CHAPTER III

PUNITIVE EXPEDITIONS

The authorities in Calcutta entertained high hopes that the peace missions would be a great success in restoring law and order in the country of the Nagas. In fact in 1841, the Angamis visited the headquarter station of Nowgong and made a voluntary offer of submission and payment of tribute. It may be recalled that two of their principal chiefs made up a longstanding feud in the presence of Captain Gordon, Principal Assistant of Nowgong and undertook to resort to trade with the plains in the newly established market at Dimapur. A school was also started at that place for the education of their children. For a time everything went well and the Angamis began to frequent Dimapur and Nowgong as freely as ever. But when in April 1844, an officer was deputed to the hills to collect the first years' promised tribute, all these professions of friendship vanished into thin air. The smaller Angami chiefs, however, paid in their small amounts, but the most powerful chiefs of Khonoma and Mozoma not only declined to keep themselves to their agreements, but even defied him by force of arms. What was worse, the Angamis recommenced their outrages all along the frontier.

1. F.P.P. 1844, Aug. 24, No.34.
One of the most daring outrages of the series committed by the Angami Nagas was on the Shan Guard located at Lunkae on the night of October 3, 1844, where three sepoys were killed and their arms and properties were carried off. The attack was led by Hetakee, the new chief of Khonoma who was one of those to come down to Nowgong and enter into agreements with Captain Gordon. Further enquiries revealed that the same party plundered the village of Semkhor on their return after surprising the Guard at Lunkae. In December 1844, Captain Eld, since succeeded Gordon as Principal Assistant of Nowgong, accompanied by his Sub-Assistant Mr. Browne Wood and a detachment of fifty men of the Second Assam Light Infantry proceeded to the hills with the object of capturing the murderers of the sepoys at Lunkae. On arriving at Hassong Hajo, Eld learned that the Nagas of Asalu were implicated in the murder through having sheltered the Angamis on their way back from Lunkae. Browne Wood was directed to visit the village, but on his approach the villagers deserted the homes. Consequently the village was burnt. Proceeding eastward, they reached Berema with a view to capture the guilty men connected with the massacre at Lunkae. The Nagas having absconded, this village was also burnt down. Captain Eld then returned to Nowgong and deputed

his Sub-Assistant Browne Wood to visit Khonoma to find out the culprits. On his arrival at Khonoma, he demanded the immediate surrender of the murderers who were connected with the Lunkae outrage. They restored the four muskets which they had carried off, but did not deliver up the guilty men as "they appeared to pride themselves on their prowess and glory." Mr. Browne Wood advanced with his detachments towards the village of Khonoma; the inhabitants having fled on the approach of the troops, the village containing about five hundred houses, was set on fire and reduced to ashes.

Eld's expedition though at first conciliatory failed to achieve the real object. Nevertheless, the expedition had effected much good among the friendly Nagas of Koizoma, who were greatly elated at the plight of their enemy, the villagers of Khonoma. The smaller Angami villages too were happy to be relieved of the tyranny of Khonoma for the time being. These villages agreed to acknowledge the friendship of the British, refer all their disputes to the arbitration of officers of the Government and to abstain from traffic in slaves. But these measures did not secure the peace which was the object of the Government; on the other hand it had created a feeling of distrust and enmity. Naturally, both the Government of India and the Court of Directors expressed strong resentment on the acts of destruction and revenge undertaken by the local authorities. The former in its letter...
dated May 23, 1845 addressed to the Government of Bengal, while condemning the proceedings against Khonoma remarked that "the burning of villages was not quite justifiable and the officers engaged with these half-civilised tribes on the frontier of our possessions would ....... gain more influence with them and be better able to carry out measures for the protection and benefit of our own frontier subjects by acting in all circumstances with strict justice and moderation, than by having recourse to harsh measures of general and indiscriminate vengeance." After the receipt of this communication from the Supreme Government, the local authorities were strictly prohibited from giving countenance to punishing an entire community or the conflagration of villages for outrages committed by individuals. Instead of resorting to such brutal methods, which does not behave well of an enlightened Government, the frontier officers were enjoined to try alternative methods like the offering of rewards, allurement to trade and even intimidation, but not open hostilities except in cases of self-defence.

ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ADVANCE POST PROPOSED:

Eld's wanton acts of destruction without discriminating friendly and unfriendly villages had really enmired so much enmity within them, that as soon as the detachment left the hills the Khonoma Nagas aided by about seventy Kanipuris burnt down the village of Mokoma for assisting the British troops against them in the last expedition. To prevent Manipur from helping one Naga tribe against another and to secure the peace of the frontier, Captain Eld proposed the occupation of the Angami country by establishing a military post in their hills. But the Government of India deemed it expedient to send another expedition to the hills under Captain John Butler, principal Assistant of Nowgong with a peaceful objective. While sanctioning the expedition, he was also instructed to examine the feasibility of establishing the proposed post in the midst of the Angamis. Although the Court of Directors was not wholly opposed to such a measure, it had cautioned the Government of India to take utmost care in the selection of the officer in case a post was decided to be established. 5

BUTLER'S EXPEDITION:

Accordingly on November 20, 1845, Captain John Butler, Eld's successor started on a peaceful mission with

a company of 100 men of the Second Assam Light Infantry for the Angami hills. Passing through the entire Angami country, he negotiated with all the chiefs whose villages he had visited. "Not a shot was fired throughout the journey, or the slightest sign of a hostile feeling was manifested towards the mission". Butler was visited by Kotah, a chief of Khonoma, who repeated his assurance of goodwill before him, so also the chief of Mozoma and many other smaller chiefs preferred their submission and presented tributes of elephant's teeth, cloth and spears. But the guilty men connected with the murder of Lunkae guard were not handed over. The chief of Khonoma frankly admitted that it was beyond his power to make them agree to surrender their own men.  

Notwithstanding the failure to punish the really guilty men connected with the crime committed on the Lunkae Guard, Butler considered that the grand object of the expedition - the conciliation of the tribes and the acquirement of a more accurate knowledge of the country were more fully gained than on any former occasion. For the first time a very accurate map of the greater portion of the Naga Hills was obtained by Mr. Thornton, who accompanied the expedition and surveyed the route traversed by it.  

Butler did not support the establishment of a post hitherto suggested; and he considered the maintenance of such a post in the hills 

6. Ibid.
7. Butler, J.; Travels and Adventures in Assam, 1855, p. 75.
would be extremely difficult. On the other hand he felt that the purpose of such a post could be best achieved by placing a thana in charge of a Native officer at Samaguting. He also pronounced that the sending of yearly expeditions for punishing every act of violence was useless. But the Agent entertained a very different view from those of Butler. To him the little influence which the Government had been able to gain over the Nagas, except a very few powerful villages, was mainly due to these yearly expeditions. Jenkins, therefore, felt annual expeditions would have to be undertaken for effectually checking the Naga aggressions on the borders of the British territories and for reclaiming them from their lawless habits.

RENEWED AGGRESSIONS IN NORTH CACHAR:

The hollowness of the agreements entered into by the Naga chiefs was proved by the recurrence of the Angami aggressions in North Cachar. In August 1846, reports of several aggressions came to the Government in quick succession. One had occurred in the neighbourhood of Hassong Najo, another at Berema and still another at Samaguting. These incidents proved beyond doubt that no reliance could be placed on the empty promises of the Naga chiefs. Their only

motive behind the show of submission was to obtain the help, both in men and arms from the British Guards to carry out their internal feuds. But, as it was not the established policy of the Government of India to take part in their internal affairs, the Naga chiefs could not get that kind of help which they wanted. As a result when they realised that the Government was not prepared to help them to carry out their internal feuds they broke off their pledges and indulged themselves in their throat-cutting and plunderous activities. As conciliation had so far failed to realise the objectives of the Government, Jenkins proposed the establishment of a military post at Samaguting and the sending of another expedition under Butler to chastise the Angami Naga for their breach of peace.

The Court of Directors, while approving the expedition insisted on the Government of India to issue specific instructions to the officer commanding it to give preference to mild over rigorous measures. In accordance with the desire of the Government, the Agent instructed Butler to adopt a pacific policy in course of his mission to the Angami hills. He advised him not to resort to coercion which might lead to open rebellion, but to enter into written agreements with any village or chief not connected with any outrage, to keep the peace, give help in the detection of offenders and assist in the movement of troops. On their agreeing to
such conditions, they were to be freely allowed to trade with the plains and as a mark of their fealty tributes were to be insisted from them making them suitable presents in return. Above all Butler was ordered to select a site in a commanding position near Samaguting and to erect a stockade to make it known to the tribes that the Government was determined to punish them for their aggressions either upon its own subjects or upon other villages. 9

BUTLER'S SECOND EXPEDITION:

In the cold season of 1846, Butler proceeded to the hills with a small but select body of troops. He covered over 277 miles of the hill country visiting all the important villages in turn. Seeing a small force accompanying him, the Nagas of Khonoma, Joppheema and Kohima leagued together to attack him. But soon they lost courage and willingly offered submission expressing readiness to pay tributes. Thus obtaining a complete victory "without firing a single shot", he returned to Nowgong on January 17, 1847. 10 Inspite of this success Butler was doubtful that the Naga chiefs would keep the peace. The power of the Naga chiefs appeared to him to be very limited and they were "merely leaders in action and spokesman in parley". They had no control over their men.

Under such circumstances all engagements entered into with them for keeping peace or payment of revenue were meaningless. Butler, therefore, before leaving the hills established a post at Samaguting and placed it under a Sajwal named Bhogchand with authority over the whole Angami tribe.\(^{11}\)

The occupation of the post at Samaguting greatly helped in stopping the incursions formerly made for heads into British villages, but their own feuds had not ceased. They frequently applied for guards to prosecute their inter-village or inter-clannish quarrels and showed little inclination to refer them to the officers of the Government for adjudication. However, the beneficial influence of the opening of the advanced post seemed to be considerable. During the year 1848, a thousand Angamis visited Nowgong for trade in salt and cornelian beads. Their confidence in the Government increased to such an extent that a party of Angami traders came down with Butler to Nowgong for purchasing beads which they prize most. Being not satisfied with the kind available at Nowgong, they left for Gauhati and Tezpur for better kind of beads. Such visits of the Nagas to the markets of the plains and the very crossing of the Brahmaputra were considered to be satisfactory proof of their increasing confidence in the peaceful intentions of the Government of India.\(^{12}\) Even the Court of Directors were

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\(^{11}\) F.P.P. 1885, Jan. 19, Nos. 128-31.
\(^{12}\) F.P.P. 1847, April, 24, No. 38.
Pleased to observe that since the early part of 1848 "their incursions into the plains seem to have been entirely ceased and the only recent instances of collision on the part of any of the tribes with the British power have been cases of resistance to our attempts to exact redress for outrages committed in the prosecution of feuds with one another".  

PACIFIC POLICY FAILED:

Daroga Bhogchand was an active, intelligent and fearless officer and had gained much influence over the Nagas because of his long intimate connections with them. He knew their language, their feelings and their habits. He had conducted several cases of murders and outrages with much temper and prudence. But he was rash and over zealous. After making an enquiry in the village of Jakhama, he had returned with his party with such bravery without which it would have been completely routed by the Nagas who had virtually rounded up his men. The submission of a large number of villages to the Sajwal and the keen desire of the smaller villages to throw off the yoke of the powerful villages were attributed by the Agent to the beneficial influence exercised by the post. But this proved to be short lived. The comfortable prospect of peace was marred by several outrages on British villages and the outbreak of

13, F.P.P. 1847, April 24, N.38.
violent feuds between Khonoma and Kozoma.

Early in 1848, three women of the village of Hassong Hajo were murdered by the Nagas of Berema. Shortly afterwards four other women were reported to have been murdered in a frontier village. These murders, it appeared were committed in retaliation of old feuds. Such internal feuds could not be stopped so easily. The policy of binding down their chiefs by agreements had proved futile. Under the circumstances Jenkins recommended to Bhogchand to treat the entire community of a village as delinquents so long individual offenders were not surrendered. Bhogchand was authorised to deal with the specific cases of murder; for the protection of Hassong Hajo the pharee was advanced to the village from Haflong. All these measures having failed to achieve the purpose in view, Bhogchand suggested the occupation of another post at Berama. Jenkins, however, proposed that Butler should go again to the hills on a mission of peace to the Nagas. But his deputation to the hills at this time was not approved by the Government as most of the able officers had been sent out to Punjab in connection with the hostilities with the Sikhs.  

Early in 1849, the feud between the villages of Mozoma and Khoroma became so much dreadful that Jubellee, the chief of Mozoma requested Bhogchand for a guard in his village and in return he promised to pay revenue to the British. Similar requests were made by the chiefs of Vohima and Berema expressing their willingness to pay revenue. Bhogchand was not the man to allow such opportunities to go by default. He wanted to extend his influence by utilising them and immediately urged the Government to place a guard at Mozoma. The proposal was accepted, but before this was done, Bhogchand got himself entangled in a quarrel between two chiefs of Mozoma Jubellee and Nilholey. These two chiefs had a long-standing feud regarding the possession of a plot of land.\(^\text{15}\) Jubellee had been assisted by Haridas Kachari, supposed to be an agent of the Manipur Government with seven Kacharis armed with muskets.\(^\text{16}\) Nilholey on the other hand

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\(^{15}\) For details see, Butler, J.; Travels and Adventures in Assam, pp. 174-8.

\(^{16}\) Haridas Kachari was a person in the employ of Manipur Government but was suspected of malpractices. Since then he had been evading his arrest. He was once apprehended for assisting Khoroma, but was released by Captain Gordon from Nowgong jail as the charges against him could not be substantiated. Captain Mc.Culloch, Manipur's Political Agent said that in the Angami frontier, there were no regular Agents of Manipur. However, there was an officer in the capital who was in-charge of the hill territory in the vicinity of the Angamis; who very often send his emissaries to the Naga villages. (vide, F.P.P. 1846, Nov. 17, No. 156).
was assisted by the Khonoma Nagas. In April 1849, Bhogchand left for Mozoma with a small escort to establish the post sanctioned by the Government. Both parties assisted him in the construction of the stockade, which was a necessary preliminary to the proposed advance post. Such willing assistance of the Nagas was prompted by their desire to obtain guards to prosecute their warfare against one another. While at Mozoma, Bhogchand took the opportunity to enquire into the disputes of both the parties. He arrested the ring-leaders of Nilholey's party and the Kaoharis who came to help Jubellee's party. By arresting men belonging to both parties he showed impartiality. But the Nagas could not tolerate the arrests of their men and both parties combined against him. Seeing the situation serious, Bhogchand, leaving the question of the post to another time started for his station with the prisoners. The Nagas surprised him at Piphima where he was encamping for the night. Although Bhogchand's men fought gallantly, their ammunition soon exhausted. By the morning, the Daroga with most of his men fell dead fighting desperately, and at this his escort the Police Militia took to flight. 17

Whatever little authority the post of Samagutine had preserved came to an end with the death of the Sajwal. The Nagas were so much encouraged by this success that they

17. Shakespear, W., History of the Assam Rifles, 1926, p.29.
attacked the post of Samaguting itself causing the death of
two sepoy who were on duty. On receipt of the news of the
disaster and the pitiable plight of the police Militia,
Butler came to the conclusion that no good purpose would be
served by the establishment of a post at Mozama. Better
results, he felt, could be expected by placing a European
Officer with a detachment from the local Infantry. The Agent,
however, was in favour of garrisoning the hills by a large
number of troops. But he was not prepared to recommend it in
view of the expensive nature of such a project. On the other
hand, he felt that something was imperative on the part of
the Government to arrest Nilholey and his supporters. The
murder of a British officer on duty should not go unpunished.
In this connection Jenkins drew the attention of the Govern-
ment to the necessity of employing extreme measures as were
followed by the Manipuris in suppressing the tribes on its
border. 18

VINCENT'S EXPEDITION AGAINST THE ANGAMIS:

On the strong recommendation of the Agent, the
Government of India decided to depute Lieutenant Vincent,
the Junior Assistant of Nowgong with a strong party of troops
to avenge the murder of the Sajwal. Accordingly, with a force
of 150 men of the Second Assam Light Infantry and a detachment

of the Cachar Levy, he entered the hills in the winter of 1849-50 to apprehend Nilholey and those who were actually concerned in the murder. The party reached Mozoma in the last part of December, but on the approach of the troops Nilholey with his clan retired into the strong fastnesses in the hills. Vincent wanted to utilise this opportunity to establish the post, which was left unfinished by Bhosechand. Leaving Lieutenant Campbell, second in command of the Second Light Infantry to complete the stockade and the post at Mozoma, he proceeded towards Manipur to meet Captain Mc Culloch, the Political Agent of that State to discuss with him for concerting measures. In the mean while, Nilholey was found constructing a strong fort near Mozoma. Campbell after making a desperate attempt to capture it proceeded towards Jopsheema, but in his absence the hostile Nagas had burnt down the friendly village of Mozoma, and destroyed the stores, the loss of which compelled Campbell to retire with the friendly Nagas to Dimapur. Vincent also arrived there on the same day under the escort of a party of Manipuri troops from Berama to Dimapur.

The withdrawal of the troops from the hills was followed by several outrages perpetrated in quick succession by Nilholey and his supporters. In December 1849, two traders had been murdered near Mohong Dijua and in the next month

23 Likirs were killed at Deelao and 18 Kacharis met the same fate in a subsequent attack on a village at the former place. The season being unfavourable for the movement of troops no action could be taken to punish these aggressions. But the Kachari subjects of Tularam were provided with firearms as a measure of defence. At the same time to punish the Nagas not only their trade with the plains was stopped, but their source of salt supply was cut off.

Meanwhile, being aided by stronger and fiercer tribes to the east and south of them, the Angamis threatened to devastate the whole frontier. The Agent who desired large-scale offensive against them, advised Vincent to return to the hills as soon as possible. Though imperfectly recovered from a recent sickness, Lieutenant Vincent returned to the hills in March 1850, and recaptured the advanced post of Mozoma. He remained there for six months to cut off Milholay from having access to his village or fields. A guard was also placed for the same purpose at Khonoma. However, the occupation of the post and the burning of Khonoma and Jongsheema had failed to bring the submission of the enemy. Even the maintenance of the post of Mozoma against imminent enemy attack appeared to be menacing. He could not bank upon the loyalty of the Nagas who had been reinstated in the village of Mozoma. Indeed, the situation appeared to be extremely

hopeless. Before leaving Nowgong, Vincent thought that with a force of 30 men he would not only be able to recapture Mozuma, but maintain it. Now he realised that even his post of 100 men was not enough. On the other hand the Nagas became bolder, having been able to obtain a large quantity of firearms with sufficient ammunitions from outside and Manipur was openly helping them against the British. In this predicament Vincent asked for a force of not less than four to five hundred bayonets with mountain guns and mortar. He drew the pointed attention of the Government of India to the clandestine relations of Manipur with the hostile Nagas and suggested that the help of the latter Government should be sought in crushing the "hydra-headed rebellion". 21

**LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS PLANNED:**

Under the circumstance, Jenkins proposed to the Government the desirability of sending five companies supported by a detail of artillery under Major Foquett, accompanied by Captain Butler on civil duty. Pending the receipt of the orders of the Government of India, the Agent directed Captain Hannay, the Commandant of the Assam Light Infantry and Major Foquett to wait in readiness with their forces at Golaghat to leave for the hills at the shortest notice. Hardly there was any alternative before the Government 21. Butler, J.; Travels and Adventures, p. 194.
than to allow the immediate advance of the troops as Vincent was in imminent danger. While considering the question of sanctioning large scale operations against the Nagas, the President in-Council took a serious view of the deteriorating situation in the hills and blamed the Agent for not keeping himself accurately informed of the day to day proceedings of Vincent of his campaign against the Nagas. He was charged for giving a distorted picture of the state of affairs in the hills. In fact, in his correspondecnes with the Government, he had given impression that Vincent had gained such an influence over the Nagas after the reoccupation of Mozoma that their speedy submission could be easily brought about by "no large a force than was usually deputed to the hills". But Vincent himself informed the Government a few weeks later that he could depend upon none of the Nagas except some fifty or sixty warriors of Jubeela's clan and that about five or six thousand warriors were likely to array themselves against the British. The President in-Council was surprised and expressed his strong displeasure. He thought that such a situation could not develop all on a sudden. He, therefore, asked Jenkins to adduce the ground for submitting a report which was not supported by facts. He frankly confessed that the whole affair in regard to the Angami Nagas had been grievously mismanaged and the Agent

was greatly to be blamed for it. The Governor-General in-Council took even a more stronger view of the inefficient manner in which Jenkins had fulfilled the duties of his position than that expressed by the President in-Council. He was not even disposed to place that amount of confidence reposed by the President in-Council on Jenkins' ability to effectively deal with the Naga affairs. Major Jenkins in his explanation could not but express his disappointment and stated that he had anticipated a different result after the re-occupation of Kozoma by Vincent. He further expressed that Lieutenant Vincent, neither then, nor when he wrote his despatch of August 26, 1850 was aware of the extent of intrigue that was carried on amongst the hostile tribes by Manipuri subjects. The interference of Manipur, Jenkins added, was the real cause of the change of the British position in the hills. About the growing influence of Manipur in the Naga Hills, he observed:

Without Munnipoori aid the Nagas never could have constructed the strong works thrown up on the heights above Khonomai for none similar have been met within any part of the Naga hills and without this aid and without the muskets and ammunitions procured from Munnipore and the hopes of further assistance in detachment of troops from that country, the Nagas would never have made the stand they did and were incapable in the largest numbers of meeting our small detachment of troops and must have made a ready submission.

24. F.P.P. 1851, June 13, No. 110.
The Government of India viewed the present position with the Nagas to be extremely disquieting. Whatever might have been the cause of Lieutenant Vincent being in the present position in the hills, there was no choice before the Government, but to act with vigour for his relief. Lord Dalhousie declared "Lieutenant Vincent must be supported and the influence of our power which seems to have been so grievously weakened of late, must be restored by active military measures". Accordingly, the Agent to the Governor-General was directed to immediately order the advance of the troops assembled at Golaghat to effect the relief of Vincent and destroy the fort on the height above Khonoma. He was further desired by the Government to proceed in person to the Naga frontier to "exercise an efficient supervision and control over the future proceedings of our officers in the Angami hills". Likewise Captain McCulluch, the Political Agent in Manipur was instructed to take such steps either directly aiding the measures of the Agent to the Governor-General or in preventing any of the subjects of the Manipur Government from enlisting themselves on the side of the Nagas.

While sanctioning large-scale operations against the Angami Nagas, the Government had realised that "its
interference in the internal feuds of the Nagas was the
original mistake and the present hostility against the powerful
Angami Nagas was the outcome of such interference by the
Police". Dalhousie emphatically pronounced:

"I can have no hesitation in declaring my opinion
that our past proceedings of late years with the
Nagas have not been for our advantage. I deprecate
the continuance of any such relations with the
barbarous tribes as tend directly to the mischievous
occurrences of "little wars" and I hold that
on this as on all other frontiers where wild and
plundering clans are seated our true policy is
to stand strictly on the defensive, to protect as
fully as we can our own border and its inhabi­tants, but not to interfere beyond it from any
motive however laudable.

FALL OF KHONOMA:

Accordingly, a strong force of 500 troops of both
the First and Second Assam Light Infantry, 200 men of the
Cachar Levy and Jorhat Militia, all under the command of
Major Foquett, with Captain Reed of the Artillery, and
Lieutenant Bivar of the Light Infantry with two three pounder
guns proceeded to Mozoma in December 1850. Jenkins reached
Dimapur on December 18 and remained there till the end of
the month. Captain Butler was already there in charge of
the civil duties. On the morning of December 10, a force of
354 men with the mountain guns and mortars left Mozoma to
capture the fort of Khonoma. After a fierce fighting and a

The siege of sixteen hours' duration, Khonoma, one of the strongest forts ever seen in Assam was captured. The hostiles desperately fighting retired to the intricacies of the hills. The friendly Nagas occupied their own village and the enemy Nagas were hunted out from the neighbouring village. Several other villages guilty of raids were also punished in quick succession. The most important fighting in the series was that of Kekrima. The village of Kekrima was also an offending one. Its punishment was considered essential because the Nagas of that village wanted to have a trial of its strength with the Government. In fact, the village had sent two of its representatives to Vincent to come and prove who had the greater power in these hills - they or the British? When they were shown the muskets and guns, they ridiculed the officers declaring that they did not care for these chunggas. Handing over a spear and a dao to Vincent, they remarked, "your Sipahis are flesh and blood as well as we, and we will fight with spear and shield, and see who are the best men; here is a specimen of our weapons". The challenge was accepted by Vincent and after a very severe fighting the village was humbled, the houses were burnt and a large quantity of grain was destroyed. The fighting of Kekrima was one on which the Nagas came out into the open to fight the British forces, departing from their usual practice.

27. F.P.P. 1851, March 21, No.245.
   Butler, J.; Travels and Adventures in Assam, pp.208-12.
of "surprise and ambush". Due to the organised offensive launched by the Nagas the use of mountain guns and mortars was necessary. The loss of men to the Nagas numbered only between 250 to 300. The burning of the village was considered by the Government of India unnecessary and an wanton piece of severity.

FUTURE POLICY OUTLINED:

After the destruction of Khonoma various suggestions were made by different officers in regard to the future policy to be followed in relation to the Angami Nagas. Foquett as a military man wanted the troops to take full possession of the hills and recommended the strengthening of the Police Militia to this effect. Vincent suggested permanent annexation of the Angami hills as a district under an European officer and to retain a force of one hundred sepoys at Kozoma for another year. Butler recommended an entirely different course. He believed that to permanently occupy the hills, a force of 500 men would be necessary; but to maintain it with provisions and necessary supplies would be difficult and expensive. Jenkins concurred in the opinion of Butler on the desirability of withdrawing from the hills, but he was aware of certain dangers in immediately doing so. Such a quick withdrawal, he thought, would make the position

of Mozoma insecure; its destruction might weaken the British footing in the hills. Moreover, it would encourage large-scale outrages all along the frontier. He, therefore, supported Vincent's proposition to retain the post of Mozoma for one year longer. By such a measure, Jenkins maintained, the Angamis who were very intelligent and bold and keen for traffic with the plains could be converted from mere plunderers to an industrious people under the guidance of an European officer placed in their midst. 30

The object of the Government of India being not to acquire any fresh territory, but to establish control over the Nagas, the President in-Council accepted Butler's proposal. Accordingly orders were issued to the Agent to withdraw the troops from Dimapur, and to see that beyond it no military force was retained. 31 The friendly clan of Mozoma was given the option of remaining at Mozoma in their village relying on their own strength or to take refuge in the British territory. These orders received the approval of the President in-Council and authority was given to the stationing of an European Officer in-charge of the post at Dimapur with the permission to remove himself to Golaghat during the rainy season. On the future policy to be followed towards the Angami Nagas, Lord Dalhousie wrote in his minute of February 20, 1851:

Hereafter we should confine ourselves to our own ground; protect it as we can and must be protected; not meddle in the feuds of fights of these savages; encourage trade with them as long as they are peaceful towards us; and rigidly exclude them from all communication, either to sell what they have got or to buy what they want, if they should become turbulent or troublesome.

These are the measures which are calculated to allay their natural fears of our aggression upon them, and to repel their aggressions on our people. These will make them feel our power both to repel their attacks, and to exclude them from advantages they desire, far better, at less cost and with more justice than by annexing their country openly by a declaration, or virtually by a partial occupation.