The aim of the present thesis *Ryle's Concept of Knowledge* is to make a critical assessment of Ryle's concept of knowledge and the allied concept of mind, mental concepts, etc. For that purpose the thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part, a detailed exposition of Ryle's main concepts such as knowledge, mind, sensation, self-knowledge and other related topics is given. The second part is devoted to a collection of the major criticisms against Ryle. Besides the exposition of the concepts, an analysis of Ryle's linguistic method is given. An idea of the traditional theory of knowledge in the context of which Ryle's theory of knowledge is to be presented is also given. Towards the end of the second part, a chapter has been added which makes some reflections on an alternative theory of mind and knowledge. This theory does not reject Ryle's idea of mind which is to be understood in terms of the body, but only points out that the body is not the body as studied by physiology or science which thinks of the body as an abstract, inert object. The human body is the lived body and all the activities of the body are the
lived aspects. This lived body has an orientation, an intentionality and a particular way of adjusting itself with the world. These aspects constitute the mental and when we understand the body in this way, we find that the mind is bodiliness and the body is mindliness. That what is understood in our ordinary everyday life as the inner process is nothing but the activity of the body, perhaps, occurring in the brain. But as such activities cannot be located with reference to a particular sense organ, they are felt to be something like the occult processes. A detailed understanding of the different so-called mental activities may, perhaps, be done in this direction. It may also be established that the mental activities are the functions of the lived body, particularly, of the area of the brain. One major difficulty which Ryle has to face is: How can we be conscious of being conscious? The answer may be that consciousness not only illumines what is known, but it illumines itself. The language may appear esoteric, but there is no mystery in it. In every case of our being conscious, there is a connection between the sense organ which is stimulated and the brain, but at the same time there may be a connection to the other parts of the central area of the brain. The sense organ which is stimulated makes us aware of the object presented by the stimulation, but the stimulation to the other parts of the brain, namely, the central area may make us aware of being conscious of the object. The two stimulations may occur at the same-time. This is what is meant when we say that there is not
only consciousness of something, but also a consciousness (of) self. Perhaps, in ways like this which are not detailed here the major difficulties of Ryle can be solved. Below is given the summary of the different chapters:

Chapter 1

The first chapter is devoted to the discussion of the analytic method as adopted by the philosophers of repute. They give utmost importance on the study of language. Some of them lay stress on the artificial or formal language, while others, on the ordinary language. They maintain that it is the misuse of language which is the sole source of philosophical problems. Russell and Moore were the early pioneers of the analytic movement. Their views have been discussed in short. Logical positivism has also a common heritage with this method. The positivists reject metaphysical propositions as meaningless; they elude our experience or verification. The so-called metaphysical questions are pseudo-questions. Metaphysics is nonsense in nature. Wittgenstein is the dominant figure in the history of the analytic thought. In both the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations we find that his aim is to disentangle us from linguistic confusions. He observes that all philosophy is the critique of language. In his opinion a complete survey of the various aspects of the use of language in the language game will help us to dissolve philosophical riddles. Following Wittgenstein Ryle practised the method of analysis. In his essay -
'Systematically Misleading Expressions' he explains the nature of philosophical analysis. Words, phrases, expressions may seem to refer to something, but ultimately they refer to nothing. Ryle wants to show that the terms and idioms in which we speak of mental happenings can suitably be applicable to overt actions only. The mental states are ghostly processes.

**Chapter II**

In the second chapter the traditional and the contemporary views of knowledge are discussed. The traditional concept of knowledge considers knowledge as a mental process, a cognitive concept. From the period of Plato we find this trend. Here knowledge is distinguished from belief, knowledge has the characteristics of truth and a mental state of certainty. But belief falls short of the desired certainty. According to some contemporary thinkers, knowledge does not consist in a mental state of certainty. Professor Ryle seems to give us a new explanation of knowledge. He wants to explain it in terms of dispositions, i.e. in terms of knowing how.

**Chapter III**

The third chapter deals with the nature of category mistake as committed by Descartes. Ryle brings this charge against Descartes' dualism. He maintains that the double life legend is false and terms this as the dogma of the ghost in the body machine. Mind is not an inner substance inside the body machine. It is rather a coordination of all observable
facts, just as the University is the way in which other units are coordinated. Both mind and body are terms of different categories. The dualist confuses the category of mind with the category of body. He forgets that mind and body are terms of separate discipline. As mind and body belong to two separate categories, it is a category mistake to conjoin or disjoin them.

Chapter-IV

The fourth chapter is the key chapter of the thesis. Here an exhaustive analysis of knowing how as given by Ryle is furnished. According to the theorists, knowledge is a mental concept, a cognitive state of mind. Knowing is a double operation of considering and executing. It is a bit of theory and a bit of practice. Ryle rejects the contention of the theorists. He asserts that knowing is not a double process of considering and executing. It is not a go-between process, i.e. something occurring inside the mind and in the outer world. It means to undergo certain skills, abilities, bents, etc. Knowledge is to be understood in terms of knowing how which is logically prior to knowing that. Ryle makes a distinction between occurrent words and disposition-words, between categorical statements and hypothetical statements. Disposition-words signify overt behaviours; they are not episodic in nature. The so-called episodic words are to be reinterpreted in hypothetical statements about public behaviours. The disposition-words are achievement-words. In knowing how something is acknowledged
or actualised. Ryle also explains the nature of semi-dispositional statements. These statements are connected with 'heed concepts'. They are half-episodic and half-dispositional in nature. Ryle does not consider 'intellect' as an inner faculty of knowledge. The intellectual epithets like judging, inferring, cognising, deducing, knowing, etc. have been misconstrued by the theorists. These are mere elements of published theories. They have done no justice to the distinction between the exploratory and the expository stage of operations. Intelligence is directly exercised in overt actions. There are no inner occurrences in connection with 'ponderings'.

Chapter V

Ryle seems to do away with all the traditional explanations of sensation, self-knowledge and imaginations. In the fifth chapter his views on these topics are discussed. He maintains that sensations are not the objects of observation. Sensations have no size, shape, colour, etc. They are not ingredients of observations, but mere species of it. It is a logical howler to assimilate the concepts of sensation to the concepts of observation. This assimilation is nonsense. It gives rise to a category mistake. Sensations are non-entities. As there are no sensations, there is no mind to house them. It is wrong to speak of observing, inspecting sensations. Sense datum, sense content, sensibilia denote nothing more than the attempt to give the concepts of sensation the job of the concepts of observation. In case of perceiving we
recognise or identify something. We perceive objects and not sensations. Ryle distinguishes process-verbs from that of achievement-verbs. He holds that seeing, hearing, detecting and the rest which have been taken to describe mental processes are not processes as such. They are achievements. They are achievements of the public or quasi-public performances, Ryle also wants to dismiss the notion of consciousness and introspection as the source of self knowledge. There is no privileged access; but open access. The official doctrine of consciousness and introspection are logical muddles. He does not deny self-knowledge, but he tries to show that self knowledge and the knowledge of other mind have a parity. And we take help of the same method in both these cases.

According to Ryle, the phrase 'in my head' is used by the theorists as a secret chamber to house inner mental occurrences. They speak of a nuclear operation existing in our minds. It consists of seeing things in the mind's eye. Imagination is the source of the knowledge of images and the so-called images resemble the objects of external world. Ryle argues to show that there are no images and also no minds to house them. They have no existence; they are pseudo objects. Seeing with the mental eye cannot be the actual seeing. The theorists ignore the fundamental differences between the actual seeing of a thing and the seeing in the mind's eye. 'Seeing' in the mind's eye is intrinsically different from the actual seeing. To see in the mind's eye - the supposed nuclear element is completely false. Imaginings are mere pretendings.
Part-II

Chapter VI

This part consists of the critical examination of Ryle’s concepts. It has been done under different sections in the sixth chapter of the thesis. The method comes first. Inspite of its merits the analytic method cannot be accepted as the sole method of philosophy. All problems of philosophy are not problems arising out of the misuse of language, words, phrases, expressions, etc. Moreover, philosophy is not clarification. It is something more. It is many things. The analysts themselves fail to give us a synoptic school of philosophy. We find differences among them with regard to language, meaning, expressions, usages, etc. Ryle observes that quasi-ontological, quasi-descriptive and quasi-platonic statements are systematically misleading expressions. These statements are non-denoting and the grammatical subjects in these cases have no genuine subjects. But these statement are not meaningless. Either they assert the genuine predicates of the genuine subjects or they must deny non-entities. Again, unlike Ryle we may state that ordinary language does permit the existential conjunction between mind and body. The dualism is still a dependable hypothesis of common vocabulary. Our language is firmly dualistic. There are inner happenings and also overt behaviours. They may belong to separate category. Yet we do not face any kind of difficulty in case of identifying them. In short, Descartes’ ghost cannot be exorcised.
According to the critics, Ryle's analysis of knowledge in terms of knowledge how is inconsistent and incomplete. The term 'knowing' is a multifarious concept. Ryle lays emphasis only on 'how' aspect of it. No doubt it is the important aspect of knowing. But besides the 'how' aspect, i.e., the capacity knowledge there are other aspects also. Some of these are 'know that', 'know where', 'know what', 'know which', etc. Any piece of knowledge cover both the phrases — knowing how and knowing that, though they have no determinate use at all. Ryle replaces the Cartesian mind with dispositions or overt behaviours. But dispositions are not only dispositions of overt behaviours, there may also be dispositions of inward acts. His distinction between the logic of episodic-words and disposition-words, between categoricals and hypotheticals is confusing. Ryle's joint attribution to the concept of knowledge is self-contradictory.

If knowing is dispositional, how can then it be an achievement? These two properties are exclusive in nature. It is also wrong to suppose that the categorical statements about mental states are to be reinterpreted into hypothetical statements about possible behaviours. Ultimately, Ryle fails to give us a satisfactory account of knowledge in his own terminology. He admits this in his study of mongrel-categorical statements. There are cognitive factors, inner processes. The 'mental' does stand for something. The 'coqito' cannot be demolished totally. Any attempt to dispense with it will be epistemologically absurd.
Some thinkers are found to have shown no sympathy to Ryle in the context of his explanation of sensations. Sensations are not ghostly objects. They are rather necessary factors of perception and sensing is an inner process. Perception is not a mere recognition. There are psychic factors in all cases of perceptions. Introspection and consciousness are two sources of self-knowledge. We have privileged access in case of ourselves, in cases of avowals. Ryle himself admits this in different passages of his writings. Thus the self-knowledge and the knowledge of other mind cannot be put on the same par. Again, Ryle’s achievement distinction is not also clear to us. We take the help of both the words - task-words and achievement-words. Unlike material objects there are image and imaginations and there are also minds to house them. These are the fundamental notions of our memory. To deny memory, introspection and self-consciousness is to pave the way to materialism. Ryle’s surgical attitude with regard to mind involving concepts seems to do the same.

Chapter VII

The last chapter - the seventh chapter is the concluding part of the thesis. It makes some reflections on an alternative theory of mind and knowledge. This theory does not reject Ryle’s idea of mind which is to be understood in terms of the body. But it only points out that the body is not an abstract, inert, material object. The human body is the lived body and all the activities of the body are the lived aspects. There is no dualism between mind and body, but the lived body and its
expressions with reference to an orientation, intentionality and meaning. These things also constitute the mental aspects of existence. The bodiliness - the lived body is also the mindliness in its manifestation. Perhaps, this is the integral picture of the human existence.

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