virtually non-existent or lost because of a succeeding recollection. So Śābdabodha cannot be explained with such a view of Āsatti. In reply, it has been pointed out that even when a recollection of a word-meaning comes to be intervened by that of another, an impression corresponding to the earlier recollection lingers unchecked. All such impressions of earlier recollections come to assist the recollection of the last word-meaning in giving rise to a corresponding Śābdabodha. Though the recollection of the meaning of the earlier word 'chatrī' is intervened by that of meanings of the words, 'kuṇḍalī' and 'vāsasvī', before the said meaning comes to be connected with that of 'devadattāh', there is nothing to check the impression left by that earliest possible recollection to linger on. Similarly the recollection of the word 'kuṇḍalī', despite being interrupted by that of the word 'vāsasvī' comes to be non-existent only as allowing its own impression to continue. Now the recollection of the meaning of the last word, namely, 'devadattāh', combined with the uninterrupted impressions left by the recollections of the earlier word-meanings succeeds in bringing about the desired Śābdabodha from the contextual proposition. In 'nāmasannikārṣaireka-pratyakṣasyeva' etc, Viśvanātha seeks to justify such a
possibility by an illustration pertaining to the field of Perception. It is a matter of day to day experience that several sense-contacts (with the objects) come to give rise to a single perceptive knowledge. If a single Perception may result from even numerous contacts of sense-organs with objects, it is quite understandable that several impressions of recollections of the word-meanings can bring about a Śabdabodha. Actually, Viśvanātha further adds, in such a case the last letter of the series of words, only as aided by the accumulated impressions, corresponding to the very words, serves as the reviver of the knowledge of the total meaning that amounts to be the Śabdabodha. The capacity of the last letter to serve as such a reviver need not be doubted, otherwise, it will not be possible to explain the knowledge of a single word that consists of only several letters. If we assert that we know the word 'ghaṭa', we shall have to admit that the letter 'ṭa' has the capacity of combining with the impression left by the knowledge of the letter 'gha' in order to give us the knowledge of the entire word 'ghaṭa'. If such a capacity of a last letter is to be admitted at the level of a Pada, there is no point

529. cf. ekaikavarnoccaṛe'rthānabodhāt kramoccāṛiṇām ca yugapacchraṇāsambhavāt pūrvavaraṇjanitasamkārasahito'ntyo varṇaḥ pratyāyakāḥ. ibid.
in refusing to admit it even at the level of a Padasūmìnā.

M(50). parantu tāvatpadārthānām smarāṇādekadaiva khale
kapotanyāyāt tāvatpadārthānām kriyākarāmbhāvenā'nvaya-
bodharūpāḥ sābdabodho bhavatīte kecit.

'vṛddhā yuvānāḥ sīśavāḥ kapotāḥ khale yathāmiyugapatpatanti/
tathaiva sarve yugapat padārthāḥ paraspareṇā'nvayōno bhavanti'/

Apare tu -
'yadyadākāṅkṣitām yogyaḥ sannidhanām prapadyate /
tena tennāvitaḥ svārthāḥ padeśivāvagamyate'.\/
tatha ca khaṇḍavākyārthabodhānantaṃ tathaiva padārthasmṛ-
, tyā mahāvākyārthabodha ityapyaḥuh. etena tāvadvarṇābhivyā-
āṅgyaḥ padasphoṭo'pi nirastāḥ, tattadvarṇasamskārasahita-
caramavānpalambhena tadvyāṅjākenaivopapatte reriti.

'Some hold that on the analogy of pigeons in a barnyard
(i.e., by the 'khale kapotanyāya'), the recollections
of the meanings of all the words lead simultaneously to a
Sābdabodha in the form of an apprehension of the syntactical
relation of the meanings of all (these) words connected as
Verbs and Objects:

"Just as those pigeons, old, fullgrown and young fall
upon a barn yard simultaneously, in the same manner the
meanings of all the words enter simultaneously into relation
with one another." Others, however, maintain, (that) -
"the meanings of words are (first) understood from the 
words themselves in combination with whatever else is 
required by sense, is consistent and is contiguous.'

So they also say, the apprehension of the meanings of 
the smaller sentence (khaṇḍavākyārtha) is followed by that 
of the meanings of the bigger ones (mahāvākyārtha) in the 
very same way through the recollection of the meanings of 
words.

This also refutes the (theory of the existence of the 
Transcendental word - Essence (Sphoṭa) corresponding to a 
whole word supposed to be manifested by all its component 
letter-sounds, for, Śabdabodha can (now) be explained just 
by the (auricular) perception of the last letter sound com-
bined with the impressions of the other letter sounds (of 
the word), which (as the Grammarians hold) manifests that 
(Sphoṭa).

In maintaining so long that there is to be a sequence 
in the matter of recollecting the word-meanings intended for 
a syntactical connection, Viśvānātha is actually reproducing 
the view of the Prābhākaras, the Anvītābhīdhanavādins. The 
Bhāṭṭamāṁsakas as Abhīhitānvaṇavādins are fully opposed to 
such a view. In the text of the Muktāvalī above, Viśvānātha 
refers to the views of both the schools. The two verses, 
quoted in the said text of the Muktāvalī, namely 'vṛddha 
yuṣṭānaḥ' etc. and 'yadyadākaṇḍksitaṁ' etc. respectively
represent the two divergent views that come to pass as Abhihitānvayavāda and Anvītabhidhānavāda. As it is not possible to add much to the bulk of the present work, we are required, however, to be concerned with the two views so far as is demanded by the exposition of the text of BP.

As we have already seen, the Bhāṭṭamāṃsakas also admit that the three well known conditions, namely Ākāṅkṣā, Yogyatā and Āsatti to help in effecting the mutual relationship among the individual word-meanings. In their view the individual word-meanings come to serve as the Karaṇa in the matter of bringing about the corresponding Vākyārtha with the aid of the aforesaid three factors. The Padārthas (individual word-meanings) are independently apprehended (i.e., abhihita) until all the words are heard; then there is a simultaneous recollection of various meanings so as to form the sentence meaning. Thus, as held by the Bhāṭṭas, the mutual relation (Anvaya) comes to take place simultaneously at a later stage in respect of all the meanings irrespective of the sequence in which the corresponding words appear. To bring home the idea, the Khalekapotanyāya is utilized by the holders of this view. In M, 'Parantu tāvat ----- kecit,' above, Viśvanātha refers exactly to the aforesaid view. The idea of the maxim 'khale kapota' is sought by Viśvanātha to be brought out in full with its relevance in the context by way of quoting the verse. It is said that the verse can be traced back in its origin
to Udayanācārya. According to this maxim, the various word-meanings in a sentence get related to each other as Kriyā, Karma, etc. simultaneously at a time, like all the old, young and little pigeons which fly down on a barn yard simultaneously. In such a view, obviously the 'abhidhāna' (apprehension of individual word-meanings) precedes the 'anvaya' (the syntactical connection of the already denoted meanings). This view, originally initiated by Kumārila stands advocated by his followers also. But we shall have to note that the Abhihitānvayavāda is not the monopoly of the Bhāṭṭamāmsakas. It is generally accepted by the Naiyāyikas and by the Vaiyākarāṇas also. Of the Naiyāyikas, Jayantabhaṭṭa accepts this Abhihitānvaya theory, of course with certain modifications. He criticises the theories held by both the Bhāṭṭas and Prabhakaras and taking views from both sides he comes to advocate a new and moderate Abhihitānvayavāda according to which, Tātparya is a Verbal

530. 'The verse explaining the 'Khalekapotanyāyaḥ' is assigned to Udayanācārya by the writer of Prabhāṣā in the following way : Khalekapotanyāyamidayanācārya- sammatyā darsāyati but the Commentator is conspicuously silent regarding the source of the verse ----- almost all the Commentators agree upon the view that the verse should be ascribed to Udayanācārya' (quoted with due deference from a Communication from Dr. Vēcārati Upādhyāya of the University of Delhi.)

531. cf. itaretṣaṁ tu śabdānāṁ svārtharūpevaṁbhidheyaṁ-vitarūpastyā vākyārthaḥ padārthagamyā iti. aṣṭeva ---- abhihitārthaṃsambandhādhabhīgamamanatvāt. NM pp.101-02; tenātra padāvagataḥ punah padārthā mitho'nvayavamānti ityevamabhihitānvayasyiddhānto darsito'smadādīnām. MM, pp. 94-95.
function. According to the Bhāṭṭas, the words convey the unrelated individual meanings by means of Abhidhā and the unrelated word meanings convey the related sentence-meaning by Lakṣaṇā. But according to Jayanta, it is the Tātparya-vṛtti and not Lakṣaṇā which brings about the Vākyārtha. It may be pointed out in this context that Visvānātha acccents neither Lakṣaṇā nor Tātparya in order to obtain a Vākyārtha. Like other Navyanāyikas, he also seems to understand it by means of what is known as Sāmsargamaryādā (i.e., the very strength of an Āvaya brought about by the approved conditions, Āsatti etc.).

The verse, yadyadākāṅkṣitam etc. is obviously in reference to the view of the Anvītābhidhānāvādins. The Anvītābhidhānavāda can be traced back to Prabhākaramiśra, the author of Brhatī. According to Prabhākara and his followers, the words can denote their respective meanings only when they are syntactically connected. A word conveys a meaning only as is consistent (Yogya) in relation to other word-meanings, proximate to word-meanings with which it is

532. The verse can be traced to Śālikanātha's Vākyārtha-mātrkā. The verse occurs in that work with some variant readings in the second half.

cf. yadyadākāṅkṣitam yogyaṁ sannidhānaṁ prapadyate
tadanvitaḥ padeṇārthaḥ svakīyaḥ pratiṇādyate.

VM, p. 5, Vide PP.
intended to be connected and only as having expectancy i.e., which can demand a curiosity to be known in the context of other meanings. It comes to be clear that in the opinion of the holders of this view, Anvaya precedes Abhidhāna. As we can understand, Prabhākara himself mooted out the idea that a word can convey its meaning only when utterances of all the words are complete. As Śālikanātha expounds the view, a word conveys an 'anvitartha' (a related sense) and also the same word conveys an 'ananvitartha' (an unrelated sense, i.e., an isolated sense of a word). Śālikanātha as a follower of Prabhākara seeks to meet the points raised against the theory by the opponents. In particular, he refuses to accept that the Anvitābhidhānavāda suffers from the fallacy of interdependence. (anyonyāśraya or itaretarāśraya). Thus the Anvitābhidhānavādins understand the effecting of Anvaya in a proposition, phase by phase. According to this view, in the expression, 'ग्रामाम gacchati', first there is the understanding of the meaning from the part sentence (Khandavākya), 'ग्रामाम' in the form

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533. tasmādyatra samudāyāḥ prayuktāḥ, tatraiva padāṃ padārthamavagamayati, BR, p. 258.

534. anvitasābhidhāne'pi svarūpāṃ vidyate sadā tena svarūpamātre'pi sābdo janayati smṛtim. evaṃ sambandhagrahaḥanāntargataṃ svarūpasmarṣarṣamuktam. VM, p. 18. Vide PP.

535. itaretarāśrayamidānāṃ parihaṇa - smṛtisannihitaevam arthanāha padaṃ sarvamiti nānyonyasamāśrayam. ibid.
of grāmavṛtiikarmatvam (i.e., the object-hood as pertaining to the village). Then follows the understanding from another part-sentence 'gacchati', of 'gamanānukūla kṛti' (an effort favourable to the act of going) and then only follows the final comprehension from the whole stence (mahāvākya), 'gramam' gacchati' in the form of 'grāmakarmakagamanānukūlakṛtimān'. Such an idea is sought to be brought home by Viśvanātha in the aforesaid text of the Muktāvalī, viz. 'tathā ca khanḍavākyārtha ــــــــــــــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ــــــــ ـــــــــ
signification of a word. As they assert, though the letters
are transitory in character in the sense that a letter may
last only for a moment, yet a word comprised of such letters
comes to be significant. It is because each succeeding
letter is united with each preceding letter through the
impression left behind by it and this process continues till
the cognition of the last letter. The comprehension of the
last letter together with the impressions of the preceding
ones goes to convey the meaning of the word. Under the above
circumstance, there is no meaning in postulating the so-
called 'sphoṭa' or the word-essence by the Grammarians in
order to explain a meaning from an assemblage of momentary
letter-sounds.

In making a brief reference to the controversial theory
of Sphoṭa, we may say that Grammarians do not believe in the
explanation of a word-unit by the Naiyāyikas as due to the
synthesis of memory and intellect. They do not understand the
meanings as signified by momentary sounds but by an indivi-
sible and eternal word-essence known as Sphoṭa, revealed
by such momentary sounds. This is what has been referred to
by Viśvanātha as the 'vraṇābhīvyāṅgo-sphoṭah'. This Sphoṭa,
as viewed by the Grammarians, is permanent and indivisible.
It is free from any idea of sequence. This very word-essence
appears as Varna-sphoṭa, Pada-sphoṭa or Vākya-sphoṭa as the
case may be, when revealed by sounds, taking the shape of
letters, words and sentences. Hence, the Sphoṭa that is
manifested by certain letters only (i.e., not by letters already enjoying the status of words or sentences) is a Padasphota. In M above, 'etena varṇābhivyāṅgo padasphoṭo'vi nirastah' etc., Visvanātha holds that the letter-sounds that are said to reveal the so-called word-essence (Padasphota) can by themselves justify the significance of a word in the aforesaid manner. Hence the assumption of the existence of some inarticulate permanent word-essence called 'sphota' in order to explain the process of conveying the meaning of a word is uncalled for.

M(51). idantu bodhyam- yatā dvāramityuktaṁ, tatra pidhe-hiti padasya jñānādeva bodhāḥ, na tu pīdhānādirūpār-thajñānāt, padajanyatattatpadārthopasthitestattacchā-bdabodhe hetutvāt. kiṁca kriyā-karmapadānāṁ tena tenāiva saha sākāṅkṣatvam, tena kriyāpadāṁ vinā kathāṁ sābdabodhaḥ syāt. tathā puspebhya ityādau spṛhayatī-tyādi-padādhyāhāram vinā caturthyanupapatteḥ padādhyā-hāra āvasyakah.

'It should be understood, however, that when the word 'dvāra' (door) is uttered, the Sābdabodha arises from the knowledge of the word 'Pidhehi' (shut), not from the apprehension of its meaning in the form of 'pidhāna' (shutting), for the recollection of the meanings of words as generated by the knowledge (corresponding) words comes to be the cause of a particular Sābdabodha. Moreover, the words that
signify actions and their objects having expectancy (ākāṃkṣā) with one and another, how can there be the Sābdabodha without words denoting Verbs? Similarly in (expressions) 'Puṣpeḥyāḥ' (for flowers) etc., the use of dative case-ending being inconsistent without supplying some such words as 'Spr̥hayati' (craves), the supply of word is (undoubtedly) necessary. The admission of the immediacy of two or more concepts in order to get a Sābdabodha from a proposition need not create an impression that the knowledge of the words corresponding to the concepts can in any way be spared or neglected. As for instance, if one utters the word, 'dvāra' (the door), the contextual comprehension is justifiably possible only by the supply (adhyāhāra) of the word 'pāda' or 'samvriyātām' (shut) and not merely by the supply of the idea of closing. This is in consonance with the earlier assertion that the knowledge of the meanings of words, only as generated by that of the corresponding words, by means of the knowledge of corresponding verbal function can be a cause of Sābdabodha (cf. Padajanyapadārthasamarāṇam vyāpāraḥ anyathā padajñānavaṭaḥ ātreyakṣādinā padārthopasthitaḥvapi sābdabodhāḥ). Here it may be pointed out that Viśvanātha has to reiterate this already asserted view only to oppose an existing tendency in certain circles to bank on the knowledge of mere ideas at the cost of that of the corresponding words. In this context, we specifically refer to...
Moreover, as Viśvanātha further points out, the words signifying verbs and vocables are mutually expectant (sākāṅkṣa). As Viśvanātha will observe in the succeeding Muktāvalī, a word is expectant (sākāṅkṣa or possessed of ākāṅkṣa) with another (word) without which the earlier one fails to give rise to a Verbal Comprehension. Now, without a Verbal form like 'pidhehi' and 'saṁvriyatām' or like 'apāvrṇu' and 'apāvriyatām', the objecthood (Karmatva) in the expression 'dvāram' is without any meaning. Otherwise the Śabdabodha from the word 'dvāram', involving as it does an idea of the objecthood comes to be totally impossible. The admission of the immediacy of mere concepts will set at defiance even the time-honoured regulations of the Grammarian Paninī. The Paninian rule demands that the fourth case ending \( \frac{1}{2} \) to be added to what is craved for when the root 'sprh' is used. When there is the expression, 'Puspebhyah', with the intention of giving the idea that one craves for flowers, the relevant total idea is possible.

536. atha yathā sannidhikathanaṁ tathā buddhau viparivṛttīḥ. sa ca na sabdanibandhanaiva, kevalā'nvitābhi-dhānāvyutpattau upalakṣaṇam. adhyāḥṛtenaṁ loke'nvitābhiddhānadasāsanāt. na ca vācyāṁ sabda evadhyāhriyate. sa ćārtahamupalakapāyatītyanupayogādāpramaṇakatvācca. yadyaparyarthāpattipramāṇako'dhyaḥāraḥ, tathāpi śabda-kalpanamupapannāṁ etc. VM, p. 8, Vide PP.

537. Sprherīpsitāḥ P 1.4.36.
only by the supply of the word 'sprhayati' and not of the idea of 'sprhā' (craving). It is because without the verbal form 'sprhayati' comprising of the root 'sprh', the use of the fourth case-ending in the expression 'puṣpebhyaḥ' will not be justified. Thus, according to Viśvanātha, in the case of incomplete proposition, the supply of ideas of Padas and not of Padārthas can serve the purpose of Śābdabodha.

K(4). PADĀRTHAE TATRA TADVATTĀ YOGYATĀ PARIKĪRTTITĀ. 83b.

'The "sense of belonging" of one word-meaning to another is called the Compatibility'.

In the Kārikā text above, Viśvanātha defines what is known as Yogyatā. In the course of his treatment of the concept of Āsatti, Viśvanātha maintains that the Śābdabodha of a Proposition demands as its pre-requisite the uninter­vened recollection of two word - meanings, which are intended to be syntactically connected. Here is a quary. Can each and every word-meaning be intended to be syntactically connected with another ? The reply is obviously in the negative. To be so intended, a word-meaning must have the consistency or Compatibility (Yogyatā). Hence Viśvanātha proceeds to ascertain what this Yogyatā (Compatibility) is.
The compatibility is being defined ‘Padārtha iti’. The connection of the meaning of a word with that of another is the compatibility. And in absence of its knowledge, there is no Śabdabodha from (propositions) (vahinī śiścatī) etc. It is said that the knowledge of this Yogyatā is not possible in all the cases before Śabdabodha because of the Vākyārtha not being something already existent; (the reply to such an objection is) No. While there arises the recollection of the meanings of words, it comes to be possible to have the knowledge of this Yogyatā in the form of sometimes 'doubt' and sometimes 'certainty'. The
followers of the New School assert that the knowledge of Yogyatā is not a cause of Ṣābdabodha; (for instance) in 'Vahninā sīṅcati' (one sprinkles with fire) etc., there is no Ṣābdabodha because of the obstruction owing to the (notion of) certainty of the absence of Yogyatā (lack of compatibility) that fire cannot be instrumental to the act of sprinkling (i.e., that sprinkling cannot be done with fire). The notion of certainty of the absence of a thing, provided it is not produced by normal sense contact or by any other defect, being an obstacle to any kind of knowledge of it (that very thing) is obviously also the obstruction with regard to (corresponding) Ṣābdabodha and it is not admissible that there can be delay in Ṣābdabodha from delay in the knowledge of Yogyatā.' In the text of the Muktāvalī above, Viśvanātha comes to elucidate his concept of Yogyatā in greater details.

Before we come to the exposition of the text of the Muktāvalī above, it will be fruitful to have a brief note on Yogyatā as it occurs in the other schools of thought.

Of the Mīmāṃsakas, the Prabhakara school understands Yogyatā as the suitability of words to have syntactical relation with other words of the same sentence. The knowledge of this Yogyatā occurs to the mind of the speaker and the listener in a particular context on the strength of the previous experience of seeing the words to be in
such relations. Rumania Bhatta and his followers admit Yogyatā as an essential factor for having a Śādbabodha as they hold that there can be no Śādbabodha in sentences like 'Vahninā siṅcati' obviously for lack of Yogyatā between the words 'Vahninā' and 'siṅcati'. Yogyatā is defined by the Vedāntins as the absence of any intervention in the matter of understanding the syntactical relation as intended by the speaker. Now in the sentence 'vahninā siṅcati' the syntactical relation between the words involved cannot be understood as 'vahnī' has no instrumentality (Karaṇatva) to 'secana-kriya' and, therefore, there is no Śādbabodha. The words 'vahninā' and 'siṅcati' donot have Yogyatā as constituent parts of the sentence.

538. kim punaridam yogyatvām nāma yat sambandhārhatvām sambandhārhamiti kathamavagamyate. sambandhitvena drṣṭatvāt. VM, p. 9, Vide PP.

539. agnīni siṅcatīdyādavayogyāṇāmananmayāt yogyatāpi parigrāhyā. MMM, p. 99.

540. yogyatā ca tātparyyaviṣayībhūtasaṁsargābhādhaḥ. vahninā siṅcedityādau tādṛśasaṁsargābādhānna yogyatā. sa prajāpatiratmanovapāmudakhidadityādavapi tātparyyaviṣayībhūtā tūparapaśuprāsastyaabādhaḥ yogyatā. tattvamasyādvikyesvapi vacyā bhedabādhye pi lakṣyasyavṛupabhede bādbhābhāvād yogyatā. VPB, pp. 84-86.
According to the Alamkārikas like Viśvanātha Kavirāja, Yogyatā is the absence of hindrance or obstruction in respect of mutual relation of the things denoted by the words. 

Of the Grammarians, Nāgėśa understands Yogyatā as possession of such attributes by two or more things as make their mutual relation possible.

An analysis of the definitions of Yogyatā in various circles gives the impression that Yogyatā is actually the capacity of two word-meanings to be coordinated. This is the spirit of the author of the Kārikāvalī also.

Coming to the Muktāvalī, we find that according to Viśvanātha, Yogyatā in the sense of the capacity of a word-meaning to be co-ordinated with another is in actuality owing to a relation between the two meanings. And the knowledge of this relation is a factor leading to the

541. yogyatā padārthānām parasparasambandhe bādhābhāvāh. padoccayasyaitadabhāve'pi vākyatve 'Vahniṃa sinçati' ityādyapi vākyām syāt. SD. p. 27.

542. yogyatā ca parasparānvaprayayaprajavakādharmavatvamtena 'payasa sinçati' iti vākyām yogyam. asti ca sekānvaprayayaka-dravadravyatvam yogyatā jāle, karaṇatvena jalānvaaprayayakārdrikaraṇatvam yogyatā sekākriyāyām ata eva 'vahniṃa sinçati' iti vākyamayogyam.vahneh sekānvaaprayayaka-dravadravyatvābhavat. F., p. 75.
Sabdabodha from a preposition involving the words that convey these two meanings. Because of the absence of such a knowledge, Sabdabodha is not possible in the preposition, 'vahninā śiñcati' (sprinkles with fire). As it is not possible to conceive even the instrumentality of fire to the act of sprinkling, one does not have the knowledge of the relation between the meanings of the two words as may exist between a Verb and an instrumental case, although the words as presented in the proposition appear to be in possession of such a relation. Some hold that Yogyatā in the sense of such a relation is not possible inasmuch as the knowledge of a relation of this sort is possible only when there is already a Vākyārthajnāna which is no short of a Sabdabodha. Viśvanātha points out this doubt and then gives the solution in M, 'nanvetasyā yogyatāyā jñānam ... yogyatāyā jñānasya sambhavat.' Such an objection has been referred to and answered by Sālikanātha also.

Particularly the Anvitabhidhānavadins are very likely to raise such an objection. The Anvitabhidhānavadins believe in an Anvaya as taking place prior to 'abhidhāna'. The

543. sambandhārhamitī kathamavagamyate ------- nanvevam
tarhi kathamāpyārve kārye'nvitabhidhānam vede -------
ucyate sāmānyato yogyatavadhāranaṃ etc.

VM, p. 9, Vide PP.
problem of Yogyatā comes at the stage of Anvaya. If Yogyatā is understood in the sense of a capability of meanings to be related, it comes to be totally impossible to have the knowledge of such a Yogyatā. Such a Knowledge demands the completion in the Knowledge of the meanings. But according to Anvitābhidhānavādins, a word completes its meaning only when it is already related to all the meanings. In other words, word-meanings are complete only when they reach the stage of a sentence-meaning. So obviously, without such a sentence-meaning, it is not possible to have the Knowledge of such a Yogyatā. Śālikanātha contends that the Knowledge of such a Yogyatā is possible in a general way. According to Viśvanātha, even in such a view, it is possible to have the Knowledge of the said Compatibility in the form of sometimes at least a doubt and sometimes even a certainty. 544 In 'navyāstu' etc.,

544. cf. In reply to the point that, as this Yogyatā, which consists in the relation which one concept bears to another is incapable of being known before deriving Verbal Knowledge, it is not proper to regard Yogyatā-jñāna as a causal factor of conceptual cognition, Viśvanātha says, when recollection of different concepts ensues from cognition of their corresponding denotative words, it is possible to have knowledge of the relation existing between these concepts, as well. In some cases, this Knowledge being confirmed by Perceptual Experience takes the form of a right notion and in others, having no experience to confirm it, assumes the form of a doubtful cognition."

LCAI, p. 209.
Visvanātha refers to some later Naiyāyikas who do not believe in the Knowledge of Yogyatā as a necessary condition for a Śābdabodha. As they hold, it is actually the Knowledge of the incompatibility (Ayogyatā) between the two concepts that stands in the way of understanding of a sentence. As for instance, the Śābdabodha does not occur from a proposition like 'vahninā siṅcati' only being prevented by the assertainment (Knowledge) of the Ayogyatā (incompatibility) existing in the form of the absence of the instrumentality of fire in respect of sprinkling. Such a Knowledge of incompatibility in the matter of relation between concepts as verbs and vocabules hinders the understanding of concepts as such. The non-understanding or the lack of knowledge of the concepts (i.e., the absence of Padārthadhīḥ) is sure to result in the non-realisation or the absence of the Śābdabodha concerned. In other words, when it is not possible to conceive the relation of 'vahninā' and 'siṅcati' as one between a Karana and Kriya, obviously there will be no knowledge of Vahninā in the sense of 'vahnikaranaṭvā' and of 'siṅcati' in the sense of 'secanānukūlakṛtī'. As a result, there remains no possibility of the participation of the knowledge of these two meanings in the matter of bringing about a Śābdabodha. Thus the Knowledge of incompatibility would serve as the cause of for non-realisation of Śābdabodha provided that this knowledge is not due to some worldly sense contact or
to some other extraneous defect (like the seeing of a white conch as yellow by one suffering from jaundice).

K(5). YATPADENA VINĀ YASYĀNANUBHĀVAKATĀ BHAVET

SĀKĀŅKŚA, VAKTURICCHĀTU TĀTPARYAM PARIKĪRTTITAM. 34.

'That ākāṅkṣā (Expectancy) is the failure of a word to produce the Knowledge (of syntactical connection) without another (word), while the intention of the speaker is called Tātparya.'

In the Kārikā above, Viśvanātha defines ākāṅkṣā and Tātparya, which together with Āsatti and Yogvātā come to constitute a Śabdabodhakāraṇa. He elucidates the above definitions in the succeeding text of the Muktāvallī. We propose to examine the above Kārikā along with corresponding portions of the Muktāvallī.

M(53). ākāṅkṣām nirvakti - yatpadenētyādyeyena padena vinā yatpadasya 'nvayānanubhāvakatvāḥ tena padena saha tasyākāṅkṣetarthaḥ, kriyāpadam vinā kārakapadam nānvayabodhaḥ janayatīti tena tasyākāṅkṣā. vastutartu kriyā-kāraka-padanāṁ sannidhānamāstātyā caritārthān. parantu ghaṭakarmatābodhah prati ghaṭapadottara-āviti tlyārūpākāṅkṣājñānaṁ kāraṇam, tena ghaṭah karmatvamānayanaṁ kṛtirityādau na śabdabodhaḥ, ayameti putro rājāḥ puruṣopāsārayatāmityādau tu putreṇa saha rājapadasya tātparyagrahasatvāt tenaivā 'nvayabodhaḥ.
purusena saha tātparīyagrahe tu tena sahā'nvayabodhah syādeva.

'Ākāṅkṣā (Expectancy) is defined, "yatpadena" etc. Expectancy of a particular word exists with that (very) word without which it cannot lead to the idea of the (desired) syntactical connection. As without a word signifying 'Verb' (kriyāpada), a word denoting a case (kārakapada) cannot give rise to the apprehension of a syntactical connection (anvayabodha), there is Ākāṅkṣā (expectancy) of it (kārakapada) with that (kriyāpada). As a matter of fact, the juxtaposition of words signifying Verbs and cases (kriyā-kārakapadas) and substantives is satisfied by āsattī itself, but the notion of Ākāṅkṣā about the accusative case ending after the word 'ghata' (jar) is a cause of the knowledge of the jar as an object of some verb; hence there is no sābdabodha to take place from a series of words like 'ghata, karmatvam, ānayanam, kṛtiḥ' (jar, the objecthood, bringing and effort). In 'ayameti putro rajñāḥ puruṣo'pa-sāryatām' etc. (here comes the son of the king, remove the man), since there is the understanding of the Tātparīya, with regard to the connection of the word 'rājan' with the word 'putra', the apprehension of the syntactical connection (in the context) takes place in that very way. If, however, the Tātparīya is understood with reference to the connection (of the word 'rājan') with 'puruṣa', then certainly the knowledge of the connection will be in that
In the Muktāvalī above, Viśvanātha expounds the concept of Ākāmksā which stands briefly hinted in the Kārikā text above. Here Viśvanātha first maintains that a word is expectant to another (word) without which it cannot convey its meaning (in full). In other words, Ākāmksā is the capability of a word to imply something by virtue of its association with another.

Before we fully examine Viśvanātha in the context, it is necessary to understand the concept of Ākāmksā occurring as it does in other schools of thought. In our foregoing general note on the conditions for knowing the meaning of a sentence, we have, of course, already referred to the concept of Ākāmksā in certain circles of Grammar and Mīmāṃsā. To add to our earlier observations on the issue, we find Śālikanātha as rejecting the view of the Naiyārīka on the issue. He defines (Ākāmksā) as the Jñānaṇāya, restricted, of course, only to the Pratiyogin, just what is required to be object of curiosity for completing the idea in a particular context. Unlike the Grammarians Śālikanātha does not believe that Ākāmksā is a curiosity on the part of a listener and that this curiosity is due to a relation of invariable association (avinābhava) as he feels that

545. kā punariyamākāmksā ? pratipatturjñāsā.
    kinnibandhanā punarasau. avinābhāvanibandhanetī kecit.
    kriyā hi kārakāvinābhāvinīti tām pratītya kārakamiṁjñāsate ------ tadayuktamanītmanyante. VM, p. 5,
    Viie PP.
there is no end of curiosity of a listener. He wants it to be conceived in view of the very concept of Anvitābhīdhāra. Even in an elliptical expression (requiring Adhyāhāra), Ṛkāṅkṣā is necessary for completing the construction of the sentence that should normally be there to convey the idea now conveyed by the elliptical expression.

Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, a Mīmāṃsaka of the Bhāṭṭa school speaks of the necessity of admitting Ṛkāṅkṣā as an essential factor, otherwise, we shall be required to recognise a syntactical relation even in the bare string of words like cow, horse, man etc. Just the same idea is sought to be conveyed by Viśvanātha, the Alāṅkārika also. He holds that Ṛkāṅkṣā is the absence of completion of an idea (i.e. of understanding a meaning). Viśvanātha, further, observes that if a sentence be admitted even without Ṛkāṅkṣā amongs words, then even a group of isolated words like cow, horse, man, elephant etc. would have the status of a sentence.

In the school of Nyāya, the predecessors of Viśvanātha have already asserted that along with Āsattī and Yogācāra, Ṛkāṅkṣā is also to be admitted as a cause for Sabdabodha.

546. anvitasyābhidhānārthaṁuktārthaghaṭānāya vā
pratīyogini jīñāsā yā sākāṅkṣeti gīvate ... ibid, p. 7.
547. gaurasyaḥ puruṣo hastīyākāṅkṣārahāteṣvino
anvayādarśanāttāvadākāṅkṣā parīgavyate. MK, p. 93.
548. nirākāṅkṣasya vākyatve 'gaurasyaḥ puruṣo hastī'
ityādīnāmapi vākyatvam syat. vṛtti, under SD II.1.
As for instance, we can point out to Udayanācārya. Udayana's Ākāṅkṣā is understood as a Jñānasa (i.e., the desire to know the meanings of words uttered along with after knowing the meaning of a particular word). Gaṅgeśopādhyāya holds that so long as there is incompleteness of the expressed meaning, there is Ākāṅkṣā. Jagadīśa holds that Ākāṅkṣā is indispensable in as much as the meanings conveyed by only expectant (sākāṅkṣā) words can be syntactically related in a sentence.

Now as we find in the text of the Muktākāla above, Visvanātha understands Ākāṅkṣā as the failure of a word to convey a complete idea (ananubhāvakatvam) without the utterance or occurrence of another word. As Visvanātha understands Ākāṅkṣā not as an inquisitiveness (i.e., jñānasa) on the part of anybody and as because he conceives it as a qualification of words in the form of not being capable to convey a complete idea without the utterance or occurrence of another, he is not wrong as he maintains that the knowledge of such an Ākāṅkṣā is a Sābdabodhakāraṇa.

549. anaikāntāḥ paricchede sambhave ca na nirṇayaḥ ākāṅkṣā sattayaḥ heturyogāḥ sattirabandhanā. NKU, p. 151.

550. cf. ākāṅkṣā ca samabhivyāhṛtapadasmāritapadarthāḥ "Eṣā. ghatamityukte ānaya, paśyeti, ānaya ityukte ghaṭam paṭaṃ veti jñānāsādayah, the' Commentary Prabha unde above.

551. sākāṅkṣāsābdairyo bodhastadarthānvayagocaraḥ SSP, p. 6.
To elucidate his points, a word cannot by itself convey a complete meaning. The word 'bring' uttered by someone needs some other (word) denoting some object, e.g. 'the jar'. Otherwise the word 'bring' will not be fully meaningful. In the given example, the word, 'bring' represents a 'kriyā' and the word 'jar' stands for a 'karma'. Similarly a Kartṛpada (i.e., a word in the nominative case) will not serve a purpose, even uttered, unless a Kriyāpada also be supplied. Thus it appears that this Expectancy is the relation between the Kriyātva and Karmādikārakatva. Such an idea seems to be brought home by Viśvanātha in the text of the Muktāvalī, 'kriyāpadāḥ ------ tena ākāṅkṣā'. But in the immediately succeeding text of the Muktāvalī, 'Viśuvatīst | 4stuvst | ------ na śabdabodhaḥ'. Viśvanātha rejects this notion in preference to another. According to him, the very concept of Āsatti serves the purpose of bringing forth the unavoidable connection between the Verbs and cases. It is unnecessary, therefore, to conceive of something like Ākāṅkṣā to drag them in. During the deliberations on Āsatti, it so transpired that the immediacy of concepts is a pre-requisite for a Śabdabodha. But the concepts concerned must be intended for a syntactical connection. The syntactical connection among meanings in a sentence shall have to take place by way of the relation of Verba and Cases. Hence the business of conceiving the concepts in view of this relation of Kriyā and Kāraka need not be left to be demanded by so-called...
Ākāṅkṣā. In stead, Ākāṅkṣā is to be conceived as the relation between the stems and their suffixes. As for illustration, the knowledge of the expectancy that the word 'ghaṭa' with regard to the second case ending (used after the word 'ghaṭa') is obviously to be admitted as a factor responsible for the knowledge of the objecthood of a jar from the expression 'ghaṭam'. Otherwise such a knowledge would have been possible from a string of words like 'ghaṭah karmatvam ānayanam kṛtiḥ'. As this is not warranted by a fact, the stem 'ghaṭa' and the suffix 'am' must be recognised as expectant to each other as they give a full cognition in combination.

It may be pointed out that if simply or singly left to Āsatti, sometimes one would be in a confusion in deciding on the knowledge of Anvaya as in a sentence like 'ayamet putro rājnah puruṣo'pasāryatām'. If this sentence is simply left to Āsatti, then the syntactical connection of 'rājnah' as an adjunct comes to be possible with 'putraḥ' and as well with 'puruṣaḥ' at the same time. Here Visvanātha makes a tacit reference to his earlier contention that Āsatti has always Tatparya as its basis (cf. M, 'tatparyagarbha ca āsattih'). As far as it can be guessed, in the aforesaid sentence, the Tatparya is on the Anvaya of the word 'rājnah' with the word 'putraḥ'. If, however, it is with regard to Anvaya (of the word 'rājnah') with the word 'puruṣaḥ', Sabdabodha will take place that way. Thus it is the contextual
Tātparya which will determine the working of āsatti in cases like 'ayameti putro rājñāḥ' etc.

M(54). tātparyam nirvakti- vakturiccheti. yadi tātparya- 
jñānam kāraṇam na syāt, tadā saindhavamānayetyādau 
kvacīdasvasya kvacīllavaṇasya bodha iti niyame na syāt. 
nā ca tātparyagrāhakāṇāṁ prakaraṇādīnāmeva śābdabodhe 
kāraṇatvamastviti vācyam. teṣāmanugamāt. tātparya-jñā- 
najanakatvena teṣāmanugame tu tātparya-jñānameva lāgha- 
vāt kāraṇamastu. itthānca vedasthale'pi tātparya-jñā- 
ārthamāśvarah kalpāyate. na ca tatrādhyāpaka - tātparya- 
jñānam kāraṇamiti vācyam. sargadhāvyāpakahāvāt. 
nā ca pralaya eva nāstīti kutaḥ sargādiri tvācyam. 
pralayasyāgameṣu pratipādyatvāt. itthānca śukavākye'- 
piśvarīyatātparya-jñānam kāraṇam. viśāvādi-śukavākyā 
tu sīkṣayitureva tātparya-jñānam kāraṇam vācyam. anye 
nānārthādau tu kvacīdeva tātparya-jñānam kāraṇam. tathā 
ca śukavākye vinaiva tātparya-jñānam śābdabodhaḥ. vede 
tvanādi-māmāśā-parisodhitatarkaīrthavadhāraṇamity- 
āhuh.

Here is explained Tātparya (Intention) (with the words) 'Vakturicchā' etc. If the knowledge of Tātparya be not a 
cause (for Śābdabodha), then there will be no regulation to 
understand sometimes a horse (of a particular species) and 
sometimes (a pinch of) salt from sentences like 'saindhava- 
mānaya' (Bring the 'saindhava'.) It cannot be held that the
context etc. as the factors responsible for the understand-
ing of Tātparya be (admitted as) the cause of Sābdabodha. It is because they cannot be understood under a common denomi-
ation. If they are so understood by virtue of their state of producing the knowledge of Tātparya, even then, for the sake of simplicity, let the knowledge of Tātparya itself be the (said) cause. In that way, even in the case of Veda, Īśvara (God) is assumed (to exist) for the sake of the knowledge of Tātparya. It cannot be maintained that there (i.e. in the case of Veda) the knowledge of the intention of the teacher is the cause, because there was no teacher at the beginning of creation. It cannot be argued that since there is no such thing as Deluge, how can we speak of 'a beginning of crea-
tion'; because the deluge has been maintained in the Veda. In the like manner, in the case of expressions pertaining to a parrot, the knowledge of the intention of Īśvara is a cause. With regard to the inconsistent expressions of a parrot, however, the knowledge of the intention of the trainer is to be held as (such) a cause. Others, however, contend that in case of words having more than one meaning etc. the knowledge of Tātparya is occasionally a cause. In case of expressions of a parrot, however, even without the knowledge of Tātparya, there takes place a Sābdabodha. In the case of Veda again, they say, the meaning is apprehended by means of arguments guided by principles of interpretation that are without a beginning, the apprehension of meaning follows the logic screened by the principles that are
In the above text of the Muktavali, Visvanātha proceeds to expound the concept of Tātparya as defined in the corresponding Kārikā. As we find here, the term Tātparya has been used by Visvanātha in the sense of the intention of a Speaker. Generally speaking, this is the Naiyāyikas' meaning of Tātparya. The listener's knowledge of this Tātparya in the sense of speaker's intention is admitted as one of the conditions for knowing the meaning of a sentence (i.e., a Śabdabodhakāraṇa).

We may recapitulate here that the term Tātparya is found to have been used elsewhere in two other senses also: (i) in the sense of the purport of a verbal statement as admitted in the circle of the Mīmāṃsakas and (ii) in the sense of the function of a sentence in order to convey its meaning i.e., a function placed on a par with Abhidhā etc., as advocated by the Naiyāyika Jayantabhaṭṭa and the Alāmikārika Abhinavagupta.

(i) The concept of Tātparya is not all the same even with all the Mīmāṃsakas. The Prābhakaras as Anvitābhidhāna-vādins believe that it is Tātparya which makes the power of Abhidhā to convey the (total) meaning of a sentence also in
addition to the meanings of the individual words. As we know, the Bhātās come to reject this notion of Tatparya prevailing in the circle of Prabhākaras. As we know, the Bhātās restrict the Abhidhā function only to convey the meanings of individual words. They assert that the individual word-meanings combine to give additionally the very meaning of the sentence with the aid of Laksanā. As aids of Laksanā, Tatparya also comes to be admitted later on along with the already accepted three conditions, namely Ākāṅkṣā, Āsatti and Yogatā.

552. prathamyadabhidhātrtvāt tatparyāvagamādānī padānāmeva sā ākāṅkṣāvamabhyanupagamyatām. prathamabhāvīnī padānāyatilāṅghya nārthegu vākyārtha-bodhahāṃaktirāśrayitum yuktā. kīcchā, padānī tatvadabhidhāyakānīti nirvivādam. tena teṣāmabhidhānabāktī sampratipannavitī tasyā evānvayaparyantata kalavyārthā sukara. ---- tatparyopagamādāpitī. yena'pi vādīn padānām smārakatvāneva padārthegavākāraṇīyaḥ, jñāti vākyārthapratipattiparatām padānāmabhyanupetyalvā. 

553. drṣṭānugunyādāpitā padārthanimittakā eva vākyārtho na padanimittaḥ drṣṭāvādhaprasaṅgāt. ---- yattu tatpratikānāmeva sākṣādanvītapratipādakatvāṃ yuktamitvāntān tatkaṣṭhānāmanapekṣitajvālānām paṇḍhaṇatvāmāgyeyāḥ In-āṅkātantritāvāntaratvāpyāparāṇām paramakāryasādhānartvā-pādayet. ---- tatparyācāvāntaravāpyaparāvāranaḥ śādhayaḥāmāvāviruddhamāntvācyate tatakatā samānān. 

554. tatra vākyenāvayāmabhavajanaṇe ākāṅkṣāvovogyatāsaṃsattijhānāṃ sahaṅkāri ---- tatparyām tu tatpratīcchā vaktuṇāsahītavat. ---- kecitā tatparyājhitām lākṣaṇikanārthasthālīyasātdehetnāmābodbodhamātra pare tu tatparyājhitāsaya na hetuvaṃ sambhayati. 

TP, BHG, pp. 80-82.
The Mīmāṃsakas are never prepared to accept the concept of Tatparya. It is because they do not find any necessity of the knowledge of the Speaker's intention in order to obtain the Sabdiabodha in a sentence. The reason for this difference is obvious. While the Mīmāṃsakas believe in the 'natural' relationship between a word and its meaning, the Naiyāyikas admit only a conventional relation between the two. As has been rightly observed by a modern scholar, the Mīmāṃsakas being all along occupied with the revealed texts, the Vedas, developed a notion in themselves that the Sabdiabodha is possible without any reference to the intention of the speaker in a context. So the Mīmāṃsakas are not to be taken to have understood Tatparya in the sense of a speaker's intention. Tatparya as understood by the Mīmāṃsakas is the purport of a passage. (ii) The Naiyāyika Jayantabhaṭṭa and the Ālamkārika Abhinavagupta have come to admit Tatparya as an independent function with the same status as that of

555. "The Mīmāṃsakas' habit of attending too exclusively to the 'revealed' texts of the Vedas probably encouraged them to formulate a theory of Verbal Comprehension without any reference to the speaker at all. Even a sentence which is unintelligible to the speaker has an inherent capacity to convey its meaning. Thus the phrase, 'the pot in the room' conveys the relation of the pot in the room without the help of the Speaker's intention."

ITM, p. 179.
Abhidhā. Both Jayantabhatta and Abhinavagupta hold the view that Tatparya is a separate Vṛtti that operates in order to convey the syntactical relation of words in a sentence.336
But Abhinavagupta moves one step ahead of Jayantabhatta. Abhinava holds that if Tatparya fails to convey the mutual connection of the primary meanings conveyed by the words through Abhidhā, Lakṣaṇa comes to remove the obstruction in the mutual relation of word-meanings in the sentence. Thus, Lakṣaṇartha is accommodated by Abhinava casually in the place of Vākyartha. The functions as admitted by Abhinava are in the order of Abhidhā, Tatparya, Lakṣaṇa and Vyañjanā. Abhidhā gives the primary meaning of words and becomes exhausted because of the maxim 'śabda-buddhikārmaṇām viramyā vyapārībhāvah'. As Abhidhā no longer remains in the process to establish the syntactical relation of words in a sentence, it is Tatparya Vṛtti that comes to operate now to perform the business of effecting the desired syntactical connection (Anvaya). If again Tatparya fails to convey the desired syntactical relation in the second stage, as Abhinava author holds, Lakṣaṇa comes to be resorted to.337

536. abhidhātri mata śaktīḥ padānāṁ svārthanisthatā
teṣāṁ tatparyasaṅkṣipti samsārga-vagamāvadhiḥ.
NM, p. 379.
samayāpekṣā vācyāvagamanasaṅkṣiptibhidhāsaktiḥ,
tadanyathānupattisahāyārthāvabodhanasaṅkṣiptistatparvāsaktiḥ.
Locana, vide OL, p.60.

537. cf. samayāpekṣā ———— mukhyārtha-bādhīdhisahākhar-
vekṣārthapratibhāsanaśaktīlakṣaṇāśaktīḥ.
Locana, vide Y, p.60.
Abhinavagupta, he believed in the involvement of two Tatparya Vṛttis in the process of a Sābdabodha in the event of admitting a Laksanā. For example, in the context of the expression 'simho mānavakah' the second function (Tātparya) fails to convey the Anvaya between the primary meanings of the two words, 'simha' and 'mānavaka'. Then Laksanā comes to be in operation on the third stage. Now this Laksanā is to be followed by another Tātparya in order to effect the relation between the secondary meaning of the word 'simha' and the primary meaning of the word 'mānavaka'.

Though Jayantabhāṭṭa did not proceed so far, it must be admitted, it was Jayantabhaṭṭa who gave the clue to the later Naiyāyikas to utilise a notion of Tātparya in the matter of an operation of Laksanā. Here we note a similarity of Naiyāyikas (excluding Jayantabhaṭṭa) with Abhinavagupta in their approach to Tātparya in the context of admitting Laksanā. The Naiyāyikas in general, like Abhinavagupta, came at least to realise the necessity of the failure of Tātparya to serve as a prerequisite for the operation of a Laksanā. Though the Naiyāyikas understand Tātparya only in the sense of Vakturicoha, they admit a Tātparyānupapatti as leading to the operation of Laksanā. We have earlier observed the natural link between

558. 'simho mānavakah' ityatra dvitiyaśaktiḥ kṣayāvāniśvṛttatāt-
parasyaaktisamarpitānvaṁbhadhaṁkollasānāntaramahābhidhiḥ tāt-
parasyaaktī śaktiḥ dvāryavatirikta tāvat tṛtiyaśaktiḥ saktistal-
baddhakāvidhurī karanaṇipūṇā laksanaḥ bhidhāṇā samullasati.  
Locana, Vide DL, p.36.
a Tatparyanupapatti and an Anvayanupapatti. Thus the failure of Tatparya (whether as Vṛtti or Vakturicchā) comes to be commonly understood as leading to an Anvayanupapatti to be removed by the operation of a Lakṣaṇā. We can add that in the matter of admitting Tatparya as a Vṛtti and not as 'Vakturicchā' Abhinavagupta did not go without a following. From Mammaṭa and Visvanātha Kavirāja also we find reference to the recognition of Tatparya by certain scholars as a Sabdavyāpāra in the 'Abhihitānvaya' theory.559 But we must carefully note that the 'Abhihitānvaya' theory as understood by Mammaṭa and Visvanātha Kavirāja is factually different from the theory as conceived by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas. In the former, Tatparya is found to be recognised as a Sabdavyāpāra and in the latter, Tatparya is not recognised as a Sabdavyāpāra as is done by Jayantabhaṭṭa. There, in the 'Abhihitānvaya' theory of Bhāṭṭās, there is no tendency to describe Tatparya as capable of conveying a Vākyātha, as is done by Abhinavagupta. Coming to the Ālāṃkārikas again, we find Anandavardhana using the word Tatparya several times in the sense of 'the state of being intent on that' (tātārthaṁ sya bhāvāḥ tātparyam). The Tatparya is found to be pramitāvādi.

559. tātparyākhyāṁ vṛttimānḥ padārthānvayabodhane
tātparyaṁ tārtham tadartham ca vākyam tadbodhakamānāre.
SD. 2.20, p. 67;
ākāṃkyayogatāsaṁhidhivaśad ———— padārthānāṁ
samane ṣya tatparyārtho ———— vākyārtho,
samullasa tītyabhihitānvayavādīnāṁ matam.
by the word 'tatparatva'. Ananda seems to strongly oppose the attempts to explain away his Dhvani as only a domain of Tātparya-akti. But Abhinavagupta seeks to assert that Ananda was not opposed to recognising Tātparya-akti in the matter of conveying the sentence-meaning or the idea of syntactical relation amongst the word-meanings. Of the Ālaṃkārikas, we find Bhojarāja boldly sharing the view of the Naiyāyikas as regards Tātparya in the sense of a speaker's intention. Now coming to the exposition of the text of the Muktāvalī above in the context of Tātparya, we shall have to arrest some misgiving that may arise from using the word 'icchā' on several occasions. We find the Naiyāyikas using the word 'icchā' (intention) in three places. (1) In Sākti, the primary verbal function, it is said that Sākti in the form of Divine intention as to 'this meaning is to be understood from this word.' (cf M 'asmācchedāyamātho bodhavya itiśvareccharūpa.) This is actually the view of the Prācīna Nyāya, (2) To remove the difficulty involved there, the Navya Nyāya asserts that not merely the Divine but any intention is the Sākti. (cf M 'navyāastvośvareccharūpa.)

560. tatparāveva sabdarthau yatra vyāṅgyampratisthitaḥ
dhvaneḥ sa eva viśayavantavyaḥ saṅkarojñhitah.
DL, I.13, p. 126

561. na ca padarthāvākyāṅgyaḥ sāṁjñaṁ yayo vācyavāṅgyayoḥ etc.
Vṛtti, under DL, I. 37; p. 460;
nanvevam mā bhūdvācakaśaktistathāpi tātparyakti
bhavijñatitya saṅkhyāḥ pa ceti etc.
Locana, under above.
na saktih, kintvicchaiva'.) (3) Tatparya as one of the four pre-requisites for a Sabdabodha comes to be defined as the intention of a speaker (cf K 'vakturiccha tu tatparyaam parikirtitam').

Under the above circumstance, one may confusingly think that as 'icchā' in this or that form is a Sakti, and as Tatparya also is an 'icchā' of some speaker, so, virtually, Tatparya and Sakti are identical. But as a matter of fact, as we find on examination, in the earlier two cases, 'icchā' is concerned only with the Sakyārtha or the meanings of the individual words. In the last case, it is actually concerned only with the Vākyārtha, the total meaning of a sentence. In the light of such an understanding, both the areas being different, Tatparya and Sakti remain independent of each other.

Moreover, the word 'vaktā' (speaker) the knowledge of the intention of whom is termed as Tatparya and is regarded as Sabdabodhakāraṇa must not be taken seriously in the sense of 'a speaker alone'. Otherwise there will be no Sabdabodha in the case of passage mentally recited by a person under a vow of silence. So scholars understand the word 'vaktā' in the sense of 'abhisandhātā'.

562. tatparyaṁ cedāṁ ------ prayokturiccha. prayokta cābhishandhāpayitṛmatram, natu vaktāiva. maunisloka—vyapteḥ. NSMR, p. 242;

vaktā cātrābhishandhatā, na tu vaktāiva, maunislokāvyāp-teḥ. MUS, Vide BPS, p. 466.
In his work, 'yadi tātparyajñānam kāraṇam na syāt ----- na syāt', Vyāsānātha shows the necessity of admitting the knowledge of the speaker's intention in bringing about Śabdabodha. As for illustration, he takes up the proposition, 'saindhavamānaya'. The word 'saindhava' literally means the product of Sindhu which means a sea and also a territory called Sindh. Hence two meanings are probable from the word 'saindhava', namely salt and a particular breed of horse.

It is the intention of the speaker which determines either of the two meanings as the primary sense in a context. For instance, in the context of a military expedition, the word 'saindhava' is used in the sense of the horse of that particular breed. In the context of a feast, however, the word comes to be used in the sense of salt. Thus Tātparya, in the sense of the speaker's intention comes to be a decisive factor in determining the contextual meaning of the word 'saindhava'. Now the listener must have the knowledge of that speaker's intention in order to have Śabdabodha of the proposition 'saindhavamānaya'. Without that knowledge, he would not be in a position to have the desired Śabdabodha of sentences like 'saindhavamānaya' in different contexts.

In the succeeding text of the Muktāvalī, 'anye tu' etc. Vyāsānātha disapprovingly refers to scholars like Veṣṭita who admit the knowledge of Tātparya as a prerequisite of Śabdabodha only of propositions involving 'nāmaññāthakāsya' (i.e., words capable of conveying many meanings). But the
sentence chosen by Visvanātha to illustrate the involvement of the knowledge of Tatparya in the matter of a Sabdabodha is 'saindhavamānaya' which is obviously a sentence containing homonymous word viz. 'saindhava'. The succeeding text of the Muktāvali on the issue gives the impression that Visvanātha believes in the necessity of the knowledge of Tatparya to be involved in one and all Sabdabodhas, but he fails to illustrate his idea fully. In this context, we may record an interesting position maintained by the Sāṁśyika Annāmbhaṭṭa. In the Saṁgṛaha, he makes no admission of Tatparya as involved in the matter of Sabdaboda. He recognises only Ākāṅkṣā, Yogyāta and Sannidhi as a cause for the knowledge of a sentence-meaning.563 But in the Dīpikā, he comes to admit the knowledge of Tatparya as a cause of Sabdabodha as demanded by the case of words having multiple meanings. Though actually the knowledge of Tatparya is required to be admitted in the case of Sabdabodha arising from sentences with nānārthakaśābdas, yet, to keep parity or conformity, he comes to admit the same universally, i.e., in all cases of Sabdabodha.564 The commentary Bhāṣākāra

563. ākāṅkṣā yogyatā sannidhīśca vākyārthajñānānenaḥhetuh.
TS, p. 66.

564. tātपaryajñānānca vākyaṛthajñānānenaḥḥhetuḥ nānārthānirvāṇanāḥ.
TD, Vide ibid, p. 331.
prakāśikā confirms our impression.  

We shall have to here that some of the Naiyāyikas assert in clear terms that the knowledge of Tātparya is necessary in bringing about a proper Śāhābodha from all words.  

It may be argued that it is not possible for a listener to have the knowledge of Tātparya, i.e., of the intention of the speaker. In this context, scholars point out to certain factors that help in ascertaining the said Tātparya.  

These factors which are commonly known as Tātparyaārāhaka have been enumerated by Bhartrhari. They are Śamyoga (conjunction), Viprayoga (disjunction), Sāhacarva (association), virodhitā (antagonism), Artha (purpose), Pravarā.  

565. 'saindhavanānaya' ityādinānārthakasthale saṁbhava-padasya śve lave ca śaktēh tuṭyatayā śāhābodha tātparyaagrāhasya kāraṇatvamantarāpyatakāle tattvadhopapattirnāstīti tatra tatkāraṇatvasyāvāvyakate tvadanurodhena sarvatra tādhāṣyaḥ kāyata-tābdhabhāvah.  

Nīlakanṭhaprakāśikā, Vide ibid.  

566. pare tu ghatādisābdasthalepi ghatapadām kumbhavanām lakaṇāyā paṭaparam vā iti saṁśaye ghatāśāhābodhābhavat sarvatra tātparyaniścayoḥ kāraṇam ityāhuh.  

Nyāyāsiddhānta manjariprakāśa of Laugāksīhāskam, quoted in NK, p. 327.  

567. prakāraṇādikām tātparyaagrāhakam. TD, Vide TD, p. 1-10; tātparyaaniyāmakām ca loke prakāraṇādikam eva. PLM, p. 1.  

568. śamyoga viprayogasaśa sāhacarvām virodhitā arthāh  

prakāraṇām lingam śābdasyānyasya sannidhitih  

śamartvamaucitī desāh kālāvaktiḥ svarādayaḥ.  

śābdārthasyānāvavacchēdē visēsāmsptihetavah.  

VP 2.315-16.
(context), Linga (special attribute), Śabdasyānyasya
Sannidhi (proximity to another word), Śāmarthya (competency,
Auciti (propriety), Deśa (place), Kāla (time), Vyaśti
(gender), Svara (accent) etc. On the strength of any one or
more of these factors, one comes to be aware of the intention
of the speaker with regard to a homonym. As a result, the
function of Denotation of such a word comes to be restricted
to one meaning instead of many.

Now one may argue as follows. If the knowledge of such
a decisive factor is invariably required to be present prior
to the knowledge of the Tatparya in a context, it is wise to
accept straightway the knowledge of these Tatparyagrāhakas
as a cause of Śabdabodha. Viśvanātha seeks to meet such a
point in M, 'na ca tatparyagrāhakānām ——— lāghavāt
kāraṇamastu'. Viśvanātha rejects the plea on the ground that
the so-called Tatparyagrāhakas cannot be grouped under a
common denomination. It may be held that those Tatparyagrāhakas,
however different they are from each other, form a community
atleast by virtue of their producing the listener's knowledge
of Tatparya in different contexts. In anticipation of such an
opinion Viśvanātha maintains that even in the event of finding
a common denomination to understand the Tatparyagrāhakas under
a group, it is wise to admit the knowledge of only Tatparya
as a Śabdabodhakāraṇa atleast for the sake of simplicity
(Lāghava).
Visvanātha maintains that in the case of Vedic writings, the necessity of recognising the knowledge of Tatparya as a Sābdabodhakāraṇa leads to the admission of the existence of Īśvara. It may be argued that the imagination of the existence of Īśvara can easily be avoided inasmuch as the knowledge of the intention of the teachers of the Vedic passages can best serve as a cause in producing Sābdabodha in the said contexts. Visvanātha rules out the scope for such an argument by pointing out that at least at the very beginning of a creation, it is idle to think of the existence of any teacher. In reply it may be argued again that there being no dissolution (Pralaya) of this cosmos at any stage, there is no meaning in imagining 'the beginning of a creation.' Visvanātha disapproves of such an argument as he upholds the cosmic dissolutions by making a reference to Vedic assertions. Like Visvanātha, many other scholars admit the knowledge of Tatparya in the sense of Divine intention to serve as cause of Sābdaboda of a Vedic passage.

In M 'īthānca sukavākya'pi śīvarīya kāraṇam vācyam', Visvanātha maintains that as in the case of Vedic passages, in the case of utterances of a parrot also, the knowledge of Tatparya only in the sense of the intention of Īśvara

569. nāsadīya-sūkta (RV X. 11.129).
570. vedavākya ca śiśvaratātparyādarthabodhaḥ. PLM, p. 30; sukavākya vedavākya ca śiśvaratātparyagraheṣa sābdabodho TP, Vide BHC, p. 52.
shall have to be admitted as a cause of the confusion of
bodhi. Though the parrots are capable of speaking, they
not endowed with the power of discrimination between
is correct and what is incorrect. Hence in the cases of
consistent utterences of parrots, the lack of inconsistent
is required to be attributed to the Divine intention.
the expression 'sukavākye' in the portion of the verse
under discussion, is to be read as 'samvādiśatvāyata'.
knowledge of Tātmārya in the sense of Īśvaracakṣa, 
admitted by many other scholars as a sāṁśāra-kāla
the context of consistent utterences of a parrot. The
inconsistency is not to be admitted in the intention of
Īśvara, Viśvanātha hastens to add that in the case of
inconsistent utterences of a parrot, the Tātmārya
is to be understood only in the sense of the intention
the trainer of the parrot concerned.

In M 'anye tu ------------ tarkairarthāyantātālaprayāya,
Viśvanātha refers to the opinions of those schol
the knowledge of Tātmārya (i.e., vakturiccha) as a
kāraṇa only in the case of 'nānāarthakāśabda's (words
multiple or more than one meanings). Amongst such we
may first consider the view of the Vedāntins. We
are not prepared to accept Tātmārya in the sense of

371. sukavākye ------------------- caśvaratātmāryararathāparyayat
TP, Viśa 3112, n.
sukavākye ca bharadvādicchaiva satīkam. TP, n.
speaker's intention to be known for each and every Sābda-bodha. They point out that one comes to have proper Sābda-bodha in the case of a Vedic passage even when it is mechanically recited or even in the case of a statement uttered by a parrot under a good trainer. These two instances, they observe, do not involve any intention of either the reciter or the parrot. The Vedāntins, however, accept, without hesitation, the Nyāya meaning of Tātparya in the case of ambiguous expressions where the same statement involves the possibility of many implications.

Gāṅgābhaṭṭa makes a reference to such scholars as are prepared to admit Tātparya-jñāna in the matter of Sābda-bodha.

572. kramapṛptāṁ tātparyaṁ nirūpyate. tatra tatpratītichayoccaritavām na tātparyaṁ. arthajñānasūnyena puruṣenoccāritaṁ vedārthabhānapraśaṅgat. ———— suktāpāyake avyutpannoccāritaṁ vedāvākyādau ca tatpratītichāya evābāvāt tadanyapratītichayoccāritaṁ vābhāvena etc. VPB, pp. 98-99.

573. Though this is not explicitly stated, we can form this opinion when we examine the observations of Vedāntins in this context.

cf. nanu saindhvaṁ añayetayādyāvākyāṁ yadā lavoñānayanan-pratītichāya proyuktaṁ cenna taditarapratītichayānucaritatvāyāṁ tātparyaṁ prati viśeṣaṇatvāt. VPB, p. 99;

cf. The Vedāntins admit, however, that the knowledge of the speaker's intention plays an important role in the comprehension of meaning in the case of ambiguous expressions. ITM, p. 179.
only of words possessed of multiple meanings. 574. We refer to the other scholars who are opposed to admit the necessity of Tatparyajnāna even in the case of 'nānārthakaśābda' in Vedas. 575. In this context we may point out another interesting view. The Grammarian Nāgęśa is not prepared to accept the knowledge of Tatparya in the case of each and every Sābdabodha. But he is prepared to admit it not only in the case of 'nānārthakaśābda' but also in the case of the Vedas. He understands the Tatparya in the case of 'nānārthakaśābda' in the sense of 'prayuktoricchā' and in the context of the Vedas in the sense of 'īśvaratātparya'.

574. kecitu tātparyajnānam lakṣaṇānāmārthaasthaliyasaśabde heturame tu sābdabodhamātre, gauravat. evaḥ sāindhavapadajanyanārthopasthitikālīnastpadajnānasaśabdehādipāsādodo sābdabodhe tātparyajnānam karaṇam ------ TP, Vide EHC, p. 52.

575. pare tu tātparyajnānasūna hetutvam sambhavati.

576. nānārthasthale loke tātparyantu ------ prayuktoricchārum. ------ atgfhojanaprakaraṇe sāindhavapadapratyagakte sāindhavapadena lavanapratyayaḥ, yuddhaviṣkamānegvepratyayaḥ. vedavākye cālīśvaratātparyādardabodhe.

PLM, p. 80.
Here we shall have to add a few lines more. Earlier in the context of maintaining that Nāgēśa does not actually believe in Lakṣaṇā as a Vṛtti separate from Sakti, we have observed that Nāgēśa's view is based upon Patañjali's notion that all words are capable of conveying all meanings. If all words are capable of conveying all meanings, the doubt arises that the word 'ghaṭa' may mean not only a 'jar' but also a 'cloth'. To arrest such a doubt, Nāgēśa contends that despite the basic capability of all words to convey all meanings, it is Tātparya that finally settles the meanings of a word in context. Hence Tātparya prevents the word 'ghaṭa' from conveying the meaning 'cloth'. Here we must take care to note that Nāgēśa believes in two different notions of Tātparya in order to serve two different purposes. The Tātparya, the knowledge of which is necessary universally, i.e., in the case of all words in order to arrest a wrong notion that may arise from the Grammarian's maxim 'sarve sarvārthavācakāh' is understood by Nāgēśa as the Divine intention. The Tātparya, the knowledge of which is specially necessary in the non-Vedic words of multiple meanings is understood as the intention of the employer or user of those words. In the case of Vedic expressions prone to many meanings however, the Divine intention itself is taken to serve the purpose.

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577. "etatvākṣyāṁ padaṁ vā etadarthabodhāyoccāranīyamitī-śvarecchā tātparyam. ata eva satī tātparyye 'sarve sarvārthavācakāh' iti sābdikanaye ghaṭasabdātpataprat-yayo netyādyuktam. nānārthasthāle lōke tātparyāntu etatpadam vākṣyam vā etadarthanātpratayāya mayoccāryate iti prayokturiccharūpaṁ. --- vedāvakṣya-caisvaratāt-paryādarthabodhaḥ. ibid."