CHAPTER - 5

Sensation, Observation, Imagination and Self-Knowledge

Section-I : Sensation and Observation

Ryle's negative thesis is to show that the term 'mental' stands for something ghostly. It does not have any real status. Uptil now people have believed that sensations are primarily mental. Ryle does not accept this supposition. He believes in the phenomena of sensation, though he does not believe in mind to house them. He tells us that the official doctrine uses the term 'sensation' in a completely different way from what is understood in ordinary sense. The official doctrine thinks that perception involves sensations and sensations are mental processes. Taken in a wide sense it includes all types of perception, and sensation as the ingredient of perception. To perceive is essentially to have sensation.

Ryle goes against this use of sensation. He maintains that the ordinary use of sensation is co-extensive with tactual and kinaesthetic perception as well as perception of temperature and localised pain, discomforts, etc. We feel things hot or cold, soft or hard, sweet or sour, etc. We are said to have sensations of the things concerned. So sensations in ordinary use are to be understood as a species of
perception and not as the ingredient in perception. It is wrong to believe that seeing, hearing, smelling are constituted of sensations. No body says that he has first visual sensation and then he has the experience of seeing. Nor also does he have first an auditory sensation and then hearing something. The cases of seeing, hearing, smelling etc. are decided without any reference to the use of the term 'sensation'. Ryle speaks of object of observation and not of sensation. There is an obvious reason for constantly referring to sensations which are connected with the organs of sense, as we mention constantly what we see and what we do not see, what we hear, smell, taste and feel. But we do not talk about these sensations. Ordinarily we mention them with reference to the things which we observe or claim to observe. People speak of having a glimpse, but only in the context of having a glimpse of something. But they do not break the habit when they are asked to describe how something looked, sounded or tasted. They will normally say that it looked like a haystack, or sounded like something humming or that it tastes like pepper. This way of describing sensation with reference to common objects is of great importance.

A haystack is something about the description of which every one could agree. It is something which any observer could observe and we hope that their accounts agree with one another or would be capable of correction, if there was a difference. The position, size, shape, weight, composition and function are facts which can be established by ordinary
method of observation and inquiry. These methods would also establish how the haystack would look, feel and smell under ordinary conditions of observation. In a similar way something tastes peppery is to say that it now tastes as peppered viands would taste to anybody who has a normal palate. In all these cases we describe our sensations with reference to observers and things like haystack. We follow the same process in describing organic sensations. Ryle maintains in this connection, "The present point of mentioning these ways of describing our sensations is to show how and why there exists a linguistic difficulty in discussing the logic of concepts of sensations. We do not employ a 'neat' sensation vocabulary. We describe particular sensations by referring to how common objects regularly look, sound, and feel to any normal person".¹ Epistemologists are fond of using words like pain, itches, stabs, glows, dazzles, etc. as if they are 'neat' sensation-names. But Ryle thinks it to be misleading. A pain in my knee is a sensation that I mind having, so unnoticed pain is an absurd expression, where unnoticed sensations have no absurdity. Here a distinction of great importance is to be made between having sensations and observing. When a person is said to be watching, seeing or looking at something he is observing some particular thing. His scrutiny is therefore describable as careful or careless, cursory or sustained, methodical or half-hazard, etc. Observing is a task which may be arduous. We can be more or less careful in it or more or less good at it. But none of these

¹ Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p.194.
powers of observations can be applied to the having of
visual, auditory or gustatory sensations.

When it is said that sensations are not sorts of things that can be observed Ryle means that they are unobservable like the infra-microscopic bacteria, flying bullets. They are unobservable in the way in which the planets are unobservable to the blind. Every word that can be written down has a spelling. Some words are more difficult to spell than others. Some words have different spelling. Yet if we are asked how the letters of the alphabet are spelled, we have to say that they cannot be spelled at all. But this 'cannot' does not mean that the task is one of a very great difficulty, but only that it is an improper question. As letters are neither easy to spell nor very hard to spell, so Ryle argues that sensations are neither observable nor unobservable. It is nonsense to speak of observing, inspecting, witnessing or scrutinizing sensations. The objects which are proper to such verbs are things and episodes. But sensations are not such things. If sensations were the proper objects of observation, then observing them must carry the having of sensations of those sensations which we have in the case of glimpse of robin without which we could not be watching the robin. But this is clearly absurd. There is nothing to the corresponding phrases - a glimpse of a glimpse, or a whiff of a pain, or the tingle of a tingle. If there was anything the series would be infinite.
The above arguments of Ryle may be summarised: First, the theorists cannot explain what the sensations are. There is no 'neat' sensation vocabulary. So sensations cannot be described in unambiguous language. The theorists describe sensations with the help of some object such as it looks or sounds in this or that way. So the description of sensations is based on the vocabulary of common objects. This falsifies the theory of the traditionalists where they tried to explain things with the help of sensations; but actually sensations themselves are explicable with the aid of things. Secondly, the sophisticated use of sensation involves perception. We ordinarily use sensations for a special family of sensations such as tactual and kinaesthetic perceptions and perception of temperature as well as localizable pains and discomforts. Seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, etc. do not involve any sensations in this sense of the word. In the sophisticated sense sensations seem to be semi-physiological and semi-psychological. Its employment is allied with the Cartesian theory. This concept does not occur in what novelists, biographers, diarists, physicians say about people. In its familiar use sensation does not denote any ingredient in perception. Thirdly, sensations do not seem to be connected in any way with the qualities of intellect or character. Even sentient creatures are said to have sensations. We speak of reptiles having sensations. Nobody can say that it is having sensations carefully, systematically, thoroughly or purposefully. Fourthly, even when we believe in the line of the theorists that perception has to be preceded by at least one sensation, we do not observe it. What is observed
is an object and not its sensation. Sensations may be noticed but not observed. Alphabets can only be written but not spelled. Similarly sensations if observed would require the sensation of a sensation and the series would go on for ever.

Further, observations are described as good or bad, careful or careless, etc. but no sensation can be described in such a way. Objects of observation have size, shape, position, temperature, colour, smell, etc. but sensations do not have these qualities. Ryle thinks that the properties which we find out by observation or not without observation to characterise the common objects of any one’s observation cannot be significantly ascribed to or denied of, sensations. All persons who believe that sensations are objects of private or internal perception are wrong, because the question of their perception has no sense. Of course the sensations that we just notice or mark are private but privacy does not make them mysterious or ghostly. It means that nobody can eat what I am eating. So nobody can have my sensation which I am having. The food which I take though personal or private is not ghostly. So my sensations though private or personal are not mysterious. So sensations need not refer to a ghostly place called mind in which they are supposed to exist.

In the way having refuted the traditionalists’ view of sensation as something originating and existing in the private world of mind, Ryle considers the associated problem of sense-data. It is quite natural that he fails to see any sense in the theory of sense-data.

A sense-datum is according to the etymology of the word that which is just given to some sense organ and is directly apprehended by it. Thus a colour which is just seen by the eye or a sound just heard by some auditory sense is an instance of what we call a sense-datum. But if we try to define it with reference to sense organ, we get involved in a vicious circle. The sense organ itself is not sensed but we infer it from the sense-data or sensations. So sense organs are to be understood with the help of sense-data and not in the other way. If it is said that a sense-datum is simply that which is given directly to consciousness we have also to regard the data of memory and introspection as sense-data, as they are also present directly to our consciousness. In memory we are directly aware of the past events and in introspection of our mental acts, such as feeling, thought, etc. The difference between sense-data and the data of memory and that of introspection may be that a sense-datum is simple sensuous existent. To understand the nature of sense-data we may take the help of the ideas of two early analysts Moore and Russell.

In his The Problems of Philosophy Russell points out that while we are acquainted with the sense-data, we know physical objects by description. He makes a distinction between two kinds of knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. In the former we become acquainted with what is directly present to us. In the case of a table we are acquainted with the sense-data of colour, shape, size,
hardness, smoothness, etc. Thus sense-data, according to Russell are those things which are immediately known in sensation and sensations to him are the immediate awareness of certain things. We become aware of sense-datum like colour in the case of sensation of colour. Our knowledge of the table as a physical object is obtained through acquaintance with the sense-data that make up the appearance of the table. Different people at different times will have different colours. But none of these can be accepted as the real colour of the table, for any one of these colour has a claim to be regarded as the colour of the table. We cannot consistently maintain that the same thing is differently coloured at different times. In the same way the different shapes of the table differ from person to person at different times. So sense-data give us merely the appearance of an object, as they depend on the relation of observers to some object.

In the opinion of Moore, sense-data are the objects of immediate or direct perception. They are actually what we see; when we look at something, we get a coloured patch of a particular size and shape. We have enough evidence to state that it either is or is not related to the object or is or is not caused by some material object. So Moore thinks that we do not directly see the material object or at least we do not see the whole of it. We percive directly such a patch of colour, shape, size, etc. of the physical object.
The things which are the objects under normal condition of perception are what Moore means by sense-data. When we place a stick in water we find it as bent. When we observe a white wall through blue glasses we have blue sense-data. But even under normal conditions our sense-data may have different shapes and sizes according to distance or the points of view. Moore in his article 'The Status of Sense Data' (PS, 168-96) gives a list of five sub-classes which are all sense-data. (1) Sensory experiences which are sense-data proper, (2) dream experiences, (3) illusion and hallucination, (4) after-images, (5) objects seen under normal condition. These entities which are experienced and anything like them which could be experienced are sense-data, according to Moore.

The advocates of the sense-datum theory are of the opinion that in case of knowing three things are involved; the act of knowing, the sense-datum and the object. We cannot know the object directly, we know directly only the sense-data, through such sense-data we infer the object. So when we know ordinary things, we actually sense some colour patches and through these impressions we can know the object. We do not taste lemon but the flavour and the lemon is known by inference. Some holders of the theory point out that we have intuition of colour patches, direct awareness of smell and acquaintance with tickles, aches, noises, etc. To make precise statement we have sense-data, i.e., they are sensed beyond doubt.
Ryle raises strong objection to the theory of sense-data. He begins his attack by pointing out that verbs like see, hear, taste, etc. do not designate 'neat' sensations. When sensations are construed as the ingredients of perception, the theorists are wrong. Sensation is to be understood as a special family of perception. We can refer to Wittgenstein here, because Ryle is too much influenced by Wittgenstein, though there are differences in their explanation and representation.

According to Wittgenstein, private languages (pain, itches, tingle, etc.) are not intelligible. They seem to name private sensations, but they refer to nothing in language game. It is thought that sensation-words denote sensations, as the word five denotes a number or understanding denotes a mental process. But the real dispute arises when we ask how the word 'pain' denotes a sensation. What sort of connection is there between the word and the sensation? In other words, how do we learn to use sensation-word? It is quite natural to suppose that the relation between pain and some kind of private sensation is similar like the relation between 'red' and a certain familiar kind of publicly observable property. But we seem to talk of pain in the same way. It means that pain and the other sensation-words are names of private sensations. This is just the view which Wittgenstein wants to refute. He raises the question:

"How do words refer to sensations? How is the connection between the name and the thing named set up".  

It is clear that the ways in which the names of public objects and qualities denote their objects cannot be in a remote way like the ways in which 'pain' denotes a sensation. The connection between the name of a public object and the object is established by certain modes of human behaviour in pointing to the objects, drawing their pictures and so on. But none of these general kinds of behaviour play a part in case of the sensation-word 'pain'. We cannot point to a pain, nor show you a pain, nor draw a picture of pain, nor fetch you a pain. None of these things can be done which we do with physical objects. So the mode of behaviour in which alone the connection between the name of something public and the thing it names is made is not available in the case of pain.

So Wittgenstein denies a particular thesis of language that the word 'pain' names or designates something that the persons feel in a way which may be remotely like the way of publicly observable things and their names. In the language-game we play with words like, tree, red, cat, book, man, etc. In these games the connection between the name and the thing is established in a particular way. But in the numerous language-games we play with private sensations, they do not play any part and so denote nothing. Then what does play a part in pain-languages? It is the pain behaviour and the pain comforting behaviours—saying some soothing words and administering sedatives, applying bandages, fixing pillow, etc.
They do not enter into pain language games and we cannot say anything about them. As Wittgenstein thinks: "And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is nothing. Not at all. It is not something, but not a nothing either. The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as something about which nothing could be said".4

In returning to Ryle we may point out, according to him, the whole theory of sense-data is absurd and false. He argues that there is no cognitive relation between mind and the so-called sense-data. So there is no mind as a secret chamber to house them. In his attack he says: "I shall try to prove that the whole theory rests upon a logical howler, the howler, namely, of assimilating the concept of sensation to the concept of observation; and I shall try to show that this assimilation makes nonsense simultaneously of the concept of sensation and of the concept of observation".5 He states that this assimilation has led the theorist to a basic category mistake, as they place the sensation to the same logical category as observation. When in fact, it should be placed in a different type of category. He brings also the reductio absurdum argument against the official theory of sensation. He points out that sensations cannot basically be the observation of sense-data, because in such application we end up in an absurdity of one sort or another. This absurdity is also a symptom of category mistake.

According to sense-datum theory, to have a visual sensation of a horse race is intuiting a patch work of colour. So when we get a glimpse of a horse race, we are getting a glimpse of what we really see. But Ryle thinks that getting a glimpse of a horse race is explained in terms of a person's having a glimpse of something else (a patch work of colour). But if having a glimpse of a horse race entails at least one sensation, then it will involve having at least one sensation which in its turn may be analysed into the sensing of another earlier sensation and so on ad infinitum.

It is also contradictory to say that some one is observing something, but he is having no sensation. It is a contradiction to say that some one is watching something but not getting one glimpse of it. Again, it will be contradictory to say that one is listening to something without having any auditory sensation. It is not possible to have one without the other. Ryle illustrates this with the statement that if all clothes are concatenation of stitches absurdity results from saying that stitches are themselves very tiny clothes. Observing is having sensations, so sensations cannot be like observing as university consists of building but no building itself be a university.

The differences between observation and sensation are noted in this way. Some one may observe patiently or skillfully but the something cannot be said of sensations. They

do not belong to the same category and so it will be a confusion to put them together in one category. As Wittgenstein says, they belong to different language-games. Conversely, things which are said about sensations are not applicable to observation. It is sensible to say that some one refrains from watching a race or he may suspend his observation of a book, but there is no sense in saying that some one is refrained from feeling a pain or has suspended tingle in his nose. We can speak of looks, sounds, flavour, etc. and we can also speak of objects as the look of a plate, the flavour of wine and the like. So there is no datum apart from the object. What we see or observe are common objects, they can be seen or observed by other persons. So sense-data are nothing else than objects. Thus it is said that sensations have no separate existence apart from the objects of observation. If this is true then having a sensation is not to be understood in relation of observer to observed thing. There is thus no need to postulate the existence of sense-data. To say that some one is having a sensation is nothing but the vulgar way of reparting the simple intuiting of a sensible object. Ryle remarks in this connection: "Sensations, then, are not perceiving, observings, or findings, they are not detectings, scannings, inspectings; they are not apprehendings, cognizings, intuitings or knowings. To have a sensation is not to be in cognitive relation to a sensible object. There are no such objects". 7

Ryle so points out that it is not necessary to introduce the absurdities of the sense-datum theory. There are no such objects as sense-data. When some one sees a tilted round plate as elliptical he means simply that, according to Ryle, it looks as an elliptical but untilted plate would look. There is no actual seeing of anything elliptical. It is just comparing how the tilted round plate does look to how untilted elliptical plates look or would look. It is not a reference to an extra object 'a look' as being elliptical, but plates as looking elliptical. To speak about the look of something is to make a mongrel-categorical statement or mixed hypothetical and categorical statement about it. Again we divide an object's qualities as Locke did, into primary and secondary qualities. The former refers to real qualities such as size, shape, extension etc. of an object. These qualities do not depend on the mind. But the qualities like taste, smell, sound, etc. are subjective and depend on the knowing mind for their existence. Ryle does not believe that secondary qualities are subjective or personal. They are objective characteristics of common objects. Sensory qualities do not belong to the observers but the objects observed. Objects are blue or green and not sensation of objects.

Thus with the collapse of the sense-datum theory Ryle claims to prove that sensations or sense impressions are not the tools of the observation of objects. Sensations are not objects of observation, nor are they observing of objects.

We do not require the medium of sense-data to perceive an object. Ryle argues: "... we have no employment for such expressions as 'object of sense', 'sensible object', 'sensum', 'sense datum', 'sense content', 'sense field', and 'sensibility'; the epistemologist's transitive verb 'to sense' and the intimidating 'direct awareness' and 'acquaintance' can be returned to store. They commemorate nothing more than the attempt to give the concepts of sensation the job of the concepts of observations ......' 9 Thus the sense-data theory being refuted mind which is the mythical place for the datum is also refuted. The sense datum theory had unnecessarily established two words – the public and the private world, one to house objects and the other to house sense-data. The result leads to a category mistake.

The denial of the sense datum theory automatically leads to the denial of phenomenology. Ryle is against the doctrine of phenomenology according to which a thing is nothing more than the family of different sense impressions. Phenomenology denies 'the thing in itself' and reduces the thing to the experience of different sense-data. According to this theory, a thing is what looks, sounds, feels, etc. The different impressions of the thing constitute the object. So phenomenology asserts that talking about an object is talking about sense-data. Ryle does not accept this theory. The theory has the merit of denying the ghostly thing in itself. But it suffers from other respects. It explains a thing in terms

of sense-data, but we have already seen that sensations are themselves explicable in terms of things or objects. So phenomenalism preaches the opposite of what the case is. Again, according to phenomenalism, observing an object means observing sensations which cannot also be true. We have already seen that Ryle has proved that sensations cannot be observed. Moreover, language does not permit the propositions about objects to be translated into propositions about sensible objects. In the last analysis sense impressions or sense-data are temporary or fleeting, but things or objects are more or less permanent. Phenomenalism is, therefore, wrong. A thing which is observed is not the family of sense impressions of sense-data. It is the object itself. We observe the common or the public objects. But it may be asked, what is meant by the observation of an object? What is Ryle's answer to this question?

Ryle tries to answer this question in the following way. He rejects the traditional account of perception or observation. Perception is interpreted by the traditionalist as sensation plus meaning. When we perceive a sensible quality we impose all other qualities on it on the basis of past experience. These qualities are found associated with the sensible qualities. We perceive an object in this way. Thus, according to this theory, perception is more than sensations. This account of perception depends on the assumption that there is a private world of mind where the meaning is applied to sensations. This also suggests that what we
directly observe are the sensations and the objects are known indirectly. We do not observe robin. We observe its sensations and know the robin thereafter. Ryle thinks that there is no truth in this account. In his opinion it is the robin which we observe. Knowledge involves, according to him, not only two factors - the knower and the object. It is necessary to introduce sensation to explain perception. What we call sensation is nothing but tactual and kinaesthetic perception. But if perception is said to having at least one sensation and that it is more than sensation, that 'more' does not lie in the ghostly mind's supply of meaning. It depends on recognition or identification. When we notice sensation, we recognise it at once and identify it. That recognition or identification is perception. It is therefore recognising or identifying. Recognising is learnt by practice. Ryle says that we learn perception as we learn bicycle, i.e., we learn by practice. As he illustrates, we perceive a tune, when on noticing the auditory sensation we recognise it. That is, we utilise our past knowledge of the tune we are said to perceive it. Recognition consists in the utilisation of the previous knowledge of the tune. It is utilised when after having a bar or two, we expect those bars to follow which do follow, when we correct omissions and errors in the tune, when after having stopped for a while, it resumes where we expect it to resume. Thus perceiving or recognising a tune means hearing a tune in a special frame of mind. When we learn a tune, we acquire certain auditory perceptions, propensities. When we recognise it
we hear expected notes after expected notes. Similar is the case with the visual and other perceptions. When we catch a glimpse of a thimble, we at once recognise it to be a thimble. When we know a thimble we acquire certain expectations, propensities. We expect to see it in a particular shape, size, colour, etc. and also expect to do with it in a certain way. When in the case of visual sensations these expectations are fulfilled, we are said to recognise or to perceive the thimble. Thus, according to Ryle, perception consists in doing with the recognised object in the expected way. When we fail to utilise our previous knowledge of object we get a mistaken perception. Error in perception is, therefore, a mistake in the technique of the utilisation of past knowledge.

When perception is understood as to recognise an object a certain difficulty may be there. We may ask, how do we pass from mere sensations to the observation of objects? Sensations are personal or private while objects are public or open. How then do we know that cows and gateposts exist by originally having a few sensations? Ryle thinks it to be an improper question. It presumes that sensations are clues or tools which lead us to the confirmation of objects. In Sherlock Holmes, the fingers on the glass and the conversation over head by eavesdroppers could be clues or tools to confirm the gate-keeper as murderer, because all these clues were observed. But sensations are not observed. So how can they be tools? So the 'how question' about cows and gateposts is an improper question. Again, some theorists treat
sensations as raw materials out of which the whole world is constructed. Just as a cake is made out of flour, sugar, milk and eggs, this world, they think is made out of different sensations. Ryle views it as ridiculous, since certain notions as storing, assembling, arranging, etc. which are applied to the ingredients of cake are not applicable to sensations.

Finally, Ryle concludes that there is nothing mysterious or ghostly about sensations. In his 'After Thought' he maintains categorically that there is no sensation but perception. They are organic feelings and do not constitute the stuff of which the secret world of mind is made. They are, in fact, tactual and kinaesthetic perceptions.

**Section II: Imagination**

What about image and imaginations? Unlike sensations images are said to be hundred percent mental. Theorists and laymen have always accepted our images to be mental without any doubt. When we see something in mind's eye or hear in our head something, it is certainly an object of a non-physical world. We think that to be imaginary something has to exist not in our physical world. Imaginary something, therefore must exist in a different world. Thus does it not seem that the denial of dualism is an impossible task? Must not there be a separate theatre to house images? These questions are certainly perplexing for one who is an opponent of dualism.
Ryle has, therefore, to answer how images and imaginations occur, if there is no private world of mind.

In case of discussing the difference between knowing how and knowing that in his book *The Concept of Mind* Ryle mentions that the phrase 'in my head' is used by the theorists as a secret chamber to house inner mental occurrences. He argues that inner activities of mind are mere imaginings. They resemble nothing. The theorists seem to use the phrase 'in my head' in a literal sense, i.e., all mental acts are operated inside our head. In case of doing mental arithmetic one is said to have the numbers in his head and not on paper. External noises come to us from distant places. But when we hear the words that we ourselves utter aloud, the tunes that we hum, the sounds of our own chewing, breathing and coughing are not coming from distant places. These noises have their sources in the head – they are literally present in our heads. Ryle maintains that the phrase 'in my head' cannot be stated in a literal sense. The numbers of arithmetic are not really being heard in one's head in a way in which one really hears one's own coughing or breathing. Arithmetic is done on the paper. In fact, the noises heard through heads like the seeing in the mind's eye are mere fancies to hear or feel something. Ryle states that our phrase 'in my head' is meant to be understood as inside inverted commas like the verb 'see' in such expression as 'I 'see'' , the accident now, though it took forty years ago. If we were really doing what we imagine ourselves doing, namely hearing
ourselves saying or humming things, then these noises would be in our head in the literal use of the phrase.\textsuperscript{10} The occurrences are noises 'inside our head'. But the noises we imagine, we do not produce or hear. We only fancy to do so. Again, Ryle says that people often use 'mental' and 'merely mental' as synonyms for the imaginary. He remarks: 'The phrase 'in the head' can and should always be dispensed with. Its use habituates its employers to the view that minds are queer 'places' the occupants of which are special status phantasms'.\textsuperscript{11}

According to Ryle, there are no images and there is no mind to house them. Images have no existence. Theorists have maintained that imagining is the seeing of mental pictures. They hold that we can see things in our mind's eye, hear tunes in our own head and so on. It is supposed that there is a common nuclear operation of our mind in which imagination consists. Imagination is the source of the knowledge of images and the so-called images resemble the objects of the external world. They thus seem to ignore the difference between the actual seeing of an object and its seeing in the mind's eye. Both the epistemologists and theorists have maintained that a mental picture or a visual image corresponds to a visual sensation. That is to say, an echo stands to the visual sensation of a noise, reflection in a mirror has a relation to the face reflected and the like.

\textsuperscript{10} Ryle, \textit{The Concept of Mind}, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 40.
Ryle raises his objections against the theorists' conception of imagination. In his positive approach he describes imagination as pretention. In his negative approach he criticises the concept of image as a private image. His chief objection to imagining is that seeing in the mind's eye cannot be actual seeing. The two 'seeings' are fundamentally different. According to Ryle, 'seeing' is completely different from seeing. He states that theorists had interpreted 'seeing' as a special case of seeing and thus they overlooked the basic differences between 'seeing' in the mind's eye and seeing the object as such. In case of seeing we have to open our eyes and we have an object present before the senses. But in case of 'seeing' we only require an object of recollection or imagination. Here we have to close our eyes. He maintains that in 'seeing' or imagining there is neither any object of seeing nor any object to be seen. As he states that in certain conditions the theorists fail to realise that he is not seeing but only 'seeing' as in dream, delirium, thirst, hypnosis and conjuring shows. The theorist does not obliterate the distinction between the concept of seeing and that of 'seeing' at all.\textsuperscript{12} 'In other words when a person says that he 'sees' something which he is not seeing, he knows that what he is doing is something which is totally different in kind from seeing'.\textsuperscript{13}

In short, Ryle's thesis on imagination is that there can be no seeing in the mind's eye, no inner pictures corresponding

\textsuperscript{12} Ryle, \textit{The Concept of Mind}, p. 233.
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 233.
to the objects of the external world and no mind to house them. Picturing or imagining is only pretending or fancying to see. A child may pretend to be a bear where there is no actual bear. A man may pretend to see where there is no actual seeing. So although imagining occurs, images are not seen. When one pictures or visualises his nursery, he does not see the internal replica, copy or resemblance of his nursery. When one pictures a thing, he does not see any likeness of that thing. This clearly means that there is neither any act of seeing nor any object to be seen. Just as pretending to murder on the stage is not actual murder, similarly, pretending to see in mind's eye is not actual seeing. Just as stage murder has no real victim, similarly, imagining has no object. Ryle points out that there are no two species of murderer, those who murder people and those who act the part of the murders on the stage. They pretend to commit murder and pretending to murder entails no murderings, but seeming to murder. As mock murders are not murders, so imagined sights or sounds are not sights or sounds as such. As Ryle puts it: "Similarly a person who sees Helvellyn in his mind's eye is not seeing either the mountain, or a likeness of the mountain; there is neither a mountain in front of the eyes in his face, nor a mock-mountain in front of any other non-facial eyes". 14 He explains away such questions as spurious questions like: where does the victim of mock-murder reside or exist? Where do the objects reside that we see in the mind's eye? Since there are neither such

victims nor such objects. Ryle thus wants to establish that as a matter of fact there are no images. Imagining is just pretending. He observes: "Indeed if we are asked whether imagining is a cognitive or non-cognitive activity, our proper policy is to ignore the question, 'cognitive' belongs to the vocabulary of examination papers". He thus refutes the theorist's doctrine of imagination and the conception of mind altogether. He maintains that the theorists' opinion is completely false.

Ryle's arguments may be summarised in the following way:

(a) Ryle's crucial objection to imagining as seeing of mental pictures rests on his showing that seeing in the mind's eye cannot be seeing. 'Seeing' in the mind's eye is intrinsically different from seeing. He seems to draw a line of distinction between the words 'see' and see. Seeing things and hearing tunes with our sense organs are fundamentally different in kind from 'seeing' in the mind's eye. The theorists ignore this difference. In the former case we refer to actual seeing of objects. They are present to our sense organs. They have their existence in the physical world. But in the latter case we have the objects in imagination or recollection. Here objects are pictured or imagined, i.e., they are not present to our sense organs. According to Ryle, to see is one thing and 'to see' or imagine is another. It is a mistake to suppose that 'seeing' is a species of seeing. Hume, as Ryle maintains, 15. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 244.
seems to commit this mistake. That is why, Hume holds that perception is the name of a genus of which there are two species, namely, impressions and ideas - the faint copies of impressions; impressions and the ghosts or echoes of impressions. Ryle argues that there are no such ghosts and if there were they would merely be extra impressions, and they would belong to seeing and not to 'seeing'.

(b) The description of seeing and hearing is different from the description of 'seeing' and 'hearing'. Where as one describes the 'seeing' of his home in his mind's eye as 'faithful', 'vivid', or 'life-like', one cannot describe the seeing of his home as 'vivid', 'faithful', or 'life-like'. Our visualisation or imagining can be termed as 'vivid', but our physical perceptions cannot.

(c) Where as it is always possible for us to see unknown things or hear unknown tunes, it is not possible to 'see' unknown things or 'hear' unknown tunes. That is way, they are basically different, i.e., 'seeing' is not same as seeing.

(d) If imagining means seeing a picture or a copy of something, then it would be confined to picturing sights and sounds only. If we see a mountain, we also see its photograph. If we hear a sound, we also hear its echoe. The mountain and the sound are physical things. The photograph and echo are copies. But where are the copies of original smell, taste, ______

and feeling? There are no copies corresponding to the cases of smelling, tasting, etc. The very idea of copy, Ryle holds, is meaningless with regard to smell or taste. Thus imagining is not at all concerned with the copy of anything.

(e) Due to our uncritical attitude we believe that 'seeing' is not different from seeing. Ryle gives us a number of reasons to show that this belief is erroneous and illfounded. When we see pictures or snapshots of things, we seem to see the original themselves, though the originals may not be physically present. Seeming to see the originals in such cases is imagining to see the originals. Seeing of pictures therefore invariably leads to imaginings. This bond gives rise to confusion. That is, if seeing pictures is imagining, imagining also is seeing pictures. But this inversion is not valid, according to Ryle.

(f) Ryle thinks that the powerful similarity that appears to exist between 'seeing' and seeing is not due to the fact that 'seeing' is a special case of seeing. They appear to be similar, because both of them are the utilisation of our same piece of knowledge. Our knowledge of a thing sometimes results in seeing and sometimes in imagining. Moreover, the assimilation between 'seeing' and seeing is also due to their common characteristics. That is why, we are not at all free 'to see' or to see whatever we wish or what we like. According to Ryle, this restriction, in both leads us to suppose that 'seeing' and seeing are not alike.
(g) Ryle holds that an image does not exist. Let us consider the case of a child picturing her doll as smiling. Now where is the smile? Certainty not on the lips of the doll. Because the doll is in front of the child, and she does not see any smile there. The smile is, therefore, supposed to be existing in the child's secret chamber called mind. But this is also absurd. How can the lips be at one place and the smile in another? The theorists conceive of the lips to be existing in one sort of the world – the physical world and the smile in another – the mental world. But this is absurd. So smile as an image does not exist when the child images her doll as smiling. The child simply fancies her doll as smiling.

A question may be raised in this context: Why does imaging appear to be the seeing of picture of things? Ryle answers that it is owing to the fact that pictures are great provocatives of imagining or fanciful seeing. While looking at the photograph of a man, one seems to perceive the man or fancies to see the man. So physical pictures or photograph of things are good stimuli to give rise to fanciful perceiving. Since pictures induce imagining or fanciful seeings, whenever there is imagining or fanciful seeing, we appear to be seeing pictures. But actually there is neither any picture nor any seeing of it. Again, it may be asked: If picturing or seeing before the mind's eye is no more than a fanciful perception, why does not one realise that it is a fancy? Why does not one believe that it is
not in truth seeing, but only pretending or fancying to see? Ryle points out that as in a game a child playing the part of a bear forgets that it is a game and gets afraid of a bear, so a man while fancying to see in the mind's eye does not understand that it is just a fancy and nothing more than a fancy. A different question still remains: If there be no seeing of any internal pictures at all how shall we explain dreams? Dreams obviously refer to the seeing of internal pictures. Ryle explains dreams also as a fanciful seeing. He states that dreaming is not witnessing a private cinematograph show. It is rather witnessing a public cinematograph show. Here we fancy to see kings, mountains, fairies, etc.

Finally, Ryle concludes that images are pseudo, rather non-existent entities. There is no mind to house them. The theorists' conception of mind as a secret chamber of internal function is nothing but a ghostly entity. To see in the mind's eye - the supposed nuclear element is completely false. There are no images, no imaginations and so no internal seeing of anything whatsoever.
No. R/Ph.D./Th-1087/A/1431

Dated: __________

From: The Registrar
University of Burdwan, Burdwan

To: Prof. /Dr. Kalayan Bagchi (Retd.)
Sudhir Apartment, Flat No. 102
108/5 N.N. Road, Calcutta-700 028

Sir,

You are requested kindly to conduct the Viva-voce of
Sri/Smt. Ranajit Manna, in connection with
the award of Ph.D. Degree in Arts/Science/Engineering/Medicine
(Philosophy), jointly with Dr. Mrinal Kanti Bhadra
(Supervisor of the candidate)
Prof. of Philosophy, on 3.2.98 (Tuesday)
at 1-30 p.m. at the Residence of Prof. M K Bhadra (Retd.)
3, Satyajit Roy Branch Road, Behala
Calcutta - 700 031

Prof. /Dr. Mrinal Kanti Bhadra (Retd.) and the
candidate are also being informed accordingly.

Admissible T.A. as per rules of the University will be paid
to you for performing the journey in this behalf. You will kindly
note in this connection that First Class Railway fare will be admi-
sible on production of Railway money receipt or ticket number as
per the rules of the University.

Yours faithfully,

D. P. Chandra
Assistant Registrar
UNIVERSITY OF BURDWAN
BURDWAN-713 104
Registrar
Ryle rejects the Cartesian thesis of dualism and upholds the view that knowledge is to be understood in terms of knowing how. He does not admit any process of mediation between theory and practice, between considering and executing. When we know, the nature of knowledge is dispositional. There is no inner life which is available to man. This theory of hidden access is to be replaced by open access. There is no room for so-called self-knowledge which has been traditionally accepted by the Cartesians. The theorists stress on the belief that human beings possess a power of apprehending their own mental states and processes. This power is superior to that which they have in knowing the facts of the external world. There is a constant awareness of the inner life. We have also a non-sensuous inner perception of these mental events. Such knowledge is supposed to be free from error. It makes self-knowledge superior in quality and also prior in genesis. We may doubt what the senses deliver to us. But what our consciousness and introspection make us aware must be beyond doubt. This theory of special privilege makes it sure that our conscious apprehension of mental states does not have any uncertainty. The sense in which mental states are thus known is not the dispositional sense. It is an occurrence. A person can be 'actively cognisant' of his mental states. Ryle revolts against such a conception of knowledge. According to him, consciousness and introspection do not have the characteristics ascribed to them by the official description. The
objects apprehended by them are mere myths. Ryle wants to show that the official doctrines of consciousness and introspection are logical muddles. He will not deny self-knowledge but will try to establish that self-knowledge and knowledge about other persons have a parity. There is not much difference between the sorts of things which I can find about myself and about other people. The method by which those things are found are more or less the same. In some cases the differences are greater, while in other cases the differences are much narrowed down. In principle, as Ryle says, John Doe's ways of finding out what is true about himself are the same as those about Richard Roe. This method removes "the fear of epistemological isolationism; we lose the bitters with the sweets of solipsism".  

Ryle thinks that we cannot have knowledge of ourselves with the doubtful means of consciousness and introspection. We have to examine the arguments by which Ryle wants to demolish the privileged access of consciousness and introspection. Generally, the word 'consciousness' has the following senses:

(1) The word 'conscious' or 'consciousness' is used when something is vaguely or indistinctly apprehended. When we say, 'I was conscious that something wrong had occurred', we understand the word in this way.

(2) It is used when we want to express some embarrassment as in the case of some young person. We say, he is conscious of the sorry figure which he shows on the occasion.

(3) The word is used when we speak of 'self-consciousness'. In such a situation we pay heed to our qualities of character or intellect. We may also say 'I am conscious of my home-sickness'. The Freudian idea of the 'unconscious' or the 'subconscious' seemsto be closely connected with this use of consciousness.

(4) 'Consciousness' may also be used in the sense of sensitiveness. We may say that consciousness is returing to my numbed feet. When a person has lost his consciousness, it is said that he has become insensitive to certain parts or the whole of his body.

(5) A person can be unconscious in another sense, when he is unmindful of a pain in the pinching of his shoes, because he was engaged in a serious talks we have this sense. A person pays heed to his bodily sensations. But when he becomes unconscious of the sensation, we may say that he did not have any consciousness of the pain at that time.

(6) There is also another sense of 'conscious', when it is said that I was conscious that the furniture had been rearranged. The furniture looked different, but the observer could not specify the difference. But this inexpressibility does not imply the presence of any special faculty.

In discussing these different senses of 'consciousness' Ryle wants to point out, not any one of these senses covers the whole meaning. About the philosophical notion of
consciousness, he thinks that it is used in the sense of the essence of the mental as opposed to physical life. To the traditional philosopher mental is conscious. It is, as if, some God given light was believed by the Protestants to have endowed our conscience. The Protestants believe that conscience has an inner light by which we can discover the moral quality of an action. Similarly it was thought by the philosophers that consciousness has an illuminating quality by which mental states are revealed. Ryle denies this 'phosphorescent' quality of consciousness. It is not true that we are aware of the two processes — one by which the object is revealed, while another illumines the process of revealing. If it is so, we would need a third mental act which throws light on the second process and this may go on ad infinitum. If I am working on a problem of geometry, I am conscious of the relation between the premises and the conclusion. But in addition, there is no awareness of this awareness. The series of consciousness has to be discarded. Ryle points out that we do usually what we are about. But no phosphorescent-theory is needed to explain it. To know what we are about does not require cases of actual monitoring. As we generally do what we are about, we do not come across any event of ghostly status. Ryle mentions that when we speak of seeing a table, we do not speak of knowing it. The table is seen in light which enables us to talk of seeing, not of knowing. Knowing is not the same as looking at. What is known is not the same sort of thing as what is illuminated. There may be some analogy between a
thing's being illuminated and its being known. It might explain how mental processes are discerned, but not how we discover truths or avoid errors.

Ryle now turns to introspection. He denies introspection almost in the same way as he denies the phosphorescent character of consciousness. He thinks that introspection is a term of art and is very seldom used by the untheoretical people for self-description. We often speak of a man as introspective, when he pays more attention to his own problems, his character, abilities, etc. It has been used in a technical sense to denote a particular species of perception. But it is a kind of non-sensuous perception. It is unlike sense observation in an important sense. Things which are looked at or heard are public objects. Anyone suitably placed could observe them. But it is only the owner of mental states who can introspect. As it has been already noted, introspection does not require any bodily organ. Again, sense perception may be dull or subject to error. But introspection is said to be perfect. Inner perception sets a standard of validity, which sense perception can never attain. In this connection Ryle stresses the difference between consciousness and introspection. The latter is an attentive operation, but consciousness is a constant element of all mental processes and does not need any special act of attention.

Introspection requires that the observer could pay attention to two things at the same time. He could make a
resolution of getting up early in the morning and at the same time observing his resolve of getting up. The question is whether such a division of attention is possible. It may be pointed out that the division is actually a rapid to-and-fro attention. But there are people who had been confident of performing this double act are becoming dubious of doing so.

Psychologists used to say previously that introspection was the main source of information about the activities of minds. But it is found that the facts reported by one psychologist conflict with those of others. Introspection is said to be unerring. If it is so, why do not the reports agree with one another? Moreover, there are some states of mind which cannot be introspected properly. There are the states of 'panic' and 'fury'. This is also true of the experience of merriment which produces violent agitation. These mental states can be examined better in retrospections. If retrospection can give us the data needed for knowledge of some states of mind, we do not understand why it cannot do so in all cases. It does not mean that retrospections being autobiographical, it does not have a privileged access. Retrospection is the process of recalling our own public or silent behaviour. We talk dispositionally about such behaviour. It is more or less the same process by which we discover the same kind of pattern in the behaviours of others.
In coming to discuss self-knowledge Ryle gives us the idea that when we speak of a person's mind we do not point to a second theatre with special status incidents. On the other hand, we speak of certain ways in which the incidents of his life are ordered. Man's life is not a double series of events with two different kinds of stuff. It is one concatenation of events. Ryle does not use the word 'mind' but uses the word person which we find later in Strawson's philosophy. It is a person who knows, thinks and feels as well as performs certain activities. We cannot understand a person as a combination of body and mind. When we make assertions about a person's mind, we are making assertions about what he does or does not in certain situations. Ryle thinks that it is an improper question to ask something about the relation between a person and his mind. It is improper in the sense in which it is so about the relation between his body and his mind. The question is improper in the same way in which we ask what transactions go between the House of Commons and the British Constitution.

We cannot say of someone's mind knowing this or choosing that. It is the person who knows this or chooses that. But choosing or knowing can be a mental fact. If we say that our eyes are seeing this or my nose is smelling that, it will be also an improper expression. The analogy between the sense-organ and the mind is not exact, for 'my mind' does not stand for another organ. It indicates certain abilities and proneness to do certain things. Ryle refers
us to a logical hazard if we construct improper conjunction, disjunction and cause-effect propositions with body and mind. As has been mentioned earlier the conjunctive phrase is as ridiculous as the conjunctive expression 'She came home in tears and a sedan chair'. Similarly, British Constitution is not another political institution like Civil Service, judiciary, the Church, the Houses of Parliament and the Royal family. We can say that the Great Britain has gone to polls, but the same cannot be said of the British Constitution. But going to polls may be described as a constitutional function.

Ryle denies mental happenings or inner workings of mind in order to answer the question, 'How does a person know his mind'? It is not taking peep into a windowless chamber illuminated by a peculiar sort of light. In the case of understanding how we know another person to be lazy or hard-working, it becomes impossible to look into another mind to which we have no access. In fact, the answer to these questions does not lie in this way. We want to see how we can establish and apply law-like propositions. By observing the moves of a chess player I can say that he is a skilled player. If I were the player, I may have some advantage, as I am never absent from myself and can listen to my soliloquies. Ryle's opinion is that the question how do I discover that I or you have a mind is not the envelope-question. On the other hand, it covers a range of specific questions such as 'How do I discover that I am more unselfish
than you? Questions of this sort are not mysterious. We know how to set, to work, to find out the answer. In some cases after listening to an argument it may appear that I do not understand it. But I know what tests would settle the point. In the cases of another person the deductions he makes that he has understood the argument. If the person is myself there may not be expressions of my deductions. But there will be hearing of the soliloquy. Thus the answer to the question how an argument can be understood is decided more or less satisfactorily in both the cases. Thus the method of knowing a person's own mind is the same as knowing the mind of another person. By noticing the behaviour of other persons I am to know his abilities and character. The dispositional account of knowledge makes an open access and with it the Cartesian ego is removed. Ryle calls this method of knowing one's mind inductive. It is an induction to law like prepositions about abilities and propensities on the basis of observed behaviour.

Ryle's attempt to confine a man's inner life to his behaviour springs from his belief that there is one world. It is a world which is open to everybody. Man's mental life is not secret or private. The various aspects of his personality are public. Ryle may speak of one world, but he thinks that what we call self or soul can be completely described in objective language. It is true that the self cannot be caught by such description. It eludes our grasps. It was Hume who denied the existence of an identical self. He said that when we enter into what I call myself I always stumble
upon some particular perception or feelings, but I do not discover anything called self. I never catch myself without perception and do never observe anything but perceptions. Ryle echoes the sentiment of Hume and says that the concept 'I' is systematically elusive. The notion is of mysterious nature and does not refer to anything for which it stands.

Philosophers raise the question about self by asking what the words 'I', 'you' stand for. Ordinary people are familiar with the names of rivers and dogs. They are also aware that other people have surnames which are used in public. But 'I' and 'you' seem to be different. They are not like public surnames. So they must be names of some queer entity which is the extra individual who exists behind their names and surnames. But this way of approaching the question, according to Ryle, is mistaken.

Ryle does not understand by the words 'I' and 'you' any queer entity. His dictionary does not refer to any such entity which is hidden inside the individual being. These names are like index words. Pronouns like 'I' and 'you' are direct index words while 'he' and 'they' and in some cases 'we' are indirect index words. 'I' indicates the person from which the word issues. 'You' refers to the person who is addressed as such by me and who hears the word when he is so addressed. In all these cases the physiological occurrence of the index word is associated bodily to what the words indicate.
In this connection Ryle introduces the concept of higher order activity. He thinks that the word 'I' is not of the same category as the word 'he', 'she' or 'it'. A higher order action is concerned with other actions. When I cheer up B while he plays football, my cheering up activity is a higher order action, since it is concerned with B's action of playing football. When someone else applauds my cheering up activity, his action is still higher order and so on. Ryle thinks that just as one directs his higher order action on the actions of others, so he directs his higher order action on his own. Just as I applauds B's success at the examination, so I applauds my own success at the examination. Ryle argues as if the formula is one — A applauding B's success at the examination, and we may substitute the variables A and B with 'I', 'you', 'he', 'she', 'my', 'mine', etc. These substitutions will give us the specific instances of some basic facts. As he observes: "'I' is not an alias for 'Gilbert Ryle'; it indicates the person whom 'Gilbert Ryle' names, when Gilbert Ryle uses 'I' " 18. In a like manner, Wittgenstein in cases of denying private sensations states that he not only denies that 'pain' in 'I am in pain' denotes a private sensation, he also denies that the 'I' in it denotes a particular person namely oneself. To quote him: "'To say 'I have pain' is no more a statement about a particular person than moaning is'". 19

Finally, Ryle's denial of Cartesianism with reference to the knowledge of other mind may lead one to philosophical behaviourism. Behaviourism which is opposed to Cartesianism holds that only behaviours of physiological changes can be studied in a fruitful way, as behaviours can be observed. But philosophical behaviourism goes further, because it denies that there could be anything which is inner process or state and therefore unobservable. It maintains that to say that 'some one is in pain' is to state that he behaves in certain ways. Further as my privileged access to my own mind is denied, it follows that any one can have a good knowledge of the fact that I am in pain and also that just as the other can learn my pain from my behaviour, I do learn of it also in the same way. We may take into account the treatment of the problem from other contemporary philosophers. We can show that they too accept the behaviouristic approach. These philosophers are Ayer, Strawson, Wittgenstein, Malcolm, etc. According to Ayer, if man's sensory history is private to himself, it results in a complete solipsism. It wants to hold that no other persons besides himself exist or at any rate there is no good reason to support that only other people besides himself can exist. The correct way in which the view can be refuted is to use an argument from analogy. It states that there is a perceptible resemblance between the behaviour of other bodies and my own behaviour. So we may define other people in terms of their empirical manifestations. Ayer remarks: '..... it follows that each of us,
although his sensory experiences are private to himself, has good reason to believe that he and other conscious beings inhabit a common world. For each of us observes the behaviours, on the part of himself and others which constitute the requisite understanding. And there is nothing in our epistemology which involves a denial of this fact". 20

Strawson in his Individuals attempts to give a note on the knowledge of other mind by pointing out the absurd consequence of the Cartesian theory of mind. Philosophers are faced often with a special difficulty about the possibility of identifying states of consciousness by reference to material objects. How is it possible to identify them? Strawson considers two alternatives in this regard and states his own opinion on identifying states of consciousness. The first one is the no-ownership theory which is rejected on the ground that if states of consciousness do not belong to anything at all, the question of their identification cannot arise. An experience can be identified only as belonging to some body's experiences. But the no-ownership theory has no way of referring to them, because it does not accept any subject of experiences. The second alternative which is a Cartesian type theory is not also satisfactory. According to it, the experiences belong to a private ego. But if the experiences are wholly private, there is no possible way in which they can be ascribed to any body but themselves. There is no way of identifying them as so and so's experiences. It would then be impossible to ascribe them even to ourselves, as there is no sense in the idea of ascribing.

states of consciousness to oneself, unless the ascriber already knows how to ascribe at least some of them to others. If we say that 'I am in pain' it is to say that it is I and not you who is experiencing the pain. It is necessary to contrast your pain with my pain for the ascription of a particular pain to myself.

Strawson upholds the concept of person as a primitive unanalysable concept. He wants to solve the problem of identification of states of consciousness by this concept. A person is not a compound of body and mind, but a single particular to which we can ascribe not only M-predicates as weighs ten stone, height, colour, etc. but also P-predicates such as 'is in pain', 'is going for a holiday', 'believe in God'. The latter predicates are ascribed to other persons on the basis of our observation of their behaviours. The mode of behaviour provides us with the logically adequate criteria for ascription of P-predicates to them. The concept of depression covers the depression which X feels but does not observe and the depression which persons other than X observes, but does not feel. To deny this, Strawson argues is to refuse to accept the structure of language in which we talk of depression.

According to N. Malcolm, the importance of analogical argument in case of knowing other mind cannot be ignored. In his article 'Knowledge of Other Mind' he gives emphasis on this argument. This argument is based on inductive reasoning. It was used by J. S. Mill. When my behaviour is such and
such I feel giddy. So perhaps when another man behaves in the same way he feels similarly. But the validity of analogical argument may be questioned. What is the criterion of verification to say that 'he has a pain' means that he has the same thing I have when I have a pain. A philosopher relying on the analogical argument cannot escape the state of being confined to himself. It is not possible to learn what thinking, fear, or pain is from one's own case. The thing to be observed does not happen to be behaviour but something 'inward'. In attributing pain to myself I speak of something inward, but when I talk about the pain of another person I mean behaviour. Thus pain cannot be attributed in the same sense to oneself and other person. If one is acquainted with one's own mental phenomena, it becomes difficult to make the transition from one's own case to the case of another.

Some philosophers before Wittgenstein may have found that solipsism results if we start with our own case. But Malcolm believes that Wittgenstein is the first thinker who has shown that both solipsism and argument from analogy are inadequate for the explanation of other mind. One supposes that one picks out something like thinking or pain inwardly and then identifies it whenever it presents itself in the soul. But the question raised in this case: Does one make correct identification? The follower of the private identification cannot say anything in this respect. He feels sure that he identifies correctly the occurrence in his mind.
But feeling sure is no guarantee of being right. Indeed he has no idea about the meaning of being right. He does not know how to distinguish between actually making correct identification and to have an expression that he does it. It may be that he identifies the emotion of anxiety as the sensation of pain. We have no standard, no example, no customary practice with which we can compare our inner recognitions. Wittgenstein tries to show that the meaning and the understanding are not the processes which go in people's mind. They are rather how they behave or how they use words and expressions. Thus he wants to corroborate his central thesis that what gives life and significance to words is their use. It is the way they figure various language-games and the mode of behaviour in which they play a part.