An Examination of Ryle's Concepts

Section I: On Ryle's Linguistic Method

The history of analytic philosophy gives greater importance to the analysis of language and holds that language, artificial or natural is the instrument or tool of human expression. The problems which arise from them can be solved or resolved by the careful analysis of the meaning of words and sentences of common vocabulary. It is the mishandling of language which is the source of all philosophical disputes. The so-called philosophical riddles relating to mind, body, knowledge, perception, sensation, etc. are in fact pseudo-problems. Once we resort to proper clarification of words and sentences, the age long problems can be cleared up and they will disappear. It is true that the importance of language and the recent trend of the movement of clarifying the philosophical concepts cannot be ignored. Yet there are certain objections against this kind of philosophy in general. In the present discussion we will first of all point out that some general objections may be raised against the
linguistic method. After that we will move to an examination of Ryle's methodology.

It is quite rational to say that the role of analysis in philosophy is very important. We have to be careful to see that in philosophical discovery the terms should be univocal and well-defined. It cannot be denied that words or expressions have exercised an unholy enchantment over the minds of the philosophers. In many cases the task of clarity has made their theories confusing. So the task of revealing the nature of the various misuses of language in terms of clarification appears to be quite legitimate. Words and expressions are the intellectual tools with which we operate in philosophical transaction. Thus for the programme to be sound we have to remember that the acceptance of the analysis may not be the only basis of philosophical understanding. To apply it perfectly most of the time we have to appeal to ordinary language as the first court of appeal. But such an attempt may be a big mistake. We may raise the question. Does every philosophical problem arise out of the linguistic confusion so that the sole business of philosophy becomes linguistic analysis? Are all philosophical problems arising out of linguistic muddles? If the clarification of language be the sole function of philosophy what then is the point of distinction between philosophy and lexicography? Why philosophy at all? Why not language artificial or natural, i.e. ordinary in place of philosophy? In this context it is very difficult to see how the problems of evils, sin,
immortality, freedom, the nature of the external world, substance, etc. had their origin from linguistic confusion and muddles. It must be pointed out that these problems arise due to man's inability to understand the mysteries of the world. Not only this, man has a curiosity to know. He wants to expand his horizon of knowledge. This has nothing to do with his linguistic ability, or how to make right choice of linguistic usage. Philosophy is not just analysis or clarification. Such things are necessary so that we can have perfect knowledge and philosophy embodies such knowledge.

To make analysis the sole end of philosophy is to confuse between the means and the end of philosophy. If by analysis we mean the avoiding of wrong use of words, it may be necessary up to a certain point. But we have to go beyond to discover how the problems can be given a proper solution. Linguistic method serves as a method. So we wonder how it can be its end. H.H.Price comments in this connection that clarification cannot be the whole task of a philosopher. It may be an indispensable part of his task, but it is not the whole thing demanded from him. He remarks that we have to be careful to see that our zeal for lighting up language should not lead us astray. The distinction between analytic clarity and synoptic clarity should not make us forget that clarity is not enough.¹

The clarification of language is accepted as the fundamental aim of philosophy by the analysts. In their opinion,

philosophy yields no new informations. Only what is known already becomes clear. The job of analysis is to cure us of the muddles created by the misuse of words. This idea of philosophy took the shape of therapeutic activity in the hands of Wittgenstein. Be it therapeutic or something else, the analytic conception of philosophy has produced a discontent. Philosophy is man's lifetime job. But if man's whole life is spent in picking out the right uses of words, he will have no time to express the wonders of philosophy. Moreover, the analytic philosophers are not interested in the history of philosophy. This makes them unaware of the roots of the various problems of philosophy. This attitude leads us to a new interpretation of philosophy. Such an interpretation makes philosophy different from its different branches such as epistemology, ethics, logic, metaphysics, etc. It may be answered that the analytic method can be adopted in all the branches of philosophy. Indeed this is what is being done in every sphere of philosophy by the analysis. But such a remodelling will throw away our traditional idea of philosophy into oblivion. We are not sure whether this way of interpreting philosophy will do any good.

One important difficulty of analytic philosophy is this that analysts do not agree with one another among themselves. Some accept the reference theory of meaning, while others prefer the use theory of meaning. Some up hold the idea of ideal or artificial theory of language, while others want to follow the line of natural - ordinary language. There is
a difference in early Wittgenstein and later Wittgenstein, though in both stages his approach is to understand the world in terms of language. We are not able to understand the analytic philosophy as a systematic school. It is said that analytic method has been in application for several decades. But the philosophers have not been able to offer a clear manifesto of their programme, method and goal. They have not come up with an explicit statement of their theory of language. This makes Katz and Fodor observe: Linguistic consideration are occupying the forefront in every major area of philosophy. But in the meantime the philosophy of language languishes. In the words of R.J. Hirst it is found that many philosophers of contemporary times are sympathetic towards Wittgenstein's dictum that 'all philosophy is a critique of language'. They agree that the proper task of philosophy is the analysis of expressions, reduction of the expressing to less misleading forms or to clear up the puzzles generated by the misuses. But it is notoriously difficult to give a clear picture of the new approach, as the exponents differ among themselves. They are performing a double task simultaneously. They are developing their method along with mutual criticism and due to this the whole thing is in a nebulous state.

Many philosophers have expressed their discontent with the absolute analytic way of doing philosophy. The analytic

philosophers have rejected metaphysics as nonsense and a house of pseudo-problems. But even some of the philosophers of this school bemoan the loss of the grand philosophical vision. We find Waismann who developed his philosophical ideas under the direct influence of Wittgenstein expressing frustration because of the feelings of being cramped in the tight jacket of Wittgensteinian philosophy. He thinks that philosophy has something deeply exciting about it. It is not just a matter of 'clarifying thought' or 'the correct use of language' nor is it any of these demanded things. He says: 'Philosophy is many things and there is no formula to cover them all. But if I were asked to express in one single word what is its most essential feature, I would unhesitatingly say 'vision'. Russell, Paton, Price, Blanshård in their writings sometimes express this kind of opinion.

There are some analysts who think that ordinary language is the final court of appeal which can solve all the problems of philosophy. But it is difficult to understand how ordinary language can consistently convey the philosophical truths. We know that ordinary language comes into conflict with scientific truth. Philosophy which aims at giving a synoptic view of life and the world cannot surely be conveyed through words of ordinary languages. The analysts often speak of the departure of philosophers from standard

English. This departure creates a host of problems, as the use of standard and fixed language is given a good-bye. But it is not clear what is meant by standard English or fixed ordinary language. But it may be asked why should a particular language decide the sensible and non-sensible nature of philosophical problems? If we look to the opinions of competent writers of language on the nature of standard English we find that it is some normative standard and has been out of use for centuries. The writers think that standard English is a trade label annexed to a particular dialect and has no special status or authority. S.Körner thinks that the appeal to the man in the street fails, because there are so many men and so many streets. There is no reason why any one of them should be preferred. Similar is the opinion of C.A.Cambell, "there is no accepted linguistic usage in respect of most mental operations". Copleston denies that there is anything called fixed ordinary language and even if there were, there is no reason, why it would act as a court of appeal to settle philosophical disputes. Paton voices the same feeling and thinks that there is no such language which can be used as a standard to which philosophical thinking must conform.

5. S.Körner, 'Some Types of Philosophical Thinking', British Philosophy in the Middle Century, ed. C.A.Mace, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957, p.122.
6. C.A.Cambell, 'Ryle on Intellect', in Clarity is not Enough, p. 283.
P. Heath remarks that the conception of fixed ordinary language is a hypothesis and philosophical problems cannot be subjected to an analysis on the basis of ordinary language. But this does not mean that there is nothing to be said in favour of ordinary language as a philosophical model. But certain weaknesses are to be encountered, when it is contemplated as a standard. Thus according to Heath, the analogy between logical and grammatical rules, if there were such rules, they are due for retirement. And the so-called rigid structures of concepts and linguistic rules are mere hypothesis. When we speak of correction of words, phrases, and expressions, we find that it depends largely on situations. Correction may mean conformity with the prevailing mode of a specified group. It has no reference to any fixed terminology. When the correctness of a sentence is meant, it means an accepted use. It is the sort of sentence which all or most people would make, when they face a particular situation. A given expression is predetermined with reference to a range of situations. We do not know any method which would decide what would or would not be said in a given situation. Nor is it said that any situation would not arise which would justify the expression. No information is given about any language whatsoever. Thus we find that for words, phrases, and expressions it is necessary that the concerned situation must be taken into account. The words, phrases

and expressions of ordinary language are generally hazy, indefinite and ambiguous. John Hospers mentions that the senses in which words are used is a blanket term covering a nest of confusions. 10 Again, if by 'expression' we mean the words and phrases occurring in a sentence, we restrict their use to description and predication. Ordinary expressions mean here only those which can be verified. In that case no grammatical orthodoxy or fixed terminology will serve any purpose. The only important thing is what the sentence purports to say. This is what is really intended by Malcolm when he says that ordinary expressions are verification sentences. It is a sentence of a certain sort of meaning, not a sentence of any particular linguistic group.

The analysts make language an independent realm, which is, as if, more important than fact. This is so because they have granted freedom to language, as it is a verbal activity. But language cannot be separated from fact in an abstract manner. It is with reference to facts or things that words and phrases acquire meaning. Language has its origin in relation to fact. Except the propositions of mathematics, most of the words and phrases used by us have relation of some sort with fact.

Ryle's linguistic method is somewhat different. So our criticisms will be more specific. 'Systematically Misleading

Expressions' is an important publication by Ryle. In it he shows that quasi-ontological, quasi-platonic expressions and quasi-descriptive statements do not denote anything. These expressions are non-denoting and the grammatical subjects in these statements have no genuine subject. But we would like to know how genuine subjects can be distinguished from bogus ones. Ryle thinks that these quasi-ontological statements such as 'God exists', 'Satan does not exist' are systematically misleading, because they do not assert or deny genuine characteristics of genuine subjects. They resemble the genuine statements in grammatical form. We may state here that the basis of Ryle's analysis is the ascription of genuine characters to certain objects in propositions which have proper logical subjects and predicates. This is the standard by which we can recognise genuine subjects and predicates. If this is so, the true ascription of genuine reality to some object must be possible. If it were not so, there would be no genuine subjects and predicates, nor there would be bogus ones. The condition of the distinction between genuine and bogus subjects is the possibility of predicating reality or existence or genuine being of some subjects. E.Haris in this connection points out that it is ridiculous to say that such predication is bogus. It is found that the analysis of existence - proposition itself presupposes the logical priority of all genuine subject-predicate statements of existence propositions. He thinks that it is therefore misleading to allege that because existence-predicates
are not characters their subjects are not genuine subjects. Thus it shows that ontological descriptive statements and the like do not mislead. Either they assert what must be presupposed if any genuine predicates are to be asserted of genuine subjects or they must deny fictions and other non-entities.

Ryle's account of difference between words and sentence presents a radical difference. Words, constructions, etc. are the atoms of language, sentences are units of speech. He seems to think that words and sentences belong to separate category. Prof. G.J. Warnock raises some objections against Ryle's view of words and sentences, use and meaning. Ryle thinks that knowing what a word means can be usefully a matter of knowing how to use the word. Knowing what a sentence means cannot be a matter of knowing how to use the sentence. Words, phrases, expressions are things used, whereas sentences are special acts or episodes of saying.

Here Ryle goes against his own theory. He compares the composer of a sentence with a cook. As a cook uses ingredient and also uses kitchen materials in making a pie, we use certain words in composing a sentence. Ryle, in fact, betrays himself in maintaining that the cook using the ingredients and utensils does not in this case use the pie, and the speaker who uses certain words in composing certain

sentences does not in this way use the sentence. It is probably true that we do not speak of people using sentences. It is also true that interest in language will often be an interest in words and not in sentential structure in which these words are ingredients. Perhaps the task of people who use the sentences is somewhat unusual. But we may say that it is wholly natural and unavoidable that we speak of using sentences, very often. We do use words and sentences and their meanings in our ordinary language without taking care of any type-mistake as noted by Ryle. We may maintain that any talk about the meaning of sentence is seemingly just as we talk meanings of words in it. And if the knowing of the meaning of words is knowing how to use them, we might have accepted that knowing the meaning of a sentence was knowing how to use the sentences, though the meaning of the word and its use are not identical or cannot be equated.

Again, we find that Ryle accepts the use theory of meaning after the manner of Wittgenstein. But we may state that meaning in the field of analytic philosophy is a complex thing. In addition to the use of words it reveals to us that there is also a reference to it. That means in dealing with the meaning the reference of a word is to be given equal importance. Philosophers who have made studies in this area are not yet decisive on the fact whether we shall accept the use theory of meaning or the reference theory of meaning. In fact, knowing the meaning of a word cannot be said to be knowing how to use it. The meaning of a word and its use are
different thing, Ryle seems to ignore this difference.
In this case G.J. Warnock remarks: "It seems to me that, in many cases, this should be recognised as at the very least a very strange thing to say. For it seems to me that philosophical habits apart, 'knowing the meaning of' and 'knowing how to use' would more naturally be contrasted or if that is too strong, at any rate not thus identified". 12

It is also objected that Ryle accepted the positivist doctrine of meaning, i.e. the method of verification. He explicates the meaning of vanity in terms of certain behaviours, namely, to talk of a lot of himself, to cleave to the society of eminent, to reject criticism, to seek the foot light and to disengage himself from conversation about the merits of others. 13 We may say that to accept the positivist's doctrine of meaning is to involve unending controversies. That is why, we find a series of interpretations and differences and differences of opinion about meaning among the positivists themselves. A.C. Ewing points out rightly: "Positivists' criterion of verification - verifiability has the success of exposing its absurdities". 14

One of the serious defects of the method of verification is that it confuses the meaning of a proposition with the evidence that we use to verify.

13. The Concept of Mind, p.86.
Ryle points out that theorists have foisted the myth of mind on ordinary language. The Cartesians consider mind as a spirit or substance piloting the body from within. In analysing mental reports Ryle wants to show that ordinary languages do not permit an existential conjunction between mind and body. Subjecting Cartesian dualism to a gross mistake – the category mistake his argument is that the Cartesian mind must be discarded. The so-called mind is nothing but a way in which public activities are ordered or co-ordinated. But the question is: whether Ryle is successful in the analysis of mind not to regard it as a separate entity other than the activities of the organism. He admits a difference between mind and body, but is not the dualism a better way of understanding the differences? Is not the ordinary language frankly dualistic? It is not at all difficult to see that dualism between mind and body is a regular feature of ordinary language of men. Since the earliest known time, they have been talking in terms of the said dualism. Stuart Hampshire argues in the following way when he observes: "Common sense language is, in fact, for better or worse, firmly dualistic..... We constantly ask and are beginning to answer various more or less general questions about the relation between a person's body and his mind, questions which cannot therefore be dismissed as improper". According to Rickman, the

dualism of mind and body has a considerable influence in our cognitive life. He argues against Ryle's view on Descartes' dualism. He remarks that the contrast between mind and matter can be fruitfully construed in terms of the subject and object of cognition. Dualism reflects common and successful practices in the human studies and focusses on the inadequacy of approaches such as behaviourism. He points out "'I certainly argue that it would be futile to add to material sphere another one which is similarly construed and runs parallel. My criticism is that he (Ryle) is mistaken about his target'." A.C. Ewing also observes: "we may be very grateful to Prof. Ryle for his particular contribution to the linguistics of psychology, but I do not see how he has contributed to his more radical object, the removal of dualism'. Thus all we have to maintain is that besides the series of bodily events there is a series of mental events, whether the two belong to the same substance or not, and indeed whether or not the substance phraseology has an applicable meaning at all here.

Lastly, we find that Ryle maintains that in cases of knowing there is no inner occult processes. Knowledge is to be understood in terms of knowing how. It is dispositional in character. The so-called cognitive words like

17. A.C.Ewing, 'Professor Ryle's Attack on Dualism' in H.D.Lewis ed. Clarity is not Enough, p.338.
'know', 'believe', 'aspire', etc. do not refer to any ghostly inner activities of mind. To know means to go through certain bents, inclinations, abilities, etc. But what actually happens in case of knowing? Do we not refer to inner processes of mind? From our experiences we acknowledge it well that mind involving concepts without giving references to inner activities of mind cannot be interpreted fully in terms of knowing how. It may well be that in most cases psychological words are dispositional and yet an account of them cannot be given in terms of behaviour. But these events involve also mental states which are observable by the observer who has them. To quote Ewing, "In this I should agree with Prof. Ryle, if only he would include in the account of disposition not only physiological behaviour but its psychological manifestation in experience". 18

18. A.C.Ewing, 'Professor Ryle's Attack on Dualism' in H.D.Lewis ed. Clarity is not Enough, p.338.
Section 2: Descartes' Myth and Category Mistake

Ryle claims to rectify the logical geography of concepts which we employ in thinking about mind. Such a rectification has shown that the concept of knowledge does not refer to any occult processes. He calls the Cartesian notion of mind as 'a dogma of the ghost in the machine'. And he charges it with committing a gross mistake, i.e. the category mistake. According to him, the traditional philosophy is a blunder of confusion. There occurred an improper juxtaposition of terms of different orders or categories which have been brought into intelligible relation with one another, while in reality no such relation can take place. These activities have created incoherence and confusion. Mind and matter belong to different categories. They cannot be legitimately conjoined or disjoined. The conjunctive phrase 'body and mind' is a meaningless phrase. Ryle asserts that the Cartesians have committed a category mistake by establishing mind in terms which are suitable to the body.

In the Concept of Mind Ryle illustrates such clear cut cases of category mistake such as our visiting the university. After seeing the different buildings of it, we may ask where is the university? Ryle calls this a category mistake. We think the university to be some sort
of extra entity like any other building of the university. But the university is just the way in which all the departments are organised. It does not belong to the same category like its buildings. The dualists also do the same thing. They confuse the category of mind with the category of body, while they belong to separate orders. Such a mistake is called Descartes' myth by Ryle.

Critics are not satisfied with Ryle's analysis of category mistake. They maintain that Ryle's magic stick has failed to frighten away the Cartesian ghosts which means that the ghost still reigns over the kingdom of mind.

About Ryle's thesis that the ghost is a product of the illegitimate mixing up of different logical types, it may be pointed out that Ryle offers no criterion to distinguish such orders or categories. The rejection of the ghost on the basis of category mistake should have been given by a precise definition of category. Unless it is known what Ryle means exactly by category we are not able to appreciate the category mistake. It is true that his example makes the readers feel that something has gone wrong. But in order to be familiar with the mistake we must have an understanding of an adequate criterion to determine the category difference. Ryle does not provide this. Warnock objected rightly:

'He thus uses expressions, some category', 'different category'; without being at all prepared to say what category or which two categories are in question and thus I
think, can be said to be refusing to gratify expectation naturally aroused by his own terminology. If one is not prepared and indeed is deliberately unwilling to say just what a category is and what categories there are, can one only really be entitled to employ the term 'Category.'\(^1\) We may argue however that Ryle may not give us an explicit definition of category, still he gives us examples by which the conception can be tested. In his earlier article 'Categories' he cites an example. 'So and so is in bed' grammatically requires the complements to the gap indicated by the 'so and so', nouns, pronouns or substantive phrases such as descriptive phrases. 'So Saturday is in bed' breaks no grammatical rule, yet the sentence is absurd.\(^2\) This is enough to show that Saturday cannot belong to the same category with something which can be said to be in bed.

Critics have pointed out that this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for showing that two words belong to the same category or different categories. It is possible that one could specify the sentence such that given any two words one could fit meaningfully and the other is absurd. It might be shown that so and so is used for storing clothes into which 'dresser' and 'chest' fit but 'bed' and 'cushion' do not. But 'bed' and 'cushion' belong to the same category.

to which 'chest' and 'dresser' belong. At the end of his article 'Categories' Ryle asks the question: 'But what are tests of absurdities'? It is clear that to know that two words belong to different categories, one must find out a context in which one fits normally and the other is absurd.
The argument will turn upon just what uses of words or concepts are or are not absurd. If we do not know the context we cannot understand a category mistake.

With regard to the tests of categories Ryle says: 'Two proposition factors are of different categories or types, if there are sentence frames such that when the expressions for those factors are imported as the alternative complements to the same gapsigns, the resultant sentences are significant in the one case and absurd in the other'. This means that of the two terms, if one can and the other cannot fit in the blank of a sentence without making nonsense, they are terms of different categories. Obviously, the category of which Ryle is talking here is like that of Aristotle, a logical category. But, again the question of appropriateness and adequacy may arise. Thus Smart has argued: 'If Ryle's criterion of determining category differences is to be adopted, terms which so obviously form one category fall into different categories'. R.C. Cross also observes 'One should not expect that in their behaviours words will always fall into sharp and clearly defined and exclusive

3. Ryle, Categories, Published in Logic and Language, p.81.
4. Ibid., pp.77-78.
pattern or that there is some easy and simple test to determine their patterns'.

It is found that Ryle himself did not take the term 'categories' so seriously. In *Dilemmas* he says that it is not for usual reason that there exists an exact, professional way of using it, in which like a skeleton key it will turn all our locks for us, but for the unusual reason there is an inexact, amateurish way of using it in which like a coal hammer, it will make a satisfactory knocking noise on doors which we want opened to us.

If ordinary language is to be accepted, we find that the structure of this language is dualistic. Mental and physical concepts are freely used together. At the same time they convey significant information to us. In the language of Stuart Hampshire we find, 'We peer at people and wonder what is going on 'inside' them occultly, the wonder having point and significance just because there is always a possibility of disclosure and therefore always a possibility of non-disclosure or lies. It is this puzzlement, peculiar to the description of states and activities of human mind, which is paradoxically omitted in professor Ryle's polemic'.

illustrations which show that ordinary language combines mental and physical terms in the description and explanation of human activities without any hesitation. Ryle makes the assertion that mind and body are terms of different categories and their conjoining or disjoining makes no sense. So he will interpret these sentences in his own usual behaviouristic way. According to him, mental concepts are nothing but dispositional concepts. But when we explain moods, feelings, emotions, sentiments, images, thought, etc. We experience that we do not report our behaviour. On the contrary, we report our inner states and processes. In case of the other persons we do report their thoughts, feelings, and other mental activities. We do not report their behaviour. We come to know their mental states indirectly through inference from their behaviours. Thus both in our cases and in the cases of other we conjoin mental with physical and physical with mental occurrences most of the time. So the question of category mistake in the context of common discourse is, in fact, an improper question. Hampshire points out again that just because Professor Ryle from the very beginning confused a general feature of language with a particular metaphysical theory, it is not clear precisely whom he is attacking when he attacks the ghost, and therefore what weapons are appropriate. A.C. Ewing also goes against Ryle, when he maintains that in order to reject

Ryle's opinion it is not necessary to adopt the theory that mind and body are different substances. All we need to hold is that besides the series of bodily events there is a series of mental events, whether the two belong to the same substance or not and whether or not the substance phraseology — 'mind and body' has any applicable meaning at all. That is why Ewing remarks: We may be grateful to Professor Ryle for his particular contribution to the linguistics of psychology, but I do not see how he has contributed to his more radical object, the removal of dualism". 10

The category mistake is the most important thing in Ryle's work. We find its influence in all his philosophical writings. He thinks that if we are not clear about the types or categories, we shall remain in dark about philosophical problems and method. In his Philosophical Arguments it seems that he gives us the same view. "What happens when a person assumes an idea to be of one logical type when it really belongs to another". 11 Or "Concepts of different types cannot be coerced into similar logical conduct". 12 According to him, logically intolerable results will appear if we assume an idea to be of one logical type when it really belongs to another. That is to say, we cannot assume that the idea 'large' or 'three' have logical power similar to those of


12. Ibid., p. 10.
'green' or 'merry'. It appears very robustly in the introduction to *The Concept of Mind*. "Philosophy is the replacement of category habit by category disciplines". In *Philosophical Arguments* it is suggested that the misapplication of logical powers to certain concepts will give rise to contradiction, because the mistakenly attributed power will be found to be irreconcilable with the genuinely posse ded power. Hence the instrument par-excellence of the exposure of type mistake or type-confusion is the reductio ad absurdum argument, the key philosophical argument of Ryle. But according to Strawson, this thesis is not stated in such a way as to be easily asserted. It is not also convincingly illustrated. Moreover is it possible for us to say that all philosophical problems emerge from category mistakes? Is it possible to maintain that all philosophical problems are category problems and philosophical errors rest on category confusions? Certainly not. There are different kinds of confusions and absurdities. There are also different kinds of reduction of absurdities. So why the reductio ad absurdum argument is to be accepted in the way of Ryle? Therefore, Strawson remarks: "When Ryle speaks of the absurdities which result from violating Category - restriction, it is clear that he does not always have in mind that rather stiff and formal kind of absurdity which we find at, or just before, the terminus of a reductio ad absurdum arguments ....... it is 13. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, p. 10.
again clear that it is not this kind of absurdity he has in mind." There may be distinctive order of absurdity which a sentence suffers. Inspite of giving us an over general difference of logical forms and powers of concepts Ryle seems to give us the analysis of different examples. He only points the way, but does not follow it. Instead, he ends his classical discussion with a question: What are the tests of absurdity?

Furthermore, Ryle's use of logical form is not also clear to us. He states that the theorists represent the facts of mental life as if they belong to one category when actually they belong to another. Strawson points out that Ryle cannot mean by 'logical form' what a logician means by the phrase. A logician is concerned to abstract all differences of the subject matter and also differences in types or categories of subject matter. There is also a discrepancy in Ryle's whole philosophical writings. In his earlier paper - Systematically Misleading Expressions, Philosophical Arguments, etc. he seems to give more emphasis on logical form of propositions. But in his later writings he lays emphasis on meaning and usages of words, expressions, etc. Thus in The Concept of Mind, Dilemmas we find that he is interested in correcting the misuses of mind involving concepts. He is said to move further away from his early stand, i.e., philosophy is

entirely an apriori enterprise. If this be the case we may ask, whom do we accept, early or later Ryle? As J.L.Austin rightly observes: "When Professor Ryle says that something has been wrongly taken to belong to a certain logical category or to be of certain logical type, it is not easy to see why 'logical' might not be omitted without loss".15 We may however state that meanings and usages of words or expressions are the primary things to correct the misconception or misuses of ordinary language. So we are interested in the usages of words rather than in their logical forms.

To return to the ghost we find that in case of rectifying the logical geography of mental conduct concepts Ryle seems to deny all inner activities of mind. It is maintained throughout his work that when we characterise people by mental predicates we do not refer to any occult processes which are impossible of being witnessed. To talk of a person's mind is to talk of his ability, liabilities, inclination, etc. to do and undergo certain sort of thing. A man's life is not a double series of events taking place in different kinds of stuff. It is one concatenation of events. Ryle thus thinks that the Cartesian myth is to be destroyed — the myth that mental conduct concept refers to a queer sort of entity. He calls mind a ghost and he is totally against the conception of ghost in the body machine.

Critics express the opinion that Ryle's explanation of mental conduct concept does not destroy the impact of the official myth upon us. It is said that the myth is one of the most primitive and natural of all the many myths which are imprinted in our minds. Before Descartes or modern mechanics such conception of mind were prevalent. Thus the myth of the mind as a ghost may have a historical importance, while to Ryle has no philosophical importance. He states that there are no occurrences taking place in a second status worlds since there is no such state and no such world and consequently no need for special modes of acquainting ourselves with the denizens of such world. This assumption of Ryle cannot be accepted. We find mystical account of mind in Greek and Christian literature and theology. In modern philosophy this conception has been transformed into a doctrine of self consciousness and consequently the conception of mind and inner occurrences can never be ignored. So Hampshire states: "But the first cardinal mistake pervading the book is just this assumption that the origin of the conception of mind as a ghost within a machine is of purely historical and of no philosophical interest".

Professor Ryle maintains that the explanation of an action does not need a reference to inner or occult causes. When we speak of a person's mind we are not speaking of a second theatre of a special status, but of certain ways in

which some of the incidents of his own life are ordered.

There are no two worlds—mental and physical worlds. There is but one world, the world of public behaviour. No privileged access of the theorist but open access. But a critical analysis will show that there are many places where a reference to inner occurrences is still accepted. Thus in case of making out the distinction between knowing how and knowing that Ryle remarks that most of our ordinary thinking is conducted in internal monologue or silent soliloquy usually accompanied by an internal cinematograph show of visual imagery. This speaks of exercises of knowing how with different ways. They may be overt or covert deeds performed or deeds imagined, words spoken aloud or words heard in one's head, picture painted on canvas or pictures in mind's eye. Ryle attacks the philosopher as corrupting the literal innocence of common sense speech with alien metaphors. In this he is not only exeggerating the influence of philosophers, specially of Descartes, on the form of common speech but neglects the fact or the necessity that the form of common speech and its modes of description ultimately may be traced back to underlying myth and imaginative pictures.

In Hampshire's opinion, in a suspicion of metaphors and graphic representation of language Ryle himself is a follower of Descartes. Normally we describe mental processes and conditions in terms which have been transferred from an original use in application to physical objects. With regard to the privileged access of mental concepts with first person signular Ryle's approach falls short of a
solution. Does he want to say that first person reports of mental activities are reducible to statement about perceptible behaviour? It may be merely shown but not quite. We have direct access of our own mental states and processes. I can pay heed to what I overhear you saying as well as to what I overhear myself saying, though I cannot overhear your silent colloquies or speech with yourself. Questions like: 'how do you know?' or 'what is your evidence'? are inapplicable to avowals of thought and sensations only when these are expressed in present tense. If you make the statement about your thought and sensations a year later or an hour before you, no less than I, might be required to produce evidence that those were or will be your thought or sensation. Thus in case of any avowals whoever makes it and whenever it is made the possibility of finding evidence against it is never in principle excluded. That is why, Hampshire points out: "'Privileged access (only I can ever know about my own states of mind) cannot be true, generalised as a point of logic: nor for precisely the same reason, can Professor Ryle's open access'. 18

Austin mentions two errors in Ryle's thought. The first error is that Ryle believes only in one world - the world of bodily behaviour or the physical world. The second error is Ryle's belief that he has a single sword by which he can cut down all references to inner activities or ghostly

processes. The mind-involving words and sentences have no
reference to realm of mind. They are wrongly supposed to
do the same by the theorists. This myth leads to a category
mistake. But it may be argued that Ryle's protest is against
a general feature of language and not any philosophical theory
of mind. So in this case Ryle's question of one world or two
world are not logical. Ryle holds that one of the alleged
pair of opposites exists and so he does not believe the body
as a machine but that it alone and not the ghost exists. He
preaches the doctrine of one world, but in philosophy the
rigid division of one world or two world is not relevant.
Austin expresses in this way: "Yet what has ever been gained
by this favourite philosophical pastime of counting worlds?
And why does the answer always turn out to be one or two
or some similar small, well rounded, philosophically accep-
table number? Why if there are nineteen of anything, is
it not philosophy'? 19 About the second error of Ryle
Austin remarks that he does not confine himself to any
single technique or method of argument. He admits at the
beginning that he will probably be taken to denying well known
facts about the mental life of human beings. His arguments
all either sound or not without substance lead to show that
many mental words do not describe the mind and its activi-
ties, though they are commonly supposed to do. But to Austin
the idea that the argument as a logical method to lead a

single clear conclusion has been turned to a delusion — confusion. Thus it is not impossible to feel that Ryle is misguided as a strategist; both in his choice of objective and his appreciation of his own forces.

Ryle's denial of inner life leads to what is called 'logical behaviourism. But if the programme of logical behaviourism is to succeed we have to show that all expressions about mental states and processes can be reformulated in such a way that there is a total elimination of references to inner life. But in the version which would be attributed to Ryle what remains would be a set of dispositional statements about people's overt behaviours. This means that the Cartesian ghost is to be replaced by a dispositional account of mental facts. But the myth cannot be eliminated in such an easy way. According to Ayer, the reason for taking such a view is commonly not that it is systematically plausible, but rather that it offers a way of escape from philosophical perplexities. Ayer questions what then we are to make of these mental residues such as the silent soliloquies, the itches, pangs, and gnawing, the dreams and the day-dreams, the processes of fancyings and those of which the various modes of perceptions are achievements? Taken as a whole do they not furnish a robust inner life? How can Ryle admit them and yet cannot be haunted by the ghost in the machine.  

Ryle may not like to have it put in these terms. According to Ayer, the answer may be that his belief in ghost is to be an honest ghost. It would therefore have to differ in some vital respect from the ghost of the official doctrine. We may then point out that the myth of the official theory makes Ryle incapable to frighten away the ghost. As in Ayer's words: "In short what Ryle has succeeded in doing is to reduce the empire of the mind over a considerable area. This is an important achievement and one that is brilliantly effected, but it does not fulfil Ryle's proposed intention of entirely exorcising the ghost in the machine. The movements of the ghost have been curtailed but it still works, and some of us are still haunted by it". 21

Ryle's main task is to drive away the ghost in the body machine. But is it at all possible to do it? Is not the 'Cogito' a dependable hypothesis to explain the inner occurrences? The derisive thrust of Ryle's metaphor lies in the word 'ghost' as most of us consider belief in ghost to be a superstition. But no one except members of some primitive tribes believe that minds or souls are ghosts or ghost like entities, mind or soul cannot be considered as superstition. That is the reason why H.P.Rickman is rather interested not to exorcise the Cartesian ghost in the machine, but to exorcise 'Ryle's ghost in machine'. What Ryle says

as the criticism of dualism including that of Descartes is that it understands mind on the model of body. It leads to the gross absurdity of category mistake. Richman thinks that Ryle fails to exorcise the ghost. After all we may say that he is not an expert exorcist to hypnotise the ghost. As Rickman expresses: "It is probably still necessary to exorcise a particular ghost, Ryle's ghost in the machine". 22 This vivid phrase is understood to show that Ryle could not free himself of the dualistic influence. It is also regarded as the Descartes' version. But the criticism implied in the metaphor misses its target. It does not properly describe such form of dualism as we find in Descartes. It cannot be taken as representing any dualism at all.

Section 3: Of Knowing How and Knowing That

Traditional thought maintains that knowledge is a mental concept. In all cases of knowledge or knowing some inner activities take place. Theorising is the primary activity and it is intrinsically a private or an internal operation. Mind is thought to be a place where people conduct their secret thought. The intellectualists argue that to know involves two things, to consider certain propositions and to put into practice what the propositions suggest. It is doing a bit of theory and also a bit of practice. Professor Ryle does not accept this conception of knowledge. According to him, there can be no go-between process something occurring in the mind and something else in the physical world. Knowledge is not in his opinion, an inner mental concept. The intellectualist legend the double life theory is criticised. In his opinion the cognitive concepts do not entail the double operation of considering and executing, theory and practice. These operations are to be analysed in terms knowing how. Ryle thinks that knowing how is logically prior to knowing that. All mental conduct concepts are to be understood without any reference to any hidden occult processes of mind. The Cartesian ghost or mind is to be
replaced by disposition of public behaviours. Knowing how is dispositional in character.

Thinkers do not agree with Ryle's description of knowing how and knowing that and so they criticise his concept of disposition. They maintain that Ryle's distinction of knowing how and knowing that have no determinate use at all. The phrases which Ryle uses are merely tags. Difficulties occur with the very division and that about knowing how. Two passages of Ryle in this context may be considered. "Philosophers have not done justice to the distinction which is quite familiar to all of us between knowing that something is the case and know how to do thing".¹ "When a person is described by one or other of the intelligence - epithets such as 'shrew' or 'silly', 'prudent' or 'imprudent' the description imputes to him not the knowledge or ignorance of this or that truth, but ability or inability to do certain sorts of things. Theorists have been so pre-occupied with the task of investigating the nature, the source and the credential of the theories that we adopt that they have for the most part ignored the question what it is for some one to know how to perform certain task".² The first passage attached strongly 'know how' to know how to do things. But in the second one 'knowing how' refers to performing certain tasks. In these passages the application of intelligent -

² Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 27.
predicates are taken into account as the exercises of intelligence in practice. If knowing what to do and where to begin and even knowing that some way to do a thing is the right way and involves the intelligence in practice are they also to be called knowing how? The answers are not clear. Again when Ryle says that know how is a disposition the exercises of which are observances of rules, he does not define knowing how. Moreover rules or canons in order to be applied elsewhere must be preceded by some activities of mind. In different passages of Ryle's analysis we find that the principle of division of knowing how and knowing that is vague and obscure. Theory and practice are closely connected. That is why, D.G. Brown remarks, "Since there is not to my knowledge a better account of distinction, no one has drawn it precisely, and although the phrases 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' have been commonly used, I do not think they have acquired a determinate use at all". 3 Again, according to Brown, Ryle's account of knowing how to do something also provokes a problem which seems incapable of being resolved within the terms of his analysis. In fact it is not clear to us what is known by knowing how.

We find that knowing how involves being able to. But why only 'involves'? Knowing how to just is being able to unless there is something to it over and above being able

to. Is it that one must learn to do it? Not that alone, because there are many things one has to learn to do, like drawing a circle freehand which one is just able to do. So it would be natural to suggest that besides being able to, there is involved knowing something. What then we call knowing? It seems fair to ask not only to be told what he knows. Perhaps what is known is a rule and a rule can be formulated in words. But this suggestion is not clear. In any case if knowing a rule is to be exhibited in performance, one has the analogous problem of why it is called knowing rather than being able to act according to the rule.

'I know French' obviously is a case of knowing how as understood by Ryle. He says that the sleeper knows French is to say that if he is addressed in French or shown any French Newspaper he responds pertinently in French, acts in a suitable manner or translates it correctly into his own language. One might argue here that the expression 'I known French' does not mean the expression of certain ability, competences or skills. It implies also the actual knowledge that the French word for knife is 'cauteau', for boy is 'garcon' and so on. I am able to read and translate French because I know that the particular French word has the same meaning as that particular English word. To speak otherwise it may be said that 'I know French' is a phrase which cannot be straightforwardly put in the category of knowing how. For it has one leg in the category of knowing that. If Ryle's
distinction between knowing how and knowing that is accepted, we feel after a preliminary analysis that both these concepts are applicable in the clarification of the phrase 'I know French'. We feel also that Ryle himself despite his own analysis is in consistency bound to admit the phrase covers both the know categories in question - knowing that and knowing how. Again, we are to state that if all cases of knowing that can and must be reduced ultimately to cases of knowing how then we have to do only with the capacity knowledge like that of Ryle. But it cannot be accepted.

There are different kinds of knowledge. So why should we accept only one form of knowledge, i.e. the capacity knowledge? R. Robinson who argues against Ryle points out, 'Knowledge can be either (1) factual knowledge, or (2) capacity knowledge, or (3) acquaintance, or (4) internal knowledge'. Ryle's analysis is not adequate for he deals only with the capacity knowledge.

In order to demolish the Cartesian 'Cogito' Ryle accepts the dispositional account of knowledge. He wants to explain the psychological concepts - know, believe, aspire, etc. in terms of knowing how. But critics have the opinion that mental concepts cannot be fully understood by the dispositional analysis. Knowledge is essentially a mental act, a cognitive activity. So it is not proper to explain the nature of knowledge in terms of bents, skills, abilities,

inclinations, etc. Professor D.Carr seems to draw our attention to this fault of Ryle. He remarks: "But whilst I am far from finding Ryle's careful and detailed account of knowing how, entirely without interest, I would include myself amongst those of his critics who remained dissatisfied with his rather indiscriminate dispositional analysis of a whole battery of what seems to be quite disparate psychological concepts and I do not think that a proper understanding of knowing how is attainable by this route". 5

Ryle wants to insist on a certain non-parallelism between knowing how and knowing that. But in what exactly do these non-parallelisms consist? According to Hartland Swan, the non-parallelism cannot be maintained. We can take two sentences:

(a) He knows the answer
(b) He knows that the answer is 35.

The differences between these two sentences is as follows: (a) The speaker does not reveal his own hand nor does he specify what the answer is. But in (b) he does both these things. Inspite of that both sentences are basically know-how sentences as the dispositional analysis reveals. We can translate (a) as he is able to state the answer correctly (knows how); (b) he is able to state correctly that the answer is 35 (knows how). In the light of this explanation

it is found that the difference between knowing how and knowing that is only a difference between the kinds of statements we have the capacity to make correct statements about what is the case - what is so and so. This applies to all know statements, to ordinary statements and also to tautological proposition of logic and of pure mathematics. No philosopher can lay down rigid and proper rule for the right use of 'know' in ordinary conversation. Of course he can usefully debate the nature and cogency of the ground or evidence on which decisions are based. Hartland Swan makes a statement following Austin: "Lastly, Austin is quite right in claiming that when I say 'I know' I give my authority and pledge my word which I do not when I merely say 'I believe', but I give my authority and pledge my word only because I have decided or accepted a decision that so and is the case".6 Knowing that includes decision or acceptance of decision. Hartland Swan makes a further suggestion that on Ryle's account of knowledge there will be no distinction between knowing how and knowing that because all cases of knowing are really cases of knowing how as all knowledge is to be analysed as the exercises of mental acts. But the distinction between knowing that and knowing how cannot be abolished in the easy way as maintained by Ryle. Hartland Swan feels that there is a distinction between the two. The process of learning an ability and the state of

being in possession of information are not one and the same thing. Knowing that may be taken to mean having an actual piece of knowledge which is privately stored in our mind. Thus knowing how cannot fully be understood without any reference to knowledge that. Though Hartland Swan is convinced by Ryle's dispositional account, yet he maintains that a logical difference between knowing how and knowing that exists. So the role of the either sort of knowledge cannot be ignored. He admits, 'Many people will find it difficult to believe that 'knowing that the earth is round' is ultimately on a par with knowing how to swim'.

Jane Roland in her article "Know How and Knowing That" states that Ryle and Hartland Swan both reduce knowing that to knowing how. She argues that knowing how is ambiguous. So the real distinction is to be made between two sorts of knowing how. The first sort is akin to all knowing that, as it is knowing how to answer certain question. The second sort is the old knowing how which is to perform certain tasks. The latter she says implies an ability or capacity gained through practice which the former does not have. She adds also a third sort of knowing how. This sort of knowledge is not really a capacity at all, but the adoption of a mode of behaviour.

According to Ernest Gellner, the knowing how, and the knowing that dichotomy is used by professor Ryle to remove
the fallacy of misusing mental conduct concepts. There
is, however, to Gellner, an alternative mistake committed
by Ryle. It is the mistake of treating knowing how as a
type of validation, as a legitimate answer to 'how do we
know' questions. The final and the main reason for misus-
ing knowing how as a category of validation is the ambiguity
of 'knowing how'. To say that somebody knows how to do
thing is to say two things. That he can do it and that he
can do it correctly. One fails to notice that two things
are being said, because knowing how is never predicated
unless both hold, and the second cannot hold unless the
first does. So Gellner observes, "Knowing how is an excellent
thing but it is no substitute for proofs, evidence or grounds
nor alternatively, for admission arbitrariness'." 8 Gellner
also maintains that it is one of the important functions of
our language in cases of facilitating criticisms, compar-
sions, discussions, improvement of skills and arts, etc. Where
the translation of knowing how into knowing that is very
difficult. When dancing or playing chess or table tennis
it is fatal to think about what one is doing.

Critics think that Ryle's distinction between knowing how
and knowing that does not have any philosophical interest.
The complete nature of the concept of knowledge cannot be
understood by making such a division. There are different

8. Ernest Gellner, 'Knowing How and Validity', Analysis,
   Vol. XII, Dec., 1951, p. 35.
aspects of knowledge and the attempt to analyse them with the aspect of knowing how is to make the concept of knowledge very simple, which is a very complicated topic. Professor Brown raises objections against Ryle when he states that there are different senses of knowing how with different divisions. Some of them cannot be logically explained without giving distinct references to mind and mental activities. Again, the standard use of know how and the English use of know how are different. There are also other uses of 'know where', 'know when', 'know what', 'know which', etc. These have been neglected in Ryle's account. What then, remains in Ryle's classification of knowing that and knowing how? Brown argues that if his account is right then all knowing how is knowing that. We are allowed to return to the common assumption which Ryle wanted to remove that knowing in general is knowing that. The explanation of practical knowledge shows that relevant knowing how is propositional and can be formulated in that clauses. That is the reason why Brown firmly puts it: "Finally, the contrast is irrelevant to any of the contrasts which are of interest in classifying kinds of knowledge. I conclude that we have good grounds for abandoning the use of the tags 'knowing how and knowing that' ".

Ryle mentions in his argument against the idea of knowing that knowing how is logically prior to knowing that.

Knowing that presupposes knowing how. Indeed he argues that the counter thesis would entail an infinite regress. As every item of theoretical knowledge requires formulation and application, such formulation and application imply knowing how. But knowing how does not imply infinite regress, as it is actualised in some overt actions. Intelligent activities if preceded by internal principles, we ultimately lead to no action. No intelligent act will be acknowledged, and the regress will go on. The question of infinite regress however, is not at all an important question in our common sense speech. Ryle himself admits that in order to get thing right we have to take diverse ways. That is why, the actualisation itself requires a series of performances.

Professor Hamlyn raises objection against Ryle. According to him, the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge need not be so sharp as is understood by Ryle. There could be forms of knowledge which are both theoretical and practical at the same time. There may be a case where theoretical rather than practical knowledge is possible. The reverse is also true. The general distinction between the two forms of knowledge is real, but the question of priority of one to the other cannot be considered to be a real and logical question. In fact, knowing how normally implies some understanding and knowledge of principle. In cases where such a question of having an understanding is not present, it is wrong to speak of knowledge how. Knowledge how is the knowledge of a technique, the principle
of which could be formulated in theory. Techniques are normally acquired by learning and are revealed in circumstances. It is true that a man cannot be said to know how to do something unless he can do it. It may be that he knows in theory how to do it, though he cannot do it in practice. He knows the principles, but he cannot apply them. As Hamlyn expresses: "To that extent 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' are parallel and it is intelligible that we have the locution 'knowing how'." 10

Ryle seeks to replace the Cartesian mind by the idea of disposition. In his opinion mental conduct concepts are dispositional in character and he wants to demolish the Cartesian 'cogito' which is a secret chamber of inner states and processes. His theory of disposition raises many questions. We may say that it is very difficult to accept Ryle's anti-Cartesianism. First of all why does Ryle think that a disposition is primarily a tendency to behave overtly? Why should knowing French mean only such thing as replying in French, translating in language and so on? Why should it not also mean a covert feeling of confidence in tackling with whatever is there is French? Why should vanity at most mean an overt act of boasting alone? Why should it not also mean a private experience of annoyance? Again, is Ryle's distinction between categorical and hypothetical, occurrence and disposition logical in the context of his

linguistic usage of common expressions? Ryle's account of disposition lays an over emphasis on overt acts, but disposition may be a disposition to act outwardly as well as to feel and experience inwardly. It has been pointed out by Sibley when he says, '... he inclines to say that disposition statements are not only hypothetical about possible acts (which is true) but about (at least predominantly) overt acts. Why then this emphasis on overt?' 11 Ewing also feels the same way and in his opinion a disposition may not be primarily 'A disposition to behave in a certain way but a disposition to have private experiences of a certain kind'. 12

Besides, the limitation of signifying only some behaviours, imposed on mental concepts, it is beset with further difficulties. If vanity means only the possibility of doing this or that, then if we see somebody does just that we may infer for certain that he is in vain. But can anybody be so confident of his finding? There is no contradiction in the assertion that the man does all that a vain man would do, but still he is not in vain. He might be doing these things not out of vanity but from some other motive. This can be illustrated with the help of a concept, the concept of intelligence Ryle thinks that intelligence is the disposition of doing things in a certain way.

Intelligence is thought to be equal with certain manner so that if some body is intelligent, he will perform in that manner and if he does so, he is intelligent. But there are cases in which the equation breaks down. Some body's inner communications might be intelligent, but public performances dull because of shyness, stage fright, etc. An intelligent student might do worse at the examination, conversely somebody might do well at times, but he may not be intelligent. This shows that intelligence is not the same thing as the manner of doing things, though it is intimately connected with such a manner. That is why, Ryle makes a basic confusion between the essence and evidence of mental conduct concepts. It is essential to make references to external observations to elucidate the nature of such concepts. But to rely wholly on overt actions or external observation cannot be tenable. Walsh says that it is one thing to insist that the term in which we appraise mental qualities are unintelligible without references to what the subjects of those qualities do, and quite another to say that we can find the whole meaning of such terms in overt actions. It is indeed too much to say that mental facts are completely and exhaustively objectified in behaviours.

Again, intelligent activities cannot fully be explicable in terms of ability, skills, bents, etc. There are some inner references in respect of these activities to be felt or

realised. It cannot make sense of learning to play chess, but only of playing chess intelligently, because one has a disposition or proneness to do so. The learning which is part of the process of manifesting disposition cannot itself be a disposition. Moreover, what will be the case where there are original or creative intellectual works? How a dispositional explanation can be given of a new intellectual move which no one has made before and which at least on Ryle's account of disposition, no one could have a disposition to do? It is pointed out by W. Lyons, "What I am getting at here is a very fundamental difficulty with any analysis of intellectual activities in terms of disposition, namely, that it cannot make sense of the pre-dispositional intellectual activity which eventually becomes dispositional."14 He indicates also another problem of Ryle's account of dispositions. It is this that he has committed himself to behavioural dispositional account. We may say how can such an account cope with silent, internal speculative intellectual activity; activities such as silent reading, mental arithmetic, non-dispositional account of speculative and theoretical thinking, etc? How can an account in terms of behavioural disposition make sense of intellectual activities where no behaviour is going on?

Critics argue that categorical statements cannot be reduced to a series of hypotheticals. It is difficult to

see how a categorical statement containing a disposition-word can be expressed in hypothetical statements. Obviously the statement 'The sleeper knows French' does not mean only a few hypotheticals like — if he is ever addressed in French or shown any French Newspaper, he responds pertinently in French, acts appropriately or translates it correctly into his own tongue. But there is also no way for us to say how many other hypotheticals will supplement and exhaust the meaning of the above categorical statement. Ryle thinks that the meaning of most dispositional statements involve an infinite number of hypothetical statements. When a man is said to be vain we do not only mean that he tends to talk a lot about himself in the company of others; we mean also that he cleaves to the society of eminent people and so on infinitely. But is this not trying one's patience to recommend that the meaning of a dispositional statement is to be sought in an infinite series of hypothetical propositions? Can such a series be even completely formulated? Can it thereby obtain the required meaning of a word or a sentence? As Peter Geach points out: 'It is really a scandal that people should count it a philosophical advance to adopt a programme of analysing ostensible categoricals into unfulfilled conditionals, like the programme of the phenomenologists with regard to physical object statements and of neo-behaviourists with regard to psychological statements'.

According to Hampshire, Ryle's distinction between categorical and hypothetical is confusing. His general thesis is that there is no mental happening, i.e. to speak of a person's mind is to speak of certain ways in which some of the incidents of his life are ordered. This hinges largely on the distinction between occurrence and disposition. He indicates that in all cases, reduction of the categorical into hypotheticals is not possible. Not only in the case of emotion, thrills, pangs but also in other various places the translation of perceptible behaviour is, as a matter of logic, a pure mistake. The double distinction between categorical and hypothetical breaks down and produces confusion. He has no logical criterion for such translation. Hampshire remarks in this regard: "But if this distinction is shown to be unworkable, and cannot be clearly formulated, the whole account of the relation between mind and body - overt intelligent performances are not clues to the workings of mind, they are those workings - collapses with it. It must be reformulated". 16

Thus Professor Ryle's distinction between occurrence and disposition is pseudo-logical distinction. In fact, they have separate logical status. We cannot explain mental occurrences in the light of overt behaviours completely. Ryle thinks that typical mental concepts are dispositions and the statements in which they occur are law-like propositions.

which have to be supported by observation of overt behaviours. His analysis reveals that statements about mental occurrences are confirmed or rejected by interpretation of overt behaviours. But this analysis is incomplete in the sense that it misleadingly denies the status of categorical propositions. Hampshire observes that he suspects that one of the main confusions of the book comes from the use of distinction such as the hypothetical and categorical distinctions which are borrowed from logic in the strict sense in order to make distinction which cannot be strictly logical.  

D.Carr also observes: "According to this criticism psychological reports instead of being merely short hand version of hypothetical conditional statements about possible behaviours have a proper place in the antecedent positions of conditionals about human conduct".  

Ryle's idea of multi-track disposition is another instance where we come across a fresh difficulty. We find him drawing a distinction between single-track dispositions which are uniform and many-track dispositions the actualisations of which are infinitely heterogeneous. 'Cigarette smoker' is a single-track disposition word, because it refers to only one type of activity, i.e., the activity of smoking. But the word 'vain' or 'greedy' is a many-track disposition word, as it signifies not one but many diverse activities.

in different situations. Ryle illustrates it with the example of grocing which stands for different activities like selling sugar, weighing tea, wrapping up butter and so on. In a similar way the term 'vanity' or 'greedy' behaves in many ways. The many track disposition-words are highly generic or determinable, but the single-track words are highly specific or determinate. Real difficulty begins in case of multi-track disposition-words. Such words are highly generic. It serves as genus having heterogeneous episodes as its species. But the question is: How can a series of episodes which are different in character be all subsumed under a common genus? How can in the absence of a relationship among these episodes they can all be taken to refer to a generic term? What is the rule of construction by which the different hypotheticals can be grouped together? Is it possible to have a definite meaning of a highly generic term? It is in this connection that Spilsbury holds, "I do not understand Ryle's use of the term 'generic' in this context. In any ordinary language it would be absurd to say that hardness is a genus of which the properties of causing pains, resisting deformation and giving out a sharp sound were species". W. Lyons makes the observation that Ryle's distinctions of determinable and determinate are not correct. He thinks that there are not two types of disposition.

there is only one and this is determinate disposition. We have nothing to do with determinable disposition. He argues: "All dispositions are determinate dispositions which are parasitic on similar occurrences or episodes of certain type".  

According to W. Lyons, Ryle's account of disposition is ambiguous and it is the initial difficulty of his philosophy. The term 'disposition' may have two senses or rather it has two kinds of implications (a) semantic (use) implication and (b) genetic (ontological) implication. If the former is taken it means how it is used and then Ryle's account is correct. But if the latter sense is taken, Ryle's account is inadequate. It seems that Ryle accepts also the latter sense of genetic explanation. He accuses the Cartesian dualist of thinking mind as a sort of ontological category—substance. He analysed what the Cartesians thought to be substances and their activities as proneness to activities of certain type in certain circumstances. He was accusing the Cartesians of elevating proneness or potentialities into actualities. But W. Lyons thinks that he suspects what Ryle's account was not merely an account of how we use the term disposition, because he argued from his account of disposition to ontological conclusions, not merely semantic conclusions.  

that dispositions are not just potentialities. They are potentialities based on the existence of real facts. The causal factor which is dominant in persons or things to which a disposition is attributed is called the structural or categorical basis of the disposition. To refer to an actual property is to refer categorically rather than hypothetically. Besides behaviour or circumstances, a third thing namely the structural basis is to be accounted for. If this be done in a dispositional analysis, this will not eradicate the inner aspect. Thus we can say that both in the semantic and genetic accounts of dispositions there are causal factors hidden or inwardly. But to admit this is not necessarily to reinstate Cartesian dualism. That is why, the categorical or the structural basis of human disposition may not turn out to be mental occurrences.

In the final analysis we find that Ryle's plea to reject the causal theory of purposive activity that involves the fallacy of infinite regress cannot be maintained. Armstrong tries to show that there will be no regress if we distinguish between the acts of will and operations of will. An act is something that we do as opposed to something that merely happens. An act springs from our will. Operations of will are mere happenings. They have causes, but these causes do not lie in the will. Both acts of will and operations of will are purposive, but not in the same sense. Actions are purposive in the sense that they are caused by will. Operations of will are purposive in the sense that
they cause actions. Only acts of will are purposive in both senses. So, according to Armstrong, there will be no regress when we say that actions are caused by operations of will.

Armstrong criticises Ryle's account of disposition also. He terms Ryle's account of disposition as the phenomenalist or the operationalist account and opposes this with what he calls the realist account. He identifies dispositions with their categorical basis. He explains that to speak of an object having a dispositional property entails that the object is in some non-dispositional state or that it has some property (There exists a categorical basis). The realist account is taken as the genetic account of disposition, whereas the phenomenalist account is the semantic account. But we may say that both accounts are speaking with crossed purposes. Thus it may be said that Ryle and Armstrong are not clear in their analysis of disposition. Indeed the whole debate on disposition has been bedevilled by the unfortunate confusion. This is the reason why Alston really suggests that Ryle's account of disposition may well be the result of confusing meaning and reference. It may be correct to say that the meaning of a disposition-term 'brittleness' can be explicated in terms of typical reactions and circumstances. But the reference of the dispositional term will

be some internal occurrence - its categorical base. Alston says: "In other words, the entity referred to by a linguistic expression may have many properties not reflected in the meaning of that expression, and such that an account of the meaning of that expression will afford no basis for anticipating them". 23

If we deny disposition as something actual or categorical we face an absurd situation. Ryle thinks that if we want to distinguish a soluble thing from an insoluble one, we can do that because of a property present in the one which is absent in another. This can be done only with the help of certain hypotheticals. But if this be the case how is it possible to distinguish one person from another? What will be the point of difference between two things or persons if no categorical statements or actual characters are not explained? Besides, infinite series of conditionals do not give a definite meaning of expressions. The denial of the actuality of expressions - statements seems to be incompatible with the learning of skills or abilities. It is known that skills are learned gradually by practice. But if every practice does not leave a positive impression how can it be carried forward in the next or how can we improve an acquired skill? If there is nothing positive due to practice which can be sustained and carried forward, every attempt in learning a skill will be a new attempt about the

learning of that skill. Again, the rejection of disposition as something actual leads to queer consequences. It has led Ryle to believe that vain behaviour is not due to an element of vanity present in the agent. It is due to some such thing as meeting the stranger, talking tall talks etc. But to say so is to explain vanity more in terms of the stranger than in the terms of the agent himself.

If we examine reflexes we find that the actuality of disposition cannot be denied. Reflexes are the actualisation of disposition of an organism to react to different stimuli in more definite ways. Such an actualisation presupposes a stable nervous system in the organism. It is in the interaction between the stimulus and the system which gives rise to manifestation of behaviour. So we find that an enduring system is necessary for the actualisation of disposition, some stable property or properties within the human organisation should be required for the actualisation of disposition. G.D.Jha in his book, *A Study of Ryle's Theory of Mind*, published by Visva-Bharati, West Bengal, 1961, p.81, states that stimulus acts on the nervous system to produce reflex-behaviour. Circumstances should also act on the inner qualities to produce dispositional behaviours. Ryle ignores the categorical basis of disposition and that is why his analysis of disposition is incomplete.
According to Ryle, disposition means a regular sequence of behaviour under appropriate conditions. If it is said the X has a disposition, it is to say that X has regularly behaved in a particular manner Y and is likely to behave in this way in future. Disposition-words do not stand for drives, force or powers existing in the agent. He reminds us that the concept of an occult process has been rejected by the physical sciences. Why should it then at all continue in the theories of mind? But it may be pointed out that physical sciences have given up the idea of an existing force. Ordinary language which is the basis of Ryle's analysis has not yet given up. The phrase 'force of habit' is very much in use to day as any other phrases. Habit is our disposition. Can we not treat disposition as force on the basis of this usage? Dispositions may be accepted to exist within us as a force which we experience when we want to do something against what we are disposed to do so. In a situation like this we are not able to do easily what we want to do. We feel as if something is preventing us. We have to develop a counter force against the resistance. The resistance which we feel and the force which we apply to meet it clearly suggests that there is a force or drive in us to do thing in a certain manner which we want to break in the present case. This is found in the case of a habitual smoker who wants to give up smoking. He will require a strong will force to overcome the preexisting force of the temptation for cigarette. In view of all these considerations it is
difficult to believe with Ryle that a disposition is not an existing drive or force. Thus we find Aaron at the time of explaining the nature of disposition observes that it does not signify only a regular behaviour sequence. On the other hand he thinks "When ordinary men and scientists and philosophers speak of disposition they clearly mean more; rightly or wrongly they mean drives, forces or powers". In a similar manner W. Lyons explains that Ryle gives us a more or less adequate account of what the term 'disposition' may be taken to mean but he does not give us a satisfactory account of what dispositions are and how they give rise to behaviour. His account is somewhat different from the account of psychologists. That is why, a psychologist deals with the nature of disposition and the causal processes that give rise to them but not about how the word 'disposition' is used. Lyons remarks in this context: "So the psychologist, rightly, looks for internal factors to explain the workings of dispositions and ..... looks first for clearly isolatable physico-logical factors to explain dispositional behaviour patterns".  

It is argued that Ryle's theory of disposition has a role in deciding about the character of mind, but not about the workings of mind. This can be explained with the help of one or two illustrations given by Ryle. When he gives 

us a criterion of intelligent activity he remarks that it is one which is the result of skill or disposition. The shooting of a bull's eye by a marksman is an example of an intelligent activity, because the marksman has the ability or skill or disposition to do it under different circumstances. The corollary which can be drawn from this view is that some acts of successful shooting by a novice is not an intelligent activity as he is not able or disposed to do it again and again. But in this case what the ability or disposition helps us to decide is that the mind of the marksman is superior to the mind of the novice. It is on the account of superiority of the mind of the marksman that we call his action intelligent. So when the question of knowing the quality of one's mind and comparing it with that of another arises, dispositions may help us. But when the question of workings is about the working of one's mind, disposition can be almost of no help. Whether the novice had pressed the trigger mindfully or not cannot be decided with the help of his disposition. In a situation like this it is not through his disposition but through his avowals that we can know whether he had or had not directed his action at the moment. Again, the word 'intelligent' as predicated of an action may mean, according to G.D. Jha, directed action as opposed to a mechanical action, or it may mean well directed and careful action as opposed to the action of an idiot. Ryle's disposition is helpful in accounting for well directed and careful action. It however fails in case of simply directed or conscious
action. The same explanation will also apply to heeding or minding.

But dispositions sometimes appear to be a good substitute for mind. Even then it is necessary for Ryle to distinguish between human and non-human disposition. Inanimate objects also have their disposition to behave in particular ways. What is it then when we classify some disposition as physical and others as mental? Ryle does not give any suitable answer to this question. That is the reason why Russell argues that a plain man would say that 'brittle' denotes a disposition of bodies and 'intelligent' denotes a disposition of mind—infact, the two adjectives apply to different kinds of stuff. But it is not open to Professor Ryle to say this and I do not quite know what he would say.26

Though Ryle does not distinguish human disposition from non-human disposition he makes a certain distinction in mental dispositions. About the distinction of 'know' and 'believe' one refers to capacity and the other to tendency. To know means to be able to get things right and to believe means to tend to act or react in certain ways. Neither the capacity verb 'know' nor the tendency verb 'believe' refers in Ryle's opinion to any act or process conducted on the private stage of mind. Dispositional concepts are different from the activity or process concepts. There are no cognitive acts or processes whatsoever. The cognitive acts lead to infinite regress. It is really absurd to ask how many

cognitive acts did he perform before breakfast? Here we may say that the answer cannot be easily given. It is not because there are no cognitive acts but because the question is more or less illegitimate. In case of knowing, the cognitive acts are to be accounted for. This means that they cannot be ignored. The only difficulty is that we cannot know them by making them objects of our consciousness. They are always subjects of consciousness or awareness. They are known in relation to their objects, as knowing and believing cannot be abstracted from the known and believed. The verb 'know' and 'believe' therefore, do report mental acts in a certain way. When we say that 'the sleeper knows French' we mean his ability or disposition to act in a certain way. But when we say that we have just come to know how the incident occurs, we do not here mean any ability or disposition, but narrate the consequences. That is why, Jane Roland argues, "In ordinary language the phrase 'knowing how' is often used when performances are not involved".27

Ryle himself has noticed that a concept of heed, noticing, concentrating, caring, attending etc. are not fully explicable in dispositional line. In the case of these concepts comprised under the head of 'minding' Ryle has to take recourse to the language of 'mongrel-categorical' or 'semi-dispositional' concepts. They are half-dispositional

and half-categorical or episodic which have both dispositional and episodic references. The proposition 'X' is reading carefully contains the heed concept 'carefully'. But introducing the concept of mongrel-categorical for elucidating the meaning of heed concept Ryle, in fact, goes against his own theory. He maintains firmly that mental concepts or inner happenings are occult ghostly processes which do not exist. The so-called inner mental concepts are dispositional and not episodic. The categorical statements about mental events are to be reduced to the conditional statements about possible behaviours. The logic of disposition-word is different from the logic of episodic words. But when we have to explain the logic of heed verbs, the occurrence-disposition dichotomy creates a great problem. Ryle had to maintain then that the logic of occurrence and disposition words both meet in the heed concepts. This obviously makes his original thesis weak. T.D. Weldon point out, "It is essential to Ryle's argument to maintain that disposition and episodic words are of different logical types". 28

Ryle wants to maintain that when a man is said to be minding what he is doing, his minding is not over and above his overt activities. It is not that the man is minding something at the ghostly level and working at the physical level. But the point is that minding cannot go by itself. It is a conscious direction which requires some objects on

which it is to be applied. When a man is 'walking' and 'humming' it is always possible to do the one without the other. But minding cannot be continued without the activity of doing or reading. Thus there is an important point of difference between walking and humming on the one hand and reading and minding on the other hand. Ryle seems to overlook this point. The complex activity of doing mindfully is not open to an outside observer. He does not have an access to the mind of others to see directly the minding aspect of the complex activity. He can see only the overt or the public part of the activity, i.e. the act of reading. He can know that it is mindful indirectly only through certain tests. Thus when I have to decide whether somebody's action is heedful or not I have to depend on these tests. But I do not need them in order to know whether my action is mindful or not. So minding, noticing, caring, etc. in my own case is known directly through the fact of my consciousness. Ryle while talking about minding, heeding, etc. talks about minding of others. He seems to confuse the question, 'How do I know that I am minding my activity'? With the question 'How do you know that some one else is minding his activity'? If we state that minding in our own case is known from consciousness then Ryle will bring the charge of infinite regress against this. He will argue that if minding is known from consciousness, the consciousness of minding must be known by another consciousness and so on. He thus uses his
favourite argument of infinite regress against the traditional concept of heed by stating: "Doing something with heed does not consist in coupling an executive performance with a piece of theorising, investigating, scrutinising, cognising or else doing something with heed would involve doing an infinite number of things with heeds". But we find that it is not difficult to see that behind this infinite regress argument there is a mistaken notion of consciousness. Ryle seems to understand that if there is consciousness it must be instantaneous or fragmentary. It is only with such a notion of consciousness that it is possible to speak of going back from one consciousness to another and so on ad infinitum. But mind is not a series of different bits of consciousness like walking which is a mere series of different steps. If the regress is accepted as true, it does not mean that the activity of consciousness is thereby refuted. The argument has its destructive force when it defeats a purpose. If to draw money from the bank the signature of the drawee is to be attested and the attested signature is again to be attested and so on ad infinitum the drawee cannot withdraw his money. Infinite regress is harmful here and in cases like this. But no such harm is done to consciousness even if regress is true there. U.T. Place in his paper 'The Concept of Heed' published in Gustafson's Essays in Philosophical Psychology, Macmillan, 1964, p.220, states that when Ryle uses 'a heed concept' we 29. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 131.
mean by that we are not merely referring to the disposition in a manner appropriate to the presence of the thing in question and specifying how the disposition is actualised. But we are also referring to an internal state of the individual. This is a necessary and sufficient condition of such a disposition. He maintains also that there are not two things sensation and my consciousness of it in the way that there are two things a penny and my consciousness of the penny. According to Place, the occurrence of a sensation entails someone's consciousness of that sensation.

The major problem of Ryle's theory of knowledge seems to be his failure to distinguish between task-verbs and achievement-verbs, between achievements and disposition. This ultimately leads to some epistemological problems. Special cognitive acts are postulated by Ryle to explain achievement-words. He considers knowledge as an achievement. It is also dispositional. The trouble is that these characteristics exclude each other and so their joint attribution is self-contradictory. Ryle explicitly introduces the episodic character of achievement-words. They signify occurrences. He stresses also equally that dispositional statements do not narrate any incidents; by holding that to clarify a word as dispositional is to say at least that it does not indicate any episode. He does not even suggest that 'know' is a hybrid word which is both episodic and dispositional. Thus we see that Ryle is not at all clear about his own theory
of knowledge. If knowledge is interpreted as dispositional how can it be achievement at the same time? Scheffler criticises Ryle by stating that Ryle is perfectly clear and explicit in classifying 'know' as a dispositional word without any qualification. He is also perfectly straightforward in calling achievement words 'genuine episodic words'. It follows that 'know' cannot be both an achievement-word and dispositional word. Ryle's total account is thus literally inconsistent. 

In discussing the various ways in which we use the word 'know' Austin unlike Ryle puts forward the theory that knowing is a performative word. The statement 'I know that S is P' is usually understood to assert that I am in a mental state in relation to 'S is P'. This doctrine Austin argues rests on the descriptive fallacy which supposes that words are used only to describe. To claim to know is not to describe my mental state. It is to take a plunge that is to give others my authority, my word. In his article 'Other Minds' Austin seems to bring an analogy between 'know statements' and 'promise-statements'. Utterances like 'I promise' are performatives in that the saying of 'I promise' is the performances of a promise itself. It actually does what is seems to say, what the speaker is doing. Austin points out that 'I know' is not just reporting a fact about myself,

it is giving one's warrant to something. He says: "But now when 'I say, I promise' a new plunge is taken: I have not merely announced my intention, but by using this formula (performing this rituals), I have bound myself to others, and asked my reputation, in a new way. Similarly, saying 'I know' is taking a new plunge". 31

Finally, we find that the official myth - 'the cogito' of the Cartesian Philosophy cannot be replaced by Ryle's knowledge how or disposition. R.King's observation is very apt when he says: "We cannot reduce 'my mind' to simply my ability or proneness to do certain sorts of thing. Indeed ability or proneness may be just those dispositions which allow me to do a thing unconsciously and without heed to dismiss my mind". 32 A.J.Ayer remarks that what Ryle has succeeded in doing is to reduce the empire of the mind over a considerable area. This is an important achievement and one that is brilliantly effected, but it does not fulfil Hyle's proposed intention of entirely exorcising the ghost in the machine. The movements of the ghost have been curtailed but it still walks and some of us are still haunted by it. 33

Recently Rickman arguing against Ryle maintains that it is not at all possible to exercise Descartes' ghost in the body machine and to for sake the dualism thereby. The

privileged access - the official legend cannot be explained away by Ryle's theory of knowledge which abolished all references to inner activities of mind in the case of knowing. Moreover, minds or souls cannot be compared with the ghost. Ghosts are superstitions, minds or souls are not. So while Ryle is interested to expel Descarte's ghost in the body machine Professor Rickman is rather anxious to exorcise 'Ryle's ghost in the machine'. He states: 'As I turn to my preferred alternative, dualism, it is still necessary to exorcise a particular ghost - Ryle's ghost in the machine'.

In a word we want to conclude by saying that Ryle in his attempt to do away with all links to mechanical and para-mechanical explanations of knowledge fails to give us a satisfactory account of his own dispositional analysis of the same.

Thinkers have pointed out the inadequacy of Ryle's view on intellect. His major objection is that the theorists have failed to notice the difference between the exploratory and expository stages of theorising. This failure has led them to believe in the prior secret acts of judging, inferring, deducing corresponding to the published judgements, inferences and deductions. Here we have to say that epistemologists are well aware of these two stages of theorising. In order to give explanation of a particular sort of thing these two stages are to be taken into account, though they differ in details. That is why, these two stages are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. So considered it may be said that the thought elements in both these two stages are not completely different. Moreover, why should Ryle presume that judgements, inferences, cognitions, deductions, etc. are elements of only published theories? They may as well be elements of exploratory processes. If they are not, where from do they emerge at the expository stage? It cannot, therefore, be maintained that the assumptions of judging, inferring, cognising, deducing, subsuming and the rest as private acts are due to the failure to distinguish between two stages of theorising. Again, is it at all satisfactory
to say that the said failure of the theorists leads us to the postulation of inner acts occurring in the secret chamber of the mind? Is it true that the finding of 'premisses and conclusions' in the published theory wrongly tempts us to the idea of cognising, inferring and judging at the theory building stage? Ryle's opinion that judging, inferring, deducing, etc. have no corresponding prior acts of inner mental happenings at the expository stage is not logically correct. That is to say these acts are not mere acts of published theories. They have their prior antecedents. The notion of causality cannot be ignored. Professor Austin in this connection rightly remarks: He points out that although the distinction drawn at some length between a man's performance in expounding a theory and his performance in inventing it ('pondering') is a useful one, and although it may well be true that attention of philosophers has been too exclusively directed to the former, to which their terminology is alone appropriate, how can this justify an omission to notice that 'ponderings' are in fact 'internal episodes'.

According to Ryle, intellectual epithets like 'judgements', 'reasoning', 'conception', 'idea', 'thinking', 'concept', 'inferring', 'apprehension', 'cognition', 'subsuming', 'discursive thinking', 'making judgement', 'drawing conclusion' and the rest have been misconstrued by the theorists. They are not activities or processes. It is

quite meaningless to ask such questions: How many cognitive acts John Doe perform before breakfast? Did the breakfast bell make him stop short half way between his premisses and conclusions? Does any body say that John Doe has woken up to do some judging, conceiving, subsuming or abstracting? Here it may be noted that though it is not possible to answer these questions epistemologically, yet in our common discourse they do not seem to be meaningless. The answers of all these question are epistemologically absurd, that is why, there is no cognitive unit to answer such questions. But the necessary fact that we cannot answer them or count them does not in any way prove that they are not activities or processes. What can be said about some physical event cannot be said about mental happening. C.A. Campbell remarks: "As well ask John Doe how many breaths he drew between walking and breakfast; and then because he cannot tell us, conclude that he must really have been dead. Certain others of the questions are unanswerable absolutely, because they are asked about non-existent feature of mental acts".  

A.C. Ewing has the same thing to say in reply to Ryle's questions of 'how many' with regard to volition. He observes: "The fact that we cannot answer questions such as how many acts of volition we perform in a given time is partly due to the fact that owing to their lack of practical importance ......".  

2. C.A. Campbell, 'Ryle on Intellect', Reprinted in Clarity is not Enough, p. 290.  
According to Ryle, judging, inferring, deducing, etc. do not occur at the exploratory stage of theorising. They are not processes, but achievements. But we may say why should a judgement be only the judgement which gives us the final conclusion of a theory? That 'the game keeper was the murderer' is a judgement which the detective finally arrived at. But it is not a part of the definition of a judgement to include this sort of connotation. There may be many judgements leading to final judgement. Ryle himself also admits of judgement occurring at the exploratory stage. This obviously weakens his stand that the judgements are elements of published theory. About inferences Ryle also tells the same tale. He holds that there are no intuitive apprehensions, intuition, no bursting of light, no flash, no implication seeing at all.

It is true as Ryle says that many of the arguments which we use in common discourse are hackneyed ones. Their use need not depend on any flash or bursting of light. But if there are hackneyed inferences, there are also unhackneyed ones. In unfamiliar situation we have to chew and digest before coming to conclusion, according to Ryle. As a matter of fact, Ryle's conception of 'chewing' and 'digesting' and the theorist's conception of the 'bursting of light' are not altogether opposing concepts. One may 'chew and digest' as well as intuit the implication. While speaking of the role of unhackneyed inference Aaron states that there are genuine
intuitions of implication. Nor are intuitions confined to inference. For instance, we may intuite the truth of such a principle as that what is green all over cannot be red, or again, we intuit that one conclusion is more probable than another.\textsuperscript{4} The denial of intuition is difficult indeed to defend. In case of drawing a conclusion from the premisses, we certainly intuit and take the help of implication. Intuition, implication, judging, thinking, inferring, cognising, etc. cannot be treated as mere elements of published theories. These things, on the other hand, occur at the contemplative level. They have their mental existence. They are essential cognitive factors of our knowledge.

Again, where from do our judgements and inferences derive their meanings? If there be no mind how can our utterances be meaningful? Ryle maintains that we do not need a second status world of mind to deal with the concept of meaning. Meaning, he holds, is the use of an expression or a sentence in a certain frame of mind. The phrase 'meaning of an expression' is an ambiguous phrase. It may be used in the speaker's or hearer's context. Ryle seems to generalise the meaning with regard to its context. Moreover, besides the use theory of meaning, there is also reference theory of meaning. C.A. Campbell observes that our meaning which is in otherwords is our thought is made up of two elements - the process and the content. He terms the first

as 'that' aspect and the second as 'what' aspect of thought.\textsuperscript{5} When we want a description of our thought behind an utterance we can only do so with reference to the 'what' aspect of thought. Thus Ryle's explanation of meaning is incomplete in nature.

Ryle holds that the significance of a proposition is derived from the 'frame of mind' in which it is uttered or spoken. He says: "Saying something in this specific frame of mind, whether aloud or in one's head is thinking the thought. It is not an after effect of thinking the thought'.\textsuperscript{6} If thinking is minding what one is saying, then what will be the distinction between heedful and un-heedful utterances? Ryle himself has seen this point when he says that a mindful activity is an activity 'with a special character' which special character eludes the observer, the camera, the dictaphone.\textsuperscript{7} But though he believes in the unwitnessable special character of mindful activity, he does not think that this special character is provided by an inner process of thought. He says that an activity is to be decided not with reference to a ghostly process going on inside but with reference to some open tests. But in case of knowing our own mind we do not follow the method of open test. We directly know mental states and processes. Ryle himself also maintains that in

respect of semi-dispositional or mongrel categorical nature of heed verbs minding is a state of readiness or preparedness to do a lot of things. Here a question arises: Does not mind reappear in the theory of Ryle with the changed name of preparedness or readiness or a ready frame of mind? Is this ready frame of mind observable in the behaviours of persons? But this ready frame of mind is essentially different from the behaviours concerned. Mind or behaviours or physiological changes cannot be one and the same thing. Once this is maintained, the traditional mind or the Cartesian ghost cannot be demolished. As Professor Jha remarks: 'The ghost is permitted to live, though with a ban. The ban is that it must not be called a Certeian mind. Indeed it is only to be called a frame of mind'.

Ryle maintains that the concept of thinking is polymorphous. There is no general answer to the question, 'what does thinking consist of'? It contains diverse forms of operations and accomplishments in diverse situations. But to this contention of Ryle it may be said that the different forms of accomplishments of the word 'thinking' are not necessary and sufficient. If practical operations are to be considered then the unnecessary ones are to be rejected. In case of considering words like abandon, abbreviate, adduct, abdicate, abolish, abridge, etc. We find the action content in none of these cases is necessary and sufficient. As Urmson

remarks: 'The polymorphous will be that which may take different forms, no forms being necessary to it. But it is in fact difficult to believe that it is what Ryle intends'.

Let us start it again. According to Ryle, thinking is not an activity or a process. He develops the non-activity principle of thinking. There can be no single ingredient or unitary activity in it. Verbs of 'thinking' are really adverbial; they do not denote activities, but ways or manners in which other activities are performed. Thinking is exercised in different dispositional acts. As in case of different games we find family resemblance, so like Wittgenstein Ryle also states in cases of citing varieties of thinking we find no unitary meaning, but only family resemblance. This view of Ryle no doubt deserves some credit. Yet we may say that he does not seem to give us a compatible opinion about thinking in his different articles. The occurrences and the manner of occurrences are two different things. Ryle ignores this. The occurrences of thinking seem to be the outcome of our trying, controlling and guiding, etc. But they cannot be equated. It cannot be said that thinking is a guiding activity. That is why, Ryle has to admit mental occurrences at the explanatory stage. Sibley rightly remarks: 'I assume that an advance parti pris against mental activities, were one operative, would not count as a reason'.

for the sake of argument we grant that thinking is not an activity, the question still remains: whether this is the only permissible sense of activity as maintained by Ryle? Is not the adverbial view in some loose sense forced on us? As a matter of fact, there is no reason to employ activity in this sense. Moreover, in common vocabulary we do not find this restricted use of 'thinking'. Here we have the activity principle of thinking. Sibley also states that we use activity to cover many different though partly similar concepts; we are notoriously ill-equipped with specific category words, and elsewhere Ryle himself has invented many ('achievements', 'tasks', 'mongrel-categoricals').

Finally, we may state that intellectual operations are the primary activities of mind. They are acts of cognisition or knowing that. They cannot be explained as mere cases of knowing how. In fact, in analysing his ability account of intellectual activity Ryle has committed himself to a behavioural dispositional account. This kind of account has no relation to silent, internal, intellectual activity; such as silent reading, mental arithmetic, etc. Lyons observes the same when he asks: 'How can an account in terms of behavioural dispositions make sense of intellectual activities where no behaviour is going on'?  

Ryle has used the word 'the frame of mind' instead of the word 'mind'. This may accord well with the idea of mind as the lived body. The lived body has an orientation and in that orientation judging activities may occur. Such activities constitute the exploratory stage. They may not be expressed in operations, but they prepare the mind to use them in the published stage. As the stage of being prepared is not observable to others, Ryle seems to think that such activities do not occur. This non-observability gives them the epithet 'internal'. But actually, they may be observable, if situation so demands.
Section 5: Sensation and Observation

Ryle understands that sensations as the supposed ingredients in observation are themselves unobserved. They are Cartesian ghostly objects. He contends against the theorists' notion of sensations. He maintains (a) we have no neat sensation vocabulary—there is no pure sensation language and (b) it makes no sense to speak of observing sensations. It has no cognitive relation to a private or sensible object. Ryle wants to demolish the theorists' view. But in the end we shall find that his arguments are not strong enough to weaken the same.

The concept of sensation as understood by the theorists, Ryle thinks, does not occur in the account of the novelists, biographers, etc. Why should novels set the standard for philosophical theory? To think of philosophical theories to contain these words which generally occur in novels is to keep philosophy and novels on the same path. This is erroneous for philosophy. Their aims are different and if philosophy borrows the vocabulary of novels it will perhaps cease to exist. Moreover, why should novel offer authoritative criteria for philosophical theory only? Why should not this hold for science as well? If the scientists do not
feel that they should make departure from common usage, why should a philosopher feel so? So it cannot be said that the theorists' notion is not covered by language and it has no reason to be meaningful when it is introduced in theory. Again, if we say that common people know what seeing, hearing, smelling, etc. mean, they come to know any thing about sensations does not invalidate the concept of sensation. One example can make the point clear. In our everyday life all of us have an idea of motion, the motion of a ball, the motion of a player, etc. But very few of us have any idea of Newton's laws of motion. The fact is that most of us have been speaking of motion before the laws were formulated by Newton. Thus the laws of motion are not invalidated, because we have no idea of these laws. The point which is to be noted here is that in our practical life we have a thing without knowing its details. It is only the analysis of a thing by exprets which reveals to us the details. So we can know and talk generally what seeing, hearing, smelling, etc. mean even though we have no idea about the details of such processes. This does not forfeit the details. The philosophers have tried to understand the details in these processes and it is in this way that they have discovered the idea of sensation.

Again, the contention that we speak of sensation in terms of object may mean that our language is generally object-oriented. But that does not mean that sensation is
to be explained away as mere myths or Cartesian objects. The structure of every day language has so evolved that such a concrete term and reference may occur in it. Ryle’s sensation of tactual and kinaesthetic kind is simply a specific sort of perception. It is the exercise of a more or less skilled capacity comparable to seeing or to hearing. It is obvious that perception or observation does not generally entail sensations in this sense. Some perceptions are just sensations of this kind. But it is also possible to perceive something without perceiving at all tactually or kinaesthetically. It means that our sensations are unique experiences to be conveyed by our language. When we talk of a glimpse we talk as if it is the glimpse of a robin. We have also noticed that sensations normally lead to the perception of objects. So, to say that sensations are spoken in terms of common objects may be true, but it is not true to say that sensations have no meaning apart from their objects or that they are Cartesian objects - pseudo objects.

Moreover, rejection of pain, itches etc. as sensation words on the ground that one cannot be unmindful of them, where as one can be unmindful of a sensation also does not hold good. We find that the more we become attentive to something other than pain, the more or less conscious or unmindful we become of it. In the moment of deep sleep or excitement or delight the pain which we might have seems to have disappeared. Of course if the pain is too acute it becomes
extremely difficult to pay no heed to it. But this is also true of other sensations. If the sensations are too intense it becomes very hard for us to ignore them.

Ryle thinks that sense-impression and observation are two different activities. Sense-impressions are not observed. It is not any kind of apprehension; it is not the exercise of intellect or character. Sense-impressions cannot be observed in the same way that letters cannot be spelled. But this analogy is vague and cannot be accepted. As Anthony Quinton in his article 'Ryle on Perception' rightly says that the correct spelling is using letters the right way, veridical perception is using sense impression in the right way. But it does not really go any further than that. To spell a word correctly is to write the letters that the conventional rules of spelling assign to them in the correct sequence. But to perceive an object is not to have correct sense-impressions in the correct order even for a phenomenalist. Moreover, sense-impressions are some kind of apprehension. They are exercises of inner activities. Their privacy cannot be ignored. Prof. Austin remarks: "In dealing with sensation, he rightly points out that this is constantly confused with observation, which is quite different, including as it does the watching, recognising, naming, etc. of what we sense. Yet however true this is, how could it tend to disprove that experience of sensation (glimpsing or what not) does

actually occur or that it is not a 'private' or 'occult' experience'. In fact, the causal questions about sensations are relevant questions. Seeing, hearing, smellings, etc. have their corresponding inner activities or psychic states.

Ryle maintains that sensations are not objects of observation which have size, shape, colour, etc. But these things are not applicable to sensations. To this point it may be argued that there is no logical contradiction to say that we know or observe our sensations carefully or carelessly. When we perceive an object, we do not frequently talk of observing sensation, because we do not have any need to talk so or we do not have any interest in sensations as such. Ryle's arguments suggest that a concept may be called mental if it is qualified by some mental predicates such as carefully or systematically, etc. But the case is not so. The concept of awareness is nothing but mental. We do not say that we are having awareness carefully or systematically. The concept of 'awareness' may be properly called mental even when such predicates are not applicable to it. It is not also less proper to say that the concept of sensation is mental even when such terms are not applicable to it. After all it is not necessary for a 'mental' to be recognised as a 'mental'. Sensations are thus mental. In addition to Ryle's contention that sensations are not mental, it also

goes against his version of perception or observation. If sensations are not mental, observations are not less non-mental, because the reptiles have not only sensations, but they do observe also. Again, sensation is the media of knowing physical objects. So the question of size, shape, colour, etc. are improper questions.

Ryle observes that we cannot have sensations, because of the absurdity of such expressions as 'sensation of sensation', 'the glimpse of a glimpse', 'the whiff of a pain', etc. It seems that he takes the word 'glimpse' or 'whiff' as sensation-words. But he himself points out that these words are not sensation-words, but observation-words. So if it is argued that they are as if sensation-words, Ryle's view leads to nothing but absurdity and confusion. Instead of proving that sensations cannot be observed, it proves only that his conception of sensation is ambiguous. In his chapter on 'Sensation and Observation' he categorically asserts that observation is a complex process, comprising of the noticing of sensations. He says that observing entails having sensation. But in another article on 'Sensation' he does not seem to hold so. There he observes that the concept of perception is on a more elementary or less technical level than that of sense-impressions. This clearly shows that observation is a complex process and is more than having

sensations. Obviously, therefore the whole idea seems to be confused. Ryle himself does not appear to be confident about the nature of sensation and observation.

Ryle's strongest argument against the theorists' notion of sensation is that if sensation is regarded as a kind of observation, it will give rise to an infinite regress of sensations. In observing a tree we must have sensations which are related to the tree. If the event of sensation is itself an observation, it must be of something other than the tree, since it can occur in the absence of the tree. Ryle argues that if sensations are proper objects of observation, then the observation of robin would require the sensation of robin. The observation of sensation of sensation would require the sensation of a sensation and so on. Ryle remarks: "There is nothing answering to the phrases 'a glimpse of a glimpse', or 'a whiff of a pain', or 'the sound of a tweak' or 'the tingle of a tingle' and if there was anything to correspond the series would go forever". 5 Against this argument of Ryle it may be pointed out that the method of knowing sensations and that of knowing robin are two different methods. Again, the regress can be checked if we consider the case that our observation is not concerned with the physical objects. The sensation of robin does not need a prior sensation in order to be known.

Marc-Wogau also states the same when he suggests that there is a single way of bringing this regress to a virtuous halt. The sensation involved in the observation of the tree can be treated as itself an observation of a single object without employing a further sensation distinct from itself. From our practical experience it is clear that observation entails sensations which are the proper parts of observation. Instead of apprehending 'the glimpse of a glimpse' we, in fact, apprehend the glimpse of a robin or the sensation of a tree. Thus there is no scope of regress in our perception. We do not face the theoretical difficulty of infinite regress argument in our perceptual knowledge.

Finally, we can say that Ryle's explanation of sensations fails to go against the theorists' notion. The privacy of sensation can never be ignored and the double-life is to be maintained. W. Lyons observes: "Perhaps Ryle's attack on perception and sensation would have been more successful if he had concentrated on the part played by awareness - which is usually described in terms of colour, patches, whiffs and smell - and attempted to give some sort of reductive account of these in terms of dispositions ....". In many passages Ryle seems to talk of sensations to be wholly private. The cobbler cannot witness the tweaks that I feel when the shoe pinches. He states, "It is, of course, true and important, I am the only person who can give a first hand account,

of the tweaks given me by my ill fitting shoe, and an occulist who cannot speak my language is without his best source of information about my visual sensation. Again, Ryle paints out that you cannot in logic hold my catches, win my races, eat my meals, frown my frowns, or dream my dreams, so you cannot have my twings or my after images. Now what is the reason that I am the only person who can give a first hand description of the tweaks? Or, why you cannot have my tweaks or after images? It is because my experience of tweaks or after images cannot be shared by any body else. Ryle himself confesses his helplessness when he says in his article on 'sensations' that one of the things which worries him most is the notion of sensation or sense impressions. In the same article there is a bold statement where he appears to yield in favour of the theorists' notion of sensation. He says that after all he confesses a residual embarrassment. There is something common between having an after image and seeing a misprint. Both are visual affairs. How can we describe their affinity without falling back on the same account very much like a part of the orthodox theories of sense-impressions? To this he is stumped for an answer. Not only this, he is not in a position to say anything about the logical grammar of such words as 'hurt', 'itch', 'qualm' and the rest. They are neither

8. Ibid., p. 199.
10. Ibid., pp. 442-443.
the names of moods nor the nouns of perception nor even the reports of achievements. Then what they are? Ryle answers: "I do not know what more is to be said about the logical grammar of such words, save that there is much more to be said". His confessions are frank and honest. But they do not support his programme, i.e. the rectification of the logical geography of mind and mental activities.

Ryle's arguments against the sense-datum theory is that it rests on the logical howler of assimilating the concept of sensation to that of observation. It is based on the assumption; observation entails having sensations and reinterprets it as observing entails sensing sense data. Sense data being momentary looks, whiffs, glimpses, sounds or tinges are private to observers. But as sensing is merely a pompous word for 'seeing' or 'observing', it means that observing entails observing sensation which is ridiculous. It involves an infinite regress. For the observing of sensations — sensing sense data as a species of observing must involve observing sensations and so on. The second charge is that sense datum interpretation of perceptual relativity fails, because it involves talking of an elliptical sense datum when we see or observe the elliptical look of a round dish or other object. This is non-sense for we cannot see or observe any more than we can eat nibbles or smell whiffs.

The first charge that sensing sense data is really observing sensations is absurd and is an ignoratio elinchi against the sense datum theory. The infinite regress argument may be reformulated. The theory holds that observing entails sensing sense data, but as sensing is a pompous observing, this means that observing entails observing sense data and so on. The charge can be acquitted here, because the objective of Ryle ignores the distinction drawn between mediate and immediate awareness. Sensing is not the same as perceiving or observing, as it is a direct acquaintance. It involves intellectual processes as well. Sensing is no doubt an inner activity of mind. Sense data are objects of empirical knowledge. As A. Quinten observes: "The vital point is that nothing is lost by the sense datum theorist who admits that sense data cannot, logically, be observed. All he requires is something that Ryle readily admits, that it should be possible to notice and report them. They can be objects of empirical knowledge, even, if not, strictly, of observation". Quinton raises his doubt about Ryle's use of infinite regress argument against the official theory. Perception includes sensations as its observational elements. Perception is observation plus other elements such as identification and so on. Thus there is no regress from observation to inner observation, to still more basic observation. The move is from whole to parts, to explain the whole perception in terms of its

parts which include an observational element. That is why, sense data mentioned by the theorist are to be noticed and reported. He is not committed to the view that sense impressions are strictly observable as pointed out by Quinton. W. Lyons also agrees with Quinton in this respect. He states: "All the sense datum theorist needs is to commit himself to the claim that they are knowable. The theory needs only to commit itself to the claim that one be able to report about sense data. If sense data are not objects of any acts of sensing, but merely product of it, then there is still reason to call the data sense data". 13

According to Ayer, the infinite regress argument against the sense datum theory does not hold good. If observation is equated with perception, according to the argument, the ground for saying that imagining and sensing are not sorts of observing would be either that they are not completion of activities like looking or listening, or they do not have physical entities as their objects. But even on this doubtful assumption that perceiving is always the completion of an activity (achievement), there is no good reason why this should be made a necessary condition for any conscious state to have an existent object. The point is that the object of sensing would not be physical entities plainly begs the questions. Ayer remarks: "The invocation of sense data is intended to

provide us with a way of describing the contents of the experiences, without incurring any further commitments. It is not universally agreed that it succeeds in this, but if, as I believe, it does succeed, it clearly does not entail that we have to go on reducing our commitments ad-infinitum. There is no foothold here for the regress to begin'.¹⁴ Thus Ayer maintain that we are entitled to admit sense data as entities. The decision not to admit them together with other private entities like images and feelings does not require a denial of the legitimacy of sense data.

Ryle states the second change that we cannot observe looks, glimpses, whiffs, etc. The particular objection he mentions is the use of the idiom - 'seeing a look'. How can a look be seen? But in our every day experience when a rope appears as a snake, we do not see the snake. We may only see the look or appearance of the rope. Ryle wants to say that when a round plate looks elliptical, the look is not an 'extra object'. There is nothing to correspond to the elliptical look. But the question is this that if the look is not elliptical then what exactly is elliptical? We cannot say that the plate is elliptical as we know very clearly that it is round. Perhaps due to this difficulty Ryle denies that there is anything called elliptical. In his opinion when a tilted round plate looks elliptical there

is no actual seeing of anything elliptical. It is just comparing or 'likening how the tilted round plate does look to how the untilted elliptical plates do or would look'.\textsuperscript{15} With regard to common language we do not find any body who says in such a situation that he is only comparing one plate with the other. A person who has no theory would feel no problem in saying that he is seeing the elliptical look of a tilted round plate. He would certainly feel problem to follow the recommendation of Ryle that he is only likening the tilted plate with an elliptical one. Ryle is also of the view that when a tilted round plate appears as elliptical, this is not due to the fact that there is anything elliptical which is to be seen, but this is because of the fact that we apply a perceptual recipe learnt from real elliptical objects. In this case the round plate which is not elliptical looks so. It means that the elliptical appearance is an illusion. But the point is why we always apply the recipe 'elliptical' and not the equally well-known facts 'square' or 'triangular' in case of tilted round plate? In fact, the elliptical appearance is a datum which is experienced by us.

We cannot also accept Ryle's equation - sense data are equal to sensations; sensations are equal to looks, glimpses whiffs, etc. We cannot equate the first and the third terms, for glimpses, whiffs and some kind of looks are not example of sense data. They are internal accusatives and have no

existence apart from the catching of them. They do not fit
the act or object analysis of sense data. Sense data are
not internal accusatives. They can exist without being
sensed or experienced. W. Lyons in criticising Ryle's view
of perception and sensation points out that it is the weakest
part of his attack on the official theory of sensation. The
official theory has no necessary connection to the sense
datum theory. Lyons remarks: "..... I suspect, that the
sense datum theory of sensation is much less Cartesian than
Ryle has tried to make out. There is no official line in the
sense datum theory, or need not be, about any internal faculty
engaging in internal episodes.....". 16

Ryle states a third charge in which he claims that sensing
is a pure invention and does not occur. All observing is
fallible and sensation is not mistaken, because it is not
an observation. The word 'fallible' or infallible are not
applicable to it. Words like 'see', 'know', 'hear', etc. are
achievement words. Like words 'win', 'cure', or 'discover'
they are not used to describe any processes or inner activ-
ities. They state that something has been brought off,
some tasks have been accomplished, some processes have been
carried to fulfilment. But the question we may ask: Is
there a sharp line of distinction between task words and
achievement-words in the field of common discourse? Ayer
points out that we are not bound to treat sensations or

feeling as private objects, but there is no strong reason why we should not do so if we wish. Ayer may be quoted here: 

''The truth is that verbs like 'observe' or 'witness' are commonly used both as task-words. If Ryle is to capitalize on the fact that not every thing that can be said about observing and also be said about having sensations, he will, therefore, have to mention that it is only when construed as a task that observing is cognitive. But then he will be mistaken. The parallel case of seeing is a sufficient counter example''. 17 The cognitive state rather the psychic state is to be considered in case of achievements. Professor S. Basu in his article points out that if it is conceded that perception is achievements in some sense or other we can legitimately maintain that such achievements refer to episodes and consequently involve or imply some psychic states or processes. 18

S. Hampshire is not also convinced by Ryle's argument that 'see' is an achievement verb. According to Hampshire, the ambiguity of Ryle's surprising argument is between seeing and describing what we see, we can not see either correctly or incorrectly : We can only describe what we see correctly or incorrectly. There are hundreds of distinguishable contexts in which 'see' is used. So there is no one achievement or performance which the verb 'see' denotes. This is the

reason why Hampshire remarks: 'On what grounds does Professor Ryle decide that there are no acts answering to such verbs as 'see', 'hear', 'taste', 'deduce', 'recall' in the same way in which familiar acts and operations do answer such verbs as 'kick', 'run', 'look', 'listen', 'wrangle' and 'tell'?'

Ryle contends that 'seeing', 'hearing', 'detecting', etc. which are supposed to describe mental processes are achievements. Just as running a race may result in winning, which winning is not a process but an achievement, similarly, 'watch', 'listen', 'probe', etc. result in 'seeing', 'hearing', 'detecting', etc. which are not processes but achievements. Task-words 'running', 'watching', 'listening' have their corresponding achievement words 'winning', 'seeing' and 'hearing'. They are achievements of public or quasi-public or mongrel categorical testable performance of observing. So, according to Ryle, there are certain adverbs which can be combined with the process verbs but which cannot be combined with the achievements verbs. One can be said to watch carefully or carelessly, successfully or unsuccessfully, but one cannot be said to see carefully or carelessly, successfully or unsuccessfully.

The question now is: Do we always mean success when we talk of perception? What do we achieve when we see a stick as bent in water? Do we not fail in our observation?

Hugh R. King points out that Ryle wants to call words like 'perceive', 'observe', 'see', etc. achievement-words, because they cannot be qualified by adverb like 'erroneously' and 'incorrectly'. If it is so we can say that Ryle's theory of achievements can only be right if perception means correct perceptions. But the question will arise: Are we linguistically justified in so limiting the scope of perception-words? Ryle argues again that the idiom seeing successfully 'is as absurd as the idiom winning successfully'. But here the first idiom does not seem to be parallel to the other in absurdity. 'Wining successfully' is absurd because wining means succeeding. 'Seeing successfully' is not absurd, because seeing does not necessarily involve achieving. In fact, in all cases of observations we are more or less becoming acquainted with the awareness of something given and here the sensing or the sense-impression of the theorist dominates the whole psycho-physical circumstances. The role of achievement-words in this regard has little importance.

Achievement distinction is to be understood in accordance with common sense and ordinary language. If sensing or perceiving is always achievement, if it is not logically possible to see unsuccessfully or incorrectly, then what becomes of our claim that perception can vary in quality and accuracy and that we may fail to see things properly? According to Hirst, the answer is two fold. First, our claim is in accordance with ordinary language. We do not
speak of 'not seeing properly', 'hearing indistinctly' and so on. It would appear to be linguistic accident that we do not denote the difficulty by the word incorrectly or un成功. Secondly, there is no real conflict between different forms of achievements in perception at issue. It means that perception can vary in quality and accuracy. Thus perceptual knowledge can never be fully illustrated in terms of Ryle's achievement-words. Hirst aptly states: 'Criticisms like those must be developed to show the notion is in fact an error and if my account is correct Ryle's explanation is faulty'. Quinton is of opinion that Ryle's conception of quasi-public or mongrel categorical achievements is not also tenable. He points out that Ryle's own account of perception as a mongrel categorical is less than satisfactory. The categorical part of the mongrel account is unexplained by Ryle himself.

In case of observation proper Ryle states: 'The questions, that is, are not questions of para-mechanical form 'How do we see robin'? but question of the form 'How do we use such description as he saw a robin'? This statement categorically asserts that all genuine questions about perception are descriptive question. We have therefore no right to pose explanatory question about the same. But the point is, are explanation and description mutually exclusive in a way that if we are entitled to ask for the description, we

are at once debarred from asking for explanation? As a matter of fact the same thing may have an explanation as well as description. We may describe an event and at the same time explain it. Description and explanation are both normal, useful and legitimate ways of knowing.

Ryle says about perception that it is the having of appropriate sensations in the appropriate frame of mind. Perceiving a thimble presents visual sensation of a thimble in the thimble seeing frame of mind. He suggests that mere seeing and perceiving though epistemologically identical differ with regard to the frame of mind. They differ because the sensory act is done in two different frames of mind. But how can we have the acquaintance of a thimble seeing frame of mind and how can it be developed if one can never observe a thimble without any such frame of mind? If observing a thimble presupposes a thimble seeing frame of mind, the having of a thimble seeing frame of mind also presupposes some observation of this thimble. Then how is it possible to break this vicious circle? It is therefore ridiculous and incredible to hold that observations are sensations in a certain frame of mind.

Ryle's argument is presented to make us believe that perception is recognising or identification. In his language 'Certainly a person who espies the thimble is recognising what he sees'. It is true that perception in most of the cases ends in recognition. But this does not mean that

22. Ibid., p.220.
perception is recognition. Instances are not rare when we are said to perceive without recognition. A friend may gaze a long time at a friend and still fails to recognise him. A child may stare at his mother dressed in an unusual way, but he may not succeed in identifying her as her mother. So how can observation be necessarily a case of recognition?

Again, it is found that according to Ryle, whenever there is an observation, it is always observation of something else or fact. But the question which is asked: What things or facts are there in the case of wrong observation? Common people will talk of making mistakes of observation. But Ryle seems to state that such mistaken cases of observations are not observations at all, but they are imaginations. This is a departure from common usage by one who is a protagonist of common discourse.

It is also amusing to find that Ryle criticises phenomenalism vehemently with regard to physical objects. But he defends it also fervently with regard to mind. Mind to him is nothing more than manifest behaviour. Matter however is sometimes more than its manifest appearances. But if we can speak of matter beyond its appearances can we not think of mind beyond its behaviours?

Ryle's idea about secondary qualities is not also acceptable. He does not believe that secondary qualities are subjective and so they are private experiences. He thinks them to be objective qualities which are publicly
observable properties of common objects. He points out, "Secondary quality adjectives are used only for the reporting of publicly assertable fact about a field that it is green, i.e., that it would look so and so to any one in a position to see it properly". Now this assertion of Ryle seems to be incompatible with his previous assertions about sensations. We remember his early statement where he says: "It is of course true and important that I am the only person who can give a first hand account of the tweaks given to me by my ill fitting shoe and an oculist who cannot speak my language is without his best source of information about my visual sensation". Obviously he maintains here that sensations are strictly personal and private. Ryle holds that to describe a common object as green or bitter is to say that it would look or taste so and so to any one who is in a position to see or taste it properly. But the use of the word 'properly' is not helpful to show that secondary qualities are objective, for we may see or taste properly and still may differ in our opinion about them.

Finally, it may be stated that Ryle's account of perception is not at all clear to us. Perception in the ordinary sense of the term cannot be explicable in Ryle's anti-Cartesian line. As a matter of fact, the act of sensing or perceiving cannot be reinterpreted with the help of

23. Ibid., p. 199.
achievement-words or rather with the help of dispositional analysis. Hirst rightly points out that Ryle's linguistic techniques are of little use with the perplexities about perception. Perception in the true sense of the term is a causal concept. Its relation to internal states and external world cannot to be ignored. Quinton observes that the concept is intrinsically causal. A perceptual belief proper is one caused by some stimulation of the senses by the external world and a genuine perception is a true perceptual belief. The most Ryle shows that common sense does not think perception as a process and by thus confirming it in a false assumption he blocks the way to the final solution. The underlying reason for the failure seems to be that the difficulties do not arise from the plain man's belief as assumed by or expressed in ordinary language. In so far as a philosophical problem is due to confusion within such belief or in misunderstanding it, it is better to suggest that attention to ordinary language is the royal road to a solution.

Section 6: Self-knowledge

In the case of self-knowledge Ryle's aim is to dismiss the traditional notion of consciousness and introspection as well as the identical nature of knowledge of one's self and that of others. The theorists hold that consciousness and introspection are the two dependable source of self-knowledge, i.e., knowledge of one's own mind. In course of our discussion we shall see that Ryle's explanation of self-knowledge in his own terminology has been criticised from different points of view.

Theorists believe in the internal faculty of knowledge. The faculty of reflections or introspection or consciousness, in general give us the data of our internal life. Ryle rejects the unwarranted assumption of introspection or consciousness. In his opinion the so-called internal faculties of knowledge are mere by product of the official theory. After considering the different senses in which the word 'conscious' is used Ryle wants to state that it does not mean any internal reflection. On the other hand it really means an awareness of different bodily behaviours. But the question is: Is not this awareness particularly private and personal? Can this awareness be shared by others? It is logically impossible for others to notice
directly my awareness the way they could notice my sneez­ing. This makes my awareness 'mental' and sneezing 'physical'.

Ryle substitutes awareness with disposition. He does not believe that awareness or consciousness as we believe in general really exists. But consciousness of awareness cannot be identified with behaviours or dispositions. The mistake of identifying awareness with behaviour is our failure to see that there is no correlation between the two. Our consciousness of things certainly makes us behave in different ways. There is also a very intimate bond between consciousness and behaviour. But this correlation does not mean identity. Our awareness of things is distinct from any kind of bodily behaviour. It is normal and obvious. Consciousness is the pre-condition of our being. It is the apprehension of all assertions and denial. So how can it itself be denied? To deny consciousness is to commit the philosophical error of denying what is obvious. As a matter of fact, the phenomenon of consciousness is so fundamental that it cannot be either denied or properly described. Arguments and reasoning cannot prove to be effective for its affirmation or denial. We will speak of awareness as something distinct from bodily behaviours. Price observes: "It is too fundamental if any one says he cannot understand what I am talking about, I do not know how I could help him". 1

In the opinion of Ryle the theorist's notion of consciousness is due to the protestant faith that there is an internal light of consciousness in us. Theorists believe that there is a general light of consciousness which reveals our inner mental activities. Ryle questions the validity of this consciousness and he argues that we cannot speak of knowing something depending on this internal light of consciousness. Moreover, the internal light of consciousness is understood by the epistemologists to be infallible and sufficient. As such it ought to reveal a full and unmistakable picture of mental states and processes. But Ryle says that neither we are conversant with all the qualities of our own character and intellect nor do we always make a correct estimation of the same.

About the observation of Ryle it may be said that it is not correct to say that philosophers' popular notion of the internal light of consciousness was only a result of the protestant belief. Moreover, the denial of consciousness that in the case of knowledge we do not refer to consciousness in our common discourse is not also satisfactory. In fact, consciousness is so basic and obvious that we need not refer to it. Again, his rejection of consciousness on the ground that it is not a sufficient and infallible source of knowledge does not carry much weight. It is one thing to say that it is not infallible and sufficient and another to reject it altogether. We may say at best that the epistemologists are wrong in treating it as infallible and sufficient.
The contents of consciousness may be false at times, though consciousness or awareness as such is not false.

Ryle's another major argument against the concept of consciousness is that it involves the fallacy of infinite regress. Consciousness being self-luminous it is at once fluorescing and noticing, i.e., it reveals itself as well as its object. The apprehension of consciousness is expressible in the form 'because so and so therefore such and such'. The awareness being mental it must lead to another awareness and so on.

But Ryle's way of depicting the theorists' notion of consciousness as consisting of two levels - the fluorescing and the noticing, the revealing and the revealed is mistaken. The Cartesian might claim that there is only one level. Consciousness is turned oneness. It is a phenomenal life stream. The events, the only events in this stream are conscious or phenomenal ones, such as pains, seeing, noticing, etc. They exist as conscious moments. They cannot exist subconsciously waiting to be noticed. If this is the case the regress argument against consciousness cannot apply. Ryle fails to distinguish between two senses of the term 'conscious'. The word 'conscious' is used in the sense of a general awareness or vague feeling as also in the sense of a particular or distinct awareness. We are often conscious of our headache in the first sense which is no doubt a mental thing. But in the second sense, that is, in the case of distinct awareness or particular awareness we become conscious
of a particular object and here the regress does not arise. That is why, it is easy to destroy the Cartesianism; the official notion of consciousness by charging it with the fallacy of infinite regress. W. Lyons holds the same view when he remarks: "If the Cartesian model is to be deposed, a convincing alternative account of consciousness will have to be given. I have also spent more times on this topic, because it seems to be that, while Ryle's account may not have taken us very far, it was in the right direction."  

Ryle's basic objection to the theorist's notion of consciousness is that there is no mental happening to be consciously felt or known. Consciousness and introspection are not what they are officially described. Their supposed objects are mere myths. He maintains: "The radical objection to the theory that minds must know what they are about, because mental happenings are by definition conscious or metaphorically self-luminous, is that there are no such happenings; there are no occurrences taking place in a second status world and consequently no need for special modes of acquainting ourselves with the denizens of such world."  

It is with this notion of mind and the mental that Ryle uses the word 'ghostly', for what ever is said to occur in the private theatre. But it may be asked: Is the content of consciousness as mysterious, mythical or elusive as a ghost is said to be? According to Ryle, the philosophers

have committed a category mistake by understanding mind with the idioms which are suitable only for the body. Consciousness is the fundamental thing of all beings. If it be denied what will be the line of distinction between beings and material objects. Ryle attacks the theorist, because of his category mistake, we may also charge Ryle for committing a fallacy of 'ignoratio elinchi'. He ignores consciousness, or mind. But a man cannot be just a typically behaving body. One may wonder if Ryle himself behaves that he is unconscious. As a matter of fact, a man's consciousness is so dear to him that he may feel completely shocked and disappointed to hear that he is unconscious. It is stated by D.S. Miller, 'If you learned today that your own life from tomorrow morning on would be of this sort, the life of a perfectly behaving body but a perfectly unconscious one, you would suddenly cease to be concerned about it; you would not in the least cling to life on those terms. Why? Because you cannot for a moment identify yourselves with a body without consciousness'.

Finally, it may be stated that consciousness or self-consciousness is a basic fundamental fact. It cannot be denied or explained away. In fact, self, self-awareness, self-consciousness are correlated things. They have a mutual interdependence. Self-consciousness plays an important role in the case of attaining self-knowledge. How do we know our

mental states and processes without depending on self-consciousness? Has freedom or intelligent purpose any meaning without consciousness which is denied by Ryle? Thus it is taken for granted that the role or the function of consciousness particularly in our own cases can never be questioned. Prof. R. V. Gulick observes rightly in his remark: "The analysis of the self-consciousness as a reflexive higher order mentality is not a catchet stone that will decipher all the mysterious and puzzles of mind, but I hope to have shown that it can explain for more than has been generally believed. Functional self consciousness turns out to be a wide spread feature of mind that plays a major role in learning, belief, mental representation, phenomenal experiences and the self". 5 Peter L. Moot also holds the same when he says: "I assume that if consciousness has a function then it has a cognitive function". 6

Ryle attacks the concept of introspection as he says it involves the splitting of our attention. It may give rise to finite or infinite series. It is not possible for us to attend to two things at the same time – the mental and the object of scrutiny. But these arguments are not so devastating to the Cartesian position. The Cartesian may admit the splitting to be finite beyond the limit of one's own introspective power. There are non-introspecting mental

events. If infinite, the Cartesian holds that human beings have at least one infinite capacity. Again, in introspection the act and the object may fuse to become one whole. We become conscious of the whole without being distinctly conscious of parts. The question of individual identity of mental acts and its object does not arise. Ewing points out in this connection that Ryle is confused with two senses of 'conscious'. All experiences must be conscious in the sense of felt, otherwise they would not be experiences. But this does not mean that we must discern all the elements present in them. We may point out that Ryle's stock charge of infinite regress argument against introspection is not at all operative here. Ewing thinks rightly: 'So if I introspect or am in some way conscious of myself as resolving, both introspection and resolving will be part of my total felt state, but they need not both be object of distinct consciousness. I can be conscious vaguely of a whole without being conscious of all its parts'\textsuperscript{7}.

Ryle rejects the theorist's contention that introspection is the deliberate act of internally perceiving mental episodes. His point is this that this is the reason of several disputes relating to the nature of our mental life. It may be said that introspection makes scrutiny and scrutiny involves judgements. One may be wrong in his judgement in

case of introspection. But this mistake would not lead to the future mistake of denying introspection altogether.

Ryle's general objection is that introspection falsely presupposes a privileged access to private or ghostly mental activities. His objection is puzzling as he seems to deny that even retrospection gives us privileged access. But it may be said that the concept of privileged access which is used in our common discourse is so deeply rooted that it cannot be ignored. Hirst observes that Ryle can hardly deny that intro- or retrospection is privileged in the sense that by it we can know what we are thinking or what colour we are experiencing. Where you cannot, you may infer it from our behaviours, and this would be indirect. It is the special ontological status claimed for the experiences introspected which is Ryle's real and plausible target, but to deny an interpretation is not to deny the activity itself. We may say that Ryle has not overthrown a modest belief in introspection and even the admission of retrospection is sufficient here. Once it is agreed that we can be introspectively or retrospectively aware what we see or hear, etc. there seems to be no force in Ryle's claim that they are not activities or phenomena; they are not or not wholly overt or publicly observable, since we are aware of the private experiences.

Ryle's denial of introspection gives rise to some sort of behaviourism. If thinking is just brain activity
how is it that we are aware of our thoughts, but not of our brain activity? Or, to put it another way, if thinking is just brain activity then it follows that we cannot be aware of our thoughts as thoughts and so we cannot introspect and report on them. There would have to be an 'interpreter' from brain processes to thoughts. That is to say, the act of thinking is fundamentally an inner process of mind. It cannot be replaced by any brain activity or physiological change. Such an account appears to be not a behaviouristic account of introspection, but a dismissal of it. Lyons remarks in this respect "To give an account of introspection in terms of brain processes and states is to make a convincing explanation of introspection very difficult indeed". 8

Ryle proceeds to give an account of self-knowledge without the theorist's notion of self-knowledge and introspection. He speaks of an identical nature of knowledge between one self and others. He admits: 'The sorts of things that I find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find out about other people, and the methods of finding them out are much the same. The residual difference in the supplies of the requisite data makes some differences in degree between what I know about myself and what I know about you, but these differences are not in favour of self-knowledge'. 9 But the critics speak of

the residual differences in a different way. They think the fact is in favour of self-knowledge and consequently the method of knowing also differ both in case of ourselves and in cases of other people. Can it at all be believed that the way I know my pain, I can also know the pain of other person? An observer has to imagine, guess or wonder whether I am actually in pain, but I have not to do the same in order to know if I am in pain. The cobbler can observe or infer my pain-behaviours when my shoes pinch, but I do not do the same thing to know them when the shoes pinch. 'I saw him sitting in corner thinking', but if I asked, how do you know that he was thinking? The answer 'I saw him' is not sufficient. It may normally be sufficient to a similar question about your sitting or talking. This leads us to say that I always have to infer that you are thinking and also thinking unlike sitting or talking is invisible. Thus the method of knowing other minds cannot be the same method by which we can know our mind. The residual difference between knowing our own mind and that of other mind cannot be over looked. There will actually remain a difference between self-knowledge and knowledge of other mind and so with regard to the method of knowing also, even when it will be accepted that knowing is not a mental fact. Professor Austin maintains that knowing is a performatible word. 'I know that S is P' does not mean a special state of mind. It means to give others my words, my authority for saying that 'S is P'. Just as to promise is to give others my word
that I will do X. Austin points out: "'I promise' is quite different from 'he promises', I describe his promising, but I do my own promising and he must do his own."\textsuperscript{10}

Thus if the method of knowing our own mind and that of other mind were the same, certain questions which could be asked of the one could also be asked of the other. When 'I feel depressed' no body would ask me the question 'How do you know'? or Are you sure? But if I say of the other 'He feels depressed' the same question can easily be asked. I may say that I have reason or clues to believe that he feels depressed, but I cannot say that I have reason or clues to believe that I feel depressed. This establishes that my justification in making the two statements is not one but different. That is to say, the method of knowing about one's self can never be said to be the same as the method of knowing about others. Strawson rightly states in this connection that the same concept — the concept of being depressed covers the depression which X feels but does not observe and the depression which persons other than X observe but do not feel. To deny this is to refuse to accept the structure of language in which we talk about depression.\textsuperscript{11} This is the common structure of our language.

We communicate in this way.


It is true that the analogical argument is the only source of our information about the mind of others. By observing the physiological changes — overt behaviours we can know other mind. My mind is not necessarily open to me through my behaviour, though other minds are. Other minds can be known only through behaviours, it is none of our privilege to have a direct access to the other mind. Behaviour in general is a clue to the workings of other minds. Ryle identifies the Cartesian mind with overt behaviours — with open access. But the real difficulty is identifying the mind with behaviour. We cannot know in that case that there are other minds for we can never observe the thought and feeling of others. For the sake of discussion if this difficulty is accepted as genuine, it does not follow that mind is nothing but behaviour, because to say so is to confuse the question 'How do you know that there are other minds'? With the question 'How do you know that there is a mind'? It is also confusing about the meaning of a statement and the method of its verification accordingly. Ryle's observation is, "The ascertainment of a person's mental capacity and propensities is an inductive process, an induction to law-like proposition from observed actions and reactions".  

But the major point is: What will be the case in case of knowing one's own mental states and processes? Can we apply the behaviour criterion with the same strength in

cases of other mind and also in cases of ourselves? Does not the privileged access have some merit over and above the behaviour criterion in cases of ourselves? 'I feel depressed' here a depression is known by me directly and the knowledge of depression is beyond the question. Here 'the privileged access' to my own inner activity can never be doubted or denied. Again, in identifying the meaning of a mental concept with its verification Ryle seems to take recourse to verification principle of the positivists. But the doctrine of verifiability principle is debatable. Moreover, the meaning of a mental concept and its verification are not one and the same thing.

Introducing the notion of higher order action and demolishing the 'cogito' - the privileged access to inner mental happenings Ryle abolishes the distinction between subjects and objects. He believes that self-awareness is just our higher order action. When I cheer up B's action my cheering up will be a higher order action. Again, some one else applauds my cheering up activity, his action will be also higher order action and so on. The implication of this line of thinking is that the word 'I' is not of the same category as the word 'he', 'she', 'you', 'they', etc. But the crucial question is: Can we maintain the case that first person avowals are not fundamentally different from that of other avowals? An avowal is a first person present-tense psychological statement. It is purely a mental content and describes incorrigible statement of a
self-revealing mental state. Here privileged access and immediate knowledge are often claimed. Among avowals 'I am in pain' is an important one. According to Wittgenstein, avowals are natural expressive behaviours. They do not refer to any inner mental sensations. The statement 'I am in pain' means pain behaviour, i.e., crying, groaning, moaning, etc. As crying, groaning etc. do not express statements, 'I am in pain' is by no means a statement. It is not capable of being true or false. In order to understand Wittgenstein's view we may argue whether the concept of pain is essentially connected with 'outward criteria' in order to get sense and whether the actual experiencing of pain itself has any part to play in our understanding of the concept of pain. To Wittgenstein, the actual experience of pain itself as distinct from pain-behaviour, plays no part in our understanding of the concept of pain. But we may say pain as such, i.e., the psychological state cannot be completely separated from pain-behaviours. For the sake of causality it is to be mentioned that as there is pain-behaviour, there is also the concept of pain. If pain-behaviour determines what pain is, then, in fact, even the person who has never experienced pain would be able to identify the behaviour and expression of pain in others. But this is not the case. Can a person who has never experienced pain be said to have a full understanding of the word 'pain', as a person who has experience of pain itself? Thus in case of attributing psychological states to others
we are, in fact, in a much better position to describe others in terms of these states than to describe the behaviour itself. As Kripke says: "Psychological language is not understood without primary reference to one's own inner states". 13

It seems that Wittgenstein makes a distinction between the expression of pain and pain as a psychological state, i.e., pain-behaviour and 'I am in pain'. According to Luckhardt, Wittgenstein does not deny that pain is something different from the expression of it. What he is denying is that it is logically independent. An expression of pain is an expression of something, so expression of pain is logically related to pain. We cannot understand that some one is in pain, if we deny that he is having pain-experience. Luckhardt observes quite rightly: "What he does want to deny is that they are referring to private objects that they possess, and stating that they possess them. Such objects drop out of consideration, but not such people's pains or their being in pain". 14

Ryle follows the dictates of Wittgenstein and holds that avowals are non-cognitive in character. He does not make any distinction between first person pronouncements

and third person ones. This discussion reveals that the first person avowals must refer to inner access of mental activity. This cannot be considered as the outcome of overt behaviours. In the words of Hampshire: 'On this crux of the use of mental concepts with the first person Professor Ryle again approaches, but (I think) falls short of, a solution, there is the same ambiguity of purpose. Will he say that the first person reports of mental activities are reducible to statement about perceptible behaviour? Nearly, but not quite'.

Kripke also argues: ''It seems to me that we have sensations or sensation qualia that we can perfectly well indentify but that have no 'natural' external manifestation, an observer cannot tell in any way whether an individual has them unless that individual avows them''.

The privacy of our mental states and processes is so obvious that it is impossible for Ryle to deny them. He states that it is not possible to overhear your silent colloquies with your self. Nor can I read your diary, if you write it in cipher or keep it under lock and key. The mental is private in the same way in which the entries of a diary are private. Thus he takes us to the task of reconciling privacy with openness. But the reconciliation is vacillating and is not methodical and so confused.


In short, we find that the essential thing which we have to maintain includes the cognitive character of inner mental occurrences. These mental processes cannot be translated into publicly observable behaviours. We can argue against Ryle that the term 'mental' does stand for something. It refers to inner happenings of mind. As Professor A. Hague expresses: "Hence it can hardly be denied that the avowals of pain can bear truth value. In fact, they are ordinarily conceived of as true or false. So they are not excluded from the domain of the cognizable".  

Wisdom also comments: "The peculiarity of the soul is not that it is visible to none but that is visible only to one".  

Ultimately we see, then, the residual difference as well as the difference of kind or nature of knowledge cannot be measured by the cherished scale of Ryle - the scale of overt behaviour. There is and there will remain the fundamental difference of knowledge in cases of ourselves and that of others.

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Section 7: Imagination

Ryle's attacks on the official theory of imagination is mainly directed against the copy theory version of it. His objection to imagining as seeing of mental picture rests on showing that 'seeing' in the mind's eye cannot be seeing at all. They are fundamentally different. The difference is 'natural one'; since the first is the case of a mental seeing, while the second is the case of a physical seeing. Ryle thinks that in case of the physical seeing we have to open our eyes and we have the objects present before our senses. But in case of the mental seeing we have to close our eyes. Here there is neither any object of seeing nor any object to be seen. Ryle in fact, rejects the theorist's literal use of the word 'seeing' in the mind's eye. It is true that in our ordinary discourse we use the word 'see' mostly in the context of the literal sense. But this does not establish that seeing always means literal seeing, for the same word 'see' is used also in cases of hallucinations and dreams. As a matter of fact, seeing may be used in different situation differently. But the awareness in all cases of seeing may appear to be similar. The difference between 'seeing' and seeing lies in the method, not however in the resultant experiences.
Ryle states that in the case of imagination there is neither an act of seeing or nor an object to be seen. We have no criteria to distinguish between imagining and non-imagining. In his words: "'Picturing', 'visualising', and 'seeing' is a proper and useful concept...... Roughly imagining occurs but images are not seen'. But if imagining occurs, there must be a criterion to distinguish it from the non-imagining. How can we do that? Ryle tells us that as in the case of stage murder there is no actual victim nor an actual act of murder, so in imagining or seeing in the mind's eye there is no object to be actually seen. But this analogy of Ryle is not entirely valid. It is true that looked from the point of view of murder, there is no victim; but it is also true that looked from the point of view of stage-murder, there is a victim. Similarly, it is true that looked from the point of view of seeing with senses, there is no object in imagining, it is also true that looked from the point of view of seeing in the mind's eye there is an object.

Ryle objects that if imagining be the 'seeing' or 'hearing' of copies or replica of things or sounds how can one imagine smell or taste since we do not speak of a copy or replica of smell or taste? The language of original and copy is applicable to sights and sounds but is not applicable to smells and taste. Things have their copy in snapshots. Sounds have their copy in echoes. But smell and taste

have no copy at all. We may argue that if it is a mistake to apply the language of original and copy to smell, tastes and feelings, then it is also a mistake to conceive of imagining smells, tastes and feelings as the perception of inner mental copies. But is it really a mistake? Ryle's answer seems to be that it makes no sense to apply words like 'copy', 'likeness' and 'dummy' to smell, taste and feeling G. Matthews holds, what a copy theory might mean by imagining a smell is really the having of a smell which more or less reproduces the original one. He says further: Surely Ryle is wrong. Surely there could be smell copies and taste copies, perhaps even feeling copies, in just the same way in which there are sound copies''. The theorists maintain that real objects correspond to their copies or pictures. But Ryle says that it is somewhat nonsense to explain visualising in terms of mental pictures. It is on the point of mental pictures Ryle demurs. But Matthews states that Ryle's demurring is unsatisfactory and suggests a justification on his behalf. He makes the observation: "I think we should content ourselves with saying that to imagine a sensible thing may be to do something like seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting or feeling that thing. We should not add, thinking to clarify matters, that what is like seeing, hearing and so forth is the real perception of mental copies. The addition does not clarify". 


3. Ibid., p. 167.
According to Ryle, seeing things in the mind's eye does not involve the existence of these things. It is not the actual seeing of things. The question: Where do the things and happenings exist which people imagine existing? is a spurious question. To 'see' something in the mind eye is to imagine that one sees something. This shows how 'seeing' is completely different from seeing. Mental images do not exist, we do not see them and so to Ryle, it is a spurious question to ask about their location.

J.M. Shorter raises an objection here. In his opinion Ryle seems little arbitrary in deciding what are and what are not spurious questions. 'Do mental images exist'? is a genuine question to which the answer is that they do not. On the other hand, 'where do they exist'? is spurious. In a philosophical context 'spurious' means meaningless. But in this case it makes perfect sense. Ryle is mistaken when he says that it is nonsense to talk of something existing by saying that it does not exist. Ryle really seems to have in mind that both questions make no sense. Both arise from the thinking that any question that may be asked about such things as table, cat, chair, unicorns can also be asked about mental images. But it is misleading to combine both ways of talking.

Ryle fails also to distinguish between the different senses of the word 'seeing' and imagining. Shorter states: 'Ryle fails to make any distinction between the various
senses of the word 'see' when it is used in quotation marks. It is this failure which makes his account of visualising seem plausible. Indeed he does not blur or ignore such distinction but positively denies their existence".\(^4\) When a normal person 'sees' a snake he does not believe that there is a snake. When a patient of delirium 'sees' a snake he believes fully that there is a snake. Ryle would say that both of them are only seeming to see a physical snake. But Shorter wants to point out that the concept of imagining is distinguished in the two cases, they cannot be identified.

In criticising Ryle from different aspects Shorter seems to defend the Cartesian model of imagination in terms of something very like creative assembling. He suggests that the true analogy for a Cartesian is not between 'imagining' and 'seeing' copies or between imagining and reviving traces. It is between imagining and depicting. For both imagining and depicting are creative and original performances, whereas seeing copies and reviving traces are mere passive and unoriginal. Thus it is altogether wrong to describe imagining or visualising as a sort of abstaining. Rather visualising is a substitute for doing something else. Shorter remarks: It is very natural to talk of visual images and we can make ourselves understood when we do so. I have argued that it is sometimes more

convenient to talk about images than to use more normal forms of expression. For these reasons the denial that there are images seems quite paradoxical to the educated non-philosopher.\(^5\) Peter Haynes states in his paper: "Of course seeing is not imaging and imaging is not seeing, although they both involve visual experience. What distinguishes the one from the other is the circumstances in which the visual experiences occur".\(^6\) In a word we may say rightly that images are not material objects so that they must be observed. They are rather fundamental ingredients of our memory. Memory, we may, is a dependable source of knowledge of past experiences. To deny memory, self-consciousness, introspection, etc. is to deny personal identity and this is to pave the way to materialism. Ryle's substitution of mind with disposition – overt bodily behaviours seems to be a clear indication in this regard.

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5. Ibid., p. 155.