Philosophical schools in Ancient India sprang up out of an urge for enquiry into the real state of things and beings (tattvajñānā). These schools are busy not only in deducing conclusions but also in determining the methods of arriving at them. Because of such an approach, the Indian Epistemology comes to involve four basic factors. They are as follows:

(1) The pramātā - the knower, the cogniser of valid knowledge

(2) The prameya - the knowable, the object to be known, the object of valid knowledge.

(3) The pramāṇa - the chief instrument or means of knowing or the source of valid knowledge.

(4) The pramā or pramiti - the valid knowledge of the object.¹

¹ pramanam pramata prameyam pramiti caturvargenaiva vyavaharah parisamapyate. NVTT on NS. 1.1.4.
In the matter of recognising different pramāṇas, the various schools of Indian Philosophy may be conveniently referred to as follows:

The Cārvākas or materialists recognise only Perception (Pratyakṣa), the Vaiśeṣikas and the Baudhāyas accept inference (Anumāna) to that (Pratyakṣa), the Sāṁkhya philosophers admit verbal testimony (Śabda) along with earlier two, some of the Naiyāyikas add comparison (Upamāṇa) to the earlier three viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony, the Prabhākara Mīmāṁsakas admit all these four pramāṇas by adding postulation (Arthāpatti) to them, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins recognise six pramāṇas as they add non-apprehension (Anupalabdhi) to the above. The Paurāṇikas add two more pramāṇas to the earlier list namely, conclusion (Sambhava) and Tradition (Aitihya).

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2. pratyakṣamekāṁ cārvākāḥ kaṇāda sugatau punah / anumāṇaṇca taccātha sāṁkhyāḥ śabdaṇca teṣ api// nyāyaikadesino'py anupalabdhiḥ prabhākarāḥ / arthāpattyaḥ sahītāni catvāryāhun prabhākarāḥ // abhāvagaśṭhaṁyetāni bhāṭṭa vedāntinastathā / sambhavaitihyayuktāni aṣṭau paurāṇikā jaguriti //

TR of Varadārāja as quoted in the NSM, p.260
The meaning of the different pramāṇas in short is as follows:

(1) Perception (Pratyakṣa) - knowledge arises by direct contact of sense-organs with the objects, e.g. - I see a dog.

(2) Inference (Anumāṇa) - knowledge depends on previous experiences, e.g. where is smoke, there is fire.

(3) Verbal Testimony (Śabda) - knowledge depends on reliable authority, and also depends on ākāṅkṣā, Yogyatā and āsatti of a sentence or different sounds arising from musical instruments, bamboos etc. etc.

(4) Comparison (Upamāṇa) - knowledge arises from the presence of some common factors in a thing which was experience previously in another thing, e.g., one who has seen an individual cow in one’s own homeyard comes to have the visual perception of an individual ‘gavaya’. He understands that this individual creature is like a cow. Thereafter, he comes to conclude that his cow is like this creature.

(5) Postulation (Arthāpatti) - Assumption of some unperceived fact in order to reconcile some inconsistency in the perceived facts e.g., Devadatta is alive and the is not in his house, therefore, the conclusion is that he must be outside the house.
(6) Non-apprehension (Anupalabdhi) - Knowledge by which we immediately cognise the non-existence of an object, e.g., absence of rainfall indicates that the connection of cloud and the wind is not happened.

(7) Conclusion (Samhava) - If somebody has thousand coins then it is concluded that definitely he possesses hundred coins.

(8) Tradition (Aitihya) - Knowledge derived from tradition e.g., once upon a time there lived a Yakṣa on this tree.

According to the Sāṃkhyaits, the sources of valid knowledge are three in number. They are, in order, perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony. All other pramanās or 'means of cognition' are included in these three. It is through the 'means of cognition' that the objects of cognition are properly cognised. The 'means of right cognition' are only three in number; not more than three or less.

The Sāṃkhya rejects all other pramanās as supported by different schools of Indian system because all the seven pramanās beginning from Upamāna to Abhāva or Aitihya

3. trividham pramāṇam/ tatsiddhau sarvasiddheḥ
   nādhikyasiddhiḥ/ Sā.S. 1.88;
   trividham pramanamistam, prameyasiddhiḥ pramanādhi,
   na nyūnam nāpyadhikamityarthah.
   SK, K, 4.

STK under Ibid
can be proved by either perception or Inference or by Valitī Testimony. The recognition of three pramāṇas (as that of Sāmkhya) is supported by Manu also. Yoga, the complement of Sāmkhya also advocates the three pramāṇas. The Devīdhārgavata is also unanimous in this respect. The commentators have tried to show that all the seven pramāṇas apart from the three recognised by the kārikā fall under the latter.

(1) Upamāna - Vācaspati splits it up into Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony. Māthara regards it to be Inference. The Jayamāṅgalā includes it under Inference and Verbal Testimony. Gauḍapāda includes it under Verbal Testimony and Candrikā under Inference.

(2) Arthāpatī - All the commentators include it under Inference.

(3) Abhāva - Vācaspati and Jayamāṅgalā regard it as Perception. Māthara includes it under Inference. Although

4. pratyakṣamanumānaṁ ca śastrāṁ ca vividhāgamam /
   trayāṁ suviditaṁ kāryam dharmasūddhimabhīpsatā //
   Manu XII. 105

5. tatra pratyakṣanumānagamaḥ pramāṇaṁ. YS. 1.7

6. tīṇya va hi pramāṇaṁ paṭhitāṁ supaṇḍitaṁ /
   pratyakṣam cānumānaṁ ca śabdāncaiva tṛtiyakam //
   DV. 1.8.23.
Gaudapāda's remark suggests its inclusion under testimony, yet another remark of his, would lead us to infer that he will have it under Inference. Candrika regards it as a help-mate of Perception and, therefore, no independent pramāṇa.

(4) Sambhava - Vācaspati, Jayamangalā and Maṭhara include it under Inference, Gaudapāda and Candrika include it under Verbal Testimony.

(5) Aitihya - Vācaspati opines that if it is pronounced by a reliable person, then it is Verbal Testimony, otherwise it is no pramāṇa; Gaudapāda and Candrika also include it under Verbal Testimony; Maṭhara includes it under Inference.

DRŚTAM

To establish a right knowledge, there is the requirement of some source of right knowledge or means of

7. sambhavābhāvapratiḥetiḥyopamāścāptavacana
   Gaudapāda's remark on SK, STK;
   Notes p.6.

8. suśkadhānyadāvāsanād vrṣṭerabhāvo gamyate
   Ibid, STK, Notes p.6.
cognition. In this point almost all the thinkers of Indian systems are unanimous. But regarding the number of pramāṇas they are different. The sources of Valid knowledge go by the name of 'pramāṇa' in Indian system. It is through the means of cognition that the objects of cognition are properly cognised. The term 'pramāṇa' or 'means of cognition' only states the thing to be defined; and the explanation of the term would constitute the definition of pramāṇa; this explanation being that the 'Means of cognition' is that through which things are cognised. Thus the aid Means comes to be recognised as the Instrument of Right Cognition. This represents a mental condition free from the contact of all that is either doubtful or wrong or unknown; what is brought about by this instrument is Right Cognition or Valid Knowledge in the form of an apprehension by the human agent and that which leads to such right notion is the 'Means of cognition'. Thus the 'Means of cognition'

9. mānādhīna meyasiddhiḥ. SDS, p. 235;
   lakṣaṇapramāṇābhyaṁ hi vastusiddhiḥ. RB, p. 2.

10. prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāddhi
    SK, K, 4.

11. pramāṇityate aneneti nirvacanat pramāṁ
    prati karaṇatvam avagamyate, STK, p.16.
becomes differentiated from all the leads to wrong notion, viz., doubt, misconception, remembrance and the like, which (on the account) are not "Means of Right Cognition". The Means of Right cognition are only three in number: not more than three or less than three according to Sāmkhya. The author rejects all other pramāṇas as supported by different schools of Indian system because all other pramāṇas can be included in Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony. The recognition of three pramanas (as that of Sāmkhya) is supported by Manu, Yoga and Devī-Bhāgavata also.

Regarding the number of pramāṇas as supported by different Indian schools beginning with "pratyakṣamekām cārvākāḥ..." will be thoroughly discussed in the seventh chapter. But it is interesting that all the different schools of Indian philosophy - both Āstika and Nāstika are unanimous about Perception or Pratyakṣa pramāṇa as the first and foremost of all the pramāṇas. Perception as the primary source of valid knowledge is universally recognised. Most probable reason is that Perception is independent or direct cognition of reality because, in it we face the reality whereas all other pramāṇas more or less

12. sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt, tribidhām pramāṇamīṣṭam
   na nyūnām nāpyadhikamityarthāh Sk, K, 4.
   Also STK under Sk 4.
13. pratyakṣasya pramāṇeṣu jyeṣṭhatvādīti, Vā, p. 41.
depend on Perception and give only an indirect knowledge. That is why Perception is placed first and without any hesitation or without any question we may say that Perception is the head of and superior to all 'means of cognition' or pramāṇas. The superiority of Perception over other means consists in that it gives a first hand and detailed information about reality.

Perception is defined as Direct Awareness. It is highly doubtful if the English term Perception is a suitable substitute for the Sanskrit Pratyakṣa. For, in Sanskrit, the term Pratyakṣa denotes not merely a type of cognition as a result but also the object and the special means (kārana) of the cognition.

Etymologically, however, the word Pratyakṣa means that which is present to our sense or the functioning of our senses towards suitable objects (akṣam akṣam pratīvaṁ- tate). Thus, from the etymological point of view, Pratyakṣa means either the object or the kārana.

But the resulting knowledge can also, in introspection, be distinguished from other types of knowledge, and this distinguishing mark so revealed in introspection, places it in a unique class. So that, even apart from any consideration of the object or the means Perception as a type of knowledge can be distinguished from other types.
Thus it is quite possible to define Perception as a unique class of knowledge, without reference to the object on this type of means. Gangesā, a neo-logician of the 13th century accordingly offers his own definition of Perception. He defines Perception as that cognition which does not require any other cognition as a means (Karana), i.e., that cognition which is not produced by the instrumentality of any other cognition.  

According to Sāmkhya, there are only three recognised modes of proof which can lead us to an understanding that the knowledge we have arrived at about a thing is true. They are: (1) direct cognition by the sense-organs (Perception); (2) Inference by logical reasoning and (3) Verbal Testimony (Āpta-vacana) - other methods of proof being included in these three. The establishment of the truth to be known about anything depends on the correctness of the mode of proving it.  

Pratyakṣa (Perception) is used as Drṣṭa in the Sāmkhya philosophy. The definition of Perception as given by the Sāmkhya is the direct cognition of an object through its contact with some sense-organ. Knowledge produced through sense-activity is

14. jñānakaraṇakaṁ jñānam,  

15. drṣṭamanumānamāptavacanāṁ ca, sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt / trividham pramāṇamīṣṭaṁ, prameyāsiddhiḥ pramanāddhi//  

16. pratīvīṣayādhivyavasāyo dṛṣṭaṁ.  

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14. jñānakaraṇakaṁ jñānam,  

15. drṣṭamanumānamāptavacanāṁ ca, sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt / trividham pramāṇamīṣṭaṁ, prameyāsiddhiḥ pramanāddhi//  

16. pratīvīṣayādhivyavasāyo dṛṣṭaṁ.
Perception. Vācaspati Miśra explains the characteristics of Perception. First, Perception must have some real object, external or internal whatever it may be. Earth, water and the like are external objects, while pleasure, pain etc. are internal objects. Gross objects are perceived by us. This may be called ordinary Perception (laukika). Subtle essence (tanmātra) are perceived only by the Yogins. This sort of Perception may be called extra-ordinary (alaukika). Secondly, a particular kind of Perception is brought about by the contact of a particular kind of object with a particular sense-organ. As for example, visual Perception is brought about by the intercourse of the visual sense-organ with colour. Thirdly, Perception involves the operation of buddhi. When the sense-organ is stimulated by its object, buddhi becomes modified into the form of the object. Due to the preponderance of Sattva in it, buddhi as modified into the form of the object reflects in it the consciousness of the self and brings about the perceptual knowledge of the object. Kapila defines Perception as the cognition of the mode of buddhi which assumes the form of an object. The Sāmkhya-Sūtra defines Perception as the achievement of exact knowledge, the relation which is established in a certain thing.

17. yatsambandhasiddham tadākārolleykhī vijñānam tat pratyakṣam

Sā. S, 1.89.
Iśvaraśrṣṇa defines perception as 'pratīvisayādhyāvasāya drṣṭam' (SK, K.5). The author of the Yuktī-dīpikā elucidates this and brings out the significance of all the terms in the definition. By 'viṣaya' the objects of cognition are meant. There are the gross and the subtle matters. The gross matters are the objects of our cognition while the subtle matters fall within the province of Perception of the Yogins (K.34). 'Pratīvisayādhyāvasāya' means that which comes in contact with particular objects, i.e., the sense organ in its intercourse with the object. By 'Pratīvisayam' a real object must be present and it thus differentiates Perception from illusion. 'Prati' denotes proximity, i.e., the sense-organ must be in contact with the object and this characteristic excludes Perception from inference. "Adhyāvasāya" is the function of intellect.\(^{18}\) The entire definition comes thus: the senses come in contact with their respective objects, the buddhi or intellect then operates in it. The idea is this; the senses are modified in the shape of their objects when they come in contact with them, the intertia or darkness of the buddhi is then removed and there is a flow of sattva. As a result of this a definite and determinate cognition of the object is thus produced. 'Adhyāvasāya' also means 'ascertainment' and by this doubtful cognitions are excluded. Now the question arises as to how 'happiness', 'misery'

\(^{18}\) adhyāvāsāyō buddhiḥ  SK, K. 23. 
and such other mental intuitions are to be cognised by the 'adhyavasāya'; for the said entities cannot be perceived through the channel of the sense-organs. The author of the *Yukti-Dīpīkā* avoids the difficulty with the help of Grammar. Finding no other means, he says that 'prativisayādhyavasāya' is an example of Ekaśeṣa compound and by expounding he gets the same expression twice - 'prativisayādhyavasāyaśa ca prativisayādhyavasāyaśa ca'; which again he explains in two different ways to serve his purpose. Of these, the first prativisaya - in his opinion speaks of the sense-organs in contact with the object and consequently the operation of the intellect in it. This has been already discussed above. Here the term 'prati' is directly connected with the sense organs. But by the second member of the compound he intends to mean the function of the intellect or 'buddhi' with respect to all entities - physical or psychical, nearer or further. This explanation has rendered its possibility to explain perception of the mental intuitions as well as the supersensible objects by the Yogins. Here the term 'prati' unlike the former is directly connected with 'adhyavasāya'.

Vārṣagāṇya's definition of Perception is thus rejected. According to him, 'Perception' is the functioning of the sense-organs. 19 The *Yukti-Dīpīkā* (p.42, lines 11-15) criticises

19. śrotrādi vrtti pratyaktam.- referred to in the YD, p. 41
   NV, I, 1. 41 PS, p. 64.
the said definition on the ground that it fails to cover the mental intuitions as well as the pre-science knowledge of the Yogins (pratibhājñāna), for these entities cannot be perceived simply by the functioning of the sense-organs.

Vācaspati opines that there are two kinds of perception — indeterminate (Nirvīkalpaka) and determinate (Savikalpaka). Of these, indeterminate perception is the immediate cognition of an object, pure and simple. It presents only a vague idea of the object as 'it is' and not 'like that' just as what belongs to the mind of an infant, the dumb and the like. It is purely presentative in character and does not involve any representative process. It is called ālocaṇā or a mere sensing of the object. Determinate perception, on the other hand, is the definite cognition of an object related with its properties and qualified by its generic and specific characteristics. It is both presentative and representative in character; for it involves the recollection of name, class and such other properties of the object as were experienced, in the past and these are revived in the mind by the law of similarity. So it is called vivecana or a judgement of the object. In determinate perception 'mind' plays an important role, for it assimilates and discriminates the image brought about by the senses; whereas in indeterminate perception 'mind' does not interfere at all, everything rests there with the sense-organs. Vācaspati assigns to mind the function of arranging the sense-data and ordering them.
into determinate Perception. Viśñānabhikṣu, on the other hand, thinks that the determinate character of things is directly perceived by the sense-organs. But it seems that Vācaspati is to be right in this point. It is curious to notice that Vindhyavāsin's definition of Perception speaks of indeterminate perception only and not the determinate one. According to the opinion of this celebrated exponent of Sāṁkhya, the sense-organs come in contact with their respective objects and are accordingly modified into the form of the objects as they are. This is Perception (Drṣṭsm). It is free from imagination (avikalpika) i.e., from all associations of name, class and such other categories. It thus presents an immediate and vague impression of the object to the mind. Buddhists also hold a similar view. According to them, 'Perception' is a non-erroneous cognition of the object free from imagination.

Sāṁkhya generally holds that the external organs receive an immediate impression of the object which they in their turn make over to the mind. The mind reflects upon the said impression brought about by the senses and gives it over to ahamkāra (egoistic principle), which again in its turn appropriates this and finally presents this self-appropriated impression to the intellect. The latter thereupon resolves

20. śrotādīvṛttiravikalpika. SS, p. 108
21. pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham nāmajātyādyasamyutam. NB, 1,4.
what is to be done and thus ascertains its duty towards the object known.

Vācaspati illustrates the process thus: just as the headman of a village hands over the revenue collected by himself to the collector of the district who again in his turn delivers it to the governor of the country who finally hands it over to the king. Similarly the external organs make over the immediate impression of the object received by themselves to the mind for reflection who in its turn makes it over to the egoistic principle for appropriation who again presents this self-appropriated impression to the intellect for final determination. Thus perception involves the operation of the external sense-organs, the mind, the egoistic principle and the intellect.

Of course, the external organs and classified into two groups; (1) the organs of knowledge and (2) the organs of action; the first category comprises of (a) the visual organ (eyes); (b) the auditory organ (ears); (c) the olfactory organ (nose); (d) the gustatory organ (tongue); and (e) the tactual organ (skin). While the second category comprises of (a) the vocal organ (speech); (b) the prehensive organ (hands); (c) the locomotive organ (feet); (d) the evacuative organ and (e) the generative organ.

The opinion of Vijñānabhinīkṣu, regarding the process of Perception is that, when any object comes in contact with
the sense-organ, buddhi becomes modified into the form of the object. Because of the predominance of Sattva in it, buddhi reflects the consciousness of the self in it and appears to be conscious. Next, buddhi which is modified into the form of the object, reflected back in the self. The object is thus presented to the self through the modification of buddhi corresponding to the form of the object.

ANUMĀNA

In the order of naming the pramāṇas in Indian Philosophy, Anumāna (Inference) comes next to Pratyakṣa Drṣṭa (Perception). Knowledge of Anumāna etc. are not possible without the aid Pratyakṣa or Drṣṭa.

Anumāna pramāṇa is recognised by the Baudhāyas, the Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, Samkhyaists, Māmānsakas and the Vedāntins: The Jainas also recognise Anumāna as a subdivision of Mediate knowledge i.e., Parokṣa jñāna.

Anumāna (Inference) literally means the knowledge (māna) which we get after (anu) other knowledge. From the knowledge of the sign (liṅga) we get a knowledge of the object possessing it. Therefore, Anumāna means the knowledge which is preceded by Perception (Drṣṭa). Anumāna as the means of knowing a thing beyond the range of the sense through its inseparable connection with another thing which lies within
the range of the senses. Thus, Inference or Anumāna is an indirect or mediate knowledge.

The Sāṁkhya conception of Anumāna is now, being described. 'Inference' according to the early school of Sāṁkhya is the establishment of a fact on the basis of a relation perceived previously.\(^2^2\) Just as perceiving the relation of mutual extermination in the case of the snake and the mongoose, it can be inferred that snakes are absent in a place where mongooses abound. In this connection, the said school of Sāṁkhya is found to speak of the seven sorts of relations, and the presence or absence of something is to be inferred on the basis of some one or other of these relations. Vācaspati quotes a verse wherein all these seven relations are enumerated.\(^2^3\)

Jayamangala also enumerates and illustrates all the seven relations in course of commenting on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's view of inference (K, 5) but with slightly differentiation.

Though the definition mentioned above is not severely criticised by the commentators of Indian Philosophy:

\(^2^2\) sambandhādekaṁcchēgaśasiddhiranumānam.
This seems to be the definition of Vārṣagāṇya - Referred to in the YD.

\(^2^3\) mātrā-nimittā-samyogī-virodhi - sahaçāribhiḥ /
svasvāmi - vadhyaghātādhyai sāṁkhyaṁ saptadhanuma //
(NVTT, 1.1.5).
but the previous knowledge of a 'relation' is absolutely necessary in the knowledge derived from Inference. The author of Yoga-Bhāṣya also supports it. According to him, 'Inference' is that fluctuation of the thought-stuff which is based upon the relation present in things belonging to the same class as the subject of Inference and absent from things belonging to classes different from the subject of Inference. For example, the moon and the stars get from one place to another like caitra, hence they possess motion, (negatively) the Vindhya mountain does not get from one place to another, hence it does not possess motion. Unlike Perception, it is mainly concerned with the generic knowledge of the object.

According to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Anumāna is the knowledge of the lingin from the linga or the sign. Or, more clearly, it is led up to by the knowledge of the Middle Term and the Major Term: - The Middle Term is that which is less extensive (Vyāpya) while the Major Term is that which is more extensive (Vyāpaka). Again, Middle Term is that whose natural concomitance with the Major Term has been duly recognised after all suspected and assumed adventitious.

24. anumeyasya tulyajātiyesvanuvṛttò bhinnajātiyebhyo
byābytto sambangho yastadviśayā sāmānyāvadhārana-pradhānā
vṛttīr-anumānam - YB, 1.7

25. tāllingalingipurvakam - SK, K.5.
accidents have been eliminated; and that with which the Middle Term is so concomitant is the 'more extensive' Major Term. The terms 'Middle Term' and 'Major Term' which are really denotative of the objects of knowledge stand for the knowledge or cognition of those objects. Thus, when we derive the knowledge of fire from the Perception of smoke, the smoke is the sign or liṅga or the Middle Term and fire is the liṅgin or signate or Major Term, since the sign exists in it. The very derivation of the term says that which has liṅga is liṅgi as who has body is an embodied being.

Kapila defines Anumāna as the knowledge of the Sādhya or the major term derived from the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between it and the Hetu or the Middle Term. Hetu is the mark by which we derive the knowledge of the unperceived term. The unperceived term is called the Sādhya and the term in which the mark is found to exist is called Pakṣa or the Minor Term. Thus the Perception of the Hetu or the mark in the Pakṣa or the Minor Term leads to the knowledge of Sādhya or the Minor Term. In the example cited above, the smoke is the Hetu or the Middle Term, the hill on which smoke is perceived is the Pakṣa or the Minor Term and the fire is the Sādhya or

\[26, \text{liṅgamasti iti liṅgin as dehamasti iti dehin.}\]
the Major Term. The definition of Anumāna, according to Sāṁkhya-Sūtra, is that knowledge of Vyāpaka (more extensive) after the knowledge of Vyāpya i.e. less extensive.  

Inference that has been just defined in its general form has three special forms, called - (1) 'pūrvavat', A Priori, (2) 'sesavat', A Posteriori and (3) 'sāmānyatodṛṣṭa' based on general observation.

But the ancient teachers used to classify 'Inference' primarily into two heads - (1) Viśa and (2) Aviṣa: that which functions through an affirmation is the Viṣa, affirmative; and that which functions through negation is the Aviṣa, Negative.

Inference is called Viṣa or affirmative when it is based on universal affirmative proposition. Viṣa is subdivided into pūrvavat (a priori) and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa (based on general observation). A pūrvavat inference is that which is based on the observed uniformity of concomitance between two things. The term 'pūrvavat' means well known, i.e., that 'universal' of which the 'specific individual' has been perceived. As for example, the existence of fire is inferred from smoke, because it is observed that smoke is always accompanied by fire, which has been previously perceived in the Kitchen. In the sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, the

27. pratibandhadṛṣṭaḥ pratibandhajñānam anumānam,
Sā. S. 1, 100.
Inference is not based on any observation of the concomitance between the middle and the major terms. The inference in it is based on the similarity of the middle term with such facts as are uniformly related to the major. For example: All actions require some instruments; the perception of colour etc. are so many acts; therefore, there must be some instruments or organs of perception. The existence of the senses, which cannot be perceived, is inferred by sāmānyatodṛśṭa.

Inference is called Avīta or negative when it is based on a universal negative proposition. The Avīta is based upon universal agreement in absence of the middle and the major terms. For example: what is non-different from other elements has no smell; the earth has smell; therefore, the earth is different from other elements. Avīta is also called 'śeṣavat' Inference. Śeṣa is that which remains, the residue; hence that inference is 'śeṣavat' which has this residue for its object. It consists in providing something to be true by eliminating the other possible alternatives. For example: sound must be a quality, since it is neither a substance, nor a quality, nor an action nor any relation or anything else.

Sāṁkhya commentators are not unanimous among themselves about the number of the members in a syllogistic reasoning. Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself is silent in this point. His commentator Māṭhara holds that an 'inference' is based
upon three members and it must be free from the thirty-three fallacies. The three members are (a) Pratijñā (thesis), (b) Hetu (reason) and (c) Udāharaṇa (exemplification). Of the thirty-three fallacies, nine belong to wrong thesis, fourteen to wrong reason and ten to wrong example. The three-membered logical reasoning is generally found to be adopted by the Buddhist teachers. The above mentioned thirty-three fallacies are also recognised by the Bauddhas. So, naturally the question arises, whether the Śāṅkhyas were influenced by the Buddhhas or not. The Chinese translation of the Madhyāntāntanasāra Śāstra, composed by Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga and translated into Chinese in A.D. 543, throws important light in the connection. From the evidence of this text we know that the three-membered logical reasoning was introduced by the Śāṅkhyas and Pāṣupatas before Vasubandhu, brother of Asaṅga (4th cent. A.D. or 5th cent. acc.to some). The Jaina writer Hemacandra also in his Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra-Vṛtti (II.1.8) states that in the opinion of Śāṅkhyas an inference consists of three members. It, therefore, clearly shows that there had been a prominent school of Śāṅkhyas which used to hold 'thesis', 'reason' and 'example' as the only members of syllogistic

28. evam trayastriṃśadalāḥbāsararhitām trayavayavamanumānam
reasoning. Though Isvarakṛṣṇa is silent about the number of the members of syllogistic reasoning yet it can be inferred easily from his Kārikās the five members of a syllogism. For example, Pratijñā - 'Purusosti' (K, 17); Hetu - saṁghāta parārthatvāt (K, 17); Udāharaṇa - nata vād Vyavatiśhate liṅgam (K, 42); Upanaya - Kṣīrasya yathā pravṛttirajñasya tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya (K, 17) and Nigamana - tasmāt trividham kāraṇām dvāri (K, 35).

On the other hand, the author of the Yuktī-Dīpikā supports neither of these two views. In this opinion, a purely syllogistic reasoning rests upon ten members. These are: (1) Jijnāsa (desire to know), (2) Saṁsaya (doubt), (3) Prayojana (purpose), (4) Saṁkṣaya (possibility of a solution), (5) Saṁsārayuddha (dispelling of the doubts); (6) Pratijñā (thesis), (7) Hetu (reason); (8) Drṣṭānta (exemplification), Upasāṁhāra (application) and (10) Nigamana (conclusion).

Though they may not have any logical necessity for proving a conclusion, yet they serve a very useful purpose in the discussion and exposition of a philosophical problem.

30. tasya punaravayavah - jijnāsa saṁsaya - prayojana - saṁkṣaya - prāpti - saṁsārayuddha - alakṣanāsca vyākhyāgam; pratijñā - hetu - drṣṭānta - pasāṁhāra - nigamanaṁ
parapratispadanāṅgamiti YD, p. 47.
Among the ten members of a syllogism, the first five are the parts of explanation while the remaining five are meant for convincing others. The first five points may be explained in the following way. For instance, (1) a student of philosophy approaches a Sāṃkhya-teacher and solicits him to explain the nature of Puruṣa. He wants to know whether the puruṣa as conceived by the Sāṃkhya exists or not (jñāsa),

(2) The teacher asked him that what was the reason of this doubt that the puruṣa might exist or not? (Doubt), the reply comes that the doubt is due to the fact that the existence of the self i.e. Puruṣa is not a matter of direct observation.

(3) The teacher may ask that what is the necessity of this enquiry. The reply may be like this as it is laid down in sāstras that the ultimate salvation rests upon the proper knowledge of manifest, unmanifest and puruṣa.31 So, for the attainment of salvation such necessity of enquiry arises.

(4) The teacher replies that this doubt to be solved i.e. there are ways of removing the doubt. (5) With the help of three means of valid knowledge i.e., Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony one can solve this problem. The settlement of this four steps thus satisfies the teacher that the enquiry is inspired by a real and honest difficulty. And it is now his duty to eliminate the doubt of the disciple, and this can be secured only by the five-fold syllogistic argument.

31. vyaktavyaktajñāvijñānāt. Sk, k, 2.
In the list of Pramāṇas, Upamāna (comparison) is followed by Inference i.e., the position of Upamāna is third. But it is to be noticed that Upamāna is not accepted as an independent Pramāṇa in the Sāmkhya system. The Baudhāyas and the Vaiśeṣikas also do not recognise Upamāna as a distinct source of knowledge. Vācaspāti splits it up into Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony. And according to Sāmkhya, perception, Inference, and Verbal Testimony are the only three sources of valid knowledge. This chapter deals with Verbal Testimony as one of the three sources of valid knowledge by the Sāmkhyas. The Cārvākas, the Baudhāyas and the Vaiśeṣikas have not recognised Verbal Testimony as a source of valid knowledge. According to the Cārvākas, Perception is the only means of cognition whereas to Baudhāyas and to Vaiśeṣikas, Perception and Inference are the two sources of valid knowledge. Verbal Testimony, as a source of valid knowledge is accepted by the Jainas, Sāmkhyāīts, Vedāntins, Mīmāṁsakas as well as by the Naiyāyikas. Verbal Testimony is designated in various ways by the different schools of Indian system. Thus it is 'Śabda' according to the Naiyāyikas, 'Śāstra' to the Mīmāṁsakas, 'Āptavacana' to the Sāmkhyāīts, 'Nigama' to the Bhāgavata and Āgama to Vedānta, Yoga, and

32. pratyakṣenānumāṇena nigamena nigamena nigamamāvīdā /
ādyantavadasa jñātva niḥsamgo vicarediha //Bhāg,II.28.9.
to Jainas also. Verbal Testimony is an important source of knowledge. A Major portion of a person’s stock of knowledge about the world is acquired from the oral or written testimony of other persons. The importance of testimony becomes obvious when we imagine a person deprived of all connection with other persons and books in which case he would simply be reduced to the level of a brute. Comparatively, we learn more by reading books than what we know from Perception or Inference. So, the importance of Verbal Testimony as a source of knowledge is great indeed. Except the Cārvāka, the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas, all Indian Philosophers have recognised Verbal Testimony as an independent source of knowledge. The Cārvāka rejects Testimony in general, because, according to him, it does not give rise to valid knowledge and scriptural testimony in particular, because Vedic knowledge in his opinion is ‘all fraud, a device of the cunning priests to earn their livelihood by creating the ignorant persons.’ The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas recognise testimony but not as an independent means of knowledge. They reduce testimony to Inference.

Testimony may be verbal or Non-verbal. Non-verbal testimony consists of gestures. But it is not important

33. trayo vedasya kartārah bhaṅga - dhūrtah - niśācarah.  

because it lacks in precision. Valid Testimony consists of verbal statements of people intended to express certain facts.

Verbal Testimony (Āptavacana) is also reckoned by Sāṃkhya as a separate source of knowledge. Sabda is authoritative statement and it gives the knowledge of objects which cannot be known by Perception and Inference. Sabda (verbal testimony) is named as Āptavacana. Valid testimony includes all valid revelations - such as the Vedas and the Brāhmanas, the religious codes of Manu etc., and the utterings of a person who is free from any defect. According to Vācaspati, Āptata (reliability) is in a sentence, not in a puruṣa. But it is quite opposite in Yogābhāṣya i.e., according to them 'Āptata' is in a puruṣa. A puruṣa is called 'Āpta' when he is free from error, negligence, disability of the sense-organs or desireness to deceive others. The utterance or advice of such a person is called Sabdapramāṇa.

In the Yukti-Dīpikā, both these two opinions are accepted. Āpta means Śruti and Śruti of Āpta - both are

34. āptena dṛṣṭo'numito vārtha paratra svavodhasāmkrāntaye śabdenopadisyate. śabdāttadarthavisayā vṛttih śroturāgamaḥ. yasyāśraddheyārtho vaktā na dṛṣṭānumitaṁ thah, sa agamaḥ plavate mūlavaktāri tu dṛṣṭānumitaṁ the nirviplavaḥ syāt. YB, 1.7.
sabdapramāṇa. In the first case the impersonal Vedas are sabdapramāṇa and in the second case the utterance of Manu etc. Vedāṅga, Śruti etc., are all sabdapramāṇa.  

In Matharabhāṣya, those who have known the characteristics of Dharma - the advice of such preceptors Brahmā, etc. as well as the Vedas - both the Āptavacana.

A statement is a sentence composed of words arranged in a certain way. A word is a sign which denotes something (Vācaka), and its meaning is the thing denoted by it (Vācyā). To understand a sentence, the knowledge of the meaning of the words which compose it is essential.

35. sravanam śrutih āptā cāsau śrutih āptasrutiḥ athava āpteśa yāstityāptah, akāro matvarthīyaḥ āptabhyaḥ śrutirāptasrutiḥ āptasrutiścāptasrutiścāptasrutiḥ sarūpā-nā-mityekasēgaḥ tatra pūrvenāpta. śrutigrahaṇenedam pratipādayati - apuruṣabuddhipūrvaka āmnāyaḥ, sa puruṣa-nihśreyasaṁartham pravartamāṇo niḥśamāyaṁ pramāṇamiti. dvitiyena manvādinvandhananāṁ ca śrutiṁāṁ vedāṅgatarkeśaśāravā muhyate sāmāyaṁ mahākāmapābhijuktānāṁ cādusṭaśamanasāṁ yād vacastatpramāṇamītyetat siddham bhavati.

YD. p. 46.

36. āptā Brahmādaya ācāryaḥ śrutirvedastadetadubhayamāptavacanaṁ, āptiḥ sākṣādārthaprāptiyathārthopalambhah, taya vartate ityāptah sākṣātkṛtadharmaḥ yathārthāptya śrutārthagrāhī taduktamāptavacanam.

MV, SK, K. 5.
The knowledge of the meanings of the words can be had in eight different ways.37 (a) Knowledge of verbs, indeclinables, suffixes, compounds, etc. can have from Grammar i.e., vyākaraṇa. Thus the sakti (meaning) of the root 'bhū' is 'to exist'. The meaning of the root 'gam' is 'to go'. The indeclinable 'ca' is used in the sense of 'and'. The suffixes 'su', 'au', 'jas', etc. are used to denote a word in their respective ways;(b) Knowledge of similarity can have through comparison i.e., Upamāna. Thus 'a gavaya is similar to that of a cow'.(c) Knowledge of synonymous terms etc. can be gathered by consulting a dictionary i.e., a kosa. Thus, viṣṇu, nārāyaṇa, krṣṇa, Rādhākānta etc. are all the different names of the Lord Viṣṇu. (d) The example of knowledge derived from āpta-vākyya is when a reliable person utters that 'pika' means cuckoo the listener gathers the knowledge of cuckoo from the word 'pika'. (e) The example of the knowledge of Vākyasēya is that it is laid down in the sāstra - 'yavamayaḥ caruḥ bhavati'. Now, what is the meaning of the word 'yava'. Different people gives different definitions. Naturally, doubt arises among the common people as to the clear conception of the word yava. To remove the doubt one has to depend on sāstra then. It is

37. saktigraham vyākaraṇopamānakosāptavākyāt vyavahāraśca/ vākyasya seṣat vivṛtvedanti sānvidhyataḥ siddhapada- syavrddhaḥ // Bhāp, p.71.
laid down in the sastra that when all the corns are decayed 'yava' remains fresh. (f) To express the meaning of a word by another word is Vivaraṇa. Thus 'pacati' means 'pakaṁ karoti' (one cooks). (g) Siddhapadaśānānidhya means the knowledge of a word which is very near to a famous word, i.e., a siddhapada. Thus, for example, when somebody says, "iha sahakārataraṁ madhuraṁ rauti pikāḥ". Sahakāra means 'a mango tree', so, by the word 'pika', is to be understood as 'cuckoo' because there is natural likeness to cuckoo with that of a mango tree (h) Vṛddhvayavahāra means usage of an elderly people. Some knowledge which one can derive from the usage of superiors.

According to the Sāmkhyaits, 'Valid Assertion is right revelation'. 38 Valid Assertion is āptavacana and āptasruti means right revelation. In the definition the word 'tu' here implies that according to Sāmkhya also, Āptavacana is a mode of proof, is more reliable than the other two methods. when an experienced person pointing another experienced person, utters a few words (e.g. Bring the cow) - and the latter, thus being directed, does a certain manner (i.e., brings the cow), - the third person standing there having all these infers that the action of the directed person was due to his understanding the sense of the words uttered by the directing person, - and from this he comes to recognise

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38. āptasrūtir āptavacanāṁ tu — SK, K, 5; āptopadesāṁ śādāṁ — Sā.Ś.J.I. 101.
the connection between the words used and the action accomplished; moreover, a particular word is found to express its meaning i.e., a particular meaning only when there is recognition of the connection between that word and its meaning - from these two facts it follows that verbal cognition is led up to by inference and that is why, after having discussed Inference, the definition of Valid Assertion is given by the author.

The Valid knowledge is self-sufficient in its authority, i.e., it is always right, inasmuch as it is brought about by the words of the Veda which is independent as it is not human-creation which is liable to error, doubt, defects etc. And it is for the same reason also that the knowledge derived from the Itihasa and the Smriti, which are based on the Veda, is regarded as right i.e., Āpta.

According to sage Kapila, the propounder of the Sāmkhya Darśana, it is possible that he remembered the revealed texts that he had studied during previous time cycles just as things known on the previous day are remembered on the next day, after waking from sleep. That such remembrance is possible is indicated by the conversation between Āvatya and Jaigīśavya, where the revealed

39. The conversation between Āvatya and Jaigīśavya, referred to by Vācaspati, occurs in Vyāsabhaṣya on YS, 3.18.
Jaigīśavāya speaks of his remembering things that occurred in past lives, extending over ten time-cycles in the next "while I was evolving during ten Time-cycles etc. etc."

The presentation of the word 'āpta' i.e., 'Right' in the term 'Right Revelation' (āptavacana) is used only to exclude all false revelations, such as the scriptures of the 'Sākya-Bhikṣu' (Buddhist), the 'Nirgranthaka' (Jaina), the 'Samsāramocaka' (Materialist who regards killing an animal is a virtuous deed because on the other hand, it frees it from the pains of existence) and others. That these scriptures are not right is to be inferred from (a) internal contradictions, (b) being devoid of any sound basis, (c) containing assertions unsupported by proofs and (d) being accepted by only a few low and beast-like persons such as Mlecchas and others.

'Valid Assertion' is totally different from 'Inference' or 'Anumāna'. Inference depends on previous connection. But in 'Valid Assertion' when the sentence expresses its meaning it does not stand in need of a previous connection between itself and the meaning as for example, it is found that in the case of the work of a new poet, the sentence is one never heard before and it, therefore, expresses a meaning which has never before been cognised as expressed by that sentence. In Anumāna, invariable concomitance between major term (fire) and middle term (Smoke) as well as previous experience is essential for the knowledge...
of 'where is smoke, there is fire'. But in 'Valid Assertion' or aptavacana such type of previous experience and invariable concomitance is not necessary. So, it has been proved that 'Valid Assertion' is totally a different source of valid knowledge of Pramāṇa.

Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony are the only three sources of Valid knowledge as supported by the Sāmkhāits. And all other Pramanās except the above-mentioned three may be included in the three pramanās supported by the Sāmkhya.

As already stated in the foregoing pages the schools of Indian Philosophy try to enquire the real nature of things and beings. This enquiry needs for basic factors. Of these factors Prameya (the object of valid knowledge or knowable) is also one. Without a prameya a pramāṇa has to do nothing. All the systems of Indian Philosophy deal with the pramāṇa and prameya. Like other systems of Indian thought, the Sāmkhya also deals with the prameyas or categories or evolutes.

In the Sāmkhya Kārikā, Īśvarakṛṣṇa gives a list of twenty five categories. They are Prakṛti, Mahat, Ahaṅkāra, Pañcatanmātra, Pañcamaḥabhūta, Pañca-Jñānendriya,
A Chart of the twenty-five Principles of Sāmkhya

(1) Puruṣa (consciousness) → (2) Prakṛti
(3) Mahat or Buddhi (universal intelligence)
(4) Ahañkāra or Abhimāna (ego)

5-9 five sensory organs (Ear, Skin, eye, tongue and nose)
10 Manas (mind)
11-15 five Motor organs (speech, subtle elements (sound, hands, feet, anus, touch, colour, taste and and genital)
16-20 five Tanmātras or organs (space (ether), wind (air), fire (light), water, earth)
21-25 five Mahabhūtas or gross elements from

water
earth
I
21-25 five Mahabhūtas or gross elements from
sound -> space (ether)
touch -> wind (air)
colour/form -> fire (light)
taste -> water
smell -> earth
To be brief, the objects treated of in the Sāṃkhya system are of four kinds - some are simply productive, some are merely products, some are both productive and products, and some, neither of the two. Vācaspati very clearly states all these in detail in his Sāṃkhya-Tattva-kaumudi. There he raises the question regarding what is this productive (Prakṛti)? His answer to this question is Prakṛti is that which produces and is also called Pradhāna. This Pradhāna and Prakṛti represents the three attributes of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas in the state of equilibrium. This is purely productive. Prakṛti is called Mūla Prakṛti. Why it is so called, is that it is the root of the universe which is an aggregate of products. There can be no root of this matter (Prakṛti).

The first product of the evolution is called Mahat. It is the germ of the vest world of objects. Including

40. mūlaprakṛtirvikṛtirmahadādyāḥ prakṛti-vikṛtayah sapta, / sodasokastu vikāro, na prakṛtirna vikṛtiḥ puruṣa //
   Sk. K. 3.
   samkṣepato hi śastrārthasya catasro vidhāḥ /
   kaścidarthaḥ prakṛtireva; kaścidartho vikṛtireva,
   kaścitaiprakṛtivikṛtiḥ, kaścidanubhayarupah/ STK, under Ibid.

41. sattva-rajastamasāṃ sāmyāvasthā hi prakṛtiḥ. STK under Ibid, K.12

42. mūlaṅcāsauprakṛtisceti mūlaprakṛtiḥ STK under Sk.K.3.
intellect, ego and mind it is cosmic in its nature. But it has a psychological aspect also being the evolute of prakṛti is material. Mahat is transformed into Ahamkāra or cosmic egoism. Ahamkāra is transformed into eleven sense organs, and the five Tanmātras or subtle essences of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. The five subtle essences are transformed into the five gross elements of ether, air, fire, water and earth. These are the twenty four principles of Sāmkhya system. Besides, there are individual source. In total, these are the twenty-five principles of according to Sāmkhya system. Evolution is the play of these twenty four principles which together with puruṣa who is a mere spectators and outside the play of evolution are the twenty-five categories or principles of the Sāmkhya system. Out of this twenty-five of principles, Puruṣa is neither a cause nor an effect. Prakṛti is already cause and not the effect. Mahat, Ahamkāra and the five subtle essences are both causes and effects. The five sensory and motor organs and the five gross elements and manas are effects only.

Vacaspāti Misra maintains that Ahamkāra in its Sāttvika aspects evolves into manas and five organ knowledge together with the five organs of action. Ahamkāra in its Tamasa aspects evolves into the five subtle essences. Again Ahamkāra in its Rajasa aspects plays its part in both. The
five subtle essences evolve into the five gross elements of earth, water, light, air and ether by a preponderance of Tamasa.

The products are sixteen in number - the five gross elements, eleven sense organs are mere products. Though the cow, the jar, the trees and the rest are products of the earth. And so are curd of milk and seed which latter are the products of the cow and the tree yet, this facts do not touch our position.

As stated by C.D. Sharma, the evolution is teleological. Everything works to serve the purpose of Puruṣa though unconsciously. Just as non-intelligent trees grow fruits, water, flows on account of the declivity of the soil or iron filings are attracted towards a magnet or milk flows through the udders of the cow in order to nourish the cow similarly everything unconsciously tends to serve the purpose of Puruṣa. Though puruṣa is inactive and indifferent and devoid of qualities, yet the virtuous and the generous

43. SPB, I.61; II, 18.
44. yadyapi prthivyādīnāṁ goghaḥ avṛkṣādayo vikāraḥ, evaṁ tad viṅkārabhedānāṁ payobi jādānāṁ dadhyaṅkuraṅdāyāḥ, bijādayo tathā’pi gavādayo ṛ vā na prthivyādibhyast attvāntaram / STK under SK, K.3.
Prakrti which is full of qualities and goodness ceaselessly works through various means in a spirit of detachment for the realisation of Puruṣa. In Śāmkhya Philosophy, the entire evolution of Prakṛti right from Mahat, the first evolute up to the last evolute is for the purpose of liberating each individual Puruṣa.

The evolutes of Prakṛti are manifold. Intellects, egoisms and minds are different in different individuals. The subtle essences and the gross elements also are manifold. The modifications of the gross elements also are manifold. The evolutes of Prakṛti subsist in their material cause. Though there is identity between cause and effect, there is the difference of substance and modification. The evolutes are related to their causes as modifications to their substances. Cosmic intellect subsists in its cause, Prakṛti. Cosmic egoism subsists in its cause, cosmic intellect. The internal organ (manas), the ten external sense-organs, and the five subtle essences subsist in their cause, cosmic egoism. The five gross elements subsist in their causes, the five subtle essences of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. The evolutes of Prakṛti are resolved into their constituent elements. The five gross elements are resolved into the five subtle essences. The five subtle essences and the eleven

45. ityeṣa prakṛtiṃ kṛto mahadādiveṣaḥ abhūtaparyantāḥ /
pratipuruṣavimokṣārtham svārthāḥ iva parārthāḥ ārambhāḥ //
SK, K. 56.
sense-organs are resolved into cosmic egoism. Cosmic egoism is resolved into cosmic intellect. Cosmic intellect is resolved into Prakṛti. The evolutes of Prakṛti are endued with sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, while Prakṛti is devoid of these qualities. Of they involve intermingling or conjunction of constituents which can exist apart from one another. For instance, the elements of earth, water and the like can come into conjunction with one another. The subtle essences can come into conjunction with one another. But Prakṛti cannot come into conjunction with cosmic intellect, cosmic egoism, and the like, since they are identical with each other in their essential nature. Likewise, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas cannot come into conjunction with one another, since they can never exist apart from one another. The evolutes of Prakṛti are dependent on other principles. Cosmic intellect depends upon Prakṛti; cosmic egoism depends upon cosmic intellect; the subtle essences and the sense-organs depend upon cosmic egoism, and the five gross elements depend upon the subtle essences to produce their respective effects. The unmanifest Prakṛti is uncause, eternal, ubiquitous, motionless, - though not inactive, - one, self-subsistent, irresolvable, partless or devoid of conjunction or qualities, and independent. It is opposed to the manifest evolutes of Prakṛti. These are the dissimilarities between Prakṛti and its effects.
This is in brief an account of the Prameyas of Sāṃkhya system. However, a detail account of the Prakṛti and Puruṣa will be discuss in the fifth chapter of the present dissertation.