CHAPTER - I

The Problem of Method: The Analytic Method

In Philosophy as well as in science method plays an important part. The particular method adopted by a philosopher goes a long way in solving the problems raised in philosophical disputes. Often it is found that a philosophical problem fails to be resolved due to the use of an inappropriate method.

We can refer to the well known dispute between the empiricist and the rationalist philosophers. One group points to a series of entities such as innate ideas, the idea of substance etc. as the important things which cannot be rejected in philosophy. But another group of philosophers tend to think that such ideas are accepted to be real, as the philosophers are victims of a wrong method. In this context we have to place Gilbert Ryle's philosophical method which draws our attention to many pseudo-problems such as those of mental concepts. We have to see how Ryle enquires into them with the help of his analytic and linguistic method. But as Ryle's philosophical method developed in the background of analytical tendency in modern Western Philosophy, we ought to give some idea of that way of thinking.

Philosophers are interested in the disputes with regard to the problems of mind and body, knowledge, sense-data,
perceptions, etc. Some philosophers have investigated into these problems with the help of conceptual analysis. But others pay their attention to the analysis of every day language, the language used in common discourse. There are thus different ways in which the problems can be investigated. This gives rise to the different approaches in analytical thinking. This difference among philosophers leads R. Ammerman to comment: "There is no 'analytic party line'—no heresies, no pontifical authorities. The word 'analysis' is used here as a way of grouping together a number of heterogeneous philosophers who share certain interests and procedures".¹ There is no single philosophy of analysis and consequently no single method. Philosophical analysis involves in essence a study of language, but it has its differences from other important studies of language, such as linguistics, philological grammar, etc. In these studies the attention is given to empirical investigation only. The interest of the thinkers in these studies is merely on how the language is used, the meanings of words, language, the gradual change of language, etc. These queries are examined through a scientific study of language. The analytic philosophers study language not with an end to formulate hypothesis about it. On the other hand, they believe that such a study offers invaluable service to their primary goal of settling philosophical disputes. In their opinion the wrong ways of using language creates philosophical problems.

The Analytic philosophers agree that the study of language is of utmost importance. But they do not hold the same opinion about the type of language which is to be selected. This has created a sharp cleavage among these philosophers. Some speak of constructing an artificial, or a formal language. The rules of such language are supposed to be clearer, more complete and more precise than those of ordinary language. Other analytic philosophers do not agree with this opinion. They think that such artificial languages do not render any help towards solving philosophical problems. They believe that a careful analysis of ordinary language is the right way to solve philosophical problems, because it is with this language we communicate with one another. Due to this fact these philosophers are called ordinary language philosophers. Generally these two groups are distinguished as the logical positivists and the linguistic analysts. Some may not fit in either of the groups, but the majority can be included either in one group or another.

We may divide the history of analytic philosophy into five stages. (1) The first stage which can be called that of realism and analysis had Russell and Moore as its advocates. (2) The second stage finds the construction of formal language associated with the work of Russell between 1914 and 1919 together with Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. It is generally known as the period of Logical Atomism. It wanted to construct a language whose syntax would mirror the relation of the basic entities which compose the universe. (3) The third stage is an attempt
to abolish metaphysics as we find in the writings of Rudolph Carnap and A.J. Ayer. This is the stage of Logical Positivism and is associated with formal language also. (4) The fourth stage is the analysis of states in natural and ordinary language. It is a repudiation of the stages two or three, direct or indirect. The analysis was practised by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*, which was also adopted by Ryle. (5) The fifth continues the practice in a more systematic way in the hands of Austin.

Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore may be called the two early pioneers of contemporary analysis. Moore made a scathing attack on Idealism in a series of articles. His main tools in his attack on Idealism were his acceptance of common sense and his repeated appeal to the meaning, words used in ordinary everyday life. He rejected the basic principle of Idealism which accepts the internality of all relations. He subjected to severe criticism the fundamental principle 'Esse est percipi' on which Idealism stands. He concludes that the thesis 'All relations are internal' must be false, as 'it flies in the face of common sense'. He admits on the basis of his appeal to common sense that some relations are external while some are internal. In his opinion the Idealist principle is mistaken. Moore criticizes the fundamental principle of Idealism 'To be is to be perceived'. He points out that if the principle can be shown to be false, it may still be true, but it cannot certainly be proved to be true.
The refutation of Idealism is an attempt to demonstrate the falsity of the thesis 'to be is to be perceived'. The formula wants to assert that if any thing 'X' is known to exist, it follows as a consequence that it is perceived. But 'to be perceived' is not identical with 'to be'. Being and being perceived cannot be identical. But the idealists have not been able to recognize the difference between 'being yellow' and 'being a sensation of yellow'. The true analysis of a sensation or an idea is that it is a case of knowing or being aware of something. When we know something, we are not describing our consciousness nor are we asserting the experience of some kind of mental image. To have a sensation of red is to be aware of something red.

In his article 'Moore and Ordinary Language' Norman Malcolm gives a list of statements by philosophers as rejected by Moore. One of these statements is 'No material things exist unperceived'. To this, Malcolm thinks that Moore's reply would that it is absurd, for no one perceived 'my' bed room, while 'I' was asleep last night and yet certainly it did not cease to exist. (Reference: 'Moore and ordinary language' in Ordinary Language ed. by V.C. Chapell, Prentice Hall, 1964, p. 7).

Malcolm states that Moore's technique of refuting philosophical statements points out that these statements go against ordinary language. Let us consider the philosophical statement 'All that one sees when one looks at a thing is part of one's
brain'. It may be interpreted as meaning 'whenever one looks at a thing it is really more correct language to say that one sees a part of one's brain'. But Moore's reply would be 'this desk which both of us see is not a part of my brain'. It may be interpreted as saying that 'it is correct language to say that what we are doing now is seeing a desk and it is not correct language to say that what we are doing now is seeing parts of our brain' (Ibid., p.9).

Malcolm states in the concluding remarks of the essay that Moore's style of refutation does not reach the source of paradox which the philosophical statements want to establish. It may show the philosopher that his paradox is false, but it does not explain the reason of the attack on ordinary language. It does not remove also the temptation to attack ordinary language by showing how fruitless it is. Moore may succeed in making the philosopher feel refuted, but he does not succeed in curing the philosophical puzzlement which caused the paradox which needs to be refuted. Malcolm thinks that Moore's philosophical method is incomplete, but it is the essential first step in a complete method. But this description does not adequately establish the importance of the role he has played in the history of philosophy. His greatest role, according to Malcolm, consists in the fact that he has been the first philosopher to sense that any philosophical statement which violates ordinary language is false. He has also been consistently defending ordinary language against philosophical violation (Ibid., pp.22-23).
In Russell's analytic philosophy the concept of logical form occupies a central position. He wants to determine the true logical form of propositions. In order to do this we have to avoid the traditional subject-predicate schema. The concept of logical form may lead us to an examination of the constituents of propositions. Once this is done, we come to find that the proposition does not have a subject-predicate form. The proposition is a relational one in which the word 'loves' indicates a relation between two constituents - 'Socrates' and 'Plato' in the proposition 'Socrates loves Plato'. Such a correct analysis of language can also throw light on the structure of reality. If we want to discover the genuine constituents of a proposition, we can do that by 'recasting' or 'reconstructing'. This is known as the method of eliminating incomplete symbols. An incomplete symbol has no meaning in isolation. The meaning occurs only in a particular context. Reconstructionism is adopted in an analysis of propositions in ordinary language. In that task we want to remove the misleading grammatical form. We bring out the true constituents which assert a fact. This shows that reconstructionism represents the method of explaining and examining the nature of true referents. In this way, symbols which are not true constituents are removed. Russell points out that denoting phrases or descriptive phrases are not names, but they may represent grammatical subjects which are incomplete symbols.
According to Russell, there are two types of descriptive phrases, definite and indefinite. A definite description is expressed in the form - 'the so and so'. These phrases may describe or denote, but they do not name anything. We can consider an indefinite description - 'a man' what is meant by the proposition 'I met a man'. In this case there is no reference to an actual man. The phrase - a unicorn, a sea-serpent, a man do not denote anything. There is no reference to any individual thing. Therefore they cannot be called names. As Russell points out:

"...an indefinite description describes nothing". 

About definite description Russell wants to say that they are incomplete symbols, as they have no meaning in isolation. Such symbols have a function in sentences, but they do not name any entity. These descriptions are grammatically more misleading, as the word 'The' suggests that a definite entity is being named. When we say 'The author of Waverly is Scot', we do not say any thing about the author of Waverly. When the proposition is analysed we get the following propositions:

(a) At least one person wrote Waverly
(b) At most one person wrote Waverly
(c) Who ever wrote Waverly is Scot.

This shows names and descriptions are two things. Descriptions do not have a referential function. Descriptive

propositions are not about any referent. As a result, they do not suggest that such objects exist.

Russell thinks that there is a complete correspondence between language and reality. It means that we can make ontological clarification through a proper analysis of language. His main purpose in such analysis is to uncover the basic form of facts – the true referents or complete symbols of propositions.

Logical positivism has a common heritage with analytic philosophy. It means that all logical positivists make use of analysis, but not all analytic philosophers are logical positivists. The logical positivists indicate a group of philosophers who shared common aim and common interest. They have a common tendency which points out that all metaphysical sentences are meaningless. They agreed with Wittgenstein that metaphysical questions are pseudo-questions and do not have any answer. Most of the logical positivists identified philosophy with analysis.

According to them, every proposition has to be verified with reference to experience. But in the case of metaphysical propositions we cannot think of any possible experience which can verify that proposition. The criterion of meaningfulness of propositions is verification. It means that the meaning of a proposition lies in its method of verification. As metaphysical entity cannot be verified, any proposition
about it is meaningless. Any proposition must be either analytic or verifiable. The programme of logical positivism showed that there is no special set philosophical propositions. But such propositions are used in clarifying other propositions. This shows that philosophy does not contain speculative truths. The business of philosophy is wholly critical and it is an analytic activity. In the works of empirical philosophers we discover this trend. Philosophy is not concerned with the physical properties of things, but only with the way in which we speak about them. In this connection Ayer points out: 'In other words the propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character—that is they do not describe the behaviour of physical or mental object'.

We can have some idea of the analytic method used by the logical positivists with reference to important members of this circle—Schlick, Carnap and A.J. Ayer. Schlick agrees with Wittgenstein that philosophy is an activity, it is not a theory. It is an activity in which we seek meaning. In his article 'Meaning and Verification' he maintains that only sentences and not propositions have meaning. But he seems to hesitate between the senses of a sentence and a proposition. Sometimes he identifies meaning with verification and at other times meaning with use. A sentence has no meaning if it is unverifiable in principle. We can

examine metaphysical statements after Schlick and come to find that they are meaningless, because of this form of reason. As an example he states, 'The child is naked but is wearing a long night gown' is meaningless, because the word 'naked' cannot be used to refer to a person who is wearing a long night gown. Verifiability is the sufficient and necessary condition of meaning as accepted by the logical positivists. We have to construct sentences according to rules by which the terms can be defined. Only in the case where verification is incomplete is the case where expressions have no relation with the rules of verification. The linguistic rules refer ultimately to experiences which are ostensively defined. Lastly, in his 'Positivism and Realism' Schlick states that the task of philosophy is to make the meaning of statements and questions clear. Philosophical analysis is not interested in pointing out what is or is not real. It is concerned only with language.

Carnap calls philosophy a branch of logic or the logic of science. In his opinion, philosophy does not give us the knowledge of transcendental entities, as all sentences referring to such entities are senseless. Philosophical propositions are description of language. The propositions of philosophy may describe relations, quality, number, meaning and the like, but they are not present in the linguistic form. In his 'Testability and Meaning' Carnap explains his theory of meaning which is regarded as the recommendation for the construction of the language of science. Such language
is addressed to empiricists who wish to construct the language of science in such a way that metaphysical expressions are not mentioned. They are not supposed to make such statements 'all knowledge is empirical' which wants to tell us something about the world. All they are doing is making a recommendation about the use of language. The main function of language is to construct an ideal language which enables the empiricists to assert logical propositions about scientific and mathematical entities. But metaphysical propositions are ruled out.

A.J. Ayer in his *Language, Truth and Logic* gives us an idea of his logical positivism. A philosopher must not attempt to formulate speculative truths or to state the first principle or make any apriori judgement about the validity of empirical beliefs. He should confine himself to works of clarification and analysis. Philosophical activity is nothing but analysis. The majority of philosophers were primarily concerned not with metaphysics but analysis. Analysis has nothing to do with the properties of things, but only with the way in which they are expressed. Philosophical propositions are not empirical propositions. They are concerned with the logical sequence of linguistic relation. Ayer states: "Language is purely logical activity and it is in this logical activity and not in any empirical study of linguistic habit of any group of people, that philosophical analysis consists."  

Ayer made a distinction between strong verifiability and weak verifiability. We know that Schlick has remarked "The criterion of the truth or falsity of propositions lies in the fact that under definite condition certain data are present or not present. The meaning of every proposition is finally to be determined by the given and nothing else." To the strong verifiability, a proposition is meaningless unless its truth or falsity is conclusively established by experience. But some observation should be relevant to the determination of the truth or falsity of a proposition. Ayer accepts the verifiability in its weak sense, as he does not wish to condemn non-sensible universal laws or statements about the past as meaningless. He thinks that a verifiability principle in this form is quite strong to destroy metaphysics. We come next to Wittgenstein who developed a conception of language in his book Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1921). He thinks that philosophers were not able to solve the metaphysical problems which we have to remember are not questioned at all. These questions do not fulfil the minimal conditions of meaningfulness. All meaningful statements are empirical in nature. Metaphysics is not empirical and so it is not meaningful. The questions of metaphysics have no answers. The statements of mathematics and logic follow from the fact that they are mere tautologies. But the propositions of metaphysics being neither tautologies nor empirical are non-sensical.

Wittgenstein makes an attempt to construct an ideal language in his 'Tractatus'. The words of propositions should be precisely defined and the sentences have to reveal the logical form of facts to which they refer. Such a perfect language is based upon atomic propositions. The fundamental philosophical problem is to describe the structure of such propositions. There is a class of absolutely basic propositions which cannot be analysed further. They are called elementary propositions. When we are not able to make any further analysis and we have to stop at a certain point we come to elementary propositions. These propositions were not discovered by any empirical investigation. It is taken for granted that there must be such propositions. This is determined by the consideration that every sentence must have a clear and definite sense.

An elementary proposition consists of names. The word 'name' has a technical sense. Ordinary terms like Plato, table, house, etc. could not be regarded as names in Wittgenstein's system. According to him, name is a primitive sign which cannot be defined. It denotes something simple and not a complex thing. It denotes an object which is simple. Thus an elementary proposition which consists entirely of names denotes simples. The object denoted by name is its meaning. In a proposition names are related and languages express reality. Thus language hooks on reality. Wittgenstein explains the nature of proposition in the way that the sense
of a proposition is the situation represented by it. This shows that propositions are pictures of reality.

In both the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein wants to show that the aim of philosophy is to save us from linguistic confusions, so that we can avoid misuse of language. The role of philosophy is explained and examined better in his *Investigations*. It is both an analysis and a clarification. Philosophy does not discover any new truth, but only rearranges our language, so that it can display its correct logical form. Ordinary language must be examined carefully, so that we are able to avoid logical and ontological howlers.

Wittgenstein points out that a man who is in the grip of philosophical problem is one who is intellectually sick and suffers from conceptual illness. The man seems to say: "I do not know my way about". It can be illustrated in this way as stated by Malcolm: "A person caught in a philosophical confusion is like a man in a room who wants to get out but does not know how. He tries the window but it is too high. He tries the chimney but it is too narrow. If he would only run around, he would see that the door has been open all the time". The purpose of philosophical analysis is to make him see how he has gone astray. When the confusion will be dispelled, he would realise that the problem was illusory.

Thus there is no philosophical problem as such. They are not to be solved, but rather dissolved. Wittgenstein says that philosophy is essentially an activity. Its task is to clear the puzzle, to cure us of the ills of understanding. Our understanding is confused over the problem of mind, body, knowledge, perception, etc. When we think over these problems we suffer intellectual cramps or we fall in confusion. We are like flies in a fly-bottle, we buzz around and around in the same confined place. We do not see any escape. Thus the primary function of philosophy is therapeutic. It removes our intellectual illness. The philosophical treatment of a problem is like the treatment of an illness. Thus we find that philosophy wants to show the fly way out of the fly-bottle. A therapeutic philosophy may present before us familiar data about our language game. It arranges them in such a way that we have a clear view of the actual use of certain expressions. If in a particular speech activity such thing happens, misunderstanding will be removed.

To Wittgenstein the philosophical disputes are mostly misconception about language. He makes language responsible for all philosophical disputes and in his opinion philosophy is a critique of language. 'It is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language'.


to understand the nature of linguistic confusion a philosopher must clarify the nature of language. Language may tempt him. For example, philosophers think that ordinary language is like an exact calculus where each word has a precise meaning. But actually such meanings are vague and indistinct and due to this characteristic language dis- guishes our thought. We should not depend on the surface word of ordinary language. Words of ordinary language have 'odd-jobs' to do. Some words may have regular function, but other words do not have any such function. As Wittgenstein remarks: 'What counts most trouble in philosophy is that we are tempted to describe the use of important 'odd-job' words as though they were words with regular function'.

The main reasons of our failure is that we do not have a clear view of the use of words. A philosopher should describe use of words or clarify expressions of certain language game. His job is to give a certain sort of description of the use of words. His job is purely descriptive and so philosophy in Wittgenstein's opinion is purely descriptive. He points out that a philosopher must not explain any thing. In his words, 'We must do away with all explanations and description alone must take its place'.

12. Ibid., p.319 (BB, p.18).
In the final analysis we find that Wittgenstein not only cites the sources of philosophical disputes, but he offers us also a method of dissolving them. In his opinion a complete survey of the various aspects of the use of words helps us to escape from the philosophical puzzles. Once we are able to do philosophy with the proper clarification of actual uses of words in language game, the philosophical problem will disappear. There will remain no misunderstanding. That is Wittgenstein expresses: "The clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear."\(^{14}\)

What does Wittgenstein mean by the use of words? He thinks that it is the business of a philosopher to give us real meaning of a certain expression. But the meaning is not the object nor any kind of spiritual entity, rather it is the use of words in speech activity, in language game. It is not the job of a philosopher to give us the meaning of philosophically difficult words but rather to give us their uses. We cannot guess how a word functions, to know it we have to look at its use and learn from it.\(^{15}\) As Wisdom expresses, "Don't ask for the meaning ask for the use.\(^{16}\)

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Wittgenstein tells us how words are used to do certain things, to perform certain linguistic job in a particular language-game. We can cite an example here: "A is building with building-stones; there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that is the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words, 'blocks', 'pillar', 'slab', 'beams'. A calls them out, B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such and such a call."¹⁷ Thus what is actually required in addition to the words is the behaviour of human beings. It is the language-game which is a play with the words. In short, it is the use of words which give them life and they become meaningful or alive.

Philosophers have a natural tendency to speak of mental activities, sensations, perceptions, unitary meaning etc. In Wittgenstein's opinion it is a fundamental mistake to explain with the help of these concepts. These things do not form a part of the language game. There are no mental states and processes. Meaning cannot be considered as a mental activity nor we should think of understanding as something mental. He excludes sensations and even private experiences. They have no role to play in our use of words or expressions. The misuse of words gives rise to the idea of unitary meaning. But Wittgenstein rejects what is called a common essence. There are only family resemblance. For example, the word 'game' means board games, card games, ball games, olympic games and so on. There is nothing

common in them. We find only the complicated net work of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing, sometimes over all similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. He states, 'I think of no better expression to characterise these similarities than 'family resemblances' - and I shall say: Games form a family'.

Weitgenstein is no doubt the dominant figure who developed linguistic analysis. But we can also name Gilbert Ryle and John Wisdom who gave linguistic analysis a more definite shape. Ryle made use of linguistic analysis in 1931, in his paper 'Systematically Misleading Expressions'. In addition to other articles the publication of his book - The Concept of Mind has been held one of the major events of philosophy in contemporary times. It gives us a good illustration of linguistic analysis. It makes a sharp attack on the problem of mind-body relation, knowledge, sensation, perception, etc. He agrees with Wittgenstein that philosophy does not propound theories. It is an activity of clarification and tries to correct the misuse of ordinary language. It has nothing new to give, but only to rectify or correct what we know already. As he says, 'The philosophical arguments which constitute this book are intended not to increase what we know about mind, but to rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we already possess'.

18. Ibid, P. 32e, Sect. 67.
concepts we want to understand the logical relation between usages of words of our every day life. We do not understand a particular area which is supposed to be occupied by mind when we use the word 'mind'. The traditional philosophers think that mind is a ghost-like substance. We have to get rid of such a mind and mental states and have to understand the logical relation between usages of expressions. The so-called inner occurrences like intelligence, grief, vanity knowing, etc. can be much more correctly analysed by focusing our attention to statements about overt behaviours. The words, phrases, expressions in which we talk of mental activities are wrongly applied to an inner substance which is thought to be mind. Mind-statements can bestly be understood with reference to the fact how we use them in common discourse. In a sense Ryle dispenses with the traditional concept of knowing, believing, sensing, aspiring, etc. He wants to replace the defective concepts by non-defective usages.

In his major work Ryle wants to show that the mental physical dichotomy which has dominated a metaphysical speculation since the time of Descartes is the result of a basic confusion about our uses of mentalistic terms. The Cartesian mind is replaced by Ryle with desposition, i.e. by actual or possible behaviour. In a situation of knowing there is no inner or ghostly process. By giving a detailed analysis of the logic of mental conduct concept Ryle tries to show that the term does not refer to any occult processes. As we find in Wittgenstein, speaking and understanding are
engaging in certain mode of behaviour that exhibit a variety of abilities or skills. Ryle’s conception of knowledge develops on the basis of criticism against the Cartesian myth and giving a dispositional account of knowledge by an analysis of the nature of mental conduct concepts. He points out that logical categories in terms of which mental powers and operations have been coordinated were wrongly selected. Descartes left us a legacy which is a myth and continue to distort the continental geography of the subject. We can point out some basic characteristics in Ryle’s analytic thought. They are as follows:

(a) Ryle uses a reductio ad absurdum argument to draw conclusion from some statements of theories to show that some conclusions are absurd. It is shown that these conclusions conflict with well grounded beliefs which we already hold. They involve also the practical impossibility, i.e. infinite series of state. As a result the initial theory has to be rejected. The philosophical tests examine the theories of statements not by observation or experiment, but by showing that it contains latent contradiction or entails infinite regress or showing that it is incompatible with well grounded beliefs. Thus the fundamental task of a philosopher is to take propositions which are uttered in the normal course of speech and to see whether their real meaning


or logical form is grasped. The philosopher does this by showing whether or not these propositions or ideas or concepts lead to logically absurd results. As Ryle points out in his Philosophical Arguments that when a person assumes an idea to be of one logical type to another, the unitary consequence leads directly logically intolerable result. Thus theories which have not been grasped properly give rise to paradoxes or absurd conclusions. Therefore such theories or views are to be reviewed and properly examined. Ryle did this when he considered the traditional concepts of believing, perceiving, introspecting, imaging, sensing, etc. He observes that philosophical arguments of the type described in the reductio ad absurdum argument have something in common with the destruction test of engineers by which they discover the strength of materials. In a similar way philosophical arguments bring out the logical power of ideas under investigation by discovering the precise form of the logical misuse under which they cannot work.

(b) The aim of the paper 'Systematically Misleading Expressions' is to show the pseudo-characters of different expressions. These expressions are not defective in grammatical sense. They are defective in the sense that they have no logical relation to the facts they represent. A class of expressions of one type which occur perfectly satisfactorily.


In ordinary discourse are systematically misleading when we find that they are put in a syntactical form improper to the facts which are recorded but proper to the fact of a quite another logical form. According to Ryle, all quasi ontological statements - 'God exists', 'Satan does not exist', 'Carnivorous cows do not exist', etc. are systematically misleading expressions. In these expressions the apparent subjects are not genuine subjects because they do not assert or deny genuine characters of genuine subjects. They appear to denote or to refer to something, but the subjects are concealed predicative expressions. Existent predicates are not characters. Existence is not a quality.

In a like manner Ryle also shows that universals or quasi-platonic statements, descriptive expressions, quasi-descriptions, and quasi-referential phrases are all misleading expressions. We use such expressions like, 'Unpunctuality is reprehensible' and 'virtue is its own reward'. In these statements we face absurdity, because we do not really suppose that unpunctuality is to be ashamed of itself. What we mean is that it is an unpunctual man and not unpunctuality who can and should be ashamed. Similarly, in the statement 'virtue is its own reward', this statement is not about virtue but about good man.

'The' phrase is used with reference to a grammatical subject but it does not refer to anything. 'The king went shooting to day' is a misleading expression. It is non-

referential, because it signifies an idiosyncratic character. In short, Ryle's intention is to say that all misleading expressions to be meaningful must be restated or rearranged as to grasp their logical form after the manner of Russell. This is the reason why Ryle holds, "And we can succeed in stating this fact in a new form of words which does exhibit what the other failed to exhibit. And I am for the present inclined to believe that this is what philosophical analysis is and that this is the sole and whole function of philosophy".  

(c) Ryle discusses another important point in his paper 'Ordinary Language'. He makes a distinction between two phrases - 'the use of ordinary language' and 'the ordinary use of expression'. The first phrase is often mistakenly interpreted as ordinary linguistic usage. When people speak of the use of ordinary language, the word 'ordinary' is contrasted with 'out of the way', 'esoteric', 'technical', 'poetical', 'notational', etc. The word 'ordinary' generally means 'common', 'current', 'colloquial', 'vernacular', 'natural', 'non-notational', 'on the tongue of every man'. It is usually contrasted with technical terms used by lawyers, philosophers, economists, mathematicians, etc. But the second phrase is not in contrast with the above mentioned usages. It is contrasted with 'non-standard', or non-stock' use, We can make a contrast between the standard use of a fish-knife with its non-regular use. The standard

use of a fish-knife is to cut up fish, but it can be used for cutting other things. The 'ordinary', 'standard' and 'stock' can refer to a use though we may not describe it. But a non-stock use needs some descriptions, to point or to cite the special context in which the word is to be used. Most words have both kinds of use. When a philosopher speaks of certain philosophical questions as something about the ordinary use of certain expressions, he does not mean that these questions are about the usages of ordinary or colloquial expressions. Most of the philosophical questions are of this type. Again, in the phrase 'the ordinary expression' may be so used that the emphasis may be on the 'expression' or on the word 'ordinary'. Then the word 'use' is ignored. But Ryle thinks that the case should be something different. He thinks that the word 'use' is operative. In the language of Wittgenstein, "What we call discriptions are instrument for particular use". 26

(d) The 'use' of a word may not be same as the word 'usage'. The former does not refer to any particular language, while the latter is to be understood in the context of a particular language. Ryle points out that there is a confusion between the way of operating with something and its usefulness or a confusion between 'a use' and 'a usage'. Many philosophers neglect the confusion and talk of these things as if they are same. But a usage is a custom,

practice, fashion or what is in vogue. It can be local or wide-spread, old or current, rural or urban, vulgar or academic. On the other hand, the use of a razor-blade or a fishing net is a technique or a method. In these cases we are concerned with how to do things. We do not want to see whether there are general rules or conventions of other people who may do similar things. We need only descriptions of the technique of doing something. These ways of doing things constitute the usages. But the description of usages presupposes the description of uses.

If we want to avoid the confusion between these two words we should use the word 'employ' and 'employment'. Though Ryle distinguishes between 'use' and 'usage' they are very much related with each other. No word can have a use unless a correct usage which is appropriate to its use is recognised. The uses of word depend on the actual usages. The changes in actual usage may enrich or improverish the conceptual equipments of a language. The usage of any language group is never in fact fixed.

(e) According to Ryle, words and sentences belong to separate category. Words, phrases, constructions are the atoms of language. Sentences are the unity of speech. Words and phrases are things used, while sentences are used in speech act, episodes of saying. We can speak of the use or misuse of words but not about the sentences. The meaning of a word is knowing how to use it, but the meaning of
a sentence may not be that. Sentences are things that we say, words and phrases are what we say things with. There is a dictionary of words or phrases, but no dictionary of sentences. We speak of sentences making sense or no sense, but words have meaning. Ryle compares the composer of a sentence with a cook who uses salt, sugar, flour, beams, etc. in making a pie. She may use or misuse the ingredients. But she does not use the pie in this way. We use certain words in composing a sentence. Words are used but not the sentences.

In the final sense Ryle wants to give us an analysis of mind which involves the concepts of knowledge, belief, will, perceptions, sensations, imaginations, etc. He wants to correct the misuse of language. The first task of a philosopher is to examine and test a theory or a concept to see whether it leads to a logically intolerable result. In the second stage he has to determine the logical form and the logical powers in the case of concepts and propositions respectively. In that task one must not be misled by the grammar or the surface appearance of words. He should not also be confused by the arrangement of a sentence or utterance. Ryle expresses: "Concepts and propositions carry with them no signal to indicate the logical type to which they belong. Expressions of the same grammatical patterns are used to express thoughts of multifarious logical sorts". 27

Ryle got his inspiration from Wittgenstein and was influenced by him to a great extent. We may make a distinction between the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* in which the idea of language and the object of analysis may not exactly be the same. There may also be a difference between what Ryle says in his *Systematically Misleading Expressions* and the *Concept of Mind* as well as *Dilemmas*. Ryle and Wittgenstein did not follow the same method of analysis. Both of them are influenced by Logical Positivists in different ways. Wittgenstein spoke of the therapeutic concept of philosophy. He is mainly interested in language game in which a word is used in certain speech activity. But phrases such as 'philosophical analysis', 'the analysis of concepts', 'mapping the logical geography of concepts', 'category-mistake', 'category discipline', 'dispositional analysis', 'adverbial analysis', 'systematically misleading expressions', 'Carterian myth', etc. were coined by Ryle. The *Concept of Mind* might have been published before Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, but it is generally in harmony with Wittgenstein's view, though there are differences of details and emphasis. Ryle is more interested in the examinations of mental conduct concepts. So one may read Ryle in a different way from that of Wittgenstein. He may also be read differently from the way in which *Ryle himself says he ought to be read*.  

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Ryle's version of linguistic analysis may be contrasted with that of J.L. Austin. His early approach was influenced by Russell's Logical Atomism and Wittgenstein's therapeutic concepts. He did not believe that ordinary language was the repository of philosophical truths which Austin thought. Austin's view of philosophy may be called 'linguistic phenomenology' and this has some affinity with the philosophy of G.E. Moore.