PART I

INTRODUCTION
India inherits from her past a very great treasure of philosophical wisdom. Ancient India is known all over the world for her rich philosophical speculations. The philosophical thinking began with the Ágveda itself, prominently revealed in the hymns like the Devísūkta, Puruṣasūkta and the Sūktas ascribed to Dīrghatamas. The Puruṣasūkta and the Devísūkta show the germs of monistic idealism and the sūktas of Dīrghatamas contain the germs of dualistic realism. Thus, as a result of this nucleus, there arose six philosophical systems in India, based on either monistic idealism or dualistic realism. These six systems are namely the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā or the Mīmāṁsā school of Jaimini, the Uttara-mīmāṁsā or the Vedānta school of Bādarāyaṇa, the Sāṁkhya system of Kapila, the Yoga school of Patañjali, the Nyāya system of Gautama and the Vaiśeṣika school of Kaṇāda. These six schools of Indian thought are known as 'āstika' (orthodox) or 'vādaikā' (Vedic) on account of their recognising Vedic authority as well as the existence of God. Side by side with these orthodox schools, there developed three 'nāstika' (non-orthodox or heterodox) or 'avaidika' (non-Vedic) schools of philosophy as they came to defy the authority of the Veda and the existence of God. Those are the Buddha, Jaina and Cārvāka darsanas.
The Vedic schools can again be found in two divisions. Mimamsa and Vedanta accept only the Vedas as the authority. But the other four schools, in the matter of recognising the authority, unhesitatingly combine the Vedic knowledge with the worldly logic. The trend is so conspicuous in the Nyaya system that Tarka (Logic) comes to be a synonym for the Nyaya school.

We have to add here that other minor systems also cropped up in support of the main trends in the arena of Indian philosophy.

The relative chronology of these Darshanas still remains a guess work. Despite serious efforts of scholars in the field, we are still in the dark as to the exact dates of these systems of thought for lack of adequate materials.

Now to suit our proposed subject of investigation we have to deal, in particular, with the two systems known as Nyaya and Vaisesika. It is because the Bhagapariccheda of Visvanatha, the work in our hand for an intensive study, belongs to the Nyayavaisesika system, the syncretised form of thought of the Naiyayikas and the Vaiseskas.

THE NYAYA, THE VAISESIIKA AND THE SYNTHESIS:

Scholars feel that the history of Nyaya and Vaisesika is still clouded in mystery. The vedic literature itself bears an obscure stamp of these philosophical trends. The
study of certain upaniṣads like the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad and the Kaṭhakopaniṣad gives strong impression that these logical thoughts occurred to the minds of the Vedic seers also. It is believed that the Śāmkhya and the Vaiśeṣika emerged in Pre-Buddhistic periods. From the prevalence of philosophical debates and symposia in the courts of King Ajāṭhasatru and Janaka, it is gathered that Nyāya and Tarka very much occupied the scholars of the day. During the days of propagation of Buddhism in the 5th century B.C., the champions of Vedic religion also tried to meet the challenge as far as practicable by taking the aid of logic and reasonings. In the 4th century B.C., it is surmised, the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika speculations assumed the final shape although the extant Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika śūtras ascribed to Gautama and Kaṇāda may reasonably be accepted as having been composed in later times.

The utility of the Nyāya philosophy amongst the branches of knowledge is sought to be brought out in a traditional verse which is seen oftquoted even by the modern scholars.

1. Introduction by Dr. G. Sāstrī to his Kīranāvalī, p. XXV.
2. pradīpāḥ sarvavidyānām
   upāyāḥ sarvakarmaṇām
   āśrayaḥ sarvadharmanām
   vidyoddese prakirtī.
   quoted in VB, under NS 1.1.1.
Regarding the importance of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy, we must bear in mind that these two systems come to us as an analytic type of philosophy and as Dr. Radhakrishnan puts it, 'uphold common sense and science.'

The Naiyāyika trend of accepting something as true only when it is proved by reason makes it more acceptable even to the moderners with a bias for science. The critical treatment of metaphysical problems and the examinations of objects of knowledge with the aid of the logical canons is the distinctive features of the school of Nyāya. Hence the study of the Nyāya system comes to be essential as an introduction to other systems also. The Vaiśeṣikas also earn distinction by their recognition of the atomic constitution of things.

Gautama, known also as Gotama and Akṣapāda, is by tradition, the founder of the Nyāya school of thought.

3. IP, p. 29.

4. "The classical studies of the Hindus comprise the five subjects of Kāvya (literature), Nāṭaka (drama) Alāmkāra (rhetoric), Tarka (logic) and Vyākaraṇa (grammar). Whatever other specialised studies a student may take up later, the preliminary course includes logic, which is the basis of all studies. Every system of Hindu thought accepts the fundamental principles of the Nyāya logic and even in criticising the Nyāya system, uses the Nyāya terminology and logic. The Nyāya serves as an introduction to all systematic philosophy. IP, p. 32."
Whatever be the origin of this school, the first systematic extant work of this school of philosophy is the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama, divided into five 'adhyāyas' or books. The system is mainly occupied with the problem of determining the conditions of correct thinking and the means of acquiring the true knowledge of the reality. This school of thought comes to be very much useful in developing the powers of logical thinking for the scholars of the succeeding periods. This is what had warranted the new names for the system such as *Nyāyavidyā*, *Tarkasastra* (logic or the science of reasoning) and *Ānvikṣikī* (the science of critical study). It must, however, be added in this context that like other orthodox systems, *Nyāya* also has 'mokṣa' (liberation) as its ultimate goal.

Subsequently there developed a huge corpus of literature on the system. The notable works thereof are namely the *Nyāyabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, the *Nyāyavārtika* of Uddyotakara, the *Nyāyavārtikatatparyātika* of Vācaspatimisra, the *Nyāyavārtikatatparyātikāparīṣuddhi* and the *Nyāyakusumānjali* of Udayana, and the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta. Mention may also be made of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and the *Nyāyapravesa* of Diśnāga, the *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti, and the *Nyāyasara*

5. cf. "There are works on Logic that have been written according to the old school, even during later centuries ........ the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayantabhaṭṭa too is an exposition of the *Nyāyasūtra*. HIL, p. 529."
of Bhāsarvajña, the Nyāyavatāra of Siddhasenadivākara and the Pramanāmimamsā of Hemacandra. These works explain, defend and develop the ideas contained in the Nyāyasutra. The said treatises, by way of maintaining the spirit of the sūtras of Gautama, represent the Pracīnanyāya or the old school of Nyāya; it is because, the later Naiyāyikas develop new trends in their thoughts and approaches in the context of different issues and come to form a somewhat separate school of thought that has passed as the Navyānāya or the modern school of Nyāya. The Navyānāya keeps its difference from the Pracīnanyāya with the conspicuity of employing a peculiar argumentative process. Some of the later Naiyāyikas again combine their thoughts with those of the Vaiśeṣikas. As a result of this amalgamation, there arose a series of works of syncretic character belonging to the so-called Nyāyavaiśeṣika school.

Udayana was the last Pracīnanyāyika after whom there flourished the Navya school of Nyāya. Scholars feel that it was Udayana who paved the way for the emergence of the Navyānāya trends of thought which came to be in full form at the hands of Gaṅgesa. Dr. Gaurinath Sāstrī is of the opinion that it was Udayana who, for the first time, made an effort to effect a synthesis of the two systems of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Now, to pursue our present issue of the

6. Preface in Bengali to KIR, p. XXXII.
division of the Nyāya into two schools, we find Dr. Sāstrī maintaining that as the seed of Navyanyāya was actually sown in the works of Udayana, he is to be recognised as the Ādipuruṣa of the Navyanyāya school; it is because the analytical approach peculiar to the Navyanyāya logic was conspicuously evident in Udayana's works. In this context we simply feel that Gaṅgesāpadhyāya, the author of the Tattvacintāmaṇi, deserves the highest credit as the founder of the Navyanyāya as a distinct school. Though amongst the Naiyāyikas, Udayana made a departure from the common trend of thought initiated by Gautama, it was only Gaṅgesā who fully broke away from the Prācīnanyāya and came to be the chief champion of the Navyanyāya. It is why the modern scholars accept the history of Navyanyāya as beginning with the Tattvacintāmaṇi, the magnum-opus of Gaṅgesā. This Navya school first arose in Mithilā and later came to be a privilege of Bengal with Navadvīpa as the main centre of these trends of thought. After Gaṅgesā, there followed a large galaxy of illustrious scholars in the line. The chief amongst them were Jayadeva, Raghunātha Siromāṇi, Mathurānātha. Tarkavāgisa, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, Gadādhara Bhāṭṭācārya etc. Their immortal works are Āloka, (a commentary on the Tattvacintāmaṇi), Tattvacintāmaṇidhiti, Tattvacintāmaṇidhitisāhasya, Sābḍhasaktiprakāsikā, Saktivāda etc.

7. loc cit.
The first systematic work of the Vaisesikas is the sūtra of Kanāda. Kanāda came to be named so for his reputation of living on 'grains of corn gleaned from the field. His other names are Kanabhuk, Kanabhakṣa, Yogi, Ulūka and Kāśyapa. The system is also known as the Kanāda system or the Aulūka system. This system is called Vaisesika because of their attitude towards 'Viṣṭa' as one of the categories. 8 Prasūṭapādā's commentary on Kanāda's sūtras, viz. Padārthadharmanāgraha, which is celebrated as Prasūṭapādabhāṣya, reads rather like an independent exposition of the philosophy. The well-known commentaries on the Bhāṣya are the Vyomavatī of Vyomasīva, the Kiranāvalī of Udayana, the Nyāvakandali of Śrīdhara, the Setu of Padmanābha, and the Sūkti of Jagadīśa. 9 Vallabhācārya's Nyāyalilāvatī and Udayana's Laksanāvalī, Sāṅkaramisrā's Upaskāra are also valuable works in this line of thought.

Here it is relevant on our part to make a brief reference to the common characteristics and differences between the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. The two schools of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas are basically so akin that Dr. Radhakrishnan even opines that they might have branched


9. Another extensive commentary on the sūtras Viz. the Rāvanabhāṣya is known only by name.
off from a hypothetical common original system. It is also observed that both systems supplement each other and finally merge into a single system. Both the systems believe in the realisation of bliss ('niḥśreyasādhhigama') from the knowledge of the true nature ('tattvajñāna') of the categories (padārthas).

Both the systems establish the existence of Ātma with the help of Inference (Anumāna). Both came to be recognised as systems of the same status ('samānatantra'). Yet the two schools of thought reveal distinctive features of their own to deserve separate identities. The Naiyāvikas recognise sixteen categories while the Vaiṣeṣikas only

10. cf. IP, p. 31.
11. cf. HIL, p. 519.
12. pramāṇaprāmeyasamāyā ---------- sthānānāṁ
tattvajñānānāniḥśreyasādhhigamaḥ. NS 1.1.1;
dharmavīśeśapraśūtāā dravya ------- tattvajñānānāniḥ-
sreyasam. VS 1.1.4.
13. iechādveśapraśyaatnasukhadvikhaṭajñānānānātmano līṅgam.
   NS 1.1.10;
   ātmavabhissambandhādātma tasya saukṣmyādaprathyākaṣṭu
   sati ------- sabdādiṣu prasiddhyā ca prasadāhako'numiyate.
   PPB, p. 360.
14. IP, p. 31.
seven. Though Kanāda does not mention Abhāva along with the six Padārthas yet from VS 1.2.1 and 9.1.1 it may be gathered that Kanāda takes due cognizance of Abhāva also as a Padārtha. It is not mentioned because the idea of Abhāva invariably depends on the idea of 'bhava-padārthas' and because the idea of 'bhavapadārthas' should automatically lead to the idea of the relative category of Abhāva. Viśvanātha in his Bhāṣāpariccheda says that the Naiyāyikas are also not opposed to the recognition of the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣikas. Vātsyāyana clearly admits that

15. pramāṇaprameyasaṁsaśayaprayojanadṛṣṭāntasiddhāntāvai-yavatārvāniṁnayaśadājlapavitāndāhetvābhāsaḥacchalajāti-nigrahasthānānām " NS 1.1.1;

dharmavisesaprasūtad dravyagunākarmaśāmānyavisesa-samavāyānāṁ padārthānāṁ sadharmayaiddharmābhyāṁ tattva-vajnānānānīṣṭreyasam. VS 1.1.4.

16. cf. ete ca padārthāḥ pradhānatayoḍḍiṣṭāḥ abhāva-stu svarūpavāṇaṁ noddiṣṭāḥ, pratiyoginirūpāṇādhiṇāniru-panatvāt na tu tucchatvāt. KIR, quoted in MUS, p. 18

17. dravyaṁ guṇastathā karma sāmānyāṁ savisesakam samavāyastathāṁ 'bhāvaḥ padārthāḥ saptakīrttitaṁ. K 2;

ete ca padārthā vaiśeṣika-prasiddhāḥ, naiyāyikana-mapyairuddhāḥ; pratipaditānaścaivameva bhāṣye.

M, under K 2.
the six Padārthas viz. Dravya, Guṇa, Karma, Sāmānyā, 
Visēṣa and Samavāya are to be recognised under the Purview 
of what is mentioned as Prameya in the list of the sixteen 
categories of Gotama. The list of six Padārthas given 
by the Bhāsyakāra should drag in Abhāva also on the 
strength of the arguments given earlier. But even if we 
take these seven Padārthas as common to both the schools, 
the Naiyāyikas' recognition of nine other 'Padārthas' 
serves as a differentiating point. Another distinguishing 
feature is the Vaiśeṣikas' recognition of Visēṣa a separate 
category. Moreover, the Naiyāyikas recognise four 'Praṇānas'
namely Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upāṇa and Sābdha, while the 
Vaiśeṣikas admit only Pratyakṣa and Anumāna.

As shown earlier, the amalgamation of the Nyāya and 
the Vaiśeṣika systems took place at a later stage and 
hence, we find only such later works like Śivāditya's 
Saptapadārthī, Laugāki Bhāskara's Tarkaumudī, Visvanātha's 
Bhāṣāpariccheda with the Siddhāntamuktāvali, Jagadisa's

18. "The fusion of these two schools began early and seems 
to have been complete at the time when the Nyāyavartika 
was written" (Jacobi quoted in IP, p. 31). This opinion 
does not appear to be tenable in the face of the exist-
ing literature.
Tarkamrtta, Annambhatta’s Tarkasaamgraha with the commentary Dipika and Kesavamisra’s Tarkabhaga as the representative works of the syneretic system of Nyayavaisesika.

In the opinion of some scholars Sivaditya’s Saptapadarthi appears to be the earliest work of the syncretic schools of the Nyayavaisesikas. It may, however, be observed that the Saptapadarthi is not completely identical in respect of its scope and pattern with a typical Nyayavaisesika work like the Bhasapariccheda. For instance it does not recognise the Sabdapramana.

THE IMPORTANCE OF NAVYANYAYA:

The Bhasapariccheda of Visvanatha, the work in hand for a specific examination, is undoubtedly of a syncretic nature as a treatise belonging to the Nyayavaisesika group. But we have to note that the Vaisesikas do not believe in the Sabdapramana. So Visvanatha, as a prominent exponent of Sabda, comes to us only as a Naiyayika. As a Naiyayika also, his approach to issues and techniques employed in the treatment of problems bears clear testimony to his identity as a Navyanaiyayika. Hence, in our present study on the Sabdakhanda of the Bhasapariccheda we are chiefly concerned with the trends of thought of the Navyanyay.

In direct contrast with the Pracinanaiyayikas, the Navyanaiyayikas are known for their exclusive stress on
logical aspects of the Nyāya. Navyanyāya develops its theory of knowledge into a formal logic of relations between concepts, terms and propositions. Navyanyāya scholars present their own ways of interpretation with the help of numerous abstracts. Wonderfully enough, the highest possible perfection and extreme thoroughness in analysis comes to be an outstanding feature of Navyanyāya. Navyanyāya is a vast mass of literature which comprises of not only Logic but also Epistemology, Physics, Grammar and many other incidental topics of interest. The techniques and methods of Navyanyāya are so thorough and subtle that they can only be compared with those of highly advanced Mathematics. The Navyanyāya techniques, because of their super-excellence are accepted in the whole of India in the matter of giving expression to any subtle idea that might have occurred in the mind of a scholar of any branch of Sanskrit study. Navyanyāya has, as a result, an overwhelming influence on modern students of Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Vyākaraṇa, law and theology and even literature and rhetorics. Without a thorough grounding in Navyanyāya dialectics and techniques, no one, however intelligent, will ever be competent to understand different schools of Indian Philosophy with accuracy.

The study of Navyanyāya itself goes a long way in sharpening one's faculty of understanding and makes it thorough and incisive. But it must be admitted that comparatively very little has so far been done in the matter of interpreting Navyanyāya according to modern methods of critical research.

**COMPARATIVE CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL WORKS IN NYĀYA, VAIŚEŚIKA AND NYĀYAVAIŚEŚIKA:**

(The bracketed numbers shown with dates signify various opinions. The sources of such opinions are mentioned in the foot note)

1. **Nyāyasūtra** of Gautama - (1) C 500 B.C.; (4) between 300 A.D. - 500 B.C.; (5) 2nd century B.C.

2. **Vaiśeṣikasūtra** of Kaṇāda - (2) C 300 A.D.; (3) Kaṇāna may have been contemporary to Buddha (C. 567 B.C.); (4) uncertain but surely before 80 A.D.; (5) 3rd century B.C.

3. **Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya** of Vātsyāyana - (3) 4th century A.D.; (4) 300 A.D.; (5) 4th century A.D.

4. **Vaiśeṣikasūtrabhāṣya** of Prasāstabādācārya - (3) 5th century A.D.; (4) 4th century A.D.; (5) 5th century A.D.

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(2) *History of Indian Literature* - by M. Winternitz.
(3) *Companion to Sanskrit Literature* - by S.C. Banerjee.
(4) Preface to *Tarkasamgraha* - by Dr. Dayānanda Bhārgava pp. XXIII to IXI.
(5) *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā.*
5. \textit{Nyāyavārtika} of Udyotakara - (1) C 620 A.D.; (4) last part of the 6th century A.D.; (5) 6th century A.D.

6. \textit{Nyāyavārtikātātparyatīkā} and \textit{Nyāyakapīka} of Vācaspatimisra - (1) 850 A.D.; (4) 841 A.D.; according to D.C. Bhattachārya, 976 A.D., Vide \textit{Jha Research Institute Journal}, Part II, pp. 349-56; (5) 9th century A.D.

7. \textit{Nyāyamañjarī} of Jayanta - (1) 9th century A.D.; (4)(a) first part of 9th century, (b) later than that.

Dayānanda Bhārgava records two opinions regarding the date of Jayanta. - (a) In the Preface ("āmukā") of the \textit{Kādambarikathāsāra} by Abhinanda, the son of Jayanta, Jayanta's grandfather Saktisyāmi has been described as the minister of Muktāpīda (Lalitāditya of Kāsmīr, 753 A.D.). So it is quite probable that Jayanta, the grandson of Saktisyāmi would be in the first part of the 9th century. This is the date also of Vācaspatimisra. Hence Jayanta and Vācaspati were contemporaries. (b) Dr. Gopinātha Kavirāja shows that Jayanta quoted Vācaspati and hence the former was a junior scholar.

8. \textit{Saptapadarthī} of Sivādityamiśra (some identify Sivāditya also as Vyomasīva, author of \textit{Vyomavatī}) - (5) 960 A.D.

10. **Nyāyakandalī** of Śrīdharācārya - (1) 991 A.D.; (5) 10th century A.D.;

11. **Nyāyalilāvatī** of Vallabhācārya - (5) 12th century A.D.

12. **Tattvacintāmaṇi** of Gaṅgesāpādhyāya - (1) C 1200 A.D.; (3) date uncertain; Gaṅgesā appears to have flourished sometime between the middle of the 13th century and 1st quarter of the 14th century A.D.; (4) 13th century A.D.; (5) 12th century A.D.

13. **Dādhiti** of Raghunāthaśīromani - disciple of Vāsudeva-sārvabhauma who happens to be the grand father of Visvanāthanyāyapañcānana - (4) 1475-1570 A.D.

14. **Sabdasāktiprakāśikā** and **Tarkāṃpta** of Jagadīśa cārya - (3) middle of the 16th century; (1) 1700 A.D.; in case this date is accepted, there is a difficulty in admitting Jagadīśa as a predecessor of Visvanātha. (4) Before 1601 A.D.; (5) 1600 A.D.

15. **Tarkikarakuṣa** of Varadarāja - (5) 1150 A.D.

16. **Nyāyasiddhāntamaṇjarī** of Jānakinātha Bhaṭṭācārya - (4) 1550 A.D.

17. **Bhāṣāpariccheda** with the **Siddhāntamuktāvalī** and **Nyāyasutrayātti** of Visvanāthanyāyapañcānana - (1) 1634 A.D.; (3) 16th century (last part); (4) 1654 A.D.; (5) 1634 A.D.
13. Tarkasamgraha with Tarkadipika of Annambhatta -

(1) Before 1585 A.D.; in case this date is accepted there is a difficulty in admitting Annambhatta as a successor of Visvanatha; (3) 17th century A.D.; (4) 1625-1700 A.D.
The **Bhasapariccheda** is the name of a work consisting of *kārikās* (technical verses) written by Visvanāthanyāya-pancānana. The name **Bhasapariccheda** occurs in the colophon.\(^1\) Visvanātha himself is the author also of a running prose commentary (*vṛttī*) of the aforesaid *kārikās*, which is called the **Siddhāntamuktāvalī**. At the beginning of this **Muktāvalī**, the core treatise is referred as *kārikāvalī* by Visvanātha himself.\(^2\) In the traditional commentaries also, the word **Bhasapariccheda** is used in the sense of the *kārikāvalī*, i.e.,

\(^1\) *itī mahāmahopādhyāya vidyānivāsa-bhaṭṭācāryasūtṛārya-viśvanāthanyāyapaṇcānana-bhaṭṭācāryaviracito bhāṣāpāricchedaḥ samāptah.* //BPS, p. 581

\(^2\) *nijanirmitakārikāvalīmatisūktacirantananoktibhiḥ.* //BPS, p. 2.

But the expression *nijanirmitakārikāvalī* need not necessarily mean that *kārikāvalī* is the name of the main book consisting of the basic *kārikās*. The term *kārikāvalī* may mean also the "cluster of *kārikās" (composed by the author himself), in a general way. If *kārikāvalī* would have been really intended by the author as the name of the work, he would have mentioned this name more prominently elsewhere also. Only the later tradition appears to have brought the name *kārikāvalī* into vogue for the sake of the convenience of keeping the distinction of the *kārikās* from the *vṛttī* in time of reference and probably also for the sake of economy, the term *kārikāvalī* being easier and shorter than the term *Bhasapariccheda*. 
the cluster of the basic Karikās. Some modern scholars also take the term Bhāṣāpariccheda only in the sense of the Karikās. Yet the fact remains that the word Bhāṣāpariccheda has now come to be used to cover the cluster of the Karikās and the Muktāvalī as well. It is because, the verse work and the prose commentary on it are so closely related in respect of the philosophical ideas presented therein that they cannot be thought of as distinct works. In the present dissertation the proposed exposition will be with reference to both the works treated as one organic whole. Hence, the word Bhāṣāpariccheda is used in the present work to cover both the so-called Karikāvalī and the Muktāvalī.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TITLE 'BHĀṢĀPARICCHEDA':

Nowhere in the existing literature, old or modern, we have come across an attempt at interpreting the title 'Bhāṣāpariccheda.' The title word comprises of two parts, 'bhāṣā' and 'pariccheda' and may be analyzed as 'bhāṣayah pariccheda.' The word 'bhāṣā' is derived from the root 'bhāṣa.'

23. tatra tavadbhāṣāparicchedavākhyānam cikīrṣurvisvanātha-paṇcānano ------ DK, vide NSM, p. 1;
   siddhāntamuktāvalīvākhyān%cikīrṣurmanabhādevah ------ ------ RR, Vide NSM, p. 1.

24. The Bhāṣāpariccheda together with the author's own gloss called the Siddhāntamuktāvalī was written by Viśvanātha Nyāyapaṇcānama ------ Satkari Mookerjee, introduction to BPM, p. IX.
with the addition of suffix 'a' together with 'ṭāp'. The word 'pariccheda' is the resultant of pari-vchid + ghañ. With this in mind, an attempt may be made to interpret the title in two ways.

(i) One of the several meanings of the root 'chid' preceded by 'pari' is 'to fix accurately or ascertain'. From this the word 'pariccheda' may be taken to mean 'an accurate fixation or ascertainment'. The word 'bhāṣa' means 'definition or description'. Thus the word 'Bhāṣa-pariccheda' comes to mean 'an accurate fixation of definitions.' In this way the treatise is supposed to contain the most accurate analysis of the problems of the domain of Indian Philosophy, in general, and of the school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in particular.

(ii) The word 'bhāṣa' may be taken to stand for 'paribhāṣa' according to the maxim 'Nāmaikadesāgrahaṇena nāmamātrakrahaṇam' on the strength of this maxim, a part of a name may be taken to mean the corresponding whole word.  


Paribhāṣā means terminology or technical terms also. In consonance with this meaning of the first part of the word, i.e., 'bhasa', the word 'pariccheda' may be taken in its sense of a 'definition'. Viewed thus, the title 'Bhāṣā-pariccheda' means 'definitions of the technical terms'. As a matter of fact, this work contains the most useful explanations of the technical terms of the sphere of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which are almost invariably come across also in the other schools of Indian Philosophy.

THE AUTHOR OF THE BHAŚĀ-PARICCHEDA:

The authorship of the Bhāṣāpariccheda has been ascribed to Visvānāthapāṇcānana who is the author of the Nyāya-sūtrayārtti. Pāṇcānana Sāstrī, however, has recorded in the preface to his own edition of the Bhāṣāpariccheda a difference of opinion in this context. As referred to by him, Dinesh Ch. Bhattacharyya is of the opinion that the author of the


Siddhāntamuktāvālī is one Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma and not Visvānātha-nyāya-pancāṇana. Bhattacharyya deduces his conclusions on the following grounds.

(i) There is the mention of Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma as the author in some of the manuscripts of the book;

(ii) The Muktāvalyullāsa of one Visvānātha, an exposition of the Muktāvalī, has been composed prior to Visvānāthanyāya-pancāṇana, the author of the Nyāyasūtravrātti.

(iii) Another exposition of the Muktāvalī namely Raudri has come to us as a work of Rudratarkavāgīśa who happens to be only a contemporary of Visvānāthanyāya-pancāṇana.

(iv) The example of Upamānapramāṇa given in the Nyāyasūtravrātti, decidedly a work of Visvānāthanyāya-pancāṇana, is different from that in the Muktāvalī.

(v) The date of the Maithili MSS of the Muktāvalī is given as only 205 sāka year. But the accepted date of Visvānātha’s Nyāyasūtravrātti, i.e., the Gautamasūtravrātti is 1556 sākābda.

Pañcāṇana Sāstrī rejects the view of Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharyya and argues as follows:

(1) The mention of Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma by name in a few manuscripts of the book can never be a strong ground to prove the authorship of the work otherwise. In a large number of manuscripts of the work available in different parts of
India, the name of Visvanātha also has been mentioned and scholars in general have no contention in respect of the authorship of Visvanātha. The tradition is very strong in this respect ever since the very date of the composition of the book.

(2) There is nothing to prove that the Muktāvalyullāsa has been composed before the life time of Visvanāthanayapāñcānana. As we cannot claim fullscale knowledge regarding the identity of Visvanātha, the author of the Ullāsa, we cannot contradict the probability that Visvanātha, the author of Muktāvalyullāsa is a person other than and posterior to Visvanāthanayapāñcānana.

Bhattacharyya wants to create an impression that as one Visvanātha was to have composed the Muktāvalyullāsa (a commentary on the Muktāvalī), there cannot be another Visvanātha itself. It is, however, not warranted by facts that there can be only one person bearing a particular name. There is no harm if two or more persons bearing the same name came to be associated with a work and its commentary.

(3) It is quite possible that notwithstanding his being a contemporary of Visvanāthanayapāñcānana, Rudratarkavāgīsa composed Rudritikā which came as a sub-commentary on the Muktāvalī. There is nothing to prevent the composition of a commentary and a sub-commentary on it by two contemporaries. Sometimes necessity demands even a contemporary to write a commentary or a sub-commentary on some particular work. So
there is no point in arguing that the **Muktāvalī** must have been composed earlier than Viśvanāthanayāpancaśāna as one of his contemporaries is found to have composed a commentary on the **Muktāvalī**.

(4) The difference in the illustrations of the Upamāna-pramāṇa in the **Nyāyasūtra-vṛtti** and the **Muktāvalī** does not carry weight in the matter of deciding the authorship of the **Muktāvalī**. The same author may give two different examples in his two different books even with regard to the same context. An author may sometimes correct himself in a later work regarding a mistake done in an earlier one. So even though the examples of Upamāna-pramāṇa are different in the two books, the books could have been composed by the same author. It may be that his illustration of Upamāna in the **Muktāvalī** was under the influence of the Maithili logician Saṅkaramisra and his fresh illustration in the **Nyāyasūtra-vṛtti** was out of his anxiety to correct himself at a mature age.

(5) The word 'sāka' indicative of time as appearing in the last part of the **Muktāvalī** in Maithili script might have been used in the sense of a local year. The Maithili scholars are found using the word 'sāka' in their language in the sense of a 'samvat' (a year in general). Thus there should be no difficulty in placing the Maithili MSS near about the **Nyāyasūtra-vṛtti**, the date of which is undoubtedly the 1556 sākābda. No proof has been there as yet to show that the **Muktāvalī** had been composed at least one hundred years earlier than the
Nyāyasyātravṛtti which has undoubtedly passed as Visvanātha-
nyāyapāñcānana’s work. If it were otherwise, there would have
been obvious scope of doubting Visvanātha’s authorship of the
Muktāvalī. 29

Dr. Dayānanda Bhārgava also refers to this difference
of opinion with late D.C. Bhattacharyya. As Dr. Bhargava
informs us, MM Haraprasād Sāstrī also believes that Kṛṣṇadāsa
Sārvabhauma was the author of the Bhāṣāpariccheda with the
Siddhāntamuktāvalī and that Visvanātha wrote only the comment-
ary Ullāsa on it. 30 Pending discovery of stronger evidences,
we may conclude, there is no point in doubting Visvanātha-
nyāyapāñcānana as the author of the Bhāṣāpariccheda.

VISVANĀTHA —— A PERSONAL INTRODUCTION :

Visvanātha makes a very brief reference to his family.
He introduces himself simply as the son of Śrīmadvidyānīvāsa
Bhaṭṭācāryya. 31 Hence, it becomes difficult to determine the

29. 'Granthāvataraṇikā', Vide BPS, p. III-IV; Vaṁge Navyanyā-
yacarca by late Dinesh Ch. Bhaṭṭācāryya referred to by
Pañcanana Sāstrī in his granthāvataraṇikā (Preface) to
his editions of the Bhāṣāpariccheda (Abb. BPS)

30. cf. Preface of TS (MB) by Dr. Dayānanda Bhārgava, p.xxxvii.

31. iti mahāmahopādhyāyavidyānīvāsabhāṭṭācāryasutah śrīvisva-
nāthanyāyapañcānanaḥbhaṭṭācāryaviracito bhāṣāparicchedah
samāptah. BPS, p. 581.
time and place of this great scholar. In the Bhasāpariccheda there is only one more personal reference made by Visāvanātha as he discloses that he composed the work in the interest of some one, Rājīva by name.32 A section of the scholars conjecture Visāvanātha to be a Bengali on the ground that BP is most popular as a text in Bengal and that the name Rājīva appears to be a typical Bengal name. Another section suppose Visāvanātha to be a Maharastrian on the ground that the authors of both Dinakarī and Rāmarudrī, the celebrated principal commentaries on the Muktāvalī, hail from Maharashtra.33 It is however, useless to indulge in such conjectures. Regarding the identity of Rājīva, Dinakarī feels that he was a disciple of Visāvanātha.34 Some others hold him to be a grandson of Visāvanātha on the strength of a colophon in certain MSS of the BP.35 About Visāvanātha's geneology, Dr. Satkarī Mookerjēe and Pt Pañcānana Sāstrī have referred the readers to a valuable book in Bengali, the Nyāyaparicayā by MM Phaṇibhusaṇa

32. nijanirmitakārikāvalimatisāksiptacirantaroktibhih visādīkaravāpi kautukān namu rājīvadayāvasāsamvadāḥ. (Prefatory to M, BP) BFS, p. 2.
33. The Preface in Bengali by Sri Gurunātha Vidyānidhi Bhattacharyya, Vide BPB, p(ii).
34. rājīve sīṣye etc, Dinakarī under M text,nijanirmita etc., Vide NSM, p. 3.
35. cf. iti bhāsāparicchedo granthah sampūrṇatām gataḥ pacito visvānāthena svapautrahitakāmyaya. referred to by G. Vidyānidhi, Vide BPB, p.(ii)
Tarkavāgīśa. As the said book is not available to us, we reproduce here an account of Visvanātha’s family as detailed by Pañcānana Sāstrī on the strength of findings of the Tarkavāgīśa.

Ratnākara Vācaspāti was the youngest brother of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, the eminent Naiyāyika and founder of Navyanyāya studies in Navadvīpa. This Sārvabhauma was the first teacher of Raghunāthaśiromāṇi. Ratnākara, the brother of Sārvabhauma, became celebrated as Vidyāvācaspāti. Kāśi-nātha Vidyāvāgīśa was the son of that Vidyāvācaspāti. Kāśi-nātha was reknowned as Vidyānivāsa Bhāttācārya. Visvanātha-nyāyapañcāna was the son of this Vidyānivāsa Bhāttācārya. Visvanātha had a brother of his own, Rudranātha by name. As Dr. Mookerjee informs us, 36 Visvanātha’s grandfather Ratnākara, together with his illustrious brother Sārvabhauma were the sons of Maheswara Visārada, celebrated for his scholarship and piety, whose father Narahari of the Vandopādhvīya family settled at Navadvīpa in the 14th century A.D.

DATE OF THE BHĀṢĀPARICCHEDA:

If Visvanāthanyāyapañcānana is the author of the Siddhāntamuktāvalī, then he is automatically the author of the whole BP as warranted by the expressions ‘nijanirmittakārikāvalī’ etc. Visvanātha is undisputedly accepted as

36. Vide introduction by Dr. Satkari Mookerjee; Vide BPM, p. (XXIV–V).
the author of the Nyāyasūtra-vṛttti, the date of which is given by himself as 1566 śakābda.37 Now we can fix the date of BP (the Karikāvalī with the Muktāvalī) around the date of the Nyāyasūtra-vṛttti. Pañcānana Śastri takes the example of Upamānapramaṇa given in the Nyāyasūtra-vṛttti as an evidence of maturity, while the example given in the Muktāvalī appears to be the act of an earlier age. Thus the Muktāvalī seems to have been composed earlier than the Nyāyasūtra-vṛttti. The date of Muktāvalī being fixed, it is not difficult to fix the date of the Karikāvalī slightly prior to that of the Muktāvalī and to place the BP as a whole some time earlier than 1556 sāka. This date is equivalent to 1634 A.D. The Nyāyasūtra-vṛttti was composed by Viśvanātha at the fag end of his life at Vṛndāvana.38

OTHER LITERARY CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE AUTHOR:

In addition to the Karikāvalī, the Siddhāntamuktāvalī, and the Nyāyasūtra-vṛttti, Viśvanātha is credited with the authorship also of three more works viz. Nyāyatantarabodhini, Padārthatattvāvaloka and Suvarṇatattvāvaloka.39 Dr. Satkari

37. rasāvānatīthau śākendrakāle bahule kāmatithau śūcau sitāhe, NSV, Vide 'Nivedana', BPS (1354 sāka edition).
38. Introduction on BPM, p. XXIV
39. Preface, BPV, p. (iii)
Mookerjee refers to a work called *Māṃsatattvaviveka* as to have been composed by Viśvanātha. Dr. Mookerjee describes it as an interesting śrīti treatise in which Viśvanātha advocates the custom of meat-eating amongst the brahmans in northern India and ridicules the South-Indian scholars for depreciating the custom.\(^{40}\)

**OTHER AUTHORS OF THE SAME NAME:**

In the domain of Nyāya philosophy itself there are three more Viśvanāthas. One is the author of the *Muktavāl-yullāsa*, the second one is the author of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, the *Tarkatarangini* and the *Tarkasaṃgṛaha*, which are all commentaries and the third one is Viśvanāthabhaṭṭa, the author of the *Nyāyavilāsa*, a work on Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvaprabhodhini*.\(^{41}\) To avoid confusion, it should be noted that Viśvanātha Kavirāja, author of the *Sāhitya-darpaṇa*, is altogether different from all the aforesaid Viśvanāthas of the domain of Nyāya.

**BHĀṢĀPĀRĪCCHEDA — A NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA WORK:**

In view of the contents the BP (i.e. *Karikāvalī* of Viśvanātha with his *Muktavālī*) belongs to the syncretic school of the Nyāyavaīṣeṣikas. Viśvanātha gives his own

\(^{40}\) Introduction on BPM, p. XXV.

\(^{41}\) Vide Preface, BPV, p. (iii).
elucidation of the concept of the seven categories (Saptapādartha) recognised by the earlier Vaiśeṣikas and again deals with four sources of valid knowledge (Pramāṇas) as enunciated by the earlier Naiyāyikas. The pure Nyāya tradition believes in sixteen categories. By way of admitting seven categories Visvanātha behaves like a Vaiśeṣika. Vaiśeṣikas again believe in only two Pramanas namely Pratyaksa and Anumāṇa. They do not recognise Upamāna and Sabda. Because of recognising all the four Pramanas admitted by the Nyāyasūtrakāra Gotama, Visvanātha emerges out as a Naiyāyika. Under this circumstance, it will be wrong to characterise Visvanātha exclusively as a Naiyāyika or a Vaiśeṣika. In the matter of methods and technicalities he is out and out a Navyanaiyāyika.

DIVISION OF THE BHĀṢĀPARICCHEDA — MAIN CONTENTS:

The BP is broadly divided into two parts, viz., the Kārikāvalī and the Muktāvalī. The Kārikāvalī consists of 168 Kārikas (verses). The Kārikās are mostly in the Anuṣṭubh metre. A few of them, however, appear in Ārya and Upajāti also. The Muktāvalī, the prose vṛtti on Kārikāvalī,

42. According to Professor Keith and Professor Winternitz there are only 166 memorial verses (Kārikās). But in all the editions available to us contain 168 Kārikās. Even if we donot recognise the 'maṅgala' verse 'mutanājaładhararucaye'etc. as a memorial verse, the number comes to 167 and in no case it should be 166. These two authors are of the opinion that some of the memorial Kārikās must have been borrowed by Visvanātha from some earlier source. cf. HSL, p. 486; HIL, p. 534.
proceeds in accordance with the relevant Karikās. The Muktāvalī consists of five divisions (Khaṇḍas)–namely Pratyakṣakhanda, Anumānakhaṇḍa, Upamānakhaṇḍa, Sābdakhaṇḍa and Guṇanirūpaṇa (Khaṇḍa).

Both the Karikāvalī and the Muktāvalī are begun with separate 'maṅgala'—verses (i.e. benedictory verses). Immediately after the 'maṅgalācaraṇa' of the Muktāvalī, Viśvanātha discusses the utility of the 'maṅgalācaraṇa' (benediction) by way of explaining the 'maṅgala' verses of the Karikāvalī. Thereafter, he informs that he has written the Muktāvalī for the sake of easy understanding of the Karikās by some Rājīva. Then he proceeds to the treatment of the issues in the following order—categories (padaṛtha), Substances (Draṇya), Perception (Pratyakṣa), Inference (Anumāna), Comparison (Upamāna), Verbal comprehension (sābdabodha) Recollection (smṛti), Mind (Manas) and Qualities (Guṇas).

Following the Vaiśeṣika trend initiated by Kaṇḍa, Viśvanātha deals with the seven categories namely, Draṇya (substance), Guṇa (quality), Karma (action), Jāti (universality), Viṣeṣa (particularity), Samavāya (inherence) and Abhāva (negation or non-existence). Following Kaṇṭha and his successors Viśvanātha discusses the nine types of Draṇya, twenty-four types of Guṇa, five types of Karman, two types of Sāmānya, then Viṣeṣa, Samavāya and Abhāva in great detail.
Visvanatha's treatment of Vyapti, Hetvabhasa, Pakṣa, Upādhi, Upamāna and Sābda is in the line of the Naiyāyikas.

Thus Visvanatha's BP comes to cover physics and psychophysics of the Vaiśeṣikas and logic and metaphysics of the Naiyāyikas.

While following the traditions of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, Visvanatha naturally happened to be influenced by the earlier authorities of these two schools of thought. But even then Visvanatha exhibits a lot of originality in his treatment of the various traditional concepts. It is rightly pointed out by Dr. Satkari Mookerjee that "Visvanatha follows the plan of Prasāstapāda in his treatment of the Vaiśeṣika categories and their relations, although his exposition embodies new contributions." Visvanatha's originality even in the face of his indebtedness to Prasāstapāda is acknowledged by Gurunātha Vidyānidhi also.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BHĀṢĀPARICCHEDA IN THE HISTORY OF NAVYANYĀYA:

The Bhāṣāpariccheda may be reckoned as the foremost of the standard and comprehensive Navyanyāya works suited to the beginners. The work seems to have been composed on the basis of the Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya of Prasāstapāda; yet the Nyāya doctrines also have been suitably incorporated into it. The Muktāvalī brings into its fold all the important

43. Vide introduction to BPM, p. ix.
44. Vide Preface (bhūmikā) to BPV, p. iii
conclusions and thoughts of the Nyāya school. It bears testimony to Visvanātha's knowledge of methods, techniques and findings of the Navyanyāya school. As Dr. Satkari Mookerjee opines, of all the Nyāyavaiśeṣika works the BP is "most popular and most extensively studied in India." In the considered opinion of Dr. Mookerjee, the popularity of the work lies in "its comprehensive treatment of most of the important topics and problems that exercise the minds of the exponents of the Navyanyāya school for several centuries." It is said to have summed up the latest results of thinking in the Nyāya line of thought. Dr. Mookerji highly advocates the study of the book by the advanced students to get acquainted with the Navyanyāya dialectics.

TRADITIONAL COMMENTARIES, TRANSLATIONS AND MODERN EDITIONS OF THE BP:

Of the commentaries the Dinakari is the main and the most celebrated one. The Dinakari was begun by Mahādevabhaṭṭa and completed by Dinakarabhaṭṭa. The original name of the commentary was Prakāśa but it passes as the Dinakari through its association with Dinakara. The Rāmarudrī is a commentary on the Dinakari and it is equally celebrated. The composition of the Rāmarudrī was started by Rāmarudra Bhaṭṭacārya and

45. Vide introduction to BPM, p. IX.
46. Vide ibid, p. IX
47. Vide introduction to BPM, p. IX
completed by Pânditarāja Rājesvara Śāstrī. The actual name of the work is Tarāṅgini, but the sub-commentary passes as the Rāmarudrī through its association with Rāmarudra. Other commentaries on the BP as far as we know are the following—the Muktāvalyullāsa of one Visvanātha, the Raudrī by Rudratarkavāgīśa, the Muktāvalisamgraha of Pañcānana Śāstrī, the Prācīna Prabhā of Drāvīḍanṛsiṃha Śāstrī, the Mañjuśa of Paṭṭabhirāmasāstrī, the Mayukha of Sūryanārāyaṇasūkla, the Nyāyacandrika, the Abhinavaprabhā by Mukundasārma and a commentary by Gāṅgārāma yati.

The Bhāṣāpariccheda was first printed in India in 1827. Then it came to have a rendering in Bengali. In 1850 Dr. E. Roer published in the Bibliotheca Indica series an English edition of the Bhāṣāpariccheda with extracts from the Muktāvalī. The book, however, is now out of print. The Bhāṣāpariccheda with the Siddhāntamuktāvalī is a very valuable translation by Swami Mādhanānanda, published by Advaita Ashrama in 1940. Of various subsequent editions of BP, we can make mention of the Bhāṣāpariccheda by Sri Pañcānana Śāstrī with his expositions in Sanskrit and Bengali, the Bhāṣāpariccheda by Sri Gurunāthavidyānīdhi-bhaṭṭācāryya with translation and exposition in Bengali, the Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī along with the commentaries,

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48. Preface (bhūmikā) in Bengali to BPV, p. xii.
49. ibid.
50. The German translation by Hultzsch published in ZDMG, lxxiv. 145 ff, is also out of reach to the average students of the BP.
Dinakari and Rāmarudri, and the Nyāyasiddhāntamuktavali with the commentary, Kiranāvalli, both published from the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi.

SCOPE AND UTILITY OF THE PRESENT WORK:

The problem of word-meaning and its communication as presented in different schools of Indian Philosophy has arrested the attention of many a modern scholar. The Nyāya concept of Śābda in this context demands a serious study as it contributes largely to the Indian theory of meaning. But because of its obscure nature, the Nyāya thought is yet to be fully explored. The Śabdakhaṇḍa of the Bhāṣāpariccheda sums-up the latest thinking of Nyāya scholars, in the matter of the concept of Śābda. Hence it is deemed necessary to make a critical exposition of the Śabdakhaṇḍa of the Bhāṣāpariccheda. The exposition is expected to assume the form of a critique on Śābda from the Nyāya point of view.

The text of the Bhāṣāpariccheda itself is a knotty one as it is written in the style of Navyanyāya terminology. Hence an exposition is necessary to facilitate the study of the work as a text book also. The contents require an elucidation, also because of embodying certain highly controversial issues.
The chapter under consideration has many technical terms and issues in common with Mīmāṁsā, Vyākaraṇa, Alāṅkara-sāstra etc. To illustrate the point, we can name Karaṇa, Vyāpāra, Sakti etc. as common technical terms and as for common issues we may consider the cases like those of Vṛtti, Laksāṇa, Sphoṭa, Saktigraha, Āsatti etc. In order to bring out the real implications of these terms and issues a fuller exposition of the Sabdakhaṇḍa of the Bhāṣāpariccheda is highly desirable. Moreover, we find that these common terms and issues do not necessarily show affinity in thought, rather sometimes they reveal marked differences.

It may be humbly pointed out that the traditional as well as the modern commentaries on the Bhāṣāpariccheda still leave scope for such an exposition. DK and RR, the celebrated traditional commentaries are really helpful in following the Bhāṣāpariccheda text. The traditional commentators, as is usual, do not deal with the issues in their historical perspective nor in the critical and comparative lines. This is equally true of other commentaries including the Muktāvalī-samgraha of Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya, comparatively a modern scholar. The English edition of the Bhāṣāpariccheda of Dr. Roer is no longer available to us. The English translation of the Bhāṣāpariccheda by Svāmī Mādhavananda (abbr. BPM) is only a helpful English rendering of the work. The Philosophy of Word and Meaning by Dr. Gaurinātha Sāstrī, otherwise a
a very important work, is concerned mainly with the doctrine of Bhartṛhari, the grammarian. The Indian theories of meaning by K. Kunjanni Raja, which is no doubt comprehensive and thematic, has not dealt elaborately with the Sabdakhaṇḍa of the Bhāṣāpariccheda. The treatment of Sābda in the Nyāya theory of knowledge by S.C. Chatterjee also is not adequate so far as the BP is concerned. We, therefore, feel that a fuller treatment of Sabdakhaṇḍa of the Bhāṣāpariccheda is a desideratum in the domain of the Nyāya concept of Sābda which forms a very important part of Indian epistemology.

A NOTE ON THE MODE OF PRESENTATION:

(a) The part II of the present work comprises of the text of the Karikāvalī and the Muktāvalī immediately followed by the English translation thereof. The translation portions are put in single inverted commas ('___') for the sake of easy identification. As the main purpose of the work is an exposition of the BP text, the translation sometimes comes to be more explanatory than literal. In this context, Svāmī Mādhava-nanda's work is utilised here and there with all gratitude.

(b) The translation of the text (both K and M) is followed by corresponding notes and expositions, critical and comparative. The issues have been discussed in their historical perspective as far as practicable.
Only the Karikāvalī text and the Muktāvalī text are given in the main body of the work. Quotations from other Sanskrit texts occur only in the Foot notes.

The BP Karikās are given in block letters and are identified by the abbreviation 'K' along with a number within bracket. The Muktāvalī text is written in small letters and is identified by the abbreviation 'M' with a number within bracket.

Because of the bewildering intricacy of the Nyāya terminology, it may not be safe to rely fully on English equivalents for the technical terms. Hence these terms have been preserved in original in the present work. To facilitate easy identification, these terms are begun with capital letters at the end of the work.

All the names of the books, traditional and modern are underlined.

Unless otherwise demanded, the name 'Viśvanātha' used hereafter would stand for Viśvanāthanyāyapañcānana, the author of the Bhāṣāpariccheda.
THE GENESIS OF THE CONCEPT OF SÁBDABODHA :
THE ORIGIN OF THE VARIOUS THEORIES OF MEANING :

The proposed critical exposition of the Śabdakhaṇḍa of the Bhāsāpariccheda is expected to be a review of the problem of Sābdabodha as dealt with by Viśvanātha Nyāyapāncaṇana.

The problem of Sābdabodha is the issue of the total meaning conveyed by the corresponding words as parts of a sentence. It is the issue of the relational thought to be gathered from a sentence. The problem of meaning has arrested, though in different ways, the attention of scholars almost in all parts of the world. The various systems of thought even in Ancient India came to present vast and variegated discussions on the problem. Those very discussions may be said to have formed the Philosophy of language in Ancient India. Even from the days of the Rgveda, probably the earliest document of mankind, language or speech has been viewed with all importance. We come across innumerable passages in the Samhitās, Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads in reverential praise of speech or language. In order to avoid much digression from our main theme we have to resist the temptation of reproducing them in full. Only for illustration, we may refer to Rgveda X.125.3\textsuperscript{51} and X.114.8\textsuperscript{52}. The Vedic

\begin{align*}
51. \text{tām mā devā vyādadhuh purutrā bhūrīṣṭhātram} \\
\text{bhūryāvesayantim. RV X.125.3.}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
52. \text{yāvad brahma viṣṭhitam tāvatī vāk. Ibid. X.114.3}
\end{align*}
passages testify to the fact that the speech or language as the vehicle of communication amongst the members of society was duly valued. Insistence also on correct use of language was seen in India since very early time. According to a Vedic seer, those who cannot use the language correctly are fools. The speech of the learned is beautiful as it is free from blemishes. The stress on the meaningful statements was duly given by the Vedic scholars. Vedic passages are eloquent even in respect of the advantages that can be derived from the proper understanding of the speech.

The trend of thought regarding language continues to acquire new dimensions with the various schools of thought in Vedic and Post-Vedic periods. The speculations on the nature of speech, i.e., the problem of word and its meaning also began with the Vedic thinkers. The four-fold division of words (Padas) into Nāma, Ākhyāta, Upasarga

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53. Rgveda X.71.2

54. uta tvāṁ saṁkhye sthira'pītamāhur / 
nainam hinvantyapi vājineśu // 
adhanvā caratī māyayaiśā vācam / 
sūsrūvām aphaḷām apuṣpām // Ibid. X.71.5.

55. uta tvāṁ paśyan na dādarsa vācam / 
uta tvāṁ śr̥navaṁ na śr̥ṇotyenāṁ // 
uto tvasmai tanvam visasre / 
jāyeva pataya uṣatī suvāsaḥ // Ibid. X.71.4.

56. ------- tadyānyetāṁ catvāri padajātāṁ nāmākhyate 
copasarganipatasaṁ tānūmāni --- Mirukta 1.1.1.; 
catvāri padajātāṁ nāmākhyatopasarganipatāsca. MBH 1.1.1.
and Nipāta by Yāska and endorsed by Patañjali is originally found in a Rgvedic verse\textsuperscript{57} which is quoted in the Mahābhāṣya. We met with attempts at etymological analysis of different words like Indra, Agni etc., in the Brāhmaṇas (namely Saṭapatha, Tāṇḍya etc.), Āranyakas and the Upaniṣadas. With the increasing importance of ritualistic part of the Vedas, there grew up some sort of a science of language or word-meanings also out of an anxiety to check the distortion of the Vedic meanings. This anxiety is best revealed in the Pūrva-māṇḍya school of Jaimini. We find the Prātiśākhyaśas and Yāska's Nirukta attempting metaphysical and syntactical speculations on language. Yāska refers to several earlier authorities like Audumbarāyana, Vārṣyāyana, Śākatāyana and Gārgya who are said to have speculated on the problem of meaning.\textsuperscript{58} Yāska's treatment may be said to have served as the basis for further speculations in later schools of Indian Philosophy.

Panini came to be concerned more with the form of language than with its meanings. He made elaborate speculations on the nature of the parts of speech and etymological

\textsuperscript{57} catvāri vāk parimitā padāni
tāni vidurbrāhmaṇā ye maniśeṣṇah
guhā tṛīṇi nihātaneṅgayanti
turiyaṃ vāco manusyaḥ vādanti. MBH 1.1.1.

\textsuperscript{58} nigamānānighantavya uccyanta ityaupamanyavo'pi

------------------ gārgyaḥ. Nirukta 1.1.
derivations of words. But he did not make any attempt at metaphysical explanation of language. It was Patañjali who dealt with the syntactical problems with due elaboration. He also supplied the metaphysical explanation of the Sutras of Pāṇini. Bhartṛhari, the author of the Vākyapadīya was responsible for the continuation and elaboration of the Philosophy of word-absolute as begun in the Upaniṣads. As claimed also by Bhartṛhari, this absolutistic Philosophy is based on the Vedas. The process of the spiritualisation of the word became too obvious in the tantras.

An objective analysis, however, shows that pure grammar and logic make the twin that serve as unavoidable aids in presenting meaningful language. In India, there came to take place an increasing and systematic growth of these two disciplines in subsequent periods. A form of a language expressing a proposition is called a sentence. Pending further discussion on the nature of a sentence in subsequent pages in the present work, we may say this much at this stage that a sentence has a definite form and it also expresses a definite meaning, true or false. The probability of truth or falsehood involved in this context leads to the problem of validity (pramāṇya) of a Vākyārthajñāna (the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence). Here again we have to remember that theśabdabodha, the subject under investigation, is nothing but this Vākyārthajñāna.

59. VP.I.
Sabda by way of serving as the principal instrument for giving such a Sabdabodha (verbal cognition) comes to get later on the status of a Pramāṇa. In this context Sabdabodha as the valid verbal knowledge is the Pramāṇa (valid knowledge) and the Sabda is the Pramāṇa (the chief instrument for the attainment of the valid knowledge). The history of Sabda as Pramāṇa can be easily traced back to the time of Pūrva-māṁsā. The Mīmāṁsā sutras commenced with a discussion on the nature of human duty. It is stated there that which gives one some urge is the very duty. Now Pratyakṣa or perception as a source of knowledge depends on the contact of sense organs with objects. So, such a Pramāṇa can guide us only in case of contemporaneous duties, in which objects are physically present. But it cannot guide us in the context of past or future duties. Inference, itself being based on perception can also be of no help. Hence the Mīmāṁsakas resort to Sabda as the Pramāṇa to guide us in respect of past and future acts. It is possible, because, according to the Mīmāṁsakas, the words have a perpetual and eternal capacity to signify things. The knowledge from the use of words proceeds without any other aid.

60. codanālakṣaṇo'ṛtho dharmaḥ. MS 1.1.2.

61. autpattikastu sābdasyārthena sambandhastasya jñānam upadeṣo'vyatirekasārthe anupalabdhe tatpramāṇam — MS 1.1.5.
THE CONCEPT OF SÁBDA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO VIŚVANĀTHA NYĀYAPANČĀNAṆA:

Sábda basically means sound (dhvani) and the organ of hearing (sṛavāṇendriya) is the sense-organ responsible for perceiving it. In this basic point, there is agreement amongst all thinkers. The trouble arises when the Mimamsakas conceive it as an eternal substance (nitya dravya) while in contrast, the Naiyāyikas describe it as an attribute of Ākāsā and understand it as 'anitya' (impermanent). In the domain of linguistics again, the word 'sábda' is found to be used to signify a Pada (word). A Pada, however, consists of certain letter or letters (varnas). A letter is undoubtedly a special kind of sound. So even in linguistics Sábda keeps in tact its basic character of being a sound. We find

62. Kastrhi sábdah yenoccarltena sāsnālāṅgulakakudakhura-visāpināṁ sampratayo bhavati sa sábdah ------- athavā pratītpadārthhako loke dhvaniḥ sábda ityucyate. tadyathā sábdāṁ kuru mā sábdāṁ kārṣīḥ sábdakāryayam mānavaka iti. dvaniṁ kurvannevamucyate tasmāddhvaniḥ sábdah.

63. sṛotramātrendriyagṛāhyah sábdah ------- kumārilamate mataḥ.tatra sṛotrāgṛāhyatve sábdasya na vivādaḥ.

64. sábdah ------- dravyam sarvagato nityaḥ kumārilamate mataḥ,viyadgunatvam sábdasya kecidūcūrmanīśīnaḥ.


Yathādarsānaṁ vikrta varnā vibhaktyantarḥ padasamjñā bhavanti. VB, under NS 2.2.60.
Visvanātha dividing Sābda into two types, viz., Sound and Letter. In view of the difference that a letter maintains from an ordinary sound, this division of Visvanātha is justified. A ‘dhvani’ (ordinary sound) is an inarticulate sound, e.g., the sound of a drum (pataha). This sound is a confused mass of sound sensations without any order or arrangement of its parts. It does not possess any fixed relation with other similar sounds. A Varna (vocal sound) is produced by the action of the vocal organ of the human beings. It is characterised by a fixed nature which enables it to occupy a place in a particular language. This letters happen to constitute the human speech and appear in two forms, spoken and written. Spoken letters are directly the auditory sensations of certain significant sounds. The written are the representation of the former by the medium of some script. This basic division of Sābda by Visvanātha is in conformity with the position of the Naiyāyikas earlier to him. In the matter of such a division of Sābda (dhvani), the Mimamsakas also do not differ.

66. sābdo dhvaniśca varnaśca
    mrdangādibhavo dhvaniḥ
    kanthasamyogādījanyā
    varṇāṣṭa kādayo matāḥ  K 164-65, Vide BPS.

67. dvividhasāyaṁ sābdāḥ varṇātmakaḥ, dhvanimātrasaṁ.  VB, under NS 2.2.40, Vide ND, p.188.

68. sa punarayaṁ sābdo vācakāvacaśaḥ bhavata. tatrāvacako bheripraharanādījanyadhvaniyanyāḥ, anyastu tālvādīvyāparajanyadhvaniyanyāḥ varṇātmakaḥ. MM, p.225.
The word 'Sabda' again is technically used in the school of Nyāya in the sense of a Pramanavākya. A sentence is undoubtedly a specific collection of words. So, a sentence is inevitably a special collection of sounds, i.e., mutually related articulate sounds. This Sabda in its basic character of dhvani is a Gunā (quality) and not a Dravya (substance). Being a Gunā, it must belong to a substratum. The substratum to which Sabda belongs is the Ākāśa. This is the position of the Nyāya-Vaisēšikas including Viśvanātha. Sabda,69 the sound, according to them, is the specific or differentiating quality (Vaisēšika Gunā) of Ākāśa. Here the Naiyāyikas differ from the Mīmāṁsakas, who understand Sabda as a Dravya.70

The approach of the Naiyāyikas including Viśvanātha to the problem of eternity (nityatva) of Sabda (both as mere 'dhvani' and 'articulate' varṇa) is being discussed separately.

We are convinced of the Naiyāyikas, using the word 'sābda' in the sense of Vākya on the strength of the following impressions.

Gautama himself defines Sābdapramāṇa as 'Āptopadesa'.1 This Āptopadesa means a communication from or assertion of a trustworthy.

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69. sabdagunamākāśām. SP, p. 64;
ākāśasya tu vijñeyah sābdo vaisēśiko gunaḥ.


70. sābdasya ca dravyatvattattātrapi samyoga eva sambandhah,
nanu vāhyendriyagrāhyatayā sābde gunatvamiti cet na
vāyau rūpatvādīsāmānye ca vyabhicārāt etc. TP, BHC, p. 16.

71. āptopadesaḥ sabbāḥ. NS 1.1.7.
person. Manu understands Upadesá only in the sense of an instructive statement or assertion. We have reasons to believe that at least the Pracicna Naiyayikas understood this 'upadesá' only in the sense of such an instructive assertion. Such an idea can be gathered from the Bhagya of Vatsyayana. But if we understand Gautama's Upadesá only in the sense of an instruction, all non-instructive statements or assertions emanating even from the áptas (trusted persons) will not obtain the status of the Sadapramána. It will limit the scope of Sabda very much. Presumably on this account, some Navyanaiyäyikas came to replace the word Upadesá by the word 'väkya' in the context of defining

72. upadesa anuśāsanam. MANU 12.206.
73. áptah khalu sāksātkṛtadharmani 'idam hātavyamidamasya hānihetuh, idamasyadhigantavyam, idamasyadhigamahetuh'iti bhūtanyanukampante teśam khalu vai prānabhṛtam svayamanavabudhyamānānāṁ nānyadupadesādavabodhakāraṇamasti. na cânabodhe samihā, varjanaṁ vā, na vā, krtvā svastiḥbhavaḥ, nāpyasyānya upakāra kopyasti. 'vayamebhyo yathādarsānam yathābhutamupadisāmāsta ime śrutvā pratipadyamānā heyam hāsyantyadhigantavyamevaḥdhigamisyanti iti evamāptopadesāḥ. VB, under NS 2.1.69;

The implication of the term upadesá gave rise to a lengthy discourse as evidenced by Jayanta's treatment of the term in the NM.

cf. upadesah śabda ityucyamāne ------ tadevaṁ paryāyamevopadesahādām ------ anye tu brūvate yuktamupadesapadameva śabdalakṣāṇam ------ aparā āha ------ bhavatyeyam upadisyate iti ko'ṛthaḥ, abhidhānakriyā kriyate ------ etc. NM, pp.137-8.
Sābda. They did it perhaps in order to widen the scope of Sabdapramāṇa. But still up to this stage there remains in tact the basic character of Sabdapramāṇa in its being a sentence (vākya), instructive or non-instructive, uttered or used by an Āptapuruṣa (trustworthy person). Here we simply note that in the context of Viśvanātha's kārikās on Sābda we shall have to discuss the issue of the acceptability of Sābda in the sense of a Pada or Vākya as a Pramāṇa, i.e., Sābdabodhakaraṇa.

With regard to the term 'upadesā', we may further add that the grammarians understand the term Upadesā in the sense of 'the first utterance'. We cannot understand Gautama's Upadesā in the sense of 'the first utterance' as in that case the subsequent utterances of the trustworthy persons will not get the status of Sabdapramāṇa. The Mīmāṃsakas understand 'Upadesā' in the sense of a context of a work that

74. āpatavākyai Sābdaḥ - TS, p. 65.
Viśvanātha is also found giving the status of Sābda to an Āptavākyā. Without being vocal like Annambhatta, he uses the word 'Sābda' indirectly to mean an Āptavākyā.


75. "upadesā ādyuccāraṇām". SIK, under p. 1.3.3.
This means the initial instruction of the teacher in respect of certain basic concepts of the science of grammar. ef.

dhātusūtra-ganānādi-vākyalingānusāasanam āgama-pratyayādeśā upadesāḥ prakīrttitaḥ.
BM in SIK, under p. 1.3.3.
comes to convey a series of desired meanings.76 We shall have to conclude here by simply reiterating that the Upadesá, taken in any of the above senses, shall have to come to us in the form of a sentence. The very etymology of the word comes in support of this position.77 In view of this, there must be a sentence to carry out the Upadesá. The position of those Navyanaiyāyikas who replaced the term 'Upadesá' by the word 'Vākya' comes to be more acceptable both for the sake of simplification and the avoidance of ambiguity. As gathered from the analysis of the later Naiyāyikas, Sābdabodha, which may be described as Sābdajñāna also came to be universally understood as the Vākyārthajñāna.78 The knowledge pertaining to Sābda came to be deemed as the knowledge of the meaning of a Vākya. From this it may be deduced that with the Naiyāyikas, a Sābda stands for a Vākya in the matter of getting the status of a Pramāṇa. But to be a Pramāṇa, however, that Vākya must belong to an Āpta (trustworthy person) by way of being uttered or used by him.

76. yatra-pekṣitasya ārthajñātasya pratipādako granthasandarbhaḥ paṭhyate sa upadesā iti Mīmāṃsakāḥ. JNV 7.1.1.
77. upadisyata anena iti.
78. vākyārthajñānam sābdajñānam. TS, p. 68.
A note is here imperative on the term 'Apta' also. While Gautama defines Sabdapramāṇa as 'Aptopadesa', he personally gives no explanation as to who is an 'Apta'. But the Bhāṣyakāra explains the term at length. According to him Āpta is one who has directly perceived the true nature of things and who is prompted to communicate the properly experienced ideas. Perception of objects may be termed 'āpti'. As he is promoted to communicate by that very 'āpti', he is called an Āpta. According to the context or the object perceived, anybody irrespective of caste or status, may emerge out as an Āpta or authority. Thus this definition of the term Āpta holds good equally with seers, Aryans (guileless or innocent people) and even mlecchas (low or uncultured people). 79 Sometimes even thieves and dacoits may speak the truth. According to one opinion, an Āpta is one who possesses true knowledge that comes to serve as the ground for further application, or engagement. 80 Viśvanātha's own idea is that the Āpta is one who possesses a perfect knowledge in respect of the meaning of the sentence of the context at hand. 81 Annambhaṭṭa more precisely explains the

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79. āptā khalu sākṣātkṛtadharma yathādṛṣṭasyā'ṛthasya cikhyāpayiṣayā prayukta upadeṣṭā. Sākṣātkaraṇamarthasyā "ptih, tayā pravartata itīāptāḥ ṭṛṣyāryamlecchānāṁ samānaṁ lakṣāṇaṁ tathā ca sarveṣāṁ vyavahāraḥ pravarttanta iti. VB, under NS 1.1.7.

80. atrśptatvam ca prayogahetubhūtayathārthajñānavattvam. Nyāyabodhini of Govardhanamisra quoted in NK, p. 126.

81. prakṛtavākyārthayathārthajñānavān, NSV, Under NS 1.1.7.
term Āpta as a truthful speaker, i.e., one who speaks about the things as they really are. In other schools of Indian Philosophy also, almost a similar view is maintained. Nāgęśa in his Paramalaghumaṇjuṣa refers to Patañjali, the author of the Carakaśaṃhitā, according to whom an Āpta is one who comes to be fully aware of something through experience and who does not make false or distorted version of own experience even out of any passion. If we take into consideration the aforesaid ideas regarding an Āpta, the point comes to be certain that for all, the Āpta is a truthful speaker as he does not falsify his experience. In the present work hereafter, we shall use only 'the statement of a trustworthy person' to mean an 'Āptavākya'.

Here we want to point out that the Naiyāyikas strictly wanted Śabda to be the statement of an Āpta in order to give it the status of a Pramāṇa. By Śabda in the sense of Āptavākya, they covered both Vedic and non-Vedic statements.

In case of Viśvaṇātha, we may say that though he does not directly define Śabda as Āptavākya, we have internal textual evidences in the Muktāvalī itself to conclude that he also accepts an Āptavākya as the Śabda.

82. āptastu yathārthavaktā. TS, p. 65.
83. anubhavena vastutattvasya kārṣṭnyena niscayavan rāgādivasadapi nānyathāvadī yah sa āptaḥ iti carake patañjaliḥ. PLM, p. 7.
It is interesting to note that Isvarakrsna in his Sāmkhyakārikā refers to the verbal testimony not as Śabda but directly as the Āptavacana (the statement of a trustworthy person). He explains his Āptavacana as Āptaśruti. Later writers on Sāmkhya freely understand this Śruti here in the sense of a Vākya.

These Āptavākyas, we may add, are seen divided into two groups (1) Drśtārtha, i.e., those relating to perceptible objects and (ii) Adṛśtārtha, i.e., those relating to non-perceptible objects. The Nyāyabhāṣyakāra feels that thereby the Śūtrakāra intends a division of sentences uttered by ordinary trustworthy persons and extra-ordinary ones like the seers.

Annaṁbhaṭṭa, a later Naiyāyika, first divides sentences into worldly and Vedic and maintains that all the Vedic sentences are valid because of being uttered by God. But of

84. drśtamānumānamāpatavacanam ca sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt trividhām pramāṇamāstiḥ ---------------- SK 4

85. āptaśrutirāptavacanam tu. SK 5;

śrutih = vākyajanitaṁ vākyārthajñānam. STK, under JK 5;
nanu 'śrutih striveda āmnāya' iti, kośćcrutipādasya veda-vākya eva saktatvata kathamasārthasyopalabdhiriti cet. śrutipadāmatra jaḥadaḥallakṣaṇaṁ sāmānyavākyaparamārṣṛitya punarupacārāt vākyajanyajñānaparam tadāsṛiya-ata ityevamuktārthalanabhiritī grhaṇa. SB on SK above.

86. sa dvividho drśtādṛśtārthatvāt. NS 1.1.8.
the worldly, i.e., non-Vedic sentences, only those which are the versions of trustworthy persons, are to be treated as valid, otherwise not.\footnote{87}

\textbf{Sābdānityaṭvatvāvāda:} 

The Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas and Vaiyākaraṇas have a discord among themselves regarding the basic nature of Sābda. The Mīmāṃsakas were very much careful in asserting the eternity (nityatva) of Sābda inasmuch as the admission of the non-eternity of Sābda would mean non-eternity of the Vedas too.\footnote{88} As Dr. Radhakrishnan sums-up, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, "the Vedas are eternal, since the words of which they are composed are eternal. The relationship between the word and its meaning is natural ------- words and objects denoted by them are both eternal."\footnote{89} As Dr. Gaṅgānāth Jha points out, in the view of the Mīmāṃsakas, the meaning of the word cannot be comprehended 'except on the hypothesis of its eternity.'\footnote{90} Jaimini contends that

\footnote{87. vākyāṁ dvividham - vaidikaṁ laukikaṁ ceti vaidikamīś-varoktavāt sarvameva pramāṇam laukikaṁ tvāptoktām pramāṇam anyadapramāṇam. TS, p. 68.}

\footnote{88. anityatve hi sābdānāṁ saśasṛṇgaphāravarat sābdātma-kaṇāṁ vedānāṁ nityatvaṁ hāsyataṁ vrajet. MM, p. 228.}

\footnote{89. IP, p. 389.}

\footnote{90. PMS, p. 150.}
the utterance only helps to make the already existing word perceptible. He is of the opinion that the volume of the word does not undergo increase or decrease, though the sound proceeding from men increases or decreases. The Bhāttas also unhesitatingly accept Śādha as nitya. Kumārila recognises Śādha as an eternal and all-pervading substance (Dravya). His followers also subscribe to this very opinion. The Prābhākaras also advocate the eternality of Śādha. They hold that there is no such thing as mere dhvani or indistinct sound. All sounds come to be heard in the shape of some letters only. Some such letters compose

91. cf. nityastu syāddarsānasasya parārthatvāt. MS 1.1.18 & SB, under above;
   cf "Jainini sets forth -------- the word is ever present, since the utterance of it is only for the purpose of manifesting it to others." IP, p. 391.

92. cf. karmaike tatra darsanāt -------- nādavṛddhiparā.
   yaccaitadbahubhirbheri ---- tena pratipurūsam śabdāvavapracaṇy iti gamyate ---- tena nādasyaṅgā vṛddhirṇa sābdasyeti. SB, under MS 1.1.17; cf. IP, p. 391.

93. śrotamātrendriyagraṇhāḥ śabdāḥ śabdavajātimān
   dravyāṁ sarvagāto nityāḥ kumārilamate mataḥ. MM, p. 218.

94. nityatvapakṣameva vayamādriyāmah. ibid, p. 225;
   nanu kathāṁ padārthasambandhasya nityatvam,
   varṇāṇamānityatvena padānāmapiṇityatvāt,
   -- iti ced --- na --- ato nānityatvam. BHC, pp. 133-4.

95. VR Under MS 1.1.6-17;
   itthāṁ varṇānāṁ nityatvāt arthasa ca pravaharūpena

96. Vide IP, p. 390.
a word (Sabda). Though the Bhattachs admit the existence of indistinct sounds, yet, they seem to be concerned with the issue of the eternality of only the distinct sounds, i.e., letters which come to constitute a word. The letters being admitted as eternal, the word comprising of it is obviously recognised as such. The Mimamsakas' admission of eternality of Varnatmakasabda is due to their recognition of it as a Dravya on a par with Akasa. They, however, do not recognise the sounds that manifest the letters as eternal.

Despite differences in opinion amongst themselves, Grammarians may be generally described as the Sabdanityavavadin. The Grammarians assert the eternality of Sabda primarily in a different way. According to them, a word is a series of successive sounds called letters. A series of such letter-sounds manifests one inarticulate sound-essence


98. varnatmakasabdasyakasavadyapakatvena dravyatvaangi-karat ------ idanima ghato jnato ghatakase dhvanirutpanna ityadyanubhavat ato nanityatvam. BHC, p. 135.

called Sphota. This Sphota is an eternal essence that exists corresponding to every word. The Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas join hands in opposing vehemently this Sphota theory of the Grammarians. We shall have the scope to discuss the issue in the context of our exposition of the Muktāvali where we have a direct reference to the view of the Naiyāyikas in this regard. Regarding the issue of 'nityatva' of a 'Varnātmakaśabda' Patañjali introduces the query in his Bhāṣya and seems to offer a balanced view. It is opined that Patañjali tries to take a non-partisan attitude in this context. But Patañjali hastens to add that his distinguished predecessor Pāṇini recognised the eternality of word, meaning and the relation between the two. That both Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiyakaraṇas recognise the term 'āksara' as a synonym of varṇa is also very significant.

100. kim punarnityah śabda āhosvītkāryah saṃgraha
etatprādhānyena parıkṣitām nityo va syātkāryo vetyatratroktā doṣah prayojanānyapyuktānī tatra tvega
 nirṇayo yadyeva nityo’thāpi kārya ubhayathāpi laksā
- naṃ pravartyamiti. MBH 1.1.1; Vide VM§ p. 6.

101. cf. paksadvayamupanyasya ---- paksapātadosām
paraḥpariṣayata 'pratītaśadārthah ko loko dvaniḥ śabdiḥ
 iti vivadaraṇaḥ pakṣa evālambitaḥ. KTS, p. 52.

102. katham ---- nityaparyāvācāśiddhasābdiḥ.
MBH 1.1.1; Vide VM§ p. 6.

103. tasmādāksarānīya eva padam. SB. Under MS 1.1.5
āksaraḥ na kṣaram vidyāt, na kṣaye na kṣatritical
vāksaram. MBH 1.1.1 Vide VM§ p. 36
The Naiyāyikas as against the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇa's in particular are known very much for their concept of non-eternity of Sabda. The Naiyāyikas controvert the position of Mīmāṃsakas asserting that Sabda is 'anitya.' But even amongst the Naiyāyikas, we come to observe differences in handling of the issue.

Visvānātha asserts that though all sounds (Sabda in all forms) remain inherent as quality in a substratum, namely, Ākāśa, they come to be objects of perception only when they are produced in the ear. As we have the notion that a particular sound, say 'ka' is produced and that it is destroyed, the conviction that sound (Sabda) is transitory is quite obvious. That which originates and gets destroyed is what is known as anitya. Visvānātha then replies to those who accept the eternity of sounds on account of what is called Pratyabhijñā (recognition). When

104. kim nityaḥ, athānitya iti ? ----- anityaḥ sābda ityuttaram. VB, Under NS 20.13-39; in NS referred to above, the Sūtrakāra replies to the anticipated arguments of the opponents and makes his own assertion regarding the non-eternity of Sabda.


106. utpannah ko vinasṭaḥ ka iti buddheranityatā

we recognise that "this is the same 'ka'," the object of
that very recognition is the fact of (the present sound
'ka'). belonging to the same class as that of the first
'sound ka' and not that of its identity with the first
'sound ka'. Such a position justifies both the notions of
origination and recognition. Visvanātha clarifies his
concept of the Pratyabhijnāna by way of giving a popular
illustration. When some person says 'The very medicine I
made comes to be made by another person also', we under­
stand the two medicines as being similar and not as
identical. As Mimāmsakas were very much insistent on
the notion of Pratyabhijnāna for proving the 'nityatva' of
Sābda, the Naiyāyikas like Jayantabhaṭṭa are found

107. so'yaṁ ka iti buddhiṁ sājātyamavalambate
       K. 167a;
       nanu sa evāyaṁ kakāra ityādi p r a t y a b h i j ā n ā n a c c h a b-
       dānāṁ nityatvāṁ tatra pratyabhijnānasya tatsu-
       jātiyatvāṁ viṣayo na tu tadvaṇyaktyabheda viṣayāṁ
108. tadeva uṣadhamityādau sajātiye'pi darsanāt.
       K. 168a;
       yada uṣadham mayā kṛtaṁ tada uṣadhamanīyenaṁpi
       kṛtamityādi-darsanāditi bhāvaḥ. M on K 168b.
109. For the Mimāṁsakas' view point. cf.
"Nor can the fact of the Word being actually recogni­
ced as the same in all cases be explained on the
basis of mere Similarity. Hence, on the ground of
this Recognition, Word should be regarded as Eternal.
The Recognition is a form of 'Perception', being
brought about by the same organ --- for these reasons
the word must be regarded as Eternal" PMS, p. 151.
giving lengthy rejoinders in the context.\textsuperscript{110}

Visvamîtha concludes that all Varnas (letters) are transitory.\textsuperscript{111} The conclusion is quite logical. As sound is proved to be basically 'anitya' in the sense of being produced and destroyed, the Varna also obviously comes to be 'anitya'. Though Visvamîtha does not proceed further to add that Padas and Vâkyas are 'anitya', the conclusion is implied. A Vâkya is a collection of Padas, a Pada is a Varna or a collection of Varnas. A Varna being proved 'anitya', a Pada or a Vâkya will obviously be 'anitya'.

As against the above notion of the Naiyâyikas, the Mîmâmsakas contend that the Sabda standing for the Vedas is eternal and impersonal and that the Vedas are without any author.\textsuperscript{112} The Mîmâmsakas are not prepared to accept the Vedas as revelations and they assert that the Vedas need nothing external for their validity. Thus in the context of ūabdaprâmaṇa also, there ensues the two notions of intrinsic validity (Śvataḥ prâmâyavâda) (of the Mîmâmsakas) and extrinsic validity (parataḥ prâmâyavâda) (of the Naiyâyikas). The Naiyâyikas give extra-ordinary stress

\textsuperscript{110} NM, pp. 200-06.
\textsuperscript{111} tasmâd anityâ eveti varpah sarve matah hi nah. K 168b.
\textsuperscript{112} cf. nanu trailokyamâmananipune paramesvare siddhe'pi tatpranîtatvam na vedasyâvakalpate---- pade śabdârthasambandhe vedasya racaṇâsu vâ kartrtvamasyâsankhyeta tace sarvatra durvacam ..varpã-nam cāvinâsitvât kathamâśvarakâryatã/sambandho'ôi na tatkâryah sa hi śaktisvabhâvakah, etc. NM, p. 188.
on Sabdapramāṇa being accepted as extrinsically valid (Parataḥpramāṇa) as demanded by their own concept of Sabda as 'anitya' and 'kārya'.

Here we may note that the Vedas or the Vedic utterances being but Collections of Words are naturally viewed as non-eternal by the Naiyāyikas. But yet the earlier Naiyāyikas were ready to declare the Vedas as 'nitya', probably in somewhat a secondary sense, only on the plea of its traditional continuity, which is categorically rejected in later times. Udayana who is known for initiating new ideas, thereby helping in the emergence of the Navyanyāya, points to the deluge and other factors which do not allow such a traditional continuity of the Vedas. Here we feel like this. The Vedas have two aspects,— (i) linguistic and (ii) essential (tīttvika). In the linguistic aspect, even the old logicians thought of the Vedic sentences as they did of the non-Vedic ones. By speaking of 'nityatva' of

113. Pratyakṣādipramāṇānāṁ tadyathā' stu tathā' stu vā
sabdasya hi pramāṇatvaṁ parato muktasamsāyam.
NM, p. 173.

114. . Manvantarayugāntaregu cātītānāgatesu sampradāyābh-
yāsapravogāvichchedo vedānāṁ nityatvam.
VB, Under NS 2.1.69

115. cf. Pramāyāḥ paratantratvāt sargapralayasambhavāt.
NKU, 2.1;
Pralayottaram pūrvavedanāsaduttaravedasya kathā
prāmāṇyam, mahājanaparigrahasyāpi tādā abhāvāt
sabdasyā'nityatvaṁ, cotpanno gakāraḥ iti pratiti-
siddham. Pravahā' viccedarūpanityatvamapi pralaya-
sambhavānāstītībhāvāḥ. - Haridāsavrtti on NKU above.
Vedas, they were anxious, we may presume, to stress on the permanent character of the essentials taught in the Vedas. But in the matter of validity of knowledge produced, they placed the 'vedāvākya's on a par with the 'laukika' Vākyas. The Naiyāyikas treated the 'vedāvākya's as āptopadeśa or āptavākya as they did in case of non-vedic sentences in the context of producing valid verbal knowledge (sābdiapramāṇa). The āpta in connection with the Vedas was no other than God. The validity of the Vedas is derived from the trustworthiness of God, the āptapurusa.

SĀBDABODHA: AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUE:

The concept of sābdabodha, with which we are primarily concerned in the present work, with special reference to its treatment in Viśvanātha's Bhāgāparipṛchchha, is obviously an epistemological issue. Sābdabodha means the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence, i.e., the total relational idea conveyed by a proposition, as distinguished from the expression 'sābdabodha', which simply signifies the knowledge of a particular word. As we shall see by and

116. evam kṛtakabve varṇānām sādhite sati varṇātmanān
padātprabhṛti sarvatra puruṣasya svātantryaṃ siddhāṃ
bhavati ---- tathā ca vaidikyo racanaḥ kartṛpūrviṅkāḥ
racanatvāllaaukikaḥ rascalāvaḥ kartāya eva javā-
makhīlāmāvṛtti/----- senaiva vedaracanaḥ iti
Yuktmetat/
Āptam tameva bhagavatamanādīmiśa/
māśritya visvasiti vedaracahsu lokah/
by, śābdabodha is the valid knowledge (Prama) coming from Śabda as its source or means (Pramāṇa). In the very first Kārikā in the chapter on Śabda in his Bhāṣāpariccheda, Visvanātha introduces śābdabodha as the 'phala' of the 'padajñāna' which is the Karāṇa. The term Karāṇa here means Pramāṅkarāṇa, as it does so in other works and other systems also.117 Pramāṅkarāṇa means Pramāṇa (i.e., a source of valid knowledge) and the 'phala' of a Karāṇa (i.e., Pramāṅkarāṇa) is the Prama (i.e., valid knowledge).118 As the concept of śābdabodha is related with the concept of a valid knowledge, it will be pertinent to preface a more detailed study of the theory of śābdabodha with an account of the Indian Epistemology or the Indian theory of knowledge in brief outlines.

As is usual with all times and climes, Indian philosophical schools also sprang up out of an urge for enquiry into the real state of things and beings (tattvajñānā). Different schools of Indian philosophy came to be busy not only in deducing conclusions but also in determining the methods of arriving at them. The thinkers were interested

117. cf. pramāyate'nta iti karaṇārthābhidhāno hi
pramāṇasaṁdbdhā

Pramāṅkarāṇamevatra pramāṇaṁ tarkapākṣavat. MM, p. 2;
Pramāyāḥ karaṇaṁ pramāṇaṁ. NSMR, p. 5

118. idam tāvatpramāṇam ----- tatphalam, prama bodha iti.
STK, Under 3K5.
not merely in knowing things but also were heavily occupied with the task of sifting out the means for ascertaining the knowledge of objects. Because of such an approach, the Indian Epistemology comes to involve four basic factors.\(^{119}\)

1. The Pramātā - the knower, the cognizer of valid knowledge.
2. The Prameya - the knowable or the object known, the object of valid knowledge.
3. The Pramāna - the chief instrument or organ of knowing; the source of valid knowledge.
4. The Pramā or Pramiti - the valid knowledge (of the object).\(^{120}\)

But here we must be cautious to note that in the context of the concept of the aforesaid factors, there are marked and delicate differences amongst the different schools. As for instance, some understand the Pramāna as the source of valid knowledge and the others as the valid knowledge itself.

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119. Pramāṇaṁ pramātā prameyam pramitiṁitis caturvargapesaṁiva vyavahāraḥ parisamāpyate. NVTT, 1.1.1.

120. Arthavatī ca pramāṇe ----------- yasyeṣājañhāṣāprayukta-asya pravṛttiḥ sa pramātā, sa yenaṁ praminiṁti tatpramāṇam, yorthaṁ pramīyate tat prameyam, yadarthavijñānaṁ sa pramitiṁ ----------- VB, Vide ND, p. 4.
As a result in the case of the latter, the Prama and the Pramāṇa come to be identified. Hence, our interpretation of the four factors here is from a general point of view especially from the standpoint of the Naiyāyikas. Naiyāyikas have objected to attempting at identification between Pramaṇa and Pramā.\textsuperscript{121}

Notwithstanding the difference maintained by the various schools regarding the number and nature of the knowable entities (Prameyas),\textsuperscript{122} the thinkers belonging to different schools behaved as one in their strong common anxiety for realising only the valid knowledge (Prama). Hence in order to ascertain the validity of their knowledge, the scholars paid serious attention to those so-called Pramaṇas.

Before we discuss the Pramaṇas, we shall have to take a note of the very validity ('pramāṇya') of knowledge. Why

\textsuperscript{121} ye tu bodhasyaiva pramaṇatvamācaksate, na śūksmad-arśanāste bodhaḥ khalu pramaṇasya phalam na sāksat pramaṇam etc. NM, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{122} For example, as for Prameyas the Sāmkhya scholars believed in twenty five entities, the Naiyāyikas believed in sixteen categories, the Vaiśeṣikas only in seven categories, of the Mīmāṁsakas Kumārila accepted five and Prabhākara eight categories and the Vedantins admitted five categories. The difference between Vedāntins and Bhāttā Mīmāṁsakas is that according to Vedānta, Śakti is a Padartha and in view of Bhāttā Mīmāṁsa Abhava is a Padarthā. The Ārāmkas admitted four entities. The Buddhists also shared the same opinion. Thus with reference to the number and identity of Prameyas, we come across divergent views amongst the Philosophers.
the knowledge is to be valid? Why again a Pramāṇa is necessary?

Almost all the principal schools of Indian Philosophy have commenced with a reply to such an anticipated question. As Gautama puts it, the very aim of philosophical speculations is Niḥśreyasa (final Beatitude or Supreme Bliss). The different schools of course understand this Niḥśreyasa in their own ways. As for illustration, the Sāmkhya aims at Kaivalya, the Vedānta at the oneness with the Brahman and the Yoga speaks of an union in the state of Samādhi. But how to realise this Niḥśreyasa? Gautama asserts that the Tattvajñāna (the ascertainment of reality) serves as the means towards this end. Niḥśreyasa, according to Gautama, follows only when one gets rid of Mithyajñāna (false knowledge) which is the root cause of one's getting involved in the worldly process.\(^\text{123}\) Our knowledge of objects is not automatically valid or real. There is, therefore, the scope of 'Mithyajñāna'. As tattvajñāna, i.e., lack of Mithyajñāna is the means for the realisation of Niḥśreyasa,\(^\text{124}\) our knowledge demands a serious scrutiny. Thus the problem of tattvajñāna obviously

\[\text{123. duḥkhajanmapravrttidosamithyājñānānamuttarottarāndaye tadanantarāṃpayādapavargah. NS. 1.1.2.} \]

\[\text{124. pramanaprameya ------------------- tattvajñānāniniḥ- śreyasādhigamah. NS. 1.1.1.} \]
leads to the relevant issues of Pramā, Pramātā, Prameya and Pramāṇa. Insistence is naturally laid on the validity of knowledge by way of wanting it to be free from doubt, uncertainty and contradiction and to be different from remembrance. For the sake of obtaining the valid knowledge of such a description, there followed a serious search for the so called Pramanās (the means of the valid knowledge) in different schools of philosophy in ancient India.

In the context of the importance of the Pramanās, we can take a special note of the Naiyāyikas' approach in the matter. As we can gather an idea from the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Naiyāyikas believe that the Pramanās lead to the cognition of objects and hence result in some physical or mental action or activity of the cogniser (the Pramātā).

125. asandigdhāviparītānadhigatavisayā cittavṛttiḥ,
bodhas’ca pauruṣeyah phalam pramā. STK, Under SK.4, p.27.
sāṃsaya-viparyaya-vikalpa-smrṭirūparcittavṛtti-
bbinnā yā cittavṛttiḥ sa pramā. STK, Under SK.4, p.27.

126. pramanar’tvadpratipattau pravrddtisāmrthādārthavat
pramāṇam. Pramanamantareṇā nārthapratipattih, nārtha-
pratipattimantareṇa pravrddtisāmrthāya. pramāṇena
khalvayām jñātārthamupalabhya tamarthamabhīpaṭti,
jihāśāti va. VB., Preface to NS. 1.1.1.

The relation between a knowledge and resultant effort on the part of the knower is very lucidly analysed by Dr. Radhakrisnan also.

cf. "Prior to fruition, our knowledge cannot be ascertained to be valid. So we cannot have that confidence without which no endeavour is possible. A valid knowledge of the objects is the precondition of successful activity." IP, p. 129.
Vātsyāyana points out the basic relation between the abovedescribed four epistemological factors. Only when the Pramaṇas are 'meaningful', the other three factors, Pramātā, Prameya and Pramiti come to be 'useful'. Hence the insistence on the validity of Pramaṇas stands justified. A controversial issue exists insofar as whether it is activity which preceds knowledge or vice-versa. Again there is the much debated problem of simultaneity of Prama and Pramaṇa.

Opinions differ as to the real nature of Prama and Pramaṇa. As for instance, while the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas agree in respect of the concept of Pramaṇa, they differ in the case of Prama. Again with regard to the Pramaṇas, the Naiyāyikas basically differ from the Buddhists. The various schools of Ancient Indian philosophy are again not unanimous in their choice of the

127. arthavatī ca pramaṇe pramatā, prameyam, pramiti-
rityarthavanti bhavanti, kasmāt? anyatamāparve'rtam-
syānapapatteḥ tatra yasyepsājihāsaprayuktasya pravṛttih-
sa pramatā�—cetārṣṣu caivaśvāśvarthatattvam
posāmāpyati. VB, Vide ND, p. 4.

128. cf. "pramākañenamevātra pramaṇam tarkapakṣavat.
Pramaṇa cajñātatattvārthaajñānam evātra bhidyate.
añatapadēntāra jñātaviśayah smṛtyanuvādayānimīrasāḥ
tatānuvādānāmaprāmāṇyaam ārthikādinaṁ nānumatam. Yayām
tu brūmaḥ —— tārthikāstu pramākaraṇam pramaṇam.
yathāarthanuḥbhaveḥ pramaṇa. Anuḥbhavasvāsmṛtiyatiriktaṁ
ejñānam —— anubhūtīḥ pramaṇām. smṛtiyatiriktaṁ ca
saśvidamubhūtāḥ iti prabhākarāḥ —— avisamvadī
evijñāṇam pramaṇam avisamvāditvām ca arthakriyākāritvam
iti bauddhāḥ." MM, p. 2-7.
Pramāṇas. There is marked difference in opinion again in the context of the validity (prāmāṇya) of knowledge. We propose to make a brief discussion on the said issue of the validity of knowledge.

SVATAHPRĀMĀNYAVĀDA AND PARATAH PRĀMĀNYAVĀDA:

Ancient Indian Philosophers distinctively differ from each other on the question of the validity and invalidity of knowledge. In this regard, two rival theories come to our notice - (i) The theory of self validity of knowledge and (ii) The theory of external validity of knowledge.

According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the validity of knowledge is self-evident. They advocate that truth is self-validating, requiring no extraneous evidence. To the Prābhākaras, the valid knowledge is the direct and immediate apprehension. Recollection or Smṛti, they say, is invalid as it depends on the impression left by some past experience. While the Bhāṭṭas also accept the view of the Prābhākaras that the valid knowledge is an apprehension, they maintain that the invalidity of knowledge is only

inferred from the knowledge of imperfections in its causes and the knowledge of its disagreement with its object. The Advaita vedāntins agree with the Mīmāṁsakas that the validity of knowledge is its inherent character and that the knowledge of invalidity proceeds only from extraneous circumstances. The sāṁkhyaits believe in knowledge as the consciousness of the self and regard both validity and invalidity of knowledge as the inherent characteristics of knowledge. As opposed to such trends of thought, the Nyāya-vāsēśikas assert that there is a correspondence between knowledge and its object. That knowledge is valid which represents the real nature of its object. When there is a disagreement between the two it (i.e., the knowledge) is invalid. Thus, the Nyāya realists reject the theory of self-validity of knowledge. In this context, the Naiyāyikas get full support from the Jainas. To the Jainas also, the validity of knowledge lies in its agreement with the object cognized and the invalidity in its disagreement with the object cognized. According to the Naiyāyikas, both validity and invalidity of knowledge are inferred from fruitful and fruitless results respectively. But, the Bauddhas differ from the Naiyāyikas only in this point that according to the former, only the validity of knowledge is known through fruitful activity, but the invalidity of knowledge is inherent in itself and does not depend on any other circumstances.
Visvanatha as a Naiyayika is strictly opposed to the concept of self-validity or self-invalidity of knowledge. He refers to the divergent views of his predecessors belonging to different schools of thought, rejects them and finally asserts that the theory of self-validity of knowledge is not acceptable as it will leave no scope for any doubt whatsoever. But the occurrence of doubt here is a matter of experience. Hence it is not a desirable position. As a matter of fact, the knowledge is valid when there is agreement or correspondence between knowledge and its object. Similarly the knowledge is invalid where there is not such agreement or correspondence between the two.

130. cf. mīmāṃsakā hi pramātvaṁ svatogrāhyatvamiti vadanti. tatra gurūnaṁ mate jñānasya svaprakāśarupatvāt tajjñānapramāṇyaṁ tenaiya grhyata iti. bhāttānāṁ mate jñānam atīndriyam. jñānanya-jnātata prayakṣā, tayā na jñānamanumulyate, murārimśrāṇāṁ mate——tanmatam duṣyati. M, under K 136.

131. pramātvaṁ na svato grāhyam samśayānapapattitah.

K 136, Part of, BP

yadi jñānasya prāmāṇyaṁ svatogrāhyam syāt, tadā' bhyāsadaśotpanna-jñāne tatsaṁśayvo na syāt tatra hi jñānam jñātām, tadā tanmatre prāmāṇyaṁ jñātameveti katham samśayah? yadi tu jñānam na jñātām, tadā dharmijñānabhāvāt katham samśayah?

M text, under K 136.

132. cf. tasmāj-jñāne prāmāṇyamanumumeyām. tathā hi idām jñānam pramā, saṁvādi-pravṛtti-janakatvāt; yannāvat tanaiyaṁ, yathā-apraṇām idām prthīvitu-prakāraṁ jñānam pramā, gandhavati prthīvitvapraκārakajñānātvāt evam——etc. M, under K 136
To make an idea regarding the Nāyāyikas’ view of Prāmāṇa, we place below the basic classification of knowledge by the Nāyāyikas in a tabular form.

| Buddhi (Knowledge) | | |
|---------------------|-----------------|
| Anubhava (experience) | Smṛti (memory) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yathārtha (true)</th>
<th>Ayathārtha (false)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yathārtha (valid)</td>
<td>Ayathārtha (non-valid)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Prama)</th>
<th>(Aprama)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samsāya (Doubt)</td>
<td>Viparyyaya (Error)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tarka (Hypothetical argumentation)</th>
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</thead>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>Pratyakṣa</th>
<th>Anumiti</th>
<th>Upamiti</th>
<th>Sabda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Perceptive knowledge)</td>
<td>(Inferential knowledge)</td>
<td>(Comparative knowledge)</td>
<td>(Verbal knowledge)</td>
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THE PRAMĀṆAS:

In the matter of recognising different Pramāṇas, the various schools of Indian philosophy may be conveniently referred to as follows:¹³³ The Āravakas or the materialists

¹³³ pratyakṣamekāṁ cārvākāṁ kaṇādaṣuṇgatau punaḥ anumāṇaṇaḥ taccātha sāmkhyāḥ sābdāṇaḥ te api nyāyakādeseśino'pyevampamāṇaṇaḥ kecana arthāpatyā sahātāni catvāryaḥ prabhākaraḥ abhāvaṣṭhānyetāni bhattā vedāntinastathā sambhavitihayuktāni tāni purāṇikā jaguriti Tārkkikarakās of Varadarāja, quoted in MUS vide BPS, p. 260; cārvākāṣṭāvadekam —— yogāt. MM, p. 8;
recognised only perception. The Vaisēṣikas and Bauddhas add Inference to that (Perception). The Sāmkhyāits accept Verbal Testimony also with the earlier two. Some of the Naiyāyikas add comparision to the earlier three, namely Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony. The Prābhākaras admit all these four Pramāṇas along with Arthāpatti, the Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsakas recognise six sources of knowledge as they add Abhāva to the above. The Paurāṇikas add two other Pramāṇas to the earlier list, namely Sambhava and Aitihya. Here we may add that in Yogadarsana three Pramāṇas are admitted namely, Perception, Inference and Scriptural knowledge. But these three sources are supposed as not competent to give an absolutely valid knowledge. In addition to Perception

pratyakṣānumānam ca sābdam copāmitistatathā;
arthāpattirabhāvaśca satpramāṇāni mādriṣām.
MM, p. 7;
katividham punah pramāṇamityatrāha.tatra naḥcowidham mānam,anenaikādisāmkyā śaḍādisāmkyā ca vyāvartītā, vyā
punastāvidhāityatrāha, pratyakṣānumānatathā, sāstram
tathopamānarthāpatti iti guormatam. PP, p. 44;
trividham pramāṇamiti pratyakṣānumānasabdā iti.
SPB, under 8822, Vid. 33

p. 39;
tāni ca pramāṇāni gāt pratyakṣānumānopamānasabdān
thāpattyanupalabdhibhedāt. VBP, p. 11;
pratyakṣānumānopamānasabdāḥ pramāṇāni.
NS. 1.1.3.

134. Y.S. 1.7.
and Inference, the Vaiśeṣikas appear to admit as Pramāṇa: corresponding to Remembrance (Smṛti) and Intuitive knowledge (Ārṣajñāna) which are also recognised by them as kinds of valid knowledge.¹³⁵

In various treatises, these problems of Pramāṇa, Prameya and Pramāṇa have been very extensively dealt with. Jayantabhaṭṭa has alluded to all these rival views on a preamble to his own opinion.¹³⁶

In the school of Nyāya, four Pramāṇas have been admitted. They are namely, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda.¹³⁷

¹³⁵. cf. IP, p. 181.
¹³⁶. cf. taccaturvidham pramanam tadāha sūtrakārañ, pratyakṣanumanopamānasabdāḥ pramāṇāni ------- nyūnādhikasaṁkhya-pratisādhena hi catvāri pramāṇāni pratiṣthāpyeran, sa ca durupapādah, tathāhi pratyakṣa-samevaikam pramāṇamiti carvakāḥ, pratyakṣanamanumānamāptavacanam ceti pramāṇanīti saṁkhyāḥ, ādhyātamapi pramāṇānām mīmāṁsakaprabhartayaḥ pratipannavantaḥ ------- ādhyātāmānīṁ prāvikṣatecaturārthapattaya saha pratyakṣādīni paṁca pramāṇanīti prabhākarāḥ, abhāvena saha śaḍiti bhāttāḥ sanbhavaitiḥ-sābhhyāmaśātvitī kecit ------- atah pramāṇesu jagāda yuktāṁ catuṣṭvametamantvatarṣapādaḥ.

NM, pp. 24-59.

¹³⁷. pratyakṣanumānopamānasabdāḥ pramāṇāni.

NS, 1.1.3.
Vātsyāyana points out the necessity of admitting more than one Pramāṇa. In the matter of acquiring knowledge, only Perception would not help. It gives us the knowledge of an object only when somebody is near it to have the object within the reach of his sense organs. While one can have the visual perception of fire only when one is near it, the same knowledge can be gathered even from a short distance through an Inference by seeing the smoke. The very knowledge of the presence of fire at the same place can be gathered also by means of a Verbal Testimony, i.e., on the strength of the assertion of a trustworthy person in the form of (There is fire). Moreover in the context of proving the validity of Vedic sentences regarding unperceptible objects like heaven, Śābda, the Verbal Testimony comes to be the only aid. Yet the Naiyāyikas as realists contend that Pratyakṣa should be deemed the best of the four as only through Pratyakṣa the desire of one to know something can be finally set at rest.

138. 

agnirāptopadesātpratīyate-'atrā'gniḥ iti pratvā-sidata dhūmadarsānenānumiyate, pratyāsannena ca pratyakṣata upalabhya-te. 
vyavasthāpunaḥ-agnihotram jhuyāt svargakāmāḥ iti. laukikasya svarge na lingadarśanam, na pratyakṣam. stanayitnuśābe śrūyāmāṇe śabdahetoranumānam, tatra na pratyakṣam, nāgamaḥ pāṇau pratyakṣata upalabhya-āme nānumānam, nāgama iti. 

VB, under NS 1.1.3, vide ND, p. 17.
be finally set at rest. Interestingly a basic difference is sought to be maintained between Pratyakṣa on one hand and other three Pramāṇas on the other hand. In Anumāṇa, Upamāna and Sābda, the knowledge respectively of premise, similarity and word serves as the data or source or what is technically called Karana for corresponding Pramāṇas. But in the matter of Pratyakṣa, no knowledge whatsoever comes to serve as the instrumental cause. As defined by Gaṅgeśa, Pratyakṣa is a direct apprehension. Here the contact of senses with objects serves as the data. Hence the Naiyāyikas as the realists show an obvious preference for Pratyakṣa. The Naiyāyikas differ from both the sections of

139. cf. sā ceyām pramitih pratyaksaparā -------
    jijnāsitam arthamāptopadesāt pratipadyāno līṅgadarsānenāpi bhubhūtsate, līṅgadarsanānumitaṁ ca pratyakṣato didrakṣate, pratyakṣata upalabdhe'ṁ jijnāsa nivartate.
    WB under NS 1.1.3 Vide ND, p. 17.

140. jñānakaranaṁ jñānam pratyakṣam anumitaṁ vyāptijñānasya, upamitaṁ sādrśyajñānasya, sābdabodhe padajñānasya, smṛtavanubhavasya ca karaṇatvāt tatra tatra nātivyāptih.
    M, vide BPS, p. 263.

141. pratyakṣasya sākṣātkāritvāṁ lakṣaṇam.
    TC(2), p. 552.

142. indriyārthasannikarṣotpannāṁ jñānam.
    NS. 1.1.4.
the Mimamsakas as they do not admit Arthapatti or Presumption as a source of knowledge. The Naiyayikas differ from
the Bhatta Mimamsakas further on the ground of not recognising Abhava as a Pramana. Unlike the Pauranikas, the
Naiyayikas do not accept Aitihya and sambhava as separate Pramanas. According to them Arthapatti, Abhava, Aitihya and
Sambhava are not separate Pramanas as they can easily be
included within the scope of the four Pramanas accepted in
the Nyaya school. 143

143. na catustvam, aitihyarthapattisambhavabhavapramanyat.
   NS 2.2.1;
satyam etani pramanani, na tu pramanantarani.
pramanantaram ca manyamahena pratisedhah uccyate.
so'yam.
   VB, under above;
sabda aitihyanarthantarabhavadanumane'arthapatti-
sambhavabhavanarthantarabhavaccopratisedhah. NS 2.2.4.
   etc. etc. vide ND, pp. 136-142.
astam tavidadam sutre ---- catusamkhya pramanesu
   nanu na kanyate paraih ------- abhavapurvakarth-
patteranumantarabhava ------- abhavasya pramanantar-
aratvanirakarañam ------ sambhavaaitihyayormanantaratsu-
vanirasah etc.    NM, p. 26-59.
THE ORDER IN THE LIST OF PRAMĀNAS:

Now it is desirable on our part to examine if there is any significance in the order of counting or naming the Pramānas. We are to find out if there be any criterion followed in this regard.

In all schools, Pratyakṣa or Perception is placed first. It is obvious and logical as Perception forms the basis of all other Pramānas. In the view of Naiyāyikas, Perception is the chief of the sources of knowledge (pramitih pratyakṣaparaṇa). But the question arises as to why Sabda is not placed just after Pratyakṣa and before Anumāna. It may be argued that the scope of Sabda is as large or wide as that of Pratyakṣa and that Anumāna is of lesser scope in comparison to Sabda. But it is a common fact that Sabda is placed not after Pratyakṣa but only after Anumāna. It has been replied in this context that the Sabda pramāna necessitates the prior involvement not only of Pratyakṣa but also of Anumāna. In the context of Sabdabodha, in the first stage words are heard. Here is the admission of auditory Perception (Śrāuta pratyakṣa). Then comes the problem of knowing the meanings of words. One can know the meaning of a word only after knowing the significative power (Sakti) of the word concerned. Now in the process of learning the significative power of words by observing Vṛddhavyaḥāra (behaviour of the elderly people), a process of Anumāna is obviously involved. We shall discuss the involvement of Anumāna in the
context of Vṛddhavyavahāra in connection with our exposition of the relevant Muktāvalī text. Here we are to note that while some authorities like Viśvanātha describe Vṛddhavyavahāra as only one of the Śaktigrāhakas (factors which serve as aids in one’s knowing the significative power of a word). Others like Nāgāsa admit Vṛddhavyavahāra as the chief or the first of all Śaktigrāhakas. The scholars belonging to the second group believe that in case of new words, the first Śaktigrāha is possible only through Vṛddhavyavahāra. Pending our elaborate discussions on Vṛddhavyavahāra, we reiterate the agreed opinion of scholars including Viśvanātha that because of the Śaktigrāha, through Vṛddhavyavahāra, involving an Anumāna, Sādva is justifiably placed after Anumāna. In the list of Pramāṇas maintained by the two schools of Mīmāṃsakas, Sādva is placed third. In view

144. prayojavṛddhasaṃvadaśravanasamanantarāṃ prayojya-
vṛddhapraavṛttihetujñānaṃanumānapūrvavaktvācchabdārtha-
sambandhagrahaṇasya ------ anumānapūrvvaktvamityanu-
māntaram śabdāṃ laksayati.

STK, under SK 5, p. 152.

145. pratyakṣamanumāṇam ca śabdāṃ copamitistathā
arthāpattirabhāvaśca saṭṭpramāṇāni mādṛṣām.

MM, p. 7.

tatra pañcavidham mānām ------ pratyakṣamanumā-
tathā. śāstraṃ tathopamānārthāpattiriti guormatam.

PP, p. 44.
of the aforesaid arguments, this can be appreciated. But how is it that the Vedántins and the Naiyážikas have come to place Śabda fourth and Upamāna third in the list of Pramāṇas maintained by them.\textsuperscript{146} The Vedántins have clarified their position with the aid of the maxim 'A needle and a frying pan'.\textsuperscript{147} The maxim may be amplified as follows: In response to two orders placed by a customer at the same time for a frying pan and a needle, a blacksmith shows his practical wisdom by supplying the needle first. There can be no denying of the fact that a frying pan has more importance to a household in comparision to a needle. But the needle is supplied first as it can be manufactured more easily and hence earlier. Similarly not withstanding the relatively greater importance of Śabda, the Vedántins name and explain Upamāna first as its concept comes to be easier for clarification. It cannot be argued that on the same ground Upamāna could be dispensed with even before Pratyakṣā.\textsuperscript{148}

\begin{enumerate}
\item[146.] tāṇi ca pramāṇāni ṣaṭ pratyakṣānumāṇopamāṇaśaḥ-
dārthāpattyamupaladbhibhedaḥ. \textsuperscript{VPB, p. 11;}
\item[147.] sūcīkaṭāhanyāyena śabdanirūpaṇātpragupamāṇanirūp-
aṇamiti dhīreyam. \textsuperscript{SM}
\under - 'athopamāṇaṁ nirūpyate ------ upamānam'. \textsuperscript{VPB(2), p. 197.}
\item[148.] namū sūcīkaṭāhanyāyādare upamānasya pratyakṣādapi
prāthamyaṁ syādīti cet, na, pratyakṣānumāṇāntarbhāvā-
nantarbhāvayor upamāne vicāraṇīyayoh pratyakṣādini
irūpaṇasāpekṣatvena tayoreva prathamanirūpaṇīyatvāt.
\textsuperscript{loc. cit.}
\end{enumerate}
Unlike Śābda, Upamāna is sought by a large number of schools to be included in Pratyakṣa and Anumāna. To arrest such wrong notions, the concepts of Pratyakṣa and Anumāna are required to be brought to focus earlier. That Naiyāyikas and others place Śābda only after Upamāna has been noticed by the Mīmāṁsakas. But yet they justify their own stand of placing Śābda immediately after Pratyakṣa and Anumāna by maintaining that Śābda is admitted by a larger number of theorists in comparison to Upamāna.¹⁴⁹ Now Naiyāyikas also might have utilized the Śucikāṭāhanyāya in placing Śābda after Upamāna although we do not find them being vocal about it. But there is a practical difficulty for the Naiyāyikas to behave like Vedāntins in this matter since their concept of Upamāna is basically different from that of the Vedāntins. According to the Vedāntins, both Upamāna and Śābda should be preceded by Pratyakṣa and Anumāna and there is no mutual dependence between Śābda and Upamāna. What concerns them is the importance of Śābda because of its wider scope in comparison to Upamāna. Yet they can dispense with Upamāna earlier as a matter of practical wisdom in the manner of a blacksmith giving delivery of the needle prior to a frying pan. But in view of the Naiyāyikas, every case

¹⁴⁹. anumāṇaṁ tathā pūrastādūpamāṇaṁ varṇayanti tarkāvidāh vādiparigrahabhūmā vayam tu śabdāṁ puraskurṁah.

MM, p. 91
of Upamāna necessitates the prior involvement of Sabda. So
is it not necessary to elucidate the concept of Sabda earlier
to that of Upamāna? Hence let us add a few more lines on the
issue. The Vedāntins' idea of the Upamānapramāṇa runs thus:
One who has seen an individual cow in one's own homeyard
comes to have the visual perception of an individual 'gavaya'.
He understands that this individual creature is like a cow.
Thereafter he comes to conclude that his cow is like this
creature. Here the knowledge of similarity with 'go' in
'gavaya' serves as the data or karaṇa to give the knower
the final knowledge of similarity of his 'go' with the
'gavaya' he has just seen. The final knowledge, i.e., the
conclusion is the sādṛṣṭapramāṇa i.e. Upamiti and the earlier
knowledge of similarity of 'gavaya' with a 'go' i.e. the
karaṇa is the Upamāna. The final knowledge here can not be
called perceptive as the 'go' is not being perceived by the
owner now. It cannot be inferential also because of the
involvement of the knowledge of similarity therein.

150. athopamanam nirūpyate tatra sādṛṣṭapramāṇakaraṇa-

mupamānaṁ tathāhi prāṅganeṇu dṛṣṭagopīṇḍasya puruṣasya
vanagatasya gavayendriyasannikarṣe sati bhavati pratī-
tirayam piṇḍo gosādṛṣṭā iti tadanantaraṁ ca bhavati
nisāçayah anena sadṛṣī madiyā gauriti. tatrāvayavyati-
rekābhyaṁ gavayaniṣṭha gosādṛṣṭyajñānam karaṇāṁ coniś-
thagavayasādṛṣṭyajñānam phalam, nacedãṁ pratyakṣeṇa
sambhavati gopīṇḍasya tadendriyasamikṣrataṁ
nāpyanumāṇena.
Of course, both Perception and Inference serve as the basis of the conclusion. Thus the Sādṛṣyapramā or Upamiti of Vedāntins is purely a personal affair without allowing any scope for participation of another person. As the knower does not need to hear from someone earlier, regarding the 'gavaya' being similar to a 'go' the question of prior involvement of Sābda does not arise. Hence, the Vedāntins are not required to clear the concept of Sābda before that of Upamāna. It may be mentioned that the Mīmāṃsakas' concept of Upamāna also does not give scope for the involvement of Sābda in it. But the position of the Naiyāyikas is to be viewed with caution. Despite some difference in approach between the earlier and the later Naiyāyikas, the concept of Upamāna of the Naiyāyikas requires that the knower is to hear earlier from someone else (a forester who has the

151. atra vṛddhanalīyikastāvadevamupamāṇasvarūpamāṅgaḥ, samjñāsamjñiśamvandha pratītiphalām prasiddhetaravokṣśārūpyapratipādakamatidesavākyamevopamāṇam, gavayāyāḥ hi nāgarakō'navagatagavayasyavarūpastadabhiśnāmārṇgavarsam pṛcchati ------ tamāḥa yādṛṣo gaustādṛṣo gavaya iti, tadetadvākyam ------ gavayasyaṃjñābhidheyatvām jñāna- yatitupamāṇamucyate ------ adyatanāstu vyācakṣate śrutātesavākyasya pramāturprasiddhe pīnde ------ samjñāsamjñi-samaṃbandha-pratipattiphalamupamāṇam, śrutātidesavākyo hi nāgarakāḥ kāhane paribhraman ------- vanecarapuruṣasakathita yathā gaustathā gavaya iti vamanamānumarati smṛtvā ca pratipādayati ayam gavayasabha-vācyā iti etc.

perceptive knowledge of 'gavaya') that the 'gavaya' is like a 'go'. This earlier statement (say of the forester in case of comparative knowledge regarding 'go' and 'gavaya') is technically known as Atideśavākya. This Atidesavākya admitted by the Naiyāyikas must be regarded as an Āptavākya to safeguard the validity of Upamiti itself inasmuch as in the Nyāya view it forms the basis for the functioning of Upamāna. A outsider goes to a forest, sees a 'gavaya', observes its similarity with a 'go', remembers the earlier statement of the forester and concludes that this creature 'gavaya' is what the 'gavaya' stands for. Hence the prior involvement of Sābda in the concept of Upamāna of the Naiyāyikas in the form of Atidesavākya cannot be ruled out. It is therefore, essential for a Naiyāyika to elucidate the concept of Sābda before he comes to ascertain the nature of Upamāna.

As the four Kārikās of Viśvanātha on Sābda in his Bhāṣāpariccheda come after his two Kārikās on Upamāna, we have to add a few more lines on the issue in the context of our present work. As Viśvanātha himself puts it, 152 the result of an Upamāna is the ascertaining of the significative power (sakti) of words like 'gavaya'. In the process of production of the Sābdabodha (verbal comprehension), according

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152. gramāṇasya prathamaḥ pasyato gavayādikam. 
 sādṛṣyadhīrgavādīnaṁ yā syāt sat karaṇām maṅgaḥ. 79. 
 vākyārthasyātidesasya sārtirvāpāra ucyate. 
gavayādi-padāntantā saktidṛupamāpahalam. 80. 

K, BP.
to Visvanātha, the knowledge of Padas (padajñāna) serves as the Karana (instrumental cause) being possessed of the functional intermediary (Vyāpara) in the form of the knowledge of the meanings of Padas (Padārthajñāna). But the knowledge (i.e., ascertaining) of the very significative power of words, i.e., Saktidhiḥ is the way or course by which the Karana in Sābdabodha comes to give rise to the Vyāpāra. Thus Upamiti (i.e., the result produced by an Upamāṇa Pramāṇa) comes to serve as an aid in case of Sābdabodha. Judged from this point of view, the precedence of the discussion on Upamāṇa to that on Sabda comes to be justified. But here we face the following problem. Upamāṇa as Saktigrāhaka comes to help us not in all but a few cases of Sābdabodha. It is why like others Visvanātha also has referred to Upamāṇa as only one of the Saktigrāhakas (i.e., the factors responsible for ascertaining the denotative power of words). We shall have to discuss in appropriate time the service that can be rendered by Upamāṇa as one of the Saktigrāhakas. But here we again come back to the point of prior involvement of Sādaprāmāṇa in the concept of Upamāṇa. Visvanātha also does not differ from other Naiyāyikas in this regard.

As we learn from Visvanātha’s own exposition in the Muktāvalī of his Karikās on Upamāṇa, the process of an Upamāṇa, may be briefly stated as follows: A villager who has never seen a ‘gavaya’ learns from a forester that a
'gavaya' is like a 'go'(cow). When the villager sees a 'gavaya', he first observes the similarity of the creature with a cow. This knowledge of similarity comes to serve as the instrumental cause for an Upamāna (UpamānaKaraṇam). Then the villager remembers the statement of the forester that a 'gavaya' is like a cow. This remembrance of the statement of the forester serves as the operative cause (Vyāpāra) for an Upamāna. Then the villager comes to have the final knowledge that the creature 'gavaya' is what is denoted by the word 'gavaya'. This is the 'Upamiti' which is undoubtedly the knowledge of the significative power of the word 'gavaya'.

The statement of the forester, the remembrance of which is regarded as the Vyāpāra of an Upamāna in a particular context, is the Atidesāvākya. An Atidesāvākya is nothing but an instructive statement (somewhat like Upadesa). The etymology of the word (i.e., atidisyate iti) also confirms it. Nevertheless, as we have already pointed out earlier, it is not different from an Āptavākya as the statement comes

153. yatṛāraṇyakena kenacid grāmāṇyoktaṁ gosadrśo
gavayapadavācyā iti. paścad grāmāṇena kvacidaraṇyādak:
gavayo drṣṭastatra gosadrśyadarśanaṁ yad jātam, tadv-
pamitikaraṇaṁ tadanantarāṁ gosadrśo gavayapadavācyam
ityatidesāvākyārthasmaranāṁ yad jāyate tadeva vyāpary-
raḥ tadanantarāṁ gavayo.gavayapadavācyā iti jñānāṁ yad
jāyate tadupamitiḥ.
M, Vide BPS, pp. 403-9.
from one who speaks with knowledge. Apta is defined as one who speaks with knowledge, i.e., points out what is what. If the Atidesavākya is nothing other than an Āptavākya, it is then no other than a Sābdapramāṇa itself. Here in the illustration of Upamāna by Visvānātha, the forester is to be regarded as an Āpta (trustworthy) as his version tallys undoubtedly with facts. Hence the Atidesavākya, i.e., the Vākya of forester here is to be recognised as Sābdapramāṇa for its being an Āptavākya. We have already discussed the Naiyāyikas approach to Sābdapramāṇa as an Āptopadesa or an Āptavākya. Thus Sābda comes to be involved as a precondition in the process of an Upamāna. But we find that Upamāna comes to serve as an aid of Sābda only in certain specific cases and not in all cases. Simply speaking, Upamāna is not the only Saktigrāhaka but is one of the Saktigrāhakas. All cases of Sābdabodha are not the result of Upamānas. But every case of Upamāna implies prior involvement of Sābda as there can be no Upamāna without an Atidesavākya. Thus there can be no Upamāna without a prior Sābda though there can be Sābda leading to a Sābdabodha without a prior Upamāna.

In the view of above observation, we can not argue that the service of Upamāna as an aid of Sābda in the production of Sābdabodha should be the treated as the ground for the order of presentation of Pramāṇa followed by Visvānātha and other Naiyāyikas. Hence at least upto this stage, we form an impression that the treatment of Sābda in case of Naiyāyikas
should have preceded that of the Upamānapramāṇa. But we can also argue otherwise. Granting that a Naiyāyika comes to discuss Sabda Prior to Upamāna because of the argument that the concept of Upamāna necessitates a prior clarification of the concept of Sabda, he would still come to be in an awkward position at the time of discussing the Saktigrāhakas which include Upamāna also. Should he break-away to discuss the concept of Upamāna while he is in the mid stream of discussion of the process of Sabdabodha? It will in no way be justified on his part again to refer to Upamāna as a Saktigrāhaka without having a prior analysis of the technical and hence not immediately understandable term Upamāna. Thus, the dependence of Sabda on Upamāna, however partial, stands admitted. Again between the two terms, Atiśeśavākva and Upamāna, the latter comes to be less immediately understandable. Because of such a position, they had to dispense with Upamāna earlier. Of if we simply realise the fact of both the Pramāṇas being inter-dependant, one fully and other partially, in that case, we can utilize the sūcīkaṭāhanyāva as the Vedāntins did.

SĀBDAPRAMĀṆA : A SPECIAL NOTE

As we have already mentioned, Sabda has been recognised as a separate Pramāṇa by almost all the important schools of Indian Philosophy except Jaina, Bauddha, Cārvāka and Vaiśeṣika. The Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins give the status of this Pramāṇa
primarily to the Vedas. Hence, in these schools, Śānta-pramāṇa is known as Sastra, Śruti and Āgama also. The Sāmkhyas also understand the Verbal-testimony in the sense of scripture. Yet with some of the Sāmkhyas, we directly find Śabdapramāṇa being named as Āptavacana. But in the Nyāya school throughout, this Pramāṇa is named as Śābda only. Mīmāṁsakas differ amongst themselves in the matter of determining as to what is to be the Śabdabodhakaraṇa. Whether it should be Pada, Padārtha, Vākya, Vākyārtha or the knowledge of any one of these? We shall have to discuss various views on Śabdabodhakaraṇa elsewhere in the context of the examination of Viśvanātha's concept of Karaṇa. Here we may simply note that Śābda as Pramāṇa is understood in the sense of a Vākya almost by all the Naiyāyikas. A sentence (Vākya) (or course, uttered by a trustworthy person) comes to be later on directly given the name 'Śābda' and the status of a Pramāṇa. This position is agreed to by some Vedāntins also.

154. The Mīmāṁsakas are primarily concerned with the teaching of Dharma and as such with the text of the Vedas as a Pramāṇa. This, however, does not amount to the complete denial of the status of Śabdapramāṇa to the non-vedic utterances also.

155. cf. pratyakṣamanumā tathā, śāstram ---- PP, n. 47: athāgamo nirūpyate. VPB, p. 80

156. drśṭamanumānamāptavacanaṁ ca. SK, 4.

157. cf āptavākyām śabdah. TS, and athāgamo nirūpyate yasya vākyasya tātparyaviśayībhūtamaṁ samāsargo mānāntareṇa na bādhyate tadvākyāṁ pramāṇam. VPB, p. 80.
We are to note that the Ārgajña admitted by the Jainas as a Pramāṇa is not to be mistaken as Sabda.

Sabda as a Pramāṇa means the source of the knowledge that we get about things, (which are not otherwise directly perceived at the same moment) from relevant sentences by understanding the meanings of the words which they are composed of. We have two types of sentences, 'Vaidika' or Vedic and 'Laukika' or non-Vedic. Only certain schools recognise all sentences as capable of being Sabdapramāṇa under permissible conditions. As for instance, while the Bhāṭṭas accept both Vedic and non-Vedic Verbal cognitions as based on Sabdapramāṇa, the Prabhakaras understand the non-Vedic Verbal Cognitions only as acts of inference. In other words, with the Bhāṭṭas all the Vākyas, Vedic or non-Vedic can get the status of Sabdapramāṇa while according to the Prabhakaras the Verbal knowledge obtained

153. "sābdam sābdavijnānādasaṁniścrtērthe vijnānam."—iti bhāyaśaḥ—sābdajñānajanayasaṁmiścrtārtha-vijñāyakāṁ yathārtha-jñānam sābdapramāṇa, tatkarāṇibhūtācāśabdhā pramāṇamityarthah —— eva vākyaśravaṇāntarāṁ padopasthitapadārthānāṁ sāmsargavijñāyini pramitīḥ pratyakṣāḥ-divilakṣaṇāḥājaye, tatkarāṇām sabdastajñānam vā pramāṇāntarām. TP, BHC, p. 47

159. tacca sābdam dvividhām pauruṣeyamapauruṣeyam ca. tatrāpāvacaḥ pauruṣeyam vedavaco'pauruṣeyam. MM, p. 103.

160. gurustvāha. vaidikameva sābdamastī. puruṣavacanāni tū vakrābhīpṛyaṇānāmāpakāntya vā navāntya vākyaśṛtyenām bodhayati —— anumeya eva navacassu vākyaśṛtyeḥ. ibid, pp. 103-4.
from the human words, i.e., Laukika Vākyas, is actually derived from an act of Inference (Anumāna). The Naiyāyikas maintain a difference with the Prabhākaras in so far as they define the Sābdapramāṇa as the Āptopadesa, i.e., Antavākya meaning both Vedic and non-Vedic utterances. We shall discuss this viewpoint of Prabhākaras in course of our examining Vṛddhavyavahāra as a 'saktigrahkanāya', which obviously involves the inferential process in it. But a point of agreement between the two schools of Mīmāṃsā comes to our notice. Both the set of thinkers regard the relationship between the word and its meaning as natural and never conventional. We shall discuss in an appropriate stage that as opposed to the Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas regarded this relationship as strictly acquired or conventional. In the case of proper names, however, the Prabhākaras admit convention as the basis of the relationship between the word and its meaning.

SĀBDA-PRAMĀṆĀ OPPOSED:

The Mīmāṃsakas who are great votaries of Sābda-pramāṇa themselves raised doubts regarding the acceptability of

161. āptopadesāḥ śabda. sa dvividho, drṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvāt.

NS 1.1.7-1.1.8 and VB under above.
Sābda as a Pramāṇa. 162 This they did only in order to establish their arguments in favour of the Sābda-Pramāṇa. They anxiously tried to meet the possible objections against the eternal character of words in general and the Veda in particular. But in subsequent times all the orthodox Philosophers had to join hands against the Buddhists in the matter of non-acceptability of Sābda in the sense of Veda. They had to argue also against the Buddhists' concept that even an ordinary word cannot signify anything positive.

The non-recognition of Sābda as Pramāṇa by the Materialists (cārvākas), the Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas is also a known fact. Of the schools accepting Sābdapramāṇa, the Nyāya is very much alive to this opposition. Gautama, himself raises the doubts of the opponents against the Sābda-Pramāṇa and elaborately argues in this context.

Gautama makes the examination separately of (i) Sābda-Sāmānyya and (ii) Sābda-Viśeṣa. By the Sābda-Sāmānyya, Gautama

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162. "pratyakṣaṃdīnanyāni bhavantu nāma pramāṇāni sābdastu na pramāṇam, kutaḥ ? animittam vidyamānopalambhanatvāt." (MS 6/11) animittamapramāṇam sābdah
SB cf UR, pp. 95-6.

163. We have already stated that of the Mīmāṃsakas again the Prābhākaras do not admit the non-Vedic sentences under the Sābda-Pramāṇa;

  cf. nanvāṣāstramapi sābdamasti laukikam, tatkālā na lakṣitam ucyate na śāstravyatiriktām sābdamasti. sabdāddhi yadvijñānānamasannikṛṣte tacchāstraṃ svāt- tadevaṃ laukikādvacaso lingabhūtadvaktṛjñānamanumāmyate.
PP, pp. 94-95.
means the word in general and by the Šabda-Visēṣa, he means the Veda, i.e., the Vedic sentences.

(i) Some scholars, particularly the Vaiśešikas, want to cover 'šābda' by the Anumāna (Pramāna). It is argued that the Verbal testimony is nothing but an Inference in so far as the meanings of words can be known only through an inferential process. Just as in a pure Inference, from an already known premise ('mitena liṅgena') some other object (i.e., the Liṅgī) comes to be subsequently known, in the so-called 'šābda' also, from the already known word, the meaning comes to be known afterwords. In both Šabda and Anumāna, the same is the process of experience. The two do not differ in

164. śabdasyāpyanumānaviṣayratvena avinābhāvopajāvakratvena vā anumānatvena. SP, p. 115.

There is no scope to mistake 'Ārsajñāna' (one of the Pramanās accepted by the Vaiśešikas) for the Šabda-Pramāna under discussion. The Vaiśešikas clearly described their 'Ārsajñāna' as the exclusive knowledge of the words: 'owing to their peculiar calibre'

āmnāyavidhātṛpramāṣṭātanāmatītanāgatavartamānaeśva- tīṃdriyeśvartheśu dharmādiṣu granthopanibaddheṣvanunani-baddheṣu cātmamanasoḥ sañyogād dharmaviśeṣācàca yat prātiṣṭhāyat yathārthanivedanām jñānamutpadyate tadārṣṭāt-yācakṣate. PPB, pp. 621-2.

165. śabdo'numānamardhāṣyaśānupalabdheranumeyatvāt?

NS 2.1.50;
śabdo'numānam, na pramāṇantaram —— yathā'nu-pala- bhyamano liṅḡmitena liṅgena paścānaṁiyate iti anumānam, evām mitena sabdena paścānaṁiyate'rtho'nu-palabhyamāna ityanumānam sabdah. VB, under NS above.
the process of giving us to know something new.\textsuperscript{166}

Further more, just as the relation between a \textit{Lingga} (Premise) and a corresponding \textit{Lingśi} (Conclusion) is the basis of an \textit{Anumāṇa}, the relation between a word and its meaning is also the basis of a \textit{Verbal testimony}.\textsuperscript{167} Only because of the existence of such a relation between the two, a meaning comes to be known from an already known word. Thus it is argued that the so-called \textit{Sabda-Pramāṇa} does not differ from an \textit{Anumāṇa}. Gautama replies that the \textit{Verbal testimony} can by no means be included in or equated with an inferential process. It is mainly because the apprehension of meanings from words takes place only on the strength of \textit{Āptopadesa}.\textsuperscript{168} In his enunciation of the relevant Śūtra, \textit{Vātsyāyana} points out that the apprehension of even unperceptible object takes place from words like heaven, nympha

\textsuperscript{166} upala\textit{bdheradvipra\textit{vttitvāt}} ? \textit{NS} 2.1.51.
pramaṇāntarabhae dvipravṛtti\textit{rupalabdhā} -----------
sabdānumāṇayostū\textit{palabdhīradvipravṛttiḥ} -----------
viśeṣābhavā\textit{danumāṇām} sā\textit{bdī} itī ?
\textit{VB}, under \textit{NS} above.

\textsuperscript{167} sa\textit{bdhāc}ca ? \textit{NS} 2.1.52;
sabdō\textit{numānamiti varttate}. sambaddhayo\textit{sca sābdārthayoh}
sambaddhprasiddhau sābdopa\textit{labdhērarthagrahaṅam}, yathā
sambaddhaylorliṅgaliṅgingōh sambandha pra\textit{ti} tvau liṅgopa\textit{labdhau liṅgigrahaṅamiti} ?
\textit{VB}, under above.

\textsuperscript{168} ā\textit{ptopadesāsāmarthya\textit{cchabdadarthasampratyayaḥ}.
\textit{NS} 2.1.53.
etc. only because of the acceptability of the Ṛptopadesa.¹⁶٩ This very factor that Ṣabda to get the status of a Pramāṇa is to be an Ṛptopadesa differentiates it from an Anumāṇa.¹⁶١ Though the verbal knowledge presupposes the knowledge of a relation between words and their meanings, yet this fact does not present any affinity between Ṣabda and Anumāṇa. The 'sambandha' between a Ṣabda and its Artha cannot be cognized by Pratyakṣa as its knowledge is purely suprasensuous. This 'sambandha' is a peculiar one and that cannot be covered by Samavāya or Sāmyoga.¹⁷¹ Or as Gautama and his Bhāṣyakāra put it, the apprehension of meanings from words, is not due to any so-called relation but because of the corresponding conventions.¹⁷² This convention is of the form that from

169. svargāḥ, apsarāsāḥ, uttāra kuravāḥ, saptadvipa-mudro lokasanniveśa ityevamāderapratyakṣasyārthasya na ṣabdāmātratpratyayayaḥ, kim tarhi, 'āptairayamuktah Ṣabdah' ityataḥ sampratyayayaḥ, viprayaye sampratyayābhāvyo na tvevamanumānamiti. VB, under NS above.

170. yatpunarupalabdheradvipraṃpratītivāditī? ayameva sābdānumānayorupalabdheḥ pravṛttibhedah-tatra viśeṣe satyaheturviśeṣābhāvāditi. Ibid.

171. yatpunaridam sambandhācceti? asti —— pratyakṣasat-astāvacchabdārthapra ṡāpternopalabdhiḥ atindriyatvāt ete. Ibid.

172. na; sāmayikatvācchabdārthasampratyayasya
   NS 2.1.36
   na sambandhakāritam śabdārthavyavasthānam, kim tarhi? samayakāritam yattadavocāma ——— VB, under NS above.
such and such a word, such and such a meaning is to be understood."\(^{173}\) In the context of the exposition of Visvanatha's Muktavali we shall again have to elaborately discuss this peculiar concept of the Naiyayikas regarding the relation in the shape of a convention or the conventional relation between a word and its meaning.\(^ {174}\) Simply we add here that the Naiyayikas' idea of conventional relation between a Sabda and its Artha comes in sharp contrast with the Mimamsakas' notion of inherent (Antapattika or Svabhavika) relation between the two. Later Naiyayikas including Jayantabhatta have very elaborately discussed the issue and have strongly advocated the acceptability of Sabda as a separate Pramana.\(^ {175}\) Visvanatha makes a direct reference to the Vaisesikas' attempt to explain away Sabda and Upamana as mere Anumana and strongly refuses the arguments forwarded by the opponents.

\(^{173}\) kah punarayam samayah? 'asya sabdasayedamarthajata-abhidheyam' iti abhidhanabhidheyaniyamaniyogah tasmir-nupayukte sabdadarthasanpratyayo bhavati. ibid.

\(^{174}\) samaayika sabdadarthasanpratyayah, na svabhavikah.

\(^{175}\) sabdasya khalu pasyamo nanumangadbhinnatam ------ samaanyavigayatva ca sambandhapeksanad dvayah --tatrabhidyate

atah sambandhadhigamamulapravrttina, numanena tasya katham samaasambhavana, padasya tu sambandhadhigama-sapeksate satyapi samegrihedad visayabhedaccanuman-aadbhinnatvam etc.

NM, pp. 139-40.
on that account. The Vaiśeṣikas see the operation of a pure inferential process in both Verbal Comprehension (Śābdabodha) and comparative knowledge (Upamiti). Viśvanātha fully opposes such a notion as even without the involvement of the knowledge of Vyāpti Śābdabodha and Upamiti are found to take place. Viśvanātha elucidates the point in the Muktāvalī. Now the Vyāpti (the law of invariable concommittance) which forms the basis of the Anumāṇa Pramāṇa is virtually a natural or inherent relation which actually

176. śabdopamānayornaiva prthakprāmānyamisyate
anumānagatārthatvāditi vaiśeṣikām matam.

K 140-41,

vaïśeṣikānāṁ mate pratyakśamanumānaṁca pramāṇam,
sabdopamānayostvanumānaṁavidhayaṁ prāmāṇyam, tathā
hi - daṇḍena gāmānayetuḥdilaukikakapāṇi --- ityanumāṇe
pakṣadharmatābalād gavyatvapraśpttinimmittakatvam
sidhyati

M under K above.

177. tanna samyak, vinā vyāptibodham śabdādibodhataḥ.

K 141, BP

178. tanna samyagiti vyāptijñānāṁ vināśŚābdabodhasya nubhavasiddhatvāt na hi sarvatra śābdasravānārantarā vyāptijñāne pramāṇamastī. Kiṃca sarvatra śābdasthale yadi vyāptijñānāṁ kalpyate, tadā sarvatṛṇumītiṣṭhale
padajñānaṁ kalpayitvā śābdabodha eva kim na svikriyātāmi
dhyeyam.

M, vide BPS, p. 541.

179. kā punariyam vyāptih ucyate, svābhāvikaḥ sambandha vyāptih.

does not exist between a word and its meaning. It is why the same word may be found to convey different meanings in different countries or in different parts of the same country.  

Yet, if it is insisted that Sabda falls within Anumāna because of involving a relation, then it could also be claimed with equal force that Anumāna should be included in Sabda in so far as at least involves the use of Vākyas.

(ii) Gautama again tries to justify the validity of 'Sabda-Visēsa' i.e. the Vedic utterences (Vedāvākyas).

The opponents argue that the Sabda in the sense of Veda-Vākya cannot be treated as valid due to various reasons, like falsehood, contradictions and repetitions. The Bhasyakāra amplifies the arguments. The birth of a son is not seen even to him who performs the ritual called 'Putresti' out of belief in the Vedic injunction 'Putrakāmāḥ putrestya yajet'. This śrutivākya enjoins that one desirous of a son should perform the putrestiyāga. If a Vedic sentence regarding a perceptible object like the birth of a son could thus

180. jātivīśeṣe cāṇiyamāt. NS 2.1.57
na svābhāvikah sābdārthayaḥ sambandhaḥ yādi svābhāvikaḥ sābdārthasaṃbandho'bhaviṣyannya jātivīśeṣe sābdārthayaṁ avasthā'bhaviṣyat, asti tu yatha kāmaṇprayogo jātivīśeṣo — jātivīśeṣasābdena punardeśo'bhavīṣyata iti.
NV, under NS above.

181. tadapramāṇyaamanṛtavyāghatapunaruktadoṣebhyah ?
NS 2.1.58.
be false, then there can be no guarantee, it is argued, regarding the truth of Vedic sentences like 'Agnihotraṃ juhuyāt etc.' which enjoin the performance of Agnihotra sacrifice for one desiring a place in the heaven which is obviously not perceptible.  

Again the Vedic sentences clash with each other by conveying contradictory meanings. As for illustration, at one place one is enjoined to perform a sacrificial rite only when the sun rises and at another place it is given to understand that the performance of the sacrificial rite at the rise of the sun does not bear any fruit.  

Moreover, repetitions of Vedic mantras are enjoined in the injunctions like 'trīḥ prathamāmanvāhā etc.' occurring in the context of the Śāmilheni sacrifice, which speaks of the recitation of the same 'mantra' thrice at the beginning and thrice at the end.  

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182. 'putrakāmaḥ putreṣṭyā yajeta' iti nesṭau samsthitāyām putrajanaṃ drṣṭyaṃ. drṣṭārthasya vākyasyānṛtateva adṛṣṭārthamapi vākyam- 'agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ ityādyanṛtāmiti jñāyate. VB, under NS above.

183. vihitavyāghātadoṣācca- havane 'udite hotavyaṃ, anudite hotavyam -- iti vidhisya, vihitam vyaḥantī- 'śyāvo'syāhutimabhyavaharati ya udite juhuti, --- VB, under NS above.

184. punaruktadoṣācca --- 'trīḥ prathamāmanvāhā trimuṭṭamāṃ iti punaruktadoṣo bhavati. punaruktām ca pramattavyamanī tasmādpramānaṃ ūbdo'nṛtavyāghātvapunaruktadoṣe bhya iti. VB, under NS 2.1.58.
is natural only for the lunatics. Thus the opponents challenge the validity of the Sabdavisesa (Vedavakya). Here we refer to Gautama's rejoinder in brief. The charge of falsehood against the Veda-Vakyas is not tenable inasmuch as the Vedavakyas regarding even some perceptible objects may not bear fruit because of some other reasons like defects in agents, actions and the materials employed. In the context of the performance of the Putresti, the performer (Karta) i.e., the parents may have defects like ignorance or misconduct. Their union representing the action (Karma) may also be defective. The materials (Sadhana) also may have defects. The ghee may be impure or the 'mantras' may be wrongly uttered. There are also no contradictions in Vedavakyas if properly understood. The Stutivakyas like 'Yo'bhuyupagatam' etc. pinpointing the possibility of loss of fruit of a ritual is meant for those who do not honour the stipulated time. The defect of repetition also does not ensue in the context of enjoining 'abhyasa' when it goes to be useful. An useless repetition is to be discarded as

185. na, karmakarti sadhanavaigunyat. NS, 2.1.59

186. nanratadosah putrakamestau, kasmat? --- istyapitara: samyujyamanaa putram janayata iti --- kartvaiigunyan- avidvam prayokta kapuyacaranasa sadhanavaigunyam - havirasamskrtramupahatamiti, etc. VB, under NS above vide ND, p. 128.

187. abhyupetya kalabhede dosavacanat - NS 2.1.60.
na vyaghato ---- yo'bhuyupagataam havanakaalam bhinati! --- tatraayam ---- doja ucyate - syavo'syahutim etc.
VB, under NS above.
'punarukta' while an useful one should be accepted in the name of Anuvāda.\(^{138}\) Sābdavīśeṣa is to be accepted as Pramāṇa even because of there being the division of Veda-Vākya into Vidhi, Arthavāda and Anuvādavacana.\(^{139}\) Gautama assets that the validity of the Veda-Vākyas may be established on the strength of their being on a par with the magic charms and the prescriptions of the Āyurvedic Physicians, which come to us in the form of Āptavākyas.\(^{190}\) The point comes to be more understandable from the Bhāṣya.\(^{191}\) One comes to get advice from the Āyurveda thus — 'Doing this, one can maintain health' or 'by way of not doing that, one comes to be ill'.

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138. anuvādopatīteseṣa. NS 2.1.61;
anarthako 'bhyaṣaḥ = punaruktaṁ, arthavānabhyāsaḥ = anuvādah. VB, under NS above, vide ND, p. 120.

139. vākyavibhāgasya cārthagrahaṇāt. NS 2.1.62;
pramāṇāṁ sābdo yathā loke. VB, under NS above. Vide ND, p. 129;
vidhyarthavadānuvādavacanaṇīyogāt. NS 2.1.63.

190. mantrāyurvedaprāmāṇyaacacca tatprāmāṇyaṁ, ānta prāmāṇyaṁ. Nj 2.1.69.

191. kim punarāyurvedasya prāmāṇyaṁ? yattarāyurvedone-
padīṣyate - idāṁ kṛtv āstamadhayagacchi, idāṁ varjavitvāniṣtaṁ jahāti, tasyaunuṣṭhīyāṁhasya tathābhāvāḥ satarthā'
iparyayaḥ mantrapadānāṁ ca viṣabhūtāśanipratipade-
dhārthānāṁ prayoge'arthasya tathābhāva etatprāmāṇyaṁ kim kṛtametat?
āptaprāmāṇyakṛtam.

drṣṭārthenāptopadesānyayurvedenādrśtarthaḥ vedabhārgbno'nu-
mātavyaḥ pramāṇamiti etc. etc.

VB, under NS above, Vide ND, pp. 132-4.
Now it is a matter of experience that such Āurvedic statements are warranted by facts. By employing the 'mantras' (charms or magic words) also people surely get rid of noise, ghost etc. But the cause of the validity of both above lies in their being the assertions or statements of certain trustworthy people (Āpta). The Veda-वाक्यas are also certain आपतवक्यas. So there is every reason to believe that the Vaidika आपतवक्यas are also by all means valid (Pramāṇa). We have already pointed out that the Naiyāyikas understand आपोस्पदेशा or आपतवक्यa to cover both veda and non-vedic utterances. Later Naiyāyikas like Jayantabhaṭṭa also strongly and elaborately advocate the validity of Vedavākyas. But so far as Viśvanātha is concerned, he makes no special treatment of the Vedavākyas. He is also not found giving any special recognition to Vedavākyas by way of using terms like śabdavisesa. As we find him in the BP, he seems to treat śabda in general as more occupied with the logical problem involved in the process of words conveying the relational thought in a sentence or briefly speaking the वाक्यार्थa. We shall elucidate our point by and by.
THE KĀRIKĀS OF THE SĀBDA-KHAṆḍA OF THE BHĀṢĀ-PARICCHEDĀ

Padajñānaṁ tu karaṇaṁ dvāraṁ tatra padārthadhiṁ. 
Sābdabodhaḥ phalaṁ tatra saktidhiṁ sahaṅkāriṇī. 81

lakṣaṇā śakyasambandhastātparyānupapattitaḥ
āsattiyogatākhaṅkṣātātparyajñānāmiṣyaṭe. 82

Karaṇaṁ sannidhānaṁ tu padasyāsattirucyaṭe
Padārthe tatra tadvattā yogatā parikṛttita. 83

yatpadeṇa vinā yasyā'nanubhāvakatā bhavet
sākāṅkṣā, vakturicchā tu tātparyāṁ parikṛttitam. 84