CHAPTER-III

PATTABHI’S CONTRIBUTION
FOR THE FORMATION OF
ANDHRA STATE
The awakening of national consciousness resulted in several movements. One of them was the demand for the formation of provinces on a linguistic basis. Linguistic nationalism, as prof. William Robson put it, was a phenomenon commonly associated with independence movements and many examples were found in Europe. In India, the development of regional languages in the nineteenth century which resulted in emotional integration of different language groups, led to a demand for linguistic provinces. Regional languages not only promoted a sense of unity among the people but facilitated Indian's political evolution. The demand for linguistic provinces which ‘aimed at a fair deal to the minorities in social, cultural and political fields’ was an integral part of the national movement. It was “an alliance between regional integration and national feeling that helped us to recover our freedom. An effect of this resurgence of regional cultures in the nineteenth century was that it weakened the hold of English.

Mahesh Narayan was among the earliest to articulate the demand for the redistribution of provinces on linguistic lines. In 1894, he asked for the separation of his home province, Bihar, from Bengal. In 1898, Balagangadhar Tilak was said to have favoured the idea of decentralization. Lord Curzon realized the importance of such a redistribution of Provinces. The linguistic principle figured for the first time in a letter from Sir Herbert Risley, Home Secretary, Government of India, to the Government of Bengal, in which the partition of Bengal was mooted. Later, it figured in the resolution on the partition of Bengal in 1905.

Among the Telugu—speaking Districts of the Madras Presidency, the Circar Districts, as stated earlier, were vibrant with the theme of nationalism. National renaissance was thriving under state repression. The Congress lent its support to the demand for linguistic provinces as early as 1905. A concession to the linguistic principle was made in 1908 when a separate Congress province of Bihar was farmed. According to K.M. Munshi, “the seeds of linguism were sown in India by the Indian National Congress in 1908.” In Masulipatnam, that year, a conference of prominent representatives of the
Telugu—Speaking people of Telangana, Rayalaseema and the Coastal Districts was held. This conference expressed the view that there was exploitation of Andhra by Tamilians in the services and that was one reason for Andhra’s economic backwardness. There was unanimity among the Andhra leaders, then as later, that the Telugu were being exploited by the Tamils in all fields. The Tamils, said N. Subbarau Pantulu, occupied predominant positions in all walks of life because they ‘had a good start in the race of life.’ Konda Venkatappayya not only referred to the historical greatness of the Andhras but affirmed that Andhras would reveal their superior qualities to those of the Tamils if a separate Andhra State was created. These Andhra leaders were then giving expression to a new movement, thought and feeling which were the result of the growth of Telugu language and literature. The seeds of the present state of Andhra Pradesh were sown then as the idea of Andhra as a separate state was conceived of then at Masulipatnam in 1908. Pattabhi had a major role in organizing the conference in that year.

The dispatch of Lord Hardinge to the Secretary of state, dated 25-8-1911, was another step favourable to the protagonists of linguistic provinces. The linguistic principle was “approved in the scheme of provincial autonomy set forth in the Government of India dispatch of August 25, 1911.” Lord Hardinge discussed elaborately the principles on which the Indian provinces should (i) provide convenient administrative units, (ii) satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the people, and (iii) be clearly based upon grounds of political administrative expediency. To the protagonists of Andhra Province, this dispatch of Lord Hardinge, was most welcome. The following year, Pattabhi started a campaign for Andhra Province through a series of articles. In August 1912, he wrote, “if the needs of the Government should ever decide upon a division of the Madras Presidency, there would be nothing unseemly in the Andhras desiring a separate Andhra Province.” In a way Pattabhi, as observed by N. Subbarau, paved the way for the crystallization of the Andhra movement.

The Andhra Conference which held its first meeting in May 1913 was a well—attended meeting which “hoped to use the Telugu Congress as a means of achieving a separate Telugu Province with a University for Telugus.” A
pamphlet written by Konda Venkatappayya and Pattabhi Sitaramayya was released at this conference. The authors cited geographical factors, historical facts and linguistic homogeneity in support of their demand for a separate State. As observed by Eugene Irschick, Pattabhi and Konda Venkatappayya foresaw the necessity of a separate University for Andhras and the status of Statehood for Andhra area. Pattabhi went a step further when he stated that similar demands from other language groups would have to be satisfied. He also declared that “the day is not far off when the Indians themselves will be responsibly associated with the full work of administration.”

He always believed in pursuing an idea till it was translated in to reality. If he was one of the earliest to conceive the vision of an Andhra Province, he pursued the ideal with irrepressible zeal through thick and thin for forty years. After the first Andhra conference was over, Pattabhi stepped up the campaign through a series of articles in newspapers, books and pamphlets. Through the columns of ‘The Hindu’ he reiterated his plea for a separate University and State. He undertook tours of several districts to mobilize public opinion in favour of the demand. For instance, his speech at Nellore in January 1914 was reported to be “inspiring, eloquent and interesting.” Pattabhi’s object was to “elevate the Andhra movement into a sub-national movement and not allow it to be equated with depressed class mission or a backward community movement.”

The growth of Indian provinces was more or less chronological and had nothing to do with logical, linguistic or ethnic considerations. The country was divided in an irrational and arbitrary manner, first by the East India company and late by the British Government. They were not imbued with the ideals of administrative efficiency or national up building. Nor did they care to consider such factors as race, religion and language. In support of this statement, Pattabhi quoted Sir John Simon who in 1929 had said that “States have grown up almost haphazard as the result of conquest, suppression of former rulers........No one of them has been deliberately formed with a view to its suitability as a self governing unit......” The existence of big multi—lingual states, despite the steady growth of administrative areas, was
unjustified. As the Report of the States Reorganization Commission said, the division of India had no basis in Indian history. The British knew that the provinces grew in a haphazard manner. The authors of the Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms admitted this fact. Even though the British conceded that boundaries of provinces were artificial, they did not consider it safe to disturb the existing boundaries.

A major defect of the administration was the lack of communication between the English rulers and the Indian people. According to Pattabhi, the bureaucracy failed to feel the pulse of the people. The use of the English language and the neglect of vernaculars widened the gap between the rulers and the ruled. The British could not understand the aspirations of the people.9 Pattabhi argued that the reorganization of provinces, by grouping them into sub-federations on natural and linguistic lines, was the first step in the achievement of provincial unity. Then only would Indian Nationalism bloom. Proper division would not affect nationalism but would help integration and promote unity. India as a Nation was possible only through a federal set-up where in the provincial factor would occupy sub-national position. There was no fragmentation of the higher idea of Indian Nationalism. The spirit could never be divided. In every fragment the national spirit could be seen in equal fullness. Local patriotism, which was lying dormant, could then be generated. It would provide opportunities for self-generated. It would provide opportunities for self-reliance and a sense of responsibility. True responsibility and a generous spirit of tolerance were possible under local autonomy. Andhras, under a new province, would hasten the realization of the ideal of self-government and enrich Indian nationality. Sub-national units would help the growth of national consciousness.10 As Robert L.Hardgrave observed, primordial sentiment, though regarded with horror by many, would serve as a vehicle in the transference of loyalty from local community to the larger community. To Pattabhi, Indian nationalism was the central stream whose waters would be enriched both in volume and content by the confluence of the various sub-national streams. Self-contained provinces would be helpful in the liquidation of inequalities and jealousies. Linguistic provinces would provide opportunities for rural leadership to discuss affairs in their mother tongue. That would enable the
village to become the key to national civilization. The village should play its legitimate part in national life.\textsuperscript{11}

Cultural pride and nationalistic feelings always remained a part of the Andhra movement’s appeal. To Pattabhi and his Masulipatnam friends, the demand for a separate Andhra province was part of the larger ideal of a proper reorganization of provinces, leading to a Perfect and harmonious Indian nation. As Kopalli Hanumantha Rao put it the conception of “Andhra unity is one with the national ideal, one in its human bearings, one in the richness of its intellectual and ethical contents one also in the ultimate harmony of the spiritual life. They were not blind to the difficulties which the minorities might face in the event of a such a division. The majorities must create confidence in the minorities. All must begin to feel that “our Mother land presents a composite, homogeneous nationality which like a multi—faceted jewel reflecting variegated colours is composed of different cultures reflected through diverse provinces. Unity is not uniformity but harmony in diversity.”\textsuperscript{12} Nor was the question of a link language ignored.

Despite their ignorance and lack of sophistication, people were transacting business in the regional language. English failed to serve as a common vehicle of expression. But it should not be completely given up as that was a vehicle of modern thought. It must be preserved as a language at high levels. Its place must be taken by Hindustani which would be the ultimate national language. Pattabhi anticipated the problems which have sprung up of late. He had the vision to suggest even then what the government has now laid down that the people in the North should learn one of the South Indian languages and every province, if possible, might learn the language of its neighbor.\textsuperscript{13}

The Andhra movement was not meant to achieve more jobs or ‘loaves and fishes’ for the Andhras as alleged by its critics. Pattabhi answered them by saying that the question of a province was not the be—all and end—all of the Andhra movement. It was only step in the achievement of Andhra progress, Andhra solidarity and Andhra unity. Andhra unity was consistent with national unity. The Andhra movement, said Pattabhi, was the first organized
effort working as a true reflex of the larger national movement. The protagonists of the Andhra movement were animated by lofty ideals. The movement was not due to a craving for posts’ or a desire to be away from the Madras State. Andhras were not the only sufferers on account of bilingualism. Marathis, Kannarese and Malayalese were among the many others that were affected by it. Pattabhi foresaw in 1912, the possibility of a similar demand being made by the various linguistic groups of the country.

The leaders of the Andhra movement were mostly Brahmin intellectuals like Konda Venkatappayya, N. Subbarau and Pattabhi. They were middle-class intellectuals. These Telugu Brahmins, as John G. Leonard put it, aimed at realizing for themselves certain political and social goals in fields such as education, occupation and language. The British government was afraid of these educated Brahmins. It is, however, difficult to agree with John G. Leonard’s inference that the origins of the Andhra movement lay in the Brahmin—non—Brahmin conflict. The movement for social change which took place earlier than the movement for Andhra province was inaugurated by one of the greatest of modern Andhras, K. Veerasalingam in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. As Eugence F. Irschick observed, it was social reform that had an impact on the subsequent political issues. While it was true that local elite, usually Brahmins, resisted social change, the educated Brahmins, particularly the Brahmin intellectuals, supplied the motive force for social reform. A few Brahmin intellectuals like Veeresalingam, followed by others later on, were the pioneers of the movement for social reform. The non-Brahmin movement followed much later. As such it may not be right to say that the Andhra movement originated in the Brahmin—non—Brahmin conflict.

If the Andhras “made the question of re—drawing the map on linguistic lines a part of Indian politics and a plank in the programme of the Indian National Congress,” the strategy for such a policy was evolved by Pattabhi after the Bapatla Conference in 1913. Accordingly, he and M. Ramachandra Rao prepared a resolution which the later to move at the subjects Committee meeting of the Bombay Congress session in 1915. In fact, it was Pattabhi who drafted the resolution. Speaking on it, Pattabhi said that there were two types
of anomalous conditions, namely, the people speaking one language were
distributed amongst several provinces and the people speaking different
languages were bundled together in one province. This provoked some Tamil
members to cross swords with Pattabhi and L.A. Govinda Raghavan interrupted
Pattabhi’s speech. On the advice of Surandranath Banerjee, the Chairman of the
Committee, Sinha, ruled the resolution out of order, saying that there was no
time. When four other resolution were moved by senior Congressmen like
Surandranath Banerjee, Pattabhi rose on a point of order and said that there
was no time for the other resolutions also. Under these circumstances,
the chairman had no alternative but to declare them out of order. Thereupon,
Pattabhi moved that the meeting be dissolved and the meeting did come to an
end. Members became indignant and said that Pattabhi was the ‘arch—destroyer
of the work of the Congress.’ But this did not dampen Pattabhi’s enthusiasm. He
knew it was only the beginning and the fight for linguistic provinces must go
on whatever be the strength of the forces that opposed him.

Pattabhi deemed it his good fortune to have come under the influence
of another remarkable person, Mrs. Annie Besent. He became a Home—Ruler
under her leadership and won her confidence. During Mrs. Besant’s internment at
Ootacamund in September 1917, Pattabhi used to meet her frequently. He spent two
months at Ootacamund and was struck by her sincerity of purpose. Such was
his regard for Mrs. Besant, that Pattabhi requisitioned a meeting of the A.I.C.C.
in 1917 and sent up a resolution to the effect that unless Mrs. Besant and her
colleagues were immediately released, the members of the A.I.C.C. Should not
co—operate with Mr. Montague during his visit to India. Incidentally, that was how he
contemplated Non—Cooperation. He said, later, that he had anticipated the
Gandhian programme a few years before it was actually launched.

Surely, Mrs. Besant did not like the idea of dividing the country on the
basis of language. For that matter, she stood four—square against the idea of a
separate Provincial Congress Committee for Andhra, like the prominent leaders
of Madras. Pattabhi gave notice of resolutions to be considered at Calcutta
Congress in December, 1917. He said that to ensure efficient administration and
to realize the ideal of a federated Indian Nationality, provinces in India should
be reorganized on a linguistic basis. He also suggested in his resolutions that
the number of representatives for the proposed Andhra Congress circle be fixed
at fifteen and that the Kanarese Districts of the Bombay and the Madras
Presidencies be constituted in to a Kannada Congress circle as asked for by the
Kanarese. He further moved that the congress should take up the question of
National Flag for India and that a committee to draw up a suitable design be
formed. Mrs. Bezant presided over the Calcutta Congress session. Pattabhi was
alone in the fight for a separate Congress circle for Andhra. Luckily for him
Lokamanya Tilak lent support to his plea at the A.I.C.C. meeting. Thanks to the
support of Tilak, the first battle was won. It was passed despite the opposition
of Mrs. Bezant and several Madras leaders. Tilak spoke very briefly but when
he rose and uttered those words which were 'sharp, crisp and convincing'\textsuperscript{14} there
was total silence. But the real battle at the Subjects—Committee meeting was
yet to be won.

The 'historic' duel' with Mrs. Bezant took place at the Subjects—Committee.
Almost throughout the memorable debate that lasted from 19-30 to 22 hours,
Pattabhi was on his legs. The atmosphere was a little tense with nearly 300
members listening to the exchange of words and arguments. Pattabhi later
complained that Mrs. Besant “led the opposition to carry on the fight.” He argued
that in a limited and homogeneous area like Andhra Desa Congress work,
organization, collection and propaganda could be done better if only a separate
congress circle existed. It would certainly be better than when people speaking five
different languages—Tamil , Telugu Malayalam, Kanarese and Oriya—were all
huddled together. Making out a strong case for a separate Andhra Province, he
said: “The future Andhra Province will be more than twice the size of Scotland,
Ireland, Bulgaria and Greece, more than five times the size of Switzerland or a
little larger than turkey and a little smaller than Italy. It will develop the economic
and moral resources of the people. It will promote education, good government
and every mark of prosperity among the Andhras. It will facilitate and hasten
the realization of the ideal of self—government. It will enrich, strengthen and
invigorate the future Indian Nationality.”\textsuperscript{15}
Sensing that Pattabhi might carry the day, Mrs. Bezant warned Pattabhi, that if his proposition was carried by a show of hands, she could still prevent its passage by asking for voting by provinces—a power given to the President by the Congress Constitution. But that would not stop Pattabhi. He sprang to his feet and retorted; “I thought that it was a game at which two could play.”

“What do you mean?” asked Mrs. Bezant. Pattabhi threatened the President that he could also defeat her on a point which related to the Constitution.

“What is it?” asked a little worried President.

“Why, Madam,” submitted Pattabhi, “You have a Constitution which provides only for two secretaries. You have a third Secretary appointed in the person of Mr. C.P. Ramaswami Iyer. When there are already two secretaries you cannot have the new secretary unless the constitution provides for three in place of two. If you want to defeat my Constitutional amendment, I shall also defeat your Constitutional amendment”. Mrs. Bezant relented and that night Pattabhi’s amendment to the Congress constitution separating Andhra from the Madras Circle was passed.

The Congress resolved that “the Telugu—speaking districts of the Madras Presidency be constituted into a separate Congress Province”. It was a great triumph for Pattabhi, who gladly said, “therein lay the beginnings of the emergence of Andhra Desa as a separate entity in the body politic of India.” The first battle for Andhra, wrote Iswara Dutt, was won by Pattabhi when he got it separated from Madras inside the Congress. He had also the satisfaction of formally raising the question of the National Flag. The elation of Pattabhi and his friends was partly due to the fact that none at the top in the Congress except Tilak, supported them. Not only Mrs. Besant but Gandhi also was opposed to the idea though the former agreed to it finally. This debate with Mrs. Besant reveals some aspects of Pattabhi’s personality. For the sake of a principle are an ideal he was never afraid of opposing any leader however influential that leader might be. Pattabhi was a highly successful South Indian politician in committees and conferences, a distinction which not many in the south could claim in pre—independence India.
The creation of the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee gave a distinct to political consciousness to the Andhras. It was a partial fulfillment of the Andhras’ intense desire to develop their cultural and artistic distinctiveness. It also served as an incentive to Sindh, Utkal and Karnataka. Sindh got a separate provincial Congress Committee the following year and Karnataka achieved it later. According to the Congress historian, the principle that was accepted in 1917 became the guiding principle redistribution of provinces. The seeds of linguism sown in 1908 struck roots in 1917, although the Congress officially committed itself to the principle in 1920.\(^{16}\)

In 1917, Pattabhi along with sixteen other Andhra leaders waited in deputation on Montagu, to urge the British government on the need for linguistic redistribution of provinces. This was known as the ‘Andhra deputation’. Later in November 1918, the views of the Andhra conference were to be placed before the south borough commission. Pattabhi was the spokesman of the deputation headed by Konda Venkatappayya. Pattabhi’s statements made before the Southborough Committee, as spokesman of the deputation, pertaining to communal representation need to be explained in brief.

The non—Brahmin movement gained momentum following the release of the non—Brahmin manifesto in December 1916. The manifesto highlighted the frustration of the non—Brahmins over the job position in Madras Presidency. They had very few opportunities for employment and they had strong feeling against

The ‘Brahmin domination’. The birth of the Justice party in 1917 marked the crystallization of the non—Brahmin movement. The Justice Party men did not desire any constitutional change that would affect British authority. What they wanted was ‘not freedom but jobs.’ The Party’s rise was largely due to the Mont ford Reforms and Non—Co—operation Programme launched by the Congress. The Party men not only secured ‘the whip hand of administration’ but carried out briskly the programme of job acquisition for non—Brahmins. Some of the leaders along with the Party followers aimed at stuffing every field with non—Brahmins.\(^{17}\) The Justice Party’s role in the state and national politics was uniformly gullible.
To Pattabhi, the economic grievance of the non-Brahmins seemed and unquestionable and therefore deserved sympathetic consideration. If the non-Brahmins wanted communal representation should be given, he stated, so that their irritation would end. It was wise to provide them with whatever system that ‘advanced their political interests’. Pattabhi felt that under the existing circumstances then communal representation was appropriate. He was opposed by “a highly articulate Brahmin.” M. Ramachandra Rao who said that communal representation would tear the communities apart. Pattabhi ‘corrected’ his view vis-a-vis communal a representation a year later and, even condemned it strongly. This ‘inconsistency’ in Pattabhi’s position can be explained by stating two are three points. Pattabhi remained convinced that non-Brahmin were denied economic opportunities in the administration though he seldom agreed with Justice Party’s ideas and programmes. He found among the leaders of the Party some sincere patriots and even helped a few in getting into the Congress later. This drew sarcastic remarks from certain quarters. He, accordingly supported the non-Brahmin demand for communal representation in 1918. But later when he came to know that the ultimate aim was responsible Government, he admitted that merit must count and the best men should go to the councils. A more obvious explanation could be that the non-Brahmins boycotted the Southborough commission in 1918 because a Brahmin, V.S.S.Sastri was included on the Commission. Pattabhi wanted the non-Brahmins to meet the Commission, so that the demand for linguistic Provinces would not be weakened. His fears about the Justice Party men weakening the Andhra Province demand came true as the party was not only unhelpful to the cause but even opposed, in the thirties, the formation of a separate Andhra province. Pattabhi was convinced that communal representation was harmful and carried on a great deal of propaganda against it, much to the delight of Tamil leaders like V.S.Srinivasa Sastri and C.P.Ramaswami Iyer. The reputation of the Andhra deputationists which till then had not been very high, went up and Tamil leaders opposed to communal representation lauded Pattabhi’s advocacy against it.¹⁸

There was a change in the creed of the Congress at the annual session held at Nagpur in 1920. Home Rule receded to the background and the
‘attainment of swaraj by peaceful and legitimate means’ became the new creed. The Congress constitution was amended to make provision for provincial Congress Committees on unilingual basis. Pattabhi had the “unique satisfaction of bringing about a remarkable change in the structure and constitution of the National Congress—a change which was destined to reflect itself in the constitution of the Indian Provinces or the states, as the amended constitution of India laid down later in 1956”. When the Working Committee met in January 1921 to discuss the question of reconstituting the Congress provinces in India, Gandhi, who knew Pattabhi’s interest in the matter, turned to him and said, “you had better look to this task. You know all about it.” Pattabhi then worked at it and divided India into twenty—one Congress circles and his plan was accepted. Pattabhi’s arrangement got for Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra separate Congress circles.

Another problem was now engaging his mind. He wanted the 20 strong Andhra Provincial Congress to have the same number (24) of representatives as that of Tamilnadu. When the A.I.C.C. met at Bezwada in March 1921, Pattabhi’s plea was referred to the Working Committee. When summoned to give his views before the Committee, Pattabhi said that in Andhra they were seeking to hold the balance of representation for the districts evenly, taking into consideration different schools of thought and interests, whereas that was not the case in Tamilnadu. Chitranjan Das, with whom Pattabhi disagreed on many occasions, said that the demand was just. But the pointed to a difficulty: “The total number is fixed. Where from can you get the extra four?” asked Das. “From you” said Pattabhi promptly. Das ‘magnanimously agreed’ to give two seats from Bengal’s quota of 52. The united Province which also had a strength of 52 gave two seats to Andhra. Bengal and U.P. came to have slightly reduced but equal strength and Andhra got 24 representatives on the A.I.C.C. till the constitution was amended in 1934.

To the Andhra leaders clamouring for a separate province, the Congress resolution of 1927 gave satisfaction. The Congress expressed the opinion that the time had come for the redistribution of provinces on a linguistic basis and that a beginning could be made by constituting Andhra, Utkal, Sind and
Karnataka in to separate provinces. The Nehru Committee report of 1928 recommended the formation of linguistic provinces ‘subject to financial and administrative consideration.’ The above report held that as “language corresponds with a special variety of culture, of traditions and literature,” it will help in the general progress of the province. In provinces, the principal language of a province shall be its official language. The Andhra leaders like Pattabhi felt that the above report’s recommendations regarding linguistic provinces and official language vindicated their stand. In 1928 December, at The all parties convention at Calcutta, delegates from Andhra, Kerala, Karnataka and Utkal—interested in furthering the Movement for linguistic provinces formed the linguistic provinces League with Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya as President and Orissa’s Viswanath Das as Secretary. Kaleswara Rao and Pattabhi met Gandhi before Gandhi’s departure for London in August 1931. Gandhi asked them to wait for Andhra Province till swaraj. Pattabhi believed that the British Government too realized the urgency and importance of the redistribution of provinces in the country. But lack of high ideals and the unhelpful attitude of the bureaucracy stood in the way of implementing it. Continuing his campaign for linguistic provinces Pattabhi stated that no good Government was possible without provincial autonomy. He suggested that India could broadly be divided into 13 or more provinces like Kerala, Karnataka, Dravida, Andhra, Maharashtra, Utkala, Sindh, Gujarat, Hindi speaking provinces one or more, Punjab-Bengal Bihar and Ajmer and Merwara. The Central Provinces should thus disappear from the map of India. A boundary commission, which was not to discuss the propriety of such distribution, but to fix the boundaries should be appointed. As K.V. Narayana Rao summed up, Pattabhi’s “writings contributed a theoretical base for a (British) Indian federation with its units reorganized on linguistic basis.”

In 1936 the Province of Orissa was created. The case of Andhra, however, offered no simple solution. In addition to the bureaucracy’s ‘indifference,’ several factors made the Andhra Province issue, one of complex problems. First of all there was no unity among the Andhra leaders who were divided into two main groups—one demanding the inclusion of Madras city in the proposed Andhra Province and the others not pressing the claim. Among the latter group,
different claims for the location of the provincial headquarters were put forward. This resulted in local patriotism figuring prominently in the controversy. As on several issues of importance, Pattabhi and Prakasam were opposed to each other over the question of demanding inclusion of Madras in the Andhra province.

Then there was the dubious role played by the Justice Party in the movement for Andhra Province. Leaders of the Party like the Rajah of Bobbili and K.V.Reddy were accused of changing their attitude because of their ‘elevated positions.’ Withdrawing his support for the demand of a separate province, K.V.Reddy said that it was not advantageous then to have a separate province. He called the people’s attention to the proposed reforms of 1935 which he said would be successful. The Andhra province, if formed, said K.V. Reddi would even be expensive. An effect of the non-Brahmin movement led by K.V. Reddi and others was that the Andhra movement was weakened. In the process, they caused the destruction of their own party.

Yet another factor no less significant than the preceding factors was the attitude of the Tamil Nadu Congress leaders, particularly that of C.Rajagopalachari, the Madras premier during 1937—39. To most Andhras, Rajagopalachari was the destroyer of their cause. Prakasam was highly critical of Rajagopalachari. Several Andhra leaders, except Pattabhi, questioned the sincerity of Rajagopalachari when he said that Andhra Province would be given. K.V.Reddi did not think it appropriate to raise the question between 1934 and 1937 during which time he headed the Madras State administration in different capacities. But once Rajagopalachari formed the Congress ministry, Reddi reopened the Andhra Province question and carried on a propaganda against Rajagopalachari. He said that the Congress government even requested the British government to postpone the question. When Rajagopalachari refuted the charge, K.V.Reddi replied that he was only voicing the “belief in the Telugu Country” that the Congress government had not strongly urged upon the Secretary of state for the formation of a separate Andhra Province. Pattabhi, however, stated that Rajagopalachari wrote to the Secretary of state recommending the formation of Andhra Province in 1938 and had it approved
by the Madras Legislature. When Pattabhi condemned the demonstration made against Rajagopalachari at Guntur in July 1938 and said that “all Andhras should hang their heads in shame,” motives were attributed to him and efforts were made to denigrate him. As bitterness between Andhras and Tamils increased, the Tamil Nadu Provincial Congress Committee passed a resolution, after the Guntur incident in July 1938, deploring “the mentality exhibited by certain Andhra leaders” for leading “a campaign of vilification and hatred against the Tamilians and the Prime minister.” The resolution supported the plea for a separate Andhra State. But several leaders began to doubt the efficacy of linguistic division of the Country when provincialism appeared to threaten national unity. It also affected the larger goal of swaraj. That was why perhaps the Congress Working Committee then asked the Telugu—speaking people to postpone the question till freedom was achieved. Sensing the mood of the national leaders, Pattabhi tried to prevent the movement from getting out of control. When he led the deputation consisting of delegates from Andhra, Kerala and Karnataka which met the Congress Working Committee in 1938, he appealed to the people not to lose sight of the objective, i.e., Swaraj, while he clearly told the Working Committee that linguistic division was an urgent and important issue. It was said that some members of the Working Committee even ridiculed Pattabhi for his repeated demands for Andhra Province.21

During his President ship of the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee, i.e., between 1937—39, Pattabhi got resolutions passed by the provincial Congress demanding the formation of a separate Andhra Province. He appealed to the Andhra members of the Madras legislative Assembly to speak in Telugu in the legislature. He sent about 600 circulars to Legislators, Municipal Councilors, District Board members, Banks, Insurance Companies, etc., in the Andhra districts suggesting that they should use Telugu in their Correspondence so as to quicken the realization of the Andhra Province. Unlike Prakasam, Pattabhi believed that Rajagopalachari, the Madras premier, was favourable for the creation of Andhra Province. But when he read the statement of Premier Rajagopalachari and Public Health Minister T.S.S.Rajan that Andhra province would involve additional expenditure, Pattabhi refuted their argument by pointing out that the land revenue of Andhra area was
more than the land revenue of Tamil Nadu. As such the Andhra area was more self-supporting than Tamil Nadu. "It looks as though the British," quipped Pattabhi, "Will grant Swaraj sooner to India than our Tamil ministers would a province for the Andhras." Rajagopalachari's support for the Hindi movement was also regarded by some Andhra leaders as an attempt to overcome the demand for linguistic Provinces. Rajagopalachari favoured the creation of Andhra province without Madras city, knowing full well that Prakasam and others would not accept such a scheme. To Pattabhi, who was never keen on demanding the inclusion of Madras city, Rajagopalachari's attitude was not unfavorable, notwithstanding the latter's occasional remarks to the contrary.

Meanwhile, another problem was posing a threat to Andhra unity. As Eugene F. Irschick remarked, ever since the formation of Andhra University in 1926, the people of Rayalaseema were getting increasingly sore over the domination by the people of the Circars. Rajagopalachari's encouragement of the Rayalaseema leaders by giving them positions in the 1937 Madras ministry was interpreted as an attempt to weaken the Andhra movement. If that was the motive of Rajagopalachari, he initially succeeded; because, the Rayalaseema leader expressed opposition to the idea of a separate Andhra province. They feared domination from the wealthy coastal Districts in the event of such a state being formed. Just about that time people in the coastal Districts charged the elder generation with 'back-sliding'.

Soon after he became the A.P.C.C. President, Pattabhi toured the Rayalaseema to mobilize the people's support for a separate Andhra Province but found them "Sullen and non-cooperative." Sensing the danger to the Andhra movement both from within and from without, Pattabhi evolved a strategy to overcome the more important problem, namely, disunity among the Andhra leaders and people. He first of all, "eloquently vindicated the elder generation of Andhra against the charge of back-sliding." He pointed out that the demand for an Andhra Province was much older than the demand for the creation of other provinces like Orissa and Sindh which had already materialized. Where was the real difficulty in achieving the Andhra Province? Finance? No. Fixation of territory? Not at all. It was the lack of concerted action
on the part of the Andhras that was the cause. That was his reasoning. The
difficulty could be overcome if the ‘coastal friends’ were prepared deal with
“the interior districts in a manly, generous, chivalrous and patriotic manner.”

The solution to the problem was the well-known ‘Sri Bagh Pact’
which came into being at the instance of Pattabhi and T.N. Ramakrishna
Reddi. Pattabhi got the approval of the A.P.C.C. for this Pact which was ‘meant
to satisfy the demands of local patriotism as well as those of a separate
Statehood.’

Explaining how he got the idea, Pattabhi said that quality he had
inherited from his father helped him in achieving this settlement. His father and
father’s brother had inherited some property. The two brothers were to share it.
When the question of dividing the property came up, the elder brother
(Pattabhi’s father) generously gave to his younger brother the right to choose
first the portion he should have. Similarly said Pattabhi, the ‘elder brother’ of
the Coastal districts should be generous towards the ‘younger brothers’ of
Rayalaseema. The Sri Bagh Pact, was so called because it was made at ‘Sri
Bagh’ the residence of the famous Andhra Leader K. Nageswara Rao Pantulu.
The Sri Bagh Fact was described as Pattabhi’s plan. P. Ramacharyulu and Kalluru
Subba Rao signed it. Ranga and Prakasam did not sign it. This Pact of October
1938 said that two University centres, One at Waltair and the other at
Anantapur, should be developed. In the field of agriculture, Rayalaseema and
Nellore district should be brought on a par with the coastal Districts and
priority should be given to them for the utilization of the waters of the
Tungabhadra, the Krishna and the Pennar. In the Legislature, the distribution of
seats should be on equal district basis. The Pact also stated that the
University, the Headquarters and the High Court might be advantageously
situated in different places so as not to concentrate all civic importance at the
same centre. The High Court and the Metropolis, it said, might be located in
suitable places in the Coastal Districts and the Rayalaseema. These could be
shifted by common consent. Pattabhi’s suggestion that seniors should surrender
the right of first choice to juniors was accepted and the Pact was signed by
all the members. This document, pattabhi recalled, played a great part in
settling many matters in 1953 when the Andhra State was formed on principles embodied in the Sri Bagh Pact of 1938. Kurnool in Rayalaseema became the capital of the new state and Guntur, in the coastal Districts, was chosen as the seat of the High Court. The Sri Bagh Pact helped the people and Leaders of Andhra overcome the problem posed by local patriotism. The Report of Justice Wanchoo observed in 1953 that “the people of Rayalaseema who swear by the Sri Bagh Pact will be very upset if it is not implemented to the fullest extent possible. If it is implemented Rayalaseema will not grudge being in the Andhra State.23

The Andhra movement, said the Indian Annual Register, did not exhaust itself simply by rationalizing the plea of linguistic provinces in India. If the Andhras prided themselves on their perseverance during the forty years of the movement, much of the credit should go to Pattabhi. Between 1928 and 1947 the Congress reaffirmed its adherence to the principle on three occasions----------(1) at the Calcutta session in October 1937, (2) at Wardha when the Working Committee met in July 1938, and (3) in its election manifesto of 1945—46. The first two occasions were solely due to Pattabhi’s initiative. At the Calcutta session in 1937, Pattabhi’s resolution recommending the creation of the Provinces of Karnataka and Andhra was adopted. The AICC recommended to the Governments of Bombay and Madras to consider the question. Pattabhi, as stated earlier, moved the matter at the Working Committee meeting at Wardha in 1938. In June 1939, the AICC passed another resolution favouring the creation of an Andhra Province. The demand for linguistic redistribution of India, with Pattabhi being its articulate exponent, was not only accepted formally by the Congress in 1920 but became a part of the Congress creed largely because of the Andhra movement.

Large multi-lingual states like Bombay, Central Provinces and Madras, said Pattabhi in 1939, must give way to smaller states like Andhra, Kerala, Karnataka, Gujarat and Maharashtra, sub-federal states were the need of the hour. Nationality to be real, observed Pattabhi, must seek its strength in the strength and integrity of the Provinces. He saw no hostility between nationalism and federalism. But exceptions could be made. If a State was of
manageable size and population, there was nothing wrong with a multi-lingual State. For instance, Hyderabad could be an ideal Sub-federal multi-lingual State, although Telugus, Kanarese, maharashtrians and Muslims were living in it. According to the Report of the State Reorganisation Commission, in the former Hyderabad State, 47.8 per cent of the people spoke Telugu, 24.3 Marathi, 11.6 Urdu, 10.5 Kannada and 5.8 other languages. Unity was not a Virtue in the state and a demand was even made that the state should be disintegrated on the basis of linguistic and the cultural affinity. It was felt that there would be no integral cohesion if Hyderabad continued as a single State. Nor as the Report of the states Reorganisation Commission pointed out, were all the language groups so placed that they could be grouped in to separate States. That was why Pattabhi stated, “How we can link a state like Hyderabad which in itself is a sub federation with one or more adjoining provinces and link up with them by contriving some new political relationship is a matter which deserves deep consideration and may not be disposed of off hand.”

Like all Andhras, Pattabhi dreamed of Visal-andhra—Union of Hyderabad State with the proposed Andhra Province. In fact, in 1908, such an idea occurred to Pattabhi and his friends at Masulipatnam. The Telugu speaking people of both areas knew that such a merger would be advantageous to both. Pattabhi’s practicality lay in that he desired the larger Visalandhra State, if the people of Telengana agreed to it. This was the view of the States Reorganisation commission also. Otherwise, said Pattabhi, there could be two Telugu-speaking States like some Hindi-speaking States, even though the state of Hyderabad had several links with the Andhra area. Pattabhi said that like Hyderabad, two more sub-federal states could be created in the South. They were one consisting of Coorg, Kanara and Mysore and the other comprising Malabar and Cochin. Big cities like Bombay and Madras might be made joint capitals.

A day before the opening of the Constituent Assembly, Pattabhi presided over the Convention on Linguistic and Cultural Provinces in India. The Convention was held at Delhi on December 8, 1946 and in his
Presidential Address, he made a downright condemnation of the British regime and its irrational distribution of provinces. He asked the Congress which had committed itself to a redistribution of provinces on a cultural and linguistic basis, not to delay the question any more. There were, doubtless, complications; but they should not delay the main issue. It was the duty of the constituent Assembly to take up the question at once. The right way of framing a constitution, said Pattabhi, was to proceed from the Centre to the Provinces. He quoted Sir Reginald Craddock, who, despite his antipathy to linguistic provinces, remarked that if the six million Oriya-speaking people were justified in having a separate state from Bengal, there was no reason why eighteen million Telugu-speaking Andhras should not be given a separate Andhra Province. The Congress fought the elections on the manifesto of linguistic provinces. There was no point in the argument that the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly would be delayed if the question was taken up by it. Pattabhi was alive to the fact that divisive forces were at work and that they might adversely affect national integration. If national integration was likely to be affected by linguistic distribution of provinces, Pattabhi suggested that a rider might be added. The rider was that reconstitution of provinces might be "subject to their economic and financial self-sufficiency." He envisaged an Indian federation in which regional autonomy and regional language would flourish. At this Convention, demand was also made for a separate Haryana State comprising the districts of Ambala, meerut, Agra and Mathura. Most of the people in these parts, both Hindus and Muslims, were vegetarians. Pattabhi supported this demand. His regret was that the State of Haryana did not come in to being at least in 1956. Pattabhi's participation in this Convention was much to his disadvantage. From that day on wards he had to fight a fierce battle with many leaders who were opposed to the linguistic movement. Most prominent among them was Sardar Patel who developed a strong dislike for Pattabhi on account of the latter's campaign for linguistic redistribution.26

By 1946, the Andhra movement was complicated by the emergence of one more political group, i.e., the Communists. AS John G. Leonard put it, they combined the agrarian unrest with agitation for Andhra State. Because of 'their orientation to local politics and manipulation of local issues,' they wielded a great deal of influence among the masses. They now appeared, as 'the genuine
protagonists’ group did not see eye to eye with each other over the question of including Madras city in the Andhra State. Ranga who gave passive support to the demand in the thirties, was trying to consolidate his position as the President of the APCC.

Elsewhere that year, Pattabhi stated that “the whole problem must be taken up as the first and foremost problem to be solved by the Constituent Assembly.” And as chairman of the provincial and union constitution subcommittee, he said on June 12, 1947, that the Government should appoint a Commission to consider the formation of the new provinces like Andhra, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra and others. When Pattabhi referred to the question of linguistic provinces, Rajendraprasad said that matter would be taken up at the appropriate time.

The principle underlying the demand for linguistic provinces was accepted and a Committee headed by S.K. Dar was appointed to go into the question. The Dar commission admitted that there were two grounds in support of linguistic redistribution. Firstly, the provinces were sub-nations from which the centre and the federation derived their power and existence. Secondly, because of the unwieldy size of large provinces, linguistic redistribution was necessary for promoting education and for smooth working of democracy. It was, however, evident from the terms of this commission that reconstitution of provinces solely on a linguistic basis was no longer taken for granted. The Committee’s report stated that ‘practical and present politics’ did not then favour the breaking up of the country into linguistic States. Although it suggested postponement of the question, it made exception in the case of the Telugus (Andhras), Malayalese, Kannadigas, and Maharashtrians. Pattabhi regretted that the report was brushed aside.

Partition of India and ‘the unthought—of problems’ that followed independence necessitated a change of outlook on the part of the Congress leaders. The leaders felt that it might not be possible to redeem their old pledges, and of them was linguistic reconstitution of provinces. Nehru voiced strong criticism of ‘provincialism.’ Patel became hostile to the idea because of
the provincial wranglings and jealousies’ during the merger of the Indian States with provinces. Patel even described the champions of linguism as “assassins of nationalism.” Patel’s main target, of criticism was Pattabhi. In 1947, Patel and Pattabhi had heated exchanges over the issue and the latter said that the former began to dislike the latter from then on.28

After Pattabhi became the Congress President in 1948, a Committee consisting of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel and Pattabhi was appointed to go into the question. The Committee’s report known as the J.V.P. Report, was called the “Report of the Linguistic Provinces Committee, Congress.” This report sought to study “how far the old policy of the Congress was affected by the new problems and the existing situation in the country……the new problems that have arisen out of the achievement of independence. The new problems according to the Report were partition, anti-social forces and narrow provincialism. Security, stability and strength “should be ensured and forces of consolidation should not be impaired. Formation of new provinces would let loose forces of disintegration and disruption and language was now regarded not only as a binding force but also a separating one. The J.V.P Committee thus became “the first Congress body to sound a note of warning against the linguistic principle.” The Committee reversed the earlier attitude of the Congress by saying that the “Congress had not considered all the implication and consequences that arose from this practical application.” Although the Committee felt that it was not an opportune moment for the formation of new provinces, it favoured the creation of an Andhra Province. If the Report was a signal triumph for the view point of Nehru and Patel, it was also a concession to Pattabhi in the sense that the Committee did not completely rule out the principle and favoured the creation of Andhra Province.

The J.V.P. Report said that “protagonists of Andhra Province will have to abandon their claims to the City of Madras.” When it rejected Andhras’ claim to Madras city, Pattabhi incurred “a lot of odium from persons in high positions like T. Prakasam and Sir S.V.Rama Murthy” on account of his stand on the issue. Former Working Committee member Bulusu Sambamurthi alleged
that Pattabhi entered into a deal with K. Kamaraj for personal benefit. In fact, Pattabhi gave up claims to the Madras city in the thirties. He said, "no second largest minority can get the city for itself over the head of the head of the first largest community." This was also the view of the states Reorganization Commission which said that Andhras' claim for Madras city was weak as more than two-thirds of the people spoke Tamil. Pattabhi said that at best Andhras should ask Madras to be made a Joint capital for some time. Pattabhi believed that Andhra State would have materialized if only the Andhras had not insisted on the inclusion of Madras city. Prakasam's insistence on Madras city delayed the formation of Andhra State, Prakasam must have also feared that if the Andhra Province was found in 1950, the strength of Pattabhi's group in the legislature would increase. The Andhra Provincial Congress Committee criticized the Report on this score. Prakasam was very critical of the Report for giving up Madras city because he tirelessly pleaded for its inclusion. Another reason for Prakasam's insistence was that he was the 'Spokesman of the Telugus' in Madras City and it was his constituency. According to Pattabhi, his strongest critics, Prakasam and S.V. Ramamurthi later "admitted the correctness of leaving Madras out of Andhra."29

A perusal of the J.V.P. Report might indicate that Pattabhi surrendered the linguistic principle which he had vigorously championed for over three decades. It might even appear that he had sacrificed a principle for the sake of a province, i.e., his own Andhra Province. But neither of them was true. If it was a surrender in view of the problems facing the country. He felt that overzealous pursuance of the linguistic principle might be exploited by the anti-national and anti-social forces. As President of the States' people's Conference and as a pioneer in the States' People's movement, he realized that divisive forces were at work. He was anxious, as Patel was, that national integration should not be affected at any cost. Another reason for his mellowed attitude was the influence of Gandhi. A month before his death, Gandhi called Pattabhi and said: "Look here, Pattabhi, if you want the Andhra province forthwith select the non-contentious areas amongst those now under the Andhra P.C.C.'s jurisdiction and from the province with these well-settled tracts. You can ask for a Boundary Commission for the rest, three or four years later." Those were
the Mahatma’s last words to Pattabhi. Twenty-six years prior to that Gandhi had asked him to divide the National Congress into provincial circles.

During his last days, Gandhi sensed the danger of linguistic balkanization in the country. He knew that linguistic redistribution would promote cultural advancement. But the danger of the organic unity of India being disrupted by it was greater. Gandhi feared that the province might become independent of the centre. “If each province might become independent of the centre, “If each province,” warned Gandhi in a prayer meeting five days before he was assassinated, “began to look upon itself as a separate sovereign unit, India’s independence would lose its meaning and with it would vanish the freedom of the various units.”

Thinking that Pattabhi had completely changed his views, some leaders like Patel, Munshi and Ambedkar offered to concede the Andhra province. But when such an offer made, Pattabhi told them that he was not fighting for the Andhra province alone. “I cannot accept a small thing and surrender the movement,” he remarked. He explained to them why he had signed the J.V.P. Report favoring only the formation of Andhra Province. That was because many Maharashtrian and Karnatak leaders permitted him to go ahead with the Andhra Province first.

The Andhra province, Pattabhi hoped. Would be created in 1949. Early that year he appealed again in the constituent Assembly for its immediate creation. He told the Assembly that the Andhras were the second largest community in India, next only to the Hindi-speaking people.

The separate state did not come into being till October 1953. Potti Sriramulu’s self-immolation in December 1952 hastened its formation. Pattabhi pointed out that if the separate State was created at least in 1950, instead of in 1953, Sriramulu would not have lost his life, and the loss of property has that resulted in the violent agitations consequent upon Sriramulu’s death could have been averted. According to Pattabhi, if the State were created in 1950, there would have been an opening balance of Rupees nine crores. Whereas in
1953, the Andhra state began with a deficit of five or six crores. The larger state of Andhra Pradesh, comprising the eleven districts of Andhra State and the nine districts of the erstwhile Hyderabad State, came into being on November 1, 1956—forty—eight years after it was first thought of by pattabhi and his friends at Masulipatnam. The events leading to the formation of Andhra State and the creation of the new State in 1953 precipitated states reorganization. The Government of India Resolution on reorganization was based on four principles and one of them was linguistic and cultural homogeneity. Linguistic homogeneity provided “the only rational basis for reconstructing the states; for, it reflects the social and cultural pattern of living obtaining in well-defined regions of the country.” Not only did public opinion favour linguistically homogeneous units but ‘even the demand for the reorganization of states is often equated with the demand for the formation of linguistic provinces.’ The demand for linguistic states was considered necessary to strengthen the unity of the nation. It would help the common man to participate in the affairs of the government and promote the culture of each region. In fact, the flowering of regional languages into ‘rich and powerful vehicles’ of expression helped India’s political evolution.

Pattabhi was hailed as the ‘father’ of the Andhra Province movement. He was ‘the virtual leader,’ certainly ‘the most vigorous spokesman’ of the Andhra movement which he raised to the level of a sub-national movement. As “the Hindustan Times” wrote, “he was one of the pioneers of nationalism in the South.” He began his work for national independence early in his life. Surely, “nobody did more to propagate the logic of linguistic states which was accepted by the Congress.” As a newspaper said, whether unilingual States are now considered “good or bad, logical or illogical, they are partly Pattabhi’s responsibility.” His work for the movement was never based on narrow or partisan grounds.

An adverse effect of the movement has been narrow provincialism which Patel and Nehru feared might wreck India’s unity. Indeed, far too many pressures have been exerted several times since independence on the central Government for the creation of new provinces. On the brighter side,
however, linguistic identification offered "the possibility of a meaningful pluralism as a basis for viable democracy." The language pull did not hinder the "Will and capacity of the people for government by Discussion." It helped in politicizing the people and was "a method of constructing the common interest." The movement helped the rise of the non-Brahmin castes to political leadership by destroying the basis of Brahmin political power. As John G. Leonard said its virtue lay in the fact that "it illustrated the importance of politics for social change and added a new dimension to the basis of secular power."32

In the Circar districts of Andhra Desa, there was early political awakening. The towns of Masulipatnam, Guntur, Rajahmundry and Cocanada were particularly active, thanks to the spearhead of the gospel of nationalism and the crusading work of Veeresalingam in social reform. As mentioned earlier, some intellectuals under the influence of Ragupathi Venkata Ratnam Nayudu strove to make Masulipatnam a leading Centre of social reform and political movement. Pattabhi made a significant contribution to the enrichment of social and political activity of the town. He began his political career in Masulipatnam. A brief study of his early political behavior in relation to that of others would be useful in understanding his role later in provincial and national politics. In such a study, it is also necessary to examine the setting in which he operated, what 'other leaders had for him and his values' and his relationship with other leaders.33

In Masulipatnam, Pattabhi's rise was quick. He along with Hanumantha Rao and Krishna Rao was engaged in fruitful literary and social activity. They had the 'spiritual guidance' of Venkataratnam Nayudu. In the first decade of the century when they were articulating their social and political views, they had the benefit of the advice of Konda Venkatappayya who was then practicing law at Masulipatnam. Pattabhi who was associated with Venkatappayya in Khadi work and political agitation, had good relations with him during this period.34 While Hanumantha Rao devoted his life mainly to the Andhra Jateeya Kalasala, and Krishna Rao to the "Krishna Patrika," Pattabhi was engaged in many-sided activities. His interest in political activity began in 1898 when he had attended the Madras Congress session. Having now
settled in Masulipatnam he sought to expand his political base. His public speeches and writings in leading newspapers had brought him prominence. Later, his ‘Janmabhoomi’ brought him name all over the country.

Realizing that intellectual activity and literary pursuits would not reach the masses, Pattabhi began to interest himself in District politics. The Krishna District Board was the seat of rivalry between two caste groups—the Kapus and the Kammas. They were both powerful caste groups with agriculture as the main source of their strength. They wielded much influence among the peasants and poorer sections of society. Pattabhi’s strategy in the beginning was to encourage the Kammas who were struggling for a hold on the politics of the District Board. He encouraged a young and respected Kamma leader Gottepati Brahmayya of Ghantasala. Pattabhi also propagated Harijan uplift. His idea seemed to be to mobilize the support of the Kammas and Harijans so that the edge of the Justice party’s attack would be blunted. Seelam Jagannadharao and K.V Ramanayya Naidu were the Kapu leaders of the District and were powerful members of the Justice Party. Another important figure belonging to the same clan and subscribing to the creed of the Justice Party was the Raja of Mirzapuram. This Raja had a strong rival in the Raja of Challapalli, a Kamma by caste and another Justice party leader. The Raja of Challapalli and Brahmayya, both Kammas, came from neighbouring areas. The former belonged to the ruling class and the latter to the peasant class. Pattabhi’s Support for Brahmayya therefore aimed at providing a blow to the strength of the justice Party and particularly the powerful Raja.

It is relevant to make a brief allusion here to the role of the Justice Party in provincial politics. The Justice Party came into being in 1917 to fight the ‘Brahmin domination’ in economic and administrative fields. It voiced the feelings of the backward and non-‘Brahmin caste groups who felt that they were not getting their due because of Brahmin exploitation. The Justice movement declared that “Hindu methods of social reform had failed to conciliate and satisfy nor-man human feelings.” The Justice Party infused into the provincial politics a new element, caste. The Indian National Congress countered the Justice Party argument by saying that political leadership had
not been the monopoly of Brahmins. The All parties Conference of 1928 stated that "Brahmins like Tilak, Gokhale and Shastri had acquired their position by the possession of the same qualities of leadership which enabled Gandhi, Lajapat Rai, C.R. Das and Jinnah to lead and influence public opinion." As Satyamurthi once remarked, the Congress, certainly as the national level, did not work on sectrain or caste lines.36

The Justice Party’s quick rise after 1919 was due to the non-co-operation programme launched by the Congress. This programme helped the Justice Party men ‘to capture the whip hand of administration.’ The Justice movement gained pace and popularity among the non-Brahmins from then on. Pattabhi was convinced that the non-Brahmins deserved a better deal. When the Justice Party demanded communal redeal. When the Justice Party demanded communal representation, Pattabhi came out in support of the demand. He said that territorial rather than communal representation Would not stop, “the present irritation and heart burning and by one stroke of the pen fuse the castes and sects of India.” Pattabhi’s view, which was later accepted by the Madras provincial Congress Committee, was that it was much better to provide non-Brahmins with whatever system that would advance their political interests. Pattabhi sympathized with the non-Brahmin’s grievances but disagreed with the views of the Justice Party leaders and the tirade some of them carried on against the Brahmins. Pattabhi’s opposition to the stemmed from two basic factors—it was led by the rich landlords and ‘opportunists’ and it gave rise to separatist forces such as-nists’ and it gave rise to separatists forces such as south VS. North. P.T.Cheetty, a leader of the Justice Party appealed to the people not to vote for ‘political Brahmin.’ Another example for the strong anti-Brahmin feelings among the South Indians particularly in Tamil Nadu was the reaction of people in Madras city when Rajagopalachari formed the first Congress ministry in 1937. Posters appeared on the walls in City accusing the new administration as being a ‘Brahmin Raj.’ When Rajagopalachari pleaded for the introducetion of Hindi in Schools, the situation became worse. Some non-Brahmins interpreted such nationalism. To rammes as means for strengthening Brahmanism. To them Brahmanism was masquerading as nationalism. The only answer to that was communalism, they added. Not only Rajagopalachari but
Gandhi also came in for attack by these people. Such extremist elements went to the extent of demanding a separate Dravidian State comprising the present South Indian States of Tamil Nadu, Mysore, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. In fact, the differences between the north and the South were highlighted by the separatist forces. The most vigorous of the separatists, in fact 'the originator of the demand for an independent Dravidasthan' was E.V. Rama-swami Naicker. The British Government realized that these demands would be injurious to the administration. The Congress felt that they would constitute threatsto national unity. It was left to Kamaraj another non-Brahmin leader and a former follower of Naicker to keep the non-Brahmin movement led in the early stages by the Justice Party gave rise in to some irritation between North and South.

Thanks to be pioneering social reform work done by Veeresalingam and the farsightedness of leaders like Pattabhi and Prakasam, the non-Brahmin movement was not as militant in Andhra as it was in Tamil Nadu. Pattabhi's attitude towards the non-Brahmins, as was evidenced by his encouragement of sympathy. His stack went up due to his bold leadership of the congress followers in the case against the Raja of Mirzapur. At the instance of Pattabhi, Brahmayya filed the case against the raja who was accused of corrupt practices in the elections to the Madras Assembly in 1926. The Raja it was said, offered a bride of Rs.50,000/- to pattabhi who was then raising funds for the Andhra Jateeya Kalasala. Pattabhi repailed that he would prefer to beg rather than accept the 'gift' to the Kalasala. This boosted Pattabhi's reputation among the Congress Workers and the poorer sections. Pattabhi's strategy worked well for some time more and he succeeded in making Brahmayya the President of the District Board, against the opposition of the Raja of Challapalli. It was a triumph for the Congress and Pattabhi's followers in the District. Pattabhi himself worked as the secretary of the Board. This led to increased opposition to the Congress from the Kapus as also the Raja of Challapalli. In fact Pattabhi even had the District divided into East Krishna and West Krishna so was a tactical move to keep away from the West Krishna politicians, the cleverest of whom the Brahmin leader Kaleswara Rao. But Pattabhi's role after the raja of Challapalli regained his strength came in for much criticism. It was true that Pattabhi's role was limited by the
acute inter-caste rivalry. But in his anxiety to maintain a grip over the District Board politics, he was pusillanimous. His deals with the Raja of Challapalli meant to secure for Brahmayya the President ship of the Board, satisfied neither the Raja nor the Kapus led by Ramanayya Naidu. Wrost of all, Brahmayya felt let down by Pattabhi. His followers in the District felt that Pattabhi did not fully take them into confidence. It used to be said that Pattabhi was a leader who was admired but hardly adored. He had never succeeded in winning the affection of his followers. This was a draw back of his personality. Brahmayya however was uniformly loyal to Pattabhi and was never tired of saying that his rise was due to Pattabhi’s guidance and support.\textsuperscript{38} In 1937, they both headed the Andhra provincial Congress Committee as President and Secretary.

A charge was made against Pattabhi that he helped the Raja of Challapalli and also the Raja of Bobbili and that he was courting the favours of the Zamindars. He was accused of ‘rehabilitating’ the raja of Bobbili and other leaders of the Justice Party by taking them in to the Congress. Such charges were totally un founded. It was Pattabhi who stood by the Congress workers in their fight against the Justice Party. Leaders The incident involving the Raja of Mirzapur was an instance of his sense of independence and fearlessness. If he were enamoured of favours of the rich, he would have exploited the influence he had as the President of the All-India States’ people’s Conference. As regards the taking them into the Congress, the less said the better. After the 1937 Congress success, a number of Justice Party leaders joined the Congress Party. In free India, the Congress not only took them into its fold but gave them a number of party tickets in elections. The ostensible reason was that their money would be helpful in winning seats. Pattabhi like the Congress took them into the Party during his President ship of the APCC with a view to weaken their hold in provincial politics.

Pattabhi could not have asked for a more favourable introduction into provincial politics than what his father-in-law Ganjam Venkataratnam had given him. Through Venkataratnam, Pattabhi came into contact with the politics of the Godavari District. During his visits to Madras City, he renewed his
contacts with Tamil leaders. He built up his position through his writings in English and Telugu. He was one of the earliest to organize meetings to demand a separate Andhra province. This enabled him to get in touch with other Andhra leaders.

A political disadvantage to all Brahmin leaders of Andhra was their disunity. As stated earlier, the Brahmin was too much of an individualist. Pattabhi seemed no exception to this rule. In the personality clashes that plagued the Andhra political scene, particularly the dominant Brahmin caste, Pattabhi had his own share of acts of omission and commission. If Konda Venkatappayya and Pattabhi worked together for the Andhra state between 1912 and 1930, they later fell out over several matters. Venkatappayya was an orthodox type of Brahmin. Pattabhi often made sarcastic references to Venkatappayya’s orthodoxy. Among the deeper causes that separated them was Pattabhi’s disapproval of Venkatappayya’s follower’s handling of the Khadi Sangh. This was a rivalry within the Congress group. Venkatappayya felt that Pattabhi carried tales to Gandhi against him and that was why Gandhi felt that the non-co-operation movement was not being properly organized in Andhra by Venkatappayya. This was a charge typical of the Andhra leaders of that time. Any Andhra leader who failed to get into Gandhi’s good books charged Pattabhi with carrying tales to Gandhi against him. The obvious reason for making such a charge was that Pattabhi was said to be Gandhi’s confident among the Andhras.

Another instance of Pattabhi’s clashes with Andhra leaders was the hostility between him and the popular leader Gopalakrishnayya. Pattabhi crossed swords with Gopalakrishnayya. Particularly because the latter was opposed to some of the programmes laid down by Gandhi. These two were said to be ‘formidable rivals.’ Gopalakrishnayya was a hero to the people of the Circars. He raised a band of Volunteers known as ‘Ramanandu’ to fight the administration. Gandhi disapproved of Gopalakrishnayya’s measures though Gandhiknew Gopalakrishnayya was a talented and self-sacrificing hero.’ It was alleged that Pattabhi influenced Gandhi and got Gopalakrishnayya censured by Gandhi. Gopalakrishnayya who was the most independent of the Andhra leaders blamed Konda Venkatappayya and Sambamurthi for the censure he got.
from Gandhi. Pattabhi, Venkatappayya, Sambamurthi and other saw to it that Gopalakrishnayya was defeated in the election for the Secretaryship of the APCC in 1924. Gopalakrishnayya died three years later. Pattabhi’s rivalry with Gopalakrishnayya got for him a good deal of unpopularity among the people of the Circars.

The internecine warfare among the Brahmins intensified in the thirties particularly during the elections to the Madras Legislative Assembly. Pattabhi and his followers among whom were some Reddis and Kammas were engaged in clashes with Prakasam’s group and also Ranga’s group between 1937 and 1951. The two or three major occasions of such conflicts were between 1937 and 1939 as also between 1946 and 1949. It is necessary to examine Pattabhi’s role during these ingroup rivalries and also the work done by Pattabhi as president of the APCC from 1937 to 1939.

During the thirties, there were three main groups in the APCC—the Prakasam group, the Pattabhi group and the Ranga group. N.G. Ranga led the peasants and particularly the Kammas of the Circars. Ranga was opposed to Pattabhi throughout and he sided with Prakasam occasionally. Being the leader of a minority group, Ranga’s strategy was to widen the gap between the two groups led by Pattabhi and Prakasam and get a hold over the APCC. Ranga was shrewd enough to realize that he would be stronger if he sided with Prakasam than with Pattabhi. That might be the reason for his occasional support to Prakasam. In the thirties in particular, Ranga was virulent in his attacks on both the groups. He filed many complaints against the actions of Prakasam, Sambamurthi and Pattabhi. He entered into correspondence with the Congress High Command. The reaction of the High Command was unfavourable to Ranga as the top leadership came to the conclusion that Ranga had no influence in the APCC. Nehru also seemed displeased with Ranga. On one occasion, when Ranga delivered a speech at a student’s rally in 1939 Nehru became furious and chided Ranga for making a speech which according to Nehru was “wholly irresponsible and unworthy of any person of judgment.” For his failure to get on well with the High Command, Ranga held Pattabhi mainly and Rajagopalachari partly responsible. He alleged that Pattabhi
and his follower Kala Venkata Rao carried on a “nerve-raking guerilla political warfare” against him since 1931. It was, however, evident from the accusations Ranga hurled at one and all in Andhra Congress Politics that most of them were imaginary than real.

Meanwhile, Pattabhi who by now was a confirmed rightist invited the opposition of another small but vociferous section in the Congress, the socialist group. It was in this atmosphere that Prakasam vacated the Presidentship of the APCC, consequent upon his becoming the Revenue Minister in the first Madras Congress ministry in July 1937. Pattabhi realized that he would have no hold over the APCC as long as Prakasam was there. That was why he seldom came out openly to oppose Prakasam. He did not hold any major position in the APCC barring the treasurership for sometime in 1925. In 1937, he was away at Simla when the question of election of the APCC President came up. Pattabhi’s followers became enthusiastic about taking over the leadership of the APCC. Accordingly, Pattabhi was proposed for the Presidentship and Brahmayya for the Secretaryship of the APCC in 1937. They were the ‘rightist’ candidates who won against M.Annapurnayya and A. Kameswara Rao supported by socialists and Ranga’s group. Prakasam, who had earlier accommodated Pattabhi on the Provincial Congress Working Committee, helped Pattabhi win the election. The following year Pattabhi’s group encountered the direct opposition of Ranga and his group. Pattabhi defeated Ranga by 143 votes to 81 and Brahmayya defeated P. Sundarayya. Prakasam’s support for Pattabhi was again evident. Prakasam was obviously unhappy with Ranga who had a little earlier accused Prakasam of building ‘his caucus’ in Andhra. Pattabhi acknowledged the support he received from Prakasam. “Although”, said Pattabhi, “I became President of the APCC in 1937, I gave it back to Prakasam in 1939 after he resigned as Revenue Minister.” Pattabhi admitted that in the APCC, Prakasam was unquestionably more powerful than he. “I always felt,” remarked Pattabhi, “that Prakasam’s saddle does not fit me.” Nevertheless, Ranga’s defeat in 1938 resulted in more rifts and increasing groupism in Andhra Politics.
As President of the APCC, Pattabhi had Brahmayya, the Kamma leader and his loyal follower, as the secretary. His selection of N. Sanjeeva Reddy as the Assistant Secretary was another tactical move on the part of Pattabhi. Sanjeeva Reddy, who later became the strong man of Andhra politics from 1954 to 1964, was said to be Pattabhi’s discovery. According to Sanjeeva Reddy himself, he was spotted by Pattabhi in 1928 during the latter’s visit to Anantapur. Sanjeeva Reddy was then in Youth Congress activities Pattabhi advised him to get into active politics. A reason that prompted Pattabhi to pickup Sanjeeva Reddy for the post was that the Rayalaseema leaders were unhappy over their backwardness in provincial politics. In fact, that was the time when the Sri Bagh Pact was being made to effect compromise between the Andhra and Rayalaseema sections. It was also said that the Madras premier Rajagopalachari tried to weaken the demand for Andhra States by offering positions to the Rayalaseema leaders in the Madras ministry.\(^ 44\) It was also the period of growing rivalry between the Kammas and Reddys. As such, the selection of Sanjeeva Reddy proved to be an important step taken by Pattabhi.

Organizationally, the APCC was benefited under Pattabhi’s leadership. It was due to Pattabhi that the APCC obtained a good library. The publication of several bulletins and works in Telugu was carried out with characteristic efficiency. Financially, the organization became stronger and by 1939 it had a surplus of Rs. 30,000. He introduced programmes for Harijan uplift and village reconstruction. The promotion of Khaddar was given the expected priority. A resolution was passed by the APCC on 16-12-1939 that all elected members of the Congress should not only wear certified Khaddar themselves, but also induce the members of their families to wear it. As per Gandhi’s directives, peace brigades were organized. Pattabhi laid down the policy that even highly placed Congressmen should not lose their contact with local bodies. He argued that Congressmen could never become successful ministers unless they interested themselves in local problems. Pattabhi suggested that a conference be convened to correct the incompatibility that existed between the working of the administration and the aspirations of the nationalists. In spite of his strong opposition to Council entry and acceptance of office, he lent support to the
Congress ministry headed by Rajagopalachari. That was his duty as loyal Congressman. But when Rajagopalachari offered Pattabhi a place on the Cabinet, Pattabhi turned it down. Rajagopalachari remarked thus: “why, Pattabhi, you refuse everything: you will one day refuse Congress Presidentship also. Why do you always say no?” Pattabhi was an unswerving ‘no-changer.’

It was, however, a difficult period for Pattabhi. The situation became complicated owing to two main reasons. Firstly, there was increased group rivalry with the emergence of the two rival caste-groups, Reddys and Kammas. Secondly, Pattabhi was tactless on several occasions and made his position vulnerable to attacks from the frustrated sections of the Party. Pattabhi had to face the campaign of vilification launched by Ranga and his followers. Complaints and petitions against Pattabhi and Brahmayya were sent to the High Command by Ranga. It must however be said that if the tenure of Prakasam or Pattabhi or Ranga as President of the APCC is to be judged on the basis of complaints filed none of them had a blemishless record. There was a spate of letters and petitions against every one of the three in the files of the Congress.

Pattabhi, however, took some decisions which proved to be unpopular. He was convinced that as there were cases of indiscipline and corruption in the APCC, he should put the house in order. He therefore took measures to rectify the errors in the membership list of the Congress. An order was issued to exclude those who did not possess receipts. This measure caused a furore in the APCC and wild accusations were made against Pattabhi. Pattabhi cancelled the nomination of P. Sundarayya, the top left Communist leader, as a Congress candidate from Kovvur constituency for the delegateship of the AICC. The reason advanced by Pattabhi was that Sundarayya did not believe, ‘in non-violence as a creed or even as a policy,’ and concealed dangerous Communist literature. This was an unwise step. Equally unpopular was Pattabhi’s disciplinary action against AlluriSatyanarayana Raju and others for using abusive language against the APCC leadership. Similar ‘strong steps’ against Congressmen in Krishna and West Godavary brought him neither significant political advantage nor enhanced prestige. It was true that some action was necessary in such districts as Vizag and Nellore which were
plagued by election disputes. It was equally true that Pattabh’s enemies made capital out of such severe disciplinary measures. Even though it was argued that as Pattabh was much of the time away from the Province, the decisions mostly emanated from his followers, Pattabh cannot escape responsibility for these measures. In fact, a stickler for Constitutional norms that he was, Pattabh generally got the prior permission of the High Command for his measures. An example in this regard was the permission he obtained from Congress President Rajendra Prasad before taking action against the members of the Subordinate-Committee in 1939. The point, however, is that Pattabh was tactless in handling the complicated election disputes in the APCC. Pattabh unnecessarily contemplated a ban on the receptions arranged for Subhas Chandra Bose in Andhra in 1939. Bose had just then won a controversial election against Pattabh. Bose was a popular figure. Pattabh's political rivals particularly Ranga and his followers arranged a number receptions in honour of Bose. When Pattabh contemplated a ban on these receptions in accordance with the Congress directive, Ranga tried his best to direct public attention against Pattabh. Rajendra Prasad, who advice Pattabh sought, suggested to Pattabh to ignore the receptions arranged for Bose. Pattabh gave up the idea of banning the receptions. Although he was constitutionally empowered to take such a step, it was a case of sheer tactlessness.

An important development during the two-year Presidentship of Pattabh was the attempt of the groups to consolidate their respective strengths within the APCC. Pattabh’s group consisting of Kala Venkata Rao. The shrewd Brahmin from East Godavary district, B. Gopala Reddy from Nellore, Brahmayya and Sanjiva Reddy from Rayalaseema and others began to entertain hopes of leading the Congress ministry in the Madras Presidency. Though not Willing for a showdown against Prakasam, Pattabh was their leader who could be defended upon to defeat Prakasam or Rajagopalachari. They were aware that Pattabh would not be acceptable to all the members of the APCC. But their confidence lay in the fact that Pattabh would be preferred to Prakasam by the High Command. B. Gopala Reddi’s no-confidence motion against Prakasam in the APCC in 1941 was the first shot fired by Pattabh’s group. It was rumoured that if Rajagopalachari joined the Federal
Executive, the High Command in concert with Rajagopalachari would manage to get the Madras Premiership for Pattabhi. Their reasoning was that in view of Prakasam’s poor relations with the Congress High Command, Pattabhi would be preferred in the absence of Rajagopalachari. Pattabhi, it was said, was Wardha’s favourite. Pattabhi like Rajagopalachari and Prakasam desired the office. But in spite of his occasional trials, it must be said to the credit of Pattabhi that he did not frantically parade his claims. Several times he even indicated his unwillingness to get into the ring. He declared that he would act in accordance with Gandhi’s wish.

The election of the Premier of Madras became the burning topic in 1946. In Andhra provincial Congress Committee, the two groups led by Pattabhi and Prakasam were working feverishly for capturing power. In Tamil Nadu, the Congress Committee was also split into groups. One led by Kamaraj and the other by Rajagopalachari. The latter’s re-entry into Congress was not welcomed by the former who established firm hold over the Congress organization in Tamil Nadu. Added to this was the open support Rajagopalachari’s candidacy for the premiership saying that Rajagopalachari was ‘the best man for the purpose.’ Prakasam’s supporters asserted that the election should be decided on the floor of the Legislature and that there should be no imposition from above. As Iswara Dutt put it, there were four groups in Legislature: (1) Those who swore by Prakasam: (2) those who owed their allegiance and inspiration to Rajagopalachari: (3) the Tamil members who took orders from Kamaraj: and (4) the Andhra members led by Gopala Reddy and Kala Venkta Rao and from behind the scenes by Pattabhi. “There was no concealing the fact,” wrote Iswara Dutt, ‘that the influence of Rajaji with the High Command and Pattabhi inside it manifestly prejudiced matters relating to Madras Politics’.

Pattabhi was not agreeable to a fight with Prakasam. He would have accepted any offer from the High Command which gave first preference to Rajagopalachari and second preference to Pattabhi. As Prakasam was unwilling to withdraw, a Showdown became imminent between Prakasam and Rajagopalachari. Pattabhi’s supporters gave an assurance that they would support...
Prakasam if Pattabhi was not there in the field. The High Command tried its best to get Rajagopalachari elected premier. It tried to keep Pattabhi and Prakasam apart so that Rajagopalachari would succeed. With Kamaraj appearing to help Prakasam and the Andhra legislators being united, it became practically impossible for Rajagopalachari to think of any success in the election. His last minute effort was to split the Andhra vote. He suggested the name of Sambamurthi for the Premiership. After getting Rajagopalachari out of the scene, Kamaraj plumped for Muthuranga Mudaliar. Pattabhi kept away from the scene. Rajagopalachari's abstained from voting Prakasam obtained 82 votes as against 69 polled by Muthu Ranga Mudaliar and became the Premier of Madras. It was a blow to the prestige of the High Command. As far as Pattabhi and his followers were concerned, they kept their promise of support.

The first half of the drama was over. But it was the latter half of it that was even more controversial. Prakasam kept Pattabhi's men like Sanjiva Reddy, Gopalareddi and Kala Venkatarao out of his ministry. Prakasam ran the ministry according to his wishes and rubbed many including Kamaraj on the wrong side. It was not only poor strategy but poor leadership that Prakasam provided during his one year's tenure as premier of Madras. Pattabhi's group joined hands with Kamaraj's Group and caused the downfall of Prakasam ministry. The High Command did not hesitate to assist the provincial legislators in bringing about the downfall of Prakasam ministry. As president of the APCC, Ranga and Prakasam's group accused the High Command of being prejudiced against Prakasam. Pattabhi was also held responsible for Prakasam's fall. As the leading Telugu newspaper which stood by Prakasam on many an occasion observed, Prakasam should blame none but himself for his downfall. Prakasam seemed to be aware of the reasons for his defeat.

Meantwhile, Ranga said in 1946 that he became the President of the APCC despite the opposition of Pattabhi. Hostilities between Pattabhi's group and Ranga intensified. In the election of the President of the Indian National Congress, Pattabhi got the support of Prakasam and most of his followers. It was probable that Prakasam was reciprocating the gesture which Pattabhi's
group did during the election of the Madras premier in 1946. All the same, it was typically generous of Prakasam to have done so. Ranga claimed to have lent his group's support to Pattabhi. It was however believed that Ranga's followers numbering thirty voted against Pattabhi. Kamaraj's support for Pattabhi was also responsible for his success in 1948.51

Another significant development in Andhra politics was the defeat of Ranga at the hands of Sanjiva Reddy in 1951. It was the defeat of a Kamma at the hands of a Reddi. It was remarked that Pattabhi 'typified the Brahman façade behind which Reddi power made its appearance. Such a conclusion was not borne out by facts. The fight was between Pattabhi's group and Prakasam's followers. The latter sided with Ranga. Pattabhi's group had a few important Kamma leaders in addition to some Brahmin leaders like Kala Venkata Rao. Sanjiva Reddy and Gopala Reddi along with Kamma leader Brahmayya were followers of Pattabhi even in the thirties. The 1951 contest was basically a fight between two old Brahmin rivals. One of them was thirsting for power and the other was making his retreat from State politics. It must be mentioned that in this crucial contest in which Sanjiva Reddy defeated Ranga by a majority of only five votes, Prakasam cast his vote and Pattabhi stayed away from it. Prakasam's followers sided with Ranga only after their failure get for Prakasam the Presidentship. Immediately, Ranga and Prakasam resigned from the Congress. Commenting on their 'resignations, the 'Andhra Patrika' editorially said that Prakasam who had lost his Madras premiership and Ranga his APCC Presidentship were wrong in thinking that they were only suffers in the freedom struggle. The paper said that they were not bigger than the Congress and that prakasam's one year of office and Ranga's four years of Presidentship did not improve matters. The Congress, said the paper, would be better off without such elements. I did not redound to their credit to have resigned following their defeat. As stated earlier, it was typical of Andhra leaders, mostly Brahmins, who were eager to be leaders but seldom willing to be disciplined followers. The 1951 election completed the destruction of the base of Brahmin power in Andhra politics. It almost synchronized with the final stage of the Andhra movement which, as John G. Leonard observed, illustrated the importance of politics for social change.
It is not irrelevant if a brief study of Pattabhi And Prakasam who were the two most outstanding of the Andhra leaders for over thirty years is attempted here. Both of them were Brahmins and even belonged to the same sect, the Niyogis. Prakasam was the older of the two, while Pattabhi was politically the senior. Prakasam arrived on the political scene in 1920. Pattabhi had by then distinguished himself in many fields notably as the ‘most brilliant exponent of the Andhra case.’ Pattabhi was a doctor of medicine and Prakasam a barrister, who was educated in England. Prakasam was ‘the most westernized of Andhra leaders.’ Prakasam’s intellectual equipment, as K.M. Panikkar remarked, was limited. He had ‘no outstanding intellectual gifts.’ Pattabhi was an intellectual of national eminence. Khasa Subbarau said that pattabhi’s influence did not correspond to his abilities.

Both had cordial relations in the early stages of their political careers. Pattabhi advised Prakasam to start a paper and was helpful to Prakasam in many ways. Politically, Prakasam was nearer to Tilak than to Gandhi. Later, he sided with the swarajist leaders and was close to Gandhi’s critic S. Srinivasa Iyengar and Mothilal Nehru. He was on the best of terms with the elder Nehru. “Mothilal,” wrote Prakasam, “would open his heart and tell me grievances, real or imaginary.” Pattabhi drew close to Gandhi and was an outspoken critic of the Swarajists. Gandhi was impressed by Pattabhi’s organizing abilities and carefulness in money matters. Prakasam on the other hand was poor in organizing business. He was not endowed with any business acumen. He was often ‘reckless’ in his business deals. His ‘Swarjya’ financially ruined him and several other journalists. Gandhi had throughout no liking or sympathy for Prakasam. The reasons were not far to seek. Prakasams role in the controversy between pro-changers and no-changers, his association with Swarajists and Srinivasa Iyengar and the purse acceptance controversy prejudiced Gandhi against Prakasam. Rajagopalachari, who among South Indian leaders was the closest to Gandhi, was opposed to Prakasam from 1923 onwards. In fact, it was not Pattabhi but Rajagopalachari who was Prakasams, rival in provincial politics. It was said that Pattabhi influenced the High Command to become unfavourable to Prakasam in 1946. It was not Pattabhi but Rajagopalachari who wielded greater influence with the High Command. Further, Rajagopalachari opposed
Prakasam in Congress politics of the Presidency. Pattabhi was never a serious rival to Prakasam in Provincial Congress, though his group ceaselessly administered pin-pricks to Prakasam.

Pattabhi was an uncompromising no-changer. Prakasam advocated council-entry and office-acceptance. Here again a contrast can be drawn. Pattabhi never contested a seat in the legislature. Prakasam was ever eager to contest in elections. Pattabhi's dislike for elections could be due to an awareness that he was not a man of the masses. As B. Gopala Reddy remarked, Pattabhi was unwilling to expose himself to electoral vagaries. Prakasam had tremendous charismatic appeal. To the 'emotional Telugus,' he was fearless leader and a self-sacrificing-hero. Prakasam knew that in an election he would be invincible. Pattabhi on the other hand was highly successful in committees and conferences. In Andhra politics, Prakasam was adored for his large-heartedness and Pattabhi was admired for his intellectual gifts. The former 'appealed to men's hearts,' while the latter 'elevated their minds.' Pattabhi had in Andhra politics a position identical to that of Rajagopalachari in Tamil Nadu. Prakasam's place could be compared to that of Satyamurthi. Pattabhi's relations with the Party-men and the in-group and his relationship with the political out-group such as the Communists and Socialists, allied to certain personal qualities and habits, were mainly responsible for 'his luck not being equal to his genius' in provincial politics. In spite of his service to the poor and down-trodden, his role performance 'failed to elicit the intended mass response.'

As a committee-man he was throughout his career highly successful. Prakasam who got into the Congress Working Committee in 1922 did not make any significant contribution to the proceedings of the Committee during his membership. He functioned more like an opposition leader. His suggestions were mostly rejected. He failed to take advantage of the opportunity and was generally a failure. Pattabhi on the other hand was highly articulate and constructive in his role as a member of the Congress Working Committee. After his joining the Committee in 1929, he steadily built up his position and proved to be an asset to the C.W.C. The fact that he was invited as a
special member to attend the Committee meetings when he was not on this powerful body, confirms the point.

In Andhra politics and even in public life, people were identified either as Prakasam’s men or Pattabhi’s men. The latter’s critics were trenchant in their condemnations of Pattabhi. The most outspoken of Pattabhi’s critics was Khasa Subbarau, a journalist of eminence, who for years carried on ‘a hate-campaign’ against Pattabhi. A follower of Prakasam he attributed every failure of his hero Prakasam to the ‘designs.’ He glorified Prakasam as ‘the daring of the Andhra crowd’ and as the peerless leader ‘to whom none in South India could hold a candle.’ But Subbarau was wild in his accusations of Pattabhi. His allegation that Pattabhi attacked the Communists to get ‘cheap popularity’ was unsupported by facts. Pattabhi dislike for Communism became manifest in 1920 and his attacks on communist leaders brought him unpopularity. Pothan Joseph summed up Subbarau’s vitriolic Writings thus: ‘By the standards of Andhra emotionalism, the late T.Prakasam often appeared a superior hero in Khasa’s polemical Writings.” A balanced assessment came from K. Iswara Dutt who said that “Konda Venkatappayya, Pattabhi and Prakasam were the soul, the brain and the driving force of the Congress movement in Andhra.” Prominent Journalists like K.Rama Rau and K. Ramakotiswara Rau was equally objective in their assessment. The former wrote in his autobiography thus: “Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya was the benevolent uncle, Kalpataru, to all of us. Ask and thou shalt be given was his attitude to us, knights of quill... To Pattabhi, we were fellow workers... He was an intellectual who satisfied me completely by the rich contents of his mind and his power of critical analysis of complex questions.”

In spite of their rivalry and divergent views on issues, Prakasam and Pattabhi had high respect for each other’s value and contribution to national life. It was stated that Gandhi in his efforts ‘to get rid of Prakasam from the political field’ was discouraged by he restrained attitude of the members of the Congress Working Committee. This proves that Pattabhi as a member of the Congress Working Committee was not hostile, if not helpful to Prakasam. They would have come closer to each other if Pattabhi’s suggestion to
nominate Prakasam to the Congress Working Committee in 1948 was not opposed by Patel. It was said that Patel did not like the idea of the two Andhra leaders coming together and therefore threatened to withdraw from the Working Committee if Pattabhi persisted in his demand to include Prakasam. Pattabhi therefore, deleted the name of Prakasam from the proposed list of names. Very few people knew then, as they know now, about this gesture of Pattabhi. Even though there was no personal animosity between the two, they could not sort out their differences mainly because of the fact that the groups they had built up became powerful in provincial politics. These groups used freely their leaders' names. Both Pattabhi and Prakasam could not control the activities of the factions they had created. At times the two leaders did not know what their groups were doing.

It is often lamented in Andhra that Prakasam known for his mass appeal and high minded devotion to public causes, Ranga whose popularity among the rural masses and sincerity of purpose were well-known and Pattabhi could not pull together, It used to be said that the Andhra politicians 'as a rule never calculated on the balance of advantage in politics.' It was Andhra's misfortune that neither Prakasam nor Pattabhi nor Ranga was an exception to this rule.

Prakasam in spite of his strength in provincial politics could not get into the All India Congress. It was partly due to his inability to pull on well with the High Command. In contrast, Pattabhi in spite of his limited strength at the provincial level, could become a front-ranking national leader. A reason for his emergence as a national leader was his ability to get on well with some of the top leaders like Rajendra Prasad, Maulana Azad and Patel till 1947. Both Prakasam and Pattabhi were in Politics individualists in a way. This was a feature of the Andhra leaders, Particularly the Brahmins.

Both were products of South Indian politics. The South was generally at a disadvantage in all-India politics. There were many political, cultural and emotional differences between the North and the South. Veteran South Indian leader Satyamurthi lamented that the South had suffered and was suffering for
a long time from an inferiority complex. There was a feeling of aloofness among the South India Leaders who never pulled together. He said that with the exception of Rajagopalachari, South India did not play ‘its full part in All India Congress Politics.’ Satyamurthi called the South Indian leaders ‘palanquin-bearers.’ In fact, the North vs South feelings came to the surface after the birth of the justice Party. Gandhi was aware of this problem. When some correspondents misrepresented Gandhi’s statement once, he warned them ‘against segregating the Dravidian South from Aryan North.’ Rajagopalachari also must have felt that South Indians were not getting their due in Indian politics when he wrote that, “…South India has undoubtedly produced many of the greatest men of India.”

The demand of some Tamil leaders for a separate Dravidasthan in the forties and the opposition of the South Indians to the introduction of Hindi as languages for compulsory study from 1937 onwards reflected the protesting attitude of the South Indians. There was almost an open breach between the Hindi enthusiasts and South Indian members. The opposition to Hindi continued after independene, particularly in Tamil Nadu, resulting in violence and agitation quite often.

There was force in Satyamurthi’s charge. Till freedom was won, the presidency of the Congress was a powerful and coveted position. And yet only two South Indians became Congress presidents during the sixty-two years of Congress prior to Independence. Ananda Charulu in 1891 and Srinivasa Iyengar in 1926 were the two president to have come from the South Pattabhi would have been the third if he were not defeated in 1939. The Congress Working Committee also did not give adequate representation to the Congress in the South. Between 1929 and 1946 only Pattabhi and Rajagopalachari served, though not uninterruptedly on the Working Committee. There were occasions when none from South India was on the committee. Even after the attainment of freedom there was no marked improvement in the situation though Nehru, Azad and Rajendra Prasad were aware of the feelings of the South. Only Kamaraj played an effective role. Though for a short period of three years in the Indian National Congress. Kamaraj’s emergence as a national leader was due mainly to three reasons. Firstly, he was a successful Tamil leader
who had strong support among the masses." Secondly, Nehru encouraged him, Lastly, Kamaraj’s strength emanated from the ‘syndicate.’ The ‘syndicate’ was formed by the strong men of the South and leaders of the non-Hindi speaking States to assert their strength in national politics. The formation of this body at the South Indian holy place, Tirupthi, revealed the strong desire of the South Indian leaders to correct long-standing imbalance between North and South in Indian Politics.

In pre-independent India, south Indians labored under a handicap about which Satyamurthi lamented long ago. It was said that Pattabhi Would have risen to greater heights if he were not from the south. If it was true in the case of many leaders from the south, it was particularly so in the case of Prakasam.

Pattabhi’s role in provincial politics ended after the formation of the Andhra State in 1953. He performed a variety of roles for over four decades in provincial politics and public life. A notable aspect of his political role was that he like Prakasam helped the emergence of other cast—groups in provincial politics.