CHAPTER - IV

THE IMAGE OF MAN IN HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY

(i) The Problem of Being

Throughout the centuries, the problem of Being has been one of the central problems of Western Philosophy; and Heidegger, in his magnum opus 'Being and Time' (Sein und Zeit), has the task of a radical renewal of the age-old problem of Being, standing face to face with Being, like the ancient Greek Philosophers. At the very beginning of his book 'Being and Time', he says that his task involves the destruction of the whole history of the Ontology of the West, i.e., of the way the West has thought about Being. He wanted to be the Aristotle of his time in dealing with the problem of Being as the most fundamental problem of philosophy.

Heidegger says that, in English language, the word 'Being' as a participle, is ambiguous, because, it has simultaneously the characteristics of a noun and a verb. As a noun, it is a name of beings and things, as for example, a table is a being, a tree is a being, and so on. In short, whatever is, is a being. Thus, 'being' as a noun, represents the most empty and abstract characteristic of anything whatsoever. But 'being', as a verb, signifies the 'to be' aspect of things. Heidegger says that the word 'being' as noun refers to the things that are, whereas as a verb, it means the 'to be' of whatever is. Thus on the one hand, there is the 'thing-which-is' and on the other, the 'to-be of what is'—the first is meant by 'being' as a noun, and the second is meant by 'being' as a verb. According to Heidegger,
the whole history of Western thought has shown an exclusive pre-occupation with the first meaning, and has left the second meaning into oblivion. He calls that part of philosophy 'Ontology' which deals with being, i.e., the to-be of whatever is. 'Being' understood solely in terms of beings or things, becomes the most general and empty of concepts. As for instance, I can say of a particular table lying before me merely that it is a being. But it gives no useful information about the table. Hence, the common people feel impatient on hearing any talk about Being. However, according to Heidegger, Being is not an empty abstraction, it is something in which all of us are immersed. In our ordinary life, we all understand the meaning of the word 'is', although we are not asked to give a conceptual explanation of it. Our ordinary human life moves within a pre-conceptual understanding of Being; and Heidegger wants to bring to light this sense of Being as the most concrete and closest of presences—not as the most remote and abstract of the concepts. Without understanding this general meaning of the word 'is' as in the sentence 'Today is Monday', nothing else can be understood. To bring into light this sense of Being has been the only aim of Heidegger's thought.

While Husserl arrived at the notion of transcendental ego by his method of epoche, and Leibnitz held that the monads are windowless, Heidegger declared that man does not look out from an external world through windows, from the isolation of his ego, he is already out-of-doors. He is a being-in-the-world, because, as existing, he is totally involved in it. According to Heidegger, 'existence' itself means standing outside one-self to be beyond oneself. One's being is spread over a field or region which is the world of his care and concern.

Heidegger calls man 'Dasein' (lit., being-there). Without making use of the word 'man' and 'consciousness' he tries to remove the gulf between subject and object or between mind and body. He says that none of us is a private self, confronting
a world of external objects, none of us is even a self, we are each simply one among many.

According to Heidegger, human existence has three general traits—mood or feeling, understanding and speech. These are regarded by him as the basic categories of existence, and technically called by him 'existentielle'. 'Mood or feeling' is the state of being attuned; and in a mood, one's whole being is attuned in a certain way, permeating one's whole existence. In every mood, one suddenly finds oneself here and now within one's situation, within one's own world. 'Dasein' means 'being-there', i.e., 'being here and now'. The fundamental mood of 'Dasein' is 'anxiety' (angst), in which the 'here and now' of our existence arises before us in all its precarious contingency. Moods are modes of Being, which are not psychological, but ontological. Understanding is a kind of openness of the world before the existent man, whose mind may be entirely devoid of ideas and of any specific intellectual understanding of the world. Thus, for Heidegger, understanding is not something abstract or theoretical; it is openness of the world before the Dasein, that makes him existent, without which it is impossible for him to exist. 'To exist' means 'to stand beyond oneself in a world that opens before oneself'. Heidegger calls this openness 'truth'. So, man 'exists' in the truth. Truth and Being are inseparable. According to Heidegger, language is not primarily a system of sounds or of marks on paper symbolising those sounds. Every attempt at formalisation by means of signs or symbols must presuppose a context of language within which understanding is already at work. People become attuned to one another in their moods, they understand one another and become silent—this silence is language, which can speak more eloquently than any words. Such silence alone makes man capable of authentic speech, without which, all his talks become reduced to mere chattering.
Besides 'being-there', Heidegger also speaks of 'Being' in the concrete sense. Thus he gives us an idea of Being, that is quite different from the traditional Western concept of Being. In his 'Being and Time', he gives us the concept of man as a creature transparent and open to Being the unutterable, in every nerve and fibre of his life. In the rest of his writings, Heidegger gives an elucidation of his concept of 'Being' and 'being-there'.

(ii) Being and Existence : Dasein-The Existent Human Being

Heidegger makes a clear distinction between 'being' and 'existence' and holds that existence belongs only to individual man. The word 'being' has a wider application than the word 'existence'. Existence is a kind of being, a self-conscious and self-determined individual human being. There are three kinds of being, viz., the being of man, the being of common objects, and the being of tools or instruments. Man alone has being proper, while the other two kinds of being are improper beings. The being of common objects, as for instance, the being of the lower animals, physical objects, and even mathematical objects, in not being proper. The being of the tools or instruments, is also improper being, it is a 'being for', as for instance, the being of the earth is for the farmer who ploughs the earth for growing corn. Of all the three kinds of being, man alone has existence which is being proper, i.e., authentic being, which consists in self-consciousness and freedom of the will or the power of self-determination. So says Heidegger, "The being that exists is man. Man alone exists. The rocks are, but they do not exist. The trees are, but they do not exist. The horses are, but they do not exist. The angels are, but they do not exist. God is, but he does not exist."(1)

To say that man alone has authentic being or existence does not mean, however, that all men have existence, it means rather that all authentic beings or existences are human beings.
Just as 'only the virtuous are happy' is logically equivalent to 'all happy persons are virtuous'; so 'only man is existent' is logically equivalent to 'all existent beings are men'. According to Heidegger, any being must be either authentic or inauthentic, because there is no third type of being besides the two types, authentic and inauthentic. The authentic being as existence is called by Heidegger 'Da-sein' (being-there). However, putting aside the sub-human inauthentic beings which are so by their very nature, Heidegger makes a distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic in respect of man as 'Da-sein'. According to him, authenticity and inauthenticity are Da-sein's two modes of existing, which refer to the relationship of a man to himself. The authentic man thinks and acts with an adequate understanding of his essential nature. On the contrary, the inauthentic man acts blindly without understanding his real nature. Both authenticity and inauthenticity are the possibilities of every Da-sein. No man is naturally authentic or inauthentic. Authenticity depends upon the proper ontological recognition of a man's existence, facticity and fallenness, while inauthenticity results from the non-recognition of these essential structures of existence. Authenticity is something that is to be attained, an ideal that is to be realized against the tendency towards fallenness that is characteristic of inauthenticity.

The following are the three essential characteristics of authentic being or existence: (1) discovery of oneself as already in the world, i.e., the recognition of one's facticity; (2) the projection of possibilities regarding one's attitudes and projects towards the world in which one has discovered oneself—existence; and (3) an underlying structure which makes speech possible, the capacity to articulate what 'turning in' and the understanding discloses to him—discourse. These three characteristics of authenticity have their counterparts in the characterization of inauthenticity. That is to say, the inauthentic
man fails to discover himself caught up in a whirlpool of daily endless and meaningless activities, in such a state, one's understanding, incapable of functioning, degenerates from questioning one's own existence and possibilities to a mere curiosity about things, never pushing a problem far enough to touch one's own existence; and in such a state, prattle takes the place of discourse. According to Heidegger, language is the key to philosophy and ontological enquiry, as well as, to authentic and inauthentic being. It is in speech that we understand best our possibilities, as for instance, poetry; although speech may consist in mere parroting or copying what has already been said by others.

It may be mentioned that in Heidegger's philosophy, there is the use of 'being' and 'Being', and it is perhaps due to his being under the influence of Aristotle's concept of Being. Aristotle holds that the individual is the primary substance and the universal is the secondary substance, and also that substance is an essential or absolute being contra the accidental being; he holds further that there is a kind of being called 'Being qua Being' or 'Being in General' or 'Universal Being'. Heidegger's use of the word 'Being' reminds us of Aristotle's 'Being qua Being', while his use of the word 'being' clearly refers to the individual human being (Da-sein).

According to Heidegger, "Da-sein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is distinguished by the fact that in its very being that Being is an issue for it......It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Da-sein's Being". (2) Da-sein has "being in such a way that one has an understanding of Being." (3) Being and human being are so essentially related that the problem of Being has to be approached through an investigation of the human being.
Heidegger rejects the concept of the empirical ego, as well as, that of the transcendental ego, as we find in Western Philosophy. The former is a kind of natural object and subject to natural law; while the latter as the subject of experience, lies behind all experiences. According to him, the real self is Dasein, which is neither a natural object nor a transcendental subject.

In his analysis of Da-sein, Heidegger introduces, on the one hand, the distinction between 'ontic' and 'ontological' and on the other, the distinction between 'existentielle' and existential'. 'Ontic' is an adjectival form of 'existence', and as such, may be interpreted as 'existent'. According to Heidegger, Da-sein is ontically distinguished from Being, because it is an issue for it. On the contrary, 'ontological' refers to the study of Being. Da-sein is essentially ontological, as it necessarily asks about Being. Everything that is, is ontic; Da-sein alone is ontological. The distinction between 'existentielle' and 'existential' represents the distinction between 'ontic' and 'ontological'. 'Existentielle' is the specific application of 'ontic' to Da-sein. That is to say, whatever is other than Da-sein has ontic structure; as for instance, a tree has an ontic structure; but De-sein has, not an ontic structure, but an existentielle structure, and it, always refers to the non-essential and the statement about it is empirical, as for instance, human beings have a tendency to worry about weight-loss. On the other hand, 'existential' is the 'ontological' scientifically applied to Da-sein; The existential structure refers to the essential, and the statement about it is a priori, as for instance, 'Da-sein is a being-in-the-world'. The ontological (a priori) features of all other entities are called, after Kant, 'categories'.

Heidegger has made an existential analysis of Da-sein for disclosing a priori structures of it. These structures are pre-ontological, but explicated ontologically. According to Heidegger, Da-sein has three existential structures, viz., Existence,
Facticity and Fallenness. He defines ‘existence’ in terms of possibility and understanding. Da-sein as existence is the projection of possibilities by the understanding. Da-sein’s facticity is its finding itself already in the world. And the fallenness of Da-sein is its falling captive to the world, being forgetful of its true existential nature, its failure to ask the question of Being in general and to ask the question of one’s own being in particular.

(iii) ‘Da-sein as Being-in-the-World’, and ‘the World as Equipment’

According to Heidegger, Da-sein and the world are not related as subject and object, they constitute a single unitary phenomenon; and it is in this sense that Da-sein is a ‘being-in-the-world’. The world is an ontological existential concept, an essential aspect of Da-sein. All particular objects within the world can be doubted, but the world cannot be doubted or bracketed (as in Husserl’s Phenomenology), because, according to Heidegger, the world is an intentional concept, not extensional. The world is composed of entities, but not constituted by them. It may be a totally different world, or even empty of objects, still it would be the same world for the Da-sein.

For Heidegger, ‘being-in-the-world’ does not mean being one among an indefinite number of entities. He uses the word ‘in’ in a very special sense while speaking of ‘being-in-the-world’. Da-sein is not in the world as a prisoner is in the stock, because, it is not just an entity among others in space. As the world, so is space one of the essential structures of Da-sein. As Kant regards space as an a priori form of intuition, so does Heidegger regards space as Da-sein’s own projection. But unlike Kant, he holds that the spatial structure in the world is not constituted by a subject, it is constituted as Da-sein. The world in logically inseparable from Da-sein. There can be no talk of
Da-sein apart from its being-in-the-world, and no talk of the world apart from Da-sein. Both Idealism and Realism are rejected by Heidegger, because the former centers exclusively upon self or consciousness, and the latter centers exclusively upon the world. Unlike either of them, he centers upon the 'being-in-the-world,' i.e., 'being-as-inseparably-related-to-the-world'. That is to say, there is no Da-sein as unrelated to the world and no world-in-itself as unrelated to Da-sein. It is in this sense that Heidegger speaks of the 'constitution' of the world by Da-sein and the 'constitution' of Da-sein by the world. Here 'constitution' does not mean, as it means ordinarily, an activity of an agent on some object. The world, according to Heidegger, is a space-oriented conceptual frame-work in which there are entities, as well as, other Da-seins. Hence, it makes no sense to ask whether there are things outside this world. The world belongs to Da-sein and there can be no intelligible distinction between Da-sein and the world.

In the same way, Da-sein is also temporality, as it is a spatiality as being-in-the-world, because, Time and Da-sein are unthinkable except as inseparably related to each other. To say that the Da-sein is essentially 'in time' does not, however, mean that Da-sein is contained in time, as in the cases of statement like 'The ink-well is in the drawer', 'The Crimean War was in the nineteenth century', etc. It means rather that Da-sein constitutes or projects temporality, 'Time' is originaly with Da-sein, it does not exist apart from human consciousness, and 'all objective time' is based upon this 'subjective condition'. Da-sein and temporality are ontologically dependent on one another.

However, Heidegger does not give equal status to Space and Time, in their relation to Da-sein. While space is, according to him, an existential structure of Da-sein, time or temporality is Da-sein. All beings-in-the-world are grounded in Da-sein as temporality.
Heidegger says that the world of Da-sein is the world as equipment. According to him, the world is an essential structure of Da-sein, but the particular entities in the world, to which Da-sein relates itself are not its essential structures. The particular entities of the world encountered by the Da-sein in concern are called by him ‘equipment’. There are two different ways of encountering entities, viz., ‘equipment’ and ‘thing’. The first is co-related with ‘knowing how’, and the second, with ‘knowing that’ and the first has primacy over the second.

According to Heidegger, equipment is different from a thing, it is not a thing at all, not even a thing with use. A thing has properties, causal relationship, a location in space; a tool has a use, it is employed in a project, and occurs in a total tool context. A thing can be isolated from other things, a hammer-thing remains a thing wherever it may be encountered by us. It can be useless, thrown out and destroyed as a tool; still it will remain a thing. The hammer-thing is context-independent. But the hammer-tool is context-dependent, it is dependent on an equipment context. Without hammering, no hammer is a tool-hammer. As Heidegger says, “taken strictly there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment, to the being of any equipment there, always belongs a totality of equipment that it is.” (4) Again, “Equipment in accordance with its equipmentality always is in terms of its belonging to other equipment.” (5) Dasein’s concern for equipment is inseparably connected with a total context of a task-to-be-done-here.

According to Heidegger, ‘equipment’ and ‘knowing how’ are primitive, while ‘things’ and ‘knowing that’ are derivative. One can derive a thing-view from an equipment-concern, but not vice versa. When tools become useful, we begin to look at them as opposed to simply putting them to use.

There are three categories of disruptions in Da-sein’s equipment-world, viz., conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy, which lead the Da-sein to look at its equipment as
things. In the first place, a tool may become unusable through damage and so it becomes 'conspicuous' because of its failure to work as a tool. Secondly, one may search for a tool and find it missing. Usually while writing, we do not think of the pen as having a particular shape and colour, but when we start searching for it, these features of the pen become all-important. This is 'obtrusiveness'. Thirdly, our equipment may not work well or be ready for us, but the items of our equipment world may actually block our progress. As for instance, I do not generally notice the books lying on my typing table until they block the movement of the carriage. This is 'obstinacy' which attracts my attention to the books on my typing table.

(iv) Da-sein as Care

Heidegger defines Da-sein further as 'Care' (Sorge). All other structures of Da-sein, according to him, are introduced as structures of care. 'Care' is a generalised structure of 'concern'. In concern, we see a tool as part of a totality of equipment. However, man's concerns are not limited to his concern to get tasks completed, to use a tool to do a job; man's ultimate concern is about himself, and this ultimate concern of man is 'care'. That is to say, 'care' is nothing but man's ultimate concern about himself. Thus Da-sein is care, and care is essentially self-concern. This does not, of course, mean that man is selfish. Man is concerned about himself in a primarily philosophical way; that is to say, he is basically concerned to find out who he is really, it is a search for self-identity. As a matter of fact, what man cares for is his self-identification. It is by virtue of this care, i.e., concern for self-identity that Da-sein relates itself to other persons, to objects and even to oneself. All human endeavours are directed ultimately towards self-recognition, towards defining one-self. In order to be able to live authentically, a man must ask question about himself, must ask, 'who am I ? And in asking such a question, a man must recognise in himself three existential structures, viz.,
Existenz, Facticity and Falleness, which have their unity in ‘care’. “These existential characteristics are not pieces belonging to something composite, one of which might sometimes be missing, but there is woven in them a primordial context which makes up that totality of the structural whole which we are seeking.” (6) It is in the unity of these characteristics of the Being of Da-sein that this Being becomes something that is graspable as such ontologically. “Da-sein is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue.”(7) According to Heidegger, “The formally existential totality of Da-sein’s ontological structural whole must therefore be grasped in the following structure: the being of Da-sein means ahead-of-itself-being-already-in-(the-world) as being alongside (entities encountered within-the-world).”(8) Here 'ahead-of-itself' refers of to Da-sein’s existence or projection of possibilities, 'already-being-in-the-world' refers to facticity of Da-sein’s already finding itself in the world, and 'being along-side entities encountered within the world' refers to man’s tendency to fallenness, his falling captive to the world.

(v) Da-sein as Temporality. Being-unto-Death

As a being-in-the-world, Da-sein is primarily historical, its horizon is temporal in so far as it projects itself towards the future. Time is the unity of Being, and the unity of Da-sein as well. Da-sein is primarily a being-in-time. As care, it is the unity of its three essential structures, viz., existenz, facticity and falleness, each of which has a temporal structure. 'Existenz' refers to future possibilities; 'facticity', to the past; and 'falleness', to the present.

Da-sein’s temporality is primitive and personal time has to be understood in terms of projects undertaken by ourselves. But we fail to realize it so long as we think of time in terms of world-time. World-time or public time is a human fabrication on the basis of the primitive personal time by the imposition
of a public measuring system. Suppose, I am sitting in my room with eyes closed and thinking about some problem. The clock shows that twenty minutes have passed, but it seems to me that an hour has passed. Those who consider world-time to be primary, say that we first form concept of time and then come to have the concept of 'seeming to have passed an hour', because we are unable to calculate time properly. But Heidegger says that the opposite is rather true. It is our concern with the future, our anxiety for lack of time, that is the basis of our 'seeming to have passed an hour'. We get the notion of a personal time on the basis of our experience of waiting, expecting, not having enough time and the like. According to the public view, time is infinite; but according to Heidegger, time is finite.

According to Heidegger, death is the end of Da-sein's projection of possibilities. He gives an analysis of the possibility of Da-sein as 'being-a-whole' and understanding of the structure of Da-sein as 'being-towards-death'. The potentiality of Da-sein is to attain wholeness, but so long as it is an entity, it can never reach its wholeness. If it attains wholeness, the attainment becomes the utter loss of its being-in-the-world, and in such a situation, it can never be experienced as an entity.

At first, Heidegger makes an analysis of the death of others and points out that the experience of it is inadequate to produce a grasp of Da-sein's coming to an end. None can take away the death of others from them, because it is something that every Da-sein has to take upon itself, death is essentially one's own.

Heidegger formulates three theses about death: "1. there belongs to Dasein, as long as it is, a "not yet" which it will be—that which is constantly still outstanding; 2. the coming-to-its-end of what-is-not-yet-at-an-end (in which what is still outstanding is liquidated as regards its Being) has the character of no-longer-Dasein; 3. coming-to-an-end implies a mode of
Being in which the particular Dasein simply cannot be represented by someone else."(9).

In Da-sein, there is always a lack of totality or completeness which ends with death. The completeness of Da-sein requires the filling up of its 'not yet', but as soon as its 'not yet' is filled up, it no longer exists. It always exists in such a way that its 'not yet' belongs to it, it is not yet actual at all. It must become what it is not yet, but its becoming what it is not yet is not just like the ripening of a fruit. An unripe fruit gets ripened, such a ripening is a characteristic of its specific being as a fruit. But ripeness as an end and death do not have the same ontological character. Ripeness is a fulfilment of the being of fruits; but death is not a fulfilment of Desein in the same sense. A fruit is just its possibility in its ripeness; but it is not so with the death of a Da-sein. A Da-sein has surely fulfilled its course with its death, but it might not have exhausted its possibility, because, even an unfulfilled Da-sein comes to an end; only in rare cases, a Da-sein comes to ripeness with death. Da-sein is already its 'not yet' and it is constantly so as long as it is. Da-sein’s death does not signify its being-as-an-end, rather it is being-towards-the-end. Death is a way of being which Da-sein, takes over as soon as it is. Thus death belongs to Da-sein, as long as it is, as a 'not yet' as constantly outstanding.

Da-sein’s coming-to-its-end is the character of no longer-Da-sein. Although a Da-sein might not have come to its end, it may come to its end at any time; and as such, it may be no longer. While 'not yet' characterizes Da-sein so long as it is living, 'no longer' also characterises it as the final limit to all its possibilities. Death is Da-sein’s extreme possibility, the end of all its possibilities. It is the one possibility of all men, of which they have no choice. It makes Da-sein’s temporality finite, because, its possibilities are limited by its death. For this reason, Dasein is being-unto-death and everything understood
so far must now be understood in terms of Da-sein's imminent death.

Death as coming to an end implies a mode of being of Da-sein which cannot be represented by some one else. My death is my own death, and it cannot be represented by the death of any one else; none can share my death, because it is exclusively my own. I must die my own death, nobody else can die for me.

Thus, according to Heidegger, death has the character of 'not yet', 'no longer' and uniqueness in relation to a particular Dasein.

According to Heidegger, it is death or the threat for death that makes authenticity possible—which consist in facing and enduring death as one's own possibility. It is death which forces us to see our true selves. With the knowledge of death, life becomes more urgent and time becomes meaningful. The foreknowledge of imminent death forces man to take hold of his destiny to become authentic, to live truly or authentically. However, Heidegger's view of death should not be misunderstood as a gloomy view of human existence, because, he considers death to be a bright prospect of life. In a sense, it signals the end of our existence, but it also lets us free from the tyranny of the public. The prospect of this freedom is not at all a gloomy prospect, as it often becomes for Sartre and Camus, but is much more like Nietzsche's celebration of the 'awful truth' that "God is dead". As Heidegger says, 'Along with sober anguish, which brings (Da-sien) up before the reality of his central existential possibility, goes a supporting joy over this very possibility. In (grasping this possibility) Dasein becomes free from the "accidents" of subsistence problems which arise out of the going-on in the world of a life of busy curiosity.' (10)
(vi) Being and Nothing

In his book 'What is Metaphysics? Heidegger says that the problem of Being and that of Nothingness are inseparably related; and that as a matter of fact, we come to the problem of being as a result of our facing the problem of Nothingness. In that very book, he explicitly says that the concept of Nothingness or Nothing is very significant for the interpretation of all things in both Greek and Christian Metaphysics, where the concept of Nothingness is intimately related to what essentially is. But as the problem of being is not philosophically analysed there, it remains unexplained, whereupon the Nothing seems to be only a vague counter-conception to the things that are. However, the nothing is intimately connected with the Being that is fundamental or essential to the things. As Hegel says, 'Pure Being and Pure Nothing are the same', Heidegger considers it to be his task and responsibility to awaken his contemporaries to reflection upon the problem of being anew, bringing before their minds its very opposite, the concept of Nothingness.

According to Heidegger, the Nothing is not derived from logical negation; rather the logical negation and the various kinds of 'not' are the outcome and relatively remote derivatives of the 'Nothing', that is given in an actual fundamental experience, though it may be rare. Nothingness is actually experienced by man in the rare state of 'dread'. Heidegger opens up the approach to the problem: what is the significance of the experience humanly and metaphysically, and how can it be shown that the experience of Nothingness in the state of dread comes before any kind of logical form of negation and any linguistic form of 'not'? He says that the totality of all that is can never be comprehended in its absoluteness, on principle. But in contrast to this incomprehensibility of it, there is the fact that human beings are placed amidst a multitude of beings within the 'whole'. This fundamental position of man constantly
repeats itself all through his life, and it opens up the domain of Metaphysics. Thus, human beings are potentially face to face with Metaphysics, although only a few of them may be aware of this fact. Here the expression 'within the whole' is very important, because, Heidegger centers upon it, all his subsequent arguments and analyses. It is, for him, an expression of demonstrable experience. He himself refers to a 'unitariness' of the whole experience in everyday life. Every bit of experience has this width of horizon within which the special things and persons are met and activities are performed, to which, from an early time, the name 'world' or 'universe' has been given, and which produces a familiar atmosphere of unitariness, although it usually escapes our notice. The 'mood' that is aroused in the individual, is the result of his being placed concretely in the midst of the variety of things within the whole. The 'whole' usually remains at the background of the horizon of our experience, and what is within the whole actually manifests itself in personal experience. In boredom there is one mood, while in joy there is another. But the question is: Is there any one specific 'mood' which brings the individual face to face with Nothingness, revealing thereby its nature to him? In reply to this question, Heidegger says that 'dread' is one such specific 'mood', though it may be rarely experienced. He gives a descriptive characterization of it as disclosing Nothingness.

Heidegger, however, concentrates not upon dread as revealing Nothingness, but upon the phenomenon of Nothingness itself. Whatever may be the nature and function of Nothingness, the phenomenon of Nothingness is discussed by him as something like a thing, something quasi-objective, although he says that it is not anything that is and it is not an object. He, as a matter of fact, puts emphasis on that which is comparable to being or object.

According to Heidegger, 'dread' is not an apprehending
Nothingness. He treats Nothingness as a metaphysical phenomenon, as a strange and bewildering entity. Nothingness is encountered, in the state of dread, not as something isolated apart from the things in the world; but along with them. In the state of dread things seem to glide away, sink away, and the control over them becomes slackened and weakened. There is also a withdrawal, a retreat from the things, but the eyes and thoughts still rest on them spell-bound. This is the indication of an attitude enforced by the Nothing. It is, as if, the Nothing in repealing the individual, points to them and induces him to get hold of them, but which is impossible in the state of dread.

Against the background of Nothingness, of horror and awe, a man is endowed with the power and made ready to grasp reality itself. Being under the impact of Nothingness which manifests itself, being inseparably bound up with the thing in the world surrounding him, man transcends all the things.

Thus Nothingness, in its metaphysical sense, is not merely a counter-conception to anything that is, but is fundamentally one with 'Being', the ground and essence of what-is.

According to Hiedegger, Da-sein can relate itself to what-is only by projecting itself into Nothing. It is of the very essence of Da-sein to go beyond 'what-is' and to ask the question of 'Nothing'—it is for this very reason that Metaphysics is said to belong to the nature of Da-sein. Metaphysics is not brought to man from outside, because the question regarding the nature of 'Nothing', as developed by him, is really asked by his own self. In so far as we exist, we are already in the realm of Metaphysics. Thus Nothing is a presence within Da-sein's own being. In anxiety, Da-sein is and is not at one and the same time—this is his 'dread'. The notions of contingency and possibilities involve the concept of 'Nothing', Heidegger says that Nothing is a sort of being. The concept of Nothing cannot
be explained by an appeal to linguistic process of Negation. The experience of Nothing is primitive, it is not the experience of the theoretical conception of logic, but that of everyday activities refusing and detesting, and the everyday mood of finding everything repulsive, hateful and detestable. There is a single mood which reveals Nothing most dramatically, in which we are brought face to face with Nothing itself—this is the familiar mood of anxiety and dread, which can be called a direct confrontation with Nothing. Nothing is revealed in dread, but not as something that 'is', not as an object, not as something detached and apart from what-is-in-totality. In dread, Nothing functions as if at one with what is in totality. Nothing is not the result of the annihilation of things, it is rather an essential part of our experience of things. The experience of Nothing is like 'Nothing nothings'.

Man, in seeing himself in the context of the world, and different from other things in it, comes to realize that he is always moving towards some unrealized possibility. By simply staying alive, he is recognizing a future consisting of things which are not yet real. The very notion of change involves negation. What is going to happen is what has not happened yet. This, according to Heidegger, is the epistemological sense of 'Nothing'.

Heidegger insists that man's recognition of the truth that he is mortal, that sooner or later, he will not exist is the first step towards the authentic way of life. In accepting it, man recognizes that, he is all alone distinct from every other person, an object in th world, no longer able to turn for support to people in general. He must die his own death, by himself. So non-existence or 'Nothingness' is the final end towards which he is moving.

Again, Heidegger gives us another related sense of Nothing—the emotional sense. As he says that, man arises out
of a chance hurling him into the world, and ending with death; but besides his own Nothingness, in this sense, he who experiences anxiety will be confronted by a kind of receding of ordinary objects in the world, so that they too will seem to exist no more. One has to experience oneself as something suspended over a void. Things in the world must lose their solidity, and one must feel deep alarm at the vacancy surrounding one. This is the second and more dramatic sense of the word 'Nothing', as Heidegger uses it. In this sense, Nothing, according to Heidegger, is explicitly connected with the finitude of human beings, their essential movements towards their own end in death. 'Nothing' in this second sense is supposed to be essential for one who, as a human being, is to exercise his right to investigate Being-in-general. He must, both epistemologically and emotionally, recognize that he exists in a medium consisting of Nothing.

(vii) **Man and the Holy**

Towards the end of his philosophical career, Heidegger became more concerned with creative thinking. There was a shift from the study of the being of particular entities to an attempt to have grasp of Being itself. Traditional language, according to him, can give answer only to the first problem of Being. So he turns gradually from philosophy to poetry. As he says, "Only poetry stands in the same order of philosophy and its thinking, though poetry and thought are not the same thing."(11) For him, to think is to poetise, and the thinking of Being is the fundamental manner of poetising. His search for an unmetaphysical and non-conceptual language leads him to the philosophy of the pre-Socratics and to the poetry of Holderlin. However, his search for an unprejudiced language to express Being itself ultimately carries him away from even these quasi-philosophical enterprises to a kind of mysticism, in which he no longer ontologizes or attempts to disclose truth, but simply waits patiently and passively for the word of Being
itself, not for the word of God. At this stage, he gives up the idea that **Da-sein** himself discloses the truth of Being to himself; and says that it is necessary to escape humanisation for understanding Being itself. Disclosure of Being is not carried out by **Da-sein**, but it is granted to **Da-sein** by Being itself; it is no longer based on **Da-sein**, but on an original mystery. Being is no longer for **Da-sein**, but **Da-sein** is for Being. Says Heidegger, "Man is only the personal, the mask of Being." (12) Being is no longer said to be disclosed by man for himself, but Being is said to disclose itself to man. In the later writings of Heidegger, it becomes clear that Being has taken the place of the transcendent God of traditional Christianity and man has become a medium for the self-revelation of Being. Thus Being becomes grossly personified, and man's attitude towards Being becomes more like worshipping rather than asking a philosophical question. Man is related to Being, like a shepherd, and attempts to preserve the dignity of Being through the spirit of sacrifice. Says Heidegger, "The need is : to preserve the truth of Being no matter what may happen to man and everything that is." (13) Again, he says, "In sacrifice there is expressed that hidden thanking which alone does homage to the grace wherewith Being has endowed the nature of man, in order that he may take over, in his relationships to Beings, the guardianship of Being". (14) So long man was concerned with the ability of language to express Being, now, obedient to the voice of Being, thought seeks the Word through which the truth of Being may be expressed. According to Heidegger, "Out of long guarded speechlessness and the careful clarification of the field thus cleared, comes the utterance of the thinker.... The thinker utters Being. The poet names what is holy." (15) Heidegger said earlier that 'language is the house of Being', but now he says that the word gives language, uses man, and we get the message for Being. Being discloses itself to itself and its disclosure to man is a 'gift' for which we are to wait patiently and be thankful. Thus philosophy conceived in
broadest outlines is no longer relevant to this new theology of Heidegger. Here Being becomes not a philosophical problem, but a mystery. Says Heidegger, 'Only out of the truth of Being can we think the essence of the holy; only out of the holy can we think the essence of divinity. And only in the light of the essence of divinity can we think or say what the word "God" is to denote...what is perhaps most remarkable about our era is that the dimension of the holy (da Heilen) is closed. This alone is perhaps what is unholy (unheil)'. (16) According to Heidegger, we are "too late for the God and too early for Being".

Thus although the earlier Heidegger was an atheist, the later Heidegger was not, because of his concept of the Holy. His position has been explained by himself as that "he does not deny the existence of God, but affirms his absence." (17) He says that original knowledge has been so overlaid, trivialized and stultified by the deadening hand of tradition and dogmatism that God is now absent.(18) So it has happened in philosophy with the quest for Being. As Heidegger says, "The dominance of tradition makes what it 'hands down' inaccessible and more than ever concealed. What is handed down is taken as self-evident and the way to the original sources is lost."(19) However, having affirmed the absence of God, Heidegger proceeds to look for Him afresh. But the question of God, according to him, cannot even he raised until the "dimension of the Holy, which as dimension remains closed to us, is reopened and the illumination of Being is rediscovered. "(20)

(viii) Man and Man: Inter-Personal Relationship

According to Heidegger, 'being-with' (Mit-sein) is an existential characteristic of Da-sein, which consists in the tendency to neglect its own existence; it is a primitive attitude towards the world, in which man defines himself as part of the public. In this condition, every man is a manifestation of average men. Man is disclosed first as das Mann, who is not
yet a real man, but not also an inauthentic being. According to Heidegger, man cannot formulate an image of himself except in the context of mutual recognition in a community. In order to understand the 'who' of Da-sein, it is necessary to enquire into primitive relations between man and man and one's recognition of others. Man, primarily as a social being, a being-with others, has the problem, not of his loneliness, but of the different forms of restrictive ties which he forms with others, and which are not authentic forms of being. According to Heidegger, the everyday Da-sein has to be awakened to the test of existential questioning and breaking him loose from the social frame-work, so that he can realize his authentic self, his 'ownmost possibilities'. A man has first to know the being of others in order to know his own being; it is wrong to suppose that I first know my own existence, and then know the existence of others by inference. It is not that the Da-sein happens to inhabit in a world with other people. As Heidegger says, "Being-with is an existential characteristic of Da-sein even when factically no other is present at hand or perceived. Even Da-sein's Being-alone is Being with the world. The other can be missing only in and for a Being-with." (21) Commenting on this, R. C. Solomon writes, "Our conception of ourselves is dependent on the conception of ourselves as Being-in-the-world-with-others, and thus the traditional arguments from my knowledge of myself to my knowledge of the existence of others is both invalid and based on the false supposition that we can know ourselves before we can know others.

Heidegger holds that man's first encounter with another is very much like his primitive encounter with the world as equipment. A man wants to employ others to serve his own purposes. But it is not possible to manipulate another person as a tool. The initial relation of one person to another is through soliciting, which may consist of requesting, demanding, and similar processes, or may take a negative form, an
indifference to others, or which may also be positive manipulation of the other person, as in cases of punishment or command. One can make other people dependent on oneself through soliciting or may make slaves of others; and one can have also dignified authentic relations with others.

However, it has to be remembered that Heidegger characterizes Da-sein as a being-with-others in the sense of a being inseparable from others, in his self-forgetfulness in everyday life. Da-sein has his identity in social roles which are defined by the public, not by the individual. As existent, he has his own possibilities, but in the character of being-with, he gives up his right to project these possibilities, which are disposed of by the public instead of by himself. As being-with, Da-sein is not personal self, but the self of the anonymous public. As such, the 'who' of Da-sein is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. It is the neuter das Mann. The das Mann simply follows the rules of everyday life and does not have to make a decision of his own, and as such, the life of das Mann is easy-going and stable. Da-sein feels tempted to remain as das Mann, and this temptation is his fallenness, it is the basis of his inauthentic self. In order to exist properly, to become his authentic self, he must raise himself from his state of fallenness by self-awareness, the realization of his true self.

(ix) Man and the World

As to the relation between Man and the World, Heidegger's view is that man is a being-in-the-world, in the sense that a part from man, there is no world, and apart from the world, there in no man. Quite obviously, here 'man' is taken in the sense of 'Da-sein', i.e., man as authentic being.

According to Heidegger, the complete existentialist conception of the world has two aspects: (i) the world is an
instrumental system which has to be understood in relation to man's practical concern; and (ii) the world is a threat to man's authentic existence, in so far as he can lose himself in it, and conceal from himself the difference between his own being and the being of what is within the world. Man is open to himself in his being. The self and the world are given together. As Heidegger says, "Truth in the most original sense is the disclosure of Da-sein, to which belongs the discovery of nature." (23) Da-sein and the world are not related as subject and object, they constitute a single unitary phenomenon, not a mere totality. Being present as such turns towards man's essence in which, through man's mindfulness of it, the turning-towards is consummated. Man, in his very essence, is the remembrance of Being in the sense of 'Being' crossed out and intrinsically part of Being is grounded in the turning-towards which as such uses the being of man so that the latter may expend himself for that.

What Heidegger means by the 'World', is the occurrence of owning (Ereignis), the play of earth and heaven, God and mortals. According to Heidegger, "it points rather into the four regions of the Square (Geviert) and their gathering at the place of intersection." (24) The Earth is that which serves and supports, out of which everything emerges. Heaven is the pure principle of light, in which everything that emerges shines forth as what it is. The Gods or the Immortals are "the beackoning messengers of Divinity; they bring with them the area of holiness in which God may appear even though as His own absence. The Mortals are men; they are called so, because they alone are capable of dying, of taking death upon themselves as death. Each of these four is involved in the other and together they constitute an indissoluble unity. Each of them reflects in its way the nature of the other and each is, in its way, mirrored back into its very own within the unity of the four. The relation which holds them together is called 'infinite',

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because standing within it, each of the four is freed of its one-sidedness and finitude.

'World' thus conceived, has no longer a metaphysical sense; it means neither the secularized conception of universum of Nature and History nor the theological conception of creation (mundus), nor does it mean simply the totality of all that is (kosmos). G. L. Mehta writes, "The mirror-game of the world, the play of the Four-fold in its unity, is the round dance of the occurrence of owning (Ereignen). The being-in-the-world which was described in Being and Time as constitutive of Dasein is now characterized simply as 'dwelling', which is the way mortals have their sojourn on earth. Man is man in so far as he has his home on the earth, under the heavens, in front of the gods, with his fellowmen. Mortals are in the Four-fold in the sense that they truly dwell in the world, that they take care of, cherish and tend the Four-fold by saving the earth and leaving it free in its essence as earth, by receiving the heaven as heaven, by awaiting the arrival of the gods, by shepherding themselves, in their own essence, towards death. But for mortals, the sole way of dwelling in this four-fold manner in the Geviert is through their sojourn with things (Dinge). Only in such sojourn with things is it possible for men to enter into relation with Being and the world." (25)

(x) Man and Morality

Heidegger does not give us any systematic theory of morality; but his distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity has some bearing upon what should be his ethical standpoint. According to him, the call of conscience leads us to question our own position in the ordinary pattern of social life. If we are to be what we are capable of being, we must not accept the given social situation nor the ordinary ways of life involved in it, as the only or the inevitable way. We must think of ourselves in a new relation to our background. This amounts
to treating ourselves as isolated, unique and free. But it does not seem to entail, for Heidegger, any particular aims or goals, nor does it determine anything which may normally be called 'morality'. However, the authentic life is the life in which we are ready to take full responsibility for whatever we do individually, each for himself. Says Mary Warnock, "What this amounts to more than anything, it seems to me, is moral tone of voice of a recognisable kind. Existentialism largely consists in this tone.....If we undergo the process of being freed from illusion, of being weaned from the ordinarily accepted categories and ways of judging things, then we see everything, and particularly our own life and actions, as meaning something, falling into place in a significant whole. It is for this reason that Existentialist writers characteristically have no separate ethical systems, but regard ethics as a part of a whole metaphysical or ontological scheme. For the deeper significance of our actions can emerge only if there is a wider whole for them to fit into." (26) So, Heidegger's ethics may be called metaphysical ethics. According to him, we start with the common and the public, and have to work our way towards the private and the subjective. Thus alone we can become what we are capable of becoming, free responsible human beings.

Thus, according to Heidegger, 'morality' consists in living authentically; and 'immorality', in living inauthentically, under the influence of the call of conscience, and that of inconscience respectively. An ideal moral being is essentially an authentic being launching towards death, in which there is fulfilment of life and its possibilities. However, Heidegger does not take 'death' in its literal sense—authenticity does not demand suicide. Launching oneself towards death, means, for him, living in the knowledge that one will die, and as such, all of us, so long as we live, we should live authentically. This is the sum and substance of Heidegger's view of morality. Man can realize his relation to the world truly only by living an authentic or a moral life.
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