FOOT PRINTS OF IMPORTANT BATTLES

The general principles of war and battles in their basic truth are the same in ancient medieval and modern age, namely how to get at the enemy’s armed force, crush it and thus destroy that peoples will to continue the war, civilization changes with time and weapons of war change with advancing civilization. But wars are always decided by three cordial factors:

- The terrain for both strategy and tactics.
- The character band mental development (miscalled race) of one people compared with their opponents.
- The difference in arms and equipments between the two sides. This last included organization and trained leadership.

No, doubt, the genius of “heaven born general” can overcome many of the difficulties in these respects, but such geniuses are a rare gift of fortune to a nation and we cannot normally count on them.

A look at the map of India will at once explain to us how geography has laid down some inexorable laws for the time and manner of conducting military operation in our country.

Thus Nature has cut the Deccan up into many small isolated compartments, each with poor resources and difficulty of communication with its neighbors. Hence, invading armies are slowed down in their march in such a terrain and usually starved out even when they have penetrated to any of these nooks.
These Deccan hill ranges, particularly the Sahyadri are often crowned by lofty forts, towering above the lowlands on some cliff with steep scarped sides and artesian water supply on the flat top or sides. These forts are Nature’s gifts to which the people can retire for safety when defeated in a pitched battle in the plain below. From these shelters nothing could expel them before modern artillery, if only they had laid in provisions or could smuggle in food at night by the back door.

Therefore, the North Indian plains have been generally the seats of vast empires, under monarchs claiming to be universal suzerains and reducing their neighbors to feudatory vassalage. The Deccan, on the contrary, except for a few short periods, has been divided into small isolated kingdoms, each confined to its own corner and unable to present any united opposition to a foreign invader. Vast cavalary forces can easily sweep as they have done age after age in the past-through the green belt from the khaibar pass via Delhi to Bengal's capital without meeting with any natural obstacle, if the forts on the way are by passed. In these plains empires have fought empires and India’s fate has been decided by one single gigantic clash of arms.

The physical geography of India has also dictated the campaigning season. There can be no movement during the three months of rain, 15th June to 15th September. The rivers are then in high flood, the roads are turned into mud pools and the fields are submerged, with the higher villages standing up like islands surrounded by a sea of water.²

Every year when the rainy season ends with the month of September, the river levels falls and the crops ripen, the invasion begins. Ancient Hindu tradition, followed by the Marathas, almost to our own days-only obeys geography when it prescribed the Dasahara day, earlier in October as the auspicious time for the king to set out on
conquest, dig-vijaya. In the month or so the crops are being harvested, so that the invaders can live off the country without burdening themselves with supplies.\(^3\)

A force of practiced horsemen mounted on the superb horses of the Khurasani or Iraqi breed marching in a compact body of 8000 men (like the army that brought Babar to Delhi) or 24000 men (like Ahmad Shah Durrani’s own troops at Panipat) - could make a rapid dash through the level green belt, skirting the foothold of the Himalayas and reach Delhi without a halt.

The Indian Infantry and even our Cavalary mounted on country-born small ponies could not come up quickly enough to bar the enemy’s path and if they gave battle, they were hopelessly defeated because infantry cannot manoeuvre with the speed of cavalry; while mounted troops can at will avoid hand to hand fight with an enemy advantageously posted or in superior numbers or wheel round and attack some weak spot of the Indian line battle. The invader’s superior mobility bewildered the Indians and frustrated their previously formed plan of operations; the cities lying behind the fighting front could not be defended against enemy forces that made a rapid detour round the main Indian Army facing the frontier.\(^4\)

From military point of view Punjab has ever been the sword arm of India. It has also been the main channel through which the fine and brave soldiery, recruitment from beyond its frontiers, flowed into the Punjab. Without a complete domination of this province, no Mughal Emperor could ever feel secure on the throne. Babar, the founder of Mughal of Mughal Empire of India, did not advance towards Delhi till he had fully established his hold over this province. After its conquest, he entrusted it to his most capable general Mir Yunis Ali, so that his eastward advance be secured
against the North-West. The Punjab was the base from where he supported his future exploits and eastward expansion.

Humayun did not realize the importance of the Punjab, as is evident from the fact that he slept over the capture of this province by Mirza Kamran and he lost his hold on the Indian Empire within a decade. Had Mirza Kamran given this province to Humayun after the latter's defeat at the hands of Sher Shah, Humayun would have retained at least a portion of the Indian Empire. The sur kings also attached great importance to this province and took maximum defensive measures to keep it free of danger from the north-west. When anarchy returned and the defensive measures slackened, Humayun easily re-occupied it in 1556.

Akbar rightly understood the strategic importance of this region and made Lahore the capital of his empire for fifteen years (1585-1598). During this period he waged a ruthless war against the turbulent Afghan tribes. Akbar succeeded in restoring order on the North west Frontier on the strength of immense military power and resources. He also conquered Kashmir during this period. During Akbar’s region this province remained an arena of revolts, Bairam Khan, Mohammad hakim Mirza, the Gorkhas, the Rajput Rajas of Nagarkot (Kangra) and Ibrahim Husain Mirza of Kashmir, one after the other revolted against Mughal Authority. But all these revolts were crushed.

Punjab was strategically the most important province of the Mughal Empire. The total tribal region between Afghanistan and India, generally known as the North west frontier, formed part of the Mughal Empire and its control was always held by the strong governors of this province under the personal and immediate attention of the
Great Mughals. Keeping this province the strongest was essential for the Great Mughals for the following reasons:

- The Hindu-Koh range, which separates Central Asia from Southern Afghanistan, Baluchistan and India, is very low in the north of Harat and permits a passage to an Invader from Iran and Central Asia to the Kabul Valley and thence to India.
- It was equally necessary for securing possession of the impregnable fortress of Qandhar, the first outpost of India’s defense and a great center of trade, frequented by merchants from various parts of Asia.
- It was necessary to control the turbulent tribes such as the Yusufzias, the Khattaks, the Muhamonds, the Uzbegs and others. For operations against these tribes, the Punjab has ever been the base of the Indian and presumably now Pakistani forces.
- The plain of Panipat in South-East Punjab has been the scene of some of the most historic battles in Indian history. From the strategic background of Afghanistan, the path for invaders lay along the lines of least resistance, Khaiber, Kurram, tochi and Gomal passes on to the Punjab plains; for, the Indus has never proved an obstacle to an enterprising general, who may find the going rough on the south because of the deserts of Rajputana. Invading armies were forced to enter the ganges and Jamuna valleys through the narrow bottleneck between the north-eastern extremity of the desert and the foot of the Himalayas.

Important battles that have made deep imprint on the socio-political and military arena of this country were battle of Panipat I (1526); Battle of Khanwa (1527); Battle of panipat II (1556); and Battle of Haldighati (1576).
The Mughal armies were drawn up in a conventional order for battles. The ingenuity shown in the earlier days by the Mughal conquerors like Babur had gradually given place to stereotyped strategy. In the front were the qarawal or skirmishers; at their back was the harawl or the vanguard. It was also called muqaddamat-u-I-jaish. To its right and left, jutting out well forward were two small wings placed in such a way that they might give support to the qarawal in case of need or act as a protection for the left and right wings of harawal, the bulk of which was stationed in the center behind the harawal was the qalb or the center of the main force. To the right and left of the qalb were the maimanah and the maisarah or the right and the left wings, also called rast of chap the qalb, the maimanah and the maisarah were sometimes called the ghol because this was considered to be the main section of the battle array. The general almost invariably took his position in the qalb. Behind the qalb was the rear guard, which also had the duty of guarding the camp. The ranks were kept in order by a small group of officers who carried the instructions of the general to other officers and kept an eye on the ranks so that they did not create confusion by acting in an undisciplined manner. In later days they came to be called nasaqchis or the maintainers of order.

First Battle of Panipat-1526

During 1192 to 1526 the first turki empire of North India passed through a course of conquest, advance and consolidation under its early rulers, but gradually it lost its vital energy and lapsed into stagnation and dissolution, at last yielding the throne to an Afghan immigrant clan. This periods differs in three respect from next epoch in our history which is called the Mughal Empire.
First the political connection between Delhi and Afghanistan was lost and recruits could no longer be regularly drawn from that country across the frontier passed by the Indian government.

Secondly baronial rebellion weakened the Central government, except under a few strong rulers.
Thirdly fire arms were unknown to them.

Then for 212 years from 1526 to 1738 northern India enjoyed a stable Centralized Govt. which spread over a part of Deccan also and kept the feudal vassals under control. It used fire arms in war and began to import European arts, techniques and teacher’s and held Afghanistan under its sway.

The Mughal Empire of Delhi was founded by Zahiruddin Babar, Sixth in the line of descent from Timur. To understand Babar’s army and tactics we must study those of Timur and to understand military power aright, we must go back to the war machine of Zengiskhan (chingis) who was babar’s ancestor in the front line.

Each improved upon the organization and technique of his predecessor, with certain necessary modifications. For instance, Timur had much more civilized tools than Zengis and Babar had a very smaller army and territorial resources than Timur, which were compensated for by his possession of a novel instrument of wonderful efficiency, namely fire-arms, unknown to his opponents. Zengis Khan(1154-1227 A.D.), showed his genius by uniting under one banner countless hordes of savage nomads,-Tartars(also called Mongols), Turks and other Scythian races. He imposed iron discipline over this miscellaneous multitude-totaling seven lakhs of armed men, according to the chroniclers. His success was due to his strict organization, unfailing
choice of able lieutenants and his wise policy of allowing complete religious
tolerance to every creed in his camp. No other general in history has shown such
power of making so many diverse tribes and sects unite in forming one compact
military machine.

His military organization was based on five principles: - First, the regular division
of troops into compact bands of regiments (Turki word Kushun, normally one
thousand), and brigades (Turki word Tuman, normally ten thousand), each under a
head and duly graded. Secondly, the enforcement of strict discipline by constant
inspection and ruthless punishment of offenders. Thirdly, unfailing selection of able
lieutenants, each of whom could independently command a distant detachment,
while co-ordinating with the general plan of the campaign. Fourthly, the creation of
a corps d’élite of the royal guards as the most efficient striking force. And fifthly,
the development of speed of movement, which was almost incredible in the case of
such vast numbers in that age of barbarism.¹²

“In the utterances ascribed to him, Chingis only emphasized his services to the
establishment of order and discipline among his people and in the army... Under
Chingis Khan order was created everywhere and to each (man, woman and child) his
position was allotted—thus replacing the disobedience prevailing everywhere before
his time.”¹³

“Each officer and soldier was made responsible, under pain of death, for the safety
and honour of his companions.” “Of special importance for the military success of
the Mongols was the creation of a numerous bodyguard (whose number reached
10,000 in 1206), with well-defined rules of their conduct in the Khan’s camp.
Discipline was maintained with the greatest strictness. A valuable means of
maintaining discipline and of training and testing the soldiers, was the hunting expeditions organized on a great scale, in which all the prescriptions of military discipline were observed with the same exactness as in actual warfare.” “Chingis, when Emperor was able to surround himself with a narrower circle of men from among his vassals, on whom he could rely as upon himself.”

Zengis Khan thus conquered the eastern world from the Adriatic to the Yellow Sea and planted Tartar rule over Russia for two centuries.

The first battle of Panipat was preceded by some preimentary attempts at the conquest of India. The preliminary attempts convinced him that he could not conquer India without strengthening his base at Qandhar. The political condition of India on the eve of Babar’s invasion was terribly deplorable. Northern India was seething with discontent and dissenious. Sikandar Lodhi a capable ruler had died in 1517 A.D. and his stupid son, Ibrahim Lodhi, had mounted the throne of Delhi. His misgovernment and arrogant behaviour had estranged his own kith and kin. His ill-treatment had disgusted the Afghan nobles who formed secret conspiracies against him. Bengal, Jaunpur, malwa and Gujarat and other outlying provinces had all become independent. The eastern districts of Oudh and Bihar had taken up arms against him. Daulat Khan Lodhi, the governor of the Punjab and Ala-ud-din, uncle of Ibrahim, revolted against the ruling prince and invited Babar to relieve India of the Tyrant. Rana Sanghram, or Rana Sangha as he is known in history, also made overtures to the king of Kabul and asked him to intervene.

Babar invasion of India was well timed. India was weak and divided in those days. The first battle of Panipat was fought between babar and Ibrahim Lodhi on April 21, 1526 on the plains of Panipat, the historic site where the throne of India has been thrice won. Babar father Umer Sheikh Mirza was the ruler of Fargana. At the time
of his father’s death Babar was just eleven years old. After the death of his father he was expelled from the state. After a long struggle Babar regained his lost state. In 1497 he took Samarkand under his control but in between he lost Fargana. After sometime he also lost Samarkand. However with the help of his small army he got Kabul in 1504. It was India for which Babar always dreamed of. He looked India at his focal point and in 1525 he attacked and took Lahore under his control. After winning Lahore he retreated and began to prepare to conquer Delhi.

Ibrahim Lodhi ruling over Delhi and state was at the verge of decline. Lodhi had a competent army, yet with his rude behavior he made many chiefs unhappy and revengeful. In the later part of sixteenth century the whole India was divided into small states and all the rulers used to fight over trivial matters.

Babar started from Kabul in Nov. 1525 to attack on India through Khaibar pass. He crossed the Indus and Jhelum river on Dec. 24, 1525. Then passing through Chenab river he reached Siyalcot on December 29. It is remarkable to point out that Babar crossed the huge river with the help of boats and by swimming. They made temporary bridges with the help of boats and got their artillery crossed. Before doing such activities Babar always sent his spies to arrange the things.

Babur left a small company of soldiers on border of Lahore. King of Delhi was busy in defense from the outside attacks. Babur stayed in Siyalcot and analyzed the situation. He sent his official and two army chiefs to study and examine the whole situation. He ordered his soldiers to stay till he himself would cross the Vyas river. On Dec. 30, Babur reached Kalanaur via Parasrampur. He attacked Kalanaur on Jan. 5, 1526 and took it under his control. The ferocious speed and terrified attack of
the army of Babur horrified the army of Sudedar Daulat Khan and the soldiers of subedar Daulat Khan left the field very fastly.

After winning Milbat Babar left for Delhi via Ropar and Karnal. The intelligence of Babar was very reliable. He always made his strategy after getting accurate information in advance. Babur’s spies informed him that two company of soldiers moved forward to contain Babar one in control of Ibrahim Lodhi and another under command of Hamid Khan from Hisar Firoja. In order to stop Hamid Khan sent his son Humayun to attack on Hamid Khan. Finally Humayun defeated Hamid Khan and took Hisar under his control.

On march 5, Babur reached Shahabad. In order to know about the intentions and strategy of the enemy Babur sent his spies. Babur himself prepared for the battle and via Yamuna river he left for South Delhi. The victory over Delhi was typical and to make his dream true Babur reached near the battle field of Panipat on April21, 1526.

The Army of Babur

Babar’s strength in this battle is not definitely in his memories. The court Historian of Akbar says that it was 12,000 Cavalry, but that must have been the number of his choice Turkish horse men or first class troops. To these we must add his foot musketeers and Indian allies as well as the hordes of Afghan and Turkey adventures drawn to his standard by the lure of gold, Lt. Col. Wolseley Haiq estimates Babar’s force in this battle at 25000. In this way Cavalry, artillery and gunners formed important composition of the Babar army. It is pertinent to mention here that on Babar’s side there were fine arms an absolutely new weapons in North Indian Warfare. The Babar army of bow and arrow was most crucial and soldier’s
were trained in art of war in such a way that they could fight anytime anywhere no matter whether it is day or night.

The Army of Ibrahim Lodhi

The army of Ibrahim was more powerful than the army of Babar. There were 10,000 soldiers and 1000 Elephants. But in comparison to Babar the soldier’s of Ibrahim were inefficient, untrained and short-sighted. There were Cavalry, infantry and Elephant corps but they did not have healthy relationship with the king. It is said that most of the Chiefs were unhappy and in the beginning scattered Gold coins and diamonds among his soldiers but still they could not be motivated or encouraged.

Strategy of Babar

After analyzing the strength of the army of his opponent Babar decided to follow a decisive strategy in war. He tried his best to harmonise the artillery and trained Cavalry. The great hurdle in his way was to stop the huge army of Ibrahim Lodhi. Having prepared for the war the army of Babar reached near the battlefield of Panipat. The right flank of the army was completely safe due to buildings and left side took the help of ditches and trenches and cut down trees. After securing the left and right flank of his army Babar settled his central part with the help of carts in such a way that the riders could go forward to attack on the enemy.

During April 12 to April 19 both the armies were in front of each other. Babar wanted that Ibrahim should have attacked first. In order to make Ibrahim aggressive Babar sent his patrolling party to instigate the enemy but did not attack on them. Then Babar without waiting for a long time Babar keeping principle of initiative in
his hand sent around five thousand of his fighting force to attack the enemy. Unfortunately they lost their way due to darkness and they found them just near the camp of the enemy in the morning. In this way Babar succeeded in his tactical approach against Ibrahim Lodhi. Seeing the gravity of the situation in the light of Babar initiative Ibrahim Lodhi ordered his army to expand with the possibility of attack.

On April 19 it became clear that Babar’s decision of April 18 worked and the soldiers of Ibrahim began to move forward. Under the prevailing situation Babar also ordered his soldiers to attack on the enemy.

Babar divided his army into five groups:

- Front Group (Haraval) includes the cannons and 7 best soldiers.
- Right Group (barangarh)
- Left Group (Jarangarh)
- Central Group (Kul and Ghol) led by Babar itself
- Rear Group (Chandaval)

Besides these five major groups there were some small groups as follows:

- Rider Bowmen (Karaval). This group was in front of the advance group. This group was not a hurdle in the activities of the front group. Under pressing situation this group could be sent behind the front group.
- Active Reserve Group (Iltmish) this was a small group. It was arranged on the left and right side of the middle group. This group was to use the weak group during the battle action.
- Right Cavalry (Taulkama) This group was supposed to attack on the flanks of the enemy from the rear.
• A small group was left in a long distance. Who was responsible to defend the camps.

The forward movement of Ibrahims made it clear that it was becoming heavy on the right side of Babar’s army.

In the beginning Ibrahim moved fastly but as and when he saw the movement of the front part of Babar’s army he stopped his forward movement. In this way Ibrahim lost the opportunity to attack on the enemy. Meanwhile Babar got an opportunity to muster up the courage of his army. During the time rear group of Ibrahim army was misled.

Babar studied the situation strategically and felt that right group may face trouble so that he sent the reserve battalion to help the right group of his army. As soon as the Afghan army was coming forward the front group of Babar started turning in deep formation. In this situation Ibharim found himself confused and he could not decide whether to attack or not to attack. Babar took the advantage of Ibharim’s dilemma and other his army’s right and left flank to attack on the enemy from rear. Right and left flank started to move forward and from the centre cannons began to fire. As a result the soldiers of Ibrahim retreated and started crushing their own soldiers. Ibrahim Lodhi died in the battle field.

**First battle of Panipat: Lessons and Fallout**

• The battle of Panipat was the decisive battle in the history as it laid the foundation stone of Mughal Empire for coming centuries.
• It was the first battle in the history of India when gun powder was used in the form of cannons & guns.
• The army of Ibrahim Lodhi found himself unable to face cannons and guns. Due to heavy fires soldiers lost their hearts. J.F.C. fuller has rightly pointed out that numbers of soldiers can not surpass the superior weapon and grand tactics.
• The leadership of Babar was far better than Ibrahim Lodhi, Otherwise how could he win such a great battle with small number of soldiers.
• Mobility is dynamic principle of war. Ferocity of Babar army was far better than Lodhi.
• Babar had opted new tactics known as “Tulgama” and his skillful strategy had made his army safe in adverse circumstance.
• Babar coordinates his cavalry and cannons in such a way that it became remarkable and unparallel. Babar won the battle with the help of intellectual leadership and new tactics.

In the battle that followed Ibrahim Lodhi fell fighting on the field and his army was routed. Delhi and Agra fell into the hands of invaders who hailed as the emperor of India by the people of the capital cities. On Friday 22 April 1526 the public prayer was said in capital mosque at Delhi in the name of new emperor. The first battle of Panipat put an end to the Afghan rule and introduced the mughal rule instead. It crowned the career of Babar and gave India a series of capable rulers.

**BATTLE OF KHANWA-1527**

The battle of khanwa was the supreme test of Babar’s generalship. His soldiers marched to it disheartened by defeat in patrol actions, terrified by stories of
Rajput Valour and astrologer’s predictions of adverse stars, and weakened by the
desertion of timid allies. Facing him was an enemy more than double of his own
numbers and flushed with unbroken success. If he was defeated or even forced to
retreat after a drawn fight, the shock of his failure would shelter his new born empire
of Delhi to pieces. But he had one weapon which the Rajputs could not match, these
were his mortars and matchlocks which were then absolutely unknown in northern
India. Above all shown his military genius and experience of war earned by incessant
fights since the age of twelve on the Rajput side was valour no doubt, but no
generalship, no brain in directing staff, no cohesion of the parts.  

After winning the battle of Panipat the founder of mughal empire Babar had the
privilege of becoming the king of Delhi and Agra but still he had a deep longing for
the whole India. The Rajputs of Rajasthan particularly Sangram Singh and Rana
Sanga were the great hurdle for hi. Babar established Agra is his capital and took
possession of the fort of Byana. This act irritated Rana Sanga and with the help of
many Rajputs kings and muslim heads he forced the mughals to leave the fort. When
Babar came to know about the incident he escorted his force to fight the battle on
Feb16, 1527 he reached near sikri and pitched the tents on the other hand Rana Sanga
also forwarded for the fight but mistakably he staged in Ghurawar for month and
during this time Babar got the opportunity to increase his strength and make an
artificial fort.

Before the battle of khanwa many encounters took place between the patrolling
parties of both sides. In all these encounters Rajput dominated the battle and this
loosened the confidence of the army of Babar. Babar was a skillful king, he gathered
his soldiers and gave them many temptations. He distributed all his gold and silver
coins among the soldiers. He made a speech full of oratory “My bold soldiers what
will we show or say to God in this crucial period that the territory if Hindu slipped through< no< we will not retreat. If we win this battle we will be known as Gajis or we will die as martyrs. As a result all the soldiers were filled with a fresh energy and the battle of khanwa took place on March 16, 1527.  

COMPARITIVE STRENGTH

- **The Army of Rana Sanga**: In the army of Rana Sanga the number of soldiers were more than the army of babar. According to Major David there were one lakh soldiers including one thousand elephants.

- **The Army of Babar**: Just a year back Babar has proved her superiority in battle of Panipat. In this Battle babar deployed his various fighting arms like a battle of Panipat. First the baggage carts of army, 1000 in numbers were placed one line in front about 40 feet apart but tied together in the Turki fashion with thougs cut out of raw hide (for wants of iron chains). Between every two carts, five or six movable shields (in Europe war called mantlets), fixed to wheel tripods, were placed, behind which the musketeers sheltered when firing. In the line of linked carts, opening were left at the distances of an arrows flight (about 60yards) for a hundred horsemen to sally out.

**Second Battle of Panipat (1556)**

Shershah Suri had expelled babar’s son Humayun out of India but within ten years of his death his descendants lost their empire through family quarrels and baronial
rebellions. The last of the Sur Kings Mubariz Khan (Shershsh Nephew) entitled Muhammad Adil Shah (popularly Called Adili) was entirely devoid of energy and capacity and devoted himself solely to the pursuit of pleasure. But his government gained unwanted strength from his Hindu Minister hemu Bhargav.

This men was a Gaur Brahmin. Though this caste had supplied priests to The Hindu kings of yore, Hemu’s own family was poor and he made his way up in the Sur royal service by his conscious ability for war and civil administration alike. His honesty and devotion to the interests of the State and his strictness in putting down slack and corrupt public savants antagonized the degenerate old official nobility and his memory has been blackened by their false aspersions and the partisan writings of Akbar’s court flatterers. Himu, in addition to being a highly efficient civil administrator, was also the best military genius on the Afghan side after Sher Shah’s death, far sighted in his strategic plans, keen-eyed and quick in his tactical decisions, cool in holding his strength in reserve and fearless of danger in encouraging his troops by his personal example. In the internecine wars of the Afghans, he had fought 22 battles with the domestic enemies of his master and had been victorious in all of them.

When Humayun returned from his exile in Persia and recovered Delhi and Agra (23rd july, 1555), Hemu marched from the eastern provinces with a large army to recover these royal cities, leaving his master Adili in Chunar fort. Soon afterwards, Humayun died in Delhi on 26th January, 1556.

At the advance of Hemu, Humayun’s governor of Agra evacuated that city and fled of Delhi. In Pursuit of him, Hemu reached Tughlaqabad, a village five miles cast of the Quthab Minar. Here Tardi Beg, the Mughal governor of Delhi came out and gave
battle on 7th October, against tremendous odds, as Hemu was reported to be leading 1000 elephants 50000 horses, 51 cannon and 500 falconets.

The wars of disaster at Tughlaqabad reached the young Akbar at jalandhar and he at once set out with all his forces to recover Delhi. The decisive battle was fought on 5th Nov. 1556 about four miles north west of the scence of Babar’s victory. Hence it is called second battle of Panipat.

It was fortunate for the mughal dynasty that the young emperor Akbar had a powerful supporter and an excellent general and diplomat in Bairam Khan who served his master and secured his position till he attained the age of discretion. The first important thing that he was required to do as regent was to fight against Hemu, who was advancing against the Mughal Emperor at the head of a huge army. Almost all the officers of the Mughal army advised the Emperor to retreat to Kabul, but Bairam Khan successfully resisted such a pusillanimous step as would have spoiled the prospects of the Mughal Dynasty. Forthwith he ordered the immediate arrest and execution of Tardi Beg on a charge of misconduct in the face of the enemy and himself marched out to oppose Hemu. Fortune favoured the resolute Mughal general from the outset. An advance-guard had already handicapped Hemu by capturing the whole park of his artillery. The two armies, each commanded by a military genius of no mean merit, came to severe blows at the memorable plain of Panipat. Hemu made a furious charge of his elephants and soon threw the left wing of the Mughal army into confusion and there was considerable consternation in the Mughal Camp. The tide of victory turned at once in favour of the Mughals when, in the thick of fight, Hemu was hit in his eye with an arrow and rendered unconscious. The fall of the leader from his elephant decided the fate of the battle. The mughals won the day. Hemu, the hero and the hope of the Hindus, was taken prisoner and brought before
the emperor. Bairam Khan was anxious to see the young emperor slaying a most formidable enemy, but the chivalrous Shahnshah refused to do so, saying that it was unchivalrous to stay a fallen for. There upon Bairam Khan took out his own sword and slew Hemu. Hemu defeat was sheer an accident whereas Akbar’s victory was bestowed by God.31 Five thousand dead ware counted on the field and many more were slain when fleeing.32

**Second battle of Panipat : Lessons and Fallout**

The victory in second battle of Panipat removed the most powerful opponents of Akbar. Hemu was badly defeated and slain. His army was ruthlessly routed. A large booty, including a big treasure and 1500 elephant fell into the hands of victorious army. Delhi, agra and the neighboring districts were occupied. The highway was prepared for further conquests. The hopes of Hindu to establish their own rule in India were dasged to the ground. The prestige of the Mughal arm and army was established once again and Akbar was hailed as the emperor of greater India. In this way Afghan rule came to an end mughal began to rule in India.

**IV Battle of Haldighati**

In order to enlarge his kingdom in the whole India Akbar tried his best. With the help of his large army and magnificent strategy he succeeded in his attempt to a great extent. The key to his success was the harmony between Hindu & Muslims. Akbar knew it well that without the help of he would not be able to establish a muslim kingdom.33 The great hurdle in this way was the powerful Rajputs , but by giving them higher posts and establishing relations with them he succeeded to bring
them under his control. Only the sisodia Rajputs of Mewar rejected the posts and relation with Akbar due to self respect.

The most interesting episode in the military career of Akbar is the fight with Rana Pratap of Mewar which has been immortalized by ballads of the Rajput bards and the Annals and antiquitices of Rajasthan by James Tode. The Rajput had been the chief Bulwark of Hinduism against the intrusion of Islam in India. Most of the Pathan rulers had to fight against the Rajputs, who though often defeated, again asserted their independence. Whenever any opportunity arose Akbar decided to win them over by matrimonial alliances. The first fruit of that policy was Akbar’s marriage with the daughter of Rana Ambar (Jaipur) and Raja Bharmal, and as a result there of both Bhagwan Das and Man Singh, son and grandson, respectively of those rulers were “enrolled amongst the nobility and received high commands”. There were two other marriage alliance of that nature (with Bikaner and Jaisalmer) with similar obligations. This policy endeared Akbar to the Rajput princes, who, became the strongest champion of Mughal Empire. Man Singh and Jaswant Singh, for example, may be said to have been the pillars of the Mughal empire during the reign of Akbar and Aurangzeb. But the new policy of Akbar failed in case of Mewar, the premier state in Rajputana, whose rulers prided themselves as the sisodiyas and descendents of the famous, almost legendary hero Bappa Rawal.34

The king Rana Pratap preferred death than slavery of Akbar. At last Akbar decided to declare war against them. In the beginning the mughal army took Mewar and Chittor under their control. Rana Pratap left Chittor and took shelter in the forest of Kumbhalgarh in Gokundnagar. In the mean time Akbar was preparing for war on Gujrat but Rana Pratap’s army was firmly stayed in the way and it had created a hurdle in the way to Gujrat. To dismantle this hurdle Akbar sent his army in the
command of Raja Man Singh strategically prepared his soldiers to wage war in Mandalgarh. As soon as Rana Pratap came to know about the preparations of Mughal he left the fort of Kumbhalgarh and came out safe hilly place known as Lohsiagh. Man Singh also move forward toward Banas river and pitched the tents in the field of Haldighati, where a terrible battle was fought between Maharana Pratap and Mughals on June 18, 1576. Due to yellow color of the soil this battle field was named Haldighati.

**Army of Mughal & Rajput**

The mughal army comprised ten thousand including four thousand Kachwaha Rajput, one thousand various Hindu soldiers and five thousand Muslims(Turks of Asia, Uzveg, Kazzam, Saiyyads and Shekh Jade of Fatehpursikri). Besides there were gunners and elephants. This army was escorted by Raja Man Singh.

In the army of Rana Pratap there were four thousand soldiers, four hundred archeror of Bhell community and elephants

**The Battle Strategy**

The strategy of mughal army was according to custum. In the front there were guerilla rider soldiers, and they were followed by gunners soldiers. Behind them there were vanguard centre and rear groups, left and right groups were in flanks. In the extreme rear there was the reserved group called Iltmis. All the groups had their separate commanders: Sayyad Hamis, Asaf Ali, Lunkus and Mulla Qazi. The middle was commanded by Raja Man Singh himself and Madho Singh was the commander of the rear group.
Tactical Expansions of Rana Pratap Army

In the army of Rana Pratap there were eight hundred soldiers in the front and behind it were the three customary groups: Left, right and center. The center was commanded by Rana Pratap. The front was commanded by Ramdas Rathore and right was commanded by Bhamashah and left by Mana. In the last there were Bheels with their bows and arrow. Bheels were expert in Guerilla war. Rana Pratap had no reserve group in the army and in comparison to Mughal army his army strength was numerically small.

Details of Battle

- On 18 June the Rajput soldiers attacked on mughals with great force and very soon they dispersed the front and left group by cutting them into Pisces. But in order to make their attack more powerful the soldier’s of Rana came out from hills and it was their terrible mistake and they had to pay it for a heavy price.
- By observing the terrible condition of his front and left group Man Singh ordered his reserve for the help of front soldiers and this created a positive creativity in the Mughal soldier.

Meanwhile a rumour that Akbar himself was coming with huge army to support Man Singh in the battle soared the confidence of mughal soldiers.

- Rana Pratap did not lose heart and reached near Man Singh. A terrible battle began between sisodia Rajputs and mughal soldiers. Rana attacked powerfully on Man Singh with his spear but it struck the driver of elephant (Mahawat) of
Raja Man Singh. All the mughal soldiers encircled Rana Pratap seeing him in danger a patriot sardar jhala wearing coronet of Rana Pratap emerged and declared himself as Rana Pratap. At this movement Rana Pratap escaped with the help of his friend and Sardar Jhala himself to save Rana Pratap. Sardar Jhala had shown Himalayan height of loyalty that is rarest of rare in medieval history of India.

**Battle of Haldighati: Lessons & Fallout**

In the battle of Haldighati mughal army won but did not became able to execute the plan. Their target was to capture Rana Pratap but Rana escaped easily and opposed Akbar till his last breadth and the battle remained undecisive.

The decision of Rana Pratap to come out from hills was the real cause to lose the battle. If they had fought guerilla tactics of hit and run based on mobility and surprise they would have succeeded in their attempts because the number of mughal soldiers were much higher than Rajputs. Guerilla warfare is the best strategy of weak against strong.

The reserved army played a crucial role in the victory of mughals. Rajput had not reserve. In the battle Rana Pratap became aggressive and offensive and reached near Man Singh however his soldiers remained behind. So, without right direction and well calculated strategy they not fight well.
Inspiteof the victory Man Singh lost the battle because Rana Pratap was out of reach and he became famous as a warrior, self respected and strange patriot unparallel in the annals of Indian history.

The story of pratap’s bravery, heroism, and untold sufferings for the cause of liberation of his kingdom has become almost proverbial, even today no name is held in great honour in Rajaputana than that of the brave Pratap. Flying from hill to hill before the superior forces of the mughals he suffered extreme want and privation together with his wife and children but still his brave heart refused to yield.

His gallantry and patriotism were at last rewarded and he recovered most of his possessions before his death in 1597. But he could not never recover chittor the far famed capital of his ancestors. He had vowed that he would take food only on a leaf and sleep on a straw bed, until he recovered chitor. He kept his vow till his death, and during the last year of his life, he often kept gazing at chittor from a neighbouring hill, while tears rolled down his cheeks. It is fair to add that Akbar fully appreciated the heroism and patriotism of his mighty opponent and paid glowing tributes to his character.36

It should be noted, however that Akbar gave evidence of his appreciated of Rajput heroism by placing the statues of jaimal and fatta at the fort of Agra.37
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