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5. Ibid., p. 386.


18. Marx, op. cit., p. 386; also, K. Marx and F. Engels, THE FIRST
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INDIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 1857-1859 (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, n.d.), p.34; K. Marx and F. Engels, ON COLONIALISM (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, n.d.), p.84.

19. Text of statement, 433 H.C. Deb. 5s., coll. 1395-8; it was also published as a White Paper, Cmd. 7047.


21. For a diary narrative of Mountbatten's work in India leading to the transfer of power, see Alan Campbell-Johnson, MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN (Robert Hale Limited, London, 1951), pp.38-162.

22. Cmd. 7136.


26. Ibid.; Cf. E.W.R. Lamby, THE TRANSFER OF POWER IN INDIA 1945-7 (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1954), pp.263-6; see also, Michael Edwarde, THE LAST YEARS OF BRITISH INDIA, p.218. Edwarde says that Labour politicians being 'incredibly ignorant about India', advanced the date of the transfer of power in the mistaken belief that the British administration in India was about to collapse.

27. 457 H.C. Deb. 5s., 28 October 1948, c.249.


29. 439 H.C. Deb. 5s., c.2441. An obvious instance is the American War of Independence.

30. Lord Mountbatten was Governor-General from 15 August 1947 to 21 June 1948.


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60. At this distance of time, it is amusing to note that the indignant British tea-planters in Assam proposed to kidnap the Marquess of Ripon: see Viscount Mersey, THE VICEROYS AND GOVERNORS GENERAL OF INDIA 1757-1947 (John Murray, London, 1949), p. 99; further, a so-called Anglo-Indian 'confederacy of blusterers' threatened to kidnap the Viceroy in order to deport him to England: see R.P. Masani, BRITAIN IN INDIA (Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1960), p. 61.

61. Before the birth of this all-India organisation, there existed provincial organisations like the British Indian Association and the National League in Bengal, the Madras Mahajan Sabha, the Sarvajanik Sabha in Poona, and the Bombay Presidency Association. Regarding the correct dates of the foundation of certain associations, see Birenbehari Majumdar, 'Chronological Blunders Made By The Early Congress Presidents', INDIAN HISTORY CONGRESS, Proceedings of the 1964 Ranchi Session, Part II, Aligarh, 1967, pp. 227-31.


66. Dadabhai Naoroji, POVERTY AND UN-BRITISH RULE IN INDIA (Publication Division, Govt. of India, Delhi, first Indian edn. 1962), passim.; Introduction, p. vii.

67. Presidential Address at the 21st Indian National Congress, quoted in THE EVOLUTION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN, p. 156.

68. For relevant extract of the resolution, Ibid., p. 160.

69. Lord Curzon to Lord Hamilton, 18 November 1900, Ibid., pp. 150-1; for a critical and comprehensive survey of Lord Curzon's (1899-1905) policies and imperialistic beliefs, see V.G. Dhir.,
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51. Masani, op. cit., p. xi.


58. 457 H.C. Deb. 5s., col. 270-1. For a contrary view and a comparative assessment of the reasons of British withdrawal, see:


59. 434 H.C. Deb. 5s., 6 March 1947, c. 674; see also, col. 665-72.

60. 439 H.C. Deb. 5s., 10 July 1947, c. 2490. Emphasis added.


67. For the recommendations, see REPORT ON INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS (Superintendent of Government Printing, Calcutta, 1918), para 317, p. 204.

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71. Ibid., p. 8. Appleby’s emphasis.


73. The factories, i.e., trading posts established by the East India Company with the consent of the then ruling powers of India, had usually a President and Council and it is from this President that the name ‘Presidency town’ arose. Bengal, Madras and Bombay were the three important early factory centres. Thus emerged the three great Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay.


78. For the course and consequence of the debate, see Thompson & Garrett, op. cit., pp. 281-2.

79. HISTORY AND CULTURE OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE, Vol. I, ‘English Education’ by R. C. Majumdar, K. K. Datta, and V. N. Datta, Chapter II(IX), p. 31. The chapter is devoted to the introduction of English education and its general impact on the Indian people leading to what is regarded as the Renaissance. See also, CHL, Vol. VI, Chapter VI, for a general review of educational progress up to 1858.

80. For text of the letter, see Sophia Dobson Collet, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF RAJA RAMCHUND ROY (Sadharan Brahma Samaj, Calcutta, 3rd edn., 1962), Appendix II. The first edn. of the work was published in 1900. The latest edn. is edited by Dilip Kumar Biswas and Prebhist Chandra Ganguly.

81. HISTORY AND CULTURE OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE, Vol. I, p. 36. An article published in a Bengali journal named SUHAKAR, 7 September 1853, pleaded for introduction of English education to remove the darkness of ignorance and to make men fit for ‘administration and other public activities’.


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84. CHI, Vol. VI, p.112.
85. At the time of independence, there were 19 universities in India: REPORT OF THE EDUCATION COMMISSION 1964—66: Education & National Development (Ministry of Education, Govt. of India, Delhi, 1966), p.275.
87. See Sastri & Srinivasan, op.cit., Chapter I, sec. 2 entitled 'The Story of Building Up The History of India'.
89. THE EVOLUTION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN, p.756.
94. William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State, USA, BRITISH RULE IN INDIA (1915), pp.8,13; quoted in HISTORY AND CULTURE OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE, Vol. I, p.445; Cf. Gandhi’s appeal 'To Every Englishman in India' (Young India, 27 October 1920), Temulkar, op.cit., Vol. II, pp.25-26; for a contrary view, see A. Coupland, BRITAIN AND INDIA (1600-1941), (Longman's Green & Co. Ltd., London, n.d.), p.55: 'the charge that the people of Britain have enslaved and exploited the people of India is untrue'.
96. Mrs Mochol, 440 H.C. Deb., 5a., 15 July 1947, c.263; Nehru, INDIA AND THE WORLD, p.201.
97. Kust, op.cit., p.19; Cf. Griffiths, THE BRITISH IMPACT ON INDIA, pp.400-4; he makes a very general statement that financial advantages as well as disadvantages accrued to India from the British connection and that 'the drain' was one of the disadvantages.
98. Ibid., p.401.
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1905 at the National Liberal Club, London: D.G. Karve and D.V. Ambekar, (ed.), SPEECHES AND WRITINGS OF GOPAL KRISHNA GOKHALE. Vol. III: Political (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1966), pp. 340-9: The theme of Gokhale's speech was the results of hundred years of British rule in India. While praising British rule for the 'blessings of peace, the establishment of law and order, the introduction of Western education' etc., Gokhale said that after a careful study of about 20 years he firmly believed that 'the economic results of British rule in India have been absolutely disastrous'.


105. In the 1930s Britain took out from India 130 to 140 million pounds sterling in 'pure' tribute alone, omitting the gains from unequal exchange, shipping profits, expenditures on the maintenance of military and administrative staff, etc. See V.I. Pavlov, INDIA: ECONOMIC FREEDOM VERSUS IMPERIALISM (People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1965), p. 7.

106. On sterling balances, see Chapter XIV.


111. Cf. Nehru, THE DISCOVERY OF INDIA, p. 301; K. Mathew Kurian, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CAPITAL ON INDIAN ECONOMY (People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1966), pp. 88-9; see also, Satis Chandra, 'Some Aspects of the Growth of a Money Economy in India During the Seventeenth Century': THE INDIAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY REVIEW, Vol. III, No. 4, December 1966, pp. 321-31: the author says that while the growth of merchant capitalism was arrested in the 18th century, industrial capitalism showed little signs of developing till the third quarter of the 19th or early 20th century.


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116. Ibid., p. 313.
120. Kast, op. cit., pp. 23-4; for a contrary opinion, see Griffiths, THE BRITISH IMPACT ON INDIA, pp. 476-9; Rawlinson, op. cit., pp. 242-3.
122. Ibid., pp. 5-10.
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136. Ibid., 35–9.


139. WHITE PAPER: in the Chinese Counsellor's note of 17 July 1954, it was alleged that more than 50 Indian soldiers 'crossed into Wu-Je of the Tibet region of China'; in a note to the Chinese Counsellor dated 18 July 1955, India denied any such intrusion, as she had earlier done on 27 August 1954, and complained of the presence of Chinese troops 'within Indian territory', pp. 1–6.


143. Article IV of the Treaty; for text, FPI, pp. 169–73.


146. See Dr P. N. Banerjee & Dr N. C. Ray, 'India and International Affairs', ITIA, 1952, pp. 165–74.


150. Ibid., p. 290.
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152. Quoted, Ibid., p.70.

153. For the resolution, Ibid., p.72.

154. For Nehru's Report thereon to the All India Congress Committee, Ibid., Appendix I, pp. 285-304.

155. Nehru, THE DISCOVERY OF INDIA, p.441; as evidence of Congress opposition to war and fascism, it was represented at the World Congress for Peace at Brussels in September 1936.

156. Lohia, op.cit., p.3.

157. See INDIA ON THE NAZI AGGRESSION AGAINST POLAND (Indian Foreign Affairs Association, New Delhi, 1959), pp.7-12.


159. Cf. Ibid., p.449.


162. For text of the broadcast, JAWAHARLAL NEHRU'S SPEECHES, Vol. I, September 1946-May 1949 (The Publications Division, Govt. of India, Delhi, 2nd edn. 1958), pp. 1-5; see also, speech, moving the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly, 13 December 1946, pp. 5-46.

163. In his Foreword, see Lohia, op.cit., p.3; years later, similar sentiments were expressed by him; Cf. Reply to the debate on the objectives resolution, 22 January 1947, in JAWAHARLAL NEHRU'S SPEECHES, Vol. I, pp. 16-25.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER XI

1. From reply to debate on foreign affairs in Lok Sabha, 12 June 1952, IFP, p. 60.

2. Speech in the Constituent Assembly while moving that the decision to continue in the Commonwealth be ratified, 16 May 1949, Ibid., p. 144.


4. At that date, the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon.

5. IFP, p. 137.

6. Nehru, INDIA AND THE WORLD, p. 204. Further, writing in 1933, Nehru maintained that British statesmen of the Liberal and Labour variety, under the cover of fine and radical phrases wanted to hide the 'ugly and brutal face of imperialism' and tried to keep India in the 'embrace of death' of the British Empire, 'now euphemistically called the British Commonwealth of Nations', WHITHER INDIA, p. 22.

7. Nehru, INDIA AND THE WORLD, p. 204. Cf. Laski Memorial Lecture, 1959, Dr (Miss) Aloo J. Dastur, INDIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH (Harold Laski Institute of Political Science, Ahmedabad, 1960), p. 3, wherein it is said that "India's membership of the Commonwealth is an unexpected culmination of Indo-British relations during the last 150 years".

8. Speech in reply to debate in the Constituent Assembly on India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth, 17 May 1949, IFP, p. 151.


10. Ibid., pp. 22-3.


12. See Earl Attlee, EMPIRE INTO COMMONWEALTH (Oxford University Press, London, 1961), pp. 14-15. Attlee called it a remarkable feature of the Commonwealth that many of its Prime Ministers had earlier fought against or had been imprisoned by the British.

13. IFP, p. 135.

14. For Churchill's speech, 457 H.C. Deb. 5s., 28 October 1948, coll. 242-5.


16. Answering a question in the British House of Commons on 2 May 1949, Prime Minister Attlee said that there had been no agreement or any decision to adopt or to exclude the use of any one of the terms - the Commonwealth, the British Commonwealth, or
the British Empire - and that it was better to allow people to use the expression they liked best: see 464 H.C.Deb. 5s., c. 644. Interestingly enough, the Lord Privy Seal (Mr Harry Crookshank) in the Conservative Government approvingly reiterated Attlee's statement in reply to a question on the use of the term 'Empire', see 525 H.C.Deb. 5s., 24 March 1954, c.1234.


18. IFF, p.138.

19. Ibid.

20. From speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 8 March 1949, IFF, p.38.

21. (1) Broadcast from New Delhi, 10 May 1949, IFF, pp.132-4; (ii) Speech in the Constituent Assembly while moving that the decision to continue in the Commonwealth be ratified, 16 May 1949, Ibid., pp. 134-46; also, Mansergh, DSOa, 1931-1952, Vol.II, pp. 947-57; (iii) Speech in reply to debate in the Constituent Assembly on India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth, 17 May 1949, IFF, pp. 146-53.

22. Sir B.N. Rau, Constitutional Adviser of the Constituent Assembly (India) from July 1946 to the end of 1948, argued that just as the completely sovereign and independent member-States of the UN find it possible to recognise certain organisational authorities for the purpose of working together, in just the same way the members of the Commonwealth could, without impairing their sovereignty in any way, recognise His Majesty as the head of the Commonwealth association. B.N. Rau, INDIA'S CONSTITUTION IN THE MAKING (Orient Longmans, Madras, 1960), p.356.

British Labour Party leader Patrick Gordon Walker claims that the idea of the common recognition of the British King as the Head of the Commonwealth originated with him when he wrote a letter to Lord Mountbatten in July 1948. Further, he claims that after a tour of Asian capitals in January 1949, he elaborated the idea in a memorandum to Mr Attlee and suggested that India's membership as a republic should be generally accepted and that all the members, including India, should recognize the King as Head of the Commonwealth. See Patrick Gordon Walker, THE COMMONWEALTH ( Seeker & Warburg, London, 1962), p.183.


24. Speaking from the experience of the actual working of the Commonwealth relationship for five years, Nehru claimed that not only that there had been no interference with India's independent sovereign status or freedom of action, but that because of the link, there had been 'a certain greater freedom of action in regard to external affairs than we might perhaps have done'. Speech in Lok Sabha on the Citizenship Bill, 5 December 1955, IFF, p.153.
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25. Cf. Ibid., pp.156-7; Rajan, op.cit., p.28. The Indian Citizenship Act, 1955 created the status of Commonwealth citizen on the basis of reciprocity.


29. Ibid., p.54.


31. Cf. Zelman Cowen, THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD (1965 Rosenthal Lectures, Northwestern University Press, Illinois, 1965), p.82; Wiseman writes: 'The ending of colonization, the abolition of foreign military bases, the destruction of apartheid, the maintenance of parliamentary democracy and the rule of law - on all these there are differences of emphasis, differences in commitment, and, above all, differences in regard to what, if any, action might be taken to deal with such issues or foster such causes'. See H. Victor Wiseman, BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1965), pp.42-3; also, A Monthly Survey of Foreign Affairs (Conservative Political Centre, London), No. 106, February 1958, p.1.


33. From reply to debate on foreign affairs in Lok Sabha, 12 June 1952, IFP, p.62.

34. Panikkar, INDIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN, p.15.


36. For defence stores purchases in Britain and the maintenance of the British pattern of India's defence forces, see B.S.N. Purti, INDIA IN THE COMMONWEALTH (Beacon Information and Publications, New Delhi, 1953), pp.57-8.

37. Speech of 12 June 1952 in Lok Sabha, IFP, p.61. Nehru further stated that India never discussed defence policies in the Commonwealth, either jointly or separately.

38. See COI H.P., P.4736/65 of February 1965, THE COMMONWEALTH IN BRIEF (British Information Services, India), p.19. Answering a Communist MP's objections regarding Indian Chiefs of Staff going to England for conferences of military officers, Nehru stated in Lok Sabha on 9 December 1955 that they used to go out occasionally to participate in joint exercises with a view to gaining wider knowledge of modern methods. But it did
not 'involve taking part in manoeuvres', or thinking of a defence policy vis-a-vis other countries'. See IFP, p.84.

39. For a brief consolidated list of such advantages, see V. Venkata Rao, 'The Commonwealth of Nations', Journal of the


41. For the period of our study, besides India, the Asian-African members were : Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana, the Federation of Malaya, and Nigeria. See COI INF.P.4756/65, op.cit., p.11.

42. Cf. Mansergh et al., COMMONWEALTH PERSPECTIVES, p.31; Miller, op.cit., p.56; Arnold, op.cit., p.102; Rajan, op.cit., passim. However, a different note is struck by Patrick Gordon Walker in his book THE COMMONWEALTH. Therein he suggests (p.141) that the Commonwealth as it stood in 1960 'was the outcome of an evolution that had its roots in the original nature of the Commonwealth and was brought to self-fulfilment by the common and conjoint action of all its members - original, Asian and African'. He also suggests (p.165) that the post-war transformation of the concept of the Commonwealth was not revolutionary, but that 'it was the logical and smooth culmination of trends and tendencies that were inherent in the nature of the Commonwealth and which had been at work throughout history'. Finally, he asserts (p.166), 'But the Asian members were not the specific cause of the transformation; Every one of the post-war constitutional changes would have come about without the membership of the Asian nations'. Dr Rajan in his book cited above has very convincingly rebutted the thesis of Gordon Walker.

43. Speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 8 March 1949, IFP, p.23.

44. On a number of occasions Nehru made this point. See IFP, pp. 44, 78.
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. SURVEY(RIIA) for 1939-1946, p. 367, quoted.
3. 464 H.C.Deb. 5s., 12 May 1949, c.2025.
Churchill first used the term 'Iron curtain' in his telegram as Prime Minister to President Truman, 12 May 1945, wherein it was said: 'An iron curtain is drawn down upon their Front. We do not know what is going on behind'. See Winston S. Churchill, THE SECOND WORLD WAR, Vol. VI, TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY (Cassel & Co., Ltd., London, 1954), pp. 498-9.
6. Albania, Bulgaria, Czecholovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania; Initially, Yugoslavia was also in the Soviet orbit.
9. The original signatories of the Treaty were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Greece and Turkey signed the Treaty in 1951 and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in 1955. For a brief account of the NATO and a favourable assessment of its role, see The British Survey (London), Main Series No. 193, April 1965, pp. 1-19.
   Almost immediately after West Germany's entry into the NATO, the Soviet bloc answered with the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact of 14 May 1955, members being, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany (German Democratic Republic), Poland, Rumania, the USSR, and Czecholovakia.
10. From Motion to approve the NATO in the British House of Commons, 464 H.C.Deb. 5s., 12 May 1949, c.2011.
11. Ibid., c.2016.
12. Mr Warbey, Ibid., c.2040.
13. It originated when on 12 March 1947, President Truman went before a joint session of the Congress of the United States proposing to send military and economic aid to Greece and
Turkey. It was an American policy of support to countries regarded as threatened with 'attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures'. For details see, OUR FOREIGN POLICY (U.S. Department of State Publication 3972, Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, 1950), pp. 43-8. The Truman Doctrine was based on the principle 'that a strong nation might go to the rescue of a weaker nation in the hour of need, especially when the threatened danger was ideological', Ian Thomson, op. cit., p. 134.

14. The Communist Information Bureau, established in Belgrade in October 1947 at the instance of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, members being the Communist Parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Rumania, the USSR, and Yugoslavia. Its ostensible purpose was to serve as a forum for exchange of information. In effect, it was designed to co-ordinate the activities of at least the ruling Communist Parties in Europe. Following grave disagreements and the resultant enmity between the Communist Parties of the USSR and Yugoslavia, the latter was expelled from the Cominform in 1948. There appeared to be a rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia in the post-Stalin era, and the Cominform was dissolved on 17 April 1956. Its dissolution was interpreted as an attempt to disabuse the minds of the Western Powers about Soviet intentions.

15. Nehru made this point in a speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on 4 December 1947, see IFP, p.28.


19. Cf. Free, op.cit., p.29. To illustrate the point: In 1949 the imports of heavy industrial equipment to India amounted to 479.9 million dollars. But during the Korean War they dropped to 340 million dollars in 1950. The imports began to rise only after the armistice in Korea, reaching 438.9 million dollars in 1955. See ECONOMIC SURVEY OF ASIA AND THE FAR EAST (United Nations, Bangkok, February 1956), p.34.


21. First formulated in the preamble to the India-China Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India, 29 April 1954, FPI, p.195. In his Lok Sabha speech of 15 May 1954, Nehru said that if these principles were adopted on a bigger scale among nations, a great deal of the troubles of the present-day world would probably disappear. The principles were reaffirmed in Nehru-Chou Joint Statement of 28 June 1954; text in FPI, pp.294-6. For details of PANDE SHREEJA and its acceptance by a number of countries from different continents,
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

see PANCH SHEELA: Its Meaning and History: A Documentary Study (Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1953).

22. IFP, p.164.

23. From speech during a foreign affairs debate in Lok Sabha on 25 March 1957, IFP, pp.194-5. The power vacuum theory appeared in a more pronounced form after the Suez fiasco as an American reaction to Arab nationalism. Prodded by John Foster Dulles who advocated instant readiness to plug any gap in the defence line of what was regarded as the 'free world', the supposed gap in the Middle East was sought to be plugged with the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine of military assistance to Middle East nations, including the employment of the armed forces of the United States with the avowed purpose of protecting the Middle East against 'international communism'. For President Eisenhower's message to Congress, 5 January 1957, and resolution adopted by the US Congress on 9 March, see DOCUMENTS(RIII),1957, pp. 235-240, 267-9; also, AR, Vol. 199 for 1957, p. 195.

24. IFP, p.48.

25. Ibid., p.164.

26. Ibid., pp. 11, 166.


32. From speech in Lok Sabha, 22 November 1960, IFP, p.235.


34. Speech at the Bangalore Session of the Indian National Congress, 17 January 1960, IFP, p.82.

35. From speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 8 March 1949, Ibid., p.38.

36. IFP, p. 82.

37. G.S. Bajpai, the first Secretary-General of the Ministry of
External Affairs of the Government of India, found historical parallel for India's non-alignment policy with the British policy of isolation at the end of the Napoleonic wars and America's isolationism: the countries concerned pursued policies for what they regarded as their national interest, see G.S. Baijal, 'India and the Balance of Power', IIIA, 1952, pp. 4-8. Krishna Menon explained that there could be no more be positive neutrality than there could be a vegetarian tiger: to call India neutral was to say that the Soviet Union and the United States were belligerents which, however, was not the case. Therefore, Menon said, 'Our position is that we are an unaligned and uncommitted nation in relation to the cold war', see GENERAL DEBATE: V.K. KRISHNA MENON'S STATEMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS 1960, p. 19. Cf. Free, op. cit., p. 27.


39. From Nehru's reply to debate on foreign affairs in Lok Sabha, 9 December 1958, IFP, p. 80.


41. SURVEY (IIA) for 1955-56, p. 17.

42. See 'India's Choice', The Economist, 2 February 1952, pp. 261-3.

43. IFP, pp. 25, 40, 46, 51; for a contrary opinion, see A.B. Shah, (ed.), INDIA'S DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES (Mankaltas, Bombay, 1966), p. 48: Shah argues that India's non-alignment ceased to be 'pure' after 1954, when 'being touchy over Kashmir', India came to rely increasingly on the Soviet veto, revealed an 'outdated conception of communism' with the result that, besides friendship for 'Communist China', India's foreign policy 'revolved round Moscow'; see also, G.F. Hudson, 'India, China, and Japan: The Emerging Balance in Asia', Orbis (Pennsylvania), Vol. 1, No. 4, Winter 1958, pp. 474-488: the author argues that non-existence of disputes with the Soviet Union contributed to the making of India's foreign policy one of neutrality in the Soviet-Western cold war and 'gave it a slant in favour of the Soviet side in international disputes' (p. 479).

44. This was a Pakistani criticism of India's foreign policy. See 'Pakistan and Her Neighbours': foreign relations of a new State, The Round Table, No. 183, June 1956, pp. 236-45. On the eve of the Bandung Conference, certain press comments in the West made too much of what they regarded as 'the cheering thought that a carefully modulated beating of anti-western drums may produce a new loosening of western purse strings', The Economist, 16 April 1955.

45. The US Secretary of State's speech was delivered on 9 June 1956. Quoted in 'Immorality Play', The Economist, 16 June 1956, p. 1076. Though not in Dullesian terms, it has been urged that freedom from alliances conferred no immunity and that true 'neutrality' could flourish only in the 'free world', see 'How to be a Neutral', The Economist, 21 May 1955, pp. 645-47.
NOTES TO CHAPTER III


47. Nehru made these points in reply to debate on foreign affairs in Lok Sabha on 20 August 1958, IPP, p. 78. Writing in 1957, Michael Brecher considered the creation of a no-war area in the uncommitted part of the world and a third force under India’s leadership as one of the pillars of India’s foreign policy. See Michael Brecher, INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY: An Interpretation. Paper for 13th Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Lahore, Pakistan, February 1958 (mimeo), (International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1957), p. 9.

48. IPP, pp. 80, 83.


50. COI RP. 4986 of March 1961, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY: A Brief Collection of Fact and Quotation (British Information Services, India), p. 5.

51. Although Britain takes into account commercial interests in framing her foreign policy, it is not her policy normally to take decisions on world affairs for narrow interests or short-term profits, see ‘Handling China’, The Economist, 12 September 1953, pp. 680-2. A nation living by trade needs peace and prosperity everywhere for good markets for its products, SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER THE Rt. HON. HAROLD MACMILLAN, M.P., ON MOSCOW TELEVISION 2ND MARCH 1959 (British Information Services, India), p. 5. The essentials of British foreign policy are basically two: ‘trade and defence, particularly the defence of trade’, C.H. Woodhouse, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR (Hutchinson of London, 1961), p. 8.

52. From Sir Eyre Crowe’s Memorandum of 1907, quoted in COI RP. 4986, op. cit., p. 18.


55. Kenneth Younger pointed out three basic changes since the Second World War: the emergence of great Powers of continental dimensions, the transformation of warfare by new weapons (of special importance to Britain), and the vastly increased importance of economic factors in the framing of government policy, see Kenneth Younger, THE DIASON LECTURES, 1955 (The Australian Institute of International Affairs, Melbourne, 1955), pp. 3-4.

56. The explosion of Britain’s first atomic bomb took place on the Monte Bello Islands, Australia, in October 1952. AR, Vol. 194 for 1952, Chronicle of Events.

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58. 473 H.C.Deb. 5s., 28 March 1950, c. 318.
60. Ibid., p.244. Commenting on Woodhouse's remarks, Younger says that elimination of 'objectives' does not serve the purpose, for a country's interests at any given time are not in any way self-evident, and that 'the need of the policy-maker to look beyond clearly defined interests to less precise long-term objectives is inescapable', Kenneth Younger, CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY (Oxford University Press for RITA, London, 1964), pp. 135-6.

61. From the reply given by Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Mr Selwyn Lloyd, to a question on the subject, 529 H.C.Deb. 5s., 5 July 1954, c. 1776. Adherence to the ideals of the UN enjoyed support from all sections in the British Parliament, irrespective of the existence of Labour or Conservative Governments. For instance, see R.A. Butler's speech, 491 H.C.Deb. 5s., 25 July 1951, c.486, and Hugh Gaitskell's speech, 582 H.C.Deb. 5s., 19 February 1958, c. 1225.

62. From statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr Herbert Morrison, 491 H.C.Deb. 5s., 25 July 1951, c.470; cf. Eden's broadcast to the people of Britain on 6 January 1953 in his capacity as Foreign Secretary, International Survey (London), Vol. I, 15.1.53, 1a (14).

63. From Foreign Secretary Eden's speech in the British House of Commons on 19 November 1951, Ibid., 30.11.51, 2b (23).

64. According to Dr Rajan, Britain's role in the UN in recent years seems to indicate that the British adherence to the principle of maintaining and supporting the UN 'is not as full, firm or consistent' as in the case of other principles of British foreign policy. See M.S. Rajan, GREAT BRITAIN AS A FACTOR IN INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: Paper for the Seminar on International Relations and Regional Studies, Bangalore, May-June 1962 (mimeo.), (Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi), p. 160.


67. For a complete list of multilateral and bilateral treaties (defence and nuclear armaments) entered into by Britain during 16 June 1373 to 15 February 1960, see 623 H.C.Deb. 5s., 16 May 1960, written answer, coll.89-90.


70. Flowing from US Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall's speech on 5 June 1947 at Harvard University. On US initiative it was developed to work as a joint endeavour of the US and European countries to carry out urgently necessary

71. Cf. Younger, CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, pp. 3-4.

72. Cf. Gaitskell, 582 H.C.Deb. 5s., 19 February 1958, c.1241.

73. From statement by Prime Minister Macmillan in the House of Commons on talks held with President Eisenhower in Washington toward the end of October 1957, 575 H.C.Deb. 5s., 29 October 1957, c.57; US-British Declaration of Common Purpose, Ibid., coll. 42-45; also, DOCUMENTS(RIIA), 1957, pp. 400-403.

74. From communique on the talks between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, 24 March 1957, DOCUMENTS(RIIA), 1957, pp. 581-3.

75. The Round Table, No.177, December 1954, p.13.

76. Miller, op. cit., p.115.


78. For relevant extract from the final communique of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting held in London, 3-13 May 1960, see Mansergh, BSQA, 1952-1962, p. 362.

79. 582 H.C.Deb. 5s., 19 February 1958, c. 1213.

80. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, permanent UK representative to the UN since June 1950 and appointed UK ambassador to France in November 1953, stressed the supreme importance of American-Commonwealth co-operation in order that the future must not belong to international communism, see International Survey, 25.3.54, Ia(94); Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr Ian Harvey) told the House of Commons that in view of the 'planned Communist offensive' at the present time, 'so far as the Government is concerned, we have no truck with international communism', 594 H.C.Deb. 5s., 30 October 1958, coll. 458-9; Cf. UK Foreign Secretary, Lord Home's broadcast on 8 December 1960 on foreign policy objectives, 08, Vol.6, No.26, 20 December 1960; US-British Declaration of Common Purpose (Supra, f.n. 73); the 1953 Defence White Paper (Cmd. 8768) for the first time referred to the Communists as the potential enemy.

81. The phrase is Eden's, International Survey, 30.11.51, 2b(30).

82. Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill's Press Conference in Washington on 28 June 1954 after the conclusion of talks with President Eisenhower, International Survey, 1.7.54, Ia(142). Churchill is to be credited with having made the first suggestion for having a try at diplomacy at the Summit level. In a statement in his Parliament on 11 May 1955, he spoke of the desirability of a high-level conference of the leading Powers of the world, Ibid., 14.5.55, Ia(33). Prime Minister Nehru
welcomed the suggestion in the Indian Parliament, Ibid., Is(37).

83. 577 H.C.Deb. 5s., 5 November 1957, c.36.
84. 624 H.C.Deb. 5s., 30 May 1960, c.1127.
85. Quoted in OOI HF.P.4986, op. cit., p.22.
86. Miller, op. cit., p.113.
87. Ibid., See also, p. 274.
89. The Common Market, European Economic Community (E.E.C.) or the
Euromarket came into being as a result of the treaty signed in
Rome on 25 March 1957, the signatories being Belgium, France,
West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. This joint
tariff union, designed to achieve complete economic integration
leading possibly to political integration, began functioning
from 1 January 1958. The EEC came to be designated as the 'Inner

90. Created in the first place to facilitate West Germany's full
partnership in the Western alliance. Its institutional aspects
are: the Assembly, the executive agencies, and the inter-govern­
mental Council. Britain regarded the Council as a convenient
forum for consultation between herself and the Six Governments
of the EEC., see UK Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd's
reply to a question on the future of the Western European Union,
613 H.C.Deb. 5s., 18 November 1959, coll. 1157-8. (For origins of the W.E.U., intra, Chapter VI,
f.n. 10). However, Britain was least interested in forming any
European political federation. As officially stated in the
British Parliament, she considered the North Atlantic Council
as the best forum for multilateral discussion of major dip­
lomatic issues by the Western allies', 614 H.C.Deb. 5s., 30
November 1959, written answer, c.30.

91. An organisation comprising Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. E.E.T.A. was set up following
the breakdown of the protracted negotiations for the creation
of a European free trade area comprising the Inner Six, and the
eleven other members of the Organisation for European Economic
Co-operation (O.E.E.C.), i.e., the UK, Austria, Denmark, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, Greece, Iceland, Irish Republic, Portugal
and Turkey. What Britain wanted was freedom of trade between
sovereign States, not economic integration of the EEC type.
The Treaty of Stockholm of November 1959 gave birth to EFTA
The EFTA came to be designated as the 'Outer Seven'.

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2. UN Document S/1511, Ibid., p. 5. India and Egypt did not participate in the voting, but two days later, the Government of India accepted the resolution of 27 June, UN Document S/1520.

3. Doubts have been expressed about the authenticity of information supplied by the UN Commission on Korea, see Karunakar Gupta, op. cit., Introduction, pp. xi-xii. The Communist side accused South Korea of aggression. Their accusation appeared to find surprising corroboration. Thus, referring to the 'prediction' made by John Foster Dulles, then Republican Adviser to the US Administration, on 22 June 1950 about 'positive action' by the US to preserve peace in the Far East, an author wondered whether the 'positive action' was the outbreak of the Korean War: see I.F. Stone, THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1952), pp. 23-27; quoting General Van Fleet's remark in January 1952 that 'there had to be a Korea either here or some place in the world', Stone concludes that 'in this simple-minded confession lies the key to the hidden history of the Korean War' (p. 348).


7. In his speech to Indian Parliament during debate on the President's Address, 17 February 1953, Nehru said that though the unit to Korea was sent purely for medical relief work, it had nothing to do with the war as such, IFP, p. 424.

8. UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE KOREAN CRISIS, p. 18.


10. The phrase is Churchill's, see The Economist, 2 February, 1952, p. 263.

11. Truman's statement, text in UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE KOREAN CRISIS, p. 18.


NOTES TO CHAPTER IV


16. The Soviet representative boycotted the Security Council on 13 January 1950 as a protest against the exclusion of the PRC. On 1 August he resumed his seat in the Council.

17. For the exchange of correspondences between Stalin, Acheson and Nehru, see *Documents(RIIA), 1949-1950*, pp. 706-8.


19. IFP, p. 419.


24. Resolution setting up the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, GAOR, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20, Resolutions, 376(V), pp. 9-10; *Documents(RIIA), 1949-1950*, pp. 698-700.


27. The appeal was signed, besides India, by Burma, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Persia, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the Yemen, and supported by Siam and Turkey. *Documents(RIIA), 1949-1950*, p. 743.


31. Speech in Indian Parliament, 6 December 1950, IFP, p. 418.


34. IFP, pp. 420, 422-3; Cf. *The Round Table*, No. 152, March 1951, p. 107.


36. It is of course true that Britain refused to accept the US resolution of 20 January 1951 in its original wording. At the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly, Britain’s representative Sir Gladwyn Jebb expressed, on 25 January,
serious doubts as to the advisability of an outright denunciation of the PRC as an aggressor. However, Britain voted for the resolution after US acceptance of Lebanese amendments to the wording of the resolution.

37. Cf. Prime Minister Attlee's statement in a foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons, 484 H.C. Deb. 5s., 12 February 1951, coll. 62-63; further, replying to questions, Mr Davies (Under-Secretary of State) reiterated the Prime Minister's 12 February statement and said that where for local tactical reasons it might be necessary to make small incursions over the 38th parallel, that would be considered a military matter, but that any substantial crossing of the Parallel would be a political matter on which consultation would take place, Ibid., 21 February 1951, coll. 1274-5.

38. Ibid., 26 February 1951, coll. 1743-5.

39. 486 H.C. Deb. 5s., 11 April 1951, c. 1027.

40. Text of the Indian draft resolution on the repatriation of the prisoners of war submitted to the Political Committee of UN General Assembly on 17 November 1952, DOCUMENTS(RIIA), 1952, pp. 442-4.

41. SURVEY(RIIA) for 1952, p. 329; Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Mr Selwyn Lloyd stated in the House of Commons that the British Government had been making every possible use of the good offices of the Government of India regarding the Korean armistice negotiations, 504 H.C. Deb. 5s., 28 July 1952, c. 1067.

42. SURVEY(RIIA) for 1952, p. 331; 508 H.C. Deb. 5s., 24 November 1952, c. 22; Ibid., 27 November 1952, coll. 631-8.

43. SURVEY(RIIA) for 1952, p. 331; 508 H.C. Deb. 5s., 1 December 1952, coll. 1081-3.


45. SURVEY(RIIA) for 1953, p. 197.


47. Text in DOCUMENTS(RIIA), 1953, pp. 386-405; Cmd. 8938, pp. 14-33.


49. See SURVEY(RIIA) for 1953, pp. 215-7; for Nehru's speech to Lok Sabha on 17 September 1953 bearing on the issue, IFP, pp. 428-30.


52. H.C.Deb. 5s., 27 January 1958, reply to a question on the situation in Korea, col. 1–2.


NOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. The four Powers agreed that the Indo-China part of the Geneva Conference should be attended, besides themselves, by the PRC and other interested States, although it was made clear that the invitation to, or the holding of, the above-mentioned conference did not imply 'diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded', DOCUMENTS (RIIA), 1954, p. 78. The decision to hold the conference was taken on 18 February 1954.

2. IFP, p. 395.

3. The Hindu (Madras), 6 March 1954.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 37.


12. The Hindu, 13 April 1954.


16. Convened on the initiative of the Ceylonese Prime Minister, Sir John Kotelawala from 28 April to 2 May 1954. Its chief preoccupations were Indo-China, disarmament, termination of colonialism, and a conference of Afro-Asian countries.

17. The Geneva Conference on Indo-China was a nine-power Conference of the UK, USA, USSR, France, PRC, the three Associated States, and the Viet Minh.


NOTES TO CHAPTER V

21. Nehru's broadcast from Colombo, 2 May 1954, IFP, p. 401. For an account of the debate on non-intervention in the Colombo Conference which led to the adoption of a modified version of Nehru's plan for a four-Power non-intervention agreement, see Jansen, op. cit., pp. 152-5.

22. After a siege lasting eight weeks and after the heaviest fighting of the Indo-China war.

23. Cf. SURVEY(RIIA) for 1954, p. 60.

24. Ibid.


26. 529 H.C.Deb. 5s., 23 June 1954, c. 432.


30. The United States made a unilateral declaration on its position regarding the Geneva Final Declaration. It took note of the Agreements of 20 and 21 July 1954 and declared that the USA would refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them. Further, it was declared that the USA would view any renewal of aggression in violation of the afore-said agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security, see DOCUMENTS(RIIA), 1954, pp. 140-1.


32. 550 H.C.Deb. 5s., 22 July 1954, c. 1572.


34. 550 H.C.Deb. 5s., 22 July 1954, c. 1571.

35. It was announced in Colombo on 4 August 1954 that the five Colombo Powers had issued a joint statement supporting the Geneva Agreements. The Ceylonese Prime Minister cabled this joint declaration to the British Foreign Secretary, The Hindu, 5 August 1954. The Colombo Powers also reaffirmed their support to the Geneva Agreements in their Bogor Conference. For text of the joint communique issued in Bogor on 29 December 1954, FPJ, pp. 542-5.

36. IFP, p. 402.

37. Ibid.


39. The Locarno Pact, initialled on 16 October and signed in London on 1 December 1925, comprised a number of interlocking treaties of which the most famous had been the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. Under this guarantee treaty, Britain, France, Belgium, Italy and Germany, collectively and severally guaranteed the Western frontiers of Germany and the demilitarisation of the Rhineland.
NOTES TO CHAPTER V

40. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of 14 February 1950 (valid for 30 years) is a joint defence treaty of the two countries directed against 'the rebirth of Japanese imperialism' and a repetition of aggression by Japan or any other State in association with Japan: the signatories expressed their desire to consolidate peace and universal security in the Far East and the world over in conformity with the aims and principles of the UN. For text of the Treaty, DOCUMENTS (RTIA), 1949-1950, pp. 541-3.

41. 529 H.C.Deb. 5a., 23 June 1954, c. 433.

42. Infra, Chapter VI.

43. A Locarno-type guarantee which included the FRC could not possibly have been opposed by India. Cf. Kundra, op.cit., p. 210.

44. IFP, p. 404.

45. Ibid., p. 403.


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NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. Formed in 1948 in response to the Marshall Plan by 16 European nations: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Irish Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the UK. The Federal Republic of Germany joined the OEEC as a full member in 1955. Cf. Simek, Chapter III, p.n. 70 and 91. It may be noted that Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty pledged the signatories to economic co-operation.


5. However, when in March 1954 the USSR suggested in a note to the Western Powers that it might join the NATO, Foreign Secretary Eden told the British Parliament that Soviet membership of the NATO would not by itself be a sufficient assurance to the members of that organization. SURVEY(RIA) for 1954, pp. 156-7.

6. The Treaty was approved by 333 votes to 6. See, 464 H.C., Deb. 5a., 12 May 1949, coll. 2023, 2128, 2131.

7. Harvey, op. cit., p. 399; Dr Nicholas Mansergh suggested that the liberal theory of the Commonwealth must not blind one to the fact that it was being subjected to new strains, and that relations built up between Britain and another Commonwealth member through a regional organisation like NATO might be 'closer and more formal than anything that they allow themselves to create outside the organisation', The Round Table, No. 177, December 1954, p. 13.

8. Speech at the World Affairs Institute of the University of Denver, Colorado (USA) on 6 August 1951, A MONTHLY SURVEY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, No. 37, September 1951, p. 5.

9. Ibid.

10. Speech in the House of Commons on 14 April 1954, Mansergh, DSCHA, 1952-1962, pp. 425-6. In the same speech, Eden spoke about the UK's relations with the European Defence Community (EDC). The EDC Treaty was signed on 27 May 1952 by the foreign ministers of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the German Federal Republic. Britain sought to build up her partnership with the EDC within the wider NATO framework. As such, she did not wish to be merged in a Federal European system. The EDC never came into existence due to the rejection of the Treaty in the French National Assembly. Thereafter, the Western European Union (WEU) was set up with effect from 5 May 1955, based on agreements concluded in Paris in October 1954: on Paris Treaties, see SURVEY(RIA) for 1955-56, pp. 37-44. The WEU consisted of the Brussels Treaty powers (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and the UK, Italy, and the German Federal Republic. Its Standing Armaments Committee works in conjunction with the NATO.


13. SURVEY(RIIA) for 1952, p. 10.


15. See Kundra, op.cit., p. 90.

16. IFP, pp. 63-64.


18. Ibid., p. 64.


20. IFP, p. 90.

21. From Nehru's reply to debate on Goa in Lok Sabha, 26 July 1955, IFP, p. 112.


23. Ibid., p. 206; in a foreign affairs debate in Lok Sabha, Nehru made the point that it was the fear of the Western countries about the armed might of the Soviet Union which brought into existence pacts and alliances like NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact, and that as a counterblast, there came the Warsaw Treaty, 19 November 1956. Ibid., p. 559.

24. For a brief description of the treaties, see MILITARY ALLIANCES 1947-1957; though Britain was excluded from the ANZUS and it was regretted, Australian Prime Minister R.G. Menzies maintained that the treaty was only a local manifestation of closer British American relations; AR, Vol. 194 for 1952, p. 84.


26. Formed by the UK, France, USA, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. The Conference met at Manila from 6-8 September 1954. In November 1955, member countries decided to use the term SEATO in preference to SEAMO, the initials of the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, see COI E.5569/65 of April 1965, THE SOUTH-EAST ASIA TREATY ORGANISATION (COI, London), p. 4, f.n.1.

27. Ibid., p. 3.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

28. Ibid., p. 4. It was argued that before it was altogether too late, 'a new unity in the region' was required to hold in check 'a dynamic and ruthlessly disciplined movement' of the other side. See 'The Real Lessons of Indo-China', The Economist, 24 July 1954, pp. 259-61; also, 'Shield For Free Asia', Ibid., 21 August 1954, pp. 565-6.


31. 532 H.C. Deb. 5s., 8 November 1954, c. 926; For Eden's speech, Ibid., coll. 927-36.

32. The only Asian countries joining the SEATO were Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines. SEATO represented 'less than half the countries and less than a quarter of the people of the area it had been designed to defend', SURVEY(RIIA) for 1955-56, see pp. 192-3. The Soviet statement on the SEATO said that countries signing the Treaty represented only one-fifth of the population of South-East Asia and one-tenth of the total population of all Asian countries, see COI R.5569/65, op. cit., p. 5. For details of the Soviet attitude, I. Farisov and G. Martysheva, SEATO: A THREAT TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE PEOPLES OF ASIA (Information Department of the USSR Embassy in India, New Delhi, n.d.), passim.

33. It came into force on 19 February 1955 after the necessary ratifications.

34. 532 H.C. Deb. 5s., 8 November 1954, coll. 973, 976.

35. Ibid., coll. 942, 946.

36. Ibid., coll. 981, 984.

37. Cf. The Hindu, 30 June 1954; The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 25 June 1954, observed: 'What the Anglo-American leaders ignore in all this is that it is one thing for the Asian nations to consider their common interests and another for the Western Powers to come forward to impose their defence plans designed to subserve Western interests in the cold war'.

38. The Times of India (Delhi), 6 August 1954, observed that neither SEATO as envisaged by the United States, nor a defence system as tentatively suggested by Mr Eden, could be reconciled with the complete neutralization of Indo-China.


40. The Hindustan Times, 4 August 1954.


43. Cf. SURVEY(RIIA) for 1954, pp. 80-1.

44. UK contributions to the budgets of SEATO from 1 April 1956 to
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

30 June 1960 totalled £138,558: see the official reply given in behalf of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 627 H.C.Deb. 5s., 25 July 1960, c. 1071.

45. See SURVEY(RIIA) for 1954, p. 80.
48. Given by Mr Dodds-Parker, Jt. Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, 550 H.C.Deb. 5s., 12 March 1956, written answer, c. 4.
49. Selwyn Lloyd was Foreign Secretary from 20 December 1955 till the Earl of Home took over on 27 July 1956.
50. Mr Robert Allen, Jt. Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: 605 H.C.Deb. 5s., 15 May 1959, c. 1675.
51. Cf., for instance, the speech of Mr Harold Davies, Ibid., coll. 1661-6.
52. SURVEY(RIIA) for 1955-56, p. 23.
56. 538 H.C.Deb. 5s., 8 March 1955, c. 157.
57. For the Special Agreement between the Governments of the UK and Iraq, Baghdad, 4 April 1955, see DOCUMENTS (RIIA), 1955, pp. 293-4.
59. Accepting the observer status in the inaugural meeting of the Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council on 21-2 November 1955, the US enlarged its co-operation with the Pact members by being a member of its Military, Counter-Subversion and Economic Committees: COI R.3889, op. cit., p. 13.
60. For Eden's statement, 529 H.C.Deb. 5s., 30 March 1955, coll. 379-83; see also, FULL CIRCLE, pp. 220, 222-3.
61. 547 H.C.Deb. 5s., 12 December 1955, c. 834.
62. The phrase is from 'India: winter manoeuvres', The Round Table, No. 182, March 1956, p. 175.
64. IFP, p. 94.
65. Ibid., p. 95.
67. IFP, p. 95.
68. COI R.3889, op. cit., p. 6.
69. Since 1954, American aid to the Iraq of King Faisal and Nuri es-Said totalled 46 million dollars worth of weapons and military equipment, SURVEY(RIIA) for 1956-58, p. 374; besides gifts of aircraft and tanks to the Iraqi Forces, and providing Pakistan with £ 40,000 worth of anti-aircraft equipment on indefinite loan, Britain expressed her readiness in 1957 to contribute up to £ 500,000 a year in cash or in kind for training for the provision of a defence 'infrastructure' for the Baghdad Pact forces, see COI R.3889, op. cit., pp. 13-14; for a brief account of the military strength existing in 1956 of two members of the Baghdad Pact, Iraq and Iran, see E. Hinterhoff, 'An Appraisal of the Military Potential of the Arab States', Asian Review (London), Vol. LII, No. 192, October 1956, pp. 300-1.
70. Speech to Lok Sabha on 14 August 1958, IFP, p. 282; speaking in the Rajya Sabha on 6 March 1959, Nehru characterised the change of regime in Iraq as a revolution, Ibid., p. 472.
74. 594 H.C. Deb. 5s., 28 October 1958, coll. 17-18.
75. 592 H.C. Deb. 5s., 22 July 1958, c. 231.
76. Ibid., c. 350.
77. GS, Vol. 5, No. 18, 1 September 1959, p. 757.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. For Gandhi's speeches on 20 and 24 July 1947 and on 26 January 1948, Tendulkar, op. cit., Vol. VIII, pp. 63-4, 70, and 338 respectively.


7. For text of Lord Mountbatten's letter, DEFENDING KASHMIR, pp. 164-5. There is a bit of history about the introduction of a new factor — reference to the people or plebiscite — in the accession of States to India or Pakistan. When Junagadh acceded to Pakistan on 15 September 1947, India refused to recognise the accession of Junagadh on 25 September. India's refusal rested not on communal but geographical grounds, because Junagadh was surrounded on three sides by Indian territory while on the fourth lay the sea. As Poplai remarks, 'The real importance of the Junagadh dispute lay in the fact that India suggested a new device to test the validity of accession by a Prince in case this accession became the subject of dispute. This device was the plebiscite'. S.L. Poplai, 'Relations Between India and Pakistan', Foreign Affairs Reports, Vol. II, No. 9, September 1953, (pp. 110-20), p. 112. Ultimately a plebiscite was held in Junagadh when 90% of the people voted for accession to India. See also, Lord Birdwood, TWO NATIONS AND KASHMIR (Robert Hale Ltd., London, 1956), pp. 87-8, f.n.2. As far as Kashmir was concerned, it appears that Lord Mountbatten influenced the opinion of the Government of India regarding the reference of the question of accession to the people in view of the composition of the population: Cf. Campbell-Johnson, op. cit., pp. 120, 224-5.

8. According to Sir Ivor Jennings, the fundamental question regar-
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

The Kashmir question was not whether the Maharaja's act of accession was final or irrevocable, but that whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir was lawfully included among the territories of the Union of India. It was considered it to be a justiciable matter deserving of reference to the International Court: see O.E. Carrington, DISPUTES BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (Chatham House Memoranda, Oxford University Press for RIIA, July 1960), p. 46. It may be noted that by an order issued on 26 January 1950 in consultation with the Kashmir Government, the President of India specified the manner in which the Indian Constitution was applicable to Kashmir (text in S.L. Poplai, ed., SELECT DOCUMENTS ON ASIAN AFFAIRS, INDIA 1947-50 (in 2 volumes: Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1959), Vol. I, pp. 411-16.

9. Convened on the basis of the resolution passed in October 1950 by the General Council of the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference calling for elections for a Constituent Assembly which would determine 'the future shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir'.


13. Campbell-Johnson, op.cit., p. 229. Further, it is to be noted that India did not send troops to Kashmir before accession. Neither was there pre-planning, as evidenced by the signed statement of three British Commanders-in-Chief of the Indian Army, Air Force and Navy: THE STORY OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE INDIAN STATES, pp. 401-2. See also, Nehru's speech of 2 November 1947, text in Poplai, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 360-2.


15. KASHMIR AND THE UNITED NATIONS, pp. 7-8.

16. The Governments of India and Pakistan ordered a cease-fire to take effect one minute before midnight on 1 January 1949. According to Lord Birdwood, it was the result of a British initiative in that General Buchar, Indian C-in-C (from 1 January 1948 to 15 January 1949), sent with Nehru's approval the telegram to General Gracey of Pakistan which brought about the cease-fire: Birdwood, op.cit., p.73. For the view that the credit might as well be claimed by the Government of India because it authorised the action of its officer, see Shair Gupta, KASHMIR: A STUDY IN INDIA-Pakistan RELATIONS (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1966), p. 190. The cease-fire line was accepted by both by India and Pakistan on 27 July 1949.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

17. This refers to 'E' of Part I of the resolution. It has been India's view that Pakistan never implemented this clause. Cf. Krishna Menon's speech in the 763rd meeting of the Security Council.

18. UN Document 8/628, Letter dated 1 January 1948 from the Representative of India to the President of the Security Council concerning the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, SOUR: Third Year, Supplement for November 1948, Annex 28, pp. 139-144. Under Article 35 of the Charter, Member nations of the UN could report situation likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

According to one opinion, it was Lord Mountbatten who played an important role in persuading the Government of India not to advance troops beyond Uri lest the expulsion of the invaders at that stage should make the Government of India less inclined to go to the UN for mediation; see Karter Singh, KASHMIR AND IMPERIALIST INTERVENTION (People's Publishing House Ltd., Bombay, 1955), pp. 13-14.

19. Carrington, op. cit., p. 37. A statement to that effect was made in the House of Commons on 30 October 1947.


21. For opinions held in this regard by the National Conference and Sheikh Abdullah in the early part of 1948, see Rajbans Krishen, KASHMIR AND THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST PEACE (People's Publishing House Ltd., Bombay, 1951), p. 20; Communist opinion of the time was critical even of Nehru for refusing to see as it argued the 'hidden hand' of 'Anglo-American imperialism' behind Pakistan: Ibid., pp. 82-6. For opinion that it was 'utter nonsense' to accuse the USA and the UK of planning to establish military bases in Kashmir, see Josef Korbel, DANGER IN KASHMIR (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1954), p. 269.


23. Government of India's communication of 9 September 1949 to the UNCIP, text in Ibid., pp. 519-24.


25. SOUR: 12th Year, 8/Pv. 772, 20 February 1957. It was the Czech member of the UNCIP, O. Chyle, who alleged that the UNCIP's confidential memorandum on arbitration reached the hands of the British High Commissioners in New Delhi and Karachi at the same time or earlier than it could be officially presented to the Government of India: see Poplai, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 345.
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32. For instance, see 483 H.C.Deb. 5s., 30 January 1951, c. 714; 491 H.C.Deb. 5s., 26 July 1951, written answer, c. 98.

33. 562 H.C.Deb. 5s., 20 December 1956, c. 1447.


36. The proposal included disbandment of local forces including on one side the armed forces and militia of the State of Kashmir and on the other, the Azad Kashmir forces.


40. SCOR, 532 meeting, 21 February 1951; SCOR, 537 meeting, 21 March 1951.


42. From reply to debate in Parliament on the President's Address, 11 August 1951, IFP, pp. 469, 470.


44. Quoted in Sisir Gupta, op. cit., p. 251; also see, Karunakaran, op. cit., p. 164.

45. Karunakaran, op. cit., p. 165; opinion in India hardened against America because of that country's alleged encourage-
ment to Sheikh Abdullah in seeking an independent status for Kashmir. Whatever might have been the actual fact, Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed from office and put to jail.


47. REPORT(MEA) for 1953-54, pp. 8-10; also, Korbel, op.cit., pp. 192-4.

48. REPORT(MEA) for 1953-54, p. 9.

49. Ibid., p. 11.


53. Ibid.

54. Vide supra, Chapter VI for points covered therein by nos. 45-8 and 69; see also, Rajan, INDIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1954-56, pp. 90, 374, 375; for implications of Pakistan’s joining the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, see The Round Table, No. 184, September 1956, pp. 345-6.


57. While speaking in a reception at Srinagar on 10 December 1955, N.S. Khrushchev, Member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said: ‘That Kashmir is one of the States of the Republic of India has been decided by the people of Kashmir. It is a question that the people themselves have decided.’ Text of the speech in VISIT TO INDIA OF N.A. BULGAEV, CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, AND N.S. KHRUSHCHEV, MEMBER OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET: SPEECHES AND OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1956), pp. 127-34. Pakistan considered it a Russian ‘award’ to India, see The Round Table, No. 183, June 1956, p. 242; on the demonstrable Soviet support to India on the Kashmir issue, a British official spokesman said that the endorsement of India’s case was ‘hardly in keeping with the United Nations resolutions on Kashmir’: 547 H.C. Deb. 5s., 19 December 1955, coll. 1655-6.

58. Mr F.M. Bennett, 562 H.C. Deb. 5s., 20 December 1956, coll. 1448-9. It appears that the six UN resolutions referred to were the Security Council resolutions of 21 April 1948, 3 June 1948, 14 March 1950 and 30 March 1951, and the two UNCIP resolutions. The MP also raised a pro-Pakistani question, Ibid., coll. 1445-6.

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62. UNIB for 1957, p. 80.


64. SCOR, 808 meeting, 1957: for Indian press comments on the 2 December resolution, see Sirir Gupta, op. cit., p. 333.

65. KASHMIR: V.K. Council, p. 163.

66. IFP, p. 487.


68. 564 H.C.Deb. 5s., 5 February 1957, written question, c.39.

69. The MPs referred to are Mr Donnelly and Mr Boyd, see 567 H.C.Deb. 5s., 21 March 1957, coll. 523-4.

70. The MP referred to is Mr Donnelly; for his questions and official replies, 578 H.C.Deb. 5s., 21 November 1957, coll. 555-7; Ibid., 28 November 1957, coll. 1258-9.


72. Cf. UNIB for 1958, 1959 and 1960, pp. 91-3, 79-80 and 175-6 respectively. Meanwhile, the UN Representative Dr Frank Graham submitted his report on 18 March 1958. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, (Commander Allan Noble), told the House of Commons that the UK government were in consultation with the Indian and Pakistani Governments about the situation following the presentation by Dr Graham of his Report: 589 H.C.Deb. 5s., 12 June 1958, coll. 391-2. For India's views on the Graham Report, IFP, pp. 488-490.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1. Text in DOCUMENTS(RIIA), 1956, pp. 77-113; SUEZ CANAL: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY, pp. 15-23.

2. Supplement to Capital (Calcutta), Vol. 137, 20 December 1956, p. 59; see also, SUEZ CANAL: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY, pp. 3-4, 11.

3. Article 8 of the Agreement of 1954 reads: 'The two contracting Governments recognize that the Suez Maritime Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, is a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance, and express the determination to uphold the Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal signed at Constantinople on October 29, 1888', Ibid., p. 63.

4. The statement issued jointly in behalf of the Governments of the UK, USA and France on 2 August 1956, while recognizing the right of Egypt to nationalise assets 'not impressed with an international interest', characterised Nasser's nationalisation of the Canal Company as an 'arbitrary and unilateral seizure by one nation of an international agency'. The 'seizure' was regarded as the more 'serious in its implications' because of the declared desire of Egypt 'to make the Canal serve the purely national purposes of the Egyptian Government', an obvious reference to the future utilisation of the revenues of the Canal to finance the Aswan High Dam following the US-British withdrawal of their offers of financial aid for the High Dam scheme. For text of the 3-Power Statement, James Eatys, THE COMMONWEALTH AND SUEZ: A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY (Oxford University Press, London, 1964), pp. 39-41. For non-official Western comments that nationalisation of the Canal Company had been illegal, see The World Today, Vol. XIII, No. 5, May 1957, pp. 189-99; 'A Challenge to Law: Colonel Nasser and the Suez Canal', The Round Table, No. 124, September 1956, pp. 307-11. For an able defence of the nationalisation on legal grounds, see Terence Robertson, CRISIS: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE SUEZ CONSPIRACY (Hutchinson & Co., London, 1965), pp. xix-xvi.

5. This unity, however, would be broken later with the invasion of the Suez.

6. From the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Gaitakall's question in the Commons on 27 July 1956, Eatys, op. cit., p. 25.


8. 557 H.C. Deb. 5s., 30 July 1956, c. 918.

9. Ibid., c. 919.

10. Eatys, op. cit., p. 32.

11. Ibid., pp. 35-6. In his broadcast speech of 8 August 1956, Prime Minister Eden used a similar language: 'this is how fascist governments behave and we all remember, only too well, what the cost can be in giving in to fascism', Ibid., p. 42.

12. Ibid., p. 36.

13. For Mr Morrison's speech, 557 H.C. Deb. 5s., 2 August 1956, coll. 1654-61.

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wherein it was commented: 'The parties therefore emerged from the
debate of August 2nd with apparently united agreement that Presi­
dent Nasser had got to be made publicly to climb down'.


16. In his statement at the 22-Power London Conference on 20 August
1956, India's Union Cabinet Minister without Portfolio Mr V.K.
Krishna Menon, made a similar point: see Eayrs, op.cit.,p.142.

17. See f.n. 4 above.

18. The Conference met from 16 August to 23 August 1956. Out of the
24 Governments invited, Greece and Egypt did not send any rep­
sentatives. So, it became a Conference of 22 nations. The Gov­
ernment of India did not 'subscribe to the appropriateness of the
list of invitees' (IFF, p.531), and it considered the exclusion
of Burma and Yugoslavia as regrettable omissions.

19. Of 21 August 1956, the 18 nations being: Australia, Denmark,
Ethiopia, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Iran, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. Text of
the proposals in Eayrs, op.cit., pp. 101-3.

20. Issued on 20 August 1956. It was supported by Ceylon, Indonesia
and the USSR. Text of the proposal in IFF, pp.252-3. See also,
Krishna Menon's statements at the London Conference on 20 Au­


22. L.S. Deb., Third Series, Vol. XLVI, No.29, 24 September 1965,
coll. 7529-7530.

23. FULL CIRCLE, pp. 444, 502. For a balanced appraisement of the
Indian position see, however, 'Asian Pressures for a Suez
Settlement', The Economist, 29 September 1956, pp.1057-8; also,
'Indian Views on Suez', Ibid., of even date, p. 1059.

24. Comprised the Chairman of the Committee, Mr R.G. Menzies, Prime
Minister of Australia, the Foreign Ministers of Ethiopia, Iran,
and Sweden (respectively Mr Habtewold, Dr Ardalan, and Mr.
Osten Unden); and, Mr Loy Henderson of the US State
Department, representing Mr John Foster Dulles. The Menzies
Mission failed because its proposals were presented in Cairo
virtually as an ultimatum, not as a basis for negotiations:
see The Economist, 22 September 1956, p. 938; also, 'Dialogue
in Cairo', Ibid., 15 September 1956, pp. 859-60; 'Poker Play
for Canal Users', Ibid., 29 September 1956, pp. 1023-5, where­
in it was stated that it was a 'take it or leave it affair
demanding internationalisation or denationalisation of the
Canal'. The Committee held talks in Cairo from 3-9 September
1956.

25. For extracts from Prime Minister Eden's speech, Eayrs,op.cit.,
pp. 109-112.


27. All the 18 Powers who formed the majority in the first London
Conference attended this second conference on Suez from 19
September to 21 September 1956. Ultimately, the 18 nations'
group was reduced to one of 15 nations when Ethiopia, Japan, and Pakistan declined membership in the users' association.


29. Ibid., p. 491.

30. Ibid., p. 484. Britain was bent upon military action before its possibility 'slipped from our grasp', cf. Ibid., pp. 427, 456, 533.


33. Eayrs, op. cit., pp. 120-1.

34. FULL CIRCLE, p. 502.


36. Quoted by Mr Hugh Gaitskell in his broadcast of 4 November 1956, Ibid., p. 217.

37. See Robertson, op. cit., p. 167.

38. Cf. 'Splenetic Isolation', The Economist, 3 November 1956, pp. 391-3; The Round Table, No. 186, March 1957, pp. 196-200.

39. Among the important British newspapers, the Anglo-French attack was supported by The Times, Daily Telegraph, Daily Express, Daily Mail, and Sunday Times. But it was opposed by the News Chronicle, Daily Herald, The Observer, and the Manchester Guardian. For press opinion before the attack, see SURVEY (NIA) for 1956-58, p. 14. For Eden's retrospective comments on the public support he claimed his Government had received, see FULL CIRCLE, p. 546.

40. 558 H.C.Deb. 5s., 31 October 1956, coll. 1454-5.


42. Eayrs, op. cit., p. 248.

43. Ibid., p. 249.

44. See the statement by India's permanent representative to the UN, Mr Arthur Lall, to the General Assembly on 1 November 1956: Eayrs, op. cit., pp. 251-6.


47. For Prime Minister Eden's statements in this regard, 558 H.C. Deb. 5s., 30 October 1956, coll. 1274-5; Ibid., 1 November 1956, coll. 1649-50.
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49. Resolution 997(E8-I) of the General Assembly's First Emergency Special Session, adopted by a roll-call vote of 65 to 5 (including Britain), with 6 abstentions. For action by UN organs from 29 October 1956 on the Anglo-French-Israeli intervention in Egypt, see UNYB for 1956, pp. 25-34.


51. PULL CIRCLE, p. 545.

52. 560 H.C.Deb. 5s., 8 November 1956, c. 270.

53. SURVEY(RIIA) for 1956-58, pp.48,56,61; Robertson, op.cit., Chapter VIII, particularly pp.157-67. For official denial of any collusion, see replies on the subject: 560 H.C.Deb. 5s., 22 November 1956, coll. 1932-37; see, however, Eayrs,op.cit., pp. 99-100. Sir Dingle Foot, Q.C., the Solicitor-General, asserted in a meeting at Ipswich on 13 April 1966 that over Suez the 'Conservatives' secretly conspired with the French and Israelis', see The Guardian(Manchester), 14 April 1966.

54. Statement in Lok Sabha, 16 November 1956, IFP, p.536.


57. Statement by Mr Alan Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 560 H.C.Deb. 5s., 8 November 1956, coll. 289-90.

58. Prime Minister Eden told the House of Commons on 30 October 1956 that his Government kept in close consultation with the Commonwealth Governments. However, in his broadcast speech on 3 November 1956, he said that Britain's friends inside and outside the Commonwealth 'could not in the very nature of things be consulted in time'; Eayrs, op. cit., pp.208,214.


60. Mr Kenneth Younger drew attention to it: 560 H.C.Deb. 5s., 8 November 1956, c. 268.


63. Ibid., pp. 523-7; also, Eayrs, op. cit., p. 452.

64. Eayrs, op. cit., pp. 455-6.


66. The Round Table, No. 186, March 1957, p. 119.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1. Cf. Carrington*, op.cit., p.1; Mr Nigel Fisher, 621 H.C.Deb. 5s., 8 April 1960, c. 806.
2. Mr H.A. Marquand, Ibid., c. 826.
3. It is a Dutch or Afrikaans word meaning 'apartness', 'separateness' or 'segregation'. Though the policy as such began long back, the first use of the term was made by Dr Daniel Francois Malan on the eve of the general elections in South Africa when the Nationalist Party appealed to the country on White South Africa cry on the basis of a stronger colour policy in 1948. In the name of 'separate development' for the White and non-White races, apartheid really means 'Die Kaffer op se plek en die Koelie uit die land'—the Kaffir (the Bantu, apartheid word for Negro) in his place and the Coolie (meaning Indian) out of the country. Under sham legality and perversion of parliamentary democracy, apartheid is a policy of inhuman exploitation, racial persecution and tyranny carried out in all spheres of life in South Africa for the suppression of the non-White majority of the South Africans. For details, see: E.B. Jeannes, THE HISTORY OF APARTHEID: The Story of the Colour War in South Africa (Pall Mall Press with Barrie & Rockliff, London, 1962), pp. 52, 72-84, 157, 161, 166; E.S. Sacks, THE ANATOMY OF APARTHEID (Collet's, London, 1965), pp. 19-28, 226, 334; for some account of the operation of the policy, see APARTHEID: Racial Discrimination (The Foreign Relations Society of India, New Delhi, 1951), pp. 2-10; Norman Phillips, THE TRAGEDY OF APARTHEID (David McKay Co., Inc. New York, 1960), pp. 5-6, 16-7.
6. Mr John Stonehouse, 621 H.C.Deb. 5s., 8 April 1960, c. 776.
7. Texts in S.B. Mukherji, INDIAN MINORITY IN SOUTH AFRICA (People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1959), Appendices II & III, pp. 196-205. See also, Mrs Vijayalakshmi Pandit's speech of 21 November 1946 at meeting of the joint First and Sixth Committees of the 1st session of the UN General Assembly: QUESTION OF THE TREATMENT OF INDIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION (Department of External Affairs & Commonwealth Relations, India, 1947), pp. 23-5. Further, it is to be noted that in 1911, the Government of India forbade further recruiting of Indian labourers for work in South Africa, and that under the Gandhi-Smuts Agreement of 1914, some of the immediate grievances were redressed: S.B. Mukherji, op.cit., Appendix I for the agreement, and Chapter III for an assessment thereof.
8. Because it was formally ratified both by British India and South Africa: see QUESTION OF THE TREATMENT ...... Organisation, p.45.
9. For its effects, see Bains, op.cit., p.3; also, Carrington, op.cit., p.30; for a South African justification of the racialist measure, Cf. Violet Wetherall, THE INDIAN QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA (The Unie-Volkspers Bpk., Cape Town, 1946), p. 71.
10. These Articles enable the UN General Assembly to discuss general
principles of co-operation among nations and to recommend measures for the peaceful settlement of disputes which the Assembly 'deems likely to impair the general welfare of friendly relations among nations'.


14. The phrase is from 'Fruits of Malacity', The Economist, 15 November, 1952, pp. 431-2; see also, 'Commonwealth in Convoz', Ibid., 16 April 1960, pp. 223-4; 'In Black and White', Ibid., 14 May 1960, p. 671.

15. On 21 March 1960, at Sharpeville near Vereeniging in the Transvaal, 78 Africans were killed and 212 injured by the South African police. Peaceful demonstrations were subjected to police firing and mass beating also at the Cape Town suburbs of Langa and Nyanga. Thousands of Africans and South African Indians were arrested. For facts of the Sharpeville massacre, see: CS, Final Vol.6, No.8, 12 April 1960, p.334; Norman Phillips, op.cit., pp. 3-10, 13, 162-73; Sachs, op.cit., pp. 505-32; Peter Calvo-coresi, SOUTH AFRICA AND WORLD OPINION (Oxford University Press, London, 1961), pp. 1-5.

16. Statement by Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr Alport, 626 H.C. De. 5s., 4 July 1960, c. 52.

17. QUESTION OF THE TREATMENT ....Organisation, pp.9, 26, 40.

18. For extracts from Sir Hartley Shawcross's speeches at Committee meetings, Ibid., pp. 56-65, 128, 150.

19. Ibid., p. 60. (Cf. f.n. 8 above).

20. Ibid., p. 61.

21. Ibid., p. 46.

22. Ibid., p. 47.

23. Ibid., p. 91.

24. GAOR. Part II of 1946, 50th Plenary meeting, 7 December 1946, p. 1016.

25. At 51st Plenary meeting, 8 December 1946, Ibid., p. 1034.

26. At 52nd Plenary meeting, Ibid., p. 1045.

27. UN Document A/205, Ibid., pp. 1060-1.


29. UNTB for 1959, p. 61; Gmd. 992, pp. 48-9.

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33. This was added to the agenda of the 7th session of the UN General Assembly; see Amelia C. Leiss, ed., APARTHEID AND UNITED NATIONS COLLECTIVE MEASURES: AN ANALYSIS (Prepared under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1965), pp. 5-9; UNYS for 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, pp. 69-72, 142-5. See also 98-102, 83-6, 57 respectively.

34. Cf. official replies on the issue under discussion: 505 H.C. Deb. 5s., 23 October and 30 October 1952, coll. (written answer) 129-30 and 2086-88 respectively; 508 H.C. Deb. 5s., 27 November 1952, c. 91; 561 H.C. Deb. 5s., 5 December 1956, c. 128 (written answer); 579 H.C. Deb. 5s., 4 December 1957, coll. 349-50; 582 H.C. Deb. 5s., 12 February 1958, coll. 582-3; 615 H.C. Deb. 5s., 7 December 1959, c. 6; 620 H.C. Deb. 5s., 28 March 1960, coll. 953-7; Ibid., 30 March 1960, c. 1329. Most of the answers in written answer columns.

35. Vide supra, Chapter III, f.n. 77.


37. Sir Dixon's statement is quoted in 621 H.C. Deb. 5s., 6 April 1960, c. 382.

38. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers met from 3 to 13 May 1960.

39. Text of the resolution in 621 H.C. Deb. 5s., 8 April 1960, c. 774; for the Debate, Ibid., coll. 774-843.


42. UNYS for 1960, pp. 152-3.

43. Ibid., pp. 147-52.
NOTES TO CHAPTER X

   Incidentally, it might be argued that if at all a considered policy of this nature had been adopted at that early date regarding India, (for the Secretary of State's announcement of 20 August 1917, see THE EVOLUTION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN, p.264), it seems incomprehensible why Montagu should have permitted himself on his own admission to react violently to Subrahmanya Aiyar's letter to President Wilson asking him to intercede for the cause of self-government for India; see Edwin S. Montagu, AN INDIAN DIARY (William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1930), pp.123-4.

2. Statement quoted in Cmd. 7167, p. 15.


6. Cf. Oliver Lyttleton, Secretary of State, Colonial Office, answer to a question in the House of Commons, Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No.1, 6 February 1952, p. 5; 'Socialist Colonial Policy', Ibid., No.21, October 1954, pp.5-7; Ibid., No.48, May 1957, pp.1-2; 'Conservatives and Colonies', The Economist, 3 November 1954, p. 1032.

7. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr Bevin), 481 H.C.Deb. 5s., 29 November 1950, coll. 1161-2.

8. The phrase is from R.A. Butler, Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No.42, November 1956, p. 5.


10. Vide Supra, Chapter II, f.n. 41.

11. Figures by Mr Macleod (Secretary of State for the Colonies), 626 H.C.Deb. 5s., 4 July 1960, c. 164.


15. Speech in Rajya Sabha on 26 August 1954, REPORT(MEA) for 1954-55, p. 47.

16. IFP, pp. 530, 531.

17. Statement in Lok Sabha, 22 May 1956, IFP, p. 505.

18. On 15 December 1960 at the First Committee of the UN General
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20. Ibid.


27. See 633 H. C. Deb. 5s., 26 and 30 January 1961, questions and answers, coll. 333, 334-5, 586-7, respectively.


29. For the Communist view that Britain's decolonisation was nothing but neo-colonialism in an effort to maintain her position as a 'world imperialist power', imposing thereby crippling burdens on Britain's home economy in the changed situation after the Second World War, see R. Palme Dutt, BRITAIN'S CRISIS OF EMPIRE (Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1949), and the same author's THE CRISIS OF BRITAIN AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE (People's Publishing House Ltd., Bombay, 1953).


32. Cf. GS, Vol. 7, No. 2, 17 January 1961, p. 81; 632 H. C. Deb. 5s., 19 and 21 December 1960, answers to questions on UK voting on the issue at the UN, coll. 872-3 and 164 respectively.

33. Statement by the Lord Privy Seal (Mr Edward Heath), 629 H. C. Deb. 5s., 4 November 1960, coll. 649-20.

34. From Nehru's statement in Lok Sabha, 22 May 1956, IFP, p. 506.

35. Ibid.


40. IPP, p. 511.


42. For facts in this regard, OS, Vol. 6, No. 15, 19 July 1960, pp. 667-8.

43. Text in DOCUMENTS(RTA), 1960, p. 277.

44. Prime Minister Macmillan's statement of 14 July, reporting to the House the reasons for abstention as given at the Security Council by Mr Beasley, Acting Head of the UK mission to UN, see Ibid., pp. 277-8.

45. IPP, p. 513.


47. See THE SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO: V.K. KRISHNA MENON'S STATEMENTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS 1960 (Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi), passim.

48. From statement by the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr J.B. Godber), 632 H.C. Deb. 5a., 21 December 1960, c. 1358.

49. THE SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO, p. 59; Nehru called it a very extraordinary position that the UN Forces sent to the Congo to prevent wrong-doing should look on helplessly, although 'very angrily', even when Colonel Mobutu's forces had been acting 'with great brutality'. Statement in the Rajya Sabha, 21 December 1960, IPP, p. 522.

50. At the unofficial level, much understanding was shown for the Indian position. For instance, see the speech of Mr John Stonehouse, 632 H.C. Deb. 5a., 21 December 1960, coll. 1356-8.


52. The total number of people of Indian origin in British colonies, according to one estimate in 1959, was 21,90,152. Ibid., p. 381, f.n. 2.


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55. REPORT(MEA) for 1953-54, p. 19.


57. REPORT(MEA) for 1956-57, p. 49.

58. See Nehru's speech in Lok Sabha, 2 September 1957, IFP, p. 433.

59. In the course of a debate in the Rajya Sabha on 7 December 1956 on the resolution ('India's further continuation of her membership in the Commonwealth is inconsistent with the principles of Panch Sheel'), a Communist MP criticised the Government for failure to promote the freedom of colonies like Kenya, Malaya and Cyprus. Further, again during a debate on the subject of India withdrawing from the Commonwealth, 2 MPs suggested that Commonwealth membership detracted from India's traditional role of helping the liberation of other countries and that it disabled her in the matter of championing the cause of dependent peoples of the world. L.S. Deb., 2nd series, Vol. XXXIX, 26 February 1960, coll. 3006-21, 3042-3.

60. REPORT(MEA) for 1953-54, p. 18.


63. Mr H. Pollick made the suggestions; see 508 H.C. Deb. 5e., 27 November 1952, coll. 952-60.

64. Mansergh, DSCA, 1952-1962, p. 555. The population of the smaller dependent territories referred to was really small. According to the latest estimates, the population of some such territories are: Falkland Islands—and Dependencies — 2,079; Pitcairn — 66; St. Helena — 4,676. See ODI WP.5747/66, op. cit., pp. 30, 40, 42, respectively.

65. From statement by Mr Macleod (Secretary of State for the Colonies), 626 H.C. Deb. 5e., 4 July 1960, coll. 164, 166.

66. REPORT(MEA) for 1960-61, p. 41.
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1. A CHRONICLE ........ SECURITY IN ASia, p. 17. This was in conformity with Article 56 of the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference adopted on 29 September 1949. DOCUMENTS(RIIA), 1949-1950, p. 539.

2. PRC Foreign Minister Chou En-lai communicated Chairman Mao Tsetung's proclamation to the Government of India and to the governments of all countries on 1 October 1949.


4. Cf. INDIAN SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Seminar on International Relations and Regional Studies at Bangalore (May-June) 1962, p. 36.


8. For statements and views referred to in the paragraph, see UNIB for 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, pp. 59-60, 136-7, 96-7, 89-91, and 76-8 respectively; Cmd. 992, pp. 13-4; statement of the Indian representative at the UN General Assembly on 16 November 1956; ADMISSION OF CHINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS: V.K. KRISHNA MENON'S STATEMENT (Information Service of India, New Delhi); SURVEY(RIIA) for 1954, pp. 247-50; statement of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr John Profumo), 612 H.C.Deb. 5s., 29 October 1959, c. 524; statement of the Lord Privy Seal (Mr Edward Heath), 629 H.C.Deb. 5s., 4 November 1960, c. 528.

9. Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr J.B. Godber), 632 H.C.Deb. 5s., 12 December 1960, c. 100.

10. Ibid., coll. 1044.

11. Lady M. Lloyd George made the point that in spite of everything, Britain was America's most powerful ally and as such, she should not be irritated 'frightened of expressing' her opinion clearly: the UK need not acquiesce in the American viewpoint on the issue, Ibid., c. 50; Miss Jennie Lee said that 'if the price of American friendship is British subservience, that is too high a price', Ibid., c. 70; Mr Desmond Donnelly, who moved the censure motion against the Government for its 'consistent failure to press for the admission' to the UN of the PRC, said that the Government stood indicted, amongst many such things, 'of duplicity for one thing in Peking and for another in Washington, and, finally, of cowardice in not making her voice heard at a time when the world is waiting to hear it', Ibid., coll. 38, 46; and, in the House of Lords, Lord Pethick-Lawrence observed that out of loyalty to the United States, the Government had blocked the entry of the PRC to the UN and that friendship with the US need not mean subservience: finally, he called upon the Government to avoid being dragged 'along on the wheels of the chariot of the
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13. IFP, p. 314.


15. IFP, p. 322.

16. From statement in Lok Sabha, 4 September 1959, IFP, p. 343.


18. Ibid., p. 207.

19. Ibid.


21. CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF TIBET, p. 208. The Government of India's note to the PRC Government dated 26 October 1950 stated that the Tibetan delegation left Delhi the day before, i.e., on 25 October. However, the second Indian note to Peking dated 31 October stated that in view of Chinese military operations in Tibet, 'the Government of India are no longer in a position to advise the Tibetan delegation to proceed to Peking unless the Chinese Government think it fit to order their troops to halt their advance into Tibet and thus give a chance for peaceful negotiations', DOCUMENTS(BIIA), 1949-1950, pp. 550, 553.

22. For statements quoted or referred to in the paragraph, see the exchange of notes between the Government of India and the PRC Government between 26 October-16 November 1950, DOCUMENTS (BIIA), 1949-1950, pp. 550-6. For a later Chinese commentary on the notes to Peking addressed by India in 1950, see CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF TIBET, pp. 264-5.

23. From statement by Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr Ernest Davies), 480 H.C.Deb. 5s., 6 November 1950, c. 602.


26. Certain people did not appreciate the abandonment of extraterritorial rights. They considered Panch Sheela as the product of India's policy of surrender in Tibet and they advocated restoration to Tibet of her 'independence' as an objective of India's foreign policy. For such opinions, see Girilal Jain, PANCHSHEELA AND AFTER: A Re-appraisal of Sino-Indian Relations In The Context of The Tibetan Insurrection (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1960), pp. 2, 3.

28. CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF TIBET, pp. 31-3, footnotes; see also, pp. 1-3, 4-13.
29. Ibid., p. 212.
30. IFP, p. 341.
31. CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF TIBET, p. 211.
32. Between 17 March and 27 April 1959, Nehru spoke seven times on events in Tibet, the most comprehensive speech being that of 27 April; for this particular speech, IFP, pp. 319-26. Declaring that India had no desire to interfere in Tibet and that she had every desire to maintain India-China friendship, Nehru said: 'We hope still that the authorities of China, in their wisdom, will not use their great strength against the Tibetans but will win them to friendly co-operation in accordance with the assurances they have themselves given about the autonomy of the Tibet region', Ibid., p. 325.
33. 'The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy', by the Editorial Department of HENMIN RBIAO (People's Daily), 6 May 1959: CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF TIBET, pp. 239-76.
34. Ibid., p. 268.
35. From speech to Rajya Sabha on 4 May 1959, IFP, p. 327.
36. 604 H.C.Deb. 5a, 27 April 1959, written answer, c. 81.
37. El Salvador sponsored the complaint of the Tibetan authorities on 15 November 1950. On India's suggestion (with which Britain concurred) the inscription of the item on the General Assembly's agenda was postponed; this was done on the basis of the Indian representative's statement that India had received a message from the PRC Government 'to the effect that they wanted to settle the question by negotiation and in a peaceful way', IFP, p. 342.
38. For details, see UNIB for 1959, pp. 67-9; THE QUESTION OF TIBET: V.K. KRISHNA MENON'S STATEMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS 1959 (Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 1960), passim; Gandh. 992, pp. 16-6; IFP, pp. 345-6.
41. From Note by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 4 November 1959: WHITE PAPER NO. II, p. 20.
42. Letter dated 26 September 1959, Ibid., pp. 45-6.
43. See Nehru's statement in the Rajya Sabha on 10 September 1959 wherein he stated that seven or eight years ago he thought that there was no issue whatever with the Chinese Government over the question of the frontier: IFP, p. 348. According to one opinion, the 'practically lifeless' Sino-Indian frontier became suddenly a live one following the suppression of the Tibetan rebellion: 'tens of thousands fled and hundreds of thousands wanted to flee. Now that the frontier was sealed off, the question of its exact location became vital': Klaus
NOTES TO CHAPTER XI

Malmestt, PEKING AND MOSCOW (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 20 New Bond Street, London, W1, 1963), p. 406. It is to be noted that frontier incidents occurred much before 1959: vide supra, Chapter I, f.n. 139.

44. WHITE PAPER, pp. 48–51, for text of the letter.

45. For text of the letter, Ibid., pp. 52–4. It may be noted that during the meetings of the officials of the Governments of India and China, held in accordance with the Nehru-Chou communiqué of 25 April 1960, the Indian officials very forcefully established the validity of the border which, for facility of reference, is referred to as the McMahon Line: see REPORT OF THE OFFICIALS...... BOUNDARY QUESTION, pp. 245–50.


47. Text of letter in DOCUMENTS ON THE SINO-INdIAN BOUNDARY QUESTION (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1960), pp. 1–13. In his reply of 26 September 1959 to Chou En-lai, Nehru gave sufficient evidence in support of the Indian stand that the present frontiers of India were her historic frontiers: WHITE PAPER No. II, pp. 34–46.

Throughout the course of the dispute falling under the scope of this study, the exchange of notes and correspondences on the boundary dispute proceeded on the basis of the letters of 8 September 1959 and 26 September 1959, setting forth as they did the respective stands of China and India. After the Tibetan rebellion, India-China relations grew from bad to worse. This was tragically evidenced, if any evidence were needed, on 20 October 1959 when Chinese ‘frontier guards' killed nine Indians near the Kongka Pass. For details, WHITE PAPER, Nos. III, IV, V.

48. Cf. NASAFEK INDIAN SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Seminar, op. cit., item (11), p. 36.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII

1. For texts of the India-France Treaty of Cession of Chandernagore (2 February 1951) and a similar treaty between the two countries on 28 May 1956 for the cession of French establishments of Pondicherry, Karikal, Mahe and Yanam, see FPI, pp. 15-32.

2. The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1573 is the oldest existing Treaty in the world. It has never been revised, although it has been confirmed in later treaties on a number of occasions. The Treaty is couched in general terms and under it the two partners undertake to give one another mutual aid and assistance. The general nature of the Treaty could be realized from Article I of the Treaty which reads: "As true and faithful friends the contracting parties shall henceforth reciprocally be friends to friends and enemies to enemies and shall assist, maintain and uphold each other mutually by sea and by land against all men that may live or die, of whatever dignity, station, rank or condition they may be, and against their lands, realms and dominions" see reply given by Mr. Butting (Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), 500 H.C. Deb. 5s., 12 May 1952, col. 844-5.

Replying to a question on the subject, Foreign Secretary Lloyd said in 1958 that Britain had 'every intention of honouring the terms of our ancient Alliance', see 588 H.C. Deb. 5s., 12 May 1958, c. 22. It was officially stated in the House of Commons a week thereafter that the principal bilateral treaties of alliance between Britain and Portugal are those of 1373, 1386, 1642, 1654, 1660, 1661, and 1703, reinforced by the Declaration of 1899: ibid., 19 May 1958, c. 869. Finally, speaking about the 'extraordinary antiquity' of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. D. Craigy-Gore) said: 'In the days of shifting alliances and rapid changes of side, this is a remarkable thing of which both countries should be proud', 590 H.C. Deb. 5s., 1 July 1958, c. 1295.


4. In his Lok Sabha speech of 17 September 1955, Nehru said: 'Goa is a symbol of decadent colonialism trying to hold on. It is something more: it has become an acid test by which we can judge of the policies of other countries'. IFP, p. 120. A similar statement was also made earlier, The Hindu, 16 August, 1954.

5. The phrase is from Rajan, INDIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1954-56, p. 366.


8. In this connection, for the relevant phrase in the Treaty of 1661 — 'to defend and protect all conquests or colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal against all his enemies as well in the future as at present' — see, 590 H.C. Deb. 5s., 1 July 1958, c. 1290.
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10. REPORT(MEA) for 1951-52, 1952-53 and 1953-54, pp. 8, 8, and 12 respectively.


13. Though the Government of India rejoiced at the liberation of the enclaves, officially it maintained strict neutrality and did not accede to the request of the local inhabitants for the merger of the territories with India. However, acting in response to requests from the Varistha Panchayat and the Administrator (Dr A. Furtado), as stated in REPORT(MEA) for 1960-61, p. 14, the Government of India sent one of its officers (Mr K.G. Badlani) to take over as the new Administrator of the areas with effect from 17 October 1960. It was also decided to extend technical assistance for developmental activities with a view to bringing the administration of the areas over a period of time in line with the prevalent pattern of administration in the rest of India.

Portugal sought to enforce its 'rights' in the enclaves by claiming right of passage over Indian territory. On India's refusal to accede to her demands, Portugal filed an application with the International Court of Justice on 22 December 1955, within eight days of her membership of the UN, seeking right of passage to the liberated enclaves of Dadra and Nagar-Aveli. The judgment of the Court was delivered on 12 April 1960 and its verdict was substantially in India's favour. The Court held that India's refusal of passage to Portugal was within her (India's) rights and that India had not acted contrary to her international obligations. The effect of the Court's decision was that the existing position in the enclaves had been stabilised and that it could not change without the permission of the Government of India: for the case of right of passage through Indian territory, see UNIB for 1955, pp. 335-6; for extracts from the judgement of the World Court, see Kumar & Arora, op. cit., pp. 457-76.

14. REPORT(MEA) for 1954-55, pp. 7-8; The Hindu, 29 July 1954.

15. The Hindu, 8 August 1954.


18. Mr Wedgwood Benn, 590 H.C. Deb. 5a., 1 July 1958, col. 1293-4.


21. The force of the Indian criticism had evidently some effect on the British Government. Replying to a question on 25 October 1954 as to what action Her Majesty's Government had taken in respect of the Indo-Portuguese dispute regarding the future of Goa, J. Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office (Mr. Dodds-Parker) said that while the Government had been in touch with the two other Governments, there had been no question of the British Government 'intervening in the merits of the case.' Further, he added: 'The object of our representations to the Government of India in August was to let them know frankly, as between friends, our concern lest the much advertised activities of some unofficial movements in India should lead to violence and bloodshed. The Government of India responded with assurances that they were determined to pursue a peaceful and conciliatory approach': 554 H.C. Deb. 5s., written answer, coll. 241-2.


23. Ibid., 5 March 1956. Selwyn Lloyd spoke at a meeting of the Indian Council of World Affairs on 4 March.

24. For Nehru's speech, IPP, pp. 100-11. Replying to the debate on Goa in the Lok Sabha on 26 July 1955, Nehru said: 'To say that Goa is part of Portugal is something in the nature of a fairy tale or nursery rhyme about the cat jumping over the moon: It has no relation to facts, and any kind of will, decree or law passed in Portugal is not going to make Goa a part of Portugal', Ibid., p. 112.

25. Vide supra, Chapter X, first section.

26. Vide supra, Chapter X, first section.

27. For an admirable exposition of this viewpoint, Rajan, INDIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1954-56, p. 371.

28. Of the official statement, replying in the negative to the question whether further representation on the lines of those made in 1954 would be made to the Government of India and Portugal, to the effect that the British Government would only 'continue to watch the situation and to maintain their contacts with both Governments', 554 H.C. Deb. 5s., 13 June 1956, written answer, c. 36.

29. Vide f.n. 2 above. Further, Mr. Wedgwood Benn put the following supplementary question: To what extent Britain is committed to the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty over Goa and other colonies in view of the fact that Dr. Salazar has repeatedly claimed that these treaties (i.e., the bilateral treaties between Britain and Portugal) bind the British Government to the maintenance of this sovereignty, and that he claims this not only through the Treaty but through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 588 H.C. Deb. 5s., 19 May 1958, c. 870.

30. Ibid., 12 May 1958, coll. 21-2. Mr. Anthony Wedgwood Benn said that the Foreign Office had informed him that the 1943 exchange of notes between his late Majesty's Ambassador in Lisbon and Dr. Salazar 'had no relevance or validity today', Ibid., c. 23.

32. The statement was made in Mr Ormsby-Gore's capacity as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs: 590 H.C.Deb. 5s., 1 July 1958, c. 1297.

33. See Rajan, INDIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1954-56, p. 366.

34. Ibid.

35. It was, however, clearly stated in a British White Paper on NATO negotiations that the North Atlantic Treaty excluded the overseas territories of the parties outside the North Atlantic area: see Cmd. 7692 (1949), para 16.

Regarding the Treaty area: The North Atlantic Treaty comes into force if an attack is made on any one of the member countries in Europe (including Turkey in Asia) or North America, or the occupation forces of any party in Europe, or the islands belonging to any of them in the North Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer or on any of their ships and aircraft in that area or the Mediterranean Sea. During the period of our survey, the Treaty ceased to apply to the Allies' occupation forces in Austria which came to be neutralised by the State Treaty of 1955. And Salazar himself was reported to have stated in August 1949 that the Treaty did not affect directly the defence of Portugal's overseas territories: see Rajan, INDIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1954-56, p. 370, f.n. 1.

36. Vide supra, Chapter VI, section on NATO.

37. IPP, p. 90.


39. From speech to Lok Sabha on 26 July 1955, IPP, p. 112. Lord Home had observed in a New Delhi press conference in October 1955 that the question of any British obligation to Portugal under NATO in respect of Goa was 'just stretching NATO too far. There may be consultations with (the) Portuguese': quoted in Rajan, INDIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1954-56, p. 370; see also f.n. 4 on that page.


41. See 'Tovarishchi Errant: The Russian Visit to India in Retrospect', The Round Table, No. 182, March 1956, pp. 117-24, p. 121. The Dulles-Cunha statement was occasioned obviously by the moribund vitriolic attacks on the West made by Bulganin and Khrushchov during their visit to India as well as by their full-throated support to India over Goa: for speeches of Bulganin & Khrushchov in this regard, see VISIT TO INDIA ... OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS (vide supra, Chapter VII, f.n. 57), pp. 103, 147-8. See also, Ibid., pp. 219-20. For the rather curious argument that difficult questions like those of Kashmir and Goa had been rendered 'even more difficult of solution by the Russian intervention', see The Round Table, No. 182, March 1956, p. 174.

42. IPP, p. 113.
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43. For details, REPORT(MEA) for 1956-57, 1957-58, 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960-61, pp. 8-9, 10, 13, 18, and 15 respectively.

44. S.G. Sardesai, FORWARD TO THE LIBERATION OF GOA (Communist Party of India publication, Delhi, 1955), p. 9.

45. See in order, IFP, pp. 115, 116, 118, 122, and 124.

46. Cf. Statement by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs when he spoke eloquently about Anglo-Portuguese friendship but had not had a word to say about Indo-British friendship as such, although he praised India's handling of the Goa problem: the casual reference to Indian statesmanship arose perhaps from the fact that India's peaceful policy allowed Portugal to hold on to Goa. For the Minister's statement, 590 H.C. Deb. 5s., 1 July 1958, coll. 1295-8, particularly c. 1298.


49. Quoted in WORLD OPINION ON GOA (Information Service of India, New Delhi, 1956), p. 6.

50. The Hindustan, 15 March 1956.

51. 590 H.C. Deb. 5s., 1 July 1958, coll. 1292-3, 1294.


53. Vide supra, Chapter X, f.n. 25.

54. Malaviya, op.cit., p. 33.

55. IFP, p. 126.


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4. Lord Home, quoted in 542 H.C.Deb. 5a., 16 June 1955, c.727.

5. Rajan, INDIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1954-56, p. 373.


7. See Rajan, INDIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1954-56, p. 372.


9. Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No.29, July 1955, p.11; in this connection, see also, Rajan, INDIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1954-56, p.373, f.n. 5.


11. It was reiterated in the Commons that the Government was 'quite prepared to receive approaches on the question of what easier access to this collection might be possible': 542 H.C. Deb. 5a., 16 June 1955, c. 726.

12. The Hindu, 8 July 1955.

13. See Ibid., 30 July 1955. See also, 547 H.C.Deb. 5a., 15 December 1955, c. 1381.


17. REPORT(MEA) for 1959-60, p. 23.


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2. Art. 41 relates to right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, etc.; Art. 43 relates to living wage, etc., for workers; Art. 45 refers to the endeavour the State shall make to provide for free and compulsory education for all children up to the age of fourteen within a period of ten years from the commencement of the Constitution; Art. 47 relates to the duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and to improve public health.


4. Ibid., p.28.
5. Ibid., p.70.


11. Ibid., pp. 45, 46.
12. According to Venkatasubbiah, 'By accepting a mixed economy for the means of economic development the Government of India accepted socialist planning; but what is more significant, it accepted capitalism as a permanent institution': H. Venkatasubbiah, INDIAN ECONOMY SINCE INDEPENDENCE (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 2nd rev.ed., 1961), p. 319; for a Soviet assessment of the concept of mixed economy, see A.I. Levkovsky, CAPITALISM IN INDIA: Basic Trends in its Development (People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1966), Chapter XI.
15. For text of the Industrial Policy Resolution of 30 April 1956, see SECOND FIVE YEAR PLAN, pp. 43-50.
18. Established by the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934.
19. See, Bhabatosh Datta, 'India', in the Symposium on the future of
the Sterling Area, BULLETIN OF THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS, Vol. 21, No. 4, November 1959, p. 279. For the period of our survey, the rupee-sterling exchange ratio was established at Rs. 1 = 1s. 6d.


21. BULLETIN OF THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS, in the article by Datta, p. 279. Rs 1 crore = Rs 10 million = £ 750, 000.

22. 421 H.C.Deb. 5s., 9 April 1946, c. 1790.

23. Mr Walter Fletcher, 434 H.C.Deb. 5s., 5 March 1947, coll. 585, 586-7.

24. Delivering the Chichelle Lectures at Oxford in May 1960, Earl Attlee said: "When the Second World War came, India — un­wisely, I think — was brought into the War without any consultation with the leading Indian statesmen": Earl Attlee, EMPIRE INTO COMMONWEALTH, p. 36.

25. Mr Wyatt, 439 H.C.Deb. 5s., 10 July 1947, c. 2520.

26. 482 H.C.Deb. 5s., 7 December 1950, c. 542; also, 493 H.C.Deb. 5s., 30 July 1951, coll. 981-2.

27. For Mr Attlee’s speech, Ibid., coll. 1067-8.


29. 558 H.C.Deb. 5s., 31 October 1956, written answer, coll. 172-3.


32. At the same time it is to be noted that under the shipping clause of the agreement between India and the United States, for shipment of 17 million tons of wheat and rice from the US to India, the amount of carriage reserved to the US was 50%: American ships had been chartered to carry wheat from the US to India at a fixed rate of freight of £ 9 at a time...
when the ships of the UK had to accept a rate of freight only 2s.6d. over £ 3. The US monopoly of the carriage of 84 million tons of grain at a high rate of freight was certainly advantageous to that country. Obviously, the US applied pressure on India because of her willingness to supply the grain. The beneficiary under the shipping clause was the United States, and therefore, it was decidedly disadvantageous to India to be saddled with the burden of a high rate of freight at a time of her foreign exchange crisis. See 624 H.C.Deb. 5s., 26 May 1960, col. 651-2.

53. For a contrary view, see Hem Pal, WHY THIS FOREIGN EXCHANGE CRISIS?: A STUDY OF SHRI T.T. KRISHNAMACHARI’S IMPORT TRADE POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY (People’s Publishing House, New Delhi, December 1958), passim, in particular pp. 2-21.


38. The Consortium came into being as a result of discussions held in Washington from 25-27 August 1958 between representatives of the IBRD and Governments of the UK, United States, Canada, West Germany and Japan about arrangements to cover India’s additional foreign exchange requirements of 350 million dollars during the fiscal year ending 31 March 1959. In subsequent years, Consortium membership had grown and included the following additional members: the IBRD affiliate International Development Association, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands. The Consortium meets every year to discuss IBRD reports on India’s needs for foreign exchange assistance; the participating nations discuss with the Government of India the quantum and form of assistance, terms of repayment, interest, etc. See OS, Vol.4, No.20, 30 September 1958, p.904; also, INDIA’S DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC AID, p. 15.

39. For earlier discussions between the Governments of India and UK on India’s need for financial aid, see 575 H.C.Deb. 5s., 31 October 1957, written answer, c.97; 576 H.C.Deb. 5s., 19 November 1957, c.183; see also, 548 H.C.Deb. 5s., 26 January 1956, written answer, c.91; 581 H.C.Deb. 5s., 7 February 1958, written answer, c.216. On 5 September 1958, the UK Treasury stated that the UK Government was willing to make available to India nearly £ 40 million before 31 March 1959, and to give continuing consideration to the long-term problems of India’s development during the rest of the Second Plan: OS, Vol.4, No.20, 30 September 1958, pp. 904-5.
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41. Cmd. 974, p. 5.
44. From written answer by the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr Alport), 595 H.C.Deb. 5s., 17 November 1958, coll. 111-2.
46. Ibid., Vol.5, No.25, 8 December 1959, pp. 1066-67.
47. From written answer by Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr Alport), 625 H.C.Deb. 5s., 30 June 1960, c. 144.
49. From official reply in the House of Commons, 625 H.C.Deb. 5s., 22 June 1960, c. 49.
50. For the scheme and functions of the Council for Technical Co-operation, see Cmd. 8080, Appendix 7.
51. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION BETWEEN INDIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, p. 22.
53. PROBLEMS IN THE THIRD PLAN: A CRITICAL MISCELLANY, p. 51; for the steel plants in the Second Plan, SECOND FIVE YEAR PLAN, p. 396.
54. The phrase is from 'British Aid To India's Economic And Industrial Development', Article in British Information Services hand-out (British High Commission in India), February 1955, p. 4; 'Durgapur is a sturdy steel plant with a better profit-earning capacity than Bhilai on account of the nature of its products', Rao and Narain, op. cit., p. 45.
55. Simon Carves Ltd. (coke ovens); Head Wrightson & Co. Ltd. (blast furnaces); Wellman Smith Owen Engineering Corporation Ltd. (melting shop equipment); Davy and United Engineering Co. Ltd. (gassing mills); Joseph Parks and Son Ltd., Dorman Long and Co. Ltd., Sir William Arrol & Co. Ltd., and Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co. Ltd. (structural steelwork); British Thomson-Houston Co. Ltd., English Electric Co. Ltd., General Electric Co. Ltd., and Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Co. Ltd. (electrical installation); and Cementation Co. Ltd. (civil engineering): GS, Vol.12, No.8, 17 April 1956, p. 291.
56. 550 H.C.Deb. 5s., 14 March 1956, written answer, coll. 52-4.
57. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION BETWEEN INDIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, p. 9; for facts of the paragraph and a detailed background beginning with the despatch to India on invitation a UK Steel Mission.
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61. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION BETWEEN INDIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, p.3.
62. From written answer in the House of Commons, 552 H.C.Deb. 5s., 3 November 1954, c.57.
64. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION BETWEEN INDIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, pp. 6-7.
66. From Ibid., p. 104.
68. OUR EXPORT TRADE : Country-wise Analysis (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi,1959), p.27.
69. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION BETWEEN INDIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, p.4.
70. For facts contained in the paragraph and details, Ibid., p.6; INDIA'S DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC AID, pp.22-6; 'India-USSR Trade : New Vistas', Soviet Review, Vol. III, No.15, 22 February 1966, pp.4,6; see also, Kidron, op.cit., p.112, Table 2, for trade between India and the European Eastern Bloc Countries.
72. See 603 H.C.Deb. 5s., 14 March 1959, c. 797; for official reply on steps to increase UK-India trade.
73. Cf. President of the Board of Trade (Sir David Eccles), 596 H.C.Deb. 5s., 2 December 1958, c. 1138.
74. From written answer by President of the Board of Trade, 566 H.C.Deb. 5s., 4 March 1957, c. 21.
75. 596 H.C.Deb., 5s., c. 1080.
76. Provisions of the Trade Agreement were quoted in 537 H.C.Deb.
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77. From written answer, 537 H.C.Deb. 5s., 21 February 1955, c. 120.
78. 530 H.C.Deb. 5s., 12 July 1954, coll. 250-51.
79. 537 H.C.Deb. 5s., 21 February 1955, c. 120, from written answer.
81. Mr Charles Fletcher-Cooke, 530 H.C.Deb. 5s., 12 July 1954, coll. 245-6.
82. Sir John Barlow, Ibid., c. 246.
83. Ibid., coll. 248-52.
84. For instance, see 536 H.C.Deb. 5s., 3 February 1955, coll. 1735-36; 557 H.C.Deb. 5s., 15 February 1955, c. 185. Ibid., 22 February 1955, coll. 1059-40; 538 H.C.Deb. 5s., 10 March 1955, written answer, c. 71; 542 H.C.Deb. 5s., 10 June 1955, coll. 234-2; Ibid., 23 June 1955, c. 1476.
86. 536 H.C.Deb. 5s., 3 February 1955, coll. 1249-50.
87. Ibid., 8 February 1955, coll. 1737-38.
88. Ibid., 3 February 1955, coll. 1251-52.
90. Ibid., c. 1525; see also, 558 H.C.Deb. 5s., 1 November 1956, coll. 1597-8.
91. Ibid. The statement quoted was made by Mr Thorneycroft, President of the Board of Trade.
92. 561 H.C.Deb. 5s., 4 December 1956, c. 99, from written answer.
93. From 558 H.C.Deb. 5s., 1 November 1956, coll. 1597-8; 565 H.C.Deb. 5s., 27 February 1957, coll. 191-2, written answer.
95. For facts in order, 486 H.C.Deb. 5s., 12 April 1951, coll. 1175-77; 539 H.C.Deb. 5s., 5 April 1955, coll. 977-8. See also, 488 H.C.Deb. 5s., 14 June 1951, coll. 2487-89.
96. 596 H.C.Deb. 5s., 2 December 1958, c. 1139.
97. For a commodity-wise analysis of such prospects, see Salvi, op. cit., pp. 73-87; INDIA’S EXPORT TRADE WITH THE U.K. AND WEST EUROPE (Oxford Book & Stationery Co., for World Trade Department, Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, 1961), pp. 4-5; see also, OUR EXPORT TRADE: Country-wise Analysis, p. 31.
99. From speech by President of the Board of Trade (Sir David
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100. Vide supra, Chapter III, f.n. 91.

101. See reply by President of the Board of Trade (Mr Reginald Maudling), 620 H.C.Deb. 5s., 31 March 1960, c. 157.

102. Vide supra, Chapter III, f.n. 89; see also, 617 H.C.Deb. 5s., 15 February 1960, coll. 965–1026.

103. 621 H.C.Deb. 5s., coll. 1537–8.


108. Ibid., p. 647.


112. Kidron, op. cit., p. 54.

113. Ibid., pp. 133–34.


116. Originally envisaged as a state body to help finance the private sector, it, however, became a private-sector body at the instance of the IBRD by the time it was registered in January 1955. It was financed by private subscription in India, Britain and in the United States, as well as by the Indian and
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US Governments. Designed to assist the growth of private industry in India, the Corporation's aims include making of long and medium term loans to industrial enterprises, purchase of shares of such enterprises, guaranteeing loans from other investment sources, and helping industry to obtain managerial, technical, and administrative advice and assistance: see OS, Vol. 1, No. 4, 14 January 1955; also, Kidron, op. cit., pp. 94, 140.


121. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION BETWEEN INDIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, p. 22.

122. Ibid., pp. 22–4.


125. Ibid., pass p. 26, for details.

126. Ibid., p. 31.


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2. These were: National Chemical Laboratory, Poona; Central Food Technological Research Institute, Mysore; Regional Research Laboratory, Hyderabad; National Aeronautical Laboratory, Bangalore; Central Indian Medicinal Plants Organisation, New Delhi; National Physical Laboratory, New Delhi; Central Road Research Institute, New Delhi; Indian Institute of Biochemistry and Experimental Medicine, Calcutta; National Metallurgical Laboratory, Jamshedpur; Central Glass and Ceramic Research Institute, Calcutta; Central Electrochemical Research Institute, Karaikudi; Central Public Health Engineering Research Institute, Calcutta; Central Fuel Research Institute, Jelsa; Central Drug Research Institute, Lucknow; Regional Research Laboratory, Jorhat; National Botanical Garden, Lucknow; Central Mining Research Station, Dhanbad; Central Scientific Instruments Organisation, New Delhi; Central Salt Research Institute, Bhavnagar; Regional Research Laboratory, Jammu; Central Building Research Institute, Roorkee; Central Electronic Engineering Research Institute, Pilani; Central Mechanical Engineering Research Institute, Durgapur; Central Leather Research Institute, Madras; Birla Industrial and Technological Museum, Calcutta; Central Scientific Instruments Organisation, Delhi; see REVIEW OF EDUCATION IN INDIA 1947-1961, pp. 2-3.


5. Vide supra, Chapter XIV, section on UK technical assistance to India; for the part played by the Government of India under the Colombo Plan, see also, REVIEW OF EDUCATION IN INDIA 1947-1961, p. 36.

6. Ibid., p. 31.


8. Vide supra, Chapter I, last part of the section entitled 'Impact of English Education'.

9. Quoted in Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's broadcast to the nation on 11 February 1965; this broadcast speech was released by the Directorate of Advertising & Visual Publicity of the Government of India's Ministry of Information & Broadcasting under the title 'English Will Continue To Be Used: Nehru's
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Assurances to be honoured in letter and in spirit'.


15. For the objects of the Nuffield Foundation, see the publication of the Federation of Commonwealth Chambers of Commerce, HANDBOOK OF COMMONWEALTH ORGANISATIONS (Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1965), paragraph no. 133.


20. For a list of such centres, see HANDBOOK OF COMMONWEALTH ORGANISATIONS, paragraph no. 120-30.


25. For facts relating to the Montreal Conference and quotations given in the paragraph, see in order, Mansergh, DBE, 1952-1962, pp. 701, 541, 701, 702.

26. For list of participating countries and territories, Cmd. 841, p. 2.

27. The following members constituted the Indian delegation: Sir A. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar, Vice-Chancellor, Madras University, Leader; Dr N.K. Siddanta, Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta University; 9 officials from the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs, India House,
and the UGC Secretary, Mr S. Nathal, Member Secretary of the Delegation; Mr T.S. Krishnamurthi, Deputy Secretary and Head, Cultural Division, Ministry of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs. See 613 H.C.Deb. 5s., 19 November 1959, written answer, c. 158.

29. The Statesman, 20 July 1959; see also the editorial, 'Sharing Knowledge', Ibid., 29 July 1959.
30. Ibid., 29 July 1959.
31. Cmd. 841, p.4.
32. Ibid., p. 18.
33. For details, Ibid., pp. 5-13; for Committee reports, pp.17 ff.
35. Cmd. 841, p.7.
37. The Commonwealth Scholarship Bill was presented to the House of Commons on 16 November 1959 and it was passed on 3 December 1959. The Commonwealth Teachers' Bill was passed on 23 May 1960. For details, 614 H.C.Deb. 5s., 25 November 1959, coll. 374-460; Ibid., 3 December 1959, coll. 1398-1449; 623 H.C.Deb. 5s., 17 May 1960, coll. 1141-1201; 624 H.C.Deb. 5s., 23 May 1960, coll. 165-72. See also, Cmd. 894, Cmd. 1032.
38. COMMONWEALTH SCHOLARSHIP AND FELLOWSHIP PLAN: First Annual Report, p.12; see also, pp. 13-4.
44. HANDBOOK OF COMMONWEALTH ORGANISATIONS, paragraph no. 112.
45. Ibid., paragraph no. 113.
46. Ibid., paragraph no. 114.
48. HANDBOOK OF COMMONWEALTH ORGANISATIONS, paragraph no. 76.
NOTES TO CHAPATER XV

49. Ibid., paragraph no. 117; GOI H/1 P-4736/65, op. cit., p. 50;

50. CS, Vol.2, No.13, 26 June 1956, pp. 513-4; Ibid., Vol.2, No.17,
21 August 1956, pp. 657-8; Ibid., Vol.3, No.4, 19 February
1957, p. 171; S.N. Gupta, (ed.), 10 YEARS OF ATOMIC ENERGY IN
INDIA 1954-1964 (Published on behalf of the Department of Ato-

51. REPORT(MEA) for 1958-59, pp. 36-7.
53. G.T. Garratt (ed.), THE LEGACY OF INDIA (Oxford University
54. REVIEW OF EDUCATION IN INDIA 1947-1961, p. 44.
55. Ibid., p. 62.
56. REPORT(MEA) for 1953-54, p. 39; also, INDIA: A REFERENCE
ANNUAL 1958, p. 149.

57. For facts, REVIEW OF EDUCATION IN INDIA 1947-1961, pp. 62,67;
INDIA: A REFERENCE ANNUAL 1958, pp. 119-20; ESTIMATES COMMIT-
TEE 1957-58: FIFTH REPORT (Second Lok Sabha): MINISTRY OF
EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: Cultural and International
Activities (Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1958), pp. 1, 20-8, 35-7.

58. For the first quotation in the paragraph, see preamble to the
Charter granted to the British Council which usually appears
in the Council's Annual Reports; for the other quotations and facts,
CS, Vol.4, No.12, 10 June 1958, pp. 545-7; for a short
account of the Royal Society, BRITAIN 1963: An Official Hand-
book, p. 205; also, HANDBOOK CP COMMONWEALTH ORGANISATIONS,
paragraph no. 117.

60. REPORT(MEA) for 1953-54, p.40; REVIEW OF EDUCATION IN INDIA
1947-1961, pp. 63, 64, 65. It may be noted that distinguished
scholars like Prof. Arnold Toynbee and Dr Kenneth Bradley
came to India from the UK.

63. The phrase is Lord Lloyd's; Ibid.; cf. THE BRITISH COUNCIL;
Report for the 19th Year: 1952-53, pp. 7-8; THE BRITISH

66. Ibid., pp. 8-9; Annual Report 1960-61, pp. 42-43.

67. For facts and details of activities of the Commonwealth Institu-
tute, see HANDBOOK OF COMMONWEALTH ORGANISATIONS, paragraph no.
3; debate on the Commonwealth Institute Bill, 582 H.C. Deb. 5s.,
14 February 1958, coll. 302-18; Sir Kenneth Bradley, 'The
Commonwealth Institute', Arian Review, Vol. LIX, No. 220,
October 1963, pp. 207-14; SURVEY OF BRITISH AND COMMONWEALTH

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