Chapter VI

LIBERATION IN THE SĀMKHYA-YOGA

The Sāmkhya is a very old system of philosophy. It is as old as some early Upaniṣads like Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya Upaniṣads etc. Scholars both from East and West have adduced arguments in favour of its antiquity. Richard Garbe in discussing the system says, "The Sāmkhya doctrine - the oldest real system of Indian philosophy - is entirely dualistic." Dr. Anima Sengupta also guessing its antiquity says, "The fact that the name of Kapila is mentioned, for the first time, in the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, might suggest that the formulation of the Sāmkhya started at the time of the older Upaniṣads, like the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, Chāndogya Upaniṣad, etc. and attained much progress at the time of Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad etc. which might have been composed after the time of Kapila." Kapila, who was called Brahma-suta (i.e., son of Brahma) in the Gauḍapāda bhāṣya of the Sāmkhya Kārikā, was the founder of the Sāmkhya system. He was known as a ṛṣi and he occupied a highly esteemed position of a teacher.

1. Richard Garbe, The Philosophy of Ancient India, p. 10
2. Anima Sengupta, Sāmkhya and Advaita Vedānta - A Comparative Study, p. 8
3. Ibid., p. 8
Though Sāmkhya elements are traceable abundantly in the Upaniṣads yet it would differ from them at least in one point. Sāmkhya philosophy stands in sharp contrast with the Upaniṣadic view of monism. Unlike the Upaniṣads it is a philosophy of dualistic realism. It admits two realities, viz., matter and soul. They are 'eternal' and 'everlasting'; but they are totally different in their innermost character.

The world is said to evolve here out of primitive matter, which first produces the subtle substances which in turn are capable of forming the internal organs of all creatures. After that it gives rise to gross matter. The world is in a cycle of evolution, existence and dissolution. After a particular duration of time the world is dissolved into its primary matter Prakṛti which then remains in an equilibrium state of three guṇas constituting it. It will again be in the process of evolution when its equilibrium will be disturbed by the presence of Puruṣa, the spirit.

The most important feature of the Sāmkhya philosophy is its rationalistic approach. The metaphysical conclusions arrived at here are based on Logic. Kapila, the founder of the system has not attempted to enter into the region to which his reason has not permitted him to do so. According to Radhakrishnan the Sāmkhya did not take the form of a well
co-ordinated system until after the rise of Buddhism. It became rationalistic and developed into a well-coordinated system of philosophy by way of meeting the challenge offered by Buddhism to its realism. "The Śāṅkhya accepted the challenge and argued on strictly rational ground, for the reality of the selves and objects. When it developed on a purely rationalistic soil, it was obliged to concede that there was no proof for the existence of God." 

Explaining this viewpoint Richard Garbe says "that Kapila, the founder of the Śāṅkhya system saw 'in a rationalistic way' only the diversity but not the unity of the universe." And it is solely because of his rationalistic approach that he denied the existence of God as Creator and ruler of the Universe. Richard Garbe further says, "In Kapila's doctrine, for the first time in the history of the world, the complete independence and freedom of human mind, its full confidence in its own powers, were exhibited." Prof. J.N. Farquhar explains the rationalistic character of the Śāṅkhya philosophy thus:

4. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 258
5. Ibid.
6. Richard Garbe, op.cit., p. 10
7. Ibid., p. 30
"It is well to recognise that with the Sāmkhya we enter upon rationalistic speculation. It is held to be throughout consistent with scripture (śruti), but it is clear on the very surface that the leading ideas have been evolved not from Vedic texts but from observation and speculative thought.\(^8\) The appeal to scripture is more formal than real; yet the system has in consequence been recognised as orthodox, and therefore superior not only to Buddhism and Jainism but to the sectarian systems. According to Paul Deussen, the six orthodox systems of Indian philosophy are not philosophical in the strict sense of the term.\(^9\) According to him the only systems, viz., Sāmkhya and Vedānta bear some metaphysical importance. In this context he says, "The only systems of metaphysical importance are the Sāmkhyam and the Vedānta; but even these are not to be considered as original creations of the philosophical mind, for the common basis of both and with them of Buddhism and Jainism is to be found in the Upaniṣads; and it is the ideas of the Upaniṣads which by a kind of degeneration have developed into Buddhism on one side and the Sāmkhya system on the other."\(^10\)

9. Paul Deussen, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 34-35
10. Ibid., p. 35
Yoga philosophy is reckoned as one of the orthodox systems of philosophy. The Indian scholars usually treat the Sāmkhya and the Yoga systems not as two separate systems of philosophy, but as one system of philosophy called Sāmkhya-yoga. According to A.K. Lad, they are not different systems of philosophy, they conjointly form one system of philosophy. Richard Garbe too finds justification in treating Yoga system as a branch of the Sāmkhya philosophy, as according to him the metaphysical basis of the system is none other than the Sāmkhya system. In this context he says, "The metaphysical basis of the Yoga system is the Sāmkhya philosophy, whose doctrines Patanjali so completely incorporated into his system that that philosophy is with justice uniformly regarded in Indian literature as a branch of the Sāmkhya." S.N. Dasgupta also points out, "Better informed persons know that it accepts the Sāmkhya system of philosophy, but believes in God (Īśvara) and adopts a body of practices for the attainment of its ultimate goal - emancipation." In this context Paul Deussen's remark is worth quoting - He says, "There seems to have been a time when Vedāntic thought lived only in this realistic form..."

11. A.K. Lad, A Comparative Study of the Concept of Liberation in Indian Philosophy, p. 100
13. S.N. Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought, p. 1
of the Sāmkhya; for, when the Yoga took the form of a philosophical system it was built up on the very inconvenient base of the Sāmkhya system, probably because at that time no other base was available. 14 Though the two systems hold identical views in respect of many philosophical problems, yet their relation may be stated thus - while Sāmkhya system stands for theory the other stands for practice. Hence the Yoga system adopts a body of practices for the attainment of its end.

Scholars differ in their opinion as to the origin of the name Sāmkhya. Some scholars hold that the name Sāmkhya is derived from the word Sāmkhyā or number, because the system gives an enumeration of the ultimate objects of knowledge solely with a view to getting at the knowledge of reality. Some others interpret it thus - It is derived from the word Sāmkhyā which means perfect knowledge (sāmyag jñāna). Hence according to these scholars, as the Sāmkhya system gives perfect kind of knowledge about reality etc. it is justly named 'Sāmkhya'. According to Pandit Ganganath Jha "Sāmkhya means the knowledge of self (puruṣa) through right discrimination." 15 V.V. Sovani opposing the view that the name Sāmkhya has been derived from the word Sāmkhyā or number says,"Sāmkhya

15. Pandit Gangha Nath Jha, Introduction to Tattva Kaumudī, p. 2
standing for the system should not be derived to mean 'number' because enumeration is not a characteristic feature of the Sāṁkhya. Other Indian systems far surpass it in this respect. The natural and traditionally accepted interpretation is from Sāṁkhya - buddhi or knowledge." It appears to be the more correct view to say that the word 'Sāṁkhya' was used in the sense of philosophical reflection. Radhakrishnan says, "The system takes its name from the fact that it arrives at its conclusions by means of theoretical investigation." He further says, "In the early texts "Sāṁkhyā" is used in the sense of philosophical reflection and not numerical reckoning." According to Guṇaratna again the system may derive its name from its first founder Saṅkha.

Like other systems of Indian philosophy Sāṁkhya is also pessimistic. It also admits the universality of sufferings. In this context Richard Garbe says, "The Sāṁkhya philosophy is already saturated with that pessimism which has put its stamp on the outcomes of this system."

16. V.V. Sovani, A Critical Study of the Sāṁkhya System, p. 3
17. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 249
18. Ibid.
19. V.V. Sovani, op.cit., p. 3
20. Richard Garbe, op.cit., p. 11
To do away with all sorts of sufferings may be said to be the aim of this system. It speaks of three different kinds of sufferings. They are — (1) Ādhyātmika (subjective), (2) Ādhibhautika (objective), and (3) Ādhidaivika (pertaining to deity).

(1) Ādhyātmika — It includes pains which arise from the psychological nature of mind or the pains that arise due to disorders of the mind or body. Physical pains like headache, fever etc. as well as mental sufferings like the pangs of fear, anger, greed etc. are included in this type of suffering.

(2) Ādhibhautika — The second type of pain is caused by extra-organic natural causes like men, beasts, thorns etc. This type of pain may be illustrated by such pains like murder, snake-bite, pricking by thorns, biting by bees, etc.

(3) Ādhidaivika (pertaining to deity). Pains caused by supernatural agencies are classed as Ādhidaivika. Pains inflicted by ghosts, demons etc. are of this type.

The Yoga system of philosophy was founded by Patañjali in the second century B.C.\(^\text{21}\) Sāṅkhya philosophy was, no doubt, the metaphysical basis of the Yoga system. It incorporated

\[\text{21. Ibid., p. 14}\]
into itself almost all the doctrines of the Sāmkhya system, for which it was regarded in the Indian literature as a branch of the Sāmkhya system. Like other systems of philosophy, Yoga too recognised that life is full of sorrows and sufferings. According to this system mere theoretical knowledge cannot help us in removing our sorrows. Radhakrishnan says, "The main interest of Patañjali is not metaphysical theorising, but the practical motive of indicating how salvation can be attained by disciplined activity." 22 Richard Garbe too says, "The methodical performance of the Yoga practice, according to Patañjali, leads not only to the possession of the supernatural powers, but is also the most effective means of attaining the saving knowledge." 23 This system is more emphatic in holding that there should be control of will.

Puruṣa and Prakṛti are the two distinct realities recognised in the Sāmkhya system. They are eternal and everlasting but in their innermost character, they are entirely different. Prakṛti is formed of three constituents, viz., sattva, rajas and tamas. Sattva is said to be the principle of manifestation while rajas and tamas are the principles of activity and non-activity respectively. Prakṛti is the root.

22. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 838
23. Richard Garbe, op.cit., p. 14
cause of all. Everything comes out of it. Prakṛti is the uncaused first cause of everything. It has no other cause than itself. Prakṛti is active but non-intelligent. Puruṣa is intelligent but non-active. It has no other cause nor it produces anything.

We cannot but admit the existence of the self. Its very denial will imply the reality of the denying self.

Though the different systems of Indian philosophy agree as to the existence of the self, they differ widely in respect of the nature of the self. Some Cārvākas or materialists hold that the self is identical with the gross body. There are others who identify the self either with the senses or with life or with the mind. The Buddhists and the empiricists maintain that the self is identical with the stream of consciousness. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and the Prabhākara Mīmāṁsakas recognise the self as unconscious substance which might acquire consciousness under certain conditions. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas on the other hand maintain that it is a conscious entity though its consciousness may remain hidden due to ignorance. According to Advaita Vedānta the self is a pure eternal consciousness which is at the same time blissful and existent. Hence it is known in Sanskrit terminology as 'Saccidānanda', i.e., one who is existent, conscious and blissful.
According to the Sāmkhya philosophy, the self is neither body, nor the senses, nor the manas nor the intellect (buddhi). In other words, the self is different from all these. It cannot be identified with any of them. It is a conscious spirit which can form only the subject of knowledge and can never become the object of knowledge. The self should not be taken to be a substance having consciousness as its attribute. Rather consciousness is its very essence. According to the Sāmkhya system, the self is not blissful too. Bliss and consciousness being different cannot be the essence of the same reality. We cannot find change and activity in the soul. It is a steady consciousness without any change or activity.

Change and activity belongs only to Prakṛti and its evolutes. The self is immutable, eternal and all pervading. Consciousness is its very essence and not an adventitious attribute as is the case with the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The self is not attached with anything of the world nor it is influenced by any object of the world. If out of ignorance the self identifies either with the body, senses, or the mind, it is bound to undergo changes, which in turn will cause suffering to it. "The puruṣas are like the Ātmans of the Vaiṣṇava-Vedāntins, the jīvas of the Jainas, and the monads of Leibnitz." 24

It is mainly on the basis of our everyday experience that the Sāṁkhya system maintains the plurality of the selves. The manyness of the selves can be proved by the fact that the birth and death of one individual does not mean the birth and death of all. If there would have been only one self, as the Advaita Vedāntins hold, the birth and death of one would have meant the birth and death of all. As there is an obvious difference in the birth and death of persons, so people differ in their sensory and motor endowments. The blindness and deafness of one would have meant the blindness and deafness in all others. But this is not the case. Rather we have an experience which is contrary to it. Hence it follows that there is not one self but many selves.

The time of activity is also not the same for all individuals – the fact which also points to the manyness of the selves. When one is at hard work, others are found to be inactive or they are found to be in deep sleep. This also indicates the plurality of the selves.

The distinction that we can make between god and the man or between man and beasts is a pointer to the fact that there are many selves. Had there been only one self, we could not have perceived difference among these creatures.

The classical Sāṁkhya system is atheistic. The Sāṁkhya philosophers found no ground to introduce in their system a
third category like Isvara, because reason did not permit them to do so. But there are scholars who have taken troubles to show that the classical Sāṃkhya is theistic. A.K. Majumdar in his 'Sāṃkhya Conception of Personality' says that the system does not deny the existence of God. What it denies is the causality and agency of God. In his opinion, God may be there even without being a cause of the universe. But Anima Sengupta while opposing him says that there is no need of recognising a third category like Isvara when we can explain the facts of life and the universe with the help of the other two categories, viz., Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Criticising A.K. Majumdar's view she writes, "The conception of Isvara generally carries with it the conception of a creator, as otherwise, it ceases to exist as an essential condition for creating the world. If the power of creation is taken away from God, He loses all strength and significance, as is the case with Him in the Yoga system."25 Dr. S. Radhakrishnan too opines, "In its classical form, however, the Sāṃkhya does not uphold theism."26

Everyday experience shows that actions are motivated either by self-interest or benevolence; but God cannot have

25. Anima Sengupta, Evolution of the Sāṃkhya School of Thought, p. 47
any self-interest, He having fulfilled all his interests. If, on the other hand, God is said to be affected by selfish motives or interest, then He is not free. And if God is supposed to be free, He will not feel the necessity of creating the world. We miss all logical grounds if we characterise God neither as free nor as fettered. As the souls prior to the creation have had no cause to suffer and hence no need to remove it. The creation cannot be said to be an act of kindness. If God is conceived as a being with goodwill, He is sure to create only happy beings. It may be necessary to bring the notion of God to deal with men of different conduct. But here the answer is of a different type. The law of Karma is sufficient to explain such facts and hence it is needless to bring the notion of God. Again material things cannot come out of immaterial spirit. The immortality of the souls cannot be explained consistently, if we conceive God as creator and infinite.27

Stressing on the atheist aspect of the classical Sāmkhya, Dr. Radhakrishnan says, "The Sāmkhya, which is anxious to abide within the strict limits of knowledge, holds that the reality of God cannot be established by logical proofs. There is no sensible evidence or inferential knowledge or scriptural testimony of Ṛṣāva."28

27. Ibid., p. 817
28. Ibid.
In the prefatory remarks of his book entitled 'The Six System of Indian Philosophy', Maxmuller speaks in unequivocal language of the atheistic nature of the Śāmkhya system thus - "Kapila for instance, the author or hero eponymous of the Śāmkhya philosophy, confesses openly that his system is atheistic, an-Īśvara, without an active Lord or God, but inspite of that, his system was treated as legitimate by his contemporaries, because it was reasoned out consistently, and admitted, nay, required some transcendent and invisible power, the invisible power the so-called purushas . . . . From a philosophical point of view, no theory of evolution, whether ancient or modern (in Sanskrit Parinām) can provide any room for a creator or governor of the world, and hence the Śāmkhya philosophy declares itself fearlessly as an-Īśvara, Lord-less leaving it to another philosophy, the Yoga to find in the old Śāmkhya system some place for an Īśvara or a personal God."29 Of course the later thinkers like Vācaspati and Vīgānabhaikṣu tried to give a theistic explanation of the system. For Vācaspati the evolution of Prakṛti is directed by an 'omniscient spirit'. Vīgānabhaikṣu thinks that Kapila's denial of Īśvara is only a regulative principle so as to induce men to withdraw themselves from an excessive contemplation of an eternal god, because such a contemplation, according to him,

29. F. Maxmuller, 'The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy', pp. ix-x
stands as barrier in the acquisition of discriminative knowledge.\textsuperscript{30} Vijnānabhikshu thinks that it is for the sake of argument and to prove that God is no integral part of the system and not to assert its antagonism to theism as such, that the Sāmkhya has not included God in its philosophy. Atheism is also explained by him as a concession to popular view.\textsuperscript{31}

Patañjali the founder of the Yoga system introduces in his philosophy the concept of God; but he does it in a very loose and superficial manner. He does not arrive at this conclusion by a philosophical analysis. Prof. S.N. Dasgupta as well as Richard Garbe have said that the introduction of the concept of Īśvara in the Yoga system is a very loose one. In this context Richard Garbe observes, "But the insertion of the personal god, which subsequently decisively determined the character of the Yoga system, was to judge from the Yoga-sūtras, the text book of Patañjali, at first accomplished in a very loose and superficial manner, so that the contents and purpose of the system were not at all affected by it."\textsuperscript{32} S.N. Dasgupta says, "He is very loosely introduced,

\textsuperscript{30} See Vācaspati, Tattvavaiśāradī.
\textsuperscript{31} See S.P.B. Introduction.
\textsuperscript{32} Richard Garbe, op.cit., p. 15
more as a matter of traditional faith than as having a place in the system of philosophy. He is introduced as only one of the alternative objects of concentration." In the Yoga-sūtra Isvāra is described as a particular spirit which is untouched by troubles, works, fruits or deserts. Thus He does not occupy a very important position in the Sāmkhya-yoga system. Like the God of Vaiṣṇava-Vedāntins, He cannot impart grace to the people. He also cannot help the puruṣa in realizing his Kaivalya.

By the introduction of the concept of God, what Patañjali did intend was to attract his fellow-country men to the Sāmkhya system. Richard Garbe in this context says - At bottom all that Patañjali did was to embellish the Sāmkhya system with the Yoga practice, the mysterious powers, and the personal god; his chief aim had, no doubt, been to render this system acceptable to his fellow country men by the eradication of its atheism."

Like some other systems of Indian philosophy, Sāmkhya also holds that ignorance is the cause of bondage. It is primarily due to ignorance that we are to suffer in life.

33. S.N. Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought, p. 245
Ignorance means lack of knowledge. Due to ignorance the self identifies itself with prakṛti or any of her evolutes, viz., the ego, the intellect or the mind. We are said to be ignorant when we do not know the true nature of the self. Ignorance is wrong knowledge for which the self confuses itself either with Prakṛti or any of her evolutes. For ignorance, we fail to make a distinction between puruṣa and Prakṛti. Removal of ignorance will lead us to freedom. The question as to how puruṣa and Prakṛti came to be connected originally is out of place here, because really speaking, there is no such bond between them. It is only due to illusion that we see the connection between them. This illusion is there from the beginningless time.

Right knowledge alone can help us to overcome this illusion and it enables us to realize that there was no such connection between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. The connection between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is explained as a matter of chance or coincidence on the part of Prakṛti and as playful activity on the part of Puruṣa by Bhāgavat Purāṇa.35

The Sāṁkhya system speaks of three kinds of bondage. They are - (1) Natural, (2) Evolutional and (3) Personal.

35. A.K. Lad, op.cit., p. 103
The bondage is natural when Prakṛti (Nature) is wrongly worshipped as spirit (Puruṣa). The bondage is evolutionary when different evolutes of Prakṛti, e.g., the five elements, the sense organs etc. are taken to be the puruṣa or they are wrongly worshipped as the Puruṣa. The bondage is personal, when a person not knowing the true nature of the self performs sacrifices or gives charity to others. Thus we notice three kinds of bondage in the system. This division is based on objects we worship or on objects which we wrongly identify with Puruṣa. Freedom, according to the Sāṁkhya system, lies in complete isolation of the Puruṣa from Prakṛti. When the puruṣa comes to know its absolute distinction from Prakṛti it gets separated from Prakṛti and as such becomes liberated. Prakṛti now ceases its activity towards the puruṣa who has attained discriminative knowledge; but it continues its activity towards one who has not acquired this discriminative knowledge and hence such a man remains in bondage. So long as Prakṛti remains active, it catches the reflection of Puruṣa and casts its shadow on the puruṣa. But the change that takes place in the puruṣa is unreal and fictitious. Bondage is the wrong identification of Puruṣa with Prakṛti. If the self fails to discriminate itself from Prakṛti and her evolutes, it will remain in bondage.

36. S.P.S. ii.8
37. S.P.S. iii.72
It is the knowledge of the distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti that liberates the self from all sorts of sufferings. Richard Garbe in this context observes, "A man has attained the highest aim of human exertion if this distinction is perfectly clear to him; discriminative knowledge delivers soul from the misery of the endless flow of existence and abolishes the necessity of being born again." 38

Really Kapila was not the man who entered into the minute discussion of the concept of liberation. Rather his followers developed this concept. What Kapila really intended was to show how misery did originate and how it can be best eradicated. 39 Imparting knowledge of the distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti and thereby releasing the soul from sorrows and sufferings is the sole object of the Sāmkhya system. Richard Garbe says, "It is the object of the Sāmkhya philosophy to teach people to know the absolute distinction between soul and matter in its most subtile modifications as it appears in the inner organs." 40 As soon as the soul attains this discriminative knowledge, it no longer remains under the spell of Prakṛti. It becomes totally separated or isolated from it.

38. Richard Garbe, op.cit., p. 11
39. F. Maxmiller, The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 297
40. Richard Garbe, op.cit., p. 11
Prakṛti withdraws its activity towards it. Hence the soul becomes what it is in itself. "Puruṣa remains in eternal isolation and Prakṛti relapses into inactivity." Now it realizes its own true nature, thereby it becomes completely free from all ills and evils of life.

Now what is the nature of this state of release according to the Sāṁkhya system. Describing this state Maxmuller says, "All that can be said is that Puruṣa freed from all Prakṛtic bonds, whether ignorance or knowledge, joy or sorrow, would remain himself, would be what he alone can be unrestricted, not interfered with, free and independent, and hence in the highest sense of the word perfect and happy in himself." This conception of liberation may be likened with such conceptions as becoming one with Brahman, or the conception of Niḥśreyas or Non-Plus ultra or with the Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa.

Explaining the Sāṁkhya state of release Maxmuller again says, "In the eyes of less advanced thinkers, this unfathomable bliss assumed naturally the character of Paradisical happiness painted in the most brilliant and even sensuous

41. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 312
42. F. Maxmuller, op.cit., p. 296
43. Ibid.
colours, while to the truly enlightened it represented tranquillity (śānti) perfect rest, and self-satisfaction."\textsuperscript{44} For Maxmüller the Buddhist idea of Nirvāṇa is the same, originally as that of the higher bliss of the Vedānta and Sāmkhya philosophy. But Radhakrishnan in this respect appears to hold a different view from that of Maxmuller. He says, "The Sāmkhya ideal of freedom is not to be confused with the Buddhist goal of voidness or extinction of self, or the Advaita absorption into Brahman or the Yogic acquisition of supernatural powers. Nor is Mukti the manifestation of bliss (ānanda) since puruṣa is free from all attributes."\textsuperscript{45}

Puruṣa cannot be said to be free so long as it has attributes. "When freed, the puruṣa keeps no company, looks to nothing without itself, and entertains no alien thoughts. It is no longer at the mercy of Prakṛti or its products, but stands as a star apart, undisturbed by the earthly cares."\textsuperscript{46} According to the system, the soul being eternally free, we must not make a distinction between the bound and the released. Release here means the removal of the objects which conceal the true nature of the self. Not only in Samādhi or ecstatic

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol.II, p. 313
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 312
consciousness or Susupti or dreamless sleep, but also in the state of release, the puruṣa rests in its own form through the dissolution of buddhi. Traces of past experience are noticeable in case of both ecstatic consciousness and dreamless sleep; but they are absent in case of release.

With the attainment of salvation, even the discriminative knowledge disappears because it is like a medicine which not only cures the disease but also purges itself out of the body. "While deliverance is an escape from suffering, it is not an escape from all existence."^{47} Thus Sāṃkhya grants existence and consciousness to the soul in the state of liberation but not bliss. Belief in the immortality of the souls does not make the Sāṃkhya thinkers pessimistic. In the state of release Puruṣa is like a seer who has nothing to look at or it is like a mirror that has nothing to reflect. It continues its existence in lasting freedom from Prakṛti and its defilements as pure intelligences for all time to come. Richard De Smet describes the liberated Puruṣa thus - "Pure, unrelated, he is then neither omniscient nor parviscident but a solitary light shining upon nothing, indifferent and serene."^{48}

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47. Ibid., p. 321
48. R. De Smet, 'Towards An Indian View of the Person' in H.D. Lewis (ed), Contemporary Indian Philosophy, p. 63
It will not be out of place to mention here that though Maxmuller holds that the idea of Buddhist Nirvana is the same originally as that of the higher bliss of the Vedanta and Sāmkhya philosophy, he asserts that such idea was not borrowed by the Buddhists from either of the systems.

As freedom in the Sāmkhya system means complete isolation or aloofness of Puruṣa from Prakṛti, liberation is also called Kaivalya here. According to some scholars, the state of liberation for the Sāmkhya is not a blissful one. The Sāmkhya philosophers equate the bliss of liberation with worldly pleasures and worldly pleasures being the manifestation of Sattva-guṇa which is the constituent of Prakṛti cannot belong to Puruṣa. The bliss that is experienced in the state of liberation according to Śruti is altogether different from worldly pleasures. But this was not understood by the Sāmkhya philosophers. Its rejection of liberation as a blissful state has been the cause of its being different from Śruti also. There are many Śruti passages which say that the soul is of the nature of existence, consciousness and bliss.

According to the Sāmkhya system, the puruṣa enjoys omniscience in the state of release, though it is not the view according to the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika systems. Consciousness is the very essence of Puruṣa and it is not its adventitious attribute. In the state of liberation, it remains in its
E.H. Johnston points out a difference in the concept of liberation in the classical Sāṁkhya and in the early Sāṁkhya that was formulated prior to the classical system of Īśvara Krishna. Rebirth, according to the early Sāɱkhyas, is due to the accumulation of 'rajas' and 'tamas' and liberation can be attained by extinguishing them and by increasing the Sattva-guna. 49 According to this view liberation is attainable with the extinction of rajas and ūtamas on the one hand and with the increase of Sattva-guna on the other. According to the classical Sāṁkhya liberation is attainable only after passing beyond the range of three gunas. It is a fact that they are not repugnant to each other. Actually one state of liberation paves the way for the other. A.K. Lad explains this fact only as a difference of standpoints. "The original Sāṁkhya view, viz., the increase of sattvaguna is the liberation viewed from the standpoint of morality, and the classical Sāṁkhya view, viz., to pass beyond the range of three gunas, is the liberation viewed from the angle of metaphysics." 50 It is merely a transition of ideal - a transition from a lower ideal to a higher ideal.

49. E.H. Johnston, Early Sāṁkhya, p. 35
50. A.K. Lad, op.cit., p. 104
"Salvation in the Sāṃkhya system is only phenomenal."\(^{51}\)

It is only empirically true. The self is here eternally free.

The self is not bound by Prakṛti. What Prakṛti binds is not
the self, but it binds itself. Bondage belongs to Prakṛti
only. Conjunction of Puruṣa with Prakṛti is the cause of
bondage, their disjunction leads to liberation. When the
puruṣa wrongly identifies itself either with Prakṛti or with
any of her evolutes, it appears to be bound. The dawning of
the discriminative knowledge enables the self to realize that
it is free eternally. Liberation here means the self's
realization of its true nature. The liberated puruṣa of the
Sāṃkhya system enjoys the same status as that of the liberated
ātman of the Vedānta. When Prakṛti comes to know that the
puruṣa has realized its true nature and thereby it has seen
Prakṛti, Prakṛti never comes before that Puruṣa. Once the
self is liberated, it will never be bound.

An explanation of what is known as discriminative
knowledge is necessary. It is of the following form - 'I am
not', 'Naught is mine', and 'Not I'.\(^{52}\) 'I am not' should not

\(^{51}\) S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 311

\(^{52}\) S. K. evaṁ tattvābhyaśān nāśmi na mē
LXIV nāham ityaparīśeṣam/
āviparyayād viśuddham kevalam
utpadyate jñānam//
be taken to mean that I am not existent. What it means is that I am not now what I conceived myself to be at the time of bondage due to delusion. During bondage, I could not recognise myself. I could not discriminate myself from Prakṛti. Similarly, 'Naught is mine' should be understood to mean that my present contents are entirely different from those which I thought myself to have owned during the state of bondage. It must not mean that I am a bare identity devoid of any content. Again 'Not I' should not be used to mean my extinction or death. Rather it means the annihilation of my egoism as well as transformation of my particular individuality to universal personality. What is denied here is not the true self-hood, but only the selfish individuality.

With the dawn of discriminative knowledge, the self becomes liberated. And the task that lies before Prakṛti is to liberate the puruṣa, and when the puruṣa is liberated, it ceases its activity towards it. On the other hand puruṣa, having the vision of Prakṛti loses all interests in her evolution. Prakṛti on her part, knowing well that she has been seen by puruṣa withdraws her activity for that puruṣa. Even then there may be some connection between them, though

53. A.K. Majoomdar, Sāṃkhya Conception of Personality, p. 117
54. Ibid.
such connection is devoid of any motive. It is for the shamefulness of Prakṛti that she will never appear before that puruṣa who has seen her. When the Prakṛti's purpose of liberating the puruṣa is fulfilled, she retires from her activity.

Sāṃkhya philosophy believes in Jīvan mukti as well as in Videhamukti. One may attain liberation during one's life time by one's possession of discriminative knowledge. A man will remain alive even for a while for exhausting his Prārabdha Karma even though discriminative knowledge has dawned on him. At this stage, the puruṣa has no interest in the body, and it is for this reason that the work done by the body in this stage is incapable of binding the puruṣa. Along with the exhaustion of Prārabdha Karmas through experience, the puruṣa gives up the body and thereby attains absolute isolation and this is the state of Kaivalya for the Sāṃkhya. Though the liberated self perceives Prakṛti, it is no longer deluded by her.

According to the Sāṃkhya system, the path to liberation is the disjunction of Puruṣa and Prakṛti by right knowledge. But here a question arises naturally. Which of them is active in being isolated from each other? Here the simple answer is that puruṣa is inactive and as such he cannot be called an agent. It is attributeless and it undergoes no
change. Activity cannot be ascribed to it, and hence the question of dissociation by the puruṣa does not arise.

According to the author of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā, the puruṣa is in no way bound, liberated. Nor does it migrate. All these belong to Prakṛti. Ascribing bondage, migration and liberation to puruṣa is analogous to the attribution of defeat and victory to a king though such attribution is applicable only to his soldiers. Bondage and liberation can be ascribed to Prakṛti alone. Thus puruṣa is eternally free; the fact which was not known to the puruṣa for its wrong identification with Prakṛti and her evolutes. Thus bondage and liberation have meaning only in so far as the empirical self is concerned. From the transcendental point of view the self is free eternally.

Yoga philosophy holds that we have an innate tendency towards the attainment of liberation. Our desire for liberation must not be confused with our desire for attainment of happiness or removal of pains.

The word 'yoga' is used in different senses. In the Gītā and the Upaniṣads, it is used to mean spiritual union of the soul with God. Its disunion or separation or estrangement is said to be the cause of all sins and sorrows. Yoga is getting to God, relating oneself to the power that rules
the universe, touching the absolute. It is the effort of man
to unite himself to the deeper principle. Yoga is also used
to mean different methods which enable one to realize the ends.
It also means practice as against Sāmkhya or knowledge. 55 Yoga
also means Karma. 56

But Yoga in Patañjali's system of philosophy means
something different from what it means in the Gītā. Yoga here
does not mean union, rather it means effort or separation of
purusa from Prakṛti. It means such an effort by which the
senses and the mind can be controlled. Yoga means processes
like 'the turning away of the senses from the external world
and the concentration of the mind within', by which super-
natural powers can be acquired. 57 Radhakrishnan says, "Yoga,
according to Patañjali, is a methodical effort to attain
perfection, through the control of the different elements of
human nature, physical and psychoical." 58 The body, the mind,
and the active will cannot be allowed to go unrestrained.
They should all be brought under control. Patañjali intended
to cure the body of its restlessness and to cleanse it from

55. Śvetāśvatara Up. vi. 13 sāmkhyayogādīgamyam/ Knower by knowledge and practice.
56. B.G. iii. 7, v. 1, ix. 28, xiii. 24
57. Richard Garbe, op. cit., p. 14
58. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 338
its impurities and accordingly with this aim in view, he laid emphasis on certain Yogic practices. Explaining the aim of the system, Radhakrishnan says, "The main interest of Patañjali is not metaphysical theorising but the practical motive of indicating how salvation can be attained by disciplined activity." Richard Garbe also expresses the same idea by saying that 'the methodical performance of the Yoga practice leads not only to the possession of the supernatural powers, but is also the most effective means of attaining the saving knowledge.'

Patañjali wanted to 'embellish' the Sāmkhya system by the insertion in the system the notion of Yogic practices, mysterious powers and of Personal God. His chief aim in introducing in the Sāmkhya philosophy the notion of personal God was to make the system acceptable to his fellow-country men by the eradication of its atheism. His introduction of the notion of Personal God was very loose and superficial and hence it did not affect in any way the contents and purpose of the system. The ultimate goal of human life as shown by the Yoga system was not different from that of the Sāmkhya system. In this context Richard Garbe says, "The

59. Ibid.
60. Richard Garbe, op.cit., p. 14
ultimate goal of human aspiration according to that text book (referring to the Yoga-sūtras) is not union with or absorption in God, but exactly what it is in the Sāmkhya philosophy the absolute isolation (Kaivalya) of the soul from matter." 61

Yoga philosophy thus accepts the same ideal of Kaivalya as the ultimate end of life as was held by the Sāmkhya system. But Patañjali holds that Yogic practices are indispensable for realizing that end. We can purify both body and mind with its aid. Thus when we purify the mind (buddhi) with the help of Yogic practices, it begins to merge into Prakṛti, its original cause. On the other hand the Puruṣa also realizes its distinctness from Prakṛti and her evolutes.

The puruṣa no longer identifies itself with Prakṛti and becomes totally isolated from Prakṛti. When Puruṣa’s ignorance is removed, it becomes liberated. From the standpoint of Prakṛti, liberation consists in the merger of the evolutes into it, and from the standpoint of Puruṣa liberation consists in the removal of its ignorance thereby realising its true nature.

There are certain points of agreement between the Sāmkhya-yoga view of liberation and the Vedānta view of

61. Ibid., p. 15
liberation. Both the systems agree in holding that bondage is due to ignorance and for both liberation consists in its removal. Ignorance in both the systems means ignorance of the self or the ātman about its own true nature. The second point of agreement in both the systems is that the self is considered free eternally and the self realises this when it removes its ignorance.

Sāmkhya as well as the Advaita Vedānta philosophy believes in the state of Videhamukti as final liberation and this is another point of their agreement. Along with the exhaustion of the prārābṛda karmas, the Jīvan-muktā reaches the next higher stage of Videhamukti. In the Videhamukti state, according to the Vedānta, there is the knowledge of non-duality between ātman and Brahman, but for the Sāmkhya philosophers there is the feeling of duality and difference even in this state of Videhamukti. Anima Sengupta is critical on this point. She says that as the 'soul' is completely dissociated from the psycho-physical organism in this state, 'there can be no knowledge producing vṛtti here, neither bheda vṛtti nor abheda vṛtti. So she concludes by saying, "It is meaningless to hold that in the final state of liberation, there is the realization of either duality or non-duality of ātman."62 In her opinion, 'there cannot be any

fight between the two schools over the issue of existence or non-existence of difference in the final Videhamukti state — though it is true, according to her, only 'from a rational and non-communal point of view.'

Ignorance being the cause of bondage, it lies within one's own mind and does not lie in the outside world. So what is needed for the attainment of liberation is not a change in the outside world, but a change only in one's own outlook. In other words, with the acquisition of tattva jñāna or right knowledge, one becomes liberated. Hence the transition from the bound state to the liberated state is only epistemological. Liberation consists in the self's correct evaluation and not in its transformation. In other words, it means that the self is eternally free. Thus bondage and liberation are true only empirically.

Now let us examine the points of difference between the two concepts. For both the systems, liberation is brought about by knowledge. Knowledge in the Vedānta system means the self's realization that it is not different from Brahman while according to the Śāmkhya system, knowledge means the self's realization that it is totally different from Prakṛti. In the Advaita Vedānta of Śāmkara, the self is non-different

63. Ibid.
from Brahman. What appears as the world is not real. It is only illusory appearance. But according to the Sāṁkhya not only the puruṣa but also the world is real. The puruṣa perceives the evolution of the world; but it is no longer deluded by it.

Another distinguishing feature is that the state of release according to the Vedānta system is blissful while according to the Sāṁkhya it is not blissful, it is merely a conscious state. For Sāṁkhya philosophy, bliss is a product of Sattva guṇa, and Sattva being one of the constituents of Prakṛti, it cannot be attributed to Puruṣa in the state of release which means complete isolation of Puruṣa from Prakṛti and her evolutes.

The Vedānta view of liberation as blissful state is criticised by Sāṁkhya philosophy. Soul, according to the Sāṁkhya system is not of the nature of bliss. Had it been so, it would have manifested bliss even in the state of bondage and there would not have been any difference between bound and released soul. And there would not have been any need of Sādhanās for realizing that state.

But this criticism is based on a misconception. The Sāṁkhya system fails to understand the distinction between the empirical truth and the transcendental truth - the fact
which Śaṁkara has emphasised so much. From the transcendental point of view, the self is eternally free, but from the empirical point of view, bondage, pains, misery etc. are all real. The Śāmkhya could not understand this.

The Yogins in their very attempt to gain salvation acquire for themselves some miraculous powers called Siddhis. They are warned not to be allured by these powers, because even these powers may prove a hindrance in their way to liberation. They should not be content with anything less than Kaivalya.

We now propose to give a critical exposition of the Śāmkhya-yoga concept of liberation. The Śāmkhya-yoga view of philosophy is found defective in several ways. First, the Śāmkhya-yoga view of the plurality of selves is certainly not satisfactory. From the empirical point of view, there is nothing wrong even if we believe in the plurality of selves; but from the transcendental point of view, we cannot consistently hold the plurality of puruṣas. In this connection we should rather say that transcendentally the puruṣa is one and not many. Empirically, of course, the plurality of the jīvas may be admitted.

Secondly the Śāmkhya-yoga's depiction of the state of release as a state of consciousness devoid of bliss is
also not satisfactory. Here too, they have committed a major mistake in confusing the empirical happiness that may arise out of Sattva guna with the transcendental bliss arising in the state of release. The explanation of the Sāṁkhya philosophy as to the human bondage is also not satisfactory. Such questions like 'When did the puruṣa come into contact with prakṛti? or, 'which of them took the initiative for their union or connection?' are not satisfactorily explained. Rather the system says that the question of their original connection cannot be raised because their connection is beginningless. Such questions are improper and illegal. And it follows from this that we cannot ascertain a particular time from which the soul was bound. Similar is the case with our Avidyā. Avidyā is inherent in us from beginningless time and it is due to this that we have been in bondage from an inaccessible remote past. Sāṁkhya fails to develop a satisfactory theory of this beginningless avidyā while Śaṅkara on his part could develop such a theory in his conception of Māyā.

As we have already pointed out, bondage and liberation of puruṣa are not real from the transcendental point of view. Puruṣa is neither bound nor liberated. These terms are applicable to what we call Prakṛti. The soul being according to this system, eternally free, what is required here for its liberation is not the transformation of the phenomenal world,
but the correct evaluation of one's own nature. It is with
the correct evaluation of the self that it becomes liberated.
But according to Śāṅkara, there must not only be the trans-
valuation of the self, but also the transvaluation of the
empirical world. The liberated in the Sāṁkhya system ceases
to be deluded by Prakṛti, though the evolution of Prakṛti is
found real by it. The self no longer identifies itself with
Prakṛti.

But for the liberated self of the Advaita Vedānta,
the world is not real; it is only an illusory appearance.
Brahman Itself appeared to him as the empirical world due to
his inherent ignorance when he was in bondage. Now in the
state of release this illusion disappears. Hence we can say
that in the Vedānta system of Śāṅkara what is required for
liberation is the re-assessment of one's own true nature as
well as of the empirical world; but for the Sāṁkhya system,
there needs re-assessment (realisation) of one's own nature
only. As A.K. Lad observes, "So far as this point is concerned,
the position of Sāṁkhya comes near to the Vedānta of Śāṅkara."64
The Sāṁkhya view which says that Prakṛti's evolution is favourable
to the liberation of Puruṣa and that the chief aim of
evolution is the liberation of Puruṣa is found not to be based

64. A.K. Lad, op.cit., p. 110
on rational grounds. Prakṛti being non-intelligent, how can it know that puruṣa has acquired the discriminative knowledge and as such it will cease to act upon Puruṣa or 'why should Avidyā (Prakṛti) have Vidyā (liberation) as its aim?' Another question can be raised against it. According to the system, Prakṛti being by nature active, how can it remain idle? If this be the case that according to the system, there is only the merger of the things into Prakṛti and not their destruction, then there is no possibility of a total destruction of ignorance and hence there is every likelihood of their reappearance which may again bind the soul.

If we want to trace the logical development of orthodox Indian thought purely from its standpoint of seeking unity amidst diversity, we must say that Nyāya Vaiśeṣika (pluralism) represents the first stage while Sāṁkhya-yoga and the Vedānta represent the second and the third stage respectively. In the Vedānta of Śaṅkara, Indian thought is found to reach in its highest acme. Whatever is true about the logical development of Indian thought and the place of Sāṁkhya in it is also true in respect of the logical development of the conception of liberation. Sāṁkhya here too represents

65. Ibid.
the second stage of development in respect of the concept of liberation, because the ethical concepts of a particular system of philosophy are certainly based on its metaphysics.

It may be evident from the fact that according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the state of release is said to be a mere state of existence of the soul who is devoid of bliss and consciousness. For Sāṁkhya-yoga again, the liberated soul is conscious only. The third stage of development is represented by the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins who hold that the soul in the liberated state attains similarity with Brahman in the matters of enjoyment and knowledge, but they say that the soul is not equal to Brahman in respect of Power. But for Śaṅkara, the liberated soul is non-different from 'Saccidānanda' Brahman. Thus it represents the highest stage in the logical development of the conception of liberation.

"The liberated realizes that he was Brahman since eternity." 67

It is obvious that Sāṁkhya understands mokṣa negatively as complete and absolute cessation of all kinds of ills that characterise mundane life. Such life is a state of bondage to the self. It results from the self's attachment to the not-self. The self is intrinsically pure consciousness. But in the empirical life it appears as an embodied being

67. A.K. Lad, op.cit., p. 111
attached to objects. This attachment leads to desire and aversion, which issuing in good and bad deeds, generate merit and demerit with their consequences of happiness and sorrow, these latter producing more desires and aversions; and thus the cycle goes on repeating itself. The cause of all this is the attachment of the self to the not-self. And this attachment arises, according to Sāṁkhya, from anādi-aviveka or a beginningless non-discrimination of puruṣa from prakṛti, of self from not-self. Liberation as the termination of all pain is to be achieved by dispelling nescience by means of Viveka- khyāti or cognition of the essential detachment of self from the object.

True to the Upaniṣadic tradition the Yoga system maintains that the self must not be identified either with the body or with the senses or with the mind or even with the ego and the intelligence-principle and that one must penetrate into the inner spiritual core after ripping open the sheaths of materiality. Radhakrishnan aptly observes, "Freedom in the Yoga is Kaivalya or absolute independence. It is not a mere negation, but is the eternal life of the puruṣa, when it is freed from the fetters of prakṛti."68

68. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 363