ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRAGMATISM AS A GENERAL PHILOSOPHY
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO EDUCATION

Origin and source of Pragmatism: The justifications of the various pragmatic or instrumental currents in the 20th century education, are firmly rooted in the general pragmatic philosophy. Hence an understanding of this is essential for fuller appreciation.

Together with the eternal problems like the problems of one and the many, materialism and idealism, rationalism and empiricism with many other isms in the realm of philosophy, the problem of attitude and temperament also plays an important role. In the problem of rationalism and empiricism, for example, the philosophers of the past began to reason out from two opposite premises. The rationalistic philosophers in their effort to see the first principles of everything began to reason out in the form of pure abstraction to the extent of ignoring the many-sided material nature while the empiricists, especially majority of the post Darwinian philosophers, began to reason just in the opposite direction from the materialistic point of view ignoring the rationalistic claims. Pragmatism as a philosophy was born out of the clashes between the rationalistic and empiricistic viewpoints with more stress on the empiricistic claims.

1. William James, Pragmatism, (Longmans, NY, 1918), p. 7
In facing this problem, many took the via medii of accepting partially both the contradictory views and making them into one. But in the present day, majority of the world intelligentsia has an empiricistic proclivity though they cannot completely reject the other. The progress of science from the time of European renaissance has seemed to mean the enlargement of material universe and the diminution of man's importance. It is rightly called the age of anthropocentric and materialistic thought. In such materialistic age as ours, only the tough minded empiricists are asserting themselves while the spiritualistic rationalists are fighting 'a slow retreat'. The modern philosopher is baffled by this two extremes; rationalism and empiricism. William James, after discussing this problem at large says, "the more absolutistic philosophers dwell on so high a level of abstraction that they never even try to come down. The absolute mind which they offer us, the mind that makes our universe by thinking it, right, for what they show us to the contrary have made any one of a million other universes just as well as this. You can deduce no single actual particular from the notion of it. It is compatible with state of things whatever being true here below. And the theistic God is almost
sterile as a principle. You have to go to the world which he has created to get any inkling of his actual character: he is the kind of God that has once for all made that kind of a world. The God of the theistic writers lives on as purly abstract heights as does the absolute. Absolutism has a certain sweep and dash about it while the usual theism is more insipid, but both equally are remote and vacuous. What you want is a philosophy that not only exercise your powers of intellectual abstractions, but that will make some positive connexion with this actual world of finite lives. Hence, there is a dilemma. One should face either empiricism with its irreligion and crudities or rationalism with its religious nature and refinement away from all definite touch with concrete facts, joys and sorrows. In most of the classroom philosophies according to William James, the contradictions of real life are absent. "Its architecture is classic. Principles of reason trace its outlines, logical necessities and cement its parts. Purity and dignity are what it must express. It is a kind of marble temple shining on a hill." A philosophy that breaths out only refinement cannot satisfy the empiricist temper of mind. It is like a 'monument of artificiality'. Therefore men of science 'turn their back on metaphysics to follow 'the call of the wild.'

3 Ibid, pp.21,22.
Pragmatism as a philosophy tries to satisfy both kinds of demands. It can remain religious and rationalistic, but at the same time can preserve the richest intimacy with facts. Thus in the 19th century, the self-reliant American thinkers challenged the idealistic Eurocentricism and Pragmatic philosophy is one of their major contribution to the world to enable it to rectify many of the abstractions and absurdism, metaphysical jargon, verbal solutions, demons, closed systems, in other words of the 'contradictorienentialt naturalism'.

Pragmatism as a word, is said to have derived from the Greek word 'Irrayn' which means action and words like 'practice' and 'practical' come from that. For the first time Mr. Charles Peirce introduced this word into philosophy in 1878 in an essay which pleased that as beliefs are really rules for actions in developing a thought's meaning, we must determine necessarily what action or conduct it will produce and that action is of real importance. It was ignored by the public.

This principle of Pragmatism of Peirce was once again brought to light after 20 years by William James more effectively in an address delivered in 1898, before Prof. Dewison's philosophical union at the University.

1. James, Ulysses, (Bedlame, London), 1888, p. 35
2. James, William, Pragmatism, (Oxsey, NY, 1959, p. 60.
3. Ibid.
of California and from hence the word 'Pragmatism'
spread far and wide signifying a number of tendencies
according to the authors who used the words - like
Oswald, the Leipzig chemist, and Prof. W.S.Franklin.
There are evidences in the History of philosophy that
many philosophers have used the same meaning in
fragments from ancient times. For example, Socrates
and Aristotle in the ancient time, Locke, Berkely
and Hume in the medieval period and still later
people like Shadworth Hodson and others with the
influence of Darwin which cropped up in diverse and
unexpected quarters. This idea is well brought out
in the words of Peirce as below: "Any philosophical
doctrine that should be completely new could hardly
fail to prove completely false; but the rivulets at
the head of the river pragmatism are easily traced
back to almost any desired antiquity. Socrates bathed
in these waters. Aristotle rejoices when he can find
them. They run where least one would suspect them
beneath the dry rubbish heaps of Spinoza. Those clear
definitions that strew the pages of the Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, had been washed out in these
same springs. It was this medium and not tar water
that gave health and strength to Berkely's earlier
works, his theory of Vision and what remains of his

7. Peirce Charles, 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear', Popular Science
8. Perry R. Barton, In the Spirit of William James, (Yale Uni. Press,
1938) p. 169
principles. From it the general views of Kant derive such clearness as they have. Auguste Comte made still more—much more—use of this element; as much as he and Kant, in their rather opposite ways, were in the habit of mingling these sparkling waters with a certain mental dedative to which many men are addicted and the burly busimen very likely to their benefit, but which plays sad havoc with the philosophical constitutions."

In the middle of the 19th century, the idea of pragmatism got new impetus due to the intense scientific ideas and truths and the consequent Metaphysical Club of Charles Peirce. "The infinite perspective of science was displacing the transcendental brooding of theology". Ideological battles and clashes were rampant in every aspect of the prismatic society; political, economical, social and religious sects. Astronomical and physical inventions such as the discovery of the planet Neptune in 1846, the kinetic theory of gases, the laws of thermodynamics and the laws of probabilities based on the earlier Mathematicians like Leibniz, Pascal, Laplace, Demoivre and others, the Evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin through his work 'The Orgin of Species' in 1859 and such other scientific truths were adding to the 19th century 'surging intellectual atmosphere'.

Following the wake of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, various scholars in different fields began to apply the theory in their own fields in the researches in order to test the concept of Evolution. Evolution as a scientific theory was differentiated from 'Evolutionism' as a generalisation invading every field of knowledge from Biology and Cosmology to Sociology and Philosophy of History. The exponents of Pragmatism challenged the validity of the 'theological fusion of Scientific and ethical consideration' and tried to meet the contingency of nature without asking for any providential intelligence.

Pragmatism in its modern form is said to have been the result of the scientific discourses in a 'Metaphysical Club', founded in the year 1878 by Chauncey Wright and his colleagues who were men of original thinking and special training in various fields. C.S. Peirce recollects in his Collected Papers as below: "It was in the earliest seventies that a knot of us young men in Old Cambridge, calling ourselves 'half-ironically, half-defiantly 'The Metaphysical Club' . . . used to meet sometimes in my study, sometimes in that of William James . . . Our metaphysical proceedings had all been in winged words until atlength, lest, the club should dissolve without leaving any material
sovenir behind, I drew up little paper expressing some of the opinions that I had been urging all along under the name of pragmatism. This paper was received with such unlooked for kindness, that I was encouraged some half-a-dozen years later on the invitation of the great publisher Mr. W.H. Appleton to insert it; somewhat expanded, in the Popular Science Monthly for November 1877 and January 1878. But according to certain scholars like Prof. Perry, the origin of pragmatism is obscure and the authenticity of Metaphysical club was challenged. Yet, there are clear indication of the various members functioning and discourses of the club in the writings of the various members of the club.

William James credited Charles Peirce to the authorship of the doctrine of Pragmatism or in other words to the doctrine of Practicalism. As already described Peirce read a paper propounding the theory of Pragmatism in the Metaphysical club. In a letter to his student Mrs. Franklin in 1905, Charles Peirce describes it as the Metaphysical club and says, "...it must have been 1857 when I first made the acquaintance of Chauncey Wright, a mind about on the level of J.S.Mill. He was a through..."
mathematician of the species that flourished at the
time, when dynamics was regarded (in America) as the
top of mathematics. He had a most penetrating intel-
lect. There were a lot of superior men in Cambridge
at that time. I doubt if they could be matched in
any other society as small as that existed at that
time anywhere in the world. Wright, whose acquaint-
ance I made at the house of Mrs. Lowell, was at
that time a thorough Hamiltonian; but soon after he
turned and became a great admirer of Mill. He and
I used to have long and very lively and close
disputations lasting two or three hours daily for
many years. In the sixties I started a little club
called the Metaphysical Club. It seldom if ever had
more than half a dozen present. Wright was the
strongest member and probably I was next. Nicholas
St. John Green was a marvelously strong intellect.
Then there were Frank Abbot, William James, and others.
It was there that the name doctrine of pragmatism
saw the light." In another letter to the editor
of the Sun, Peirce associated the genius of Pragmatism
with a group of thinkers and pointed out that he
was to have known "something of the inwardness of
the great ideas of the 19th century. By far the
most interesting of these was the idea of Pragmatism."

11 Peirce Manuscripts at Wiener Library 1.R. 1, Box 1: Pragmatism
    Made Easy, vide Wiener, en.cit. p. 70.
In the same letter he refers to the members of his club as below. "After my return (from Europe) a knot of us, Chauncy Wright, Nicholas St. John Green, William James, and others including occasionally Francis Kilnwood Abbot and John Fiske used frequently to meet to discuss fundamental questions. Green was especially impressed with the doctrine of Bain and impressed the rest of us with them; and finally the writer of this paper brought forward that, we called the principle of Pragmatism." Thus, though William James attributed the usage of the word Pragmatism to himself and Peirce, there were also other strong forces inside and outside of the metaphysical club which helped the birth of 'Pragmatism'.

William James dedicated his Pragmatism to the memory of John Stuart Mill with the following words. "To the memory of John Stuart Mill from whom I first learned the Pragmatic openness of mind and whom my fancy like to picture as our leader were he alive today." This clearly shows that John Stuart Mill was also one of the early exponents of the theory.

We cannot ignore the able mathematician and original thinker Chauncy Wright and who was attributed

15. Ibid
as the 'Corphaes' of the metaphysical club and the Precursor of Pragmatism though he never wrote any book or used the word Pragmatism and the great scholar who Bain who was styled by Peirce as the 'Grand father of Pragmatism' and the various other sources for the birth and development of pragmatism. There is an element of truth in the claim that the origin of Pragmatism according to some is obscure. There are traces of Pragmatism in the earlier philosophers down from Socrates, Plato, and Kant. "The chief historical source of Peirce's definition of Pragmatic belief is Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, a work well known and discussed at great length by Wright and Peirce." Kant himself has used the term Pragmatism in some part of his writings. "The physician must do something in the case of a patient who is in danger, even if he is not sure of the disease. He looks out for symptoms and judges, according to his best knowledge, that it is a case of phthisis. His belief is even in his own judgment only a contingent one; someone else might perhaps judge better. I call such contingent belief which still forms the basis of the actual use of means for the attainment of certain ends, pragmatic belief.

17. Wiener, Evolution and Founders of Pragmatism, op. cit. p. 31
18. Ibid
19. Ibid p. 68
20. Ibid p. 23
The usual touch-stone or test of whether something is just talk or at least subjective conviction, that is, firm belief, is the bet... A bet makes one stop short... If in our thoughts, we imagine the happiness of our whole life at stake, our triumphant judgment disappears, we tremble lest our belief has gone too far. Thus Pragmatic belief has degrees of strength varying in proportion to the magnitude of the diverse interests involved." Kant's usage of the term Pragmatism is different from that of the American Pragmatism. Whereas according to Kant, the Pragmatic belief are the purely rational, necessary and absolute ideas of transcendental nature over and above the contingent pragmatic belief, the American Pragmatists deny that. The transcendental absolutistic sense or the 'Praktischen Vernunft' with its categorical Imperative of Kant's ethics is rejected by Peirce. 'He preferred the Kantian term "Pragmatisch" which stood for the humbler means and ends relations expressed in hypothetical imperatives." Because all the reasoning was hypothetical and operational for Peirce, whether it was ethical or scientific, he preferred to name his method 'Pragmatism' rather than 'Practicalism'.

23. Ibid
For one who had learned the philosophy of Kant along with nineteen out of every twenty experimentalists who have turned to philosophy had done and who still thought in Kantian terms must readily accept the 'Praktisch' and 'Pragmatisch' which were as far apart as two poles, the former belonging in a region of thought where no mind of the experimentalists type can ever make sure of solid ground under his feet, the latter expressing a relation to some definite human purpose. Now quite the most striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of an inseparable connections between rational cognitions and rational purpose; and that consideration it was which determined the preference for the name of Pragmatism."

The General Implication of Pragmatism: Having discussed the origin and sources of Pragmatism, the meaning or the implication of Pragmatism in general must be appraised of. The pragmatic philosophy represents the empiricist attitude in a radical as well as less-objectionable form. A pragmatist should turn his head away from all 'apriori reasons', 'abstractions and insufficiency', 'verbal solutions and fixed principles', 'closed systems, pretended absolutes and a lot of inveterate habits. He must turn his head towards -

realities as they are known as in actual life towards concretness, 'adequacy', 'facts', 'actions', and 'power' which means not a closed universe but an open universe, not dogma, artificiality and pretense of final nature in truth, but open air and immense possibilities. Hence Pragmatism is otherwise called as or having close connexion with Instrumentalism, Experimentalism, Practicalism, Radical Empiricism, Nominalism, Utilitarianism, Neo-realistm, Tychism and Temporalism and common sensism.

Pragmatism does not stand for any special results. It is a method, an attitude, a temperament, and it is against rigidity of theories and stress for the "Practical Cash Value" in the streams of experience. According to James, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve. The function of philosophy is to find out what difference it makes to you or me if this or that world formula is true. In this way theories become instruments, not answers to enigmas.

Unlike the metaphysical faith which is an unknowable beyond experience, James expounded a 'clear eyed pragmatic faith in the individual as the basis of the hopes of humanity. Hence James's Pragmatism

did not appeal either to a 'Schopenhauerian annihilation of desire' or a blind Nietzschean 'will to power'. On the other hand he argued for a more liberal and humane conception of the mind's dynamic power to ameliorate man's sorry lot. That neither physical nor biological science sealed man's fate or destined him to passive resignation in a closed universe was one of the chief moral and metaphysical conclusions of James's psychological work."

William James tried to develop the evolutionary ideas in brain and Nervous system, the psychological expression of emotions and other human traits as against the earlier American philosophy which was written by theologians or educators or both in the same person. He talks about Pragmatism in a letter as follows:

"A real science of man is now being built upon the theory of evolution and the facts of archeology, the nervous system and the senses. It has already a vast material extent, the papers and magazines are full of essays and articles having more or less to do with it."

James did not name the Pragmatic doctrines until 1896. He credited Peirce as the 'baptizer' of the Pragmatic doctrines. The members of the Metaphysical

club severely criticised James's anthropocentric doctrine of the will to believe. Hence there was the manifold application of the method of determining the meanings of ideas by examining their evolutionary effects on thought and behavior. The variety and complexity of nature which was named as "Cosmic Weather" by Wrier and "Tychism" by Peirce, became the metaphysical basis of the "theory of an open universe and individual moral freedom". The ideas of Temporalism and Spontaneous variation helped him to depend the primary importance of individual experience and personal freedom. James explained the external world of sensations and the inner world of rational, moral, religious and aesthetic sentiments in his metaphysics. His faith in the sufficiency of immediate experience in spite of its transient nature rests upon the ideas of spontaneous variations and creative impulses. According to him "the arrogance of Metaphysical evolutionism is due to its attempt to substitute scientific abstractions for the more deeply felt flux."

William James, thus "sought both a general theory of the method of clarifying all generalizations and a criterion of truth that would do justice to the specific differences that are felt in scientific and

ethico-religious experiences. In explaining the meanings, the felt perceptions must make a practical difference. These meanings will become clearer when they are considered as guides to conduct.

Ideas are the first expressions of the active nature. Hence to understand the meaning of an idea, one should act on an idea either actually or imaginatively. Otherwise it is not possible to know the meaning of an idea. The doctrine of the will to believe which is peculiar to James' Pragmatism emerges out from these conception. This doctrine of the will to believe on which Peirce could not agree was James' effort "to humanize science and fortify individual morality against scientific skepticism and neutral indifference." According to him the meaning of an idea grows out of the particular effects we perceive when we act on it. Truth is what happens to idea when they fit our experience dynamically.

The evolutionary role of social institution was ably expounded by Fiske through his lectures in "The Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy." This concept was supported by the American representatives of Herclian Idealism also. Though not one of the founders of

30. Ibid.
31. Ibid. p.102
Pragmatism, he shared his views with his pragmatic friends at Cambridge. In a controversial reply to James' essay entitled "Sociology and Hero worship, an Evolutionary reply to Dr. James", Fiske explains further on the impact of evolutionism on the growth of Pragmatism in the social sciences in the later part of the 19th century in America. In his exposition Fiske seeks to establish the general propositions relating to the way in which masses of men act under given conditions. Of course the study of sociology is primarily concerned with institutions rather than individuals and the sociologists need not undervalue the efficiency of individual initiative in determining the course of history. In the historiography of any particular period, the heart of the problems of free will is not the imputing of necessity to events, but of fixing the responsibility in moral and legal situations relative to a given Psychological, social and political conditions which is the pragmatic question. According to him, history can scientifically ascertain what those conditions are and thereby forms an indispensable auxiliary to the study of the problems of civilisations. Free will according to him and others like Buckle, Mill and James was
subjected to empirical conditions and not metaphysical conditions. Hence the metaphysical metaphysicians' concept of free will need not deter us from applying scientific methods of interpretations to the phenomena of human history. He regarded the metaphysical problem of free will pseudo problem generated by "Confused and inaccurate verbiage".  

Fiske says, "strip the question of the peculiar metaphysical jargon in which it is usually propounded, restate it in very precise scientific language and it becomes a very easy question to answer. Would that science presented none more difficult. Confirmed inaccurate verbiage is responsible for the chronic disputation upon this subject. Nowhere else is Berkeley's complaint so thoroughly applicable that in dealing with metaphysics, men first kick up dust and then wonder why they cannot see through it."

In an article in the 'North American Review', Fiske attempted again to apply the principles of evolution to the growth of modern language from the variations of local dialects. He believed in the infinite power of thought and his convictions that

33 Fiske, 'Cosmic Philosophy' II p.174, Evolution and Founders of Pragmatism, op. cit. p.135  
the programme of science was not going to eliminate the religious sentiment but would guide it as 'emotional promoting toward completeness of life.' The law of evolution according to Fiske has the same universality as the law of gravitation in relation to our experience. The prophetic dreams of Bacon that philosophy as an organism of which the various sciences are members has been realized and the universe being thus shown inductively to be a cosmos rather than a chaos, the true philosophy is properly said as the cosmic philosophy.

There were many law graduates in the Metaphysical club where 'pragmatism saw the light of the day.' They tried to extend the scientific thinking in the sphere of law. 'The law was regarded by them as the evolving body of custom' in line with the view point of Sir Henry Sumner Maine's historical studies.

The inductive logic of the British lawyer-philosophers, Sir Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham as well as their Utilitarian ethics were faced with an historical evolutionary approach to the law by the Harvard lawyers. The discussion on the context of

35. Fiske J., *Unseen World*, op.cit. p. 52
36. Ibid p. 115
37. Fiske, *Cosmic Philosophy*, op.cit. p. 275
38. Weiner, *Evolution and Founders of Pragmatism*, op.cit. p. 113
Pragmatism with its problem of legal philosophy was centering round the writings of Nicholas St. John Green, an "acute and learned lawyer." "He kept a pragmatic balance between the analytical and historical schools of jurisprudence. In thus avoiding the lifeless formalism of the Austrians and the metaphysical tendencies of the post Kantian to force History into apriori schemata, Green paved the way for the Sociological, Empirical and pluralistic method which was soon to be formulated by Peirce, James and others as the consciously philosophic doctrine of pragmatism."

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Oliver Wendell Holms, another accurate brain of the Metaphysical Club, abhorred traditional systems of static law and absolutic metaphysics and tried to arrive at satisfactory answers to the perennial questions of philosophy like what is Truth, what is man's place in cosmos, what is the Sumum Bonum and how it is related to the evolution of law, and thereby formulated a pragmatic theory of law. 40

In their deep respect for the inviolable creative character of individual freedom, the American Pragmatists did not subscribe to a single coherent all-inclusive system of reality. Though they were of diverse interests.

39. Ibid. p.156
40. Ibid.
they brought together the impact of evolution on scientific and social thinking. They applied the Darwinian ideas of Chance variations and Natural selection to many of the important questions in logic, physics, psychology, history, jurisprudence and social ethics and emerged with a new important pragmatic reconstruction of traditional philosophy, and thereby brought philosophy down to earth to be an useful instrument in the blazing of the new paths in the pursuit of Truth and Justice. By doing so, they made the American Liberalism came to philosophic maturity and placed it in the forefront of intellectual and social progress. Their intellectual reactions to evolution were marked by a farsighted and experimental attitude which freed thought from the incubus of theological dogma, authoritarianism and apriori rationalism. The features of their method of thinking constitute their legacy to the 20th century philosophy.

Mr. Wiener in his book Evolution and Philosophy of Pragmatism enumerates those features of Pragmatic method and the fruits of evolutionary Pragmatism in the following way:

1. American Pragmatism fostered an empirical respect for the complexity of existence requiring a plurality of

Ibid. pp. 190,191.
concepts to do justice to the diverse problems of mankind in its evolutionary struggles.

2. It has abandoned the eternal as an absolute frame of reference for thought and emphasized the ineictuable pervasiveness of temporal change in the nature of things.

3. It has regarded the nature of things as known and appraised by men to be relative to the categories and standards of the minds that have evolved modes of knowing and evaluating objects.

4. It has insisted on the contingency and precariousness of the minds interactions with the physical and social environment so that even in the most successful result of hard gained experimental knowledge is fallible.

5. The American Pragmatism upholds the democratic freedom of the individual inquirer and appraiser as an indispensable condition for progress in the future evolution of science and society.

The increased specialization of the various branches of the sciences to-day requires the use of these peacemeal methods of approach which is essentially in accord with Aristotle's advice to adopt method
Scholars in different fields of studies in the modern time are wary of beginning with a single a priori scheme of evolution and pluralistic empiricism in one form or another. Schools of thought like Pragmatists, Critical Realists, Logical Positivists, Existentialists and the British Cambridge school of logical analysts are disposed to abandon the system building and synoptic truth for the peacemeal study of the basic concepts, procedures and language of the sciences, enabling them thus to make enormous progress in clarifying the ideas of truth, causality, probability, meaning, values, and the methods of verification and deduction of sciences and everyday reasoning.

The principle of verifiability as the test of the meaning of an idea was advanced by the founders of Pragmatism against the metaphysical assumptions of empirically unverifiable, unrecognizable 'realities', supernaturally revealed eternal truths and uncritically held common sense intuitions of the Scottish school. They went beyond the 'experimental' theory of British Sensationalism by advancing an evolutionary conception of objects. Their evolutionary empiricism was thus able to overcome the static character of experience entirely by the passive ideas, sensations or impressions.

\[2. \text{Ibid} \]
\[3. \text{Ibid. p.193.} \]
of Locke, Berkeley, or Hume. When James was repeatedly insisting that experience had its external aspects and never that he never deny the realistic impact of "hard data" external to our feelings.

James, Wright and Peirce advocated a "Critical Common sense Realism" though with different meaning. According to Peirce's Commonsensism, "while it is possible that propositions that really are indubitable for the time being should nevertheless be false, yet in so far as we do not doubt a proposition, we cannot but regard it as perfectly true and perfectly certain; that while holding certain propositions to be each individually perfectly certain we may and ought to think it likely that some one of them if not more is false. This is the doctrine of Critical Commonsensism and the present pertinent of it is that a pragmatist to be consistent is obliged to embrace it."

The concept of temporalism poses always the problem of ontological dualism, which made it possible to conceive of the natures or ideas of species as eternal link in the chain of being. By conceiving the forms of thought and the nature of things as themselves products of the flux of evolution, The pragmatists used...

\[\text{Charles Peirce, } \text{'Unpublished Manuscripts,} \text{'Weiner, } \text{Evolution and Founders of Pragmatism, op.cit. p.194} \]
temporalism to invade the eternal citadel of one of the oldest metaphysical traditions. The pragmatic temporalism leads to a more empirical view of history and knowledge than that which finds eternal laws of developments in social change and science.

Relativism as a theory is inherent in both behaviourism and pragmatism. A knowledge of it will increase the Pragmatic understanding. According to Mach and Mill, scientific laws are correlations of sensations. According to the Darwinian theory of Natural selection, the essential properties of living things depended on the emergence of traits that increased the power of individuals to cope with a hostile environment. As for the theory of relativity of mind, which is coming out of the relation between physiology and language, imply the methods of Behaviorism. The relativistic theory of mind can be said as the out come of Behaviouristic theory. The meaning of a statement varies with the spatio-temporal, linguistic conditions. In the same way relativity is developed in physics, logic, psychology, and sociology. Thus not only nature, but also the human nature on the face of nature, not only human nature but also the values such as Goodness, Truth and Beauti-
are at flux. "They are neither given nor begged; they are consequential; they eventuate; they are made." Progress is possible because of this relativity of ends.

In the same way a knowledge of the theory of Probabilism and Fallibilism which refers to the abandonment of mechanical determinism in physical and social sciences by viewing their laws as probable and contingent, the theory of Determinism which profess that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely what the other parts shall be and the future has no hidden possibilities and the theory of chance or indeterminism which admits certain ultimate pluralism professes, that the parts have a certain amount of loose play on one another and hence the laying down of any one of them does not necessarily determine what the other shall be, go to make the pragmatic conception more clear to the student of pragmatic philosophy. Having discussed thus the general nature of Pragmatism we must shift our attention to the Pragmatism in Education.

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46. Ibid. p. 70.
Pragmatic Educational Ideas according to Peirce: in the effort of applying the theory of evolution Peirce describes the concepts of doubt, habit and belief and explains how they are explaining a biological basis for inquiry. Belief constitutes the end of inquiry. But doubt initiates inquiry. Tenacity and authority represent intellectual slavery without having the capacity to produce opinions. Intuitive method also is subjective and arbitrary together with the Cartesian method which well leads to static, abstract definitions. He points out to the method of science as the most successful and objective one having in it self-corrective techniques. It is not only flexible but maintains integrity of belief.

The meaning of an intellectual concept imbibles in the efficacy and the practical consequences of it. This conception, Peirce applies to a few scientific concepts like "hard", "weight" etc. and demonstrates that the meanings of these concepts lie in their "conceived effects." Take for example, the concept 'hard'. The meaning is best conceived only because of its test of practical efficacy and consequence. There is no difference whatsoever between a hard thing

47. Peterfreund P.S. An Introduction to American Philosophy, op. cit. p.35
and a soft thing so long as they are not brought to the test. So also with the concept 'weight'; to understand that a body is heavy means, its practicability or consequence vis. in the absence of opposite force it will fall. Metaphysics, according to Peirce should come into the fold of the methods of science if it wants to become a genuine discipline.

Investigating into Tychism, he asserts that 'the basic proof for the existence of chance involves the doctrine of evolution. The evidences of growth and diversity in the universe can not be explained by mechanical principles and by the advocates of determinism. This does not mean that tychism stands against the belief that the universe is uniform and orderly.

Peirce does not agree with the views of William James which is at the same time empirical and flexible. According to him, "The 'true' is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving," and which gives way in his 'The Will to Believe' a pragmatic justification of religion unlike his other

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colleagues in the Pragmatic group. William James' other views of pragmatism apart from the justification of religion according to his Will to Believe have no quarrel with the views of the members of the metaphysical club and he develops Pragmatism into a more systematic philosophy through his lectures and writings. He offers the Pragmatic philosophy as the test stone for all the dualistic philosophical disputes. The test involves in an orientation toward effects and facts rather than an adherence to self-evident principles.

Pragmatism represents the empiricist attitude in a more radical and less objectionable form. "A pragmatist turn his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers ... " Metaphysics has usually followed a primitive kind of quest, hankering after unlawful magic and meaningless words with formula of incantation which would bind spirits and genies. Even Solomon is said to know the names of all spirits and having their names hold them in control. This view makes the universe an enigma to the natural, ordinary mind with the key in the shape of some illuminating, power-

49. Peterfreund P.S., An Introduction to American Philosophy, op. cit. p.66
50. James William, Pragmatism, op. cit. p.52
power-bringing word or name. "That word names the universe's principle and to possess it is after a fashion to possess the universe itself. 'God', 'Matter', 'Reason', 'The Absolute', 'Energy', are so many solving names. You can rest when you have them: you are at the end of your metaphysical quest."

But the pragmatic method will not allow to take to any such newer 'solving and quest ending word. Under it, one must bring out of each word its practical cash value, set it to work with in the stream of experience and assess its practical value and meaning. Pragmatism therefore seems less as a solution than as a programme for work and more particularly as an indication of the ways in which existing realities may be challenged. Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas in which we can rest. We don't lie back upon them, we move forward, and on occasion make nature over again by their aid. Pragmatism unstiffens all our theories, limbers them up and sets each one at work. Being nothing essentially new, it harmonizes with many ancient philosophic tendencies. It agrees with nominalism for instance in always appealing to particulars; with utilitarianism in emphasizing practical aspects; with positivism in its disdain for

51. Ibid. pp.52,53.
verbal solutions, useless questions and metaphysical abstractions.

Pragmatism is posed both as a theory of meaning as well as theory of method. Militant against rationalism, it has no dogmas of its own except its method, which stresses on the attitude of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences and facts. In addition to being a method, pragmatism is a theory of truth. James rejects the traditional correspondence theory of truth because of its static character and says that truth must be equated with the dynamic verification process. Truth as verification is developed through a discussion of the direct and indirect modes of verifications according to William James.

Consciousness according to him is a non-entity and therefore it cannot come under the first principles. He says that "for twenty years past I have mistrusted "consciousness" as an entity; for seven or eight years past I have suggested its non-existence to my students and tried to give them its pragmatic equivalent in realities of experience. It seems to me that the

52 Ibid pp.53,54.
hour is ripe for it to be openly and universally discarded. Thus, William James discards 'consciousness' as an entity. There is no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, out of which our thoughts are made. But there is a function in experience which thought performs and for the performance of which this quality of being is invoked. That performance or function of experience is "Knowing". Consciousness is necessary to explain the fact that things not only are, but get reported or known. Whosoever blots out the notion of consciousness from his list of first principles must still provide in some way for that function's being carried on . . . "

Consciousness stands for an external relation and does not denote a special stuff or way of being. The peculiar nature of experiences is better understood by their relations which are themselves experiences to each other.

To analyse experience, according to some there are two elements. The factor of experience and the inner content of it just like the paint and the inner content of it. But according to James, experience has no such inner duplicity and "the separations of it into consciousness and content comes not by way of substraction of

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but by way of addition, "A given undivided portion of experience in one context play the part of the knower (of consciousness) and in another context play the part of the thing known (of content) just like paint when spread out in the form of a picture in the canvas showing a different spiritual purpose. It serves in one group as 'thought' and in another group as 'thing', 'consciousness', and 'content'. Peirce was ambitious to construct a comprehensive philosophy, but however he was never a systematic writer. Though the broad outlines of a system are discernible in most of his writings, Peirce himself never explicitly formulated his system. His wealth of ideas we get from his collected papers.

He wanted philosophy to be a science on the basis of tangible premises and arguments. He built his epistemology by considering the validity of the propositions in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Duns Scotus's

Gramatica Speculativa.

According to Peirce, 'we live in two worlds, a world of fact and a world of fancy' or External or internal world. In the external world, man is master of his own voluntary muscles and nothing else. Yet he

57. Ibid., p.176.
Yet he is sly and shrewd and contrives to make his little, more than he needs. Beyond that, he defends himself from the angles of hard fact by clothing himself with a garment of contentment and habitations. Were it not for this garment, he would find his internal world rudely disturbed and his "flats set at naught by brutal inroads from without. Such forciful modification of our ways of thinking, Peirce calls "influence of the world of fact of experience."

Experience is nothing but the resultant ideas that have been forced upon us. Such ideas according to Peirce belong to three categories. "All knowledge comes to us by observation. A part is forced upon us "from without and seems to result from nature's mind." In cognition therefore "there is nothing which is in itself in the sense of not being relative to the mind through things which are relative to the mind doubtless are apart from that relation." The 'real' is according to Peirce that which sooner or later becomes information and reasoning would finally result in and which is independent of the vagaries of me and you." The very origin of conception of reality thus shows that this conception essentially involves

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60. Ibid, Vol. V, p. 311
61. Ibid.
the notion of a community without definite limits and capable of a definite increase of knowledge. The real in other words consists of cognitions "which at a time sufficiently future, the community will always continue to re-affirm. The unreal on the other hand consists of cognition "which under the same conditions will ever be denied."

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Naming two grades of consistent being, Essence and Existence, Peirce explains the epistemological and metaphysical force of each of these terms. All that which is "truly experienced" and not hallucinations are existent; whereas "that mode of being which consists in the resultant genuine dyadic relation of a strict individual with all the other such individuals of the same universe is "existence" in the metaphysical sense. On the other hand essence "in its epistemological force is the intelligible character which truly defines what a general or indefinite... predicate primarily asserts."

63

62 Ibid
63 Ibid, Vol. VI, p. 337
All our knowledge rests upon observed facts and only when the cognition has become worked up into a proposition or a judgment of fact, direct control over the process can be exercised. "Observation of facts have to be accepted as they occur," and "observed facts do not in themselves contain any practical knowledge." If the facts are to be useful on future occasions, we must add to them that which they do not in themselves contain. Any such addition tending to make the facts applicable in any way to other circumstances that those under which they were observed, Peirce calls it hypothesis. And if the hypothesis is to be of any value, it must be testable by experiment. So every proposition which is not a pure metaphysical jargon must have some learning upon practice.

In the observed facts, we encounter knowledge which is directly forced upon us and which we are compelled —

to admit. But knowledge which is forced upon us, is constantly at flux and flow. "It would be gone long before I could tell myself many items; and those items would be quite unlike the precepts themselves. Therefore I am forced to content myself not with the fleeting percepts but with the crude, and possibly erroneous thoughts or self-informations of what the precepts were."

In the place of percept which although not a first impression of sense, is a construction with which the will have nothing to do and therefore it may be called 'the evidence of the senses.' The only thing that one can carry away with him is the Perceptual facts, which is explained by Peirce as follows. "The percept, could I make sure, what they were, constitute experience proper, that which I am forced to accept. Yet the perceptual facts are a very imperfect report of the percepts and I cannot go behind that record and as for "going back to the first impression of the sense would be the most chimerical of understandings."

Thus according to Peirce, the data from which inference sets out and upon which reasoning depends are the perceptual facts which are the evidence of the senses. Hence, "our perceptual judgments are the first

65.Ibid. Vol.II, p.141
66.Ibid
The concept of 'experience is broader than that of perception. It is because of the compulsion, we have been thinking that constitutes experience; and since compulsion cannot exist without resistance, which is effort opposing; there must be an element of effort in experience or change with its peculiar character. In a similar discourse Peirce "resuscitates Hegel though in a strange costume."

According to Hegel, the universe is everywhere premeated with continuous growth. If everything is premeated with continuous growth, then it cannot be otherwise in the realm of cognition. Since there is "no absolutely first cognition of any object" and since "cognition arises by a continuous process," an analysis of knowledge must begin "with a process of cognition." This process according to Peirce is the process of valid inference. All mental action should be reduced firstly to the formula of valid reasoning. "If a man is made to believe in the -

67. Ibid. Vol.V. p.116
68. Ibid. Vol.I. p.42
69. Ibid. Vol.V. p.267
premises, in the sense that he will also be ready
to act from the conclusion and to say that is true.
Something therefore takes place within the organism
which is equivalent to the syllogistic process." And it
is this which constitutes the process of cognitions.
The "syllogistic Character" of the cognition has its
final shooting up in the "relativity of knowledge."
Every fact is a relation says Peirce. The fact that
an object is blue consists of the peculiar action of
that object on human eyes. But really every fact is
not only a relation, but also the thought of the fact.
One's thought of the fact implicitly represent it as
such.

Peirce's interest in logic also was deeply rooted
in his epistemology, with an empirical basis, grounded
in the actual process of cognition. The Metaphysical
conceptions, according to Peirce can be apprehended
only in the light of a minutely accurate and thorough
going system of formal logic, which should serve as a
stepping stone to an ideal logic devoid of the 'dele-
rably backward' and 'immature' conditions of the
metaphysics. Pragmatism as a method of reflection having
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for its purpose to render ideas clear was considered

71. Werkmeister, A History of Philosophical ideas in America,
    on cit. pp. 182, 190.
by Peirce as his own 'offspring' and 'a wonderfully efficient instrument of signal service in every branch of science.'

Pragmatism performs two functions. Firstly it gives an 'expeditions riddance' of all unclear ideas and secondly it supports and helps to render 'clear ideas' into 'distinct ideas' by its method of determining the meanings of intellectual concepts. "The reference to objective fact" is here all important because according to Peirce, Pragmatism has "nothing to do with qualities of feeling" which designate 'mere subjective feelings only' and depends on the following four principles viz. (1) What effects that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of thought." (2) In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception, one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessarily from the truth of that conception and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception. (3) "The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct"

which conditionally act upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, and would ensure upon the acceptance of the symbol."

"The rational purport of a word or other expression lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so that since obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct; if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept would imply, one will have there in a complete definition of the concepts and there is absolutely nothing more to it."

These principles were considered as basic principles to pragmatism by Peirce and we can see a gradual shifting of emphasis. Yet, in spite of the care of Peirce informing these principles, they are not "as clear and unambiguous as might be expected." But a clear conception of pragmatism according to Peirce can be obtained only if we consider in some detail the application of the basic principle in concrete situation.

For example Peirce himself is making one of them in concrete situation in the interpretation of the meaning of the "lithium". Lithium we can get only after so
much experiments, Peirce says, "if you search among minerals that are virtuous, translucent, grey or white, very hard, brittle, and insoluble for one which imparts a crimson tinge to an unilluminous flame, this mineral being triturated with lime or witherite rata-bane, and then fused, can be partly dissolved in muriatic acid; and if this solution be evaporated and the residue be extracted with sulphuric acid and duly purified, it can be converted by ordinary methods into chloride which being obtained in the solid state, fused and electrolysed with a half-a-dozen powerful cells, will yield a globule of a pinkish silvery metal that will float on a casolene; and the material of that is a specimen of lithium." Peirce contends that the whole process of experimentations "tells you what the word lithium denotes by prescribing what you should do in order to gain a concrete acquaintance with the object of the word."

Pragmatism "will serve to show that almost every preposition of ontological metaphysics is either meaningless—less gibberish—one word being defined by other words and they by still others without any real conception ever being reached—else down right absurd so that..."

76. Ibid.
all such rubbish being swept away what will remain of philosophy will be a series of problem capable of investigations by the observational methods of the true sciences—the truth about which can be reached without these interminable misunderstanding and disputes which have made the highest of the positive sciences a mere amusement for idle intellects." Yet, its retentions of a purified philosophy, its acceptance of the mainbody of our instinctive believes, and its strenuous insistence upon the truth of scholastic realism are distinguishing uragmatism from all other proper positivism.

"Instead of merely fearing at metaphysics, the pragmatist extracts from it a precious essence which will serve to give life and light to cosmology and physics. At the same time the moral application of the doctrine are positive and potent." Peirce influence upon his contemporaries was almost nil because of the fact that he never took care to impress the public with his thinking and his failure to present his system in a coherent manner. He was not teaching in an University and wrote for specialist alone. Even men like Royce and James misunderstood his positions.

77 Ibid. Vol. V. p. 23
78 Ibid
The Pragmatic Educational Conceptions of William James: During 1860's, the new science of textual criticism came to America from Germany, resulting in a controversy on "the nature of Biblical Inspiration" through the agency of a number of magazines and works of fiction. Margaret Delaud, Harold Frederics, Robert G. Ingersoll, William Clarke and George W. Knox and Robert Hume could be cited as notable authors in this effect. As a result new standard and measuring rods appeared to all interpretations of Christianity.

In such an ideological environment William James believed religion "as the feeling, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine". He established his religious theory with subtle arguments in his *Will To Believe*. The religious hypothesis about the universe in order to be active faiths of individuals are expressing themselves freely in life. They are in the form of experimental tests by which they are verified and generalized. According to him, both in the scientific and religious fields, the truest hypothesis is that which work best. The religious issues affect the whole life of human beings and they gain

some 'vital good' through their beliefs and loose that by not believing on them.

James was ready therefore to decide positively in favour of religious belief hoping thereby he will avail of the religion if there be any truth in religion at all. He says, "If religion be true and the evidence for it be still insufficient, I do not wish... to forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon the winning side by remaining sceptical..."

Differentiating between rationalism and empiricism, James lays stresses on empiricism. What is needed is a philosophy which will satisfy our intellect and will also have some bearing upon the actual world of human living - a philosophy which will combine the scientific loyalty to facts and willingness to take account of them in day today life. Empiricism is associated with 'inhumanism and irreligion' while rationalism is out of touch with concrete facts of joys and sorrows. The philosophy we want must according to James, 'in a sense transcend both empiricism and rationalism and must provide a new synthesis. Pragmatism is that new synthesis which can remain religious and yet preserve the 'richest intimacy with the facts'."

80. James William, Will To Believe, (Longmans, NY, 1897) p.27
James admitted his indebtedness to Peirce for pragmatic philosophy and says that the pragmatic philosophy was first introduced into philosophy by Charles S. Peirce in 1878. But James' Pragmatism differs widely from Peirce. According to James, Peirce holds that in order to develop a thought's meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce; that conduct is for us its sole significance. Hence, if we are to attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object we need only to consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve and what sensations we are to expect from it and what reactions it may produce in other objects. Our conception of the effects constitutes for us the whole of our conceptions of the object with its positive significance.

James discovers that "pragmatism thus conceived in the philosophy of Socrates and Aristotle, no less than in the writings of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, but not until his own time has it been generalized as a method or "become conscious of a universal mission". He further says that pragmatism was only a method and not a theory of reality." It appears less as a

82 James, Pragmatism, op.cit. pp.50,51.
solution... than as a program for more work. It
"unstiffens all our theories, limbers them up and sets
each one at work." It means only an attitude or
orientation and not any particular results, just as the
attitude of looking away from 'first things, principles,
categories, supposed necessities and of looking towards
last things, fruits, consequences and facts.'

Pragmatism is also a theory of truth. Ideas
which are part of our experience become true in so
far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation
with other parts of our experience. Truth in our ideas
means their power to work and satisfy "the individual
desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to
his belief in stock."

According to James, any new idea, if it is to
be significant must both depend on old truth and grasp
new fact. Its success depends upon individual appreci-
ation. But the new idea becomes more and more true
when it performs its functions of satisfying the double
urgency viz. holding to the old and grasping the new.
James is willing to accept anything as true provided it
stands up under the pragmatic test of 'practical benefit.'

83, Ibid, p. 53
84, Ibid, p. 216
85, Ibid, p. 63
86, Ibid, p. 64
As a property of ideas, truth means, their agreement with reality. But what is meant by reality and what is meant by agreement raise problems. These problems will be solved, when it is asked over a supposed true idea, what concrete difference will its being true make in any one's actual life? What experiences will be different or what is the truth's 'cash value' in experimental terms. To these questions the pragmatists get the answer that true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify; false ideas are those that we cannot. Validation, corroborations and verifications determine Truth. Verification is the meaning of Truth.

It follows then that truth 'happens to an idea' and is not a stagnant, inherent property in a true idea. Events go to form truth. Its truthfulness is in fact an event and a process viz. the process of its verifying itself. If Truth is verification, then, naturally the question arises as to what is pragmatically 'verification'? According to James, we live in a world of realities which may be either useful or harmful to us. Ideas which tell us in advance what to expect of some specific reality 'counts as the true ideas.'

87, Ibid. p. 201
88, Ibid. p. 63
The possession of truth is not an end itself; it is a means. 'A preliminary means towards other vital satisfactions' and it is because we want these satisfactions that the pursuit of true ideas becomes a 'primary human duty'.

Ideas which have proved their value in experience enter the stock of ideas so that to be re-called in future in times of emergency. In such times of need, we remember and recall them and act upon them saving they are useful because they are true. To James, both these terms, 'useful' and 'true' mean exactly the same thing viz, that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. "True is the name for whatever idea starts the verification process, useful is the name for its completed functions in experience."

James admits direct and indirect verifications. Firstly, according to him, 'what is true with respect to our ideas of the objects of sense experience is true and he also maintains the same with the ideas of ideal objects and abstract relation. Truth in science is "simply that which gives us the maximum possible sum of satisfaction, taste included," placing special emphasis upon consistency with previous truth and the novel fact.

89. Ibid. p. 203
90. Ibid. p. 204
91. Ibid. p. 214
In other words, 'the true' is only 'the expedient in this way of our thinking'. Unlike Peirce who regarded pragmatism mainly as a method of clarifying ideas, appealing to the 'confirmatory evidence of percepts', James admits other evidences as well. Thus, "a world with a God in it to say the last word may indeed burn up or brest, but when we think of him as still mindful of the old ideals and sure to bring elsewhere to fruition, so that, where he is, tragedy is only provisional and partial and shipwreck and dissolution not the absolutely final thing. This need of an eternal moral order is one of the deepest need of our breast." Whatever may the differences between James and Peirce, "James' philosophy is by no means an extension or development of Peirce's position. Although certain aspects of it were undoubtedly suggested to James by Peirce, James pluralistic pragmatism must stand or fall on its own premises and the repudiation of James is not in itself also a repudiation of Peirce. The usual arguments against 'pragmatism' should be directed more specially against the doctrine of James; they do not necessarily or in the same sense apply to the philosophy of Peirce."

92 Ibid, p. 222
93 Ibid, p. 236
94 Ibid, p. 237
The Pragmatic Educational Conceptions of George S. Mead: George S. Mead in the 19th century also emphasised Pragmatism although in his time Pragmatism itself gave to two versions those of James and Dewey. According to the general pragmatic theory "intelligence in its simplest phase and also in a later phase really inside of a process of conduct." The test of intelligence is found in action and the test of the object is "found in conduct. Any stimulus received is thus tested in this way by both man and animal alike. If an animal from an enclosure sees a way out to escape, it rushes off in that direction and gets away. That is a fair test for it of a hypothesis. It did not present ideas to itself in terms of significant symbols, but it was a good working hypothesis. It could continue its action of living that way. Hence according to Mead, Pragmatism finds the test of the so called 'true' in the working of the hypothesis. By the 'working of the hypotheses', pragmatism means that a process which has been inhibited by a problem can, as a result of the application of a hypothesis, start working again and going on. The pleasure derived by the individual from the renewed or continued working of the process is only incidental to the test. It is the working itself, not the satisfaction.

96 Ibid. p. 345
97 Ibid. p. 349
obtained which constitutes the pragmatic test.

Mead sees the sources of Pragmatism in Behaviouristic psychology and scientific technique and even views the history of the scientific method as essentially the history of the development of the point of view of instrumentalism. The crucial point in Meads position is that in the process of determining the structure of experience which will be tested by experiments of the legitimacy of a new hypothesis and in the process of formulating the problem and the hypothesis for its solution, the individual although functioning in full particularity is yet in organic relationship with the society that is responsible for him.

Mead's philosophy of society together with his conceptions on 'self' and 'action' are equally relevant to the present project. According to him society as a whole contributes to a set of social habits which must be acquainted with and understood properly to realize one's own real self in the society. The understanding of the social habits create some modes of action and thereby a common emotion and sympathy. Hence, by taking the attitude of others in the group in their co-operative activity, the individual is able to enter

into their experiences. In this way of participation and consideration of establishing a common form, complex societies are possible. "The individual may take the form which enables him to communicate with others into his own life so that by means of this form, he talks to himself as he talks to others... and that he may then bring his own solution to public consideration with the advantage of having analysed and discussed it within himself."

Thus our own thoughts are moulded by social communication. "Taking the attitude of others, talking to other people, and then recyling in their language" constitutes thinking. Hence the importance of co-operative process and stress on community, which form organic relation with language and thinking and action. Mead therefore defines thinking as "a process of conversation with one's self when the individual takes the common attitude of the whole group, when the symbol that he uses is a common symbol, has a meaning common to the entire group, to every one who is in it and every one who might be in it." The development of mind according to him is invariably connected with the development of society and its institutions.

100. Ibid. pp.338 - 381.
Mead's philosophy of the present and his philosophy of the act are complementary. In the philosophy of the present, Mead showed that our understanding of the space-time world involves a construction of spatio-temporal pattern which anchors in the immediately experienced and real present. Then it transcends that present in the direction of a reconstructed past and also in the direction of an anticipated future. In the philosophy of the act, Mead expands this principle of transcendent construction to encompass the whole realm of cognition and in particular, the realm of scientific objects.

He starts with perception which, as such 'involves all the elements of an act.' It is rather a process of sensing under specific conditions which itself is a form of activity. "In the process of perceiving there is present not only the stimulation but the attitude of looking or feeling or smelling or tasting which as activity involves a picking out of a certain character in the field of stimulations. Perception in other words is a selective activity, a matter of selective attention."

Perceptual object which is the organization of the immediate environment with reference to the experiencing

101 Ibid. p.533
102 Ibid. p.534
organism is different from the scientific objects which are freed from the peculiarities which different perceptual situations reveal and are given uniformities which all experiencing subjects must recognize. It is in this way the scientific objects are established as the ultimate reality given in observation. The scientists attempt to bridge the gap between these objects namely, the objects of immediate experience and the objects of scientific objects through the employment of the experimental technique.

Science starts with the private experience of an individual, but it never operates in a mind or an experience that is not social. In other words, cognition starts in the experience of an individual as an observation or information received. But the reliability of the observation or informations calls for verification. It must at least be repeatable either in the experience of the individual himself or in that of the other witnesses. What is thus verified become part of the world which surrounds the immediate experience within which the other problems may arise.

Reflective experience or the world and the things within that world exist only in the form of situation.

103 Ibid. p.557
These situations are fundamentally characterized by the relation of an organic individual to his environment or world. The world, things, and the individual are what they are because of this relation.

Sensations have their own important role in reflective experience. The sensuous characters of things which depend upon the presence of an individual disappear when they are stated in terms of electrons or other scientific objects. Science does not assume an actually given universe which is independent of the individuals and their environment, but really science assumes the existence of such a universe, which is not actually given but only the pre-supposition of those that are given. It also assumes that the characters which appear in the given universe of scientific hypotheses will appear in every hypotheses with different interpretations. Science does not assume a transcendent world universe of things in themselves which cannot appear in experience. The assumptions of experimental method is that the test is being made not with things in themselves, but with reference to a world which is called in question only at the point at which the problem has arisen in experience, and that the contem-
contemplated new hypothesis will take place within that world whenever the test of experiment sustains the hypothesis. Thus, we are testing the hypotheses not only by a world of ultimate reality, but also by a world within which we are actually living and acting.

John Dewey's Pragmatic Philosophy in Education: The other version of Pragmatism in the 19th century as different from that of William James was that of John Dewey. He, together with his other colleagues such as Albion Small, James H. Tufts, George H. Mead, W.S. Thomas and Thorstein Veblen formed the 'Chicago School', where they "formulated a theory of democracy not merely as a form of government, but also as a mode of associated living, based on the ideas that individuality and freedom are themselves social products and that a democratic society is one which subordinates its institutions to the basic aim of permitting its members to grow - intellectually and emotionally by widening their 'areas of shared concern', by promoting means of communication and public expression and by giving all a responsible participation in the process of social and physical control." The philosophy was given a more technical

and systematic elaboration as a theory of government by Arthur F. Bentley and others. "Smith has shown how the pragmatic philosophy can be applied to the theory of equality, the art of compromise, and the ethics of democratic discipline."

Dewey started and ended his philosophical discussions with the everyday common world. He says that "it is supremely important task of philosophy to help find a way into a better order—an order in which there will be social unity of mind as a consequence of achieving civilized integration of intelligent life."

This broad goal of philosophy according to Dewey led him to the discussion of the philosophy in relation with things and values. Using the modern science and scientific methods as the standard for knowledge in general and starting point, Dewey's philosophy becomes pre-eminently the philosophy of experimentalism. His philosophical position in his own words were 'camelion like' drifting from Hegelian Idealism gradually to other shifts. In 1896, as the Director of the Experimental School at Chicago, he experimented his ideas concerning the nature and function of intelligence in an

106. Ibid.
Stressing upon the hazards involved in all intellectual activities in new situation and current problems, he says that life is problem solving and problematic and therefore an adventure. It is an experience in coping with the ever coming new situations. Hence, he contends that knowledge is always "constituted by the conditions of its genesis and cannot be understood properly apart from its context." Therefore, knowledge cannot be a metaphysics with a reality independent of anything and prior to cognitive act. "Instrumentalism involves the doctrine that the origin, structure, and purpose of knowing are such as to render nugatory any wholesale inquiries into the nature of Being." His conception of the nature of experience has of course undergone marked changes. He interpreted experience at first in the traditional sense as a succession of states of consciousness. Existence "means existence for consciousness." Experience always is there and we cannot say how experience came to be in existence. Dewey says, "we shall never account for it by referring it to something else, for 'something' always is only for and in experience." The self undergoes perfectually
variety of things and experience and becomes a solid conscious self. There cannot be any tragic in life if we cannot be aware of what is going on in and around us. "Experience is double barrelled in that it recognizes in its primary integrity no division between act and material, subject and object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed totality... Life denotes a function, a comprehension activity in which organisms and environment are included. Only upon reflective analysis, does it break up into external conditions - air breathed, food taken, ground walked upon - and internal structures - lungs respiring, stomach digesting, legs walking."

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While talking about the objects of science and experience, Dewey traces the importance of objects, events, and labour. The world is a scene of risk and uncertainty and dangers. We long for perfection, peace and security. But we forget that what gives meaning to the notion of perfection is the events that create longing, and that, apart from them a 'perfect' world would mean 'just an unchanging brute, existential thing.'

114 Security can be attained only by a material change in the actual conditions under which life exists; but if

113, DEWEY, Experience and Nature, (1925) 2nd edition, op. 8-9 as Quoted by Werkmeister, op.cit. p.547
114, Ibid, p.63
imagined objects are satisfying and give us a feeling of security, our search for real security may falter and the logic of drama, of suspense, thrill and success, dominates the logic of objective events. Out of this attitude the arts were developed unlike the classical philosophy born in wonder, leisure and contemplation.

It follows then that only labour induces us to consider things in their connections as means and signs. Out of our understandings of a thing as a tool emerges our belief in causality. "The first thinker who proclaimed that every event is the effect of something and cause of something else, that every particular existence is both conditioned and condition, merely put into words the procedure of the workman, converting a mode of practice into formula." Out of the crafts and technologies of healing, navigation, war and the working of wood, metal, leather, flax, and wool were thus born the physical sciences; and out of the arts of political management the mutual sciences. "The distinctively intellectual attitude which marks scientific inquiry was generated in efforts at controlling persons and things so that consequences, issues, outcomes would be more stable and assured."
It is due to this origin of sciences that the objects of science are an order of relations which serve as tools to effect immediate havings. The physical sciences only reveals the relations upon which the immediate occurrences and final qualities depends. And they do not set up another rival realm of antithetical existence as well. They only enable us to link the immediate things with another comprehensive scheme of constant relationships.

According to Dewey, the objects of natural science are equally not metaphysical rivals of historical events. They are means and instruments of directing the historical events. Only individual things exist; but individually qualified things have some qualities which are pervasive, and common and stable. They are out of time in the sense that a particular temporal quality is irrelevant to them. These non-temporal mathematical or logical qualities are capable of abstraction, and of conversion into relation, into temporal, numerical and spatial orders. As such they are dialectical, non-existential. But also as such they are tools, instrumentalities applicable to historic events to help regulate their course. Instrumentalism is therefore a theory " not

118, Ibid., pp.138-140.
119, Wermeister, A History of Philosophic Ideas in America, op.cit. p.550
about personal disposition and satisfaction in knowing
but about the proper objects of science, what is proper
is being defined in terms of physics." 121

Dewey felt that the "absolute has existence only
so far as it has manifested itself in his conscious
experience." 122

Philosophy so far knows no such consciousness which
is out of relation to time. But after 18 years Dewey
says "if one is already committed to a belief that
reality is neatly and finally tied up in a packet
without loose ends, unfinished issues, or new departures,
one would object to knowledge making a difference, just
as one would object to any other impertinent intruder.
But if one believes that the world itself is in
transformation, why should the notion that knowledge is
the most important mode of its modification and the
only organ of its guidance be apriori abnoxious." 123
However, Dewey accepts that all existences and reality
itself are in transition.

This general conception of reality as temporal and
as in a state of flux is in harmony with Dewey's
contention that inquiry and knowledge must both be

121. Ibid. p.151.
122. Dewey,'Psychology as philosophic Method,' Mind, (1886)p.167
123. Dewey,'Does Reality Possess Practical Character', Essays in
honour of William James, p.55 - 56, vide Werkmeister, p.56.
considered as embedded in ever new situations and that knowledge brings about a change in any given situation; for it is Dewey's contention that "reflection in its distinctions and processes can be understood only when placed in its intermediate pivotal position - as a process of control, through reorganization of material alogical in character."

By the influence of Darwinism, Dewey placed special emphasis on the process and character of reality and upon "practical problems." The significance of the evolutionary method in biological and sociological history is, that every distinct organ, structure, or formation, every grouping of cells or elements, is to be treated as an instrument of adjustment of adaptation to a particular environing situation. Its meaning, its character, its force is known when, only when, it is considered as an arrangement for meeting the conditions involved in some specific situation. Reflection itself originates only when in the course of experience, some specific problems arises that makes our accustomed conduct difficult to proceed. In such situations, opposed responses are provoked and reflection appears as the dominant trait of a difficult situation among the factors of the prior non-intellectual experience.

Thinking and reflective knowledge are never having their own purpose or own justification for their existence. But they pass naturally into a more direct and vital type of experience of various kinds such as technological, appreciative or social. Dewey's epistemology "treats the knowledge standpoint, in all its pattern, structures, and purposes, as evolving out of and operating in the interest of the guidance and enrichment of these primary biological and social functions." Dewey contends that the "meaning of an idea is the changes it, as our attitude, effects in objects." And ideas are statements of what is or has been, but of acts to be performed.

Although Dewey distinguishes between 'Judgements of facts' and 'Judgements of Practice," he assimilate the former to the latter and thus places special emphasis upon the practical character of ideas. According to Dewey 'Judgements of practice' are of the form "M. K. should do thus and so; it is better, wiser . . . etc.; to act thus and so." Explaining six types of such Judgement, Dewey asks the question "how far is it possible and legitimate to extend or generalize the result reached to apply to all propositions of facts."

128. Ibid. p. 335.
129. Ibid. p. 347.
He concludes after due analysis, that the existence of ideas is bound up with the practical needs of life because unless "an original practical uneasiness" creates a "practical aim of inquiry", there is no need for an idea to arise and that only in problematic situation, consciousness can be found and "that ideas are problematic objects" which in their problematic character may be used "to direct observations and experiments which finally relieve the doubtful features of the situation." He also sees that "every perception and every idea is a sense of the bearings, use, and cause of a thing" as in the case of a chair and the wagon.

This practicality of Dewey becomes more significant with the position of "operationism". Dewey states that "all conceptions, all intellectual discriptions must be formulated in terms of operations, actual or imaginative possible." Thought and conceptions of ideas therefore are designations of operations as in the case of 'sweet'. The nature of ideas in terms of operations together with the test of the validity of the ideas by the consequences of these operations establishes connectivity within concrete experience. When objects are defined in terms of their consequences with respect

130 Werkmeister, A History of Philosophic Ideas in America cited, 54
131 Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, (Capricorn 1929, NY) p. 118
to one another, instead of being defined in terms of their consequences in social interactions and discussions, scientific meanings are super added to aesthetic and affecional meanings.

Many pragmatists interpreted the term 'practical' as referring to the biological and social consequences of ideas and objects or to the necessities of life. But for Dewey, 'practical' means the consequences as such without specific restrictions of the character which they may possess. In other words, it means nothing but a reference to the future. Dewey puts it "The preoccupation of experience with things which are coming...is obvious to any one whose interest in experience is empirical. Since we live forward, since we live in a world where changes are going on whose issue means our real weal or woe; since every act of ours modifies these changes and hence is fraught with promise or charged with hostile energies - what should experience be but a future implicated in a present. The 'future' implies not only objective events but the intelligence which undergoes experience also, the being which can use given and finished acts as signs of things to come; which can take given things

as evidences of absent things, can, in that sense, forecast the future; it can form reasonable expectations. It is capable of achieving ideas; it is possessed of intelligence. For use of the given or finished to anticipate the consequences of processes arises on is precisely what is meant by 'ideas', by 'intelligence'."

Besides this, the 'future' permeates Dewey's conception of the cognitive or 'problematic' situation. "Given (certain ideas) which locate the nature of the problem, there is evoked a thought of an operation which if put into execution may eventuate in a situation in which the trouble or doubt which evoked inquiry will be resolved."

Dewey's reference to the future is instrumental to determine the meaning. He further clarifies the issue by asking the question himself "how can the present belief jump out of its present skin, dive into the past and land upon just the one event, which, by definition constitutes its truth? How do we manage to know when one thought lands straight on the devoted head of some thing past and gone, while another thought comes down on the wrong thing in the past?" To clear this 13th, Dewey says, that mere verification of the consequences of the belief is not enough. "There must be a conceptual location of the event referred to in a 133.

temporal schema within which the present reflective act is 'later' than the designated event. Only if such a schema can be constructed can the experiencing subject refer meaningfully to events which are no longer actual. The criterion of potential or actual consequences by itself, is therefore inadequate."

The active useful role of intelligence according to Dewey is an outgrowth of biological considerations. He says, "the progress of biology has accustomed our minds to the notion that intelligence is not an outside power presiding supremely, but at or statically over the desires and efforts of man, but is a method of adjustment of capacities and conditions within specific situations." This role of intelligence is completely ignored by idealistic logic. It is an operative factor within nature. Hence Dewey concerned himself deeply with practical judgement.

It is due to the efficacy of intelligence within the process of nature, the act of knowing involves a transformation of experience necessarily. "What is known is seen to be a production which the act of observation plays a necessary role. Knowing is seen to be a

135. Werkmeister, History of Philosophic Ideas in America, op. cit. p. 556
participant in what is finally known. " A pragmatic intelligence is a creative one rather than a mechanical one which is the most promising of all novelties involving both imaginative forecast of the future and imaginative recovery of the bygone. Here, the function of mind is the project to free experience from routine and from caprice. Not the use of thought to accomplish purposes already given either in the mechanism of the body or in that of the existent state of society, but the use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action is the pragmatic lesson.

Amidst the functions of intelligence, Dewey pays importance to the imaginative forecast of the future rather than the imaginative recovery of the past. What is more important in the process of knowing is "the property of awareness or perception. Because of this property, the initial stages is capable of being judged in the light of its probable course and consequence. There is anticipation. Each successive event being a stage in a serial process is both expectant and commemorative."

For Dewey there is no mind body dualism and there is a fundamental confirmity. "There is no separate 'mind'."

137. Dewey, The Quest For Certainity, op.cit. p. 204.
138. Dewey, Creative Intelligence, op.cit. pp.14, 64, 66,
gifted in and of itself with a faculty of thought."

The real existence according to him is "the history in its entirety, the history as just what it is" — in which "natural" and "mental" events constitute as one continuous process. The realm of ideals grows out of the day to day experience with a capacity for further development. An "ideal world" cut off from the 'natural world' is impotent for direction and control and change of the natural world."

The development and growth of life as a continuous process of natural and human events are due to the primary 'categories' of life viz. success and failure.

Not only he rejects the psychophysical dualism but also the dualism between scientific and ethical thinking. For him both fuse, and he felt the necessity of the construction of a logic towards this and which would treat without any breach of continuity towards these two words is the need of the day and which would solve the problem as well.

He further holds that man's thinking arises only when values are at stake, that our constant and inalienable concern is with good and bad, prosperity and

and failure, and hence with choice." Moreover, we are constructed to think in terms of value, of bearing upon welfare. The chief concern of philosophy therefore, is or ought to be with values. "The intellectual registrations which constitute a philosophy are generative but because they are selective and eliminative exaggerations, while professing to say that such and such is, and always has been the record of the record of nature, in effect they proclaim that such and such should be the significant value to which mankind should loyally attach itself. The task of future philosophy is to clarify men's ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their own day. Its aim is to become, so far as humanly possible, an organ for dealing with these essential conflicts."

Dewey, Experience and Nature, op. cit., n. 32
Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920) vide Zerkruester, A History of Philosophic Ideas in America, op. cit., n. 120