Chapter - V

The Status of Appearance

The entire philosophy of Śaṅkara is expressed in a beautiful half verse, which runs as follows, "Brahma Satya Jaganmithyā jīvo Brahmaiva na paraḥ." i.e. "The Brahman is the only reality, and everything else-this world of manifestation is unreal, a mere appearance, the individual soul (jīva) is non-different from Brahman," the Absolute.

There are countless passages where Śaṅkara speaks of the world as unreal, that the only real is Brahman and that some scriptural passages quoted by Śaṅkara to strengthen his thesis are as follows- "All this has the Brahman for its self, which is true; it is the self, That thou art."\(^1\) "All this is self."\(^2\) "Brahman alone is all this."\(^3\) "There is in it no plurality."\(^4\) etc. Thus from all these, it is clear that Brahman is the only reality. As we have already seen, the scriptures define Brahman as "Existence, knowledge, Bliss."\(^5\) "Brahman is Existence, Knowledge and Infinity (Satyam Jñānam Anantarfi)\(^6\) "Brahman is Knowledge, Bliss."\(^7\) Again, the identity of the jīva and Brahman is clearly stated by the scriptures in texts like "Thou art That, O Svetaketu."\(^8\) "I am Brahman. (Aham Brahmasmī)"\(^9\) and "The self alone is to be meditated upon."\(^10\) etc.

Now, the fundamental problem of the Advaita vedānta is, if Brahman be the one, Absolute reality, then how can we explain the world appearance at all and what is the status of the world appearance? The various systems of Indian philosophy since the time of vedic religion have advanced various interpretations of the nature of the world appearances, and the reality behind
it. But most of the interpretations are theistic and dualistic in character. For them the world creation is closely related with the philosophical and theological discussions of the nature of God and His relation to the world. What goes to the credit of śaṅkara is that his interpretation provides for the reconciliation of dualistic theism with non-dualistic absolutism, by giving us a two-fold conception of the Absolute, both as devoid of attributes (Nirguṇa) and as endowed with attributes (Saguṇa). He does not however place these two conceptions on the same level of existence which may involve self contradiction. He regards one of them as higher and the other as lower. The Absolute in itself is of course devoid of all attributes and free from all distinctions, there is nothing in reality besides Brahman. This is the higher view of Brahman. But so long as we are in the mundane (embodied) existence, we can not deny the reality of this world, we can not rise to the true conception of reality. So we misconceive the Absolute as God who has created this beautiful world of which we are the beautiful creations. As long as we believe in the existence of this world appearances, we can not help believing some supreme being, who has created this world along with us in a perfect order, so let us discuss about the world creation first.

I) The Concept of World Creation :-

According to the Advaitins Brahman is the cause of the world. It is the Brahman, that creates, sustains and destroys the world. Different Upaniṣadadic statements are cited by the Advaita vedāntins in support of their views, eg. “He creates all”1, “That desired, may I be many, let me produced”12 etc. The second aphorism of the Brahma sutra viz. “Yamadasya yataḥ”13 summarises the whole situation and says that Brahman is the source of the origination, sustainance and destruction of the world.
As we have already seen, the Nirguna Brahman, by itself can not be the cause of the world. Brahman becomes the cause of the world only through the instrumentality of māyā or avidyā. That is why Śaṅkara describes māyā as the causal power (Bija sakti) without which Brahman can not be deemed as the cause.¹⁴ But this avidyā unlike the prakṛti of Saṅkhya, is not an independent entity, it is dependent onĪśvara in all its activities. "This illusion or creative power can not create of itself without the instrumentality of the Lord. The illusion of a snake in a rope is not possible merely through ignorance without the rope. So also the world can not be created merely by ignorance without the substratum, the Lord. Hence it is dependent on the Lord."¹⁵

Now, the question is what type of causality is to be ascribed to Brahman? Whether Brahman is the material cause or the efficient cause of the world? The cause that follows into the effect is the material cause and the cause that helps the material cause to transform into the effect is the efficient cause. For example, gold is the material cause of the golden ornaments and the goldsmith is the efficient cause. The Advaita vedāntin's reply is that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the world.

That Brahman is both the efficient and also the material cause is clearly expressed in Brahma-sutra as "Brahman is the material cause also (on account of this view alone) not being contradictory to the proposition and the illustration (cited in the śruti)".¹⁶ Now in the empirical world, the material cause of a thing generally differ from its efficient cause. But since before the creation of the world, there is nothing else but Brahman Itself, so Brahman must be accepted as both the material and the efficient cause of the world. Evidence of this is
found in the texts like "My dear, as by one lump of clay all that is made of clay is known" etc, which clearly shows that Brahman is the material cause of the world. Again texts like "Brahman alone was at the beginning one without a second", shows that It is also the efficient cause, for who else were such a cause when there was nothing else?

That Brahman is both the efficient cause and also the material cause of the world is indicated in the śruti itself. In the Upaniṣads, the world cause has been described as becoming many out of itself after having desired to do so. Now, desire, planning and execution are the characteristics of the efficient cause which is necessarily an intelligent being. Hence Brahman which is of the nature of consciousness, must be conceived of as the efficient cause of the world. In the Chhāndogya upaniṣad, Svetaketu's father explains the nature of Brahman as "by knowing one clod of clay, all that is made of clay becomes known, the modification being only a name, arising from speech while the truth is that it is just clay", that by the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman, everything else is known. The examples offered in this contest, such as clay and the pot gold and golden ornaments etc, also show that here the Upaniṣads speaks of the material causality of Brahman for the explanation of which these examples have been put forward. The material causality of Brahman is clearly expressed in the Taittiriya upaniṣad where Varuṇa explains about Brahman to his son Bhrigu that "Brahman is that where from the world is originated, where it subsists and where to it goes back in the dissolution". It is seen that the effect is originated from, subsists in and goes back to the material cause only. In the Māndukya upaniṣad, it is said that "Brahman is the Lord of all, knower of all..."
inner controller of all, source of all (yoni), beginning and end of all being. Thus from all these evidences it is clear that Brahman is also the material cause of this world.

**Objection Against the Creation Concept of Brahman**

That Brahman is the material cause of the universe, falls into criticism. Firstly, it is generally known to us that the effect and its material cause are of similar nature. But there is nothing similar between Brahman and the world. Brahman is conscious, pure, eternal etc, whereas the world is of just the opposite nature, i.e. inert, impure, non-eternal etc. Hence Brahman can not be the material cause of the world. It may be argued that since Brahman, the cause is conscious, the world also will have to be regarded as conscious. But it is contradictory to the śruti text like, “he becomes both the founded and the non-founded, the intelligent and the non-intelligent, the true and the untrue”. Where non-intelligent (avijñāna) stands for the world. So the conscious and pure Brahman can not be the material cause of the inert and impure world.

To this objection it is replied that the world of inert objects coming out of a conscious cause are not altogether absurd. For it is seen that intelligent things like scorpions etc are produced from non-intelligent cowdung etc. Again from a sentient spider there comes forth the thread of the web. So also do hairs etc come forth from a man, who is an intelligent being. Therefore it is quite possible that this material world is the creation of an intelligent Being i.e. Brahman. Besides, it must be admitted that the cause and its effect are not similar in every respect, but something in the cause or some qualities of it must be found in the effect also, e.g. the clay in the lump is found in the effect i.e.
pot also, though their shape, size etc are different. So we may say that in the case of Brahman and the world some qualities of its cause i.e. Brahman such as existence and intelligence, are to be found in the world, the effect, which justify our conclusion that in spite of difference in other respects, Brahman is the cause of the world.27

A further objection is raised by the critics against the material causality of Brahman. If Brahman is the material cause, then its effect i.e. the world would be non-different from Brahman, the jīva and Brahman being identical in Vedānta, the difference between the subject and the object would be destroyed, since one would pass over into the other. But in our experience, we perceive difference in the world. The distinction between the enjoyer (the jiva) and the object of enjoyment is established by our experience. Hence the critics says that Brahman can not be held to be the material cause as it contradicts our perceptual experience.28

But this view is opposed by the Sutrākāra. It says that "nevertheless there can be such differences in non-different things. For instance, waxes, foams etc are non-different, being alike sea waves, yet as waves and foams they are different from each other. As sea water, their causes, they are one, but as waves, foams etc, they are different and is no contradiction here".29 Hence there is no possibility in maintaining the difference and non-difference in things simultaneously, owing to name and forms. Therefore, from the stand point of Brahman the enjoyer and the enjoyed are not different, but as enjoyer and things enjoyed, they are different, there is no contradiction in it.
The problem of creation in the Vedanta of Śaṅkara has been subject to constant misunderstanding, and the entire misunderstanding about the problem of creation has its genesis in the thought that the Saguna Brahman is an ontological principle and the second sutra of Brahma Sutra is an explanation of Saguna Brahman. Śaṅkara never doubted that Brahman is the cause of the universe. "At the very outset, in his commentary on the First Sutra, Śaṅkara shows that Brahman can not be denied, because it is the very self of the universe and of every one of us. In the commentary on the second Sutra, he elaborated his view as to how Brahman can be regarded as the Self of the universe. Brahman is the Ātman or Self, because it is the cause or source of the universe". But along with it we must remember that from the ontological point Śaṅkara holds only Nirguna Brahman and the Saguṇa Brahman has only a Vyavahārika value. The entire misunderstanding is only to granting an ontological status to Saguṇa Brahman.

Another objection is raised by the critics that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world because to be a cause or to create; involves motif or purpose and if Brahman have any motive or purpose, He will not be perfect. Being at all. Brahman is self sufficient, therefore, he has nothing to gain by the creation, hence we can not expect Him to engage himself in such a useless job of creation. Hence Brahman can not be the cause of the world.

Bādarāyana offers a solution against the critics that God (Brahman as Īśvara) creates this world out of sport (Līlā), which is also explained by Śaṅkara in his Bhāsyā. It is said that just as a benevolent king engaged himself to act for mere pastime (Līlā) even as man breathe without a purpose (for it is
his very nature) even as children play out of mere fun, so also Brahman engages itself in creating this world of diversity out of mere fun (Līlā)\(^{32}\).

The notion of Līlā or play or sport emphasises the fact that Īśvara creates the world out of the sheer joy. It is a sort of activity which is neither purposive nor purposeless. God is moved not by need or necessity but rather by a free, spontaneous and joyous creativity, by release of energy for its own sake.\(^{33}\) Thus Eliot Deutch has rightly says that, “Līlā removes all motives, purposes and responsibility from Īśvara in his creative activity”.\(^{34}\) Līlā, thus, avoids any sort of responsibility from Īśvara of action or of result and sets aside as meaningless any question of why Īśvara creates at all. There can be no question as “why” to creation in case of God.

The English word ‘sport’ is generally used for ‘Līlā’ by the modern scholars which may create some confusion regarding the creativity of God. An action like ‘game’ or ‘sport’ does not spring from freedom, can not be called ‘Līlā’ or ‘Kriḍā’. Modern sport based on strict rules and self interested competition does not share this characteristic of freedom and spontaneity, whereas artistic activity comes much closer to the idea of play implied in Līlā.\(^{35}\) So it is better to use the ‘Līlā’ ‘as it is’ and not to translate it in English to avoid misunderstanding or misinterpretation.
II) Brahman and the World:

One of the most important questions taken up by the Upaniṣads which is also the central problem of Advaita Vedānta is "what is the relation between Brahman and the world?" or in what sense is Brahman, the absolute, the creator of the world? Multifarious explanations are given in the Upaniṣads. Most of these descriptions are Sāṁkhyan-type model of explanation i.e. like the Sāṁkhya theory of evolution, consisting of progressive unfolding of various principles, such as mind (manasā) and egoity (ahaṅkāra), out of a primordial nature (prakṛti) which then form the basis of the subtle and gross objects that constitutes the world. At the same time, the Upaniṣads repeatedly declare that "Brahman is one only without a second", that Brahman is the only Being where in all distinctions between self, world and God are transcendental and are obliterated. So the question naturally arises, what is the relation between Brahman and the world? How from the one absolute Brahman, we get the world of manifestedness? And in order to have a clear understanding of all these problems, it is necessary to know about the Vedāntic concept of causality. So let us have a brief discussion about the concept of causation.

III) Causation:—

In the history of Indian philosophy, two types of theories are put forward for the explanation of causation. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has explained that the ultimate reality of this universe is the atoms or padārtha from which the world of manifoldness come into existence. They accept the theory of 'Asat kārya' i.e. the theory that the effect is a new creation, new beginning, from the cause.
As different from this, the Sānkhya holds that the causation is the production of pradhāna or prakṛti. Their theory is ‘Satkārya’, that the effect pre-exists in the cause before its production and hence production is a manifestation of the already existing cause. Thus in any act of production, there is no creation but only the explicit form of what is in the cause, before production. The main import of the title ‘parināma’ is that according to Sāṅkhya there is a real change (parināma), a cause really change into its effect through a causal process. The main point is that the material cause in Sāṅkhya undergoes a real change in its shape, size, colour etc, but so far as its essence is concerned, it does not change, the essence continues to be the same through out the whole process. An effect, thus does not differ from its cause essentially. A cloth eg. is not different from its cause, the thread, the golden ornaments are not different from gold, the pot is not essentially different from the clay. Thus the Sāṅkhya stresses the identity of cause and effect.

In the Upaniṣads, we do not find any systematic concept of causation. In the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad, it is said, that though there are so many diversities of appearances, yet, in reality, these are only empty distinctions of name arising from speech. Thus the Upaniṣads suggests that there is only one Being, and all modifications, manifestations, all developments, changes are only nominal, eg. pot is the manifestation of clay, golden ornaments are all of lump of gold, nail, scissors are all of from iron etc. Paul Deussen, who has done much to popularise vedantic lore in Europe, have pointed out four different theories of creation occur in the Upaniṣads.
(i) That matter exists from eternity independently of God, which he fashions, but does not create.

(ii) That God creates the universe out of nothing and the latter is independent of God, although it is his creation.

(iii) That God creates the universe by transforming Himself into it.

(iv) That God alone is real, and there is no creation at all.40

The last one, according to Deussen is the fundamental view of the Upanisads which implies that Brahman or God alone is real and the world of space and time is an appearance, an illusion, a shadow of God. But S. Radhakrisnan refutes the view of Deussen that in the Upaniṣads, in fact, there is no mention of the illusion theory41. We have already pointed out in our previous chapter that the term illusion can not be applied in case of world appearance. And the passages which employ the oneness of Brahman and the world, which implies that all the things are modifications of one substance. Hence the world is not an illusory appearance of Brahman. S. Radhakrisnan writes, "it (the modification) is vyavahārīkāṁ or empirical, but it does not follow that it is mithyā or falsehood.42

The Śaṅkhya conception of parināmavāda is to be traced in the Upaniṣads. But one difference must be admitted that the Upaniṣadic conception of Brahman, is endowed with consciousness, while Śaṅkhya prakṛti is not. As M.C. Bharatiya says, 'The conscious aspect of Brahman can very well play the part of efficient cause by including change, while there is nothing to do so in prakṛti. Yoga brings in God as the primary efficient cause but that is only to multiply the primary principle."43 In spite of this, we may say that the theory of
causation in Upaniṣads is more akin to the Sāṁkhya parināmavāda than to the Śaṅkara Vivartavāda.

IV) Parināmavāda and Vivartavāda :-

Śaṅkara is the follower of Satkāryavāda. As Brahman is the material and also the efficient cause, so the term cause is understood by him to include both the efficient cause and also the material cause. But if the cause is material, does it undergo transformation in order to become effect? As Brahman is aparināmi and kutasthanitya, so the Advaitin will not allow Brahman to undergo transformation. Therefore he propounds the doctrine of causation without transformation. Thus we get two types of satkāryavāda, viz parināmavāda and vivartavāda. When the cause which has parts really transformed into the effect then we have parināmavāda. It is the name given to that causation in which the being of the effect is similar to that of the cause, eg. the change of milk into curd. When once milk has transformed into curd, we cannot get back the former. The effect is here different from its original form but has got the same sort of existence as that thing itself has. On the other hand where without loss of prior form, a new form is produced not different from the first, or an apparent change takes place, there is Vivarta. Vivarta is apparent or unreal presentation and so it is a theory which stands midway between the two standpoint of real transformation and unreal transformation. Here the cause retains its being unaffected, and produces the effect which is relatively less real or possesses an inferior being, eg. the production of the world by the Absolute. If the perfection of the Absolute is to be defended, while at the same time, admitting the world we have to adopt the idea of vivartavāda. Thus Brahman assumes many
forms, but He does not become transformed into these forms under which He appears. Besides, the examples of rope-snake and shell-silver. Śaṅkara put forward some other illustrations also to explain the vivarta theory. The lump of clay is presented in the form of pots, but actually the pots are not different from the clay. Similarly, the ornaments made of gold are really different from the gold, or the nail scissors are different from iron. And when these forms are destroyed, we get clay, gold, iron, respectively, the form themselves-disappears.

Though Śaṅkara’s name is associated with the vivarta theory of causation, Yet he is not refusing parināmavāda. Thus the Śruti passages like, “Just as the spider creates and absorbs its threads, as herbs grow on the earth, as the hair (grow) on the head and the body of a living person, so from the Imperishable arises here the universe.” “He becomes both the manifest and the unmanifest” In the Brahmasutra also parināmavāda has been propounded as, “ātmakṛtaḥ parināmat.” “śyaḥlokkavat”. From all these, we can surely come to the point that Śaṅkara is the admirer of both parināmavāda and also vivartavāda.

V) Can Parināma and Vivarta be compatible?

From the above discussion, we have seen that Śaṅkara has advocated both parināmavāda and vivartavāda. The world, according to him, is a transformation (parināma) of Īśvara’s māyā, but it is also an appearance (vivarta) of Brahman. Now, the problem is whether the world as parināma and vivarta of Brahman is compatible with Advaitic doctrine or not? Again, the ‘parināma’ generally connotes the reality and the ‘vivarta’, the unreality of the world. So this also leads to the question, whether the world is real or unreal?
Generally, it is held by all the philosophers in India that the world is either parināma or vivarta and as a consequence we have the upholder of these two views, and they regard parināma and vivarta as opposite and hence incompatible with each other.

Now, so far as Śaṅkara is concerned neither of these two views are incompatible with each other. Both have got some relative value to the world. As held by V.H. Date, we may support the view that "That world is real not because it is vivarta on it" and so "it is real because it is nothing else but Brahman, it is unreal because it is taken to be something other than Brahman. With Brahman, the world is real, without it is unreal." Thus it is only from the point of view of parināma and vivarta that the philosophers have regarded the world as reality or unreality and held that both parināma and vivarta are incompatible with each other. But according to Śaṅkara, they are not incompatible. For parināma and vivarta taken separately are both dogmatic and one sided. Śaṅkara has taken both kinds of illustration to explain the relation between the world and Brahman. He explains that the world is like a snake on the rope, a mirage in the desert, vessel made of clay, like an ornament made of gold; ripple on water, a piece of cloth, out of threads. V.H. Date has therefore remarked that, "if parināma and vivarta were to be the sole criteria of reality, the Ācarya would appear as breathing hot and cold at the same time". So we may remark that the traditional notion of parināma and vivarta as incompatible with each other is arbitrary and false. Again both the theory are also not applicable at the same time to the world causality. The correct view will be that from the phenomenal point of view, the world causality is parināmavāda i.e. the world
appearance is a real creation of God. And from the ontological point of view, the world is a vivarta i.e. the illusory appearance of Brahman due to maya. Here Śaṅkara uses the examples of 'rope-snake illusion', 'mirage on the desert', 'silver on the shell', 'a castle in the clouds' etc. All these illustrations are made valid from the ultimate point of view. From the phenomenal point of view, on the other hand, the world-appearance is explained with the illustrations of pot made of clay, an ornament of gold, curds of milk, a ripple on water, a piece of cloth out of threads etc. These are the cases of parināma.

So the real status of the snake on the rope or ornament on the gold, lies in the fact that when snake appears on the rope, the rope is not really transformed into the snake. It is only a name that is imposed on the rope. Similarly what else is the ornament except the appearance of a name and form over and above the gold, and we call it as the transformation of gold into various ornaments. According to Śaṅkara, "Whatever is made of gold is forever of the nature of gold, even as everything born of Brahman must be of the nature of Brahman". Thus the ornaments are nothing but a name appearing on the gold, as silver appearing on the shell. On the same reason, we may say that the world appearance is nothing but Brahman, the name or appearance, which is superimposed on Brahman due to Avidyā or Māyā. As the gold ornaments have no status apart from gold, the world appearance have no status apart from Brahman. And this is the sole reality, realisable through the Advaita philosophy of Śaṅkara.

In conclusion to this, we may say that in fact, the creation theory of Śaṅkara is insignificant, though Śaṅkara uses so many simile like the lump of
clay, gold ornament etc, yet it teach only that Brahman is the only reality and everything else is unreal, and they do not convey the creativity of the world. Texts speaking of the creation of the world have no similar power of effecting the cessation of all desires, passages about creation aims at teaching the unity of the self. Passages delineating the origin, continuity and dissolution of the universe are for strengthening the idea of the identity of the individual self with the supreme self. Thus it is said, "The self alone is to be meditated upon, for all these are unified in It. Of all these, this self alone should be realised, for one knows all these through it, just as one may get (an animal) through its footprints". Another passages also illustrates how from the same Brahman or the self all the things and beings, all Gods, all worlds originates. "As a spider moves along the threads, (it produced) and as from a fire tiny sparks fly in all directions so from this self emanates all organs, all worlds, all Gods and all beings".

From all these statements, it is evident that "The mention in all vedānta texts of the origin, continuity and dissolution of the universe is only to strengthen our idea of Brahman being a homogeneous unity and not to make us believe in the origin etc. as an actuality". The chief interest of Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta is being the mystical union of Brahman, he does not care to discover the creativity of the world appearance. The relation between the supreme Brahman and this world appearance is expressed by him through the concept of māyā. Dr. S. Radhakrisnan's best express the attitude of Śaṅkara towards the universe "As for the empirical ramifications which also exist, well, they are there, and there is an end of it. We do not know how and can not know why it is all a contradiction, and yet it is actual".
VI) Level of existence :-

Though Brahman is the only reality, for Śaṅkara, yet he is conscious about the fact that the various objects of our experience can not be reduced to nullity. Thus in our normal life, we experience so many things, which are true to our experience, but in reality it is different from the fact. To the passengers in a fast moving railway train the trees appear to be running backwards. When the clouds move in the sky it looks as if the moon is moving. A stick which is burning at one end, when revolved rapidly produces the impression of a circle of fire. These experiences are happened in our everyday life which are natural to us.

As M. K. Venkatarama Iyer observes, “The disparity between appearance and reality is mainly due to the intellectual apparatus owing to these limitations things appears to us other than what in reality they are.”

Thus a rope appears as a snake and we have the positive experience of it. Possibly it is due to the fact that the man who have the experience of a snake may be afraid to go in the dark, or he knows that snakes are usually found in that place and so on. And it is this mental disposition coupled with the ignorance of the rope in its essential nature and the general awareness of the zigzag form of the rope which happen to be a common element with the rope and the snake and all these are responsible to rouse the memory of the snake and there arises the perception of snake. And this perception is a positive one, so long as the knowledge of the rope does not arise.

Now, in case of world appearance which is a fact, there is the ultimate reality i.e. Brahman, underlying it. And the main contribution of Śaṅkara’s Advaitavāda is to establish the unreality of the world-appearance in order to
maintain the non-dual character of Brahman. Here, naturally the question arises as to what is the real status of the world. What does the world appearance mean to us? Is it totally unreal? Is it simply false? How is it related to the Brahman? etc. In order to solve these problems, the Advaitins have introduced three levels of existence. They are Paramārthika Sattā, Vyavahārika Sattā and Prātibhāsika Sattā. The first is the transcendental reality which is not a matter of cognition, but of realisation. Secondly, there are empirical things which have practical value and significance. And thirdly, there are existence which have no pragmatic reference. They are illusory. Another fourth kind of existence, is also pointed out which may be described as an impossible concept, which is technically called Tuccha Sattā. This Tuccha Sattā or insignificant being or existence is merely imaginary, the fanciful and can be accepted as self-contradictory. Examples are the horns of a hare, the lotuses of the heavenly river (sky-lotus), the son of a barren woman, the circular square etc. They may belong to imaginary level, but are acknowledged as having the place in reality. Their being is said to be insignificant, because it has no significance for epistemology. Still it is a kind of being. According to P.T. Raju, "The Advaita logicians have not drawn a distinction between what is logically impossible like the son of a barren woman and what is factually not true like the horn of a hare". P.T. Raju has logically established the objectivity of Tuccattva that "These are no doubt, the object of imagination of mind. Yet we can not deny that it is an object otherwise we can not assert any judgement as 'it is false'. As object or my mind or thought they have being, but only an insignificant form."
Now, from the Advaitic point of view, there is only one absolute and unlimited reality i.e. Brahman. All other things are only apparent manifestation of Brahman. Thus from the absolute or pāramārthika level, reality is one and it admits of no degree or differentiation, and that besides this one reality, there is no other reality whether in empirical or illusory form. “Thus the exponent of this view do not tolerate the recognition of any separate or empirically distinct type of phenomenal reality, as one and the same reality is enough to explain all realities.”

Thus from the pāramārthika level, the world appearance is false. But the world appearance is not wholly unreal or absolute nothing, it has an apparent and relative reality. Thus according to Śāṅkara so long as the empirical world continued to be perceived, both the external and the internal world are accepted as facts, as reals. Hence the world has a reality of its own, which is distinguished from absolute reality and it is called vyavahārika Sattā i.e. reality as far as it is necessary for the practical purpose. “The object of a dream, although known as false on waking, are real within the limits of the dream, similarly, the world is also relatively real, and is said to be false (mithyā) only when knowledge dawn.”

The superiority of vyarahārika sattā, can be understood well, when we compare it with the prālībhasika sattā. It is said, “Śāṅkara is even prepared to grant some reality to the rajju-sarpa (rope-srake), which he calls pratibhāsika satyātva (seeming reality) as distinguished from the other two kinds of reality.”

Thus the illusory appearance of snake in the rope is in the level of pratibhāsika, it is a false appearance, yet not altogether unreal, non-existent (alīka) like the
son of a barren woman or a hare's horn. The snake has some reality as it can create some reaction to the mind of the perceiver, like the real snake, so long as the illusion lasts. Its falsity can be realised only when the perceiver can perceive the rope.

It must be pointed out that in consideration of these levels of existence, Śaṅkara was in all possibility influenced by the Buddhists philosophy where the three kinds of existence are clearly explained, viz. Pāramārthika Sattā, Samyṛti Sattā (vyavahārika sattā of the vedānta) and the Prātibhāsika Sattā. In the Vījnānavāda Buddhism, these levels have been termed Parinispāna, Paratāntra and Parikalpita respectively. Even in European philosophy, we find the explanation of three level of reality as reality, existence and unreality, and their difference in degree. But we must remember that the vedāntic theory of level of existence (Sattā) is not true equivalent of the degree of reality as we find in Hegel or Bradley. For Vedānta, the three grades of reality differ from one another only in ontological point, where as the doctrine of degree in both Hegel and Bradley clearly implies distinction of worth within the realm of the appearance. Actually we can not determine the degree of the phenomenal and the illusory existence in the philosophy of Śaṅkara. Nor does the vedānta ascribe different grades of reality to different objects belonging to one and the same place of existence. P.T. Raju has says that "These levels of reality of existence should not be used as degrees of truth, as they donot contain a graduated measure of more and more of truth, one may call them level of Being (Sattā)". Hence Śaṅkara is not the upholder of degree of reality as is commonly understood.
There is also marked difference between Śaṅkara’s doctrine of the phenomenal world and that of the Mādhyamika. For the Mādhyamikas the world appearance have no essence of its own, each and every entity of this world is produced by other things or entities and they again by others, and we can not specify the nature of each one of them without referring to others which produced them or from which they originated. Thus every things of this world is causally related to each other, and they have no reality of their own. This world of experience holds good and remain uncontradicted and are true for all our practical purposes which is called Samyūṭi Sattā (vyavahārika sattā) and its falsehood can be realised only when their real nature (pāramārthika rūpa) as a succession of essenceless product of causal complexes is properly understood. Thus for the Buddha, the appearance of the world as reality is true only to that period, till the veil of ignorance is not removed, from our eyes, and this vyavahārika Sattā is designated by them as ‘Loka Sarvṛta’ upto this point. Śaṅkara has similarity with the Buddhism. But now the question is, if the world appearance has no essence of its own, how is it that it appears to have one, or how is it that it appears at all? To this Nāgārajunā compares the world appearance with the appearance of mirage or dream, which have no reality of their own, but still presents an objective appearance of reality. Chandrakirti quotes a passage from the Ārya-dṛthasaya-paripṛccha, where it is said that just as a man may see in a dream that he is spending the night with the wife of a king and suddenly realizing that he is discovered, tries to fly for fear of his life (thus perceiving the presence of a woman, where there is none), so we are always falling into the error of asserting that we have perceiving the manifold world appearance where there is none.
Such analogies of error, as emphasised by the Buddhist naturally deny the reality that underlies the world appearance, which is the main point of difference in Śaṅkara. For Śaṅkara, the essence of all illusory appearance is that one thing is mistaken for another, which is clearly explained in his ‘Adhyāsa Bhāṣya’. Nāgārjuna tries to prove that all appearances are causally related and all are interdependent and relative and hence there is no basis of truth anywhere, no essence of anything. But for Śaṅkara the underlying reality, the unchanging basis on which the world appearance is imposed is the self (Ātman) or Brahman, which is the only reality, that all philosophers endeavour to realise, that makes the difference between Buddhists and Śaṅkara vedānta.

Thus Śaṅkara admits different levels of reality. For him no appearance is so low that the Absolute can not embrace it. It is the reality which makes it appearance and hence every appearance must have some amount of truth in it. Śaṅkara distinguishes all forms of existences from non-existence also. The object like hare's horn or sky-flowers etc are the objects which may be called as absolutely unreal or false (aśīka), which is called Tuccha. A barren woman's son, he says, is born neither actually nor even through māyā. Such things are utterly unreal. Thus the absolute non-existence have neither a cause nor an effect. Dr. Kazi Nurul Islam has rightly says that Śaṅkara's claim that 'a barren women's child never exist,' may be logically and factually impossible is justified. But this may not be the case with 'hare's horn'. It may be that hare's horn is not existent at the moment. But from this it cannot be said that it can never exist in future. Here Śaṅkara's claim is subject to controversy. Now a days, modern science have developed so much that even barren women can
be proud of being a mother. Of course, we have no right to underestimate Śaṅkara. For we can not ignore the time factor and we must support Śaṅkara's view on traditional ground which is based on Upaniṣadic literature.

In the prātibhāsika level, illusions are not altogether unreal. Illusory appearances such as 'rope-snake' and 'water in a mirage' etc are perceived nowhere and by no person without a ground underlying them. So long as the underlying reality is not realised, the apparent reality is not contradicted and hence assumes to be true. The same is the case with dreams also which is true so long as it lasts. Of course there is a difference between illusory and dream object. The illusory objects appear in spatio-temporal existence and secondly they have a ground underlying them. Here Śaṅkara is correct in making a difference between the two.

The object of vyavahārika level have resemblance with the object of prātibhāsika level in so far as they are non-external, finite and subject to change and different from absolutely non existent (tuccha). But it is superior to prātibhāsika level on so many points. Thus the reality of the empirical world is even more prominent than the reality of such objects as the mirage and the like. The water which quenches our thirst is certainly real if compared with the water of a mirage. The former is commonly called as real and the latter as unreal. 'While describing the created subtle and gross elements of the world Śaṅkara calls them 'reals' where as the underlying Brahman is the Reality or the reals.'72 The world, according to the Advatins cross in bliss, is supported by bliss and is destined to return to bliss.73 Thus the world appearance is not merely a scene of suffering and retribution, but also a realm of opportunities for
higher development, moral upliftment. It is a standing challenge to us to realise the truth of our life. It is the eternal Asvatha Briksa whose roots are above and whose branches are below. Thus the world appearance is quite meaningful for us; for it is a bridge which leads us to the highest Truth; and that is the main significance of the Vyavahārika level of existence which needs to be understood.

However, great is the practical utility of the vyavahārika level of existence i.e. (the world), enduring it is, yet it can not be the absolute in status. It is inferior to the Absolute Reality or Brahman which is perfect, Immutable, Self-existent and Self-shining. Brahman alone contributes the pāramārthika sattā for Śaṅkara. It is the thing in itself as Kant holds. From this transcendental point of view the world is an appearance. But behind this world appearance, there is ultimate reality. Even if we deny the reality of the world appearance, that will be possible only with reference to the transcendental reality. Thus from the empirical point of view, the appearances are real and from the transcendental point of view, Brahman is real and appearances are false.

The recognition of the three level of reality should not be regarded as violating the non-dualistic character of Śaṅkara’s philosophy; because this division is based on the value, nature, standard and empirical order of phenomenal reality in accordance with different standpoints and evaluating scales. No doubt, the highest or absolute value is nothing but eternal existence, pure consciousness and unalloyed bliss, but in the lower level of existence, they appear to be distinct from one another. It is this distinction which is responsible for the prevalence of value in varying degrees, attributable to empirical entities in their stratum. Thus value has been indentified with reality.
In Vedānta, i.e. the real and the ideal are one and the same. This is an important feature of Śaṅkara’s idealism. The absolute value is the pāramārthika sattā i.e. Brahman. Judged from the absolute point of view, but viewed from empirical existence, there are innumerable grades of empirical values including illusory manifestation like shell-silver which have merely apparent value to world appearance ascribing higher degree of values. This is the significance of the threefold division of pāramārtha, vyavahāra and prātibhāsa set forth above.

Thus from the above discussion it is evident that Śaṅkara never deny the empirical reality of the world. From the vyavahārika point of view, the world is real, but from the pāramārthika point of view he does not consider the world to be real. But this does not imply that he considers the world to be unreal, which is evident from the above discussion. Another point is that world appearance is not absolutely naught, it is the appearance of or expression of Absolute Brahman. Not to speak of the object of the world, even the illusory objects are not unreal, for a snake can not remain separated from its underlying rope, nor a mirage can stand even for a moment separated from the surface of the desert. It follows, therefore, that the man who takes so much pain in disapproving the unreality of the illusory object, can not consider the world to be unreal. Only in comparison to the pāramārthika sattā or Brahman the object of the world are considered by him as mithyā but not unreal. So we conclude that the world appearance is not mere nothing or illusory in the ordinary sense. It is real one, from vyavahārika standpoint which is different from both absolute non-existence and illusory appearance. Śaṅkara has never questioned about the reality of the world from all practical point of view.
VII) The concept of Jaganmithya :-

The world appearance in Advaita vedānta is often described as mithyā. This term ‘mithyā’ has a technical sense in Śaṅkara Vedānta, which is often misunderstood by the critics, and a charge has often been brought that Śaṅkara has treated the world as either a fiction or even a mere illusion like the rope-snake. And the critics find an appropriate and admirable support in the short but significant half-verse which runs as “Brahma satya jaŋat mithyā jivo Brahmaiva na paraḥ”. i.e. Brahman is the only reality, the world is false, the individual self are non-different from Brahman. The current belief is that Śaṅkara’s Advaitavāda unmistakably teaches us the falsity of the world, that Brahman being considered to be the only reality everything being considered to be unreal and false. But the term ‘mithyā’ has a special implication in Śaṅkara’s philosopohy which is wrongly interpreted by the critics. Hence it is essential to determine precisely what is meant by the expression ‘jaganmithyā’ or ‘the world is mithyā or false’.

Śaṅkara did not properly explain what is meant by saying that the world is mithyā. Padmapāda, a direct disciple of Śaṅkara gives two meaning of the term ‘mithyā’ in his famous ‘Pañcapadikā’ as negation and as indeterminability. Of these the second viz. being indefinable as either sat or asat “Sadasadvilaksanam” is the sense Advaitins have in mind when they describe the term mithyā. The author of Advaita Siddti gives many definitions of the term. That —
(i) Mithyā is other the real.

(ii) It has the same locus as that of its own absolute negation.

(iii) It is non-existent at all the three times.

(iv) By falsity of the world is meant that it has not eternal existence, incapable of sublation while at the same time, it does not appear its locus, i.e. Brahman etc.\(^1\)

Citsukha defines mithyātva as the non-existence of a thing in that which is considered to be its locus.\(^2\) So the falsity of the world consists in the fact that it is supposed to be existing as real, though it does not exist.

To have a clear understanding of the term 'mithyā' or anirvacaniya, it is necessary to know the fundamental point of difference between asat, sat and mithyā. The Advaita Vedāntins defines these terms in a quite different sense from that of other philosophers.

The Buddists defines 'sattā' or existence as 'arthakriyākāritva' or causal efficiency or the capacity to produce some effect. That means, an entity is called 'Sat' if it can produce some effect. But the Advaita vedāntins do not accept the definition of 'Sattā' on the ground that it will give rise to the fallacy of infinite regress. Their argument is that if existence means 'causal efficiency', then to make that 'causal efficiency' existent, another such efficiency will be required and for that another as ad infinitum. Hence 'sattā' can not be defined as 'arthakriyākāritva'.

According to Vaiśeṣika, 'sat' or existent means that which is endowed with the genesis 'satta'. The Advaita Vedāntins reject this definition also on the same ground that it will give rise to the fallacy of infinite regress. Thus if 'sat' is
defined as 'endowed with satta' this 'satta' will require another 'satta' for its existence and that another ad infinitum. 

In the view of the Advaita vedânta, 'sat' means that which is eternal and as such is not sublated at any time past, present and future. Accordingly, the Advaita vedântins hold that only Brahman is Sat. That means, 'sat' in its real sense, means 'pāramārtha sat or transcendental reality. Asat or non-existent, according to the Advaita vedântins, is that which is not cognised as existent at any time in any locus'. In other words, asat means that which is never perceived as existent. The barren women's child, sky-lotus etc are never perceived and as such, are regarded as asat.

Now, there are such things which can be said neither as sat (existent) nor as asat (totally non-existent). Such things are regarded by the Advaita vedânta as 'anirvacaniya' or indeterminable. The object of erroneous cognition like rope-snake, nacre-silver etc are not (real) sat, since they are contradicted afterwards by the true knowledge of the rope, the nacre etc. Nor are they totally non-existent, as they are perceived to be existing in the front. Again these objects can not be regarded as both sat and asat since sat and asat being contradictory to each other can not remain in the same locus. Hence they are regarded as anirvacaniya or indeterminable, i.e. neither sat nor asat nor sadasat.

According to the Advaita vedânta, though sat and asat are not remain in the same locus, their negation can. Thus 'gotva' (cowness) and 'asvatva' (horseness) can not remain in the same object i.e. where there is cowness, there is the absence of horseness and viceversa. But the negation of both cowness and horseness can remain in the one and the same object eg. in the gardhabha.
Similarly though 'satta' and 'asatta' cannot remain in the same locus, their negation can. And that stage where both satta and asatta are negated is called anirvacaniya or mithyā.

That, which is neither sat nor asat is mithyā. But the Dvaita philosopher maintain that this view is falacious, since, according to them, there is nothing which is neither sat nor asat. According to them, that which is sublated by some later knowledge is asat, while that which is never sublated is sat. Hence these two conceptions are contradictory to each other and the negation of one, necessarily indicates the presence of the other. But this definition is not acceptable. For by 'sat', the Advaita vedāntins means that which is eternally existent and is never sublated. In this sense only Brahman can be regarded as sat. By asat they mean that which is totally non-existent and is never experienced. eg. hare's horn, the sky flower etc; which are never experienced. Hence, these two terms, viz sat and asat are not contradictory but contrary to each other. So though both sat and asat, can not exist in the same locus, their negation can. Thus the nacre-silver seems to be existent at the time of cognition but is proved to be non-existent by a later knowledge, i.e. by the knowledge of the nacre. Accordingly, it is neither sat (existent) nor asat (non-existent) nor totally (non-existent) and is therefore mithyā.

The World Appearance is Mithyā:

The world is regarded as mithyā. For the world is not sat or eternally existent, since it is contradicted by the knowledge of Brahman. Again, the world is not asat or totally non-existent, as it has a practical or pragmatic reality. So long as the Brahmajñāna is not attained, the world continues to exist. Thus the
world is different from both sat and asat and as such mithyā. And this is the implication which is used by the Advaita Vedanta in their conception of Jaganmithyā.

From the above discussion, it is evident that the concept of mithyā has a special implication in Śaṅkara. Mithyā does not imply false or illusory as it is ordinarily understood. The analogy of the rope-snake illusion which is commonly used, has been responsible to certain extent for suggesting that the world is an illusion. But the world is not illusory in the sense in which the snake presentation in the rope is illusory. For the world is not seer naught, a vacuum it is a being, though of a lower order. The Absolute dwells in it. In the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, Yajñāvalkya says, "He who dwells in the earth, yet is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is who controls the earth from within, he is your self, the inner controller, the immortal."

Thus Brahman is the supreme basis of the world and there is no radical distinction between the supreme spirit and the actual world. If world were absolutely different from Brahman, if world appearance is not based upon Brahman, then the repudiation of the reality of the world, could not lead us to the attainment of Mokṣa. It is vital to note is this connection that Śaṅkara neither declares the world to be like dream or a subjective concept. His refutation of Viññānavāda Buddhism is a genuine proof for his thesis that the world is not an illusion or a subjective concept.
VIII) Refutation of Vijnānavāda :-

The Vijnānavādins or the Yogācāra Buddhist maintain that the external world has no existence and that it is a false projection of the internal mind. That means, all the perceptual objects are not actually real, they are ideas, created by the mind or internal Vijnāna. Just as illusory objects or dream objects only appear to be outside the mind but they are not really so, similarly all the objects of waking life are only appear to be external to mind but really they are mere ideas of the mind. On the other hand, this pluralistic universe, according to Śaṅkara including sun, moon, stars etc, are not the creation of the mind. Here Śaṅkara is anti-subjectivist. In the Brahma Sutra Bhāṣya, he is vehemently criticizing the Vijnānavāda which proves that he is opposed to subjectivism or mentalism. His refutation of Vijnānavāda is so clear and emphatic that it should leave no doubt about his being an anti-subjectivist.

In the Brahma Sutra Bhāṣya, Śaṅkara takes the standpoint of common-sense realism in refuting the Vijnānavāda idealism. Śaṅkara gives a number of arguments to establish the existence of external object independently of the knowing mind. External objects like pot, cloth etc. exist since they are perceived as distinct from the knower. If these objects were not existent how could they be cognized at all. Thus the external world is an object of experience through the senses, and can not therefore be altogether non-existent like the horns of a hare. Our perceptions point out to us external things like pillars and walls. We are aware in perception not of the act of perception, but of the object of perception. The very fact that the Buddhists say that the internal cognition appears ‘as something external’ shows that the external world is real. If it were
not real, the comparison 'like something external' would be meaningless. No one says that 'Visnumitra is like the son of a barren woman'.

Again the non-existence of object external to mind does not follow from the fact of the ideas having the same form as objects; for if there were no objects, the idea could not have the forms of the object. We perceive a black cow and a white cow. Now the attributes of blackness and whiteness may differ, but cowness remain the same. Similarly in 'cognition of a jar' and the 'cognition of a cloth', jar and cloth being objects differ, while consciousness remains the same. This proves that ideas and objects are distinct.

Śaṅkara is a radical realists so far as his epistemology is concerned. Knowledge or experience is dependent on object. It has invariably an objective reference. For Śaṅkara, the object of experience depends upon knowledge or experience not for their nature but for their revelation. Like the Vijnānavādin, he never say that the object of knowledge are in any way affected or modified by the cognitive act. As we have already seen, the entire subject-object universe is of the nature of Absolute consciousness (Ātman or Brahman) and the world is the appearance of the Absolute consciousness. Hence Śaṅkara may be called an objective idealist (in the ultimate level) who rejected subjective idealism and emphasized the phenomenal reality of the external world.

The Vijnānavādins hold that the things of the world are illusory like dream object. As we see in dream many objects which have no external existence, similarly the objects seen in the waking life also do not have external existence.
Śaṅkara has vehemently criticised this view and argues that the dream state and the waking state can not be placed on a par. "The object known in waking life are not like those of a dream." The Buddhists may say that in a dream there are no external object, yet the idea appear in a two-fold form as subject and object. But Śaṅkara opposes this view. Firstly, the dream objects are sublated by the waking experience. Their false and illusory character are realised when the dreamer is awakened. On the otherhand, the object of waking life are never likewise sublated. Dreams are private, whereas waking life is public, and it is shared by all. The dream state is a kind of memory, but the waking state is a real perception. So it can not be rejected like the dream experience. Even the Buddhist himself realises the acute difference between the two states and what is directly experienced can not be refuted by mere intellectual jugglery. Thus from all these it is evident that Śaṅkara can not be held to be the supporter of the view that the world experience are subjective idea which resembles to dream experience.

It has been argued by the Vijnānavādins that as ideas alone are real, then the various differences in knowledge like pot knowledge, cloth knowledge etc can be known through the difference in Saṃskāras or Vāṣana which is beginningless. That means, in their view, knowledge and Saṃskāra both of which are beginningless,being mutually dependent as cause and effect that creates this manifold world. But this argument is not correct according to Śaṅkara. As the Saṃskāras themselves are the result of the earlier experience of different objects, so to prove its validity, will lead to regressus ad infinitum. Which will create another difficulty. Hence, if there is no admission of external
object, there can not be any experience and as a result no Saṁskāras will be created. Again, Saṁskāras can not remain without a locus, but there is nothing which can be the locus of Saṁskāras. The Vijnānavādin regard Ālayavijnāna or ego-consciousness as the locus of Saṁskāras, but Ālayavijnāna can not be regarded as the locus of Saṁskāras since it is momentary.

Hence, from all these arguments it is clear that for the Advaita Vedāntins there exists an objective world independently of the knower; it is not identical with knowledge. Śaṅkara’s criticism against the Buddhist subjectivism is sufficient to prove his assertion of the objective reality to this world appearance.

The question about the status of the world (jagat) is an urgent and important one in the Vedāntic literature, which is related with the monistic view of reality: if the self or Brahman alone is the reality, then how the plurality of the Universe which we perceive, experience, is to be accounted for? This is the vexed problem of the one and the many “The hard rock on which most of the monistic system break”. So far we have seen, Śaṅkara is the only philosopher who have successfully explained the world appearance without losing the Advaitic character of Brahman or the Absolute.

According to Śaṅkara, Brahman is the only reality and the world of manifoldness are unreal and unsubstantial. But if ultimate reality is one, then how the substantial world of name and form come into existence? What is the relationship between the one and the many, the Absolute and the relative? These are the most confusing questions of philosophy and the philosophers of varying time have proposed varying answers; as a result of which we get different groups as monist, dualists or pluralists philosophers. Again, according to some
extremist non-dualists like Gauḍapāda, there have been no world creation at all. Brahman alone is real and all that is perceived is Brahman only. If a man perceive the universe of multiplicity, he is a victim of an illusion; for when truth is known, duality does not arise.

But for Śaṅkara, the universe of name and form can not be denied as it is a fact of every day experience. He is emphatic, however that from the standpoint of Brahman, it is totally non-existent. Again, Śaṅkara, like some Buddhists, does not uphold subjective idealism. He does not believe that the individual soul or ego, creates the non-ego or the universe. On account of cosmic illusion (māyā) the ego and the non-ego come into existence and a fictitious relationship is established. It must be remembered that fundamentally there is no difference between the philosophical view of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. Gauḍapāda has established his view from the standpoint of Brahman and has therefore declared the world to be non-existent, where as Śaṅkara discuss the universe from the standpoint of māyā where the world is seen to be real. Thus a man can not ignore the universe as long as he sees it, experience it, nor can he deny his relationship with other human being or the various object of the world as long as they appear to be real. Therefore, as long as a man sees multiplicity, he must work, pray, worship, reap the fruit of his action and experience happiness and misery, accordingly. In that state, he even can not disregard the distinction between morality and immorality. Thus according to Śaṅkara, the validity of the scriptures, the usefulness of spiritual disciplines and in short, all the injunctions of religion and morality are meaningfull, which are based upon a recognition of the reality of the phenomenal world.
But from the standpoint of Brahman, all these are meaningless. The world is unreal, then from the transcendental level. And as we have seen in order to establish this fact, he takes the help of his world causality as parināmavāda and vivartavāda. Generally these two views of causation are regarded as contradictory, but in Śaṅkara’s philosophy, both these are accommodated so as to explain the phenomenal and the transcendental view of reality. Again the four level of being or existence, where everything of this universe is explained in a logical manner, and by all these he explains the real status of the world as ‘anirvacaniya’. Thus the introduction of ‘anirvacaniyatā’ is a compromising factor where the worldly objects are more real than an illusion, object and less real than the absolute reality.

That, what has been stated above, it appears that the philosophical attitude of Śaṅkara, is related with the historical situation of that time when Śaṅkara flourished, as a result of which as a monist, he instead of signifying fictitious status, he have designated the world as ‘anirvacaniya’. As has been stated by Sanghamitra Dasgupta, "This type of consideration to take the account of prevailing historical situation in society is important for an appraisal of any philosophical views. Because it is indeed true that the thoughts and feelings that are common to the community or masses in vague and diffused forms are being crystallised and concentrated in the philosophical writing of the age.”

Thus there was a revolutionary change in the socio-cultural and spiritual life of India due to the advent of Buddhism. At the hand of various patron king like Ashoka, Buddhism was spread rapidly almost all over India and even many other neighbouring countries as well. But within a short time-
deteriorated and degrading practices grew up in Buddhism. "Śaṅkara historically speaking was born and lived in an era when the Buddhist monasteries became rich centre of vested interests and their disciplines became lax; magic and superstition crept into the popular forms of worship."\textsuperscript{100} It is this malpractice of Buddhism, which induced Śaṅkara to formulate a philosophy which is a direct interpretation of upaniṣadic texts as well as different from Buddhism (of course, the influence of Buddhism upon Śaṅkara is an unignorable factor in so many respects). In such a situation he can not extend the view that "The world is fictitious or mere illusion" which will certainly miss the public support. No one can live and act without taking the world to be real. To say that the world is illusory and yet to behave in every respect like other persons for whom it is real is something self-contradictory. Śaṅkara realised this practical difficulties and his Māyāvāda is the successful solution to this problem to reestablish the faith and confidence towards this worldly objects.

Śaṅkara even strongly criticised the 'Śunyāvāda' of Nāgārjuna and the subjective idealism of Vijñānavāda. Thus the experience of external world by the people can not be denied. Here he is on the same platform with the realists and the pragmatists in admitting the existence of the external world.\textsuperscript{101} Hence granting his attitude towards objective idealism, Śaṅkara regards the status of the world as 'mithyā', or 'anirvacanīya' i.e. neither 'sat' nor 'asat'. Here, Śaṅkara and his immediate followers might feel it necessary to give some indeterminable status to the world which gives due justice to upaniṣadic spiritualism and also maintain the advaitic conception of philosophy.
Sāṅkara's philosophy of Advaita is thus the outcome of then socio-cultural perspective for which he introduced the causal theory of vivartha, that the real status of the world is neither sat nor asat i.e. anirvacaniya or indeterminate. Without disturbing the monism or advaïtic character of Upaniṣadic metaphysics, the vivartavādins assigned the indeterminate category of the world have maintained their distinctive characteristic from the extreme subjective idealism of Vijñānavāda.

Thus throughout our whole study about the status of the world we have seen that the world appearance is a fact of our everyday experience from the vyavahārika point of view. We can not deny or ignore the world as a mere naught. It is really a platform in which we must work, pray, worship and reap the fruit of our action and experience happiness or misery accordingly. The world is quite meaningful to us, where we born and work, and where we can endeavour to attain the highest end of our life i.e. mokṣa. So next chapter will contain the discussion about the concept of mokṣa, nature of bondage, the path or way leading to self-realisation and the state or position of a man attaining mokṣa.
References

1) Ch. Upa. 6.8.7.
2) Brh. Upa. 2.4.6.
3) Mund. Upa. 2.2.11.
4) Brh. Upa. 4.4.19.
5) Sadānanda.
6) Taitt. Upa. 2.1.
7) Brh. Upa. 3.9.28.
8) Ch. Upa. 6.8.7.
9) Brh. Upa. 1.4.10.
10) Ibid. 1.4.7.
11) Taitt. Upa. 2.6.
12) Ch. Upa. 6.2.3.
13) B. S. S. 1.1.2.
14) Ibid. 1.4.3.
15) Ibid. 1.4.3.
16) Ibid. 1.4.23. 'Prakṛtisca pratijñātṛstāntānuprodhat'.
17) Ch. Upa. 6.1.4.
18) Ibid. 6.2.1.
19) P. Upa. 6.3.14, Ch. Upa. 6.2.3 etc.
20) Ch. Upa. 6.1.4.
21) Ibid. 6.2.1.
22) 'Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, yena jātāni jīvanti, yat prayanty abhisarāṁvisanti tad vijñānasva tad brahmati'.-T. Upa. 3.1.1.
23) 'Esa sarvesvarah esa sarvajñaḥ, eso'ntaryāmi, esa yoniḥ, sarvasya prabhavapyayau hi bhutanām'.-Mān. Upa. 1.6.

24) B. S. S. 2.1.4.

25) T. Upa. 2.6.1.

26) B. S. S. 2.1.6.

27) ibid. 2.1.6.

28) ibid. 2.1.13.

29) ibid.


31) B. S. S. 2.1.32. 'Na prayojanatvāt'.

32) ibid. 2.1.33. 'Lilābat lilā kaivalyaṁ'.


34) ibid. P-39.


36) eg. Ch. Upa. Ill-19.1, IV-2.1.4, Ait Upa. II, Prasna Upa. 1.4, Brh Upa 1.2.1, 1.4.1 etc, Mu Upa 1.1.7, Taitt Upa III-1.1 etc.


38) eg. Katha Upa. 11.1.1, Ch. Upa V-2.1, Kena Upa. 1.4. etc.

39) Ch. Upa IV-1.4, IV-1.5, IV-1.6, IV-1.7.


41) ibid. P-189.

42) ibid. P-188.

43) Bharatiya M. C. Causation in Indian Philosophy. P-58.
44) B. S. S. II-1.24.


46) Ch. Upa. IV-1.4, 1.5, 1.6.


48) Taitt. Upa. 2.6.1.


50) ibid. 2.1.13.

51) Date V. H. Vedānta Explained. P-492.

52) ibid. P-492.

53) ibid. P-492.

54) ibid. P-493.


56) Brh. Upa. 1.4.7.

57) ‘Sa yathorṇanābhis tantunoccarat, yathāgneḥ kṣudrā visphulinga 
vuccaranti, evarī evāsmād ātmanaḥ sarve prāṇah, sarve lokah,
sarve devah, sarvāni bhūtāni vuccaranī; tasyoṃ satyaSha 
satyāṃ iti prāṇa vai satyaSa, teśāṃ esa satyaSa’—Brh. Upa. II-1.20

58) ibid.


62) ibid. P-389.


64) Bhattarcharya Haridas. The Cultural Heritage of India. Vol-III. 
P.P.242-243.
65) ibid. P-243.
68) ibid. P.P. 4-5.
69) ibid. P-5.
70) ‘Bandhyāputro na tatvaima māyayā vāpi jāyate’-
Māṇḍukya Kārikā-16.
P-165.
74) B. G. XV-1.
76) ‘Brahma satya jagat mithyā’.
78) N.B.- We are to understand the term ‘mithyā’, in what sense Śaṅkara
uses it.
79) ‘aphnavavacano'nirvacaniyatāvacanasća’- C. S. S. No-l.P.68:
‘mithyeti anirvacaniyatocyate’. ibid. P-88.- Quoted from Warrier A. G.
80) ‘mithyāiti anirvacaniyocyte’- Pañcapādika.
81) Quoted from Warrier A. G. Krisna. The Concept of Mukti in Advaita
Vedānta. P-380.
83) Bhāmati on Adhyasa Bhasya.

84) ibid. P-666.

85) ibid. P-16.


88) B. S. S. II-2.28.

89) ibid. II-2.28. ‘Na hi Visnumitrau bandhyā putravadababhāsata...

90) ibid. II-2.28.

91) ibid.

92) ibid. II-2.29.

93) ibid.

94) ibid.

95) ibid.

96) ibid. II-2.30.

97) ibid.

98) ibid. II-2.31. ‘kṣanitavāt’.

99) Quoted from ‘Indian Philosophical Quarterly’. Vol-XXIV-97
   By Sanghamitra Dasgupta. Article- ‘Some reflection on the status
   of the world (jagat) in Śaṅkaraite Advaita Vedānta. P-365

100) ibid. P-366. Quoted from ‘The Discovery of India (19th impression’

101) ibid. P-367.